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Three Sūtras from the Saṃyuktāgama Concerning Emptiness*  

Étienne Lamotte  

Three sūtras in the Saṃyuktāgama (Taishō Issaikyō (T) 99) which deal, under various titles, with emptiness especially attracted the attention of the author of the Mahāprajñā-pāramitopadeśa (abbrev. Upadeśa, T 1509), an authoritative interpreter of the Madhyamaka or Philosophy of the Middle. These are the Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra 'Sūtra on Emptiness in the True Sense of the Word', the Mahāśūnyatāsūtra 'Sūtra on Great Emptiness' and the Samṛddhisūtra 'Sūtra of Samṛddhi', named after one of the Buddha’s disciples. Here are some quotations, accompanied by the explanations devoted to them by the Upadeśa.

I  

Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra  
(T 99, ch.13, p.92c 12-26)

In the Chinese translation of the Saṃyuktāgama made between 436 and 443 by Guṇabhadra, this Sūtra is entitled Ti yi yi k'ung ching 第一義空經, which presupposes the Sanskrit Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra. The early authors referred to it frequently

while leaving aside the final section of the work.

As far as I know, this Sūtra has no parallel in the Pāli Saṃyutta Nikāya; conversely, it is reproduced, with some variants, at the beginning of a sūtra which appears in the Chinese version of the Ekottarāgama (T 125, ch.30, pp.713c-12-714a 3), and the Abhidharma masters quoted several extracts from it in their original Indian text.

1. Evam mayā śrutam / ekasmin samaye bhagavān kurusiv-haratī kalmāśadامy niyame /

2. tatra bhagavān bhikṣun āmantrayati /

3. dharmam vo deśayise adau kalyānam madhye kalyānam paryavasāne kalyānam svartham suvyāṇjanaṃ kevalam pariṇānaṃ parisuddham paryavadātam brahma-caryam prakāśayise 4 / yad uta paramār-

1 Thus have I heard. At one time the Blessed One was residing with the Kurus, in the village of Kalmāśadāmya.

2. Then the Blessed One addressed the monks.

3. I will teach you the Dharma which is good at the beginning, good in the middle, good at the end, of which the meaning is good, of which the letter is good, unique of its kind, quite

4. paramārthaśūnyatāsūtram kaṇam l caksur bhiksava upadyamanāna na kutaś cāgacchati / nirudhyamānaṃ ca na kva cā samnīcayam gacchati /

5. iti hi caksur abhūtvā bhavati bhūtvā ca pratigacchati /

1 Their quotations are introduced by this formula: Paramārthasūnyatāyām uktaṃ bhagavata, or merely Paramārthasūnyatāyām.

2 Several of these have been noted by L. de La Vallée Poussin in his translation of the Abhidharma-kosa (Koja) (Paris, 1923-31, repr. Brussels 1971), III p.57; V, p.59, IX, p.260.


7. Reading attested in the Kośabhāṣya, p.299, 11.13-14, and, with the variant pratigacchati, in the Pañjikā, p.582, 112-3. My translation is based on that of Gunabhadra in his Chinese version (T 99, p.92c 17-18). It should not be taken as final, but we can understand: Hence the eye exists after having been non-existent and, after having existed, it disappears, and make use of this interpretation to affirm the existence of the past (cf. Koja, V, p.59).
6. asti karmāsti vipākaḥ kāra-kas tu nopalabhya ya imāṃ ca skandhān niksipaty anyāṃ ca skandhān pratisamadāhāry anyatra dharmasamkṣeṭāḥ

having arisen, it perishes.

6. There is action, there is fruition, but no agent exists which rejects these aggregates and assumes other aggregates, unless a metaphor

8. anyatra dharmasamkṣeṭād iti / atrāyaṁ dharmasamkṣeta yaḥ utāṣīṁ saitāṁ bhavati / as-yotpādād idam utpadyate / yad idam avidyāprayayāḥ

anyam vijñānam / yāvad evam

of the Dharma is involved there.

7. With regard to the ear, nose, tongue, body and mind, the same should be said.

8. I said: 'Unless a metaphor of the Dharma is involved there'. Here, the metaphor of the Dharma means (only) this: This being, that is, from the arising of this, that arises, that is to say the forma-

action. Of what kind would he be? Answer: an agent who rejects, who abandons, these aggregates, the aggregates of present existence, and assumes, takes on, other aggregates, the aggregates of future existence: an agent who would be presented as existing substantially. "Unless a metaphor is concerned there: unless as a (simple) designation of dependent origination'.

In the present passage samkṣeta means metaphor, metaphorical designation, symbol. The early translators made no mistake over this and all of them rendered it in a manner equivalent to the expression anyatra dharmasamkṣeṭā 'unless in the case of a metaphor of the Dharma (in this instance the Pratītyasamutpāda)'.

Tibetan version in Catuspārīṣat, p.539:chos su (or chos kyi) bīdrar biags pa ma biags pa.

Gunabhadrā (T 99, p.92c 19): ch'u su shu fa 善根數法
Samghadeva (T 125, p.711b 17–18): ch'u chia hiao fa 善根数法
Hsün-tsang (T 1558, p.155a 27): wei ch'ü fa chia 善根數法
Paramārtha (T 1559, p.306c 28–29): 善根數法此數法所立入 ‘except when, according to worldly usage to designate dharmas, it is said that they are a person (pudgala)'.

asya kevalasya mahato duhkhasandhasyotpado bhavati

9. tatrasminn atishadam na bhavati / asya nirohda idam nirudhyate / yad utavidyanirodha samskaranirodhah / samskaranirodhah vijananirodhah / yavadd evam asya kevalasya mahato duhkhasandhasyaptis are conditioned by ignorance, consciousness is conditioned by the formations', etc., up to: 'Such is the origin of this whole great mass of suffering'.

9. Moreover, 'This not being, that is not; through the cessation of this, that ceases, that is to say the cessation of ignorance results in the cessation of the formations; the cessation of the formations results in the cessation of consciousness', etc., up to: 'Such is the cessation of this whole great mass of suffering'.

10. avam bhiksava ucya para-marthasunyata nama dharmaparyaya /

11. idam avocad bhagavan attamanasas te bhiksavo bhagavato bhasita abhyanandan /

In this Sutra, paramartha sunyata is none other than the emptiness of beings (sattvasunyata), the fundamental teaching of the Buddhism of the Sravakas. Taking this text as a basis, it

10 The unabridged formula of the Pratityasamutpada in terms of 'arising' or 'origination' (samudaya) is well-known.


For the Pali wording see, among other sources, Vin. I, p.1; M III, p.63; S II pp.1, 25, etc.

11 The unabridged formula of the Pratityasamutpada in terms of 'cessation' (nirodha) generally follows the preceding one (see the references above): asmin asatidam na bhavaty asya nirohda idam nirudhyate / yad utavidhyanirodhat samaksaranirodhat / samaksaranirodhat vijananirodhat / vijananirodhat namarupanirodhah / namarupanirodhah sadhyatananirodhah / sadhyatananirodhah sparshanirodhah / sparshanirodhah vedananirodhah / vedananirodhah trsananirodhah / trsananirodhah upadananirodhah / upadananirodhah bhavananirodhah / bhavananirodhah jatinirodhah / jatinirodhah jaramarananirodhah Sokaparipravadukhadaurmanasayo paryasa nirudhyante / evam asya kevalasya mahato duhkhasandhasya nirodho bhavati.

It should be noted that, in the phrase evam asya kevalasya mahato duhkhasandhasya samudayo ... nirodho bhavati, the Koabba, p.140, 11.21-2, glosses kevala 'only, whole' with utamgarhita 'devoid of a self', and mahat, 'great' with anddaya 'without beginning or end'. The underlying teaching of the Pratityasamutpada is essentially a teaching on Non-self.

12 Customary conclusion at the end of Sanskrit sutras.
might be wondered if the Buddha ever taught anything but the
emptiness of beings in the Tripitaka or, if he spoke of the empti-
ness of phenomena (dharmasûnyatā), why he spoke of it so little. It is this question that the Upadesa will attempt to answer.

Commentary in the Upadesa*
(T 1509, ch.31, pp.294c 29 - 295a 17)

Question: If the emptiness of all dharmas (sarvadharmasûnyatā) is truly true, why, in the Tripitaka, did the Buddha especially speak of impermanent (anitya), suffering (duhkha), empty (śunya) and impersonal (anātman) dharmas? See the [Paramārthaśûnyatāsūtra in which the Buddha says to the bhikṣus: 'I will propound to you the Dharma teaching (dharmaparyāya) entitled Paramārthaśûnyatā. What is that Paramārthaśûnyatā? The eye (caksus), when it arises, does not come from anywhere, and when it perishes, does not go anywhere. There is only action (karman) and fruition of action (karmavipāka); the agent (kāraka) does not exist. For the ear, nose, tongue, body and mind, it is also the same'. Here, to affirm that on arising (dharmas) do not come from anywhere and on perishing do not go anywhere, is to say that there are no eternal (nitya) dharmas and that they are all impermanent (anitya); there is only action and fruition of action, but the agent does not exist. Such is, in the Śrāvaka system, paramārthaśûnyatā. Why do you still speak to us of a sarvadharmasûnyatā 'emptiness of all dharmas'?

Answer: The self (atman) is the root of all the passions (klesa). At first one becomes attached to the five aggregates (skand-


dha) as if they were a self (atman); then one becomes attached
to external objects (bāhyavastu) as if they pertained to the self (atmiyā). Bound by the self, one arouses craving (rāga) and hatred (dveṣa), and because of that craving and hatred, one performs actions (karma). When the Buddha says (in the Para-

mārthaśûnyatāsūtra) that 'the agent does not exist', he is des-
tr.vorying the Atman in every dharma. When he says: 'The eye, when it arises, does not come from anywhere, and when it perishes, does not go anywhere', he is affirming the imper-
manence (anityatā) of the eye, etc. Indeed, 'that which is im-
permanent is suffering, and that which is suffering is devoid of self and anything pertaining to a self'13. Self and anything per-
taining to a self not existing, the mind is no longer attached to any dharmas, and the mind having no more attachment (abhiniveśa)14 no longer incurs fetters (samyojana). Since it no longer incurs fetters, what point is there in propounding emptiness? That is why, in the Tripitaka, the Buddha especially speaks of the impermanent (anitya), suffering (duhkha), empty (śunya) and impersonal (anātman), but speaks much less of the emptiness of all dharmas.

II

Mahāśûnyatā nāma dharmaparyāya
(T 99, ch.12, pp.84c II - 85a 10)

Prof. E. Waldschmidt, who rendered such eminent service to
Buddhist studies, identified the original text of this Sūtra in a

13 Cf. S III, pp.22, 82, 84; IV, p.l: yad aniccam tam dukkham, yam dukkham tad anatā; yad anatā tam netam mama nesam amśa na nesam atāti.
14 Abhiniveśa, mîon par ien, chu 託, or chih chu 極著, is a mental attachment to non-existent things.
manuscript from Turfan.


This Sūtra was subsequently published, translated and profusely annotated by Chandrabāhī Tripāthī, Funfundzwanzig Sūtras des Nidānasamīyutta, Berlin 1962, pp.152-7. I venture to refer the reader to this excellent edition and will limit myself to translating a few extracts from this Nidānasamīyutta (loc. cit.) and the Avijjāpaccayā (S II, pp.60-3).

Nidānasamīyutta

4.mahāśūnyatādharma-pārīyāyaḥkatamāḥ/yadudāminसतिदामभवatyasyotpādā́/idadutpadyateyadudvidyā-प्रत्ययांहस्मकाराययावतसमयंभवाति/  

4. What are these Dharma teachings called Great Emptiness? They are expressed thus: 'This being, that is, from the arising of this, that arises, that is to say the formations are conditioned by ignorance; up to: 'Such is

5. jātipratyayam jārāmarāṇam iti / iatrāko jārāmarāṇam kas-ya vā jārāmarāṇam iti hi syuh/prastāra iti ya evam vaded ayaṃ jārāmarāṇam asya vā jārāmarāṇam i ya caivaṃ va- 
det taj jīvam tac charīram anyay jīvam anyac charīram / udbhayam etad ekam / vyañ- 
janam atra nānā /  

taj jīvam tac charīram iti 

drṣṭau satyāṁ brahmacarya- 
vāso na bhavati /  

anyay jīvam anyac charīram iti bhikṣavo drṣṭau sat- 

the origin . . .

5. It is said that old-age-death is conditioned by birth, and concerning this certain people might wonder what is old-age-death and to whom does old-age-death pertain. Someone might answer, 'This is old-age-death', or 'It is to this one that old-age-death pertains'. Another person might answer, 'The life-principle is identical to the body', or 'The life principle is different from the body'. These two answers would be identical (in error) and different (only) in the letter.

As long as the false view which consists in saying that the life principle is identical to the body persists, the spiritual life is impossible.

O monks, as long as the false view which consists in


16 jīva should not be rendered by 'Leben', but by 'life principle' or 'living being': ātman, saitva, jīva, poṣa, puruṣa, pūḍga, maṇuṣa, māna, kāraṇa, vedika, jānaka, pāṣyaka, etc., are so many synonyms designating the self. Cf. Pañcaviṃśatisūhassikā, ed. N. Dutt (London 1934), p.39, 112-3, p.99, 117, p.115, 118, etc.
yāṁ brahmācaryavāso na bha-
vati /

ity etāv ubhāv antāv anu-
pagamyāsti madhayamā práti-
pad āryā lokottarā yathābhūtā 
aviparitā samyagdrṣṭih / yad 
utā jātiprayayaṁ jāramara-
ṇam /

Avijjāpaccayā

2. avijjāpaccayā bhikkhave / sankhārā / sankhārapaccayā viññānāṁ / pe / evam etassa kevalassa dukkhakhandhassā samudayo hoti ti /

3. katamaṁ nu kho bhante ja-
rāmarāṇanāṁ / kassa ca pani-
daṁ jāramarāṇanāṁ ti / no kallo 
pañhoṭi bhagavā avoca /

katamaṁ jāramarāṇanāṁ kass-
a ca panidam jāramarāṇanāṁ ti 
iti vā bhikkhu yo vadeyya / aṁṇam jāramarāṇanāṁ aṁṇassa 
ca panidam jāramarāṇanāṁ ti iti saying that the life principle 
is different from the body 
persists, the spiritual life is 
impossible.

There is a middle path 
which avoids these two ex-
remes: it is the noble, trans-
endental, correct and right 
unperverted view, which af-
irms (simply) that old-age-death is 
conditioned by birth.

2. O monks, the formations 
are conditioned by igno-
ance, consciousness is con-
ditioned by the formations, 
etc., up to: ‘Such is the 
origin of this whole mass of 
suffering’.

3. O Blessed One, what then 
is old-age-death and, further-
more, to whom does that 
old-age-death pertain? That 
question is not correctly put, 
answered the Blessed One.

O monk, if one were to 
ask: ‘What is old-age-death 
and, furthermore, to whom 
does old-age-death pertain’, 
or if one were to say: ‘Other

vā bhikkhu yo vadeyya / ubha-
yam etam ekathām vyaṇjanam 
eva nānāṁ /

tam jīvam tāṁ sarīran ti 
vā bhikkhu dīṭṭhiyā satī brah-
macariyavāso na hoti / aṁṇam 
jīvam aṁṇam sarīran ti vā 
bhikkhu dīṭṭhiyā satī brahma-
cariyavāso na hoti /

ete te bhikkhu ubho ante 
anupagama majhena tathā-
gato dhammaṁ deseti / jāti-
paccayā jāramarāṇanāṁ ti /

is old-age-death, and other 
is he to whom old-age-
dearth pertains’, the two 
propositions would be the 
same in meaning (in error) 
and different only in the 
letter.

O monk, as long as the 
false view which consists in 
saying that the life principle 
is identical to the body per-
sists, the spiritual life is 
impossible. O monk, as long 
as the false view which 
consists in saying that the 
life principle is different 
from the body persists, the 
spiritual life is impossible.

O monk, the Tathāgata, 
having avoided those two 
extremes, teaches the Dhar-
ma by means of the middle 
in saying that old-age-death 
is conditioned by birth.

In short, to claim that old-age-death pertains to someone 
is a false view because there is an emptiness of beings (sattva-
sūnyatā) in the sense that all the formations are devoid of self 
(atman) and anything pertaining to a self (atmiya). To claim 
that old-age-death is something is a false view because there is 
an emptiness of things (dharmaśūnyatā) in the sense that all 
dharmas are devoid of a self-nature (svabhāva) and marks (lak-
śāna), whether general (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) or specific (sva-
lakṣaṇa). The Upadeśa is categoric in this respect.

Commentary in the Upadeśa17
(T 1509, ch.18, pp.192c 26 - 193 a 6)

The Buddha says in the Ta ch'ung ching (Mahāsūnyatāsūtra): 'The twelve causes (dvādaśanidāna) go from ignorance (avidyā) to old-age-death (jārāmarana). To say: "This is old-age-death" (ayam jārāmaranam), to ask "To whom does old-age-death pertain?" (kasya jārāmaranam): all that consists of a false view (dṛṣṭi). With regard to birth (jātī), the action of existence (bhava), clinging (upādāna), thirst (trṣṇā), feeling (vedanā), contact (sparśa), the six bases of consciousness (sādāyatana), name-and-form (nāmarūpa), consciousness (vijñāna), the formations (samskāra) and ignorance (avidyā), it is the same. To say that the life principle is identical to the body (taj jīvam taci chari-
ram), to say that the life principle is different from the body (anyaj jīvam anyac chariram), both propositions, although different (in the letter), are false views'. The Buddha continued: 'That the life principle is identical to the body constitutes a false view which is not that of my disciples. That the life principle is different from the body also constitutes a false view which is not that of my disciples'.

In this Sūtra, the Buddha proclaims the emptiness of things (dharmaśūnyatā). If one asks to whom old-age-death pertains, it should be known that that question is erroneous (mithyā) and that there is an emptiness of beings (sattvasūnyatā). If one asks

what is old-age-death, it should be known that that question is erroneous and that there is an emptiness of things (dharma-
śūnyatā). It is the same for the other (links of the causal chain), up to and including ignorance (avidyā).

Elsewhere, the Upadeśa (ch.31, p.295b 27-8) classes the Mahā-
sūnyatāsūtra of the Samyuktāgama among certain sūtras in the Tripiṭaka which categorically teach the dharmaśūnyatā.

III
Suṇāsutta and Samrddhisūtra
(S IV, p.54; T 99, p.56b 21-c 1)

This point is not made by the Suṇāsutta of the Saṃyutta Nikāya (IV, p.54) which, when asserting that the world of beings (loka)18 is empty, merely means that it is empty of self (ātman) and anything pertaining to a self (ātmiya). This text narrates a short dialogue between the Buddha and Ānanda, which takes place in Sāvatthi. It is often evoked as proof of the non-

existence of the Ātman19.

1. sāvatthi nidānām

1-3. atha kho āyasmā ānando / la / bhagavantam etad avoca / suṇño loko suṇño loko ti
bhante vuccati / kitīvātā
nu kho bhante suṇño loko ti
vuccati /

17 This passage is translated in the Traité de la grande vertu de sagesse II, Louvain 1949, pp.1079-81, in which the close relationship between the Mahāsūnyatāsūtra and the Avijjāpaccayā has already been noted.

18 loka, understood as sattaloka 'world of beings'.
Thus is bhadanta IV, empty p.263; is ekantanisanno heard. be suhham said, makes upetya yampidam rupa said also It an vuccati common O this cakkhuvihha-tasma multiplies self the emptiness p36; Compare Sravasti, empty In last p.2%; svadhatthu, p.579. In this last passage: suññam ṣamkhāra attena vā attaniyena vā.

4. yasā ca kho Ananda suññam na vā attaniyena va? / tasmā suñño loko ti vuccati / kiñca Ananda suññam attena vā attaniyena vā / 5-10. cakkhum kho Ananda suññam attena vā attaniyena vā / rūpā suññā attena vā attaniyena vā / cakkhuviññā-ṇam suññam attena vā attaniyena vā / cakkhusamphasso suñño attena vā attaniyena vā / pe / yampidām manosampphassapaccayā uppajjati vedayitam sukham vā dukkham vā adukkham asukham vā tam pi suññam attena vā attaniyena vā /

II. yasā ca kho Ananda suññam attena vā attaniyena the affirmation that the world is empty? 4. O Ananda, because there is an emptiness of self or of anything pertaining to self, it is said that the world is empty. What is, O Ananda, the emptiness of self or anything pertaining to self? 5-10. The eye, O Ananda, is empty of self or anything pertaining to self, visible are empty of self or anything pertaining to self, eye-consciousness is empty of self or anything pertaining to self, eye contact is empty of self or anything pertaining to self, and so on. And to end, pleasant, unpleasant or neither unpleasant nor pleasant feeling which arises from mental contact is also empty of self or anything pertaining to self.

II. Therefore since, O Ananda, there is emptiness of self or of anything pertaining to self, it is said that the world is empty.

In his Comparative Catalogue of the Chinese Āgamas and Pāli Nikāyas, p.223, Ch. Akanuma has compared the Suññāsutta of the Saṅyutta Nikāya with the Samīrdhisūtra of the Chinese Saṃyuktāgama (T 99, No.22, ch.9, p.56b 21-c 1). However, despite an obvious relationship, the Samīrdhisūtra differs notably from the former. It makes Samīrdhi (the Samīrdhi of the Pāli sources) the questioner of the Buddha; it multiplies the aspects (ākāra) of emptiness; finally and above all, it introduces a stock phrase on the essential nature (prakṛti) of things which never appears in the Nikāyas, but which is common in the Prajñāpāramitā texts. Here again, we can attempt a reconstruction of the original Indian text.

