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THE SĀL — AN ALTERNATIVE BUDDHIST HOLY TREE?

John D. Ireland

The sāl tree (śala- or sāka-rukkha, Shorea robusta) played a significant part in the life of the Buddha as recorded in Pāli literature1, although its role has been overshadowed by the Holy Fig, the Bodhi Tree, beneath which the Buddha is said to have attained Enlightenment. The Bodhi Tree (Ficus religiosa) was associated with Indian religion even before the Buddha’s time, with yakkha-shrines, with local and tribal guardian deities to whom offerings were made and yogins and holy men who meditated beneath its shade. It is appropriate, therefore, that the Buddha should have attained Enlightenment sitting beneath it.

Whereas the Bodhi Tree rarely occurs outside the context of the Enlightenment, the sāl tree is mentioned many times in the suttas. Indeed it is actually the sāl tree that played a more intimate role in the Buddha’s life. It was while standing holding a flowering sāl branch that Mahāmāyā gave birth to the Buddha-to-be and it was between two flowering sāl trees that the Buddha lay when he finally passed away. It is appropriate that the sāl tree should figure in these contexts when it is remembered that the Buddha was born in the Sakyan clan, Sakya or Sakiya meaning ‘the people of the sāka2 forest’. The sāl (or sāka) is indigenous to what is called the Nepal Terai, the tract of forest between the foothills of the Himalayas and the plains, the homeland of the Sakyans people. The legendary ancestors of the Sakyans were the sons of King Okkāka, who were banished when the king

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2 This is to assume sāka is a synonym of śala. Although the PED refers to the sāka as the teak (Tectone grandis), this tree is not indigenous to the Terai forests. See Thomas, ibid., p.7, footnote, referring to Dr Hoey, JRAS, 1906, p.453.
wished to make their younger half-brother his heir. They then went to live on the slopes of the Himalayas by the banks of a lotus pool where there was a grove of sāl trees, hence the name. This place became the site of the chief city of the Sakyans, Kapilavatthu (‘Kapi-la’s Place’), said to be named after the brahmin hermit Kapila who was living there in a leaf-hut when the princes arrived. There was still a sāl grove there at the time of the Buddha.

The traditional date of the birth, Enlightenment and passing away (parinibbāna) of the Buddha is the full-moon day of Vesākha (April-May). The sāl tree would be in full bloom at this time, which accords with the story of his birth in the Lumbini sāl tree grove and his mother being attracted by the sight of the flowers. However, in the Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta, when the Buddha was to pass away, it is said that the twin sāl trees were flowering out of season while raining their blossoms down upon him in homage. The Parinibbāna probably occurred in December-January, taking into account the chronology suggested by the text. At the end of the last rains-retreat (September-October) spent at the village of Beluva near Vesāli, the encounter with Māra occurred, when the Buddha stated that he would attain final Nibbāna in three months’ time. This would, of course, be December-January and too early for the normal flowering of the sāl.

The sāl is a tall forest tree yielding a useful timber, but is chiefly remarked upon for its flowers. In S I 131, Māra speaks of the beauty of the bhikkhuṇhi Uppalavanna as she stands at the foot of a sāl tree as if crowned in blossom. At A IV 259, the Buddha observes that even sāl trees would benefit from keeping the uposatha if they had minds — and would be proclaimed sotāpanna if they could know what is well-spoken or not (S V 377; also A II 194). These remarks are never said of any other kind of tree and may indicate an affectionate regard for it possibly because of its connection with his original home and people.

* * *

ON SOME FRAGMENTS OF THE BHIKṢUṆĪPRĀTIMOKṢA OF THE SARVĀŚTIVĀDAINS

Ann Heirman

In ‘Zwei kleine Fragmente aus den Bhikṣuṇīprātimokṣa’¹, K. Wille identifies two fragments of the Pelliot manuscripts², i.e., Pelliot Sanskrit (= P.Skt.) Bleu 46 and 47, found near Kuča, as possibly belonging to the Bhikṣuṇīprātimokṣa (= Bhipra) of the Dharmaguptaka school. The fragment P.Skt. Bleu 46 contains the first eight pācattikā³ precepts for bhikṣuṇīs, the fragment P.Skt. Bleu 47 contains two other pācattikā precepts. In the introduction preceding this category of precepts, P.Skt. Bleu 46 says that there are (1)7(8) pāc precepts.⁴ Only two schools have this number of precepts for bhikṣuṇīs, namely the Dharmaguptaka and Sarvāśtivāda schools. Yet, the identification of the Pelliot fragments poses a problem: the fifth pāc. precept mentioned in P.Skt. Bleu 46 is lacking in T 1437, Shih-sung Pi-ch’iu-ni Po-lo-t’i-mu-ch’a Chieh-pen, i.e., the Chinese Bhipra of the Sarvāśtivādains compiled by Fa-yiing between 465 and

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2 On these Mss, see J.-U. Hartmann and K. Wille, ‘Die nordturkistanischen Sanskrit-Handschriften der Sammlung Pelliot’ in Bechert et al, op. cit., pp.131-82.
471 CE\(^5\), while the order of the other precepts in T 1437 corresponds exactly to the order of the precepts in the Pelleio fragments. In T 1431, *Szu-fen Pi-ch'iu-ni Chieh-pen*, i.e. the Chinese Bhipra of the Dharmaguptakas compiled by Huai-su (634-707 CE\(^6\)), the fifth precept is included as pāc. 9 on pp.1034c24-1035a1: "If a bhikṣuṇi explains the doctrine to a man in more than five to six sentences, in the absence of a learned woman, there is a pācittika offence". On the other hand, the order of the precepts in T 1431 differs completely from the order in P.Skt. Bleu 46. These data make it hard to decide whether to attribute the Pelleio manuscripts to the Sarvāstivāda or Dharmaguptaka school.

Another element to be taken into consideration is the technical term pācattika used in P.Skt. Bleu 47. This term differs from pātayantikā, usually found in Sarvāstivāda texts\(^7\), and is closer to the term pācittika, attested in a Dharmaguptaka text\(^3\).

K. Wille, in a very convincing way, further proves that also in SHT I 44, Pa12\(^9\) the fifth precept of P.Skt. Bleu 46 is present\(^10\).

Moreover, also in SHT I 44, Pa12 the technical term pācattika appears.

This suggests that — contrary to E. Waldschmidt's conclusion\(^11\) — we have to classify SHT I 44 among the Dharmaguptaka texts. Because of the technical term pācattika O. von Hinüber also had expressed some hesitation in attributing the manuscript to the Sarvāstivādins\(^12\). On the one hand, according to von Hinüber, the term pācattika could be used by the Sarvāstivādins before pātayantikā became the more general term. This could explain why the Sarvāstivādins interpret pātayantikā as ‘... paca ti dahaty uddahaty ...’\(^13\), associating pācattika with √pac. On the other hand, schools strongly hold on to their technical terms. Therefore von Hinüber is inclined to attribute SHT I 44 to the Dharmaguptaka school, which uses the term pācittika\(^3\). K. Wille agrees with von Hinüber's argumentation, further referring to the fact that the precept on 'the five to six sentences' is present in both SHT I 44, Pa12 and in T 1431, the Chinese Bhipra of the Dharmaguptakas, but is lacking in T 1437, the Chinese Bhipra of the Sarvāstivādins.

Furthermore, T 1440, *Sa-p'o-to P'i-ni P'i-p'o-sha*, a commentary on the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya\(^14\), p.541b ff. explicitly mentions that the precept on 'the five to six sentences' does not apply to bhikṣuṇīs in the same way that it applies to bhikṣus: for bhikṣuṇīs, explaining the doctrine to a man implies a duṣkri\(^15\) and not a pāc.

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6 Id., ib., p.34.
7 An analogous precept for bhikṣus (not being permitted to speak to a woman about the doctrine in more than five to six sentences) is included in the Bhikṣu-prātimokṣa of both the Dharmaguptakas (T 1429, *Szu-fen Lü Pi-ch'iu Chieh-pen*, compiled by Huai-su (634-707 CE\(^)), p.1018b20-21 and the Sarvāstivādins (T 1436, *Shih-sung Pi-ch'iu Po-lo-mu-t'i-ch'a Chieh-pen* (translated by Kumārajīva at the beginning of the 5th century), p.474a21-22, as well as in the other extant Vinayas.
9 Published in E. Waldschmidt, *Bruchstücke des Bhikṣuṇi-Prātimokṣa der Sarvāstivādins (BhiPr)*, Leipzig 1926, p.32. — SHT I 44 are fragments, numbered by Waldschmidt from Pa1 to Pa14, belonging to the Bhipra.
11 Comparing the many similarities, in order and content, of the precepts in SHT I 44 with the precepts in T 1437, Waldschmidt, with absolute certainty, attributed SHT I 44 to the Sarvāstivāda school (Waldschmidt, *BhiPr*, p.2). Not noticing that the precept on 'the five to six sentences' is present in SHT I 44, Pa12, he did not see any difference with T 1437.
13 Rosen, *op. cit.*, p.10, n.7 ("Pātayantika reif, brennt, brennt auf...").
14 Probably translated after the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya (T 1435) was translated into Chinese and before 431 CE (cf. Yuyama, *op. cit.*, pp.8-9).
15 Lit. 'a bad action', i.e., a light offence.
The above seems to indicate that both P.Skt. Bleu 46 and 47, and SHT I 44 do not belong to the Sarvāstivāda school, but more likely to the Dharmaguptaka school. This hypothesis, however, encounters some insurmountable problems:

1) The order of the precepts in P.Skt. Bleu 46 and 47 corresponds to their order in the Sarvāstivāda text, T 1437, and differs from the order in the Dharmaguptaka text, T 1431. This is further illustrated by the indication [4]16, completed by K. Wille to [4] (1)17, in P.Skt. Bleu 47.2. The number follows the 41st precept of the Bhipra: a bhikṣuṇi may not associate with a suspended bhikṣuṇi. Also in T 1437, this precept has the number 41 (p.483c4-6). In T 1431, however, it has the number 53 (p.1036a1-2).

2) The order and content of the precepts in SHT I 44 closely correspond to the order and content of the precepts in T 1437.

We can illustrate this with the eight pratidesanīya (Pali pāṭidesanīya) precepts18 of SHT I 44, Pa1319 as compared to the precepts in the extant Vinayas. These precepts, particular to the bhikṣuṇīs20, display some clear differences between schools. The Pāli Vinaya, T 1421 (Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya), T 1425 (Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya), the Bhikṣuṇīvibhanga of the Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravāda school, and T 1428 and T 1431 (Dharmaguptaka Vinaya and the Dharmaguptaka Bhīpra), all have the same eight precepts. T 1435 and T 1437 (Sarvāstivāda Vinaya and the Sarvāstivāda Bhīpra) and T 1443 (Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya, Bhikṣuṇīvibhangā) show the following differences:

16 [ ]: damaged fragment or uncertain reconstruction.
17 Wille, op. cit., p.312.
18 Precepts requiring a confession. The precepts for nuns all concern the consumption of inappropriate food.
19 Waldschmidt, BhiPr, p.33.
20 The 8 pratidesanīya precepts for bhikṣuṇīs do not correspond with the pratidesanīya precepts for bhikṣus. They are, however, related to a pāc. precept for bhikṣus found in all the Vinayas: Pāli Vin: pāc. 39; T 1421: pāc. 41; T 1425: Pāc. 39; T 1428, T 1435 and T 1442: pāc. 40.

Hervalds — Sarvāstivādin Bhikṣuṇi-prātimokṣa

Pāli: H. Oldenberg, Vinaya Pitaka IV, pp.346-8
T 1421: p.100a16-b10 (Mahā)
T 1425: p.544a8-c5 (Mahā)
Ma-L.: G. Roth, Bhikṣuṇi-Vinaya, §252
T 1428: p.778a8-b10 (corresponds to T 1431, Bhipra, p.1038c6-29
(Dharma)
T 1435: p.345a23-b28 (corresponds to T 1437, Bhipra, p.486a29-b6
(Sarva)
T 1443: pp.1016a28-1017b10 (11 precepts) (Mūla).

—SEE OVER THE PAGE FOR TABLE—

The order and content of the precepts in SHT I 44, Pa13 exactly correspond to the order and content of the precepts in the Bhikṣuṇīvibhanga of the Sarvāstivādins (and in the Bhipra), and hardly tally with any other tradition21.

Due to this evidence, we think that, most probably, both SHT I 44 and the P.Skt. Bleu 46 and 47 fragments related to it, belong to the Sarvāstivāda school.

Moreover, the use of the term pācattika in these manuscripts is not a convincing argument to cast doubt on a Sarvāstivāda origin. Although Sarvāstivāda texts usually display the technical term pātayantika, it is not at all impossible that, as already mentioned by von Hinüber (see above), at a certain time, the school might have used pācattika. Moreover, the terms pāyita / pāttī are also attested in a Sarvāstivāda (Bhikṣuprātimokṣa) fragment, written in a hybrid

21 Also, the supposition that SHT I 44 and P.Skt. Bleu 46 and 47 could belong to the Kāśyapīya school, of which a Bhikṣuprātimokṣa has been handed down, can be excluded. The pāc. precept, in casu pāc. 40 (T 1460, p.662c19-21), upon which the pratidesanīya precepts for bhikṣuṇīs are based (see the preceding note), gives an enumeration of 9 food articles. The order and partially the content are not parallel to SHT I 44, Pa13. It is, however to be noticed that T 1460, like SHT I 44, mentions the article 生麩 (navanlta): 麩, 油, 醬, 石蜜, 乳酪, 生麩, 魚 and 肉.
language with Prākrit and Sanskrit elements. This clearly shows that variants of one technical term do appear within the same school, though maybe not at the same time. It is true, however, that no Sarvāstivāda text other than SHT I 44 and P.Skt. Bleu 47 has a variant of this technical term containing the consonant <c>.

The question why the precepts on the ‘five to six sentences’ is mentioned in SHT I 44 and P.Skt. Bleu 46, but is considered lacking by the commentary on the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya, T 1440, later confirmed by the Chinese Bhipra of the Sarvāstivāda school, T 1437, remains unsolved.

Possibly the answer can be found in the redaction of the Sarvāstivāda Bhipra. T 1437 is not a translation but a compilation (ca. 465-71 CE) by Fa-ying based on the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya, T 1435. Since, in T 1435, the precepts common to both bhiksus and bhikṣunis have not been included, the question arises as to how Fa-ying integrates these precepts into his compilation.

In the oldest extant catalogue of Buddhist texts translated into Chinese, Ch’u San-tsong Chi-chi (T 2145) (510-18 CE), pp. 14c28-15a1, Seng-yu mentions four Bhipras belonging to the Sarvāstivāda:

— Pi-ch’iu-ni Chieh by Chu Fa-hu (i.e. Dharmarakṣa, second half of third century CE). According to Seng-yu, this work is lost. Since,

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however, Seng-yu mentions it, A. Hirakawa is of the opinion that it must have existed.27

— Pi-ch’iu-ni Ta Chieh by Seng-ch’un (ca. 380 CE, see further on). According to Hirakawa28, it is beyond doubt that this work existed but is lost.29

— Shih-sung Pi-ch’iu-ni Chieh-pen by Fa-ying (ca 465-71 CE34). — Ta Pi-ch’iu-ni Chieh by Mi-li, mentioned as a lost apocryphal work.

Moreover, in Seng-yu’s catalogue, an introduction to a Bhipra is included (p.79c9 ff.). According to Hirakawa, it probably introduces Seng-ch’un’s text.30 Further in the catalogue, pp.81b2-24, b25-c17 and 81c18-82a17, three short comments on two works related to the

Bhipra. According to Hirakawa, A Study, op. cit., p.234. — Ca. 150 years after Seng-yu, Tao-hsüan, T 2149 (664 CE), pp.235c12 and 243a10, says that Chu Fa-hu’s text does not differ greatly from the translation by T’an-mo-ch’ih (i.e., Seng-ch’un’s text; see n.29). 28 A Study, op. cit., pp.234-5.

29 See Seng-yu, T 2145, p.10a26-29: a ‘barbarian’ (hu, Mathews 2167) text obtained by Seng-ch’un in Kuča at the time of the emperor Chien-Wen (fl. 371-72 CE) of the (Eastern) Chin and brought by him to Kuan-chung (i.e. present-day Shen-hsi), where he had it translated by Chu Fo-nien, T’an-mo-ch’ih and Hui-ch’ang. This text is further mentioned in the following catalogues: Fa-ching et al., T 2146 (594 CE) — for compilation dates, see Mizuno, op. cit., pp.187-206), p.140b11; Tao-hsüan, T 2149 (664 CE), p.250a15-18; Ching-mai, T 2151 (627-49 CE), p.358a24-26; Chih-sheng, T 2154 (730 CE), pp.510c3 and 648c6-7; Yu-an-chiao et al., T 2157 (800 CE), pp.807b9 and 984c7-8. As the last two catalogues base their information on Seng-yu’s catalogue, this suggests that the Bhipra was probably lost at the time.


