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clusions of a sympathetic and experienced observer on a problem of the most urgent importance, and this, together with its compact form and cheap price, should ensure that it is widely read.

J. B. PAYNE.

London, England.

MÉCANISME ET LIMITES DE L'ASSOCIATION HUMAINE. By J. Novicow. Paris: Giard & Brière, 1912. Pp. 113.

This little book, which forms a number of the *Bibliothèque Sociologique Internationale*, sets forth in an interesting way the social philosophy of its author, the late M. Novicow, long and favorably known as a leading Russian publicist. M. Novicow aspires to make sociology very simple. He finds that the fundamental fact of human association is what he calls "exchange," but what has often been called by other sociological writers "reciprocity of services." He finds that such reciprocity of services underlies all the phenomena of group life. Quite rightly he also finds that the same factor is fundamental in life itself. "Exchange," therefore, in the sense of M. Novicow, produces, not only association, but life itself. Over against this phenomenon of "exchange" or mutuality of services is the phenomenon of "spoliation," that is, the taking or receiving of something without rendering an equivalent. Just as exchange produces life and society, so spoliation produces social disintegration and death. The fundamental fallacy in sociology and in ethics is that spoliation can produce anything other than death. Upon this basis M. Novicow goes on to build up a very wholesome, even though somewhat narrow, social philosophy.

In criticism it may be said that the idea which M. Novicow exploits is not at all new in sociological literature. Reciprocity of services has been recognized by many sociologists to be fundamental in the social life. It is difficult to see what advantage our author has gained by taking such a word as "exchange," which has acquired a technical economic meaning, and extending it to include all of the constructive phenomena of life and society. The conception itself, moreover, is so broad that its scientific utility is doubtful. It would seem that the conception of mental interaction or of psychical interdepend-

ence is much more satisfactory from a scientific point of view in approaching the problems of our social life.

Finally, it is regrettable that M. Novicow has seen fit to mix up with his "exchange" philosophy of society a hedonistic psychology and ethics. He says (p. 11): "All exchanges go back in the last analysis to exchange of pleasures (*jouissances*). Now, pleasure is the condition even of life. Life is, therefore, pleasure and pleasure comes from exchange, and, therefore, life comes from exchange." This shows very well the radical defect in M. Novicow's social philosophy. It is altogether too simple. Had he made human nature more complex than is indicated by such a simple hedonistic psychology, he would also have seen that human social life is much more complex and cannot be wholly explained in terms of the mutuality of services, especially not if by services we mean subjective appreciations of utility.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD.

University of Missouri.

VOM GEISTIGEN LEBEN UND SCHAFFEN. Von Carl Becker. Berlin: Hugo Steinitz, 1912. Pp. 164.

The purpose of this little book is to describe all the factors, in all their forms, which make the life of the modern person what it is. The author first gives a psychological analysis of the individual consciousness, laying great stress upon unconscious elements and the involuntary character of much of our experience. He has contrived to give a short sketch of his views without being too abstract, but we cannot take it as scientific psychology; it is rather a groundwork for the more suggestive part of the book. Accordingly, he turns to the development of the moral concepts, resulting from the working of the spiritual factors already discussed in a society. He defends our 'freedom,' which resides in the judgment of the understanding. Finally, he discusses our modern points of view, such as the common *Weltanschauung* of science, and analyzes the beautiful and sublime.

There are many references to the histories of various nations, to the most prominent intellectual developments, and to art and genius: combined with the easy character of the essay, this should make it interesting and suggestive to the ordinary reader.