1. evam mayā śrutam / ekasmin samaye bhagavān chrāvastyaṁ viharati sma jetavane 'nathapiṇḍadasyārāme / 2. atha samīrdhir nāma bhikṣur yena bhagavāṁ tenopajāgāma / upetya bhagavatpādaṁ śirasā vanditaṁkaṇāṁ nāyidat / ekāntaṁsānaṁ bhagavan tam idam avocat / 3. śūnyo loka iti bhadanta uc-

1. Thus have I heard. At one time the Blessed One was residing in Śrāvasti, at the Jeta grove, in Anāthapindada's park. 2. Then a monk named Samīrdhi went to where the Blessed One was to be found, saluted with his head the feet of the Blessed One then sat to one side. Seated to one side he said this to the Blessed One. 3. It is said, O Lord: 'Empty

7. rūpam caścakṣurviṣṇānam yad api dām caścakṣusamsgarsa
pratayam upadhyate vedayitam dukkham vā sukhām vā
duḥkhahāsukham vā tath api sūnyam i sāsvatenaviparītā
madharmaṇa sūnyam ātmīyena sūnyam /

8. tat kasya hetoh / prakṛtr ir asyaiśa /
9. evam eva śrōtram grhṇām jihvā kāyo manah /
10. tasmāt sūnyo loka iti ucyate /
11. idam avocad bhagavān / samṛddhir bhikṣur bhagavato bhāṣitam abhinandyānūma-

7. The visible, eye-consciousness and also that unpleasant, pleasant, or neither unpleasant nor pleasant feeling which arises with eye contact as its condition, is also empty, empty of perpetuity and of changelessness, empty of self.
8. Why? Because such is its essential nature.
9. It is the same for the ear, nose, tongue, body and mind.
10. That is why it is said that the world is empty.
11. Thus spoke the Blessed One; the monk Samuddhi, having expressed his satisfac-

Hindu philosophical systems is, in the meaning of essential or original nature (or matter), practically unknown to the early canonical writings, but frequently appears in the Mahāyāna sūtras, particularly in the Prajñāpāramitā literature. 

The phrase tat kasya hetoh, prakṛtr ir asyaiśa which appears here in §§ 6 and 8 of the Samuddhiṣṭra, plays the part of a refrain in the definitions of the sixteen, eighteen or twenty savyatār proposed by the large Prajñāpāramitā sūtras; Cf. Aṣṭādasaśāsrāski (Tib. Trip. XIX, No.732, p.260,fol.135a 8-137b 5; T. 220, ch.488, pp.480b 6-481a 1); Paścāvatāśāsrāski, ed. N. Dutt, pp.195, 192-197, 120, Śataśāsrāski, ed. P. Ghosa (Calcutta 1914), p.1407, 110-111, 112.

The presence of this phrase in the Samuddhiṣṭra of the Saṃyukta and its absence in the Sunāsutta of the Saṃyutta Nikāya raises a text-critical problem, and I would willingly believe that this phrase was introduced into the Samuddhiṣṭra by a Mahāyānīst interpolator. We know the degree to which the Chinese Ekottarāgama was also subjected to similar intervention.
dhya prakṛāntah
dition and rejoiced at the
discourse of the Blessed
One, went away.

The Pali Suṇñasutta and the Sanskrit Samrddhisūtra have
exactly the same significance. Both teach the sattvasunyatā by
presenting the six internal bases of consciousness (adhyātmāyatana) as being empty of self and anything pertaining to
self. The latter also stresses the impermanence (anityatā) of
those same bases by giving them as 'empty of permanence
and changelessness'. Nevertheless, the author of the Upadeśa, allowing
himself to be impressed by the phrase, tat kasya hetoh, 
prakṛtir asyaiśa, sees in the second of these sūtras an
affirmation of that emptiness of essential natures (prakṛtiśunyatā)
referred to by the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras.

Commentary in the Upadeśa*
(T 1509, ch.31, p.282a 28 - b II)

Prakṛtiśunyatā, 'The Emptiness of Essential Natures'. The Prakṛti
of dharma is eternally empty, but by assuming the karmic series (karmaprabandha), it appears not to be empty. Thus the
Prakṛti of water (udaka) is cold (śīta) in itself, but if it is taken
near fire (agni) it becomes hot (usna), and if the fire is put out
it becomes cold again. It is the same with the Prakṛti of
dharmas: as long as the [karmic conditions] are not present, it is
empty (śunya) and imperceptible (anupalabdhā), like the Prakṛti
of permanently cold water; but when the conditions (pratyaya)
are assembled, the dharmas exist like water which becomes hot
near fire. If the conditions lessen or disappear, there is no more
dharma, like boiling water which becomes cold when the fire is
extinguished. See what is said in the Śūtra: The eye (cākṣus) is
empty (śunya), devoid of self (anatman) and of anything pertaining
to a self (anatmya). Why? Because that is its essential
nature (prakṛti asyaiśa). The ear (śrotra), nose (gṛhāna),
tongue (jihvā), body (kāya) and mind (manas), colour (rūpa),
lsound (śabda), odour (gandha), taste (rasa), tangibility (spra-
stavya) and dharmas are also like that.

Objection: That Sūtra says that [the twelves āyatanas] are
empty of self and anything pertaining to a self (śunya ātmanā
vātmīyena vā), in other words it is referring to the emptiness of
beings (sattvasunyatā), and not to the emptiness of things
dharmasunyatā). How do you see evidence in this in favour
of the emptiness of essential natures (prakṛtiśunyatā)?

Answer: In that Sūtra, it is only a matter of Prakṛtiśunyatā; it does not speak of the emptiness of beings (sattva-
sunyatā) or of the emptiness of things (dharmasunyatā).

The Prakṛtiśunyatā is of two kinds:

1. In the twelve bases of consciousness (āyatana), there is
no self (ātman) or anything pertaining to a self (ātmya). The
emptiness proper to the twelve āyatanas consists of the absence
of self and the absence of anything pertaining to a self. That is
what is said in the Śrāvaka system.

2. As for the Mahāyāna system, it says this: The twelve
āyatanas, having no self or anything pertaining to a self, are
empty, and the Prakṛti of the twelve āyatanas not existing, is

24 With regard to this ending, compare Mahāparinirvāṇa, pp.118, 152, 186;
Nidānasamuccaya, pp.114, 176, 197.
* [Tr.'s note] - Translated by the author in Le Traité IV (op. cit), pp.210-15.
25 The Samuddhisūtra quoted immediately above.
(itself) empty [of Prakṛti].

In short, in the opinion of the Upadeśa, the Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra teaches only the emptiness of beings; the Mahāśūnyatāsūtra proclaims both the emptiness of beings and the emptiness of things; as for the Śamṛdhīsūtra, it affirms the emptiness of essential natures (prakṛti).

The shifts in meaning undergone in the course of time by the technical vocabulary of Buddhism did not escape the author of the Upadeśa. In the canonical works, paramārthaśūnyatā is emptiness in the proper sense of the word, namely Anātman or the emptiness of beings (sattvaśūnyatā) devoid of self and anything pertaining to a self, while mahāśūnyatā is the great emptiness relating to both things and beings. In the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras of the Mahāyāna, paramārthaśūnyatā is the emptiness of the Absolute, i.e. of Nirvāṇa; mahāśūnyatā is quite simply the emptiness of the spatial regions. This is what results from the definitions supplied by the Pañcaviṃśatisahasrikā and the Śatasahasrikā:

‘What is the emptiness of the Absolute? Here the Absolute means Nirvāṇa, and that Nirvāṇa is empty of Nirvāṇa because it is neither eternal nor transitory. Why? Because such is its essential nature. That is called Great Emptiness’.

‘What is great emptiness? The eastern region is empty of eastern region; the southern region is empty of southern region.

26 Emended text of the Pañcaviṃśatisahasrikā, p.196, 11.9-10; and of the Śatasahasrikā, pp.1408, 120 - 1409, 121: tatra katamā paramārthaśūnyatā / tatra paramārtha ucyata nirvāṇam / yac ca nirvāṇam nirvāṇena śūnyam akāraśīvānāśītām upādaya / tat kasya hetoh / prakṛtrir asyaśā / iyaṃ ucyate paramārthaśūnyatā /

... , etc., up to: the intermediate regions are empty of intermediate regions, because they are neither eternal nor transitory. Why? Because such is their essential nature. That is called Great Emptiness’.

[Ed.] - A more detailed bibliography can be found in the author’s five volumes of Le Traité de la grande vertu de sagesse (Publications de l'Institut Orientaliste, Louvain and Louvain-la-Neuve 1949-80), the English version of which is virtually completed by the present translator and awaits publication in the same series.

Note: The above article originally appeared prior to the publication of Traité IV, the longest section of which is devoted to the 'Eighteen kinds of śūnyatā'.

NOTICE

Just as we were going to press, we learnt with deep regret of the death of the French scholar André BAREAU, aged 71, on 2 March 1993. An appreciation of this Professor at the Collège de France and world renowned writer on Buddhism will follow in the next issue.
SUKARAMADDAVA, THE BUDDHA'S LAST MEAL

John D. Ireland

From the earliest times the nature of this dish, sukaramaddava, which was the Buddha's last meal and associated with the sickness the Buddha suffered at the time, has been the subject of continuing controversy. Sukara in Pāli means a pig or young hog, and maddava means soft, tender, succulent, etc. The Commentaries give various speculations: the tender parts of a pig carefully prepared; or a soft-boiled rice dish; or a plant or mushroom loved by pigs (hence it was translated by Rhys Davids as 'truffles'); or again bamboo shoots trampled by pigs, etc. It has also been suggested that the dish was an infusion of an alchemical elixir prepared by Cunda, the (gold-)smith. Thus the meaning of sukaramaddava has never been settled.

It is possible that it was purely a local dish or perhaps, more likely, the name was a dialect word unknown to the compilers of the Canon and retained for want of an equivalent in Pāli. So, for some reason, such as its symbolic or traditional importance, because signifying an important event during the last days of the Buddha's life, this word, approximating to sukaramaddava in Pāli was retained.

Another possible explanation of the word which has, so far as I am aware, never been suggested, is to read sukara instead of sukara. By the simple expedient of shortening a vowel this compound word would have a slightly different meaning. Sukara means 'well-made', 'well-prepared', and the idea of 'pig' or 'hog's flesh' would disappear. Combined with maddava it could be interpreted as a dish that was 'made well softened', that is to say, 'easily digestible' and thus suitable for an invalid and saying nothing about its actual ingredients. However, even if sukara was an ingredient the commentators still state its preparation involved a certain care, which suggests the idea it was intended as something special. That the devas too are said to have infused it with heavenly essences is significant and together with the care taken in its preparation also suggests it was, perhaps, a special sacrificial offering.

If Cunda the smith was aware the Lord was suffering from a stomach or bowel upset, from dysentery, it would be considered of him to prepare a meal suitable for someone in that condition. There is no need to jump to the conclusion, because

2 Thomas has pointed out that if 'pork' was originally intended it is curious that the word for flesh or meat (mamsa) does not occur and Pāli is usually very precise in these matters. See E.J. Thomas, The Life of the Buddha in Legend and History, p.149.
3 It was for this reason that it was made unsuitable for another to eat and that the Buddha advised Cunda to bury the remainder in a hole. Not, as John Stevens naively suggested, because there was actually something wrong with the food (see John Stevens, 'What did the Buddha Eat?', BSR 4, 1, 1987). The procedure for the disposal of food consecrated by being offered to the Buddha was either to bury it or put it into water with no living creatures. See the Kasihāradvāja Sutta (Sn p.15) where the offering of milk-rice smoked and steamed with sacrificial heat when put into water after first being offered to the Buddha and rejected by him.
4 The Udāna Commentary suggests the illness was visācikā, which the dictionaries say is cholera.
of subsequent events, that the meal was the actual cause of the Buddha’s sickness, as has been thought. He could well have been suffering from the illness prior to the meal. All that is said is that shortly after eating the food the Buddha had an attack of violent pains, passed some blood and then recovered somewhat, deliberately suppressing the pains by an act of will and mindful endurance. Then, after accepting a drink of water, he continued the journey to Kusinārā.

Thus this special dish, prepared for the Buddha because he was unable to eat ordinary food, may have helped by acting as a purge. That the Buddha subsequently says that Cunda the smith should feel no remorse because the last meal was received from him, again need not imply that it was the cause of the sickness. Possibly the remorse of Cunda was that his food did not result in a complete recovery, but we know it was already settled the Buddha would pass away even before his arrival at Cunda’s dwelling. The Udāna Commentary actually suggests that Cunda prepared the food with the purpose of prolonging the Buddha’s life.

These ideas are also supported by the Milindapañha (p.175), where Nāgasena says the food was good for the digestion (jather ‘aggitejassa hitam) and the Buddha did not pass away because of it, but because his life-force was spent.

6 The Buddha is indeed recorded as having fallen ill during the last rains-retreat in an earlier part of the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta (D II, p.99). This was some time before the Cunda episode which must have taken place shortly after the retreat ended.

ON A DEPARTURE FORMULA
AND ITS TRANSLATION

Joy Manné

The Pāli Buddhist texts are characterised by their use of formulas. Not only can these formulas help us to distinguish the different types of sutta, but also, because many of these texts are narratives, correct understanding of the formulas can prevent misunderstandings of the redactor/storyteller's intentions. It can help us to understand characters and events; it can contribute to our appreciation of sociological details, and it can enable us to make accurate translations.

The narrative literature of the Pāli Canon contains many instances of the formula:

(1) Handa ca dāni mayāṃ (bhante) gacchāma, bahu kiccā mayāṃ bahu-karaniyā ti.
(2) Yassa dāni tvām (mahārāja) kālam maññasi ti.

The sentences of this formula are numbered for ease of reference: they will be referred to as (1) and (2) throughout. The words that I have placed within brackets change according to the identity of the speaker of (1) and the convention according to which he is addressed.

1 These investigations were supported by the Foundation for Research in the field of Theology and the Science of Religions in the Netherlands, which is subsidised by the Netherlands Organisation for the Advancement of Pure Research (Z.W.O.), and constitutes Chapter III of my doctoral dissertation, 'Debates and Case Histories in the Pāli Canon' (Utrecht 1991).
2 See Manné, 1990.
3 See Wagle, 1966, Chapter III for an analysis of these conventions.
When the whole formula occurs in a text, (1) is used at the end of a meeting or conversation when a person announces that he is about to leave; (2) is an acknowledgement of this announcement. Hence, this is a departure formula.

English translations of this formula vary not only from translator to translator and hence from Nikāya to Nikāya but also within each Nikāya. So, for instance in the D translation (DB) there is found both:

A. [1] "Now, Lord, we would fain go. We are busy and there is much to do".
   [2] "Do, O king, whatever seemeth to thee fit".

and

B. [1] "Well, dear sire, now we take our leave; we have many duties, much to do".
   [2] "That, sires, is whenever you think fit".

and in the M translation (MLS),

C. [1] 'And if you please, we, good Gotama, are going now, for there is much to do, much to be done by us'.
   [2] 'Do now whatever you think it is the right time for, ...'.

and

D. [1] "Well I am going now, reverend sire, I am very busy, there is much to be done".

4 I have omitted the German translation by Franke from this consideration because I am not competent to judge its terms and its tone. It is "Herr, wohlan, nun wollen wir gehen, wir haben noch viele Geschäfte und Aufgaben zu erledigen". "Wie es dir an der Zeit scheint, ..." Franke, 1913, 84.

5 D I 85. Tr. T.W. Rhys Davids, DB I 95.
7 M I 251. Tr. Horner, MLS I 305.

[2] "You do now, sire, that for which you deem it the right time".

The question is do the various translations of this formula reflect the different situations in which it occurs, and are they therefore sensitively responding to the sense and atmosphere of the texts when they vary their terminology? Or is there one consistent translation that would fit all cases? This is not simply a matter of words. The suttas are not only religious documents: they are also narrative literature. The choice of words in a sutta is intended to influence us, and the words we choose (or accept) in translation both reflect and influence our understanding and interpretation of the sutta. Formulas play an important part in this (as in other) oral literature. They function, whatever their length, not only to indicate the type of literature but also as a short-hand for setting an atmosphere, for indicating a particular state of affairs, for summarising a character, for showing social status and for creating expectations on the part of the listener, as well as to render the communication of the Teaching consistent and easily memorable. If we correctly and fully grasp what its formulas imply, we are aided in our appreciation of this literature. If we misunderstand them we may also miss important points, make false interpretations and generally be led astray.

8 M II 102. Tr. Horner, MLS II 288.
9 See Manné, 1960.
10 On this point see Wagh, 1966, Chapter III.
11 On this point see Cousins, 1983.
12 See e.g. Bronkhorst, 1986, where, among other methods, the study of particular formulas has been used to show the character of and early influence upon Buddhist meditation.
The interpretation offered above can be justified to at least some extent, however, because this is how Graeme MacQueen has taken it in his study of the various versions of the Sāmaññaphala Sutta, an interpretation upon which (in part) he bases his appreciation, or depreciation, of Ajātasattu’s character, (Ajātasattu remarks) that he must leave because he has much to do. This ending fits with the rather shallow spiritual attainment ascribed to him in this version. He has just received a discourse on the vanity of worldly things and the stages through which a man may renounce them and strive after higher goals: yet he tells the Buddha he is in a hurry, for he must get back to his secular affairs.

Basing his interpretation of the structure of the sutta upon this understanding of the formula, MacQueen has further interpreted the text:

Through its use of [the details: Ajātasattu says he must leave because he has much to do] [the Pāli] has the sutra end quickly and rather abruptly.

This essay will analyse the various occasions when this formula is used. It will show that the above are misleading translations, as are most of the translations of this formula in the texts, and that MacQueen’s interpretation is ill-founded. It is possible to do this because, as will be shown, this formula is used completely consistently in this literature. This paper then (bravely) goes on to suggest a consistent and generally appropriate translation for this formula.

There are indeed suttas that might be taken to support the view that the speaker of (1) is self-important and/or foolish. One of these is the Sāmaññaphala Sutta (D 2). Here King

13 MacQueen is referring to the Pāli version of this sutta.
14 MacQueen, 1988, 222.
15 MacQueen has categorised the sutta into elements and the expression (1) of our formula is his fifth element: (5) Ajātasattu says he must leave because he has much to do (Pāli). MacQueen, 1988, 184.
16 MacQueen, 1988, 184, 187.
Ajātasattu uses (I) to announce his departure. The depiction of Ajātasattu in this sutta is as an earnest but not very (morally) wise man: he has killed his father\(^1\)\(^7\). Ajātasattu is not, however, depicted as a self-important man. Although he is wise enough after his dialogue with the Buddha to become a lay disciple (upāsaka), his previous foolishness stands in the way of his further attainment. Moreover, the sutta is explicit in its representation of this situation. It has the Buddha himself explain that it is because Ajātasattu killed his father that he has not attained 'religious insight' — dhammacakkhu\(^18\).

The Kandaraka Sutta (M 51) is another example. Pessa, the son of the elephant trainer (hatthārohaputta), after a conversation with the Buddha takes his leave of him using (I). The Buddha responds with (2). After Pessa's departure the Buddha comments that if he had stayed to hear the Buddha's further analysis he would have attained a yet greater profit than he did attain\(^19\). The text depicts Pessa's self-importance in many details. It shows him intruding into someone else's conversation with the Buddha, taking over the conversation, appointing himself as spokesman for all householders and even instructing the Buddha himself with regard to householders' conduct. It shows him to be someone who does not wait for instruction from the Buddha, but who has the last word in his dialogue with him. Just as the Sāmaññaphala Sutta was explicit in its criticism of Ajātasattu, placing it in the mouth of the Buddha, so does this sutta also express its criticism of Pessa in words which are uttered by the Buddha.

Other cases, however, are not quite so clear. In these cases, we may be tempted to infer from the situation portrayed in a sutta that the use of this formula implies self-importance and foolishness in the speaker of (I), but are we correct? The Ambattha Sutta (D 3), for example, might be taken to provide a similar case to those cited above, but this view would be mistaken. In this sutta the brahman youth (māna) Ambattha is sent by his teacher to find out if the Buddha has the thirty-two marks of the wise man. His self-importance and pretentiousness are portrayed in the text in many details. His means of transport to the Buddha is 'a chariot drawn by mares'\(^20\), where it is part of the debate tradition that one 'drives to a yajña or discussion by chariot as a challenge . . .'\(^21\). This detail shows that Ambattha is so presumptuous as to intend to challenge the Buddha, rather than simply to make the inquiry about him that he has been sent by his teacher to make. A further detail that points to Ambattha's self-importance and pretentiousness is the extensive retinue that he takes with him. Then there is also his rudeness to the Buddha in their conversation, and his lack of responsiveness to the Buddha's exposition of the path he teaches

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\(^{17}\) This was not his only unwise action. See DPPN, s.v. Ajātasattu.

\(^{18}\) BHSD, s.v. dhamma-cakkhu. Lit. 'the eye of the dhamma'. Sacāyam bhikkhave rājā pilāram dharmikam dharmarājānām jīvitā na voropessathā, imasmiṃ yeva āsane virajam vītam-malam dharmam-cakkham uppaśijjāthāti. D I 86.

\(^{19}\) sace bhikkhave Pessa hatthārohaputto mahatam nisideyya yāv' assahām ime cattāro puggale viharëna vihajāmi, mahatā athena saññyutto agamissa. Api ca bhikkhave etāvātā pi Pessa hatthārohaputto mahatā athena saññyutto ti. M I 342.

\(^{20}\) valavā-ratuha.

with its results\textsuperscript{22} where the more usual response to this exposition is to convert at least to lay discipleship (upāsaka) if not to full going forth (pabbajā)\textsuperscript{23}. Āmbattha is thoroughly humiliated and put in his place by the Buddha who publicly exposes his ill-based self-importance and his foolishness. He takes his leave of the Buddha using (I) of the formula. This sutta, however, has the Buddha utter no explanatory or critical remarks concerning Āmbattha after his departure, contrary to what occurred in the previous examples. Are we right, then, to consider that the use of this formula by the text in this instance is intended to indicate an abrupt and impolite departure of a self-important and foolish man?