31 These passages have been translated and annotated in Tsukamoto, op. cit., I, pp.636-41.

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Let us again take the pratideśaniya precepts for bhikṣunīs as an illustration. Since the precepts of the Sarvāstivāda school are clearly distinct from those of the other schools, they offer a good basis for the determination of the affiliation of a text. The Tun-huang Ms contains exactly the same pratideśaniya precepts as T 1437, i.e., the Chinese Bhipra of the Sarvāstivāda, compiled by Fa-ying: 乳, 酪, 酢, 熟酥, 魚, 肉, 腸. This proves that both texts belong to the same school, i.e. the Sarvāstivāda school.

However, some very small differences in order and content of the precepts indicate that the Tun-huang Ms is not identical to Fa-ying’s compilation. The Ms, for instance, contains 358 precepts, whilst T 1437 contains only 354. The difference is due to the different number of saikṣā precepts, the Ms containing four more. The most important difference, in the scope of this article, is certainly the precept on the ‘five to six sentences’: while the precept is lacking in T 1437, the Tun-huang Ms does contain it (as the fifth pāc. precept). This implies that, among the Sarvāstivādins, there are at least two different versions of the Bhipra: one containing the precept on the ‘five to six sentences’ and one in which it is lacking.

Finally, since the terminology and order of the precepts in the Tun-huang Ms follow the translation of the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya by Kumārajīva (T 1435), Nishimoto is of the opinion that Kumārajīva is possibly the translator of the Bhipra in the Tun-huang Ms. The main objection to this hypothesis is that no catalogue mentions this fact.

Seng-yu’s catalogue reveals that, amongst the Sarvāstivādins, many discussions on the exact content of the Bhipra arose. Nishimoto’s study proves that within the Sarvāstivāda tradition at least two versions of the prātimokṣa were in circulation. When, eventually, only one version, i.e., Fa-ying’s compilation, survived, the discussions died down.

The question as to what is the original version of the Sarvāstivāda Bhipra remains and will, we are afraid, be hard to answer. It can only be said that it seems likely that the discussion on the precepts for bhikṣunīs amongst the Sarvāstivādins were influenced by the positions of the other schools, in the first place, of the Mūlasarvāstivādins and Dharmaguptakas. Also, the Mahīśāsakas might have exerted some influence. The Bhipras of these three schools all contain the precept on the ‘five to six sentences’.

Mūlasarvāstivāda and Sarvāstivāda communities in India and Central Asia kept in close contact. Moreover, their Vinayas display many similarities. The Dharmaguptakas also had contact with the Sarvāstivādins. Both schools were situated in the North-West of the Indian sub-continent and they reached the North-West of China via the T’ien-shan mountains. Further, the Mahīśāsakas were also present in the North-West. Hui-chiao, T 2059, p.339a3-4, in the biography of Buddhajīva who, between 422 and 423 CE, translated the Mahīśāsaka Vinaya into Chinese, says that Buddhajīva, a monk from Kaśmīra, had, as a young man, a teacher belonging to the Mahīśāsaka school. Yet, in China, the Mahīśāsakas, unlike the Dharmaguptakas and Sarvāstivādins, do not play an important part. To our knowledge, they

34 Kṣīra, dadhi, navanta, sarpis, taila, matsya, māṃsa, vallūra.
35 In the Sarvāstivāda school, differences concerning the saikṣā precepts are not unusual. The Bhikṣuvivaha (T 1435, p.133b14 ff.) contains 107 precepts, whilst the Bhikṣuprātimokṣa (T 1436, p.476c25 ff.) contains 113. The Sanskrit Bhikṣuprātimokṣa equally has 113 precepts (Finot and Huber, op. cit., p.527 ff.). The Bhikṣuṇivivaha (T 1435, p.345b28) says that the saikṣā precepts for bhikṣunīs correspond to those for bhikṣus. This implies that there should be 107 saikṣā precepts for bhikṣunīs. However, the Bhipra (T 1437, p.486b11 ff.) has only 106 precepts.

36 T 1423 (Mahīśāsaka); T 1431 (Dharmaguptaka); T 1455 (Mūlasarvāstivāda).
37 See Waldschmidt, BhPr; W. Pachow, A Comparative Study of the Prātimokṣa on the Basis of its Chinese, Tibetan, Sanskrit and Pali Versions, Santiniketan 1955.
38 For other references on their presence in the North-West, see E. Frauwallner, The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginnings of Buddhist Literature, Rome 1956, pp.20-1.
are not mentioned among the schools ordaining monks and nuns in China.\(^{39}\)

For the monastic life in China, the Dharmaguptakas are considered to be the first to introduce a *karma*vācanā (third century CE)\(^{40}\). Around the same period, Dharmakāla translated a Bhāpura of the Mahāsāṃghikas\(^{41}\). In the fourth and fifth centuries some kind of rivalry as to the Vinaya arises mainly between three schools in China:

\(^{39}\) See also notes 41 and 42.

\(^{40}\) The Chinese catalogues mention two *karma*vācanās, belonging to the Dharmaguptakas, translated in the 3rd C. CE: T 1432 (first mentioned in Chih-sheng, T 2154, pp.486c9-487a7) and T 1433 (first mentioned in Fa-ching et al., T 2146, p.140b13). These two texts, however, are proven to be compilations based on the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya, T 1428 (see Hirakawa, *A Study*, op. cit., pp.202-18). This does not mean that the Dharmaguptakas were not present in China in the third century. Texts of the sixth and seventh centuries display a strong belief in their early presence (cf. Hui-chiao, T 2059, p.325a8-9; Tao-hsian (596-667 CE), T 2060, p.620b8 and c2-3). Linguistic evidence further confirms the early presence of the Gândhārī language, used by the Dharmaguptakas (E. Pulleyblank, 'Stages in the Transcription of Indian Words in Chinese from Han to Tang', in K. Rörhard & W. Veenker, *Sprachen des Buddhismus in Zentralasien*, Wiesbaden 1983, pp.73-102, here pp.84-7; von Hünucker, 'Expansion to the North: Afghanistan and Central Asia' in H. Bechert & R. Gombrich, *The World of Buddhism*, London 1984, 1993, pp.99-107, here p.103). To this should be added that the Sarvāstivāda school probably made use of this language also (von Hünucker, *Die Bestimmung...*, op. cit., p.75; von Simson, *op. cit.*, p.601).

\(^{41}\) See Hui-chiao, T 2059, p.325a3-4; Fa-ching et al., T 2146, p.140b8; for further references, see Hirakawa, *A Study*, op. cit., pp.218-20). Later, Dharmakāla’s work was lost (see Chih-sheng, T 2154, p.648c22-24; Hirakawa, *ibid.*, p.219) — According to Pao-ch’ang, T 2063, p.934c22-23, the first Chinese nun Ching-chien (ca.292-361 CE) was ordained in the middle of the fourth century on the basis of a *karma*vācanā and a *prātimokṣa* belonging to the Mahāsāṃghikas. Tsukamoto, *op. cit.*, I, p.424, however, says that there is no proof of the spread of these texts and points to the fact that after this time the search for a correct and complete Bhāpura also continued. — Unlike the Bhpras of the Mahāśātras, Dharmaguptakas and Mūlasarvāstivādins, the Mahāsāṃghika Bhāpura, T 1427, does not include the precept on the ‘five to six sentences’. This once more reveals that the viewpoints on this precept were not the same in every school.

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Heirman — Sarvāstivāda Bhikṣuṇi-prātimokṣa

Since the Sarvāstivāda were unsure about the exact content of the Bhpras, a discussion arose among them and it seems likely that contacts between the different schools played an important part in this. In our view, the presence of the precept on the ‘five to six sentences’ in SHT I 44 and P.Skt. Bleu 46, as well as in the Tun-huang Ms studied by Nishimoto, is due to the opinion that this precept belongs to the original Sarvāstivāda Bhāpura. This opinion is possibly influenced by the position of other schools, most probably the Mūlasarvāstivādins and/or the Dharmaguptakas.\(^{42}\) On the other hand, the absence of the precept in T 1437, a fact which is in accordance with a statement in T 1440, indicates that, according to Fa-ying and to the author of T 1440, this precept does not belong to the original Sarvāstivāda Bhāpura. This might point to a Mahāsāṃghika influence, as they do not include this precept in their Bhāpura. In the second and

\(^{42}\) Tao-hsian, T 2060, p.620b6, c2-7, says that in T’ang dynasty China, the Dharmaguptaka rules were generally followed. He regrets that before, in the South, two Vinayas were used at the same time: the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya and the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya. At the end of the seventh century CE, I-ching, T 2125, p.205b26-c5, says that in the East of China, the Dharmaguptaka rules were generally followed. In some places e.g., Kuan-chung (in present-day Shen-hsi) one finds followers of both the Dharmaguptakas and Mahāsāṃghikas. Before, in the South China, the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya was followed. I-ching adds that adherents of different schools have to follow their own Vinaya, but must also respect the Vinayas of the others.

\(^{43}\) One late, additional, link between the precepts for bhikṣuṇis of the Sarvāstivāda and those of the Dharmaguptakas is the monk Chu Fo-nien, one of the most prominent translators at the end of the fourth and the beginning of the fifth centuries CE (see Zürcher, *op. cit.*, I, p.202). He is one of the translators of both the Bhāpura obtained by Seng-ch’un and the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya, T 1428 (see T 1428, p.567b24-25 *et passim*; Yuyama, *op. cit.*, p.36). In addition, he is also mentioned as the translator of a Sarvāstivāda Vinaya (T 1464), partially translated in 383 CE (see Yuyama, *ibid.*, pp.7-8).
third centuries CE, they too were present in the North-West of India. Moreover, given the fact that the Mahāśāṃghikhas had followers in China, they probably also met Sarvāstivaṃśa monks on the Chinese sub-continent. Yet, given the many dissimilarities between the Bhipras of the Sarvāstivaṃśas and Mahāśāṃghikas, partly due to a different organisation of the prātimokṣa, it seems unlikely that the Sarvāstivaṃśa admitted any authority of the Mahāśāṃghikas as to the content of the precepts.  

Summarising, it is clear that SHT I 44 and P.Skt. Bleu 46 and 47 are, given the many similarities with the Bhipra of the Sarvāstivaṃśas (T 1437), manuscripts belonging to the Sarvāstivaṃśa school. In this school, however, there is a discussion on the exact content of the Bhipra, and at least two slightly different versions have been handed down. Eventually, only the compilation by Fa-ying, T 1437, survived and is considered to be correct. The presence of the precept on the ‘five to six sentences’ in SHT I 44 and P.Skt. Bleu 46, and in the Tun-huang Ms studied by Nishimoto, is based on the opinion that this precept belongs to the original Sarvāstivaṃśa Bhipra. This opinion is probably influenced by the position of other schools, most likely the Mūlasarvāstivaṃśas and/or the Dhamaguptakas.

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46 In this sense, a few similarities between the Mahāśāṃghika and Sarvāstivaṃśa precepts, such as the lack of the precept on the ‘five to six sentences’ (see C. Kabilsingh, *A Comparative Study of Bhikkhuni Pātimokka*, Varanasi 1984/Delhi 1998, p.93) are probably due to a remainder of a very old stage or to a coincidentally common evolution.

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**THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INJUNCTION TO HOLD ONESELF AND THE DHAMMA AS AN ISLAND AND A REFUGE IN THE BUDDHA’S TEACHING**

**Abraham Vélez de Cea**

**INTRODUCTION**

The Buddha frequently used the term atta in its colloquial sense as ‘oneself’, ‘myself’, ‘yourself’, ‘himself’, etc., as required by the everyday linguistic usage of his time, because this did not necessarily contradict the teaching of anatta. As Steven Collins has pointed out: ‘The linguistic items translated lexically as “self” and “person” (in Pali atta, purisa/puggala, Sanskrit ātman, purusā/pudgala respectively, are used quite naturally and freely in a number of contexts, without any suggestion that their being so used might conflict with the doctrine of anatta.”

Similarly, the Buddha used certain current idiomatic phrases involving the term atta because this was part of the usual terminology in philosophical and religious circles of his time, and such usage did not imply a philosophical commitment to a particular conception of atta, nor an acceptance of atta as an ultimate reality.

Just as other teachers did, in order to make themselves better understood, the Buddha resorted to the language currently in use, and saw no problems in putting forward his own ideas in the religious terminology and idiomatic terms that were common in his cultural context. Now the fact that the Buddha occasionally used idiomatic phrases and religious terminology common to other teachers and schools in no way means that he interpreted this language in the same manner. On the contrary, a comparative analysis of religious terms in current use in the cultural context of the times, such as kamma, brahma, brāhmaṇa, ariya, etc., makes it clear that the Buddha

* Translated by the author from his (forthcoming) doctoral dissertation, ‘La filosofía del Buddha según los sermons Pali’ (Madrid).  
invested those terms with new meanings more in accordance with his own thinking. Similarly, a comparative analysis of other idiomatic terms that were equally common in philosophical and religious discussions of the times, such as for instance, brahmaçariya, brahma-bhūtena attanā, brahmavihāra, attakāma, attanam gavesati, bhāvitatto, attadīpā viharatha attasaranā anaññasañā, etc., shows that the Buddha used those terms rather as metaphors to convey his own spirituality. As Prof. Gombrich rightly indicates: "the Buddha regularly used the language of his opponents, but turned it into metaphor"

One of the most famous phrases with the term attā in the Pāli discourses is the injunction to hold oneself and the Dhamma, and no one or nothing else, as an island and a refuge.

Some authors, such as C.A.F. Rhys Davids, I.B. Horner, A.K. Coomaraswamy, K. Bhattacharya, J. Pérez-Remón, etc., claim that this injunction shows that the Buddha accepted the ultimate existence of an unchanging attā (as an individual or a universal entity, depending on each author’s philosophical stance) which is literally one’s island and refuge. However, and this is the point of the present study, a close examination of the Pāli discourses shows that this injunction does not constitute an explicit reference to an immortal and transcendent attā which is identical with the Dhamma, but simply uses current everyday language as a metaphor to recommend the practice of the Four Foundations of Mindfulness, that is to say, the awareness of an impermanent and dependently originated process which is the result of causes and conditions which are themselves impermanent. As we shall see, this injunction is addressed to persons who are confused and depressed because of someone’s illness or death. The purpose of this is, on the one hand, to provide encouragement at times of crisis, so as to help the person to avoid unwholesome mental states that are an obstacle to spiritual practice, and on the other hand to serve as a reminder of the fact that, irrespective of whether this or that teacher may have died or be about to die, it is still possible to go on practising the Dhamma.

We shall also see that when the Buddha declares that he has achieved his own refuge he is far from referring to an immortal attā that finds shelter from suffering, and far from suggesting that Nibbāna, Dhamma and attā are identical. All he is saying is that he has practised the Four Foundations of Mindfulness and that through this practice he has attained the refuge of Nibbāna, a state defined in the Pāli texts as non-attā.

I. POSSIBLE TRANSLATIONS OF THE INJUNCTION AND PROBLEMS ARISING WITH THE ATMANIC INTERPRETATION.

The locus classicus for this injunction is, of course, the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta, where the Buddha, shortly before expiring, says to Ānanda:

3 D II 100, etc.
9 For details of the Pāli texts where Nibbāna is defined as anattā, see S. Collins, Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities, Cambridge 1998, pp.141-2.
10 The interpretation just described, which takes idiomatic phrases and compounds including the term attā as proving that the Buddha accepted the existence of an immortal attā, and therefore tends to translate attā as a noun (the attā or an attā) instead of a reflexive pronoun (oneself). The terms ‘atmanic’ and ‘atmanic’ are neologisms coined by Raimondo Panikkar to identify, respectively, traditions which accept or do not accept the reality of attā.
Without getting into a philological debate as to whether it is legitimate to translate attā as ‘the self’, instead of simply ‘oneself’, or into hermeneutic dispute about whether the ‘self’ supposedly referred to in this passage is meant to be a permanent and eternal individual ‘I’ (as Pérez-Remón seems to believe on the basis of Christian philosophical premises) or a universal ‘I’ (as A.K. Coomaraswamy and S. Radhakrishnan maintain from a neo-Vedantic point of view), let us admit, for argument’s sake, that the atmantic translation is, at least, philologically acceptable and consider some of the problems it raises.

The atmantic translation of the passage in question assumes that Dhamma is the same as attā.16

The atmantic interpretation would seem to maintain that if the Buddha exhorts his disciples to take attā and Dhamma as an island and refuge, those two terms, Dhamma and attā, denote the same reality. Now this identity or equivalence assumed in the atmantic translation is highly problematic because it makes the Pāli texts contradict themselves. If the passage, attadipā viharatha attasaraṇaṁ anaññasaṛanaṁ, dhammadipā dhammasaraṇaṁ anaññasaṛanaṁ, implies that Dhamma and attā are one and the same thing, this means that there is at least one dhamma which is attā, which is in clear contradiction of the Buddha’s other statement that ‘sabbhe dharmam anattā’ (all dhammas are non-attā).

To claim that Dhamma and attā are identical or equivalent renders the teaching of Dependent Origination unnecessary. In effect, Dependent Origination explains suffering and the nature of things on the basis that there is no such thing as an attā that might constitute the essence, or substantive foundation of the impermanent processes that constitute a human being. But if it is assumed that in the ultimate analysis there exists in fact an attā that is the same as Dhamma, what would be the point of Dependent Origination?

The identification of attā and Dhamma is in direct contradiction to the Buddha’s explicit identification of Dependent Origination with

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11 All Pāli quotations refer to the Pali Text Society edition, in this case D II 100.
13 Dialogues of the Buddha II, PTS, p.108.
14 Pérez-Remón, op. cit., p.20.
15 Ibid., p.20.
the Dhamma when he declares that he who sees the one sees the other, and vice versa. If to see the Dhamma is to see that things arise dependently, and Dependent Origination does not need to postulate a real, essential attā, it does not make much sense to claim at the same time that Dhamma and attā are the same.

What is explicitly stated throughout the Pāli Canon is that to see the Dhamma is to see Dependent Origination, but nowhere is anything said to the effect that seeing the Dhamma is equivalent to seeing attā. Rather the opposite: what is explicitly declared is that the concept of attā is the consequence of an inadequate perception of the psychophysical aggregates which constitute human reality and that, if an attā existed, liberation from suffering would not be possible (not be perceived).

Now, since the passage we are examining is to be found in the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta, which narrates the Buddha’s last days, an atmanic interpreter might argue that, before dying, the Buddha meant to reveal the esoteric meaning of the anatta doctrine, so as to make everything clear before his disappearance and prevent any misunderstanding about the ultimate meaning of the anatta doctrine, i.e. — according to this interpretation — he would not have been questioning the ultimate reality of an attā but the mistake that would consist in confusing this attā with the physical and mental aggregates that make up the individual.

Firstly, however, this interpretation may easily be countered by recalling that the injunction under consideration is also found in many other texts of the Pāli Canon, and there is no reason to assume that it appears for the first time in the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta.

Secondly, it would not seem to be at all consistent to believe that the Buddha, just before his disappearance, decided to enjoin his disciples to hold the attā as their island and refuge in a literal, rather than an idiomatic or figured sense, when he had previously spent forty-five years tirelessly repeating that nothing is to be regarded as ‘I am’ or as ‘this is my attā’.

Thirdly, the esoteric interpretation is untenable in the light of what the Buddha says just before: ‘I have preached the truth without making any distinction between exoteric and esoteric doctrine; for in respect of the truths, Ānanda, the Tathāgata has no such thing as the closed fist of a teacher who keeps things back.

If the Buddha has just been saying that he has been preaching the Dhamma without making any distinction between exoteric and esoteric teaching, it would be absurd for him to reveal, shortly afterwards, a secret meaning of the anatta doctrine. If the Buddha had wanted to teach that there was such a thing as a real attā he would have said so clearly in the course of his long life, without waiting for his dying day to reveal a supposedly true esoteric, occult meaning of his often repeated teaching of non-attā.

Fourthly, the context (in D II 100) does not justify the inference that the Buddha is advising his disciples to turn to an unchanging, eternal attā as an island and a refuge. Rather, the context makes it clear that what the Buddha is saying is that no one needs to be appointed to succeed him at the head of the Order, as a refuge for others, after his death. In fact, in the context we see that the Buddha is very ill. Ānanda says that he feels purposeless (madhurakajāto) and unable to make sense of things (me na pakkhāyanti dhammā) because of the Lord’s sickness, but he derives some comfort from the thought that the Master would not attain final Nibbāna until he had made some statement about who would be his successor and lead the Order of monks after his death. It is at this point that the Buddha says to him that he has preached the Dhamma without making any distinction between open and occult teachings and that he does not think it necessary to say anything further about the Community of monks, i.e., that

17 Yo pañcasamuppādam passati. So dhamman passati. Yo dhamman passati. So pañcasamuppādam passatit — M I 191, etc.
18 S III 46.
19 S III 144.
20 D II 100; trans. in Dialogues of the Buddha I, op. cit., p.107.
he does not think it necessary to appoint anyone to succeed him as the leader of the Community. He then adds that he will soon die, that he is old and frail and that he can only overcome physical suffering by dwelling in certain meditative states.

It is at this point that the Buddha exhorts Ānanda and all his disciples to live ‘as those who have the self as island, as those who have the self as refuge, as those who have no other refuge; as those who have Dhamma as island, as those who have Dhamma as refuge, as those who have no other refuge’21.

Since the Buddha has already taught everything that is necessary to make oneself free from suffering, what the disciples have to do is simply to protect themselves from unwholesome mental states, i.e., to be their own island and refuge and to have the Dhamma as an island and refuge, which means practising the Dhamma.

In the past, as stated elsewhere in the Pali discourses22 the disciples could turn to the Buddha as their island and refuge. But once the Buddha is gone, they themselves and the Dhamma must be their own island and refuge, i.e., they must concentrate on practising the Dhamma and not place their expectations in any successor of the Buddha as head of the Community and future preacher of the Dhamma that has already been taught. That is to say, they must practise the Four Foundations of Mindfulness, thereby eliminating all unwholesome mental states: ‘And how does a monk live as an island unto himself... with no other refuge? Here, Ānanda, a monk abides contemplating the body as body earnestly, clearly aware, mindful and have put away all hankering and fretting for the world, and likewise with regard to feelings, mind and mind-objects. That, Ānanda, is how a monk lives as an island unto himself... with no other refuge’23.

This confirms that to live ‘as an island unto oneself, being one’s own refuge, with Dhamma as an island, with Dhamma as one’s refuge’ does not presuppose a Dhamma/attā identity as an unchanging and eternal entity, but refers simply, in the context of an impermanent and dependently originated process, to the need to protect oneself from unwholesome states (taking oneself as island and refuge) by practising the Four Foundations of Mindfulness (taking the Dhamma as island and refuge)24.

II. THE MEANING OF THE ‘ATTADĪPĀ VIHARATHA ATTASARĀNA’ INJUNCTION IN THE LIGHT OF OTHER TEXTS, AND SIMILES.

There are other passages in the Pali texts where the Buddha similarly stresses the relationship between the practice of the Four Foundations of Mindfulness and the fact of living with oneself or the Dhamma as an island and refuge. See for instance the beginning of the Cakkavatti Sīhanāda Sutta (D III 58), which parallels the passage in the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta (D II 100), and follows it with a further simile for the practice of the Foundations of Mindfulness, recommending to ‘keep to one’s own pasture, to one’s own home range, and not to leave them’.

If one does so, the Buddha goes on to explain, Mara (the personification of evil and of unwholesome mental states) will not be able to seize his prey25.

Now, in the Makkato Sutta of the Samyutta Nikāya (S V 149), ‘one’s own pasture’ is defined as the practice of the Foundations of Mindfulness. At the same time, we have seen that ‘living with oneself and the Dhamma as an island and refuge’ is also defined in terms of the Foundations of Mindfulness. It is therefore perfectly legitimate to equate the two similes as referring, both of them, to the practice of the Foundations of Mindfulness.

Mara’s own home range or territory is defined as the five strands of sensual pleasure: ‘Objects cognizable by the eye, objects desirable,

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21 D II 100.
22 S IV 315.
23 D II 100; trans. Walshe, op. cit., p.245.
25 In other discourses, e.g. M I 174, Mara is compared to a hunter.
pleasant, delightful and dear, passion-fraught, inciting to lust... There are sounds cognizable by the ear... scents cognizable by the nose... savours cognizable by the tongue... tangibles cognizable by the body, objects desirable, pleasant, delightful and dear, passion-fraught, inciting to lust. This, monks, is the range that is not yours, that belongs to others.  

In the Āneñjasappaya Sutta (M II 261-2) Māra's domain is described specifically as the realm where unwholesome mental states prevail: 'Bhikkhus, sensual pleasures are impermanent, hollow, false, deceptive; they are illusory, the prattle of sensual pleasures here and now and sensual pleasures in lives to come, sensual perceptions here and now and sensual perceptions in lives to come — both alike are Māra's realm, Māra's bait, Māra's hunting ground. On account of these, these evil unwholesome mental states such as covetousness, ill will, and presumption arise, and they constitute an obstruction to a noble disciple in training here.  

So we can see that both injunctions — to live having oneself and the Dhamma as an island and a refuge, and to remain within one's own pasture and home range — refer to the Four Foundations of Mindfulness and to the prevention of unwholesome mental states. So when the Buddha exhorts his disciples to take themselves and the Dhamma as an island and a refuge he is not talking about an immutable, eternal self or attā to which one turns as a refuge, but simply about the practice of the Four Foundations of Mindfulness to eliminate and prevent unwholesome mental states.  

As we have seen, the oft-quoted advice from the Buddha to Ānanda follows immediately upon the latter's admission that he has been feeling purposeless and confused because of the Lord's sickness. That is to say, Ānanda has been experiencing unwholesome mental states which are not conducive to mindfulness, and the Buddha advises him accordingly.

Ananda to live with himself and the Dhamma as an island and refuge and again explains this as the practice of the Four Foundations of Mindfulness.

Elsewhere again, the advice to have oneself as an island and refuge is brought up in connection with the death of two leading disciples to whom the other monks usually turned, as islands and refuges, for explanations of the teaching.

For instance, in the Cela Sutta, the next discourse in the Samyutta Nikāya (S V 163-5), the Buddha, speaking to the monks about the deaths of Sāriputta and Moggallāna, agrees that they leave a great vacuum behind them and praises their excellent qualities, but adds that, despite this, he does not experience sorrow (soka) or lamentation (parīdeva)28 because it is not conceivable that whatever is born, becomes, is conditioned and impermanent should be satisfactory. He concludes that, in consequence, now they will have to live with themselves and the Dhamma as an island and refuge, and again defines this as the practice of the Four Foundations of Mindfulness.

So we see that time and again the Buddha advises his disciples not to give in to depression and sorrow when someone dies, because this is inherently inherent in the impermanent nature of things, but to carry on practising the Four Foundations of Mindfulness, i.e. dwelling with themselves and the Dhamma as their island and refuge. Only thus will they transcend birth, becoming and death and achieve the final liberation from suffering. The solemn utterance at the beginning of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta makes this quite clear: ‘Bhikkhus, this is the direct path for the purification of beings, for the surmounting of sorrow and lamentation [sokapariddavānam], for the disappearance of pain and grief, for the attainment of the true way, for the realisation of Nibbāna — namely, the four foundations of mindfulness’29.

III. WHAT DOES IT MEAN, ‘TO MAKE ONESELF ONE’S REFUGE’?

When the Buddha, a few moments before dying, says that he dwells ‘having made myself my refuge’ (katam me saraṇam attano)30, he is not suggesting that he has somehow made for himself a refuge to shelter an immutable, eternal atta, but he is simply saying that by practising previously the Four Foundations of Mindfulness he has definitely put an end to suffering. He has followed the Path that leads to the extinction of suffering (by practising the Four Foundations of Mindfulness, i.e., by having made himself and the Dhamma his island and refuge) and thus attained Nibbāna, that is, the total extinction of unwholesome mental states.

This statement of the Buddha must not be isolated from its context. Just before, he has been urging his disciples to practise those things which he had discovered for himself (abhiñña) and proclaimed: the Four Foundations of Mindfulness, the Five Spiritual Faculties, the Seven Factors of Enlightenment, the Noble Eightfold Path, etc. Then he announces that he will take his final Nibbāna within three months, and only then does he speak the verses where this phrase appears:

Ripe am I in years. My life-span’s determined.
Now I go from you, having made myself my refuge.
Monks, be untiring, mindful, disciplined,
Guarding your minds with well-collected thought.
He who, tireless, keeps to law and discipline,
Leaving birth behind will put an end to woe.31

As can be seen the phrase ‘having made myself my refuge’ (literally, ‘having made a refuge for myself’ — katam me saraṇam attano) is preceded and followed by references to what needs to be done to attain liberation, and the successful conclusion is clearly stated in the last two verses. He who practises the Dhamma makes himself free from Samsāra and attains the refuge of Nibbāna.

28 S V 164.
As we have seen, the atmanic interpretation might, and does, claim that in this text, since Nibbāna is referred to as the refuge, this means that it is identical with attā and Dhamma, which are to be taken as one’s island and refuge. K. Bhattacharya\(^\text{32}\), for instance, maintains that Nibbāna, attā and Dhamma are three designations for one and the same thing because the Buddha uses the same phrase, ‘island and refuge’, for all three.

However, the use of the same simile for all three does not imply that they are all one. Nibbāna is the end of suffering and the end purpose of the holy life. But to have oneself (attā) and the Dhamma as island and refuge is the means for attaining that end. So Nibbāna on the one hand, and attā and Dhamma on the other cannot be the same, even though the simile is used for them.

If the atmanic interpretation were correct, attā and Dhamma would be the island and refuge where one is safe from the ocean of Saṁsāra. This would mean that they were the same as Nibbāna, i.e., ends in themselves rather than means to an end. But since having oneself and the Dhamma as island and refuge refers in fact to the practice of the Four Foundations of Mindfulness, attā and Dhamma clearly cannot be identical with Nibbāna, since the latter is the end and the former are the means to attaining this end.

In the Dhammapada there is a passage (Dhp 236) that makes this very clear: ‘Make an island unto yourself. Strive quickly; become wise. Purged of stain and passionless, you shall enter the heavenly stage of the Ariyas’\(^\text{33}\).

It is important to pay attention to the contrast in the verbal tenses in the earlier and later parts of the verse: first, imperative (make — karohi; strive — vāyama), then future (you shall enter — ehisi). Shortly after we find another verse (Dhp 238) where the Buddha urges the same, with an explicit reference to freeing oneself from birth and old age (here we recall that the various stages of sanctity (ariya) mentioned in the previous verse culminate in arahantship which, being the attaining of Nibbāna, involves precisely the freedom from birth and old age mentioned here): ‘Make an island unto yourself. Strive without delay; become wise. Purged of stain and passionless, you will not come again to birth and old age.’\(^\text{34}\)

In this verse we again see the contrast between the imperative (what has to be done, i.e., the means) and the future (what will be attained, i.e., the end). The same pattern can be observed in the standard passage from the Mahāparinibbāṇa Sutta, except that in the early part the verbs are in the present (‘he who abides contemplating’, i.e. practising the Four Foundations of Mindfulness), and then in the future (‘those . . . who shall live . . . will become’): ‘Here, Ānanda, a monk abides contemplating the body as body earnestly, clearly aware, mindful and having put away all hankering and fretting for the world, and likewise with regards to feelings, mind and mind-objects. That, Ānanda, is how a monk lives as an island unto himself, . . . with no other refuge. And those who now in my time or afterwards shall live\(^\text{35}\) thus, they will become\(^\text{36}\) the highest, if they are desirous of learning.’\(^\text{37}\)

As the following quotation shows, the same point about ends and means, and oneself and the Dhamma as island and refuge (being the means) is made in the Attādīpa Sutta of the Sānyutta Nikāya (S III 42): ‘Do ye abide, brethren, island unto yourself, refuges unto yourself: taking refuge in none other; islanded by the Norm, taking refuge in the Norm, seeking refuge in none other.

\(^\text{32}\) K. Bhattacharya, op. cit., pp.79-114.
\(^\text{34}\) Dhp 238; trans. id., ib.
\(^\text{35}\) Viharissanti. The use of the future tense in this case reflects the conditional character of the phrase and does not mean that it is something to be done in the future, i.e., if they live in this manner, then they will become the highest.
\(^\text{36}\) Bhavissanti. This truly refers to the future result of practising the Four Foundations of Mindfulness ‘earnestly, clearly aware and mindful’ here and now.
\(^\text{37}\) D II 100-1.
By themselves who are islands unto themselves, brethren, who are a refuge unto themselves, who take refuge in none other; who are islanded by the Norm, take refuge in the Norm, seek refuge in none other — by them the very source of things is to be searched for: thus — What is the source of sorrow and grief, of woe, lamentation and despair? What is their origin? 38

This understanding of the Dhamma as the means to the end that is Nibbāna, but not as an end in itself (and therefore identical to Nibbāna) is abundantly confirmed in the famous raft simile in the Alagaddūpama Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya 39, where the Buddha compares the Dhamma to a raft to be used for crossing over the waters of suffering, but that is not to be clung to after its purpose has been served. The raft is the means for crossing over, the end is the extinction of suffering on the far shore.

CONCLUSIONS
— To live with attā and Dhamma as an island and refuge is defined as the practice of the Four Foundations of Mindfulness, that is, as an impermanent process subject itself to Dependent Origination and whose final aim is precisely to realise that all is non-attā. Therefore the injunction to have attā and Dhamma as island and refuge cannot be interpreted as meaning that there is an immutable, eternal attā which is identical to Dhamma.
— The atmanic translation of attādīpa viharatha attāsaraṇa, etc., cannot prove anything beyond the fact that the Buddha at that point simply resorts to a metaphor to urge his disciples to practise the Four Foundations of Mindfulness, which means to avoid unwholesome mental states and persevere in practising the Dhamma.
— When the Buddha declares that he has made a refuge for himself, the meaning is not that he has found shelter in a permanent, eternal attā, but merely that he has previously practised the Four Foundations of Mindfulness and has, through this practice, attained the refuge that is Nibbāna.

The metaphorical reference to Nibbāna as a refuge does not imply its identification with Dhamma and attā. It is simply a case of the Buddha using the same simile for two different things: on the one hand, the means (practising the Four Foundations of Mindfulness, which is equated with having oneself and the Dhamma as island and refuge) and on the other hand the end (attaining the ultimate refuge that is Nibbāna).