This question arises similarly with regard to the Mahā-Saccaka Sutta (M 26) and the Gopaka-Moggallāna Sutta (M 108). Without going into details of the situations in these suttas the essential point is that, where some argument can be made that the speaker of the formula in each of them was offensive (Saccaka) or self-important (Vassakāra), no point in these suttas is made explicitly against them\textsuperscript{24}.

An important feature of all these suttas is what occurs in the text after the formula. The Sāmaññaphala, Mahā-Saccaka, Kandaraka and Gopaka-Moggallāna Suttas contain an identical formulaic description of the departure of the person who

\textsuperscript{22} This standard exposition comprises §§ 40–98 of the Sāmaññaphala Sutta.

\textsuperscript{23} Cd. D 2, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13.

\textsuperscript{24} The Commentary, however, takes up this issue and explains Saccaka’s lack of attainment (MA II 293; see also MLS I 305, fn.2). The Commentary is accounting for a state of affairs: it is not criticizing Saccaka in the way the texts D 2 and M 51 incorporate criticism (of Ajītasattu and Pessa respectively) by attributing it to the Buddha himself.

condemned his leave-taking by the utterance of (I).

‘Then (the speaker), having rejoiced in what the Lord had said, having given thanks, rising from his seat, having greeted the Lord, departed keeping his right side towards him\textsuperscript{25}.

These endings demonstrate a situation so formally correct as to contradict the interpretation of the formula implied by the translators in their choice of words and given by MacQueen. Although the Āmbattha Sutta contains no similar formula, Āmbattha simply gets into his chariot and drives off\textsuperscript{26}, its absence can be explained by the sutta’s structure: Āmbattha’s departure takes place in the middle of the narrative; the other departures take place at the end. These instances therefore contradict any understanding of this formula which implies abruptness or any other form of unsuitable or impolite behaviour on behalf of the speaker of (I).

Could there be a constraint on the use of this formula, so that it is polite usage between the king and the Buddha but arrogance when other castes use it? The answer is no. The use of this formula is not limited to kings or kṣatriyas. Brahmins use it in polite leave-taking\textsuperscript{27} as do householders\textsuperscript{28} and disciples\textsuperscript{29}. If this formula is conventional polite usage between highly-placed brahmins and the Buddha it seems reasonable to think

\textsuperscript{25} MLS II 6. (The speaker) Bhagavato bhāṣitam abhinanditvā anumoditvā utkhāy āsānā Bhagavatam abhipādetvā padakkhaṇam kāvā pakkāmi. M 36 and 108 omit the padakkhaṇa.

\textsuperscript{26} Aṭṭha kho Āmaṁtha mānavo vaiḷavā-ratham āruhya pakkāmi. D II 106.

\textsuperscript{27} Cf. Vassakāra, Ajītasattu’s minister, D II 76; A II 181, IV 21.

\textsuperscript{28} M 56, etc.

\textsuperscript{29} M 99, etc.
that the formula is equally polite in the mouth of Ambattha, whatever his other character defects.

Other instances of the formula in the texts provide parallel cases to all the instances cited above, both those that might be interpreted to support and generalise the interpretation that (1) is uttered by a self-important and foolish man and those where the case is doubtful. They use (1) and (2) with no implication of self-importance or foolishness on the part of the speaker of (1) or irony on the part of the speaker of (2). They strongly support this alternative position\(^\text{30}\). Thus they cast doubt on this interpretation of the redactors' intentions in using the formula. There are two further points which support this argument. One is that it is extremely unlikely that a formula is used in two completely different and mutually incompatible ways in oral literature, where formulas are such an important way of making effects. The second is that there are no grounds to impute to the redactors the literary device of placing a formula of courtesy in the mouth of a discourteous person to show his pretentiousness. Besides, we have seen that where the sutta chooses to criticise the speaker of (1) it does so explicitly. These instances show that the formula is quite simply a standard means of polite leave-taking. It is a conventional means to end a conversation and to enable a polite departure.

\(^{30}\) E.g. M i 117; A V 69; M II 102, where King Pasenadi offers gifts prior to making a departure announced by this formula. M II 124, where the same king utters a detailed appreciation of the Buddha before taking leave using the formula and where, after his departure, the Buddha pays tribute to the king and instructs the monks to learn the testimonies to Dhamma that the king has spoken. See also M 90.

Translations are important. They are, after all, one justification for the work of philologists. They are in their own right the result of research. Their intention must be to make works available not only to co-philologists but to researchers in other disciplines. Thus their task is to make texts as widely available as possible. The translator therefore bears many responsibilities. Colleagues who can read the language of his text have the necessary knowledge to be critical. Others must trust him to make available much more than a literal, ‘pidgin-language’ rendering which especially makes nonsense out of idiomatic expressions. He is required to render accurately both the meaning of his text and its literary intentions. Every word and sentence in a text requires honouring this way. Even a misrendering of a conventional utterance can have a significant effect on the interpretation of the text.

How then shall I dare to translate the formula?

The first phrase (1) of this formula appears in variation in the texts, and the second phrase (2) independently. These instances will point the way.

The problem regarding the first phrase (1) is to find the proper translation equivalents for the synonymous\(^{31}\) terms bahu-kicca and bahu-karaniya, which can be construed either as gerunds, the choice of English translations, or as neuter nouns. The PTS renders these quite satisfactorily as ‘duty’ and ‘obligation’ for both bahu-kicca and bahu-karaniya. In the Cullatatha-sankhaya Sutta, Sakka, the king of the gods, uses these ex-

\(^{31}\) vevacana DA I 237.
The translation renders them generally, 'I am very busy, there is much to be done by me'. The text, however, shows that Sakka has two specific types of obligations, 'both on my own account there are things to be done, and there are also (still more) things to be done for the devas of the Thirty-Three'. This refutes any argument that a loose translation of these terms more accurately reflects their intention. The same case can be made out in the Anuruddha Sutta (M 127) where Pāṇḍakaṅgo, a master carpenter or builder, invites Anuruddha and three other bhikkhus for a meal, stipulating that he has much to do for the king. The carpenter does not have an amorphous mass of general tasks (much to be done); he has specific duties and obligations as a professional in the king's employ.

Using these more precise renderings of bahukicca and bahukaraniya (i), Handa ca dānī mayam bhante gacchāma, bahukicca mayam bahu-karanīyā ti, can be translated: 'Well, Lord, we are going. We have many tasks, many obligations'. This translation is true to the texts and carries no innuendos or implications about the character of the speaker beyond what may be imputed to one who takes leave in a conventionally polite way. It is an excuse for going, but without self-importance. The words 'task' and 'obligation' may be taken to show that the speaker is going somewhat against his will, and that his choice in the matter is limited. He is obliged to go. It is all very polite and conventional.

The instances where part (2) of the formula occurs quite independently in the texts are so frequent that this sentence must be respected as a formula in its own right, and may not be regarded as invariably dependent on (i). The different instances of its usage fall into discrete categories.

i. The most frequent use of this formula occurs as a courteous acknowledgement to indicate that a command has been carried out. Thus this formula is standard when, having been instructed by the Buddha to assemble the bhikkhus, Ānanda reports back with this expression that the task has been performed. It is standard usage also in an announcement that some form of transport that has been ordered such as chariots or elephants, or an army, has now been prepared. The person who has issued these orders is not invariably the Buddha. The formula (2) is similarly the standard means in the situation where the Buddha has agreed to preach by informing him that the hall has been prepared. The use of this formula in this way occurs in other similar situations. These cases can only be instances of courteous usage. If we respect the terms that refer to time:

33 Horner, MLS I 308.
34 app-eva sakena karanīyena api ca devānan āyatavisakānaṃ karanīyena. Horner, MLS I 308.
35 bahukicca bahu-karanīyo rājākaranīyenāti. M III 144.
36 However, with reference to the king, a vast mass of tasks of all sorts, 'the (entire) royal service' (rāka-karanīyā), requires doing, not only those of a carpenter. Cf Skt. rājakūra 'state affairs', 'royal command'. (Monier Williams).
37 Sannipātito bhante bhikkhu-saṅgham... D 16, II, 176, 119; S V 321; A III 70.
38 D II 21; M I 118; S I 234, 236; Vin I 348.
39 D I 49.
40 D II 189.
41 D II 84; III 208f; M I 354; S IV 183; Vin I 227f.
42 Cf. A I 277; Ud 68.
dāni, kālam maññasi⁴³, however, and the literal translation: 'For which you know⁴⁴ ['bethink' 'choose'] the (right) time', this expression can perhaps be better rendered by the equally euphemistic English phrase, 'When you are ready... ', with 'when' capturing the meaning of dāni and the idea of readiness capturing the meaning of kālam maññasi.

ii. The formula is used to indicate that an interview or a social call is over. It is used both by the Buddha towards others⁴⁵ and by others towards himself⁴⁶.

If this formula were used only by the Buddha we might be justified in regarding it as a 'royal dismissal'. In that case we could render it by the dismissive phrase, 'You can go now', or 'That will be all now', although this phrase does the 'time words' less than justice. The fact that Potthapāda the wandering ascetic⁴⁶ also uses this phrase to the Buddha, however, makes this translation equivalent unsuitable. Potthapāda is unequivocally polite and respectful towards the Buddha and does not express himself to him in a high-handed way.

I think I am right in saying that in all Western cultures, informing a guest directly in a face-to-face situation that it is time for him to depart can be construed as demonstrating a lack of politeness. Formal invitations avoid this by providing in

writing the time of arrival together with the time of departure. This sort of eventuality is conveyed more by body language — shuffling a chair, partially rising, tidying up a table — than through the use of words. We have to be influenced by our own cultural norms when choosing words for a translation as well as by our text: it is the people of our culture who will read our translations. As the formula cannot be rendered by inventing stage directions I would use, 'When you are ready... ', here too. It is the best I can think of and it keeps identical the translation of identical words without doing any injustice to the context.

iii. A further frequent use of this formula is to accede to a request⁴⁷. In these cases the translation again could be, 'When he is/you are ready...', the 'yes' of agreement being implied.

iv. A further particular usage is the situation where one person has been instructed to inform another when a particular event is taking place: for example that the Buddha is approaching a certain area⁴⁸, or that a particular event has taken place: for example the death of the Buddha⁴⁹. The formula follows the delivery of the requested report. The proposed translation above would be appropriate here too, as the next step in the

⁴³ According to the PTC this expression occurs only in this formula.
⁴⁴ Commentary, ... kālam maññasi jānāsi, tassa kālam tvam eva jānāhi vuttaṁ hoti. DA II 237.
⁴⁵ M III 269 (cf. S II 62) to bhikkhus, including Ānanda; D II 104 = S V 260 = Ud 63 to the latter specifically; D II 86 to householders.
⁴⁶ D 9 [I 189].
⁴⁷ A request to do something, M II 61; to go somewhere, A IV 373; Ud 34, 35; to be received as a visitor by the Buddha, M II 142; to undertake some further development: King Renu is asked by his high steward for permission to leave him in order to meditate for four months (D II 237), and later for permission to go forth (D II 243); Dabba asks the Buddha for permission to enter parinibbāna (Ud 92).
⁴⁸ M II 210.
⁴⁹ D II 158.
story is that the characters undertake an action together. What is implied is the acknowledgement of the information, and the courteous invitation, 'when (the other) is ready', to undertake appropriate action together.

The above usages are invariably courteous.

I offered above, as a translation for (1), 'Well then, Lord, we are going now. We have many tasks, many obligations'. Because it can be used in all the above cases, I have chosen for (2), Yassa dāni (tvam mahārāja) kālam maññasi ti, 'When you are ready . . .', but I am open to any better suggestion. 50

A correct analysis of an important formula can lead to an understanding of the development of the Buddha's teaching. 51 A correct understanding of a simple formula, something that is simply a storyteller's device — the utilisation by his characters of the correct, conventional phrases upon taking leave — does not lead to anything quite so grand. It does, however, prevent us from misunderstanding our texts and from projecting our own fantasies about them into our translations and analyses.

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND ABBREVIATIONS

All Pāli texts are cited according to the Pali Text Society's (PTS) editions.

50 This phrase has been translated 'If you consider it to be the right time' by Sara Boin in The Teaching of Vimalakīrti (SBB 32, PTS 1976), which is a completely valid literal rendering.

51 See, e.g., Bronkhorst, 1986.

Horner, I.B. see MLS.
Manné, Joy (1990), 'Categories of Sutta in the Pāli Literature and their implications for our appreciation of the Buddhist Teaching and Literature', JPTS XV, pp.29-87.
PTC = Pāli Tipitaka Concordance, ed. E.M. Hare and others, PTS, London 1952 -.
Wagle, Narendra (1966), Society at the time of the Buddha, Popular Prakashan, Bombay.
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Theravāda, had their own collections of discourses. The Theravāda school, whose tradition has come down to us uninterrupted, is believed to have preserved the Buddha's teachings collected by Mahākassapa and others faithfully and intact. The traditions of other schools could not survive the ravages of time and their collections were lost beyond recovery except for some fragmentary sūtras in Sanskrit. However, parallel to the collections of the Theravāda, known as Nikāyas, there have come down to us other collections in Chinese. For these collections and others, the term A-han, a transliteration of Āgama, has invariably been used in place of Nikāya in Chinese. The earliest use of the term A-han is found in the name of a sūtra, A-han-chêng-hsing-ching, translated by An-shih-kao in the later part of the second century C.E.


2 No complete Āgama text in Sanskrit is extant now. The fragments in Central Asia constitute little more than a dozen. Of them, seven were edited by A.F. Rudolf Hoernle in Manuscript Remains of Buddhist Literature Found in Eastern Turkestan, Oxford 1916, repr. Amsterdam 1970 and Delhi 1988; R. Fischel, S. Lévi, L. de La Vallée Poussin, E. Waldeis et al. are also credited with the editing of fragments (M. Winternitz, A History of Indian Literature II, Calcutta 1933; repr. New Delhi 1972, pp.232 and 234, n.3). See also R. Yamada, 'Agon Rui', Bongobutten no Shobunkin, Tokyo 1959, pp.33ff.

3 Ency. Bud., op. cit., p.245.

Āgamas in Chinese — In the Taishō edition of the Chinese Buddhist Canon, the first two volumes, entitled A-han-ching, contain a set of four Āgamas which are recorded with their translators and dates of translation as follows:

Ch'ang-a-han-ching / Đirghāgama, Buddhayasas and Cho-fon-nien, 412-13 C.E.;
Chung-a-han-ching / Madhyamāgama, Gautama Sanghadeva, 397-8 C.E.;
Tsa-a-han-ching / Śamyuṭāgama, Guṇabhadrā, 435-43 C.E.;
Tsêng-i-a-han-ching / Ekottāgama, Dharmāradī, 384-5 C.E.

In addition to these Āgamas, the volumes include two incomplete translations of the Śamyuṭāgama — the Pieh-tsa-a-han-ching (No.100, 16 fasc., 364 sūtras) translated by an unknown hand during the reign of the Three Ch'in (351-431 C.E.) and the Tsa-a-han-ching (No.101, 1 fasc., 27 sūtras) also by an unknown translator during the time of the Three Kingdoms (220-80 C.E.). An-shih-kao's 'Mixed Sūtras in Forty-four Chapters' (No.150, 1 fasc., 44 sūtras) contains some sūtras of the Ekottāgama. A large number of detached sūtras, whose translation spread over the later Han down to the Northern Sung (148-1058 C.E.), form almost half of the A-han-ching collections. There is no fifth Āgama, Kṣudraka, in these volumes, though there are a few sūtras included in another

volume which correspond to some of the texts of the Khuddaka Nikāya, such as the Dhammapada, Udāna, Āṭṭhavagga of the Suttanipāta, and also to the Udānavarga of the Sarvavātikā tradition. The four Chinese Āgamas do not contain any information about their originals. It was a general practice among translators of Buddhist texts to name the school to which a particular text belonged. The absence of such information in this case could not just have been an oversight on the part of the translators. How could all of them commit the same mistake? In case they did so, it would not have escaped the eagle eyes of later scholars who thoroughly scrutinised the translations before they accepted them as genuine. The whole process gives the appearance of a conspiracy, a wilful suppression of information in order to present the materials as the original doctrinal discourses of the Buddha. Commenting on this, N. Dutt says the various schools were at one in their acceptance of the texts of the Āgamas.

The four Chinese Āgamas form a set, but the same cannot be said about their originals. As their comparison with the Nikāyas has shown, they are similar but not identical, and they are certainly not mere translations of the Nikāyas. The Sarvavātikā tradition adopted Sanskrit as its medium and some fragmentary Sanskrit Āgama sūtras have come down to us. The close affinity of these texts with their counterparts in the Chinese Āgamas led some scholars (earlier) to believe that the latter belonged to the Sarvavātikā tradition. On the contrary, the differences between them led P.V. Prasad to suggest a set of Prakrit Āgamas as the original. However, as the accounts/records say, the complete set of the Āgamas of a particular school or tradition was not taken up for translation. Each Āgama was carried to China separately by different individuals from different places and at different times. Each translation was made by a different individual and his collaborators. Apart from the Dirghāgama, the other three Āgamas were also translated more than once, by different translators and not from the same originals. The fragmentary portions of the Samyuktāgama and the Ekottarāgama, as well as some quotations from the Āgamas in other Chinese and Tibetan texts, convincingly lead us to this conclusion.


However, on the basis of materials found in the Āgamas themselves and also from external evidence, scholars have identified the different schools which inspired the Āgamas. Regarding the school of the Dirghāgama, H. Ui thinks that it belongs to the Dharmagupta school. In support he argues that the translator, Buddhayasas, was a propagator and also a translator of the Dharmagupta's Vinaya. K. Watanabe brings in the same argument and further notes that the absence of the Ājñātiya-sūtra negates the possibility of its relationship with the Sarvāstivāda school, which includes the same in its Vinaya. H. Ui has also pointed out the great significance attributed to the offerings to the Buddha's stūpa, which is in conformity with the teachings of the school. K. Ishikawa, however, cautions us in attributing it to the Dharmagupta alone because it had assimilated the influence of other schools as well, particularly the Sarvāstivāda of Gandhāra.

Although the fragmentary Sanskrit sūtras do not agree word for word with the corresponding portions of the Madhyamāgama, scholars accept (with a fair degree of certainty) that the latter has come from the Sarvāstivāda tradition. Minh Chau, in his comparative study, has also reached the same conclusion and produced some convincing evidence in support. He has quoted H. Sakurabe's finding that the portions quoted from the Sarvāstivāda's Madhyamāgama are strikingly similar to their parallels in the Chinese Madhyamāgama. It will not be out of place to caution the reader that what applies to one may also apply to others. For instance, the total omission of any mention of meat and fish in the Madhyamāgama has brought Minh Chau to support his view that the text belongs to the Sarvāstivāda school. However, the omission extends to all the Āgamas which are acknowledged as belonging to other traditions. Moreover, the Vinaya of the Sarvāstivāda school and also of other schools contains the Buddha's admonition to monks to eat meat and fish blamelessly in three ways — not seen, not heard, and not suspected.

The Samyuktāgama is considered to be a work of the Sarvāstivāda tradition or of a school related to it. According to Lü Cheng, it is evidently of the Mūlasarvāstivāda, because its system agrees well with that of the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya-ksudrakavastu, and the order of the text of the basic portion is in perfect accord with that described in the Samyuktāgama-mātrikā, quoted in the Yogācārabhūmi (fases 85-98). To this it may be added that the omission of the Niruttiriyāpātha Sutta (Samyutta Nikāya III 71-2), which denounces the existence of a part of the

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12 See Hoernle, Manuscript Remains... p.18.
13 Same as n.11.
17 Ibid., pp.24-5.
18 Ibid., p.31.
past and future, negatively makes it more akin to the Sarvāstivāda with the doctrine of sarvamasti — everything exists in all three divisions of time: past, present and future.

Regarding the Ekottaragama, H. Ui and also others are of the opinion that it probably belongs to the Mahāsāṃghika tradition. It show some Mahāyāna influence and some of the theories are akin to those of the Mahāsāṃghika22.

The Chinese Āgamas are translations of the Indian originals. Should we come across the originals, the former may not tally exactly with the latter as is the case with the fragmentary Sanskrit sūtras and their corresponding portions in the Āgamas in Chinese. The Chinese translations do not appear to be identical with the originals because most of the translators, as Sir Charles Bell observed, fell short of our standards of accuracy23. The contents have been amplified and transposed in the originals; the translations also underwent scrutiny and severe editing before being included in the Canon. The translators of the Āgamas were no exception and their versions were subject to omissions, commissions and editorial retouching24.

**Common Source of the Āgamas and Nikāyas** — On the relation between the Chinese Āgamas and Pāli Nikāyas, M. Anesaki has observed that they show 'both agreement to a considerable ex-

tent, and notable divergences25. There is agreement between the materials which are pretty much the same in both, whereas the divergences are limited to the arrangement of the materials26. Anesaki further added, 'the deviations in matter, though usually inconsiderable, are sometimes interesting27. Bapat is of the opinion that the Chinese version is nearer to the Pāli texts than the Sanskrit ones28. Hoernle, who edited fragments of the Sanskrit sūtras, reached the conclusion that 'the Sanskrit text of our fragments differs not inconsiderably from the Pāli29. Taking the case of a particular sūtra, he further adds that 'the Sanskrit version agrees neither with the Pāli, nor with the Chinese, though there is more agreement with the former than the latter30. In a comparative study of the Madhyāgamagama nd the Majjhima Nikāya, Minh Chau has further verified the correctness of earlier observations by scholars and has added that 'the high percentage of similarities ... show that there existed a basic stock, not only of doctrines, but also of texts, agreeing in all essentials with both the Chinese and the Pāli versions31.