Abraham Vélez de Cea

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39 M I 134-5.
TWO SMALL REMNANTS OF ‘PRE-HÍNAYÁNIST’
BUDDHISM IN THE PÁLI NIKÁYAS

Eric Fallick

As is well known, the Atthaka- and Páryaya-vaggas of the Sutta Nipata represent texts of the greatest antiquity and present a teaching significantly different from that of most of the later strata of the bulk of the Páli texts¹. These texts, or their Prakrit or Sanskrit equivalents, are quoted or referred to by name in the later texts of several different schools, and thus would appear to have circulated widely and been esteemed in the Buddhist world in the earliest period to which we have access². At present, if we wish to read more teachings such as these, integrally combining ‘forest’ asceticism with a direct, non-conceptual meditation approach to the Undying, we are forced to turn to Maháyána texts such as the Samádhírásútra. Here, however, I would like to call attention to two brief, isolated verse passages that clearly belong to the same teaching as the Atthakavagga, but somehow managed to slip by the editors/authors of the Theravádín Canon, perhaps by being disguised as the concluding verses of otherwise more ordinary, mild-mannered Páli suttas. Possibly, the existence of these verses (in addition to their intrinsic spiritual value) could add to the suggestion that the teaching genre of these texts may once have been much more widespread, if not the norm of earliest Buddhism, than it might now appear from the extremely limited sample of surviving texts of ‘Hinayánist’ Buddhism (which may, after all, be mostly just late products of the cenobium) to which we currently have access.

The first passage occurs at Culla Nihāya II 24 and, according to the Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana edition (as presented in the Dhamma-giri-Pāli-Ganṭhamāla Series) which differs slightly from the PTS ed., runs as follows:

\[
yāṁ kīci dīṭṭham vā sutaṁ mutam vā \\
ajjhositam saccamutam paresam / \\
na tesaṁ ādhyasamvutesu \\
saccaṁ musā vāpi param dāheyya // \\
etāṇca sallaṁ puṭikacca disvā \\
ajjhositā yathā pajā visatā / \\
jānāmi passāmi tatheva etam \\
ajjhositam nattthi tathāgatānān ti ///
\]

For more Sanskrit-oriented readers, I would, ignoring metrical considerations, offer the following (tentatively rendered) chāyā:

\[
yat kimci drṣṭaṁ vā śrūtaṁ matam vā \\
adhyavasitaṁ sayamatam paresāṁ / \\
na tesaṁ ādukṣa svayaṁ samvṛtesu \\
sayam mṛṣā vāpi param dāhyat // \\
etam ca śalyam pratikṛtya drṣṭvā \\
adhyavasitā yatra praṣā visaktā / \\
jānāmi paśyāmi tathāva etad \\
adhyavasitaṁ nāsti tathāgatānām iti ///
\]

One possible translation:
Whatever (is) seen, heard or thought (is) grasped (as) a true thought by others. Such a one (as the sage), among those tied up by themselves, would not take these, whether true or false, as the Beyond. And having previously seen this stake, stuck on which are

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3 Cf. Vajracchedikā, ed. Max Müller, p.32, lines 13-14/p.37, lines 11-12: ... yas tathāgatena dharma 'bhisambuddho deśito niḍāhyato na tatra sayam na mṛṣā / ... yas ca subhāte tathāgatena dharma 'bhisambuddho deśito vā tatra na sayam na mṛṣā // '... that dharma fully-awakened to, shown, (and) meditated on by a tathāgata — there (there is) neither true nor false / ... and that, O Subhūti, dharma (which is) fully-awakened to or shown by a tathāgata — there (there is) neither true nor false'.

4 Tathāgata is here, presumably, in its use as an epithet of any fully accomplished sage, not just of the periodically appearing Buddhas as in the later texts.

diversification (papañca or prapañca, Sn 874) and perception (saññā or saññjā, also, e.g., Sn 847), the yogi must abandon all involvement with the realm of sensory experience (saññjā and prapañca), which includes all thoughts and verbal conceptualisations. Far from containing ultimate truth and being a place to seek purity and the basis of spiritual practice (as apparently was assumed by the other systems of the Buddha’s time that would form the milieu of these texts), thoughts and verbal understanding are just conditioned sensory experience no more real than the objects of the other five senses and belong entirely to the relative (saññyati) world. Only the non-diversified realm of the Absolute, known only by the direct non-verbal prajñā of the sage is actual truth (paramārtha). The Āṭṭhaka and these related verses use words to point directly or re-orient us to this totally other dimension of the Absolute, and this is also the purpose of much of the Prajñāpāramitā literature, Mādhyamika texts, etc. At the same time, the Āṭṭhaka clearly and integrally sets forth the ascetic, renunciants, yogic life and practice which is essential to and inseparable from the process of going from the suffering realm of diversified sense data (including thoughts!) and perception to the non-diversified, perception-free mokṣa of the Absolute. Such close combination can also sometimes be found in Mahāyāna texts such as the gathās of Chapter 19 of the Samādhīrajasūtra.

It appears that the above two passages derive from the same contemplative (and, in this case, also ‘textual’) tradition as the Āṭṭhaka- and Pārāyana-vaggas. This tradition, or at least derivatives of it, has left more abundant literary remains in later, rather less clean and more problematic forms, such as the Prajñāpāramitā, Samādhīrāja, Mādhyamika, the Satya-(or Tattva-)siddhisāstra of Harivarman, etc., but sources for its ‘original’ form, apparently suppressed by the development of ‘Hinayānistic’ Buddhism, are presently more sparse. These two surviving, isolated passages may suggest that they were once more copious. It only remains to be regretted that all such historical discussion, whether true or false, is just something seen, heard, or thought, not the Beyond.

* * * * *

3. 1 ‘... When the brahmin Nayātikrama had risen from his seat and again had sat down on the seat reserved for the chief [of the assembly], he very much disliked his having been ranked foremost in that gathering. [He thought to himself with regard to] the vows [formerly] taken by him: These people have made me move to another seat so as to fill the vacancy. Now that I have made known scriptural authority, it will be difficult [for me] to keep up my practice (śīla). Supposing there is a really virtuous person who wholeheartedly keeps his vows; he performs actions [in conformity with] places he hopes to be born in. I [would] in fact destroy for good the virtue (guna) [resulting from my brahminical studies and practice should I become attached to name and fame]. – Then the person in charge of the munificence [function] (dānasvāmin) provided five hundred ounces of gold, one golden staff, one golden jug for ablutions, one thousand head of cattle and one beautiful girl. [He] handed over [these various yajñā ingredients] to the [new] chairman.

1 See T2, 598b5 ff.; Hayashi, p. 177 ff.
2 From the context it can be inferred that, after Nayātikrama’s reciting a text unknown to the large gathering of learned brahmins and after the brahmins’ proposal that he should assume the position of being their chief, the actual chief and chairman of that yajñā function had perforce vacated his seat.
3 Cf. Karashima, p. 227: 経論, 'a scriptural text'.
4 For 壊敗 Hayashi reads 壽敗 which does not seem correct.
5 Cf. Divy(V), p. 152, 14: kanyā ca sarvālaṃkāravibhūṣita; at BSR 16, 2 (1999), p. 213, where the ingredients of the yajñā are enumerated, the beautiful girl is omitted.
6 上坐, uttamāsana, 'he who [occupies] the highest seat'.

Translated from the Chinese Version by Thích Huyền-Vi and Bhikkhu Pāsādika in collaboration with Sara Boin-Webb

Eleventh Fascicle Part 20
(A Spiritual Friend)
by felicitating him with a sacred formula (mantra). Herewith, said
the chairman to the person in charge of the munificence [function], I
accept the five hundred ounces of gold, the golden staff and jug for
ablutions in order to offer them to my master for his support. As to
the girl and the one thousand head of cattle, [they may] be returned
to your people because I do not need them, and I do not have the
habit of amassing property. –

After receiving [the five hundred ounces of gold], the golden
staff and jug, the brahmin Nayâtikrama entered the great kingdom
[known as] Padma. The name of its king was Dipa. As the ruler of
that country he had invited the Tathâgata Dipâmkarâ and a [large]
multitude (gana) of his bhikus to an offering or robes and [alms]-
food. In the [main] city of that kingdom the king issued the order
that no fragrant flowers should be sold by any of its inhabitants.
Anyone selling them would incur severe punishment. Even if he
himself took the liberty of buying [flowers] it should not be compul-
sory to bypass [the order] and sell them. Again he had the people
clean up [all places], sweep and sprinkle them [with water]. Fouled
earth and sand had to be removed. Silken banners and canopies were
fluttering [in the wind], perfumed water was showered on the
ground; [all these] preparations created [an atmosphere of tidiness and
serenity] to which sensual pleasures do not bear comparison.
Witnessing [these ongoing preparations], the brahmin [Nayâtikrama]
asked [some] passers-by: [All places] are being swept and sprinkled
[with water], roads are being cleared of refuse, silken banners and
canopies are fluttering [in the wind]; [this atmosphere of tidiness and
serenity] is incomparable! What special event is it? It is [certainly]
not the crown prince, the heir to the throne, who is going to marry
his graceful [bride]. – Does the brahmin not know it? the passers-by
were wondering and [went on] to say: For today the king of the

great Padma kingdom has invited the Tathâgata Dipâmkarâ, the Fully
and Completely Enlightened One, to an offering of robes and [alms]-
food. For this very reason the roads are being cleared, silken banners
and canopies are fluttering [in the wind]. – [On hearing] this [news]
the brahmin [N.] uttered these words, pregnant with meaning,11
which he had memorised: It is extremely rare for a Tathâgata to
appear in the world, and [since] he appears only occasionally (kadâ
kârthi cit)12 [after immense intervals of time], it is practically
impossible to see him. It is exceedingly rare for a Tathâgata to appear
in the world – as rare as the udumbara flower blossoming only occa-
sionally [after immense intervals of time].13 Moreover, in the brah-
mínical scriptures there is the following saying: It is extremely rare
for two persons to appear in the world. For which two persons? It is
extremely rare for a Tathâgata and for a noble universal monarch to
appear in the world.14 – Then the following occurred to him: Now I
could invite the Buddha's favour (upakâra) at once by respectfully
offering Him, the Tathâgata Dipâmkarâ, the five hundred ounces of
gold. – And again it came into his mind: According to what the
scriptures say, a Tathâgata neither accepts gold and silver nor [other]
precious things. I could instead use the five hundred ounces of gold
to buy fragrant flowers in order to shower the Tathâgata with them.
– Thereafter the brahmin entered the city with a view to buying fra-
grant flowers. – Does the brahmin not know it? also the passers-by
in the city were wondering and [went on] to say: Our king has
issued the order that anyone selling fragrant flowers should be pun-

11 Lit.: 'mysterious, secret'.

12 See Karashima, p. 404, under 時時; see also SWTF, fasc. 9, p. 34
s.v. karha, karhi (with references to CPS, MPS, SHT etc.).

13 The udumbara-puspa is already mentioned at EĀ 578a 15-18; cf.
BSR 9, 2 (1992), p. 180, n. 12 with references. As for the rareness of a Tathâga-
ta's appearing without the udumbara-puspa simile, see A I, 22: Ekapuggalass
bhikkhave pûthâbhavo dullabho lokasmin. Katamassa ekapuggalassa? Tathâga-
tassass...; cf. also A I, 266; A III, 168; thematically related to the latter two
passages is Dhp 182.

ished severely. The brahmin N. was at a loss and thought: [I] just do not know how to get flowers.

Having [decided to] return and having left the city, he stayed outside the gates [of the city]. There was a brahmin girl named Su-
svādāi, carrying a water jug so as to fetch water. In one hand she was holding five flowers. On seeing that girl the brahmin said to her: Distinguished (mahat) younger sister, I need the flowers and hope the younger sister will be kind enough to sell them to me. – [Since] when, replied the brahmin girl, am I your younger sister? You do not [even] know who are my parents. – That girl is really good-
hearted, the brahmin N. thought to himself, she just wants to make fun [of me]. – Again he said [to her]: Good (bhadra) girl, will you kindly [sell me] these flowers at any price. – Do you not know, replied the brahmin girl, that His Majesty has prohibited the sale of flowers? – Good girl, said the brahmin, as for that matter, do not be concerned. What has the king to do with you? I urgently need these five flowers, and you will have got a good bargain. – What are you going to do with the flowers so urgently needed by you? asked the brahmin girl. The brahmin: I [can] see there is fertile ground that needs to be cultivated [by means of] these flowers [for growing roots of merit]. – The brahmin girl: These flowers have been cut off from their roots; so they can by no means strike [root] again. How can [you] say you want to grow them? – The brahmin: Today, for instance, I see a fertile field to be cultivated; though bleak and bare [things] grow in it again and again. All the more [fertile is the field in which roots of merit can be cultivated by dint of] these flowers. – The brahmin girl: What is this fertile field like in which, though bleak and bare, [after] cultivation [things] grow? – The brahmin: Good girl, the Buddha, the Tathāgata Dipamkara, the Fully and Completely Enlightened One, has appeared in the world. – The girl: What is the Tathāgata Dipamkara like? – The brahmin: The Tathāgata Dipamkara whose merit is perfect, is endowed with such[-and-such] (īdṛṣṭa) virtues and such[-and-such] (T2, 599a) conduct. – The girl: What kind of merit does a virtuous person strive for? – The brahmin: I am filled with the aspiration to become – like the Tathāgata Dipamkara – fully and completely enlightened in a future existence, being [endowed with] virtues and conduct like him. – The girl: If you promise to accept me as your wife existence after existence17 I shall give you the flowers. – The brahmin: As for my behaviour (samudācara), now my mind is free from clinging. – The girl: Let me be your wife in future existences just as now I do not desire to be your wife physically. – The brahmin N.: A bodhisattva's manner of conduct excludes one's sparing oneself. If you want to be my wife [you] should overcome selfish attachment (mamakāra). – The girl: I will by no means betray your aspiring after generosity (dānādhyāsaya). Let me with the right motivation make use of my body, donating it to others. [Thus] I will certainly not betray [our] aspiring after generosity. – Then [the brahmin N.] took the five hundred gold coins18 and bought with them the five flowers. After both [he himself] and that girl had vowed [to embark on a bodhisattva's practice] they parted company.

Meanwhile, the Tathāgata Dipamkara, the Fully and Completely Enlightened One, had put on his [outer] robes and taken up his alms-bowl. Heading the bhikṣus accompanying [him] in order of seniority19, he entered the great Padma kingdom. Seeing him some distance away, an [inspiring] appearance20 of genuine modesty21, the brahmin N. was not disappointed: The Tathāgata Dipamkara's

17 Cf. Karashima, p. 407, under 世世; cf. also Divy(V), p. 154, 10: yadi ... mamāpi jātyām jātyām pamānān itcasis...; according to the Divy story, the girl whose flowers the brahmin wants to buy and the beautiful girl offered to and refused by him at the yajña function mentioned above are the same.
18 Whilst above 'five hundred ounces of gold' are mentioned, in this place EĀ tallies with Divy(V) 152ff.: pañcā ca rāpaṇaṃ saṣāti.
20 Lit.: 'facial expression'.
21 After Hayashi read 端正 for 端政.
Then verses:
The brahmin, occasion complete alated spot.
To he calmed, alerting two bearing.

On Buddha Mahāpuruṣa, Bhikṣu, occasioned the brahmin's experience, the brahmin N. became elated (sumanas). Holding the five flowers meant for the Tathāgata, he went to where Dipamkara was and stood at one side; then he said to the Buddha Dipamkara: It is to be hoped that something will be obtained. Supposing now the Exalted One decides not to impart anything, then it would be preferable to put an end to one's life on the spot. It would not be worthwhile living on. – Brahmin, said the Exalted One, it is not possible thanks to these five flowers to impart the Complete and Highest Enlightenment. – I [only] hope, replied the brahmin, the Exalted One will be so kind as to teach me how to embark on a bodhisattva's practice. – A bodhisattva's practice, explained the Buddha Dipamkara, excludes one's sparing oneself. – On this occasion the brahmin uttered the following verses:

No [body] dares take hold of his parents and give them away to other people. The Buddhas, too, surpassing [other] wise (vyakta) persons, dare not give away [their parents]. Sun (!) and moon circling the earth – These two cannot be given away either. Everything else can be given away; it will not be difficult to make up one's mind [to do so]. –

Then also the Buddha Dipamkara addressed the brahmin with these verses:

The way you talk about giving away is not the Tathāgata's [way] to talk about. [A bodhisattva] should be [prepared to] put up with a hundred million aeons of great Hardship [involving the giving away of one's] Head, trunk, ears, eyes, one's wife, children, one's

Realm, treasures, carriages, horses, servants and Retinue. If [you] can bear all this, then you May make [your] resolution.

Furthermore, the young brahmin (mānava) uttered these verses:
The high mountain [of great hardship] burning like Fire – for a hundred million aeons [I] will put up With carrying it on [my] head. My aspiring for [Supreme] enlightenment (buddhicitta) shall not be Impaired. All [I] wish now is to make [my] resolution.

Now the Tathāgata Dipamkara kept silent, and the brahmin, holding in his hand the five flowers, knelt down with his right knee on the ground and scattered [the flowers] over the Tathāgata. In doing this, he said: [May] this [action] be conducive to having merit also in a future existence. Not unlike the Tathāgata Dipamkara, I shall realise Full and Complete Enlightenment. – On the spot he let down [his long] hair, spread it on a muddy [section of the road and said]: If the Tathāgata approves of my resolution [He] may kindly cross [the muddy section] by stepping on my hair.

O bhikṣus, [said the Exalted One] you should know that the Tathāgata Dipamkara looked into the brahmin's mind and scrutinised what he was thinking. Then he said to the brahmin: In a future existence you will realise Full and Complete Enlightenment and become the Tathāgata Śākyamuni Buddha. – At [that] time a fellow-student of the brahmin N., Dharmaruci by name, stood next to the Tathāgata. Witnessing the Buddha Dipamkara's approval of the brahmin N.'s resolution by stepping on [the latter's] hair, he remonstrated: How can this shaveling of a śramaṇa be so impudent as to trample on this pure brahmin's hair? This is not a [civilised] man's behaviour! – As for the brahmin Yajñāda of those days, asked the Buddha the bhikṣus, do you [think] he was an altogether unique person? Do not regard him as such because the person of that time [known as] Yajñāda is none other than Śuddhodana. As for the [former] chief of the

22 Lit. 'organs of sense (indriya) and behaviour'.
23 See Mahāvyut. 235-267, 268-349.
[assembly of] 84,000 brahmins, he is none other than Devadatta, and I was at that time that very brahmin Nayātikrama. As far as the brahmin girl of those days is concerned who sold the flowers, she is now Gopi, and the person in charge of the *yajña* [function] is none other than the brahmin Daṇḍapāṇī. Dharmaruci who hurled abusive language [at the Tathāgata] in those days is in fact the Dharmaruci of today. For innumerable aeons this Dharmaruci was again and again born as a domestic animal, and in his [second but] last life he took on the body of a fish that measured seven hundred yojanas, living in the Great Ocean. That existence having come to an end, he was born here [again as a human being]. By always being close to a spiritual friend (*kalyāṇamitra*), by relying on a spiritual friend one habituates oneself to karmically wholesome actions conducing to the [spiritual] faculties, to the gates (*dvāra*) [of deliverance] and to supernormal knowledge (*abhijñā*). It is for this very reason that I have said: Here after a long time. – And Dharmaruci, too, expressed himself: Indeed, Exalted One, here after a long time. – Thus, O bhikṣus, you should constantly cultivate [mindfulness] with regard to physical, vocal and mental actions. Thus, O bhikṣus, you should train. – After listening to the Buddha’s words, the bhikṣus were pleased and respectfully applied themselves to practice.  

25 After Hayashi read 千 for 千.  

26 See DPPN I, p. 818f. (under ‘Gopi, Gopīka’ and ‘3. Gopaka’): ‘The Śākiyan maiden of Kapilavatthu, who was born later on as Gopaka-devaputta.’ See also BHSD, p. 216, s.v. ‘Gopā, Gopi, Gopika’: according to two Buddhist Skt. texts, the Śākiya girl becomes the wife of the Bodhisattva. 

27 I. e. the above-mentioned ‘person in charge of the munificence [function]’ (*dānasvāmin*).  

28 See DPPN I, p. 1053 (under ‘Daṇḍapāṇī’): ‘... He was the Buddha’s maternal uncle... According to northern sources Prince Siddhattha’s wife was Daṇḍapāṇī’s daughter.’ Cf. also BHSD, p. 261 ( s.v. ‘Daṇḍapāṇī’). 

29 See Nyanatiloka, pp. 61 (s.v. *indriya*), 173 (s.v. *vimokkhā, vimutta*), 2f. (s.v. *abhijñā*).
LETTER TO THE EDITOR

Though I cannot agree with the positions taken by Stephen Batchelor’s book *Buddhism Without Beliefs*, I should like to comment on some errors in Colin Edwards’ review of this work (BSR 16, 2, 1999, pp.246-50).

In general I find the points raised by Edwards to be a fair appraise-ment of the Dhamma found in the Pāli Tipitaka. Certainly Batchelor’s arguments in favour of a Buddhism without *saddhā* represent one extreme, the other of which would be a Buddhism without *panñā*! However, among the points raised by the reviewer, his first one cannot go unremarked. *Kindred Sayings*, the PTS translation of Samyutta Nikāya, while a good attempt in its day, is now completely outdated and does in fact contain many mistakes. Among the more curious of them is this translation of *kalyāṇamittata* as ‘friendship with the lovely’. What precisely such an abstract concept could mean is very unclear. *Mittata* is certainly ‘friendship’ but a correct translation of *kalyāṇa* (which can also mean ‘lovely’, ‘beautiful’) would be ‘noble’. So we get ‘noble friendship’, a more readily understandable idea.

Buddhist monks, (I was one for more than thirty years) have ‘noble friends’, that is, their compassionate and wise Teachers, without which the *brahmācariya* would be impossible for most people. The idea that Buddhist monks should live in solitude all the time (as per Edwards) runs counter to the evidence of the Suttas and Vinaya, to speak nothing of modern practice.

If now we consider that noble friendship (with one’s Teachers and fellow-practitioners) is compared to the dAWN preceding the sun’s arising, this makes perfect sense. This does not, of course, preclude longer or shorter periods of retreat in which there is solitude.

Perhaps, too, the reviewer should be reminded, in connection with point 4, that there are a number of paean s of praise for beauty included in the Theragāthā. Notwithstanding the narrow views of some modern monks from Theravādin Sri Lanka who have said such things as ‘Buddhist monks are not allowed to admire the beautiful’, Buddhist practitioners generally I have found to have a keen sense of aesthetic appreciation. When one lives in caves and distant forests this appreciation of beauty is naturally sharpened. It need have nothing to do with lust, or even sensual desire. Fear of beauty’s power, of course, is common enough among the ascetically minded but should not be dissolved through Dhamma-practice. In later Buddhist tantric practice the senses and their objects are regarded as ‘ornaments’ to practise with, but even a thorough knowledge of the Pāli Suttas will make one aware of many examples of the unattached appreciation of *subha*.

Laurence Khantipālo Mills

THE BUDDHA: FRIENDSHIP AND BEAUTY

Colin Edwards

In a letter to the Editor, Laurence Khantipālo Mills reacts to my review of Stephen Batchelor’s *Buddhism Without Beliefs*. He says that the review includes overall a ‘fair appraisement of the Dhamma found in the Pāli Tipitaka’ but points to what he believes are two important areas of error.

These are, I think, partly explainable by a misreading of my review, which dealt with these areas only briefly. The first area is that of friendship. Mills sees my point 1 (BSR 16, 2, p.248) as a personal criticism of friendship between bhikkhus and between bhikkhus and their teachers, and takes exception partly on the basis of his own experience, that as a monk for over thirty years he found the friendship of his teachers of profound value. However, in my review I refer only to the Buddha’s remarks about friendship; I was not stating my own beliefs and as a lay person would not be qualified to make any personal comment on monastic practice. The only point at issue was, and is, for me, what the Buddha says in the Tipitaka, in this case about friendship.

Nonetheless, in my review I did imply that friendship is not

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1 I wish to acknowledge the help of Dr William Pruitt (PTS) in the preparation of this article.
important in the Buddha’s Dhamma, and Mills is right to point to errors in my use of the quotations, the result of too easy an acceptance of PTS translations of the compound kalyāṇamittattā. The first is:

Just as, monks, the dawn is the forerunner, the harbinger of the arising of the sun, so friendship with the lovely is the forerunner, the harbinger of the arising of the Arian eight-fold way (KS (Kindred Sayings, PTS) V, 27).

Accepting Woodward’s translation of kalyāṇamittattā as ‘friendship with the lovely’ in the Biblical sense of ‘lovely’ as ‘whatever is good’ (see KS I, 27, n.2), I argued that this statement was not about friendship between monks but moral integrity in a single monk, but Mills’ translation ‘noble friendship’ is backed up by other scholars, notably Steven Collins (‘Kalyāṇamittta and Kalyāṇamittattā’, JPTS XI, 232 and 236) in which not only does kalyāṇamittattā clearly mean ‘having a good friend’ but is mentioned as a factor in Path advancement. It is virtually certain that the Buddha is, as Mills points out, referring to the value of friendship.

The second quotation occurs twice in the Saṁyutta. The relevant part begins:

... So seated the venerable Ānanda said this: ‘The half of the holy life, lord, is friendship with what is lovely, association with what is lovely, intimacy with what is lovely (kalyāṇamittattā kalyāṇasahāyaṁ-kalyāṇasampavankatā)! Say not so, Ānanda! Say not so, Ānanda. It is the whole, not the half, of the holy life, — this friendship, this association, this intimacy with what is lovely (kalyāṇamittattā kalyāṇasahāyaṁ-kalyāṇasampavankatā) (KS V, 2; the other instance is at KS I, 113).

Even in the face of genuine Pāli scholarship I think the issue here is more complex than has been recognised. Woodward’s translation above is clearly wrong in Ānanda’s statement; he would hardly say that moral integrity is only half of the religious life and use the three synonyms kalyāṇamittattā, kalyāṇasahāyaṁ and kalyāṇasampavankatā to refer to good friendship and their value. But what about the Buddha’s use of them in his response? Is he saying that the whole of the brahmacariyaṁ consists of good friendships (as per Mills/ Collin’s)? Not impossible if we take these as friendships between bhikkhu and teacher with the Buddha suggesting that these relationships determine the nature and outcome of the training. But is it likely that he would see such relationships as the whole of the monk’s life? What about the value of communal debate and isolated effort (see below)? It is true that the suttas are given to rhetorical overstatement but not in the form of a contradicting response. The Commentary’s explanation is that, whereas Ānanda believes that half the monk’s progress is due to self-help and half to the help of others, the Buddha realises that these two cannot be differentiated, just as a mother’s influence on a child cannot be differentiated from the father’s. The trouble with this is that, if we translate as Mills/Collins, the Buddha does differentiate, does say how much comes from what, the whole of the brahmacariyaṁ from having good friends. Despite the weight of scholarly opinion against kalyāṇamittattā as ‘friendship with whatever is good’ (see Collins, p.55), the Buddha’s surprising remark is, I think, shifting the meaning of kalyāṇamittattā away from Ānanda’s usage towards the PTS translation, while still retaining the disciple’s sense as a secondary implication. I think he is saying that the whole of the religious life is kalyāṇamittattā, but not in Ānanda’s sense. It is wholly ‘friendship with the lovely’. There seems to be something akin to this usage as regards the related concrete noun kalyāṇamittta in the introduction to the passage at KS I, 112, where the Buddha agrees that the Dhamma has been well taught (svākyāto) to kalyāṇamittassā and not to pāpamittassā. Much more feasible to take these as singular representatives of good and bad men (friends of whatever is good and friends of whatever is bad) rather than men with good friends (or good friends to others) and men with bad friends (or bad friends to others). ‘Friendship with whatever is good’ is a perfectly valid translation for kalyāṇamittattā, the uninflected first element of the compound being taken as neuter instrumental, and may sound awkward to us only because such compounds are rare in English. I think Gotama’s kalyāṇamittattā at this point means primarily this ‘friendship with whatever is good’, but this kind of ‘friendship’ includes ‘having good friends’). The Buddha’s meaning includes Ānanda’s; we might call it an inflexional pun. Admittedly, a double-layered meaning is not a
EDITORIAL STATEMENT

We apologise to readers for the late appearance of BSR 17 following a computer 'crash'. With great difficulty the text of No.1 was eventually retrieved and reset by David and Nancy Reigle of the Eastern School Press (to whom are gratitude is due) but the delay resulted in the journal’s publication several months later than anticipated. No.2 has been correspondingly delayed whilst we acquired and mastered the techniques of a new computer and software program.

We should return to normality during 2001 when both issues will largely comprise papers delivered at the UKABS conference held at Bristol University in June-July 2000.

Please note the changes in subscription charges for BSR: after a decade of unchanged rates, rising production costs and postage levels have forced us to increase subscription charges as from the next issue.

Finally, we regret that our regular feature – the serialisation of the Ekottaragama translation – has had to be held over until a later issue.

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Corrigenda to Buddhist Studies Review 17, 1 (2000)

In Collins Edwards, ‘The Buddha: Friendship and Beauty’:

p.50, 1.13, correctly reads: ... JPTS XI, 1987, pp.51-72), who cites other examples (for instance Itivuttaka I, xvii; GS IV, 232 and 236)...

p.52, 1.17 from below, to p.53, 1.9, should be indented as with other citations in this article. The line references in the succeeding paragraph of p.53 should be amended as follows: (line 2 unchanged), (lines 20 and 29 now lines 16 and 23), (lines 1-6 now lines 1-5), (line 11 now lines 8-9), (line 27 now line 21).

THE VAIBHĀSIKA IMPACT*

Bart Dessein

The Vaibhāsikas, named after a Vībhāsa commentary on the original Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma works, are often defined as the Sarvāstivāda orthodoxy (of Kaśmīra). ‘Vaibhāsika’ is only one of many names one encounters in reference to the ‘Sarvāstivādins’. Under the general name Sarvāstivāda, different sub-schools figure: the original Sarvāstivādins originating from Mathurā, the Kaśmīri Vaibhāsikas, the Western Masters of Gandhāra and Bactria who are also referred to as Bahirdēsaka (Outsiders), Aparāntaka (Those living at the Western Border) and Pāścātaya (Westerners); and the Mūlasarvāstivādins. These names appear in a fairly strict chronological series1. In connection with the Sarvāstivādins, we further have to mention the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas. All sources agree on the fact that the term Sautrāntika appears later than the term Sarvāstivāda.2 Of these names, the earlier ones (Bahirdēsaka, Aparāntaka, Pāścātaya) refer to a geographical location, while the later ones refer either to a textual type or means of exegesis (Vaibhāsika, Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika) or to a dogmatic standpoint (Mūlasarvāstivāda). This seems to substantiate the standpoint of Erich Frauwallner (The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginnings of Buddhist Literature, Rome 1956) and Heinz Bechert (ed., Zur Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hinayāna-Literatur, 2 vols, Göttingen 1985-87) concerning the criterion upon which different Buddhist schools have been formed: disciplinary matters have led to the rise of distinct sects (nikāyā); dogmatic schools have then arisen later from within Vinaya sects. David Seyfort Ruegg, however, argued that dog-

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* This article is a slightly reworked and edited version of my lecture held at the XXIIth IABS Conference, Lausanne, 23-28 August 1999. Part of this paper had earlier been presented as a lecture at the same university, Section de langues et civilisations orientales, on 31 March 1998.


3 See ibid., p.106.
common facet of sutta-language, but nor for that matter is the effect of sharp surprise created by the Buddha’s response, which challenges interpretation and leads to close questioning. The Buddha’s linguistic dexterity emphasises the friendliness of his superiority to Ānanda in moving the disciple’s word to a meaning of greater significance for the Path, not disapproving but setting friendship in what for him is its right and only context, the friendship with whatever is good, the essence of the religious life. He points to the superior value of moral integrity without denigrating friendship.

If we accept this, then what follows becomes vibrant in the Buddha’s use of the two possible meanings of kalyāṇamittatā — ‘moral beauty’ and ‘having good friends’ (possibly also ‘being a good friend’, though Collins says this meaning does not occur in the suttas) — and the three possible meanings of kalyāṇamittata — ‘a friend of what is good’, ‘a good friend to another or to others’ and ‘a person having a good friend or friends’. The two words create quite a complex variety of possible implications, but the basic effect at every occurrence is to further the two layers of meaning. At KS I, 113, the translation continues with the Buddha’s words:

‘... From a bhikkhu, Ānanda, who is a friend to righteousness (kalyāṇa-mittassā), we expect that he will develop and expand the Ariyan eightfold path of one who is a friend, an intimate, an associate of that which is righteous (kalyāṇa-mittassā kalyāṇasahāyassā kalyāṇa-sampavankassā).

And how, Ānanda, does a bhikkhu who is a friend, an intimate, an associate of that which is righteous (kalyāṇa-mitto kalyāṇa-sahāyo kalyāṇa-sampavanko) expand the Ariyan eightfold path? He is taught, Ānanda, to develop right views based on detachment, based on passionlessness, based on cessation, involving maturity of surrender; to develop in the same way, right plans, right speech, action and livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration. It is thus, Ānanda, that a bhikkhu who is a friend, an intimate, an associate of that which is righteous (kalyāṇa-mitto kalyāṇa-sahāyo kalyāṇa-sampavanko), develops and expands the Ariyan eightfold path. And it is in just this way, Ānanda, that thou must understand how the whole of this life in religion is concerned with friendship, intimacy, association with whatsoever is lovely and righteous (kalyāṇa-mittatā kalyāṇa-sahāyatā kalyāṇa-sampavankatā).

Verily, Ānanda, it is because I am a friend of what is lovely and righteous (kalyāṇa-mittam) that beings liable to... despair, are released from despair.

It is in just this way, Ānanda, that thou must understand how the whole of this life in religion is concerned with friendship, intimacy, association with whatsoever is lovely and righteous (kalyāṇa-mittatā kalyāṇa-sahāyatā kalyāṇa-sampavankatā).’