Not only similarities but also divergences point to the fact that they are based on a common stock of materials32. In the

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22 Ibid., pp.242 and 248, ibid., p.665.
23 Op. cit., p.294; see also L. Lahirī, 'Interpretation of Buddhist Terminology at the Background of Chinese Traditional Thought', *Buddhist Studies*, Univ. of Delhi 1974, pp.57ff.
26 JRAS 1901, pp.895ff.
27 Ibid., p.897.
30 Ibid., p.18.
diverging portions of the Āgamas and the Nikāyas, there are comparatively older materials. Where did they come from? Certainly from the common stock of the Buddha’s teachings to which the Āgamas and Nikāyas both owe their origin. Listening to the recitation of the Dhamma and Vinaya by Mahākasāpa and other arahats, an elderly monk, Purāṇa by name, expressed his satisfaction with their work but he himself chose to go his own way. Like him, there might have been a number of persons who had gained something personal from the Buddha, but had no chance to have them included in the deliberations of the First Council. Their discourses which remained unrecorded, in a floating state as it were, found their way into the Āgamas and Nikāyas of different schools. With the splitting of the Sangha into small groups, called schools, the opportunity for monks to have their own way in their own affairs increased. This facilitated the tapping and exploitation of the aforesaid floating materials.

Both the similarities and differences help us to form an idea of the common stock of the Buddha’s teachings. The differences are due to independent handling of orally transmitted teachings. Sectarian developments certainly took place, but their scope was confined to certain omissions and insertions, and not much to the fabrication of materials33. The nature of the similarities points to the fact that the teachings at some stage were given a well-organised form. Their divisions into Dirgha, Madhyama, Samyukta and Ekottara were fixed once and for all; the sections and subsections of each were worked out and the


sūtras meant to be preserved were sorted out, though not rigidly. All these might have been the work of the theras of the First Council34. Later, among the schools, the framework was retained, but the sūtras, particularly the short ones because of their flexible character and great number, were interchanged, replaced, or dropped at will.

Āgamas as Authentic as Nikāyas — Some of the schools adopted different languages for their scriptures35. The Āgamas, too, did not remain unaffected. As these languages were of the same family, with a common vocabulary, this dubbing does not imply more than a change in grammatical forms; and this does not reduce their authenticity. The teachings had mnemonic value for the Buddha’s disciples and the latter preserved them as faithfully as they could. Again, the Āgamas were rendered into Chinese and the translations were checked and rechecked in all seriousness. Even in their present form, they present the teachings of the Buddha as authentically as the Nikāyas do. ‘What’s in a name, a rose by any other name smells just as sweet’.

34 Thomas, op. cit., p.157: the arrangements of the four Nikāyas and Āgamas must have originated before sectarian differences became acute.
35 The Buddha allowed his disciples to learn his teachings in their own tongue (Sākkāya niruttīyā buddhavacanam pariśāpputitarā — Cullavagga, Nālandā ed., p.229). True to his instructions, some of the prominent schools adopted different languages as their medium in order to cater for the aspirations of their followers and to give a distinctive feature to their schools. Vinitadeva (eighth century C.E.) informs us that the Sarvāstivādins used Sanskrit, and the Mahāsāṃghikas, Sammitiyas and Sthavīravādins used Prakrit, Abhāramāśa and Paśiṣcī respectively (R. Kimura, ‘Introduction to the History of Early Buddhist Schools’, Sir Asutosh Moorkeree Silver Jubilee Volumes III, Oriant, p.3, Calcutta 1927, p.125; see also E. Obermiller (tr.), History of Buddhism by Bu-ston, Heidelberg 1932, repr. Delhi 1986, p.96).
However, observations such as 'The Pali Tripiṭaka represents the earliest available and most complete collection of Buddhist sacred literature'36 have led the younger generation of Pali scholars in India to believe that the Nikāyas are the only authentic version of the Buddha's teachings. They should not forget that the Nikāyas are not all that came directly from the Buddha's lips and that the texts took quite a long time to reach their present form. Strata in subject-matter and language are conspicuous. The Agamas in their Indian original were synchronous with the Nikāyas in their composition. Hence, more reasonably we subscribe to Anesaki's view that 'it can hardly be said that the present Pali canon was the only version of the Buddha's discourses and that others are mere derivations from it'37.

To conclude, we may say that to whatever school or schools these Chinese Agamas will finally be attributed, they are primary sources for early Buddhist teachings. Any kind of study in this field remains incomplete unless the materials of the Chinese Agamas are tapped and utilised. However, the difficulty is that, being in Chinese, they are terra incognita to most of us. It is, therefore, imperative that they should be made available in English translation to scholars and students38. The task is extremely difficult, but not impossible. We may even have them restored in Sanskrit, Prakrit or Pāli.

36 B.V. Bapat in 2500 Years of Buddhism, p.138.
37 'The Four Buddhist Agamas . . .' p.1.
38 (Ed.) See BSR 2, 1-2 (1985), pp.71-2, on the Bukkyo Dendo Kyokai's plan to translate the entire Chinese Buddhist Canon into English (we have received no progress report on this project).

THE EARLY SPREAD AND INFLUENCE OF BUDDHISM IN WESTERN ASIA

Russell Webb

Although earlier historians of Orientalism have reviewed the first Western contacts, few, if any, have defined the geographical boundaries of the Occident or delineated its eastern extent.

Strictly speaking, the eastern limits of the West are bounded by the Bosphorus and the Urals, but these divide the modern states of Turkey and Russia; politically, the former is considered as part of the 'West' whilst the latter until recently led the 'Eastern bloc' albeit not of the Orient in cultural terms. Possibly as a logical consequence and culmination of the Diaspora, the modern state of Israel is invariably considered, politically, culturally and even ethnically, as a 'Western' country, whereas its half Christian neighbour to the north, Lebanon, is not.

An important consideration to bear in mind is common religious or spiritual aspirations or tendencies. Thus, with the establishment of Zoroastrianism as the state religion at the beginning of the Sassanian era (226-651 CE), Persia became, with its dualistic and theistic eschatology having influenced Judaism and Christianity, the embodiment of the cultural divide

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1 A shortened version of the introductory chapter to the author's projected book on Buddhism in the West.
between East and West. Despite its exclusive ideology, the country continued to serve as a two-way conduit for religious and cultural expressions between East and West until the Arab Muslim conquest created an 'Iron Curtain' which was not to be penetrated until the Mongol invasions and settlements of the twelfth century.

It is with this understanding in mind that we can initiate a preliminary discussion of the extent of Buddhist influence in the 'Western borderlands'. Mindful of the extent of its far-reaching ramifications, however, it may only be possible to provide a few pointers supplemented by details of published works which explore specific issues in greater depth.

** References to Buddhist penetration in Persia proper are few and far between. The Mahāvamsa refers to Mahādeva Thera leading a delegation from Pallavabhoga (i.e. the land of the Pahlavas or Persians) to witness the foundation stone laying of the Mahāthipa (Suvaṇṇamāli or Rūvanvālsāya) at Anuradhapura, Ceylon, in 137 CE. The intrepid Chinese pilgrim monk, Hsüan-tsang (600-64), in his Hsi-yü-chih refers to two or three Sarvāstivādin ārāmas in the kingdom of Po-la-ssē. Otherwise, we have only the sweeping (and unsubstantiated) statement of the Muslim historian, Al-Birūnī (973-1048): 'In former times, Khurāsān, Persia, Iraq, Mosul and the country up

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2 Despite the 'Aryan connection', there is but a single allusion to Buddhism in the Zoroastrian Canon: v.6 of the Farvadin Yasht exohits 'a man . . . who returns a vistor from discussions with Gautema the heretic' (tr. James Darmesteter, The Zend-Avesta II, Sacred Books of the East, Oxford 1883, Delhi 1977, p.184). However, in 'Some References about Buddhism in Iranian Literature and History' (Proceedings and Transactions of the Seventh Indian Oriental Conference [Baroda 1933] 1935, pp.869-79), A. A. Pour-e-Davoud cites Spiegel, Geldner, Justi and Tiele in arguing that Gautema was merely a legendary opponent of Ahura Mazda and 'that in Zoroastrian scriptures neither Buddhism nor its founder Buddha are mentioned directly or indirectly' (p.879).

In the Bundahišn, a treatise completed in the twelfth century but containing traditional materials dating back to classical Iranian times, a list of Zoroastrian demons mentions 'The demon But [Buddha] whom they worship in India and whose spirit dwells in such idols [but] as Bōdāsāp, (she) worshipped'. The Bundahišn, ed. T.D. Anklesaria, Bombay 1908, p.186, II.11-12; tr. B.T. Anklesaria, Zand-Akāsīh. Iranian or greater Bundahišn, Bombay 1956, p.241.


3 The Hellenistic influences in Afghanistan and Pakistan will be discussed in the chapter on Greece in the author's book, Buddhism in the West.
to the frontiers of Syria were Buddhistico.

With Khurāsān in north-east Iran we seem to be on firmer ground insofar as documentation is concerned. The territory

Jātaka 339 which relates the story of the Bodhisatta (the future Buddha Gotama) who, in the form of a peacock, is brought there by Indian merchants. Could this legendary episode allude to the introduction of Buddhism by the (numerous) converts from the vaiśya (mercantile) caste? Less tenable is W. Stede's suggestion (Pali-English Dictionary, Afterword. PTS repr. 1972, p.737, n.3) that the brahmin Bāvari, who features in the Prologue and Epilogue of Sutta-Nipāta V, is a Babylonian. See also R. Morris, 'Are there any traces of Babylonian or Assyrian names in Pāli literature?' (Academy 963, 14.10, 1890; repr. in JPTS 1891–3, 1978), S. Lévi, 'Autour du Bāverū-Jātaka' (Annuale de l'ÉPHE, Paris 1913–14) and E. Sluszkievicz, Pāli Bāverū "Babylon" (Rozczeń Orientalistycey XI, Warsaw 1980).

One of the few pieces of tangible evidence to suggest a concrete link between India and Arabia is a figure of a dancing girl found at Khor Rori, Dhofar, in the modern state of Yemen. Dated from the second century CE and probably emanating from Gujarāt, it could well have formed part of a private shrine of a Jain or Buddhist merchant (Hermann Goetz, 'A Unique Indian Bronze from South India', Journal of the Oriental Institute of Baroda XII, 1963, and Archaeologia XVI, Cambridge Mass. 1963).


9 See, e.g. W. Sundermann, 'Die Bedeutung des Parthischen für die Vorbereitung buddhistischer Wörter indische Herkunft' (Altorientalische Forschung—

formed an independent kingdom from c.250 BCE until the advent of the Sassanian Empire in 226 CE. The names of a number of Parthian Buddhists (mainly Hinayānists) have been recorded in the annals of China which called the kingdom (of Parthia — Arsak) An-hsi — hence all Dharmadūtas bore the prefix 'An': An Shih-kao (= Pārthamaśri?) was a prince of the second century who abdicated in favour of his uncle, entered the Sangha and studied the Abhidharma and meditation techniques. In 147 he travelled (possibly by sea via Canton) to Loyang, the capital of Honan province in China, mastered the language and translated sūtras from the Āgamas, particularly those dealing with samatha and vipaśyanā.

An-hsian was an upāsaka who went to Loyang before 181 and translated Prajñāpāramitā texts.

An Fa-hsien (= Dharmabhadra) was a bhikṣu who flourished at

the time of the Wei dynasty (220-64).
An Fa-ch'īn¹⁴, also translated texts at Loyang, between 281-306.
T'an (wu-)ti¹⁵ (= Dharmasatya) translated a Dharmaguptaka Vinaya text (Taishō No.1433) in 254.
Chi-tsan¹⁶ (549-623) came from Parthia and composed a
descriptive work on the Buddhist Schools (Taishō No.1852).

According to Yang Hsüan-chih's Lo-yang ch'ieh-lan chi (Taishō No.2092)¹⁷, the legendary founder of Ch'an Buddhism in sixth century China, Bodhidharma, came from Po-sū-hu-jen which has been identified as Persia or an Iranised state in Central Asia which would point to Khotan or Sogdiana. Certainly, his radical method of practice hardly accords with his alleged brahmin background and upbringing in South India and one suspects that his Chinese followers felt obliged to legitimise the new movement by claiming a connection with India, the 'holy land' and therefore the authentic source of the Buddha-dharma¹⁸.

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The syncretic tenets of Mānī (217-76), a native of what is now Iraq, are well enough known and several writers have paid attention to the Indian (although not necessarily the Buddhist)

derivation and complexion of his doctrines¹⁹ which, in turn, influenced the Western Gnostics and Cathari. Indeed, the Christian eremetical and monastic manifestations in Syria arose as a direct consequence of the former Manichaean presence. Another factor to bear in mind was the presence of the Aramaic-speaking proto-Gnostic community — the Mandaean²⁰.


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¹⁴ Ibid.
¹⁶ Lamotte, History, p.537.
¹⁷ Tr. by Yi-t'ing Wang as A Record of Buddhist Monasteries in Lo-Yang, Princeton University Press, 1983.
— which had migrated from Palestine in the first century to Maishan in the lower Tigris-Euphrates valley, the homeland of Mānī. Moreover, whilst debating the possible proto-Mandaean affiliation of the latter’s father, Patek, who resided in the capital city of Ctesiphon, L.J.R. Ort makes the startling statement that ‘The temple (or: sanctuary) where Patek used to go may have belonged to the following religions: Zoroastrianism, Zervanism, the cults of Mithra or of Anahita, Buddhism, the Jewish religion, Christianity, or a gnostic religious community’.

Influencing the contemporary Semitic religions in the West, could not the Mandaens themselves have been influenced by developments further east? Maishan (modern Basra?) was as much an international entrepôt at the top of the Persian Gulf as Alexandria (reached via the Red Sea); if a community of Indian Buddhist merchants (even bhikṣus) could establish itself in the latter, why not in the former which was more accessible by sea from India or overland from Afghanistan during the Kusāṇa era?

‘In “one year of his reign”, i.e. of Taxmōrūp, Bōdāsp [= Bodhisattva in Middle Persian] appeared and founded the astrological lore of the Sābians: covering both religious communities known in Islamic times by this name — the Sābians of Harrān [north-western Iraq] and the Mandaean Baptists of the South Mesopotamian swamps. Mas‘ūdi [d. 965] well knows that this Bōdāsp is of Indian origin. He is supposed to have emigrated via Iran to the West. His astrology was a renewal and spiritualisation of the older idolatry. The Persians, too, were supposed to have been followers of the Bōdāsp’s Sabaean religion before Zarathustra converted them. Ḥamaza establishment of the Sunga dynasty — an argument that is enhanced by the fact that brahmans were forbidden to cross the sea on pain of incurring ritual pollution and possible expulsion from caste membership (see Sedlar, ‘Travellers Indian and Greek’, India and the Greek World, op. cit.).


24 Maqoudi (op. cit., IV, 1865, pp.44, 2 – 45, 9), Christensen (op. cit., pp.194–5), Sundermann (op. cit.).

25 M.J. de Goeje (ed) Kitab at-tanbih wal-ischrāf auctore al-Mas‘ūdī (Leiden 1894, pp.90, 13 – 91, 1), Christensen (op. cit., p.195), Sundermann (op. cit.).
al-Iṣfahānī described and explained in detail why idolatry developed under Taxmūrūp. Then came Būdāsp, who introduced fasting and gave the traditional religion an ascetic turn.26 It has been suggested ‘that the Harrānians adopted the Buddha, together with Hermes Trismegistos, as founder of their religion, and even identified the two’27

Arabic histories identify Indian settlements in Arabia and neighbouring territories and these included the ahmara or hantra — ‘the red-clad people from Sind’ — so-named after their saffron-coloured robes. It has been suggested that these were bhikṣus resident at Kūfah28 — a centre of learning ninety miles south of Baghdad — and on the Persian Gulf29. Moreover, the Tārikh-i-Tabarī has mentioned the names of three ahmari renowned commentators during the time of Caliph Abū Bakr. It may be presumed that this group was primarily engaged in scholastic pursuits and also might have interpreted the Buddhist philosophy to the Arabs.30 It has also been stated (albeit not substantiated) that ‘Many Buddhist texts (Jārakas) were translated into Arabic and Asvaghosa’s Buddhacarita was edited and modified by Arab writers31 and that ‘The Islamic sidja (prostration), ahrām (garb of worship during the Ḥaj), tawāf (circumambulation) of Ka‘ba have close resemblance to the mode of worship of the Buddhists’32.

Despite the triumph of an aggressive Islam, some of the quietist characteristics of Buddhism surfaced in the mystical Sufi movement. This was initially centred on Balkh, a noted Buddhist site in Afghanistan where, until their conversion to Islam c.705, the Barmaki (from barmak, ‘head priest’) had acted as hereditary wardens of the Nawbahār33 ( = Nāvavihāra or Nāvasanghārāma) which, sixty years later, they were alleged to have plotted to restore to its former glory. (Yahya ibn Barmak, the grandson of the last such warden became vizir of Caliph Haroun al-Rashid and was instrumental in listing ‘Indian faiths and religions’ in the Arabic catalogue, Kitāb al-Fihrist.)

27 Christensen (op. cit., pp.199, 203), Sundemann (op. cit., p.338).
29 The latter observation was made by W. Ball in ‘Two Aspects of Iranian Buddhism’ Bulletin of the Asian Institute of Pahlavi University, NS II, 1-4, Shiraz 1976, pp.103-27) who tentatively identified the Chehel-khāneh Caves at Zīr Rāh as having belonged to an Indian Buddhist community of the seventh-eighth century.
30 Abidi/Siddiqi, op. cit., pp.31/582. Tabarī’s chronicle was edited by M.J. de Goeje for the series Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum, Leiden 1879.
32 Siddiqi (ibid.).
33 This monastery, the main regional centre of pilgrimage, was described in detail by Ibn al-Faqīh Hamadhānī (early tenth century) whose work, Kitāb al-Buldān, was edited by de Goeje (Bibl. Geogr. Arab., 1885). In the early thirteenth century, on the eve of the Mongol conquest when the valley was denuded of all life for six centuries, Yaqui (ibn ‘Abd Allah, al-Ḥamawi) described the ‘two immense idols’ of the standing Buddha at Bāmlān: ‘carved in the rock and rising from the foot of the mountain to the summit... One cannot see anything comparable to these statues in the whole world’ — quoted from Benjamin Rowland, The Art of Central Asia (New York 1974, No original source indicated).
The far-reaching spiritual influence of the Nawbahār warrants our attention. It now transpires\(^{34}\) that there was a cluster of sites bearing the same name, mainly concentrated at Khurāsān but also as far west as the modern border with Iraq and at Bukhara and Samarkand in Uzbekistan. ‘Since there have been no finds of Buddhist remains in Iran and since no one has as yet excavated any of the sites named Naw Bahār, no material connection can be drawn between the Naw Bahārs of Iran and the Buddhist Naw Bahār of Balkh; but geographical distribution may be added to the already strong circumstantial case for making the connection. The great concentration of Naw Bahārs in north-eastern Iran, and in particular at the point where the road from Herat and the road from Bukhara join to form the Khurāsān Highway, the main east-west route in Iran, fits well with the idea of Buddhism spreading westward from its stronghold in eastern Afghanistan and becoming progressively attenuated the further it went\(^{35}\). ‘What particular doctrines may have distinguished the Buddhism of the Naw Bahār from other types of Buddhism we have no way of knowing at present. Politically, however, the geographical distribution of Naw Bahār place-names, assuming they betray ancient sites of other monasteries, indicates that the Buddhism of Naw Bahār was overwhelmingly Iranian in character. Perhaps it is best to see in the Naw Bahār at Balkh the last functioning segment of what was once a string of monasteries stretching from Bactria to Kurdistan and devoted to a form of Buddhism that was uniquely identified with Iranian speakers\(^{36}\).

Despite the destruction of the monasteries west of Balkh at the hands of an intolerant Zoroastrian régime prior to the Arab invasion, the popular sympathy for Buddhism in Khurāsān remained. Moreover, these institutions retained a reputation as educational centres for centuries after they had lost their purely religious identification\(^{37}\) and, indeed, led to the creation of the Islamic madrasa (which originated in the above Iranian province in the ninth century).

‘It is known that Buddhist works were translated into Arabic during the Abbasid period, especially in the reigns of Al-Mansūr and Harun Al-Rashid\(^{38}\). Early Muslim historical literature refers to Buddhist monks and temples. For example, al-Shahrastānī (1076-1153) in his Kitāb al-milāl wan Nihāl gives a coherent account of the tenets of Buddhism, whilst contemporaries describe the Buddha as the prophet of the samāniyya (Sanskrit, śramaṇas; Gandhāri, samana), the term for Buddhists in Iran. Writers have also provided some indication of the extent, in Iran, of Buddhism and its subsequent influence, albeit intangible, on Islam\(^{39}\).

36 Ibid, p.144.
37 Ibid, p.145.
39 In chronological order, Alfred Kremer, *Kulturgeschichtliche Streifzüge auf dem Gebiete des Islams* (Vienna 1873), Ignác Goldziher, ‘A Buddhizmus hatása az Iszláma’ (a lecture delivered to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, in March 1903) summarised by Th. Duka as ‘The Influence of Buddhism upon Islam’ (UARAS, London 1904) and incorporated in the former’s *Vorlesungen über den Islam* (Heidelberg 1910, 1925), V.V. Barthold, ‘Der iranische Buddhismus und sein Verhältnis zum Islam’ (Oriental Studies in
Following the Arab conquest, Arabic became the medium for transmitting Indian culture to the West. The most renowned example of a legend that received this treatment and which had far-reaching consequences was that of Barlaam and Josaphat. What follows is based mainly on the definitive study by D.M. Lang.