Is the kalyāṇa-mittta (kalyāṇa-mittassā, line 2) who develops the path of another bhikkhu a friend of the learner or are they both or either ‘a friend to righteousness’? Does the Buddha’s repeated insistence that ‘it is in just this way’ (lines 20 and 29) that Ānanda should see the religious life refer back to the limitation of the disciple’s use of kalyāṇamittatā and represent an emphasis on moral virtue as more important than friendship — the detailed delineation of the Path may seem to refer to righteous activity rather than friendly influence? Or is it a further reminder that the nature of the training is determined by the bhikkhu-teacher relationship (lines 1-6)? The phrase ‘he is taught’ (line 11) might seem to suggest this, but in the Pāli there is no form of ‘teach’ only the active bhāveti (develops). Does the Buddha see himself as healer of dukkha because he is a friend of others (kalyāṇa-mittam, line 27) or because he is virtuous? In every instance both layers vibrate harmoniously.

However, whether we accept the presence of ‘inflexional ambiguity’ in this sutta, it remains true that in the first quotation mentioned above (KS V, 27) Gotama is stressing the value of interpersonal relationships. My review was incorrect in this respect and also in that

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2 In KS V it is possible to translate as there being only one bhikkhu involved in the learning process since the corresponding Pāli contains only one kalyāṇamittassa, omitting the second at KS I above, and the three synonyms may be taken as in apposition with each other. However, the same ambiguity may apply to a single monk.
it failed to take into account other statements by the Buddha in which he refers, for example, to ‘...lovely friends, compassionate, desirous of (the monk’s) welfare, who encourage and exhort...’ (GS (= The Book of the Gradual Sayings, PTS) V, 215).3

In such statements the dominant factor is the absolute importance of the Path. This is plainly evident in both the extracts discussed above, even if we ignore the meaningful ambiguity which moves the idea of ‘good friendship’ towards and envelops it in ‘friendship with the lovely’. Friendship is valuable in that, as Mills’ experience bears out, monks may help each other in the brahma-cariya. For monks the ideal is communally directed loving-kindness and self-sacrifice within the Sangha (see especially MLDB (= The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, tr. Ānāmoli & Bodhi, Boston 1995), 302) rather than a close personal relationship; for teacher-monks the ideal is that of father-son (see BD (= The Book of the Discipline, PTS) IV, 58-9). The Buddha does not consider the possibility that friendship might be valuable in itself as an intimate personal connection.

In this way his attitude contrasts, in Western culture, for example, with E.M. Forster’s. Gotama does praise qualities in a friend which Forster also would admire — unselfishness, trustworthiness, loyalty, sympathy (see, e.g. GS IV, 18 and LDB (= The Long Discourses of the Buddha, tr. M. Walshe, Boston 1995), 465-6) —, but for Forster close friendship is itself a virtue without regard to what it may lead to and apart from communal ‘priorities’. In A Passage to India the friendship of Aziz-Fielding exists despite differences in belief and culture and is portrayed as admirable in transcending these differences. For the radically single-minded Buddha friendship has value only within one set of beliefs and only insofar as it furthers the associated practice. This is a different kind of friendship from that exemplified in the ‘narrative’ sequences of Batchelor’s Buddhism Without Beliefs, and the viewpoint is different from the way in which people in the West in general tend to look at friendship. We think of friends as usually having an interest or interests in common but, if we see these interests as the sole basis of the relationship and more important than what we see, mistakenly or not, as the friendship itself, if friends are friends only to further an activity (good or bad), then for us the friendship tends to be viewed as a lesser rather than a nobler thing, as, for instance, implied in ‘drinking mate’ as against plain ‘mate’. Not so for the Buddha; for him the Path is the whole of life, and friendship, where it exists, needs to conform to the whole.

Kalyāṇamittatā may seem to mean simply ‘good friends’, but I do not think I.B. Horner is wrong to translate ‘friends who were lovely in deed’ (BD V, 12) because for the Buddha the good friend must by definition be morally good. This is true for a lay person as well as a monk, since a ‘fellow-wastrel’ is an enemy (LDB, 465). For us a bad person may be a good friend, an impossibility within the parameters of the Dhamma. Kalyāṇamitta has the technical sense of ‘spiritual adviser’ and, within the Sangha, a friend is just that and to be so must be virtuous. For lay-people, likewise, friendship involves emulation of ‘friends’ who are morally superior (GS IV, 188). Herein is the weakness of Mills’ ‘noble friendship’; it may imply that friendship per se is noble, as per E.M. Forster.

Connection between two selves is an idea which does not concern the Buddha, let alone represent something noble, unless a person influences another positively in Path-advancement. The non-self doctrine, whatever else its meaning, implies that there is no permanent personal entity, only an ever-changing complex of moods and attitudes. If this is true, then how can there be anything durable in friendship? No durable connection is possible between variables, and to make an ideal of something ephemeral is not the Buddha’s way. He does not actually say this because an ideal of friendship (in the Forster sense) does not occur to him. All things in Samsāra are of the born, the dying, the everchanging, and interpersonal connections are samsāric.

Moreover, the Buddha sees dangers in personal connections out-
side his Path and community guidelines. In the Suttavibhaṅga (BD III, 137) there is the story of a bhikkhu who, when his fellow-bhikkhus make a slurping noise during a meal, makes a joke to the effect that it sounds as if the Sangha is ‘cooled’ (with a pun on the meaning of ‘cooled’ referring to Nibbāna). The Buddha’s response, when informed of this, is to make two rules, one forbidding slurping noises and another forbidding any bhikkhu to make a joke about Dhamma, Sangha or Buddha. What might seem to be a harmless joke among friends the Buddha sees as a threat to the practice. He highlights the dangers of friendship in The Greater Discourse on Voidness:

Indeed, Ānanda, it is not possible that a bhikkhu who delights in company, takes delight in company, and devotes himself to delight in company, who delights in society, takes delight in society and rejoices in society, will ever enter upon and abide in either the deliverance of mind that is temporary and delectable or in (the deliverance of mind) that is perpetual and unshakeable. But it can be expected that when a bhikkhu lives alone, withdrawn from society, he will enter upon and abide in the deliverance of mind that is temporary and delectable or in (the deliverance of mind) that is perpetual and unshakeable (MLDB, 972).

This is so plain a statement as to need no comment except perhaps to say that assessment of its severity depends on how we take the two triple phrases ‘delights... takes delight... devotes himself to delight’ and ‘delights... takes delight... rejoices’. Is ‘delighting’ enough to make the monks’ task impossible without his ‘devoting himself’ or ‘rejoicing’? Certainly, the greater the delight the harder the task and, conversely, the greater the solitude, the easier the task. There is a simpler, even more categorical statement at GS III, 298 — a monk ‘delighting in company’ will not ‘find delight alone, in seclusion’ and ‘without finding delight in seclusion’ it ‘cannot be’ that he will ‘realise Nibbāna’ (see also GS IV, 216, and GD (= The Group of Discourses, PTS), 6, v.54).

The value of solitude is a very much iterated theme of the suttas. The dominant image of the meditating monk is not of one in company but of a figure alone at the base of a tree, ‘a cultivator of empty places’ (Middle Length Sayings (PTS) I, 265), who sits ‘like a stript log left lying in the wood’ (KS I, 225). ‘The Dhamma is for the secluded, not for the fond of society’ (GS IV, 155), and this seclusion may be referred to as more than occasional, a way of life:

O well is him, the self-restrained sage,
Whose haunts are homes of empty loneliness!
There let him fare who hath relinquished all,
Men of his stamp such life in sooth beseems (KS I, 133).

The act of isolation is akin to and conducive to the renunciatory action of the Dhamma (see also especially GD, 4-8).

On the other hand, the Buddha does not say that all monks should live alone all the time, and one of the five factors for a good lodging-place is that elder monks should live there and be available for Dhamma-consultation (GS V, 11-12); it should not be a home of ‘empty loneliness’. Gotama actually disapproves of three monks who spend the rainy season in total silence and calls this ‘an observance of other sects’ which ‘should not be observed’ (BD IV, 211).

He evidently does approve of communal activity:

‘... This is right for you clansmen, who by faith have gone forth from the home to the homeless life, when you may be seated around for Dhamma discourse! For you assembled... there are two courses: either discourse on Dhamma or maintain the Ariyan silence’ (GS IV, 238).

There cannot but be a measure of inconsistency here. The impossibility of believing at one and the same time that living alone makes enlightenment ‘to be expected’ (MLDB, 972 cited above) and that there is ‘no other single condition by which the Ariyan eightfold way, if not yet arisen, can arise, or by which, if arisen, the Ariyan eightfold way can reach perfection of culture, save (the condition of having noble friends)’ (KS V, 31 — Collins/Mills clearly applies here) might

be excused as the result of rhetorical overstatement, evident elsewhere in the suttas, in the insistence on one factor as the only factor in a given situation but, granted that the Buddha’s kind of friendship is communal rather than individual (‘Dhamma discourse’ and ‘Ariyan silence’ are not friendly chat or intensely personal communication), it remains true that the assessment of two mutually incompatible factors as important in the Path is problematical.

It is no use trying to explain this by postulating that the Buddha recommends times of isolation and times of community for all monks. Within the communal Sangha organisation this may be true, but Gotama advises that a monk living in a ‘jungle thicket’, if he attains the ‘supreme security from bondage’, should not depart from his abode even if the ‘requisites of life . . . are hard to come by’ and, if they are ‘easy to come by’, he ‘should continue living in that jungle thicket as long as life lasts; he should not depart’ (MLDB, 199). This may suggest that the Buddha affords special status to forest-dwellers, or at least to successful ones. For them he sees no need for friendships and therefore no need for a lodging with elders at hand. Cassapa, although he does not live alone all the time — he begs for alms and sometimes comes to the community to give a discourse — is praised by the Buddha for his forest life in ‘seclusion’; it provides an example and is ‘for the happiness of many folk’ (KS II, 136). The Buddha laments the decrease in numbers of such bhikkhus and looks back to a time when the recluse was welcome on his visiting the Sangha (KS II, 140).

Such a special status may provide a clue towards explaining the sutta dichotomy between friendship and solitude. The behaviour of bhikkhus is judged by the one standard of Path-advancement, and any mode of life shown to be conducive to progress is welcomed. Within the single direction there is tolerance. When monks complain about a novice who does not take part in communal activity, the Buddha sees that the novice has attained ‘that uttermost goal of divine living . . . for himself’ (KS II, 188) and commends him. When pressed by Devadatta, he says, ‘Whoever wishes let him be a forest-dweller . . .’ (BD I, 298). The Buddha says that a successful monk should not leave his ‘jungle thicket’, and in the same sutta he goes on to say that monks with other modes of life should likewise not change them if success is being achieved. A monk may live ‘in dependence upon a certain village . . . certain town . . . certain city . . . certain country . . . certain person’, and any one of these conditions may be helpful to a particular monk. If he is in dependence on a person, he ‘should not depart from him even if told to go away’ (MLDB, 200). There is no single mode of life to be recommended because bhikkhus are human beings and not all the same; the right mode for one may be isolation, for another ‘friendship’.

Friendship is not a Path necessity. It may depend on circumstances:

If one find friend with whom to fare
Rapt in the well-abiding, apt,
surmounting dangers one and all,
with joy fare with him mindfully.
Finding none apt with whom to fare;
None in the well-abiding rapt,
As raja quits the conquered realm,
fare lonely as bull-elephant in elephant jungle.
Better the faring of one alone,
there is no companionship with the foolish,
fare lonely, unconcerned, working no evil,
as bull-elephant in elephant-jungle (BD IV, 499-500).

In this instance solitude is caused by friendliness, but there is no implication of second-best about the rāja and elephant similes, no sense of dissatisfactoriness about the lack of community. The Buddha’s kind of friendship may be important in leading to the Path and helping within it, but it is not a necessity at all. Bhikkhu, or layman for that matter, should seek a friend (in the Buddha’s sense) ‘if any need a friend’ (GS IV, 18).

Mills’ second area of ‘error’ is that of beauty. No apparent problems of translation here, but again I think he misreads my review. I was not myself saying that monks should not appreciate beauty but merely trying to report the Buddha’s attitude in this respect against Batchelor’s misrepresentation. Mills refers to the ‘paeans of praise for beauty’ in the Theragāthā, but these are not the words of the Buddha.
Many practising Buddhists may have a ‘keen sense of aesthetic appreciation’, but this has no bearing on what Gotama says.

He does not say very much. The subject of beauty is treated less in the suttas than that of friendship, and that is not central. The Buddha occasionally comments on the pleasantness of his surroundings, but this hardly amounts to aesthetic appreciation except perhaps on one occasion when he admires certain shrines:

‘Delightful, Ananda, is Vesali! Delightful the shrine of Udena and of Gotama! ... Delightful is Cāpāla Shrine! Whosoever, Ānanda, has cultivated and made much of, applied himself to, made a basis of, stood upon, increased and fully undertaken the four bases of psychic power, — such an one, if he so wished, might remain (on earth) for his full span of life, or for what is left of it...’ (KS V, 230-1).

The sudden shift, a rarity in the formal progression of the suttas, from admiration of shrines to consideration of prolonging his life-span might seem to indicate a personally intense and unusually dramatic moment in which the Buddha, affected by beauty, wavers towards bhava-tānha (‘desire for life’ usually applied to rebirth), but what immediately follows is a more mundane explanation of his remarks as a ‘broad hint’ of his own death to Ananda, and he goes on to reject his ‘life’s aggregate’ without any conflict concerning beauty.

There is little of aesthetic appreciation in the Buddha’s Dhamma. He deprecates beauty:

‘Monks, I know not of any thing of such power to cause the arising of sensual lust, if not already arisen, or, if arisen, to cause its more-becoming and increase, as the feature of beauty...’ (GS I, 2).

In this context the beauty is bodily — the previous references are to a ‘woman’s form’ (GS I, 1) and attractive physical attributes —, for a man the beauty of a woman. Bodily beauty creates and increases lust.

However, perception of all forms of beauty is to be avoided in the control of all the senses, including the ‘sense’ of the mind. The Mūlaparīyāya Sutta sets out the right perception of all phenomena. The arahant sees all things as they are (yaṭṭhābhūtan) — and therefore does not delight in them — because he is ‘free from lust through the destruction of lust... free from hate through the destruction of hate... free from delusion through the destruction of delusion’ (MLDB, 88-9). Implicit in these remarks is a thought-system evident elsewhere in the suttas (for instance at BD I, 162, 165, 170, and KS V, 85) involving the three defilements of lust, hatred and delusion. Bhikkhu Bodhi explains:

... The objective field exhibits a variety of features, some of which are potentially provocative of the defilements. When the dormant defilements, through their cumulative force, push for the opportunity to come into the open, they direct the attentional function of consciousness to rivet upon these qualities and revert to them again and again. This ‘unwise attention’ is followed by a series of perceptions which take these qualities as a springboard for imputation. In the act of perception one ascribes to the object certain properties it does not really possess but only appears to possess through the attributive power of the unwholesome mental dispositions. Thus under the influence of latent lust the object will appear beautiful (subha), under the influence of hatred it will appear repulsive (patigha), and under the influence of delusion it will appear permanent (nicca) and substantial (atta)... The perverted perceptions that result from the latent defilements can in turn spark the defilements to rise up to the surface in an activated form. The perception of an object as beautiful and pleasurable will stimulate lust and the effort to acquire and enjoy it... (The Discourse on the Root of Existence (BPS), p.5).

As regards beauty, this process is given direct expression in the Anāgāra Sutta:

‘... it can be expected that he will give attention to the sign of the beautiful, that by doing so lust will infect his mind, and that he will die with lust, hate and delusion...’ (MLDB, 1080).

These words are spoken not by the Buddha but by Sāriputta, but they conform to the pattern set out in the Mūlaparīyāya Sutta.

‘Lust’ in this context translates rāga which may refer to sexual desire but also to greed or passion. The Buddha is not saying that perception of beauty arises solely from sexual desire, but he is saying...
that it arises from a defilement and is illusory.

To dismiss beauty as illusion and its perception as moral weakness leading to further moral weakness may seem, according to one’s point of view, admirably uncompromising or simplistic, simplistic in that Gotama seems to be unaware that the immediate effect of beauty, either in natural phenomena or in art, on the observer is often an experience of stillness, not of lust or greed or even desire. Likewise, as regards the human body, he does not take into account the fact that artistic representation does not generally lead to sexual lust. There is a difference, however hard to categorise because of differing reactions, between a pornographic image, which arouses lust, and, for example, a Renoir nude, which does not.

If the Buddha is unaware of this effect, what are we to make of his insistence that perception of beauty is an illusion created by rāga? He may be right, since rāga includes passion not only as regards the kāma realms but also those above and may therefore possibly refer to a desire to create or perceive out of the randomness of existence a transcendent form which delights. Gotama’s goal does not include delight in any form within Samsāra or shaped from samsāric material, and the experiencing of beauty represents a partaking in dukkha since aesthetic experience, as much as any other samsāric experience (including friendship — witness the failure of the Aziz-Fielding relationship in Forster’s novel), is subject to anicca. All delight is a turning away from the Buddha’s transcendence. For the artist and/or experiencer of beauty his or her experience may be a transcendence of Samsāra experienced within Samsāra; for the Buddha this experience is illusion, and the immediate stasis of aesthetic experience must appear irrelevant as against the continuing desire for beauty in one who experiences it.