Arada Kàlâma (the ascetic teacher of the Buddha-to-be) — Barlaam — Balahvar instructs the Bodhisattva — Bûdhâsaî (Arabic) — Yûdâsaî (or Bodys, Persian) — Iodosaf (Georgian) — Iosaph (Greek) — Josaphat (Latin). Although there is no direct Sanskrit original upon which the Arabic and Western legends are based, in extolling asceticism and renunciation the closest parallel text is the Buddhacarita. The Manichaeans had, in the eighth century and possibly through the medium of Sogdian, conveyed the legend from Central Asia to the Arabs. (Note: PwysB — Bôdisaf — Old Turkic, Bodisav = Bodhisattva, Sutadun = Suddodhana, and Chinak = Chandaka or Channa.) Arabic ‘lives’ of the Buddha (translated from Pahlavi) composed between 767-815, comprised Kitâb al-Budd (‘Book of the Buddha’) and Kitâb Bûdhâsaî mufrad (‘Book of Buddha by himself’). The former was later incorporated in Kitâb Bilahwar wa-Bûdhâsaî (‘Book of Bilahwar and Bûdhâsaî’), versified by the Baghdad poet, Abân al-Lâhiki (750-815), but no longer extant; the most complete available text is the ‘Book of Bilahwar and Bûdhâsaif, with Exhortations and Parables filled with Wisdom’.

The second original work only survived in the form of a chapter in Nihâyat al-Irâb fi Akhar al-Furs wa'l-Arab, attributed to Ibn al-Mukaffa.

The earliest surviving Arabic version of the legend was included in a Shi‘a work, Kitâb ikmâl al-din wa’l-imâm al-ma‘ma (‘Book of the Perfection of Faith and the Accomplishment of Felicity’), composed by Ibn Bâbûya of Qum (d.991), whilst a

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41 Published by Shaykh Nür al-Dîn ibn Jûvakhân (Safidarian Printing Press, Bombay 1888–9) and tr. by Baron Viktor R. Rosen under the title Povest'o Varlaame pustynnike i Iosafe tsareviche indiyiskom (ed. L.Yu. Krachkovsky, Moscow 1947).
42 Summarised by E.J. Browne (JRAS 1900) and tr. by V.R. Rosen (Mémoires de la section orientale de la Société impériale d'Archéologie de Russie, St. Petersburg 1901–2).
43 The relevant sections were analysed by S. Oldenburg under the title Persidsky izvod povesti o Varlaame i Iosafe (Mémoires... St. Petersburg 1890). The same Shi‘ite theologian copied or translated other stories which were undoubtely derived from Indian Buddhist originals, ed. and tr. by S.M. Stern and Sofie Walzer in Three Buddhist stories in an Arabic version, Oxford 1971.
44 At the VIIth International Congress of Orientalists (Vienna 1886), Fritz Hommel presented ‘Die älteste arabischen Barlaam-Version’ (published in Proceedings I, Vienna 1888). This admittedly defective text, dating from 1688 and housed in the library of the Deutsche Morgenländischen Gesellschaft (Halle), was subsequently tr. by E. Rehtsek as ‘The Book of the King’s Son and the Ascetic’ (JRAS 1890). Finally, at the end of the seventeenth century,
Spanish rabbi, Abraham bar Samuel Halevi ibn Hasdāy (or Chisdai, d. c.1220), produced a Hebrew metrical translation — 'The King's Son and the Ascetic'\textsuperscript{44}.

The Georgian Life of the Blessed Iodasaph\textsuperscript{45}, preserved in an eleventh century manuscript in the Greek Patriarchal Library, Jerusalem, 'is a direct adaption of the Arabic story of the Bodhisattva in a Christian context, and thus lies at the base of all the Christian versions of the Barlaam and Ioasaph romance\textsuperscript{46} ... despite the composite, indeed disparate elements of which the Christian legend of Barlaam and Ioasaph is composed, it manages to retain a surprisingly large element of the authentic teachings of Gautama Buddha\textsuperscript{47}.

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The intrusion of the Mongols put a temporary check to rampant Islam and even reversed the declining fortunes of Buddhism. A grandson of Genghis Khan, Hulegu (1217-65), conquered Persia from 1253 and established the Il-khan dynasty with the capital at Marāgeh (later Tabriz). His son, Abagha (d. 1282), was Buddhist and married a Christian. Their son, Arghūn (ruled 1284-91), endeavoured to establish Buddhism as the state religion but this final effort to stabilise the westernmost territorial limit of Buddhism was completely undone by his successor who became known as Mahmud Ghāzān (1271-1304). Although educated by bhikṣus, he was persuaded to embrace Islam prior to his coronation in 1295 — if only to legitimise his rule in the eyes of the predominantly Muslim population. Despite the attempt of bhikṣus to reconvert Ūlejtū (1305-16) — who was successively Christian, Buddhist and Muslim — to Buddhism, the religious complexion of the country has remained unchanged ever since\textsuperscript{48}.

Only fragmentary evidence of Buddhist settlements during the Mongol occupation of Persia has survived, e.g. previously inhabited caves at Rasat-khāneh, Marāgeh, have been dated to

\textsuperscript{44} Tr. by Nathan Weissowitz as Prinz und Derwisch, Munich 1890.

\textsuperscript{45} Published by I.V. Abuladze, Tbilisi 1957.


\textsuperscript{47} Lang, op. cit., p.17.

\textsuperscript{48} For a brief survey of this era see A. Bausani, 'Religion under the Mongols' in J.A. Boyle (ed.), The Cambridge History of Islam 5 (1968).
the thirteenth century\textsuperscript{49}. Otherwise, the only tangible signs of any Buddhist influence lie in the fields of art and architecture\textsuperscript{50}.

In 1305 Rashid ad-Din composed a ‘Life and Teaching of Buddha’\textsuperscript{51}. The only full-length work of its kind, it provides a unique picture of the Indian-based, non-Mongol lamaistic, system of Buddhism that prevailed prior to Ghāzān Khan’s conversion a decade earlier. The author’s informant, Kamālaśrī Bakṣī (a hermit from Kasmīr), obviously quoted from the texts of which only the Arabic titles have survived. A further three texts have also been identified with Sanskrit originals\textsuperscript{52}.


\textsuperscript{51} Summarised in English by Karl Jahn in Central Asiatic Journal 2, Wiesbaden 1956.


- The next development to consider is that of Gnosticism, a fusion of Oriental, Platonic and Christian ideas that has been described as ‘Orientalism in a Hellenic mask’\textsuperscript{53}. We need only mention two prominent representatives. First, Basilides (or Basileides), a Hellenised Egyptian or Syrian of the second century CE, who heard of Buddhism from Indian merchants from the port of Barygazā in Gujarāt and from Ceylon. His main work, the Exegesica, ‘a commentary on the Gospels’, was quoted by St. Clement of Alexandria in his Stromata. However, Basilides ‘adopts the Buddhist philosophy, but not the Buddhist religion; the Buddhist faith is nothing to him. And it is as a metaphysic, not a religion, that Buddhism first penetrated to the West’\textsuperscript{54}. Basilides accepted the presence of duhkha qualified, nevertheless, by positing (the propensity to) sin as a prime cause. The doctrine of karma and transmigration\textsuperscript{55} (citing St. John ix 2


\textsuperscript{54} J. Kennedy, ‘Buddhist Gnosticism, the System of Basileides’ (JRAS 1902, p.388) on which the following account is based. See also Gilles Quispel, ‘L’homme gnostique (La doctrine de Basileide)’, Eranos XVI, Zürich 1948.

\textsuperscript{55} This doctrine was firmly held and developed in antiquity only by the Indians, Gauls and Lithuanians. It was transmitted by the Cymni or Cimmerians of Asia Minor during the sixth century BCE to Phrygians and Pythagorans. Under the term gigül the doctrine was even introduced into the Hebrew tradition via one of the books of the Kabbalah, Sefer ha-bahir (‘Book of Brightness’), dating from the late twelfth century and probably composed in Provence (France). This text has been tr. by Ronald C. Kienzler and included in The Early Kabbalah (ed. Joseph Dan, New York 1986). See Margaret Smith, ‘Reincarnation in Jewish Thought’ (The Aryan Path XIII, Bombay 1942) and the Jewish sections in Joseph Head and S.L. Cranston (ed.), Reincarnation...
and Romans vii 9) were also accepted. He propounded five entities of spirit and matter (cp. skandhas) and would appear to have denied the concepts of soul and a personal Creator God in the accepted brahmanical and later Christian sense of these terms.

A contemporary, neo-Gnostic, teacher was Bardasanes (or Bardaisan) who was b. 154 in Edessa (= Urfa in modern Turkey) — an independent Parthian city-state which was annexed by Rome in 216. He was converted to Christianity in 179 but was later excommunicated and died in exile in 222. Towards the end of his life he met an embassy from India passing through Syria to the Roman emperor, Elagabalus, in 218. From the leading delegate, Dandamis, he learnt of Indian religious doctrines and practices and subsequently alluded to bhikṣus (‘samanaeans’ - śramanas) in a fragment of a lost work preserved by the Greek Neoplatonist, Porphyrios (Porphyry), in his treatise ‘On Abstinence from Animal Food’.

Despite the attention given to Gnosticism as a whole in recent years, very little has been written on the Indian


60 This observation is disputed by B.N. Mukherjee who, in the sole full-length study of the Aramaic inscriptions — Studies in the Aramaic Edicts of Asoka (Calcutta 1984, p.11) — maintains that it is the rock on which the edict is inscribed that was called Tdmr (or Trmd).
Philadelphos (Egypt, 285-247), Magas (Cyrene, North Africa, c.258-250), Antigonus Gonatos (Macedonia, 276-239) and Alexander (Corinth, 252-244, or of Epirus, 272-255).

The Anglican theologian, Henry Mansel (1821-70), maintained that the philosophy and rites of the Therapeutae were derived from these Dharmadūtas within two generations of Alexander the Great, a view shared by F. Schelling, Schopenhauer, C. Lassen and E. Renan. Whether this statement is accurate or not, 'The Therapeutae ... appear to have sprung from a union of the Alexandrian Judaism with the precepts and modes of life of the Buddhist devotees, ... in their ascetic life, in their mortification of the body and their devotion to pure contemplation, we may trace at least a sufficient affinity to the Indian mystics to indicate a common origin'. Their

61 Quoted by Arthur Lillie in Buddhism in Christendom, London 1887, p.75. In fact, the time scale is incorrect by at least fifty years: Alexander died in 323 BCE whereas the Dharmadūtas despatched by the Third Council in Pāṭaliputra would not have started before 246. A similar chronological discrepancy attends the argument of Vladas Stanka (The Star from the East and Asoka's Wheel, The Maha Bodhi 71, 1962), who maintains that the Three Kings in the Gospel of St. Matthew symbolised the (alleged) presence of Dharmadūtas — the 'Wise Men from the East'. See also Christian-Buddhist Encounter in Medieval Central Asia (The Cross and the Lotus, ed. Houston, op. cit.) where H.-J. Klimkeit cites (on p.17) an Old Turkic text which implies that the 'three precious gifts' from the Magi are the tirana.


See also Philo's nine-point observation quoted by Samuel Beal in Abstract of Four Lectures on Buddhist Literature in China (London 1882; Delhi 1988, pp.162-3); William M.F. Petrie, Personal Religion in Egypt before Christ—nomenclature derived from the Greek for 'healers', 'devotees' or 'attendants', the adherents settled on the shores of Lake Mareotis, near Alexandria. The only contemporary account of them is contained in De Vita Contemplativa by Philo Judaeus (c.20 BCE - 45 CE)3, a Hellenised Jew who lived in Alexandria.

Concerning the Essenes, the other Jewish sect, 'whether the Essenes owed their rules of life to Buddhist influences in Palestine or not, the agreement of these rules with Buddhism is very remarkable. Nor is there any difficulty in supposing that a knowledge of Buddhism had reached as far as Judea, before Christ. It would be strange, considering the close intercourse between the Greek Bactrian kingdom and Syria, if it had not. Buddhism in India undoubtedly owed much to Greek art in Bactria; and the same workmen who were employed at Taxila, may have worked at Antioch. At least, there is no improbability in such a supposition.'

'At any rate, when the Greek Bactrian kingdom was overthrown, we may reasonably suppose that many of the colonists would return to lands nearer home, and seek intercourse with their brethren in Syria, and, perhaps, among the Macedonian colonists in Samaria.'

The Greeks were supplanted by Parthians — and not only do we find Parthian Buddhists, but we read of Parthians among

the Jews at Jerusalem keeping Pentecost. Both Josephus and Philo provide graphic descriptions of the daily life of the Essenes who were centred on Qumrán, near the Dead Sea. Their communities flourished between 150 BCE and 70 CE and they numbered approximately 4,000 according to the Roman historian, Pliny the Elder (23-79 CE).

However, both these communities died out in the first century CE, a good two centuries before the rise of Christian movements which were directly influenced by Manichaean examples in Syria rather than Egypt. The initial contacts and dialogue between Buddhism and Christianity, and those in more recent times, have been surveyed more extensively elsewhere.

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Summing up, a Buddhist community, recognisable as such, was never established in the Mediterranean area or, indeed, anywhere in the West proper. The only exception might be made in the case of the international emporium of Alexandria in Egypt where individual Buddhist merchants from India could well have formed part of the transient population. É. Lamotte concluded an essay with the statement (in translation): '... it [Buddhism] disdained the Western world, which was indifferent to hostile to the Good Word...'. Lucette Boulois, on the other hand, suggests reasons for the tangible absence of Buddhists in Europe — notably the formidable economic and ideological barrier of Persia. However, she continues by generalising over the supposed greater knowledge of bramanical philosophy, citing Jean Filliozat who, in an edited translation of *Katā pasōn airēseōn elenchos or Philosophumena* ('Refutation of all heresies') by [Bishop] St. (Romanus) Hippolytus (d. c.240), cautiously attempts to relate each doctrine to that to be found in the Upaniṣads. But even he admits that the primary source of the bishop's information derives from the Greek ambassador Megasthenes' reports four centuries earlier! In any case, it can be argued that the main thrust of the Christian polemic was aimed at the Gnostics who had accepted Indian metaphysical views indiscriminately.

Boulois ends her brief discussion on this subject with the remark that 'Buddhism, in spite of all it had in common with contemporary Western thought, scarcely impinged upon Western consciousness; it was Hindu ideas that made their mark. A

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64 S. Beal, op. cit., pp.159-60.
65 Ibid., pp.160–2. Beal then favourably compares the Essene observances with those of both bhikṣus and upāsakas (pp.164–5). However, J.J. Modi (Who were the Persian Magi, who influenced the Jewish Sect of the Essenes?, *Festschrift Moriz Winternitz*, Leipzig 1933) argues that the Maga, a celibate sub-sect of Zoroastrianism, exerted a direct influence on the Essenes whose name is derived from *ashavan* (holy) in the Zend Avesta.
66 See, e.g. Arthur Lillie, *The Influence of Buddhism on Primitive Christianity* (London 1893) and Sedlar, 'Christian-Buddhist Affinities', *India and the Greek World* (op. cit.).

doctrine undergoes ideological attack when it becomes important enough to be a menace; and doubtless Brahmanism aroused too much interest for the liking of convinced Christians. No such attack was necessary in the case of Buddhism, for this religion made almost no impression on Western thought70. However, far from having anything in common with Western thought (certainly posterior to the ideas generated by the Athenian Academy), the essential Buddhadharma was ahead of the prevailing mental attitude, even of that of the most liberally-inclined Gnostics, obsessed as they were with cosmological speculations and, as everywhere in the West, unable to conceive of a system of thought and practice disconnected from some form of theism.

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70 The Silk Road, op. cit., p.105.

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EKOTTARĀGAMA (XIV)

Traduit de la version chinoise par
Thîch Huyên-Vi

Fascicule septième
Partie 16

3. "Ainsi ai-je entendu. Une fois quand le Buddha résidait à Srückasti, dans le bois de Jeta, au parc d'Anāthapindada, il disait aux bhikṣu: Je vais établir deux comparaisons [du comportement humain]: celle avec le comportement du corbeau et celle avec le comportement du cochon. Ecoutez bien et réfléchissez bien. Voici la comparaison de l'homme avec le corbeau:

Celui qui habite dans un lieu calme, cherche souvent à satisfaire ses désirs sexuels, pratique de mauvaises habitudes, puis par pudeur il regrette et cherche une personne respectable pour parler des ses actes indignes. Pourquoi? Parce qu'il est critiqué par des honnêtes gens, et qu'il se repent. C'est comme le corbeau qui a peur de la faim, mange de la chair pourrie, puis il frotte son bec pour l'essuyer parce qu'il a peur que d'autres corbeaux savent qu'il a mangé de la pourriture.

'Voici la comparaison de l'homme avec le cochon: Celui qui habite dans un lieu calme, cherche à satisfaire ses désirs sexuels, à pratiquer de mauvaises habitudes, mais il est impudent, il ne regrette pas ce qu'il a fait, au contraire il s'vante de son courage, de sa compétence dans la satisfaction des

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1 Voir T 2, 579a2- et suiv.
cinq désirs fondamentaux de l'homme². Il se sent supérieur aux autres parce qu'il a eu des plaisirs que d'autres ne connaissent pas. C'est comme le cochon qui mange des aliments malsains, qui se couche sur des saletés, gambade de joie en s'adressant aux autres cochons.

C'est pourquoi, ô bhikṣu, il faut éviter [ces deux comportements]. Vous devez apprendre sérieusement cela. — Ayant entendu ces paroles du Bouddha, les bhikṣu étaient heureux et les mettaient respectueusement en pratique.

4. ‘Ainsi ai-je entendu… le Bouddha résidait à Śrāvastī… il disait aux bhikṣu: Je vais vous parler des gens qui se comportent comme un âne et d'autres qui se comportent comme un buffle. Écoutez et réfléchissez bien.

‘Voici celui qui se comporte comme un âne. Il a les cheveux, les moustaches et la barbe rasés, il porte les trois vêtements religieux, il a la foi solide — c'est pourquoi il a quitté sa famille pour être admis dans le saṃgha³. Cependant il n'a pas la pureté sensorielle⁴ quand il voit quelque chose, de nombreuses illusions sont nées dans son esprit et de nombreux sentiments sont nés dans son coeur, il ne sait pas maîtriser ses sensations visuelles; il en est de même pour l'ouïe, l'odorat, le goût et le toucher; il ne sait pas maîtriser ses pensées, il se laisse entraîner par des idées malsaines. Il ne sait non plus maîtriser ses mouvements pour avoir une démarche et des postures correctes. Il ne sait pas porter les vêtements religieux et le bol à aumône comme il faut. En le voyant, ceux qui mènent la vie brahmique (brahma-kyaya) rigolent et disent: ‘Cet imbécile a l'air d'un moine, mais un moine ne lui ressemble certainement pas'. Il réplique tout de suite à haute voix: ‘Je suis aussi un moine! Je suis aussi un moine!'. C'est comme un âne parmi les buffles; il dit: ‘Je suis aussi un buffle!', alors que oreilles, cornes, queue, voix, tout est différent; et les buffles, en le voyant, lui donnent des coups de cornes et des coups de pieds pour le chasser.

‘Voici celui qui se comporte comme un buffle. Il a les cheveux, les moustaches et la barbe rasés, il porte les trois vêtements religieux, il a la foi solide — c'est pourquoi il a quitté sa famille pour être admis dans le saṃgha. Il a obtenu la pureté sensorielle⁵: il mange et boit avec modération, il ne manque jamais les séances de pratique religieuse et il est résolu à développer les trente-sept auxiliaires de l'illumination (saptarimśad bodhipāksikā dharmān). Quand il voit quelque chose, il ne laisse pas son esprit entraîner par des illusions visuelles, ni son cœur par des sentiments de désir ou de haine; il essaye de voir chaque chose telle qu'elle est; ceci fait naître en lui la bonté naturelle et fait disparaître toutes les mauvaises idées. Il en est de même quand il entend, quand il sent, quand ilgoûte, ou quand il touche. Grâce à cela son esprit est pur et son coeur serein. En le voyant de loin, ceux qui mènent la vie brahmique se disent: ‘Nous avons de la chance d'avoir un camarade de classe comme lui'; puis ils viennent volontiers pour subvenir à ses besoins de telle façon qu'il ne lui manque de

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2 C-a-d 'les cinq désirs qui naissent des objets des cinq sens: les choses vues, entendues, senties, goûtées ou touchées. Aussi les cinq désirs de la richesse, de la luxure, de la nourriture et des boissons, du renom et du sommeil' (Soothill et Houdous, Dict. of Chin. Buddh. Terms, p.121).
3 Litt. 'pour étudier le Chemin ou la Vérité.'
4 Litt. 'ses organes sensoriels ne sont pas établis'.
5 Litt. 'ses organes sensoriels sont calmes et établis'.
rien. C’est comme un bon buffle parmi les buffles, car leur pelage, leur queue, leurs oreilles, leurs cornes, leur voix se ressemblent tous. Les autres buffles viennent le lécher partout pour témoigner leur sympathie.

‘C’est pourquoi, ô bhikṣu! il faut faire comme le buffle et non pas comme l’âne. Vous devez apprendre sérieusement cela’.

Ayant entendu ces paroles de Bouddha... en pratique.

5. ‘Ainsi ai-je entendu... le Bouddha résidait à Śrāvasti... il disait aux bhikṣu: Je vais vous parler de ce qui est bien et de ce qui est mal. Ecoutez et réfléchissez bien.