Gotama does not make this last statement simply because he is, with one possible exception (see below), not aware of the stillness of beauty. It does not occur to him that aesthetic experience might be a factor in the development of the state of mind conducive to entering the Path, just as moral integrity or friendship may. As regards meditation, his recommended objects of concentration are the basic colours detached from any other colour and aesthetically unshaped and the basic elements of earth, air, fire, water and the element of space, together with objects that might naturally cause repulsion — corpses in systematised stages of decomposition and the body with its thirty-two parts ‘full of many kinds of filth’ (The Path of Purification (BPS), p.236). At KS V, 283 ff. and BD I, 116 ff. he specifically recommends (with drastic results) contemplation of the asubha (‘unbeautiful’). The bhikkhu is not to be diverted by any illusory attraction in his training towards non-delight.

There is a possible exception to all this. Gotama refers to ‘eight liberations’ (LDB, 229; see also MLDB, 638 and 1072), that is, eight meditation stages, and the third stage includes a non-pejorative reference to beauty. The first ‘liberation’ involves concentration on one’s own body, the second on forms inside it. Then the Buddha says, ‘Thinking: “It is beautiful”, one becomes intent on it. That is the third’ (LDB, 229). Walshe glosses the first phrase, ‘By concentrating on the perfectly bright and pure colours of the kasiṇa’. Is this a use of the stasis of beauty within the meditative process? It must be remembered that the kasiṇas are essentially non-beautiful. If they appear as or become beautiful for the meditator it is not because of their intrinsic beauty (or, according to the Buddha, their characteristics which are productive of rāga). The bhikkhu concentrates on a colour or element; thinking of it as beautiful does not involve any appreciation of aesthetic form. If this is a recognition of value of the beauty experience, then it is of a very limited kind of beauty, a beauty of yathābhūṭam, a beauty of the non-beautiful! The kasiṇa becomes beautiful because of the absorption; the absorption is not induced by an experience of the beautiful. What is recommended is the absorption itself, not the admiration of a beautiful object.

The Buddha’s attitudes to friendship and beauty may, to an extent, be contrasted. As regards friendship, his unawareness of a Forster-like personal connection may be explained culturally — was such an idea/experience available in his time? As regards beauty, his general unawareness of aesthetic stasis may be a more personal element. This unawareness may, at least partly, account for his dismissal of beauty as against his positive attitude towards ‘lovely friends’ (GS V, 215) who enhance Path-faring. On the other hand,
both friendship and beauty are samsāric and ultimately to be abandoned. The Tathāgata’s cure for dukkha involves ‘giving no attention to all signs’ (MLDB, 972) and for him the sign of beauty is not only an irrelevance but a danger; the arahant takes no delight in all things, and delight in beauty or friendship is a weakness. It involves a non-seeing of yathābhūtam.

These attitudes may pose questions for many Buddhists. And Gotama asks us to ask. The paradoxical Buddha, who proclaims of himself, ‘Whosoever in the world... all that do I know’ (GS II, 27), will have ‘naught to do with homage’ (GS IV, 224) and wants his followers to speak not out of respect for him but only what they themselves have ‘known, seen and understood’ (MLDB, 358). His Dhamma remains ehipassīka — ‘come-and-see-ish’ (Johansson, *Pali Buddhist Texts*, Curzon, p.22), ‘inviting inspection’ (MLDB, 358).

*Colin Edwards*

**OBITUARIES**

Hans-Joachim Klimkeit (22 July 1939 - 7 February 1999)

Last year Hans-Joachim Klimkeit, Professor of Comparative Religion at the University of Bonn, passed away and, although he had been in ill-health, his premature death at the age of almost 60 came as a shock. For nearly thirty years he had worked at the University of Bonn, absorbed in research and teaching. His ideal was to establish Comparative Religion as a historico-philological discipline free of any theological or ideological restraint.

Born in Ranchi the son of a Lutheran missionary, Klimkeit spent his childhood and youth in India. In 1955 he followed his family to Germany and, three years later, started his studies first of Protestant Theology at Neuendettelsau, then, from 1959, of Comparative Religion and Philosophy at the University of Tübingen, where he received the stimulus for broad religio-historical horizons and methodological problems from his teachers Helmut von Gluens and Otto Friedrich Bollnow. In the summer term of 1961 he enrolled at the University of Bonn, where Gustav Mensching became his new mentor and supervisor, and Klimkeit obtained his doctorate three years later.

A postgraduate scholarship made it possible for him to complete his studies at the Center for the Study of World Religions at Harvard University during the academic year 1964-65 where he was instructed by Wilfrid Cantwell Smith in the History of Religions and by Daniel H.H. Ingalls in Indology. After returning home he qualified as a lecturer in Comparative Religion early in 1969. When, in 1970, the Chair of Comparative Religion at Bonn became vacant after Gustav Mensching, Hans Klimkeit was the locum tenens for two years and in 1972 was appointed to the Chair, a position he held until his death.

The dominant lines in Klimkeit’s research and teaching took shape in the course of time. More and more he focused his activities on topics related to Asia, although he was also interested in the systematic and comparative aspects of the history of religions. His first major field of research was India, as can be seen from his many publications on Hinduism and Buddhism. But his historico-
geographical scope expanded more and more. Apart from pre-Islamic Iran, it was Central Asia which he found fascinating, especially the cultural areas of the Silk Roads. That is why another major field of his research was the great encounter of religions there, in particular of Buddhism, Manichaeanism and Christianity (see, e.g., his 'Christian and Buddhist Encounter in Medieval Central Asia', The Cross and the Lotus, ed. G.W. Houston, Delhi 1985). He was convinced that only the immediate philological analysis of texts could give an insight into the mutual influence of religious ideas, notions and iconographies. Therefore he concerned himself among others with Middle Persian/Parthian and Uighur (Old Turkish). As a result he published articles such as 'Jesus' Entry into Parinirvāṇa' (Numen XXXIII, 1986), 'Buddhism in Turkish Central Asia' (Numen XXXVII, 1990), and translated into German texts such as the Maitrisimit (see, in translation, 'On the Contents of the Old Turkish Maitrisimit', BSR 16, 1 (1999), pp.60-70).

In September 1965, Hans-Joachim Klimkeit made his first contribution to an academic conference, the Xth International Congress of the International Association for the History of Religions at Claremont, California. He read a paper on 'Guilt, Pollution and Puri- fication Rites in Vajrayāna Buddhism' (published in the Proceedings II, Leiden 1968). The last text of his to be published was written in hospital, a short review of a book dealing with Buddhism in general. Prof. Klimkeit hoped to resume his research and teaching after his stay in hospital, but this was sadly unrealised. This way things had come full circle.

Ulrich Vollmer

Hajime Nakamura (1912 - 10 October 1999)

The Japanese doyen of Indian studies has passed away after a long academic career during which his name remained at the forefront of Indological publications.

For thirty years he occupied the Chair of Indian and Buddhist Philosophy at the University of Tokyo. After his retirement he directed his own establishment, the Eastern Institute. He was Visiting Professor at a number of American universities, lectured extensively in India and was awarded an Honorary Fellowship by the University of Sian (China) and D.Litt. by Van Hanh University (Saigon). A member of the Academy of Japan, the Order of Merit was bestowed on him by the Emperor and the degree of Vidy-Vacaspati by the President of India, S. Radhakrishnan. He was also a member of several Indian research institutions and Hon. Fellow of the Royal Asiatic Society.

Of his numerous writings, the most outstanding and relevant are: History of Early Vedānta Philosophy, History of the Development of Japanese Thought, Buddhism in Comparative Light, and the encyclopaedic Indian Buddhism. A Survey with Bibliographical Notes (repr. Delhi 1998) which will undoubtedly remain his monumental contribution in this field.

Jan Willem de Jong (15 February 1921 - 22 January 2000)

J.W. de Jong, the founding Professor of South Asian and Buddhist Studies at the Australian National University has died in Canberra aged 78. The last in the line of distinguished European Orientalist polymaths, he made outstanding contributions in the field of Buddhist philology.

Born in Leiden, in 1941 he ‘enrolled’ at the University which had been closed by the German occupation authorities, as a result of which (as at other Dutch universities) classes were held in ‘safe houses’. Despite such onerous conditions he was able to master Sanskrit, Pāli, Chinese and Classical Tibetan. Almost immediately after the War he sailed to the USA on a scholarship at Harvard where he made lifelong friends with the Sanskrit scholars Franklin Edgerton and Daniel Ingalls. Between 1947-50 he attended the Sorbonne and the Collège de France in Paris under the tutelage of the Sinologist Paul Demiéville. His doctoral dissertation, presented at Leiden, was a translation, Cinq Chapitres de la Prasannapādā (i.e. Chs 18-22), published in Paris in 1949. (Whilst in Paris he met and married his lifelong partner, Giselle.)
Returning to Leiden, he was appointed successively Research Assistant (1950-53) and Lecturer (1953-56) and, in 1956, the first Professor of Tibetan and Buddhist Studies in The Netherlands. (He also worked in the Kern Institute.) Also in the Buddha Jayanti Year he served as a UNESCO delegate to India (and Nepal) where he met the yet-to-be-exiled Dalai Lama. Together with the Sanskrit philologist at Leiden, Prof. F.B.J. Kuiper, he launched the Indo-Iranian Journal in 1957 and remained co-editor until 1998. Specialising in philology, religions and history of pre-Islamic India and Iran, it has remained a leading journal in Buddhist studies and featured de Jong’s incisive, philological-orientated reviews which, allegedly, made or broke academic careers worldwide. The pair of scholars also established the Indo-Iranian Monograph series which included, i.a., de Jong’s edition of the Tibetan life of Milarepa, Mi La Ras Pa’i Rnam Thar (The Hague 1959). During this formative period of his career (and subsequently) he gradually acquired a reading knowledge, if not fluency, in several European languages — German, English, French, Danish, Italian, Russian.

In 1965 de Jong was invited to head the Department of South Asian and Buddhist Studies at the Australian National University in Canberra. Subsequently he was elected Dean of the Faculty of Asian Studies, which included the late Professor of Indian History, A.L. Basham, who had been lured from the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies. Their combined presence ensured the prestige of classical Indology at the ANU which offered doctorates in Sanskrit and Buddhist Studies, the beneficiaries coming mainly from Japan where de Jong’s reputation remains high because he was one of the few European scholars of Buddhism who recognised the proficiency of Japanese academics in the study of Chinese and Tibetan Buddhism. On the occasion of his 60th birthday, the Faculty presented a volume of essays (ed. L.A. Hercus, F.B.J. Kuiper, T. Raja-patirana — one of his doctoral candidates — and E.R. Skrzypczak) entitled Indological and Buddhist Studies (Canberra 1982, Delhi 1984).

Although de Jong retired in 1986, he continued to write and correspond with colleagues throughout the world and to build up his personal library which totals a staggering 10,000 volumes in over a dozen languages. This collection largely duplicates that at the ANU which, of course, was his singlehanded responsibility.

The overwhelming bulk of his writings comprise book reviews in which he did not hesitate to be hypercritical but also contributed useful suggestions — usually philological observations or textual emendations — which enhanced the overall work concerned. Otherwise, he produced articles of a linguistic or historical nature and very few full-length works, e.g. (with André Bareau and P. Demiéville), the revised edition of Parts 2 and 3 of Lin Li-kouang’s Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese and French translation of the Dharmasamuccaya, Le Compendium de la Loi (Chs VI-XII, XIII-XXXII, Paris 1969/73), the edition of Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Madras 1979), Textcritical Remarks on the Bodhisattvavādānakalpātā (Pallavas 42-108 — Tokyo 1979) and A Brief History of Buddhist Studies in Europe and America (2nd rev. and enlarged ed., Delhi 1987, Tokyo 1997).

His erstwhile student, the American Gregory Schopen, can take the credit for editing sixty-six literary offerings in English and French for collective reprint under the title Buddhist Studies (Berkeley 1979 — but not appearing for a further two years), whilst similar treatment was accorded his specifically Tibetan Studies (Swisttal-Odendorf 1994). The former volume includes a bibliography of de Jong spanning the years 1949-77 and totalling 318 items. A supplementary typescript for 1977-81, circulated to interested parties by the author himself, took this number up to 419, but there was an overlap between the bibliographies for 1977: in the second list items 307-314 and 318-322 already appeared in Buddhist Studies as 306-313 and 314-318 respectively, whilst in the second list also items 306 and 315-317 are new entries with Buddhist Studies itself listed as No. 400. No. 419 correctly ends ‘TP 66 (1980), pp.277-283’. Otherwise, excluding reviews, the following items bring de Jong’s bibliography up to date:

BOOK REVIEWS


Volumes I and II of this text were noticed in earlier numbers of this Journal (BSR 15, 1, 1998, pp.100-1; 16, 1, 1999, p.87). As in Volume II, the editor does not repeat in this Volume the list of abbreviations, the introduction and the bibliography found in Volume I, and readers must therefore refer to the earlier volume for such information. Nor does he include any Notes or list of parallel passages.

The volume is entirely devoted to text, and in its 297 pages it comments on pp.1-166 of Volume II of the Pali Text Society edition of the Manorathapūraṇi, i.e. the second half of the commentary on the Eka-nipāta, and the whole of the commentary on the Duka-nipāta of the Aṅguttara Nikāya (= A I 26-100). It is the equivalent of the final 78 pages of Volume I of the Burmese Chaṭṭasangāyana edition (= B*) of the tikā, and the first 74 pages of Volume II. There is still a very long way to go. There are another 321 pages in Volume II of B*, and 371 pages in Volume II.

The sheer volume of the task — to be paralleled in the tikās to the Majjhima and Samyutta Nikāyas, should the PTS ever decide to publish those texts — and the expense which will be involved must cast doubt on the Society’s ability to complete this project and then, more importantly, sell the large number of books which will be produced, in view of the fact that all the tikās are now easily accessible on the Vipassana Research Institute’s cd-ROM version of the B* and doubtless, in time, on other cd’s too. The fact that the VRI cd does not include variant readings — not even the small number found in B* — is probably of no great importance since, to judge from a quick inspection of the plethora of variants recorded in the volume under review, the editor seems very rarely to depart from the readings of B*.

K. R. Norman

[Ed. Thanks are due to Royce Wiles, doctoral candidate at the ANU’s Asian History Centre, for permission to adapt and supplement his tribute to de Jong which was published in the Canberra Times on 4 February 2000.]

This book first appeared as an internal publication of Kyoto University in 1966. As it was found to be a useful teaching aid for students of Buddhist philosophy, particularly as an introduction to the logical and epistemological tradition of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, it was made widely available by a reprint in 1989, albeit within a wider collection of papers brought out on the occasion of Professor Kajiyama’s retirement. The editor of ‘Wiener Studien’, Prof. Dr Ernst Steinkellner, has been using it for years in his own courses and still regards it as unsurpassed, hence his decision to reprint it in this prestigious series, using the copy of the original 1966 edition which the author presented at the time to Prof. Frawallner.

The author’s Introduction describes the nature and context of Mokṣākara-gupta’s little work and the problems connected with its dating. Nothing is known about Mokṣākara-gupta except that he was a monk in the Jagaddhala monastery in the Pāla territory. Indirect evidence, i.e. Mokṣākara-gupta’s citations from other works, and works quoting from Mokṣākara-gupta and a few other facts, e.g., the final destruction of Jagaddhala Vihāra by Muslim forces, probably in 1202, place Mokṣākara-gupta somewhere between the years 1050-1202. The text of his Tarkabhāṣā (‘the language of logic’) has so far been published in two Sanskrit editions on the basis of incomplete manuscripts (Gaekwad’s Oriental Series XCIV and Mysore 1952), but there is also a Tibetan translation of the text which fills the lacunae. There are not many in the Mysore manuscript which the author used as a basis for his translation, but he utilised the other one whenever it offered a better reading. He also translated from the Tibetan source any portions missing in the Sanskrit recensions.

Basically, the work is concerned with the criteria and nature of what is regarded, in the Buddhist logical tradition, as valid cognition. It deals with this topic in three chapters. The first discusses pratyakṣa, translated here as ‘indeterminate knowledge’ (often, and perhaps more frequently, rendered ‘direct cognition’ in other works) and the subsequent two deal with two kinds of anumāna or ‘determinate knowledge’ (which can be explained as ‘cognition by logical conclusion’). These three ways of ascertaining things are, for Mokṣākara-gupta, the only valid kinds of cognition. He refutes other channels of knowledge accepted by different schools: śabda (testimony, which may include scriptural evidence), upamāna (analogy), postulation (arthāpatti) and [so called] non-existence (abhāva), i.e., negative cognition (that something is not the case). He also, of course, demolishes materialists for regarding pratyakṣa as the only means of valid knowledge.