‘1. Tuer est mal, respecter la vie est bien.
‘2. Voler est mal, respecter la propriété d’autrui est bien’.
‘3. La luxure est mal, s’en abstenir est bien.
‘4. Mentir est mal, dire la vérité est bien.
‘5. La médisance est mal, s’abstenir de la médisance est bien’.
‘6. Parler pour créer un affrontement entre deux personnes est mal, parler pour créer la compréhension entre deux personnes est bien’.
‘7. La parole inconsiderée est mal, s’abstenir de la parole inconsiderée est bien.
‘8. La convoitise est mal, s’abstenir de la convoitise est bien.
‘9. La colère est mal, la sérénité est bien.
‘10. La vue fausse est mal, la vue correcte est bien.

7 Litt: ‘prendre seulement ce qui est donné est bien’.
8 ‘La médisance’ littéralement ‘les propos sensuels, les remarques impolites’.
9 Litt: ‘deux langues est mal...’

‘Celui qui pratique ces mauvaises actions tombera dans l’animalité, dans la voie des fantômes affamés, dans l’enfer.

‘Celui qui pratique ces bonnes actions bénéficiera du bonheur dans le ciel, en ce monde des hommes, ou dans le monde des asuras’.

‘C’est pourquoi, ô bhikṣu, il faut éviter les mauvaises actions et pratiquer les bonnes. Vous devez apprendre sérieusement cela.

Ayant entendu ces paroles du Bouddha... en pratique.

6. ‘Ainsi ai-je entendu... le Bouddha résidait à Śrāvasti... il disait aux bhikṣu: Je vais vous prêcher la Doctrine subtile, belle au commencement, belle au milieu, belle à la fin, avec son sens et sa teneur, manifestant la vie brahmique dans son intégrale plénitude. Il y a deux dharma. Ecoutez et réfléchissez bien. C’est la distinction entre:

la vue fausse et la vue correcte,

10 Contraire à l’EA qui considère heureuse la renaissance comme un asura, selon la tradition pali, c’est apāya, un état de malheur et de perte; cf. par ex. livutaka 93.
la conception fausse et la conception correcte,
la parole fausse et la parole correcte,
la manière de vivre fausse et la manière de vivre
correcte,
l’effort faux et l’effort correcte,
l’attention fausse et l’attention correcte,
la concentration fausse et la concentration correcte13.

Voilà, je vous ai montré le domaine de ce qui est faux et le
domaine de ce qui est correct. Le Tathāgata a fait tout ce qu’il
7. ‘Ainsi ai-je entendu... le Bouddha résidait à Śrāvasti... il
disait aux bhikṣu: Je vais vous parler du flambeau du Dharma,
et je vais vous montrer aussi les actions qui créent ce flambeau.
Ecoutez bien et réfléchissez bien. Le flambeau éclairant est la
fin de la convoitise, de la colère et de l’ignorance. Les actions
qui créent ce flambeau sont: la vue correcte, la conception
correcte, la parole correcte, l’action correcte, la manière de vivre
correcte, l’effort correcte, l’attention correcte et la concentration
correcte14. C’est donc le bon karma qui crée le flambeau
eclairant. Voilà je vous ai parlé du flambeau éclairant et des
actions qui créent ce flambeau. Le Tathāgata a fait ce qu’il faut.
Réfléchissez bien, méditez bien sans relâche. Celui qui ne
met pas en pratique cette leçon dès maintenant, n’aura plus le
temps de se repenrir.

Ayant entendu ces paroles du Bouddha... en pratique.

8. ‘Ainsi ai-je entendu... le Bouddha résidait à Śrāvasti... il
disait aux bhikṣu: Il y a deux forces (bala): celle de la patience
(kṣaṇīti) et celle de l’attention mentale (manasikāra). Si je
n’avais pas eu ces deux forces, je n’aurais pas été venu aux
environs d’Uruvilvā pour y pratiquer l’ascétisme pendant six ans,
je n’aurais pas pu maîtriser Māra le Malin (litt. sātrū) et réaliser
la suprême et parfaite illumination (anuttarasamāyaksambodhi).
C’est parce que j’ai la force de la patience et la force de

l'attention mentale que j'ai pu, assis au pied de l'arbre Bodhi (litt.: l'endroit du Chemin), maîtriser Māra et ses troupes et réaliser la suprême et parfaite illumination. C'est pourquoi, ô bhikṣu, il faut trouver les moyens salvifiques pour développer en vous la force de la patience et la force de l'attention mentale; [si vous réussissez en cela], vous obtiendrez le niveau de celui qui est 'entré dans le courant', le niveau de celui 'qui ne revient qu'une fois', le niveau de celui 'qui ne revient plus', le niveau de l'arhat15, le stade du Nirvāṇa sans un reste de conditionnement (anupadhiṣeṣanirvāṇadhātu), le Parinirvāṇa. Vous devez apprendre sérieusement cela.

Ayan entendu ces paroles du Bouddha ..., en pratique.

9. 'Ainsi ai-je entendu. Une fois quand le Bouddha résidait à Śrāvasti, dans le bois de Jeta, au parc d'Anāthapindada, le vénérable Aniruddha demeurait à Kuśinagara, là où il est né16. Un jour, les Caturmahārājakāyika et cinq cents [autres] deva, y compris le vingt-huit rois des esprits errants, vinrent au devant du vénérable Aniruddha, se prosternèrent à ses pieds, puis se tinrent debout à ses côtés et chantèrent ces vers:

Nous vous saluons avec adoration, ô vénérable,
Que les hommes ont beaucoup respecté!
Veuillez bien nous montrer
Quelle méditation nous devons pratiquer.

En ce moment, un brahmacārin nommé Chō-pa-tcha

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15 Voir BSR 1, 2, p.134, n.16.
16 Sur Aniruddha, voir Malalasekera, DPPN 1, pp.85-90; Lamotte, L’Enseignement de Vimalakirti, pp.167-9. Selon la tradition bouddhiste, Aniruddha était originaire de Kapilavastu, non pas de Kuśinagara comme rapporté ici par l'EA.

(准提念), disciple de Fan-mo-yu (梵摩優), vint aussi au devant du vénérable Aniruddha, se prosterna à ses pieds, puis s'assit à ses côtés. Ensuite il demanda:

— Jadis je vivais dans un palais royal mais je n'ai jamais senti cet exquis parfum naturel. Quelqu'un est-il déjà venu ici? Ou est-ce le parfum des deva, des nāga, des génies?

— Regardez, dit Aniruddha, voilà les Caturmahārājakāyika et cinq cents deva, y compris les vingt-huit rois des esprits errants.

— Pourquoi, dit le brahmacārin, je ne les vois pas? Où sont les Caturmahārājakāyika?

— Aniruddha: Peut-être parce que vous n'avez pas encore d'œil divin (divyacākṣus)?

— Le brahmacārin: Si j'avais l'œil divin pourrais-je voir les Caturmahārājakāyika et les vingt-huit rois des esprits errants?

— Aniruddha: Bien sûr! si vous aviez l'œil divin vous pourriez voir les Caturmahārājakāyika et les cinq cents deva, y compris les vingt-huit rois des esprits errants. Mais, ô brahmacārin! l'œil divin n'a rien d'extraordinaire! Il y a un Brahmadeva nommé Sahasracākṣus (Indra)18 qui peut voir des milliers de mondes comme on voit un diadème dans sa main; cependant il ne peut pas voir son propre corps habillé.

— Le brahmacārin: Pourquoi ce Brahmadeva Sahasracākṣus ne peut-il pas voir son propre corps habillé?

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17 Sur Aniruddha et l'œil divin et sur les cinq yeux, avec toutes références utiles, voir É. Lamotte, ibid.
18 À la différence de l'EA ici, selon la tradition Indra n'appartient pas à la classe des dieux Brahmā.
— Aniruddha: Parce qu'il n'a pas encore l'œil de la sagesse suprême.

Le brahmacārīn: Si j'avais l'œil de la sagesse suprême, pourrais-je voir mon propre corps habillé?

— Aniruddha: N'importe qui a l'œil de la sagesse suprême peut voir son propre corps habillé.

— Le Brahmacārīn: Ó vénérable, veuillez m'apprendre ce qu'il faut faire pour avoir l'œil de la sagesse suprême.

— Aniruddha: Est-ce que vous pouvez respecter les observances (ṣīla)?

— Le brahmacārīn: Quelles sont ces observances?

— Aniruddha: S'abstenir de faire le mal, de faire ce qui est injuste.

— Le brahmacārīn: Oui, je pourrais respecter de telles observances.

— Aniruddha: Ó brahmacārīn! dorénavant vous devez respecter strictement les observances; vous devez aussi vous débarrasser des nœuds de l'orgueil (māna), et des préjugés de l'ego (aham) et du moi (ātman).

— Le brahmacārīn: Qu'est-ce que l'ego? Qu'est-ce que le moi? Quels sont les nœuds de l'orgueil?

— Aniruddha: L'ego c'est le domaine de l'esprit (nāma). Le moi c'est la forme (rūpā). De ceux-ci sont produits les connaissances, les sentiments, les jugements et l'idée de l'ego et du moi qui sont les nœuds de l'orgueil. C'est pourquoi, ô brahmacārīn! il faut chercher des moyens salvifiques pour éliminer ces nœuds. Vous devez apprendre sérieusement cela.

Le brahmacārīn se leva, se prosterna devant Aniruddha, fit trois tours autour du vénérable et quitta le lieu. Sur son chemin de retour, en réfléchissant sur ce qu'eut dit Aniruddha, il fut illuminé, toutes ses impuretés s'effacèrent et il obtint l'œil dharmique (dharmacaksus). En ce moment T'ien-hi-yu (天音與), un de ses amis, sachant ce qui s'était passé pour le brahmacārīn, vint se prosterner aux pieds d'Aniruddha, se tint debout à ses côtés et le complimenta par ces vers:

Le brahmacārīn n'est pas encore arrivé chez lui,
Sur son chemin il est déjà illuminé.
Il n'a plus d'impuretés, il a obtenu l'œil dharmique,
Il n'a plus de doute, plus d'hésitations.

Le vénérable Aniruddha répondit:

J'ai deviné que le brahmacārīn
Serait illuminé sur son chemin de retour
Car, à l'époque du Bouddha Kāśyapa,
Il avait déjà écouté cet enseignement.

Après cet événement, le vénérable Aniruddha quitta son pays natal, voyageait à travers plusiers pays [pour enseigner la doctrine].

Ce jour-là il arriva à Śrāvasti, se prosterna aux pieds du Bouddha, puis se tint debout à ses côtés. Le Bienheureux lui donna quelques conseils. Aniruddha écouta attentivement, puis le salua et se retira. Alors le Bienheureux dit aux bhikṣū: Parmi mes disciples (śrāvaka) le bhikṣū Aniruddha est le
meilleur [entre ceux qui] ont obtenu l'oeil divin. Ayant entendu ces paroles du Bouddha, les bhikṣu étaient heureux et mettaient en pratique [la doctrine].

10. 'Ainsi ai-je entendu. Une fois quand le Bouddha résidait à Śrāvasti, dans le bois de Jeta, au parc d'Anāthapindada, il y avait le vénérable Rāhula qui observait strictement les śīla sans laisser aucune faille, aussi petite soit-elle; cependant il n'arrivait pas encore à maîtriser toutes ses passions, son esprit n'était pas encore libéré. Plusieurs bhikṣu, voulant des explications, vinrent au devant de Bienheureux, se prosternèrent à ses pieds, puis s'assirent à ses côtés. Ensuite ils demandèrent au Bienheureux: Le bhikṣu Rāhula observe strictement les śīla sans laisser aucune faille, aussi petite soit-elle; pourquoi n'arrive-t-il pas à maîtriser ses passions et à libérer son esprit? — Le Bienheureux répondit par ce quatrains:

Celui qui observe correctement les śīla
Aura ses organes sensoriels purifiés.
À fur et à mesure, il arrivera sans doute
À éliminer toutes ses entraves passionnelles.

C'est pourquoi, ô bhikṣul, il faut toujours observer les śīla et perpétuer dans la pratique du vrai dharma pour éliminer les impuretés mentales. Vous devez apprendre sérieusement cela. — Ayant entendu l'enseignement du Bouddha, les bhikṣu étaient heureux et le mettaient respectueusement en pratique'.

Traduit en français par Minh-Thiên Trần-Huu-Danh

Notes par les rédacteurs adjoints

Cross-Cultural Approach (Dubuque, Iowa, 1992): that the Thera-
vāda tradition has claimed the vast majority of publications in a
still tiny area and that even those studies which move beyond
the Theravāda tradition, such as Louis de La Vallée Poussin's La
Morale Bouddhique (Paris 1927), do not venture beyond the
general scope of the various Hinayāna sects. Not only does
Keown make a serious attempt to offer the reader more than a
simple descriptive approach to ethics, he also engages in a
decisive and important dialogue with Mahāyāna ethics, a subject
barely considered in the majority of published works on
Buddhist ethics. To be sure, at least one major study of
Buddhist ethics confronts the Mahāyāna tradition (i.e. G.S.P.
Misra's Development of Buddhist Ethics, Delhi 1984), but
Keown far surpasses Misra's rather cursory study. At the outset,
Keown informs us that he intends to go 'against the current'
with regard to traditional studies of Buddhist ethics, listing no
less than fifteen viewpoints which he intends to reject in the
development of his study.

In the beginning of his important chapter on 'Aspects of
Sila', Keown makes it abundantly clear that the major focus of
any consideration of Buddhist ethics must necessarily con-
centrate on sila rather than vinaya, despite efforts by such
scholars as W. Pachow to argue that the Vinaya essentially
represents a fuller exposition of the precepts included in the
traditional pañcasila. Following John C. Holt (Discipline. The
Canonical Buddhism of the Vinayapitaka, Delhi 1981) and others,
he concludes, 'Overall, there seems to be no reason to believe
that the Vinaya is either derived from a simpler set of moral
principles or founded upon a single underlying principle or
rationale' (p.34). This is an important distinction, for in East
Asian Buddhism, the technical term chieh-lū combines sila/
vinaya, resulting in statements like that of Ven. Sheng-Yen who,
in the Prologue to Buddhist Ethics and Modern Society (ed.
Charles Wei-hsun Fu and Sandra A. Wawrytko; Westport, Conn.,
1991) says, 'The precepts (Vinaya) form the basis of Buddhist
ethics' (p.4). Although Akira Hirakawa sheds considerable light
on this subject (in Genshibukkyō no Kenkyu; Kyōdansoshiki no
genkei - Studies in Primal Buddhism: The Original Model of the
Organisation of the Buddhist Order', Tokyo 1964), establishing
the need to understand vinaya as an externally enforced code,
as much concerned with organisational purity as with the
specifics of ethical conduct, while sila presents an internally
enforced ethical framework for structuring an individual's
life, it is rather the norm for scholars to gloss over this
important distinction. Keown understands this clearly, discerning
sila as an incredibly rich concept for understanding individual
ethical conduct. Accordingly, he offers in this chapter a critical
consideration of the various etymological derivations of the
term, far more difficult to explain than vinaya, and citing such
diverse sources as Buddhaghosa, Vasubandhu and sGam-po-pa.
Perhaps the major thrust of the chapter concentrates on locating
sila contextually in both the canonical and non-canonical
literature. In this respect he devotes much time to an analysis
of the first thirteen suttas of the Dīgha Nikāya, a section known
as the Silakkhandavagga and presenting the clearest and most
detailed exposition of sila in the Pāli Canon. In his
consideration of the Brahmagāla Sutta, he carefully examines the
preliminary critical portion of the text, divided into three
sections known, respectively, as the short, medium and long
divisions. This is significant because these three tracts occur in
each of the thirteen suttas of the Silakkhandavagga, and,
more importantly, contain almost all the precepts deemed
essential for proper ethical conduct as presented in the
pañcasila, athāṅgasila, dasasila, dasakusalakammāpātha and
Pātimokkha. In presenting both the benefits and dangers of sila, Keown concludes that ‘Sīla is precious, valuable and pleasant in itself, and at the same time is the necessary foundation for the entire spiritual project envisaged by Buddhism’ (p.55). As his study progresses, Keown presents sila in a fashion that supersedes even his own initial presumptions.

It would be incorrect to presume sila is topically important only in the suttas, as it is also of much interest to the Abhidhamma and later commentarial authors as well. Keown recognises this circumstance and explores it fully in a chapter on ‘Ethics and Psychology’. He shows how the very first text of the Theravādin Abhidhamma, the Dhammasaṅgaṇī, classifies mental elements around a markedly ethical base. He draws freely from the Visuddhimagga and Milindapaṇhī as well. In so doing, he echoes G.S.P. Misra’s conclusion drawn from a different Abhidhamma text, the Puggalapaṇñati, which: ‘deals with the classification of human types in which ethical consideration, among others, is the most dominant principle’ (Development of Buddhist Ethics, p.67). Keown enhances his work in this section by references to Harvey Aronson’s important study of sympathy (anukampā) in Love and Sympathy in Theravāda Buddhism (Delhi 1980), and to the role and relevance of calming meditation (samatha-bhāvanā) and insight meditation (vipassanā-bhāvanā) in the ethical process, as explored by Griffiths, Gimello and others.

One of the most interesting chapters of the book is entitled ‘The Transcendency Thesis’, especially important because it thoroughly details, and utterly undermines, the so-called ‘transcendency thesis’ postulated primarily by E.J. Thomas (in ‘The Basis of Buddhist Ethics’, The Quest VI) in 1914, but fully developed independently by Winston King in In the Hope of Nibbana (La Salle, Ill., 1964) and by Melford Spiro in Buddhism and Society (Berkeley, Ca., 1970). The argument is simple and straightforward. Using Spiro’s terminology, Nibbānic Buddhism involves monks pursuing the goal of Nibbāna by destroying kamma through bhāvanā or meditative discipline, while Kammatic Buddhism involves lay practitioners pursuing the goal of favourable rebirth through the production of puñna or merit by acts of dāna (giving) and sila (morality). And, of course, once Nibbāna is attained, ethical cultivation is transcended. The theory is largely based on the well-known ‘Parable of the Raft’, taken from the Alagaddūpama Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya (‘Discourse on the Parable of the Water-Snake’). In addition to citing a number of additional passages from other canonical texts which contradict the transcendency thesis by clearly stating that sila is part of the farther shore, Keown concludes properly:

‘...the Buddha is using the Raft Parable to remind the monks of two things: first, that the sole purpose of the collective body of knowledge and discipline which is the dhamma is to be a means for reaching salvation; and second, that the individual components of this, such as particular doctrines, practices, teachings or philosophical views (dhammā) must not be allowed to become the subject of an emotional attachment and assume a disproportionate status within the context as a whole’ (p.102).

Having dismissed the transcendency thesis, the author is thus necessarily obliged to consider how ethics functions not only on the path to the attainment of Nibbāna, but also after the attainment of enlightenment. This problem he attacks in
'Ethics and Soteriology'.

Having dispensed with the notion that Buddhist ethics is a purely worldly concern, eventually to be transcended, Keown progresses to a comprehensive discussion of the Eightfold Path insofar as it relates to ethical matters. Here he tries to demonstrate that Buddhism does not present two paths, one for the laity and one for the monastic tradition, or one path for slow learners and another for the quick-witted, but rather one single path in which proper ethical conduct is a necessary ingredient of the path to enlightenment. As such it becomes possible to summarise the relationship between *sīla*, *samma* and *paññā*:

'The fact that the Eightfold Path begins with *sīla* does not mean that morality is only a preliminary stage. The Eightfold Path begins with *sīla* but ends with *sīla* and *paññā*. *Sīla* is the starting point since human nature is so constituted that moral discipline (*sīla*) facilitates intellectual discipline (*paññā*). Until correct attitudes, habits, and dispositions have been inculcated it is easy to fall prey to speculative views and opinions of all kinds. This does not mean that there is a direct line leading through *sīla* to *paññā*, or that morality is merely a means of limbering up for the intellectual athlete. No; morality is taken up first but constantly cultivated alongside insight until the two fuse in the transformation of the entire personality in the existential realisation of selflessness' (pp.111-12).

Yet *sīla* is not left behind upon the attainment of enlightenment and remains a significant element in the conduct of the Buddha and other enlightened beings. In the Kassapa-sihanāda Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya, the Buddha says, with regard to his own ethical attainment:

'Now there are some recluse and Brahmins, Kassapa, who lay emphasis on conduct. They speak, in various ways, in praise of morality. But so far as regards the really noble, the highest conduct, I am aware of no one who is equal to myself, much less superior. And it is I who have gone the furthest therein; that is, in the highest conduct (of the Path)' (Part I, p.237 in T.W. Rhys Davids' PTS translation).

Of course the Pāli word utilised to indicate 'highest conduct' is *adhisīla*. The implication of the Buddha's statement is clear enough: his attainment was unquestionably motivated by compassion and fuelled by moral development of the highest order, but also that the attainment of Buddhahood (or, for that matter, arahantship) does not preclude ethical propriety. Drawing again from Aronson's *Love and Sympathy in Theravāda Buddhism*, Keown sees ethical goodness, as manifested by the Buddha or any serious practitioner, as a reflection of his sympathy (*anukampā*) for all sentient beings. Thus, in identifying *sīla* as an on-going attribute in the behaviour of the enlightened, he remarks that 'the *Arahat* certainly has not gone beyond kusala, and kusala is the term which *par excellence* denoted ethical goodness' (p.124).

If the above demonstrates that Buddhist ethical development takes its inspiration from the Buddha's personal example, it is not unreasonable to conclude about the Buddha, as Lal Mani Joshi does, that 'His love of solitude and silence was matched only by his universal compassion for suffering creatures'
important of the four since it supports the other three and is itself composed of three sections: (a) morality as temperance (samvara-sīla), (b) morality as the pursuit of good (kusala-dharma-samgrāhaka-sīla), and (c) morality as altruism (sattva-artha-kriyā-sīla). This threefold categorisation of morality is further developed by the Bodhisattvabhūmi, concluding that it is the element of altruism that enables Mahāyāna morality to surpass its Hinayāna counterpart.

In the fourth chapter of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, one reads, ‘The son of the Conqueror, having grasped the Thought of Enlightenment firmly, must make every effort, constantly and alertly, not to transgress the discipline (śīkṣā)’ (Marion Mathes, Entering the Path of Enlightenment, London 1970, p.157 [verse 1]). Just one chapter later, the text says, ‘Thus enlightened, one ought to be constantly active for the sake of others. Even that which generally is forbidden is allowed to one who understands the work of compassion’ (Matics, p.169). As a result of the above passages, we find ourselves confused over the apparent incongruity in the textual accounts of Mahāyāna ethical conduct and wondering just how breaches of conventional ethical behaviour are sanctioned. Keown addresses the resolution of these two radically conflicting views by explaining the notion of upāya-kausālya, or skill-in-means, in a profoundly new and innovative fashion. In the process, he offers a brilliant resolution of the problem. That the bodhisattva is free to transgress the precepts, even to the extent of taking life, is stated with regularity in Mahāyāna texts such as the Śūkṣasamuccaya, Upādhiparipṛcchāsūtra, Upāyakausalyasūtra and others, but such apparent transgressions are always sanctioned in the name of skill-in-means. About these activities, Keown remarks (on p.154):

‘When actions of these kinds are performed there
are usually two provisos which must be satisfied: (a) that the prohibited action will conduce to the greater good of those beings directly affected by it; and (b) that the action is performed on the basis of perfect knowledge (prajñā) or perfect compassion (karunā).

The above conclusion is mirrored by Misra in Development of Buddhist Ethics (p.137). Thus the relationship between śīla and prajñā in Mahāyāna is parallel to the similar relationship between these two perfections operative in Hinayana, but what seems not to be parallel is that the Hinayana adept is at no time allowed to breach the practice of proper morality. From the above, Keown postulates that Mahāyāna is utilising two uniquely different types of upāya-kauśalya. About the first, which he categorises as normative ethics and calls upāyal, Keown says (on p.159):

‘Upayal does not enjoin laxity in moral practices but rather the greater recognition of the needs and interest of others. One's moral practice is now for the benefit of oneself and others by means of example. Through its emphasis on karunā the Mahāyāna gave full recognition to the value of ethical perfection, making it explicit that ethics and insight were of equal importance for a bodhisattva.’

The second type of upāya-kauśalya has nothing to do with normative ethics or ordinary individuals. It is the province of those who have already perfected ethics and insight. Thus (on p.157) we read

‘... It is the upāya of the bodhisattvas of the seventh stage (upāya-kauśalya-bhūmi) and beyond, whose powers and perfections are supernatural. Upāya2 is depicted as an activity of the Budhas and Great Bodhisattvas (Bodhisattva-Mahasattvas) and it is only they who have the knowledge and power to use it. It is by virtue of upāya2 that bodhisattvas transgress the precepts from motives of compassion and are said to do no wrong.'

There can be little doubt that upāya2 is not the model by which ordinary beings perfect themselves but the rather pragmatic moral outcome of the attainment of the seventh stage of the bodhisattva path. Upāya2 is the social expression of a genuine understanding of the notion of emptiness (śūnyatā) in which no precepts can even be theorised. As such, it represents the far extreme of the ethical continuum, a Buddhist situation ethics established not simply on love, as in Joseph Fletcher’s system, but on the highest and most profound manifestation of compassion.

Keown concludes his volume with chapters on ‘Buddhism and Utilitarianism’ and ‘Buddhism and Aristotle’. In the former chapter, he explores a number of theories of utilitarianism (e.g. act utilitarianism, rule utilitarianism and negative utilitarianism) as well as the writings of Bentham and Mill. He proceeds to an examination of Buddhism in relation to utilitarianism and a discussion of skill-in-means compared to situation ethics. In the latter chapter, he moves beyond the social and cultural differences in the two systems to focus on the parallels with respect to human perfection in each programme. In this regard, Keown examines eudaemonia and Nirvana. Aristotle’s psychology, the psychology of moral choice and the desire for
good. No doubt Keown’s motives for concluding in this fashion are obvious, for he suggests early in his text (p.21) that ‘Aristotle’s ethical theory appears to be the closest Western analogue to Buddhist ethics, and is an illuminating guide to an understanding of the Buddhist moral system’. While these final chapters are indeed interesting in their own right and demonstrate that Keown’s vision proceeds beyond a rather narrow focus, this reviewer finds them a rather odd termination of the volume. Precisely because the points emphasised are valuable for their contextual location of the major problematics of Buddhist ethics, I would have preferred their placement at the front of the book rather than the rear. This may, however, only reflect an idiosyncratic judgment on my part.

The relative vitality of Buddhist ethics in the modern world is a concern that cannot be minimised. Indeed, Kōshō Mizutani, in the Prologue to Buddhist Ethics and Modern Society asserts, ‘I submit that a study of Buddhism that emphasizes its ethical aspects will be the most important task facing Buddhists in the twenty-first century’ (p.7). At least with regard to the scholarly tradition, I think The Nature of Buddhist Ethics represents an exceedingly important step in the direction suggested by Mizutani. It is an entirely different direction than that taken by the contributors to such interesting volumes as The Path of Compassion (ed. Fred Eppsteiner, Berkley, Ca, 1988) in which modern Buddhists like Sulak Sivaraksa, Jack Kornfield, Thich Nhat Hanh and others argue about timely ethical issues with deep sincerity and commitment, but with rarely a canonical reference, almost never a footnote to Buddhist commentarial literature. It is my contention that works such as Keown’s which are not only expansive in scope and thorough in methodology, but also textually grounded provide a genuine potential for bringing Buddhist ethics to our attention in a bold new way that is useful to both scholars and practising Buddhists alike.

In an exciting new article, drawing heavily on the work of recent biblical scholarship, Harold Coward points out that:

‘The relationship between a religious community and its scripture is complex, reciprocal and usually central to the normative self-definition of a religion. The awareness of this relationship is the result of postmodern approaches that no longer see scriptures as museum pieces for historical critical analysis, but recognize them to be the products of human perception and interaction — both in their own time and in today’s study by scholars’ (See ‘The Role of Scripture in the Self-Definition of Hinduism and Buddhism in India’, Studies in Religion 21, 2 [Wilfrid Laurier Univ., Ontario 1992], p.129).

Coward goes on to argue for what he calls ‘the reciprocal relationship between text and tradition in Buddhism’ (p.143). A careful examination of Keown’s The Nature of Buddhist Ethics documents amply how such an important and necessary approach functions in Buddhism.

The high success of The Nature of Buddhist Ethics develops not simply because it moves well beyond such outdated works as S. Tachibana’s The Ethics of Buddhism (London 1926, 1981), King’s In the Hope of Nibbana (op. cit.) and Saddhatissa’s Buddhist Ethics (London 1970, 1987; New York 1970), or because it supersedes such less than successful studies as G. Dharmasiri’s Fundamentals of Buddhist Ethics (Singapore 1986; Antioch, Ca, 1989) but rather because it presents a creative and innovative revisioning of Buddhist ethics, a new paradigm for understanding the whole of the
Buddhist ethical tradition, and makes full use of the rich canonical and commentarial literature that is available. It succeeds because Keown lets the texts speak for themselves without forcing the passages cited into a pre-arranged agenda dictated more by prior researchers' conclusions than by the message delivered. To be sure, there will be those who will neither agree with nor appreciate Keown's approach and conclusions. This reviewer, however, thinks that Damien Keown has presented Buddhist Studies with a most valuable volume, perhaps even the most important such work in decades, and one that may well provide important renewed interest in the Buddhist ethical tradition.

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BOOK REVIEWS


Following the successful revival of the Society's Journal in 1981 to mark the Society centenary, the Council of the Pali Text Society decided to continue the Journal on an ad hoc basis, as and when sufficient material of a publishable standard was received. After the publication of Vol. XIII in 1989 (noticed in BSR 9, 1, pp.88-90), a good supply of material enabled the editor to produce two volumes (XIV and XV) in 1990, but no volume was published in 1991. Once again it was possible to produce two volumes (XVI and XVII) in 1992, while Vol. XVIII was published early in 1993.

A very large proportion of Vol. XIV is devoted to a study by Dr H. Hundius of the colophons of thirty Pāli manuscripts from Northern Thailand, and he shows how the information which they contain throws light on the cultural and social conditions of the time at which the manuscripts were written. The volume also contains No.2 part 1 of a further study of the Pāli grammarians by O.H. Pind, in continuation of his article in Vol. XIII. Vol. XV contains no less than three articles written (by O. von Hinüber, Richard Gombrich and Charles Hallisey) in response to Gregory Schopen's comments in Vol. XIII on the fact that no rules are prescribed in the Khandhaka of the Theravāda Vinaya regulating the veneration of stūpas. Richard Gombrich also contributes a short note about the verses attributed to the former courtesan Ambapāli in the Therīgāthā, while Charles Hallisey has produced an edition, with a lengthy introduction, of the Tundilovāda Sutta, which despite its title of
sutta and its attribution to the Buddha is not reckoned as canonical. The problem of what 'canonical' means in the context of Theravāda scriptures is the subject of a paper 'On the very idea of the Pāli canon' by Steven Collins in the same volume. (This is a revised version of the second I.B. Horner memorial lecture which he delivered in London in September 1987.) The volume also contains a posthumous edition by Ven. Dr H. Saddhātissa of the Nāmacārādīpika, one of the nine Abhidhamma manuals entitled in Burmese Let-than or 'Little finger summaries', a study of the categories of sutta in the Pāli Nikāyas by Joy Manné, and a brief note by P. Jackson on some of the problems presented by the fact that there are several authors of Pāli texts who have the name Dhammapāla.

Theravāda literature is full of references to texts which are frequently known to us only by name. What is needed is a computer data-base into which titles can be entered as they are encountered, with quotations and further information being added later. As a preliminary to this, Vol. XVI contains an index which Jacqueline Filliozat has compiled to various articles by the late H. Saddhātissa and other scholars dealing with Pāli literature in South-East Asian countries. To this she has added an index to the Bhānavārapāli, which includes many hundreds of references to, and quotation from, Pāli texts. The volume also contains a translation by R.H.B. Exell of the Rūpārūpa-vibhāga, another of the Let-than texts. (This is a revised version of a translation which appeared in Visakha Puja, Bangkok 1964.) An article by Oskar von Hinüber examines the meaning of the Vinaya term āpatti-samutthāna ‘the arising of an offence' and puts it into the context and history of the Theravāda Vinaya. In an article entitled 'The case of the murdered monks' Laurence C.R. Mills (formerly Phra Khantipālo) examines the strange story told in the Mahāvibhanga about Migalanīka who murdered a number of monks, at their own request, since they were so affected by the asubha nature of their bodies that self-hatred arose in them. Gregory Schopen contributes another study of the ritual obligations of monks in the Pāli Vinaya, this time their role as donors, while Peter Skilling contributes a study of the rākṣa ‘protection' literature of the Śrāvakāyāna, comparing the Pāli parītta texts with similar texts found in the Mūlasarvāstivādin and other, including Mahāyāna, literature.

Almost the whole of Volume XVII is devoted to a very long article by Eivind Kahrs, the recently appointed lecturer in Sanskrit at the University of Cambridge, in which he explores a portion of the Saddaniti. This very long and important Pāli grammatical text has been little studied, and the article is a revised form of the lectures which Dr Kahrs gave in Cambridge during the first year of his appointment. The Society hopes that this paper will lead others to examine and expound this text and make its contents better known. The volume also contains a short addendum by Richard Gombrich to the study of the Aggaṇa Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya which he published in Indo-Iranian Journal 35 (1992).

Vol. XVIII contains an edition by the late Eugène Denis, S.J., of the Māleyadevathavatavattu. This has been revised by Steven Collins, who has also translated Denis's introduction to the edition, and added a new translation of the text. Charles Hallisey follows up his earlier work on the Tūndīlovāda Sutta with an edition and translation of the Nibbāna Sutta, an allegedly non-canonical sutta which compares Nibbāna to a great city. The volume also contains a list, made by Jinadasa Liyanaratne, of Cambridge University Library's collection of Pāli manuscripts from Sri Lanka, many of them formerly in the possession of T.W. Rhys Davids, while Peter Skilling contributes a note on a citation from an Abhayagiri text, preserved in
Tibetan translation in the Tarkajvāla of Bhavya, which appears to be from the Buddhavamsa of the Abhayagiri school.

Each of these volumes contains a few pages devoted to Pāli Lexicographical Studies (VII-X) by the present reviewer, who also contributes to Vols XIV, XV and XVIII cumulative indexes of articles which have appeared in JPTS since the Index to the JPTS 1882-1927 by P.D. Ratnātunga (revised with appendix and arranged by S.S. Davidson) was published in 1973. All volumes contain information about the grants which the PTS makes for the study of Pāli, and invite contributions in the field of Pāli (not Buddhist) studies for future volumes of the JPTS.

K. R. Norman


It is not always understood by those who read some of the older translations of Pāli texts that the translators thereof often had no formal training in the language. Self-taught, or taught by native scholars whose standard of proficiency in teaching was not necessarily high, they were forced, in the days before such aids as good dictionaries and grammars in a European language existed, to translate by the 'intuitive' method, whereby they examined the context and deduced from that what the meaning must be. The wonder is not that these intuitive translators were incorrect, but that they were correct so often.

Nor is it always understood by non-specialists that an early Pāli canonical sutta is itself a translation, and forms which have been left untranslated from an earlier version in another dialect can sometimes be identified. Although it may be possible to translate such a Pāli text into English, it is necessary, if the aim is to establish its meaning for the original hearers, first to try to find out what the author actually said, i.e. to 'back-translate' the text into a form of language as close as possible to that which it is believed was spoken at the time of the Buddha.

This involves making use of all the resources of linguistic and literary criticism to establish the original form of the text which it is wished to translate, which requires a knowledge of the languages of North India and Ceylon at the time of the Buddha and the centuries immediately following his decease. This in turn necessitates expertise not only in the Middle Indo-Aryan languages, of which Pāli is one, but also in classical and Buddhist Sanskrit, since much of the language of the early Buddhist texts is related to or taken over from Sanskrit, while parallel versions of many Pāli canonical texts exist in Buddhist Sanskrit.

In the rules of the Pāli Text Society one of its objects is stated to be to 'publish such other works as may be necessary for or conducive to the study of Pāli'. In the belief that an appropriate way for the Society to fulfil this obligation would be to publish his mainly philological articles, the Council of the PTS persuaded Mr Norman to allow this to be done. These studies span the years from 1956 and appeared in a large number of different journals and books, access to which is in many cases now rather difficult. All the pieces have been re-typed, facilitating the adoption of a standard form of page format, footnotes and abbreviations. Where appropriate, references have been added to later articles in which the same subject has been treated.

Ninety-nine articles have been listed but two are 'not included'. The balance comprises a series of sixteen ‘Middle Indo-Aryan Studies’ with an additional six items on aspects of
Prakrit, eight 'Pāli Lexicographical Studies' (from JPTS) together with twelve and nine pieces respectively on the Pāli language and cultural/historical aspects of Pāli, eighteen articles on the Aśokan inscriptions, two/one on the Gândhari/Patna Dhammapadas, and miscellaneous studies on Pāli canonical doctrines and factual issues (i.e. on the PTS itself). All told, these volumes serve as an illuminating testimonial to the academic career of the President of the PTS.

Mr Norman retired last year from his position as (Hon.) Professor of Indian Studies (specialising in Prakrit and Pāli) at Cambridge. In his honour, L.S. Cousins and John D. Smith edited a special issue of the Indo-Iranian Journal (Vol.35, Nos 2-3) which comprised ten essays by friends and colleagues, including one by Dr Eivind Kahrs from Oslo, his successor (as Lecturer in Sanskrit) at Cambridge.

RBW et al.


This concise work is well-described by its title: it presents no speculations and does not digress into Indian history, simply but with a wealth of textual illustration, it presents Buddhist monastic life according to the Vinaya and Sutta traditions in Pāli. In the short space of only 150-odd pages the author attempts to cover a subject which in the original texts runs to a few thousand; on the whole he has done so with lucidity.

As the reviewer has recently completed a Vinaya-treatise with rather different intentions — Vinaya for the present age and 'western' society, divided into four sections on Persons, Possessions, Places and Procedures, it is interesting to see whether our author has covered a similar range with his eight chapters.

'The Origins of the Community' (Ch.1) deal with the how and why of renunciation. What pabbajja, leaving home or going forth, really means is thoroughly dealt with here quoting from suttas as well as Vinaya. The author remarks truly that 'renunciation could be either negatively or positively motivated. But Buddhist monasticism accorded no importance to this distinction . . .'.

Under 'Dwelling-Places' (Ch.2) the author has clearly indicated the beginnings of settled monastic life, settled for three months of the Rains at any rate, and how monks and nuns were expected to travel, lodging at different monasteries as they encountered them, or staying in the forest or other suitable places if they did not. The 'settled' nature of the modern Sanghas can in no way be compared with the temporary settlement of Sangha members then. Now the Sangha on the whole has really settled down to be comfortable in this world, but this was not so easy to do when it was expected that one would move on, keep going, as long as health, weather and age permitted. Nor, of course, were those ancient Sanghas burdened by books to study.

Chapter 3 considers clothing and the author's very literal attitude to the Vinaya is well-illustrated by his treatment of the subject. He has accepted all the statements about monks' and nuns' robes without questioning them at all. His attitude is very much: this is what the Vinaya says so this is the way it was. Rather more interpretation of Vinaya matters is needed so as to avoid this extreme view of fundamentalism. This chapter treats not only of robes but has some interesting things to say on
private and communal property. Shoes also find mention, the first allowed having only 'a single strand' (Horner has 'a single lining') but this should read 'a single layer' (of the sole).

After the last two chapters it is natural to review the rules on food. The author remarks, 'So monks and nuns were only allowed to eat what they had been given ... In this matter they were completely dependent on others like small children or hospitalized sick people'. In my work I have noted some reasons for this, a restriction that worked well enough in ancient India and even in modern Thailand but which seems strange to Westerners. Comparing monks to small children is appropriate. They are helpless, having always to be helped by other people. Whether this condition of the Helpless Monk Syndrome can long continue in our times is doubtful. Both almsround and invitations are described here with reference to the relevant rules.

A whole chapter is then devoted to the interesting subject of money. From my investigation of Vinaya in my book, as well as from experience in Asia, I have found this a particularly confused area. The author covers the same general area and quotes from the same texts but he omits totally to comment upon what happens with monks and money now in Buddhist countries. His book deals only with the texts, thereby giving perhaps a very distorted picture of what Buddhism is like at the present time.

Chapter 6 deals with Chastity (which is not a very good translation of brahmācariya), that is, abstaining from sexual relations and the whole range of actions which are allied to or lead up to sex. When reading Pāli texts, whether Vinaya or Sutta — which are plentifully quoted on the subject — one must not forget they have been transmitted by monks. Generations of monks recited them and later wrote them down.

As to how reliably they transmit the Buddha's teachings is some cause for dispute. They emphasise the monastic Sangha activities and tell us very little about those who were teachers of Dhamma, Ugga for instance, or Visākhā, who were not ordained. As this is so, it is legitimate to enquire whether the emphasis on a chaste monastic Sangha represents the whole of the Buddha's teaching. Anyone who investigates this matter must conclude that while monks' and nuns' orders were a part of the original dispensation, there were also many learned and well-practised laypeople who reached high attainments. The Vinaya rules on a very strict brahmācariya begin to look decidedly strange in this light. The author devotes a long chapter to this subject, considered only with regard to the texts, but covering all the ground there.

In the next chapter he has reviewed Solitude and come out quite strongly in favour of cenobitic Sangha lifestyle that much of the Vinaya texts portray. He has not considered that the early Sangha had a variety of lifestyles available according to types of persons. This is much better illustrated by the earliest texts ('early' and 'late' are not distinguished by him), such as the Suttanipāta and the Thera-therīgāthā where evidence of the muni lifestyle is still visible. This is one of the weakest chapters in the book as it has not given a proper balance but has plumped for the Vinaya accounts without close examination. But this would take the author into an area where plainly he does not wish to tread. The chapter holds more than a disquisition on solitude and community life, for we are also given notes on Admission into the Community, its Rules, its Unity and its relations with lay society. In his comments on the last subject (p.129) the author describes a Sangha penalty that may be imposed on troublesome laypeople: the overturning of the bowl. Horner's Vinaya translation makes it seem as though
the bowl of the trouble-making layman is to be overturned! The present work has the monks ‘in a symbolic gesture’ overturning their bowls in front of that layman’s house! This is also a misunderstanding for the Pāli expression of ‘overturning the bowl’ merely means that it would not be upright and so open for that person’s offerings. This practice, like so much of the Vinaya, has not been used, possibly for centuries.

The last chapter on the Rules of the Community attempts to cover rules unmentioned so far. Principal matters are outlined but obviously details cannot be given in full. This chapter ends noting that the Buddha did not name a leader, a patriarch, to follow him. Sangha affairs were to be decided by the local Sanghas independently without a superstructure of abbots or other authority-figures. Though he does not say so, his quotations of the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta and of the Gopaka-Moggallāna Sutta constitute a criticism of the modern hierarchical Sanghas.

Three appendices round off the book — on Nuns (well might they be an Appendix in Theravāda Buddhism), Laypeople and The Precepts. A Glossary and Index complete this useful work. The scope of this book is similar to my own but of course it is much more compact, citing more Sutta references though it does not explore many Vinaya matters in detail.

Laurence Mills (formerly Phra Khantipalo)


This interesting book contains a collection of short articles, essays and parts of a diary in an attempt to portray the author’s encounter with the Korean variety of Zen (Son). He was for some years a Gelugpa monk who encountered Theravāda mindfulness meditation in India and then went to Korea to stay in Song-kwang-сан. There a community of Western monks and nuns had gathered round the great Master Kusan Sunim and there this book was created.

Stephen, as he is again now, found his Gelug experience rather stifling, good no doubt if one has a great deal of faith. In encountering Theravāda he chanced on the Kālāma Sutta which opened to him a new approach allowing, indeed positively encouraging, questions. The move to Son in Korea may then be seen as the resolution of this problem by developing the great doubt which lies at the centre of our being.

Readers who like the sound of this — but remember that it was produced by as well as concurrent with a great deal of meditation practice — should dip into this book for some refreshing attitudes.

Personally I liked the fragments of a twenty-fifth century dialogue somewhat in the manner of the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras (Ch. Five), the account of the great Master’s cremation (Ch. Seven) and the Appendix: The Chinese Lesson. In the last, parallels are drawn between the introduction of Buddhism into China and its present entry into the West. This piece particularly repays reading again and reflection.

More practical and philosophical writings fill the remainder of the book. All of them indicate to us that the way to overcome doubt is not to stifle it with an eiderdown of beliefs but to be courageous in careful examination of questions with appropriate action to follow.

Laurence Mills

This little book, delightfully illustrated by Marcelle Hanselaar, contains eight selected talks by the distinguished abbot of Amarāvati. In the forest tradition, they are all extempore talks, and they cover various aspects of Buddhist life. Jack Kornfield's foreword gives some account of Ven. Sumedho's early struggles and summarises his teaching thus: 'All his teaching points to an immediate mindfulness of this very body and mind. It is not through philosophy or special practices, but here that wisdom arises... To live the holy life, the life of freedom, is to stand nowhere, to possess nothing, to take no fixed position, to open to what is, moment after moment'. All the talks are really variations on this theme. Thus in the first talk, 'Let Go of Fire', he points out that to grasp at a fire, however pretty, is painful. Going on to mindfulness, he points out that even amid distractions we can be mindful: 'Being aware of confusion is also being mindful' (p.21). In the second talk, the two 'tools' are discussed: concentration/tranquillisation and the development of insight. Both are basically simple but not necessarily easy at first.

Other chapters deal with all that can be accomplished by contemplating one exhalation at a time, the nature of the whining, complaining mind, the 'unfairness' of life, the uselessness of worrying, and so on, and, especially, 'being the knowing'. In the last chapter he recalls his annoyance at a senior monk who 'would not pass the cakes' and indicates how we can use difficult situations as material for contemplation. But perhaps the message is best summed up in a paragraph on p.37: 'Through awareness we no longer identify and attach to such thoughts - this is liberation into immortality. And we cannot conceive. Can we conceive of anything that does not begin and end? What is the beginning of immortality? And what is the end of it? We can philosophise about it till doomsday - it will not help at all. So we bring our practice down to practical living, right now in the present moment, to awareness in the present moment, from one moment to the next. It is through resolute, constant awareness that we develop'.

Maurice Walshe


The author of this book had a brief career in journalism, but eventually opted for the study of Indology and comparative religion. From 1961-63 he lectured at Banaras Hindu University but, as no permanent academic appointment was forthcoming, he entered the diplomatic service. He is now the German Consul-General in Bombay. English readers may remember him from his earlier survey of Buddhist teachings and schools which was translated into English at the instigation of the reviewer by a research student of his for the benefit of students in his undergraduate course in Mahāyāna Buddhism, as it was a useful handbook of important Buddhist schools and their terminological peculiarities, even though it gave only slight surveys of the doctrine (Buddhism: An Outline of its Teachings and Schools, London 1973).

The present book, covering virtually the same ground, certainly has much more substance than its predecessor but,
should it also be translated, it would now have to compete with a large number of substantial books on Mahāyāna Buddhism which have appeared in English in the past fifteen years or so.

The author starts in his 'Foreword' with a reference to the image of the three turnings of the 'Wheel of the Doctrine' [adapted by later schools from the Dhammacakkappavatana Sutta, the first discourse of the Buddha]. The second turning is ascribed to the 'transcendent' Buddha who revealed the Prajñāpāramitā and Saddharmapuṇḍarika Sūtras and the third push was given to the wheel by Ādi Buddha in revealing the Tantras. A short introduction, called 'From Hinayāna to Mahāyāna', then briefly outlines the transitory period of sectarian splits with the characteristics of those schools from which the system of Mahāyāna drew some of its ideas, viz. Theravāda, Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, Mahāsāṅghika and Lokottaravāda, and ends with a list of the fourteen most important Mahāyāna sūtras.

The book is then divided into three sections. The first, 'The Philosophy of Mahāyāna Monism', deals with the systems of Śūnyatāvāda and Viśṇuvāda. The former is derived, in the author's presentation, from the Buddha's anatta or 'no-self' doctrine, 'no-self' and 'empty' (śūnya) being synonyms. Emptiness then becomes the abiding, absolute and unconditioned dharma immanent both in Sāṃsāra and Nirvāṇa, which led to the monistic philosophy of emptiness (developed already in the Aṣṭasāhasrika). With emptiness inherent in all beings, they must be, on the absolute level, identical. Since the absolute represents salvation, i.e. Buddhahood, everybody is inherently already saved, everybody is a Buddha, only 'the Buddha is aware of his own Buddha-nature, while the worldling is not'. Liberation comes with this knowledge, namely with the 'perfection of wisdom'. Being difficult to develop, but easy to revere, a cult developed around it until Prajñāpāramitā came to be described as 'Mother of all Buddhas' and was worshipped as a female bodhisattva who could be asked to help in the process of liberation. The author deals also with the philosophical problems of the existence of things and of the reality of the world and Nāgārjuna's contribution to the development of the school in the sense of a new formulation of the 'middle way' which gave it its second name, Madhyamaka.

As to the second school, that of consciousness or 'mind-only', in the author's view, 'already the historical Buddha Gautama derived the subjective existence of the world from consciousness' and to illustrate it he quotes a passage from D 11 and the better known passage from A 4, 45, 3 ('In this fathom-long body . . .') which reappears in the Sanskrit version of the Lāṅkāvatāra Sūtra, the basic source of Viśṇuvāda thought. The author explains its teaching on three modes of existence: (1) the imagined (kalpatīta) world of objects is just thought-consciousness (manovijñāna) and does not exist outside the (universal) mind (citta); (2) the subject of this process, the I, is also a product of thought (manas) within citta; (3) in the absolute sense only mind (cittamātra) exists and harbours as ground- or store-consciousness (alāyavijñāna) the seeds of the subject-object world. This, according to the author, is an absolute idealism which does not need the concept of emptiness for what it regards as non-existent, but borrows the concept of two levels of truth to explain ignorance which causes the world to seem real. However, it can be overcome by a sudden act of knowledge brought about by previous sustained effort which entails discipline, study and meditation, i.e., the practice of yoga (which gave the school its second designation, Yogācāra). Then it is recognised that all being mind only, there is no difference between Sāṃsāra and Nirvāṇa. Further attention is then given to Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, followed by a brief look at Zen
Buddhism.

The second section, 'Buddhas of Time, Buddhas of Space, Ādi Buddha', gives a survey of the Buddhas of the past from the Pāli sources, starting with Dipaṅkara and ending with Gotama as the twenty-fifth one. After dealing with the transformation of the Lokottaravāda school, the author proceeds to the systems of 'transcendent Buddhas' of Mahāyāna combined with the Trikāya doctrine. While Pāli sources denied the possibility of the appearance of more than one Buddha at a time, Mahāyāna envisages, already in the Saddharmapundarīka Sūtra, the coexistence of many Buddhas, each looking after a different world system from his own paradise (buddha-ksetra), an intermediary sphere on the threshold of Nirvāṇa. This development led to popular cults, that of the Amitābha/Amida being the most influential among them. A certain system was brought into the profusion of these space Buddhas by the development of the mandala of five (Dhyānī) Buddhas (with their retinues of bodhisattvas), one for each direction, and the central one as Ādi Buddha whom the author regards as the product of Mahāyāna monism, the personified Absolute with which all Buddhas are identical.

The final section deals with the 'Bodhisattva Path' as described in various sources and distinguishes the active path, with its training in perfections which proceeds through ten stages, and a passive path which is open to followers of one of the transcendent Bodhisattvas who made a solemn vow to save all beings, the most popular among them being Avalokiteśvara and Mañjuśrī, later joined by Tārā.

The book is a reasonably comprehensive overview of the field of Mahāyāna Buddhism with useful hints about the connections to earlier schools and Pāli sources. It also gives quite substantial extracts from the sources in translation to illustrate the teachings and supplement the author's expositions. Its main drawback is the author's misleading interpretation of Mahāyāna as a monistic philosophy. He appears to view many of the textual pronouncements uttered by transcendent Buddhas and bodhisattvas in their many conversations as categorical ontological statements and the Mahāyāna philosophers as system builders in the vein of the German idealistic tradition. Yet not even the Lankāvatāra Sūtra can justifiably be interpreted that way (despite the works of D.T. Suzuki); all Mahāyāna texts and philosophical works appear, on careful analysis, rather vague about the nature of the ultimate achievement, just as the Buddha always avoided answering definite questions with ontological purport. In both cases the purpose is to stir the mind and turn it to practice so that the final vision becomes a matter of experience rather than of anticipated conceptual understanding.

A similar reservation must be expressed with respect to the author's statements about Ādi Buddha and Dharmakāya where 'all Buddhas are identical' and which is 'duality-free' and 'another name for the Absolute in which everybody, knowingly or unknowingly, participates'. One should further bear in mind that many of the author's descriptions are, unavoidably in a popularisation, simplifications of the intricate Mahāyāna doctrines. However, with these reservations in mind, the book can be regarded as a very useful introduction to the vast area of Mahāyāna developments, made attractive also by its illustrations with captions explaining their iconography.

Karel Werner

This is the first biography of a most remarkable personality among Western converts to and practitioners of Buddhism. Born Ernst Lothar Hoffmann in Kassel, Germany, at the turn of the century, he had already become drawn to studying different religions, including Buddhism, by his teens. The war caught up with him in 1916 when he was called up. He contracted tuberculosis while serving, but his condition was later cured. After university studies in Switzerland and Italy he settled for a time on Capri and wrote his first book, on Buddhism and the idea of God, in 1920. He also discovered that he could pant and various influences led him to archaeological studies of Stone Age monuments in the Mediterranean, for which he received a fellowship. He utilised his field-work experience of ancient tumuli when his interest turned to the study of Buddhist monuments, particularly the stūpa.

In 1928/9 he moved to Ceylon to study under the renowned monk Nyanatiloka Mahāthera, who was also German born. There he became Brahmacāri Govinda. Together they then travelled in Burma where Govinda obtained the status of an anāgarika. Back in Ceylon, he received an invitation to an international Buddhist conference in Darjeeling in his capacity as General Secretary of the International Buddhist Union. This changed his life. Stranded on his travels by bad weather for several days in the Ghoom monastery near Darjeeling, he experienced a transformation in his perception of Buddhism and found in its Tibetan form a spiritual dimension which was fully alive and contemporary, yet represented an uninterrupted continuity from the past centuries. When he met the renowned Tomo Geshé Rinpoche, he became his pupil and was initiated by him. Through his guidance he acquired a direction which he was to follow all his life, maturing into a competent teacher and interpreter of living Buddhism to the West. At his teacher's instigation Govinda founded the Society and Vajrayāna Buddhist Order ‘Arya Maitreya Mandala’ which now has its headquarters in Germany, with members and branches in several other countries.

Govinda never returned to Ceylon, and the book then describes his studies and activities in India and gives surveys and sometimes vivid pictures of his travels in Tibet, the most important of which were later undertaken together with his wife Li Gotami. He first met her around 1933, when she was studying and he was teaching in Tagore’s University in Shantiniketan, but they married only in 1947. In between he suffered wartime internment in Premanagar where he struck up a lifelong friendship with Nyanaponika Thera, another German-born Buddhist monk brought there from Ceylon. The most arduous and adventurous journey the husband and wife team undertook was to the ancient abandoned city of Tsaparang in Western Tibet. Here they copied priceless frescoes, most of which were later destroyed during the Chinese ‘cultural revolution’.

Acquaintance with Evans-Wentz led to the pair’s settling down on his estate in Almora, which became known to many Western visitors and readers of Govinda’s books as Kasar Devi Ashram. Here many important conversations took place which had a direct or indirect influence on Buddhist activities throughout the world. Among visitors was Sangharakshita, who later founded (The Friends of) the Western Buddhist Order. Their stay in the sub-Himalayan refuge was interrupted by travels to Europe for the sake of providing personal guidance and teaching for the members and friends of AMM, but fame brought invitations to lecture in universities, colleges and Buddhist organisations in the USA with protracted stays. Deteriorating conditions in India and better publishing oppor-
tunities eventually led to a decision to remain in the USA for good, and the Lama passed away there in early 1985. Li Gotami then returned to her family in India where she died in three years later.

This is a most welcome book and every reader of Govinda's works will find it useful and will be delighted by some of its photographs. Readers who do not know his books will no doubt immediately start hunting for his best known and loved autobiographical work, *The Way of the White Clouds*, on which the author draws heavily in parts. In some passages the depth and calibre of Govinda's personality come through, but on the whole the book leaves a lot to be desired. The author is obviously not an experienced writer and certainly not a biographer. We have, of course, to concede that it could not have been an easy task to try to assemble basic materials for a full and more detailed life story in face of the fact that the Lama, as it seems, never kept a diary or any continuous records of his life and, although an excellent narrator and conversationalist, it was always difficult to make him talk about himself. Nevertheless, one cannot escape the impression that the author did not make best use of his opportunity of frequent visits to the couple during their years in the USA. This may well be true also of his interviews with those who knew Govinda and of his approach to finding and researching written sources. Still, as a first life sketch the book will serve well, not least also as a reminder that another biography which would be thoroughly researched and draw also on German sources is needed.

Lama Govinda certainly deserves it. His was an unusually balanced personality which the reviewer had the good fortune of experiencing in seminar sessions and personal encounters in Germany. He was an artist (poet and painter), a philosopher, a master of the spoken as well as the written word, both in English and German, an experienced meditator and a supreme performer and reciter of *mantras* when conducting rituals which, with him, were never dull or routine but endowed with meaning — they were true 'meditations made visible'. He was also a true teacher who could address those who approached him on the appropriate level. Much of his deeper transmissions may never become public. Just as he was reticent about what was going on during his encounters with his teachers, so his direct pupils may similarly keep their experiences to themselves. The next step now would be if Dr Gottmann, the successor of Lama Govinda in the leadership of the AMM, could be persuaded to write the next biography.

*Karel Werner*


When the author prepared this book for publication, he could not have foreseen that it would come out at a time when his native country, from which he had emigrated after the Soviet invasion in 1968, would have cast off the chains of Communist rule under which it had languished for nearly forty-two years with only a month's respite during the 'Prague Spring'. His background was in economics and at one time he had served in the Czechoslovak Central Union of Commerce and even held positions in the Czechoslovak State Bank and the Academy of Sciences. Professionally, he did not survive the Communist putsch of 1948 for very long and in the 1950s he found himself in a labour camp, with the relatively easy task of grinding glass for chandeliers (other, less fortunate, undesirable intellectuals..."
were languishing in heavy industrial jobs, in Bohemian uranium mines or on construction sites). Whilst engaged in this work his mind was free to ponder the problems of human existence and from economics his interest shifted to socio-historical perspectives, prompted to some degree by his knowledge of the works of Sorokin and Toynbee, both of whom were powerful challengers of the Marxist ideology which ruled around him. When released in 1960, he developed his own ideas about the rise and fall of the fortunes of mankind as it developed various civilisations and let them slip away again. After a brief return to economics during the Dubček era, he emigrated to Britain where he found an interesting appointment in the Faculty of Arts at Lancaster University as an inter-departmental lecturer on social structures and developments, which included a course on the role of religion in that context for the Department of Religious Studies; his previous studies of non-European civilisations now acquired a new use as well as a fresh perspective. However, it was only his retirement as Professor Emeritus which enabled him to return to what by then became his tour de force, and the present book is the result.

In his introduction to this grandiose survey of civilisations, the author points out that it is only Europeans who have ever shown the irresistible drive to explore the whole globe. Other peoples, when they developed their high cultures, tended to 'rest on their oars' and, consequently, they now busy themselves in imitating and absorbing those elements of European civilisation which have made it so powerful and influential, particularly its science and technology, but also some of its humanitarian values such as personal liberty and greater equality between people, although some signs of resistance to this process have manifested themselves in most of the non-European spheres, e.g. in the militant Islamic backlash or in the partial revival of traditionalist values in India and Japan.

In dealing with individual civilisations, the author presents their specific paths to prominence and peak achievement, describes their social structures and cultural successes and pays special attention to the religious perspective within them. When surveying the ancient Mesopotamian and Egyptian achievements, the author comments on the 'mythopoetic' nature of their world-views. In Egypt 'everything revolved around a fantastic world of spiritual forces', but in spite of that the belief was that, provided he learned the rules that governed the world, man could take his fate into his own hands and even find salvation beyond. In the multi-ethnic Mesopotamian context man felt himself more like a servant, if not a mere puppet, in the hands of the gods - a much more resigned attitude, compensated for by focussing on empire-building in this world, rather than a futile search for immortality. Both these civilisations perished, but some of their features have been carried over even into modern times by peoples whose ancestors lived on their fringes but later played a more prominent role in the march of history. The Phoenicians transformed writing from the cuneiform script to the phonetic alphabet and carried it around the Mediterranean world in the trail of the commercial ventures. The Hebrews wrote the first full story of the creation of the world and crystallised the idea of one God, which may have originated with the Egyptian Akhenaten.

With the Iranians we meet the first Aryans (Indo-Europeans) in the book and they have been very influential in history, with Zarathustra's dualism still to some extent traceable in Christianity, then in the wars and cultural encounters with Greece and Hellenism, in Manichaean connections with medieval heresies, in softening Islam somewhat with Sufi trends, and in the complicated situation in modern Middle Eastern
politics, though the latter is no concern of the book.

India gets coverage from the pre-historic Harappan civilisation to the onset of colonialism. The great achievement of the Vedas was the notion of a cosmic and moral order (rit) projected in human terms into the karmic law governing metempsychosis from which liberation was sought by various means. Buddhism elaborated the concepts, but does not differ in aim from Hindu schools. Yet it liberated Indian society from the constraints of rigid caste regulations, at least for a time, and from the ban on foreign travel, thus enabling the spread of Indian civilisation to South-East Asia. Some attention is also given to the emergence of Maháyana described, not quite accurately, as the split in Buddhism, and its aspect of the 'happy end' for the individual as well as on the cosmic level is highlighted. Nevertheless, the 'Pan-Indian Synthesis', dominating also much of the South-East Asian scene, has the garb of revitalised Hinduism, based especially on the Epics, although softened by Buddhist ethics. The inroads of Islam into the area brought new imperial regrouping, but in effect paved the way for the colonial powers.

China also receives a substantial chapter. More practical than India, it had the technological edge until the sixteenth century, but the lack of feeling for generalisations and abstractions due to the peculiarities of the Chinese language and script was not favourable to developing real science. Instead, it was bureaucratic pedantism making use of the Confucian value system which ruled, while the emotional and spiritually creative elements were supplied by Taoism and Buddhism. Modern European technology brought even this colossus under indirect Western domination, only to lead to the tragic result of its adopting Europe's Communist ideology in asserting its independence from Europe, again a feature which the book does not touch upon.

A short final chapter entitled 'The Rythm of the Far East: Reception and Adaptation' deals with the countries to which China radiated its overpowering civilisation: Korea, Japan and Vietnam with Laos and Cambodia. Japan developed a unique symbiosis of its own Shintó tradition with adapted forms of Chinese Buddhism before the appearance of Western gunboats forced it into integration with the modern world.

The book falls within the tradition of the great continental surveys which used to flourish in Germany and is still alive in France, and it certainly fills a gap in the Anglo-Saxon scene with its bias towards hard specialisation and suspicion of comprehensive works of scholarship, especially when written by one person. At the same time, the book is not as voluminous as it would be if it had been conceived in Germany and it does not try, as a French work might do, to discover an underlying unifying trend in the evolution of civilisations to be realised in the future. In fact, the book represents in my view an essential comparative mosaic of knowledge about Oriental civilisations, which everybody who is interested in any of their individual facets should possess in order to fit his chosen subject into context. Buddhists are likely to find that the line of thought and interpretation evident in the book, besides being firmly rooted in sober yet open-minded European rationalism, has much in common with the Buddhist way of looking at and evaluating human endeavours in social and cultural fields. A well written and very readable book.

Karel Werner
CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS TO BSR 9, 2

1 - NOTES ON THE UDĀNA, by J.D. Ireland:

p.143, l10: for 'Their origin' read 'The tradition of their origin'.
p.144, l10: for 'complexion' read 'colour'.
p.146, l16: for 'Mahādeva' read 'Mādhava'.

2 - Review of Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden:

p.211, l6: for 'Mulasarvāstivādin' read 'Mulasarvāstivāda'.
p.212, l3: for DhpĀ read 'Dhp-a'.
p.212, n.4, l1: for 'Untersuchungen der ...' read 'Untersuchungen zur ...'.
p.213, il.14-15: for 'Those, who do not believe this fact,' read 'Those, who do not perceive ...'.
p.215, l13: for 'Hybrid Buddhist' read 'Buddhist Hybrid'.

3 - Obituaries:


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We welcome contributions to this journal, particularly in the field of early mainstream Buddhism and especially Buddhism in Central Asia except that, since they are adequately covered in other journals, Tibetan studies per se should be avoided.

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