Indeterminate knowledge (pratyakṣa), to be understood as ‘direct apprehension’ (sākṣāt-kārita), is free from constructs and determining factors. It includes sense-perception (indriya-jñāna), mental perception (mānasā) which follows from a combination of sense-perceptions, self-consciousness (sva-saṃvedana, atma-saṃvedana) and yogic cognition (yogijñāna). The inclusion of mānasā may be debatable, since one can argue that the mental perception of an apple on the basis of the combination of its sensual properties (colour, smell, texture, taste) involves a determining mental process based on more than one act of perception and therefore engages memory; it could therefore be regarded as a result of the determining mental process. But Mokṣākara-gupta insists on the immediacy of mental perceptions; according to him, even a baby perceives a mental object directly and has an internal (inarticulate) notion of it. It becomes an object of determinate knowledge only when it is associated with verbal (or other symbolical) expression, as was already argued by Dharmakīrti. The explanation of self-consciousness as an indeterminate direct act of cognition in each instance of pratyakṣa without some kind of actual self being the basis of this cognition is a tricky one and we can hardly feel that we have come nearer to understanding the permanent problem of our own individual existence after going through all of Mokṣākara-gupta’s arguments and the counterarguments of the opponents in the text. No doubt, this would be directly understood (seen) only by one capable of the fourth kind of pratyakṣa, namely yogijñāna or the ‘mystic intuition of a seer’. This would mean, in the
last instance, a *buddha*. The inclusion of *yogijñāna*, its highest stage being wisdom (*prajñā*) and enlightenment (*bodhi*), in the category of
‘indeterminate knowledge’ would imply, to my mind, an abstention
from interpretative accounts of the contents of mystic intuitions or
insights. Such accounts would represent mental constructs and therefore fall into the category of inferential (determinate) knowledge. The
true object of *yogijñāna*, which is the result of intense meditation, is
the grasping of the Four Noble Truths, as Mokṣākaragupta rightly,
true to universally accepted Buddhist tradition, observes. Yet, when
describing the resulting direct insight into the nature of existence,
again rightly, as painful and ‘soulless’ (*nairātmaka*), he appears to
overstep the line when he further characterises it as momentary
(*kṣanika*) instead of impermanent, thus subscribing to a controversial
theory for which he then argues in the third chapter, where he tries to
make a case for it also as a result of inferential knowledge which, for
him, is in agreement with mystic intuition.

The second chapter is concerned with ‘determinate knowledge’
or inference ‘for oneself’ (*svārthānumāna*), by which one gets to
know by oneself what one does not perceive directly (as illustrated by
the simple syllogism which establishes one’s own knowledge that
there is a fire on the mountain when one sees smoke on it). It contains
analyses of a variety of inferential processes and detailed classifications
of various kinds of formal expressions of inference. It also tackles
the nature of negative inference and discusses the problem of how to
determine and classify causal relations. It is thus a veritable exercise
in formal logic.

The third chapter, inscribed ‘Inference for others’ (*parārthānumāna*), deals with the same logical operations as the preceding chapter
when they are used in the capacity of proofs in the attempt to convince
others about the veracity of proposed conclusions. This is clearly
the weak point of the system when used for advocating sectarian
doctrines, as Mokṣākaragupta does for the Sautrāntika teaching of
universal momentariness (which is shared by the Theravāda school,
but refuted by others and rarely referred to by Mahāyāna schools).
This contrasts with the obvious and undisputed conclusion in the
exemplary syllogism about all existing things, cognised by valid

knowledge, being impermanent. On its basis Mokṣākaragupta easily
refutes the claim about the Vedas being anything else but a human
product. He further refutes, in the manner of Dharmakīrti and others,
Naiyāyi’s proof of the existence of an omniscient God (*iṣvara*) as
an intelligent and permanent agent and asserts that the actions
(*karman*) of sentient beings are the real cause of the world. Following
Ratnakīrti, Mokṣākaragupta also rejects solipsism and sees proof of
the existence of other persons’ minds in the fact that they are insepara-
table from their bodies which are visible and are therefore objects of
sense-perception and consequently established by valid knowledge.

Many other topics, important for Buddhist philosophical discus-
sions, are aired in the text which is highly instructive regardless of
the validity or otherwise of Mokṣākaragupta’s arguments. He
also gives a summary of the doctrines of four Buddhist schools
(Vaibhāsika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra and Madhyamaka) which be-
came a model for some later expositions (including the well-known
*Sarvadarśanasamgraha*).

In view of the amount of condensed information, the presenta-
tion of logical procedures used within the Buddhist tradition and the
consequent use of relevant terminology, Mokṣākaragupta’s work is
indeed a useful introduction to the Buddhist way of philosophising.

The writer of this book provides all the important Sanskrit terms in
brackets throughout the text of his translation, adds, in notes, refer-
ences and Sanskrit quotations from the text of the *Tarkabhāṣa* and
also portions from its Tibetan version with a reconstruction of the
missing Sanskrit text, as well as quotations from the works of other
Buddhist authors. The usefulness of the *Tarkabhāṣa* as an intro-
ductive text for students would have been further greatly enhanced if
the book had contained the whole Sanskrit text of the work. That
would certainly be a *desideratum* for its possible future re-edition.
Additional comparative material useful for the study of Buddhist phi-
losophy is presented by the author in the Appendix. Excellent also are
indexes of Sanskrit quotations, Sanskrit technical terms and proper
names.

*Karel Werner*

The Second International Dharmakirti Conference was held in Vienna in 1989, and the papers were published under the editorship of Ernst Steinkellner in 1991. During the three-day intensive meeting in Hiroshima, in November 1997, forty-two papers were presented. This volume contains thirty-eight of them, two of which reflect a heated debate that took place between two contributors on the first day of the conference.

P. Balcerowicz reminds us of the influence that Dharmakirti had on Jaina logic, in this case the epistemological tradition represented by Siddhasena Divákara and Siddharsigani, when it comes to formulating fallacies of the example.

J. Bronkhorst asks why the theory of apoha was developed by Dignāga in the first place, and suggests that this was intended to solve a question raised by Nāgārjuna about what words actually denote. For O.H. Pind, on the contrary, the explanation is rather to be seen in the ‘fact that Dignāga worked out the apoha theory on the basis of a conceptual tree that ultimately stems from Vaiśeṣika taxonomy’ (p.320).

In my opinion both views are partly true, but the real point that should be made is that Dignāga was working within the framework of Yogācāra/Vijñāpatimātra, according to which parikalpacetasvabhāva, including language, is absent from paratantrasvabhāva, including real things. Dignāga, in other words, has to explain how one can communicate something meaningful by means of empty words. He tries to solve one of his own problems, not that of others. (See my remarks on H. Yaita’s paper below.)

Pind also points out, correctly, that Kumārila’s critique of Dignāga forced Dharmakirti to reconsider the more controversial issues of Dignāga’s epistemology, but he goes too far when claiming that he does so ‘on a new epistemological basis’. By comparing Dharmakirti’s and Kumārila’s refutations of the existence of God, H. Krasser ‘safely’ concludes that Dharmakirti was aware of the

criticism of Kumārila (in the Ślokavārttika).

There can, therefore, be no doubt that Dharmakirti knew Kumārila. In this conclusion, however, there is nothing new: it is a case of siddhasādhanā. The interesting question would have been to what extent Kumārila also knew Dharmakirti, as suggested by Frawallner and others long ago.

Several papers point out the enormous influence of Dharmakirti’s works in India, as well as Tibet. Other papers are concerned with the interpretation of certain significant words or ideas.

In his Preface, Shoryu Katsura observes that three approaches are currently practised by students of Dharmakirti, viz. philological, historical and philosophical. He finds that what is missing here is the ‘traditional Indian approach’. We should, he suggests, also ‘try to understand the texts written by classical Indian authors in a way as faithful as possible to that conceived by the authors themselves, which requires a good knowledge of their historical as well as contemporary background’. With this I can only agree, for such, roughly, is the general task of historical-philological inquiry, cf. my remarks in WZKS 38 (1984), p.149. We must try to understand the past from its own background without borrowing our own presuppositions along with us.

In the case of Dharmakirti this has proved to be an arduous task. First of all, one has to learn to ‘think in Sanskrit’. This takes time. One must also, as it were, become a yogin without, of course, forgetting to be a critical scholar. People such as Dharmakirti managed to be both, naturally, and so should we.

The difficulty comes up, in different ways, in the papers of R.M. Davidson and E. Steinkellner. Are the ideals of Mahāyāna philosophy and Vajrayāna ritualism compatible? A text such as the Tatwavidhi, ascribed to Śantaraksitaka, attempts to combine the ideals of Mahāyāna with those of Mahāvajrayāna. Therefore, the question of its authenticity is of paramount importance. Steinkellner (p.357) considers the attribution to Śantaraksitaka ‘as quite impossible for reasons of its style and structure, and above all, because of its idiosyncratic quality as a scholarly treatise which is what it intends to be’.

My own arguments in favour of the opposite position are given in the paper mentioned by Steinkellner (p.357, n.38). It was published
in 1994 (‘Yoga in Mahāyāna and Mahāvajrayāna’, The Esoteric Buddhist Tradition, ed. H.H. Sørensen, Copenhagen, pp.1-30). Steinkellner disagrees with my remark that ‘we are here dealing with the prose-style of Dharmakīrti’, but I fail to see why, for on the same page Steinkellner himself, correctly, points out ‘the author’s close dependence on Dharmakīrti’s formulations in the Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti’. When it comes to Sāntarakṣita’s own prose we may compare the Tattvasiddhi with that of the Madhyamakālāṃkāra (unfortunately only in Tibetan, but easily available in the excellent edition by Masamichi Ichigō, Kyoto 1985). Also, we want to keep in mind that the Tattvasiddhi has a verse in common with the Madhyamakālāṃkāra. Steinkellner finds that the development of the argument in TS is ‘jerky’ and also ‘spiked with redundancies as if the author wanted to show off with his ability to compose a logically structured text…’. Even if one is prepared to accept this observation, though partly subjective, it cannot be used as an argument against the authenticity of the Tattvasiddhi, for the same style is occasionally to be found in what we all consider the authentic works of Dharmakīrti as well as Sāntarakṣita. Moreover, the author of the Tattvasiddhi himself states that he is just going to give ‘some explanations’ (abhidhiyate kimcit). So, we should not expect too much, i.e. more than the author himself intends to provide, from this rather brief text. We should try to explain why the author wrote as he wrote rather than, to quote Steinkellner’s unfounded remark, to assume in advance that the text ‘was transmitted by mistake’ (p.356).

The problems of the authenticity of texts cannot be separated from problems concerning chronology. T. Kimura proposes a new chronology of Dharmakīrti (pp.209-14) and points out, correctly, that Xuanzang, who stayed in India between 629 and 641, knew Dharmakīrti. He also points out, again, correctly, that Dharmakīrti was known to Dharmapāla who, again, was known to Candrakīrti. Kimura’s assumption that Subandhu knew Dharmakīrti is more problematic; but his conclusion that Dharmakīrti’s date is c. 550-620 comes close to what I myself have suggested a long time ago, namely 530-600. Other scholars still prefer later dates. So we have not heard the final word in this debate. Unfortunately, my paper ‘On the Date of Dharmakīrti etc.’ (The Adyar Library Bulletin 56 (1992), pp.56-62) escaped Kimura’s attention. The evidence provided by Bhavya, Kumārila and others must also be considered in proposing a new chronology for Dharmakīrti. It is to be hoped that Kimura will try to defend his new date on a broader basis in the near future.

The most curious contribution to this volume is surely that of Claus Oetke (pp.243-51) on the by now celebrated disjunction vā in the Pramāṇasiddhi. The same topic, as pointed out in the Preface by Prof. Katsura, was already dealt with by myself and others at the previous conference in Vienna in June 1989. Prof. Oetke’s curious criticism is, to the extent that I can make any sense of his hypercriticism at all, responded to well by E. Franco in the ‘Response to Claus Oetke’s Paper’ that Prof. Katsura invited him to publish (pp.253-9). Not being present in Hiroshima, I could not personally respond to Oetke’s criticism and I am, therefore, thankful to Franco (p.255) for defending me, for ‘Oetke basically criticizes him (i.e. me) for not answering questions that he (Lindner) did not raise in the first place’. It would certainly be useful (but perhaps less entertaining) if Claus Oetke could learn to put things in a more simple and clear way.

It is important to be reminded of the fact, as does H. Yaita (pp.441-8), referring to the Yogācārabhūmi, ‘that the essential points in the definition of pratyakṣa and kalpanā by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti were already present in the earlier Buddhist tradition…’. I myself did so long ago, and on several occasions, in fact.

Alex Wayman asks the pertinent question: ‘Does the Buddhist “Momentary” Theory Preclude Anything Permanent?’ In reply to his question, Prof. Wayman points to the Buddhist Dharmadhātu as not ‘momentary’ (p.439). His other references would seem to be less happy. In order to come up with a more satisfactory answer to this question, one would, I suggest, have to consider Buddhist thought in its broader Indian context. One would have to take into account that early and later Indian Buddhism are in their own way forms of anekāntavāda and dvānavāda, odd as it may seem at the present state of research, cf. my paper ‘From Brahmanism to Buddhism’ in Asian Philosophy 9 (1999), pp.5-37. While always having to avoid the extremes of sat and asat etc., Buddhist philosophers never abandon
the quest for values more permanent than those offered by the impermanence of normal life in Samsāra. It makes sense to ask for 'permanent values' in Buddhism.

So, in conclusion, there are many open questions with regard to the thought, impact, chronology, etc. of Dharmakirti. There is undoubtedly a sufficient basis of interested scholars to consider preparing for the convention of a Fourth International Dharmakirti Conference. Professors Steinkellner and Katsura and all their assistants have done a fine job in organising the second and third international conferences and in publishing the proceedings very quickly. Future participants will do well in keeping in mind the advice about finding a balance of the four approaches mentioned above. Many of the papers in this volume each end by listing 'Abbreviations and Literature', which leads to far too many unnecessary repetitions. The future editor of such proceedings should try to find a simple solution to this waste of space. It may also be useful, I suggest, to invite chairpersons to provide a brief critical summary of the papers during his session, also to avoid repetitions and to ensure that contributions are brought up to date with current research.

Chr. Lindtner

RARE BOOK REPRINT

To commemorate the centenary of its first reprint by Luzac (London), the Ananda Buddha Vihara Trust will reissue (in May) V. Fausbøl's edition and Latin translation of the Dhammapada. This was originally published in Copenhagen 1855.

Copies, with a new Foreword by Dr Chr. Lindtner, may be obtained from the publishers at Mahendra Hills, Secunderabad 500026, A.P., India.

Book Reviews


This lavishly produced volume contains much that is new and important even from the point of view of Buddhist studies. This brief review can only draw attention to some of the most significant facts and problems.

Fourteen papers deal with coins, seals and cultural history; eight papers with art and archaeology. As pointed out in the Foreword, a particular concern of this volume is the integration of numismatic, artistic and archaeological materials. Coins themselves are of great significance for the reconstruction of the history of ancient Central Asia, although the numismatic evidence must be combined with evidence from epigraphy, linguistics, archaeology and art history.

In spite of the vast amount of art from this period, there is still no scholarly agreement on the absolute dates of the Kuṣāṇa dynasty. Even the recent discovery of the monumental inscriptions from Surkh Khotal and Rabatak have not enabled scholars to overcome the problems stemming from the fact that different and inconsistent methods of recording dates were used in various regions at different times.

P. Bernard, in his paper on Greek geography and literary fiction from Bactria to India, reaches the conclusion that Philostratus' Life of Apollonius is a work of literary fiction that cannot be considered an authentic account of India. It was written about the same time as the Syriac version of the Acts of Thomas, the anonymous Christian author of which has Thomas encounter a real king of Taxila, the famous Gondophares who reigned from Seistan to the eastern Punjab from (in Bernard's opinion) 19 to about 45 ce.

O. Bopearachchi writes about recent coin hoard evidence on pre-Kuṣāṇa chronology (pp.99-149). Taking into consideration the objections of Frank Holt, he now suggests that Menander I may have reigned from c. 165-150 BCE. Menander is often associated with Śāgala-Salkot, but it was only in 1993 that for the first time two hoards with Menander coins were found in that area (p.112). It is, therefore, unlikely that Menander had his capital there (cf. A.K.
Narain, *The Indo-Greeks*, Oxford 1962, p.172). It seems certain that Menander I and Eucratides I were close contemporaries (p.121).

Thanks to the Rabatak inscriptions we can now be fairly sure about the relative chronology of the early Kuṣāṇas: Kuṣula Kadphises was the great grandfather, Vima Takti (or Takti) the grandfather, and Vima Kadphises the father of the famous Kaniska I. Kaniska, known as *devaputra*, is the first to issue coins with the image of the Buddha. Since at least thirty other deities are shown on his coins, however, one cannot draw the conclusion that he was a Buddhist. About the absolute date of Kaniska I there is anything but unanimity. Some scholars suggest 78 CE, others, such as the late Robert Göbl, 230 CE.

For the important Gondophares I, Bopearachchi suggests the date c.20-46; for Kuṣula Kadphises 30-80 (p.139). For establishing a relative chronology the overstrikes are always very important. Hermaios seems to have reigned from c.90 BCE (p.124). Gondophares’ coins struck over Hermaios tetradrachms are available and so are coins of Kuṣula over Gondophares. Maues (or Moga), who reigned in Taxila about 90-80 BCE, and Azes I are to be placed a little earlier than Gondophares. About 55 BCE, the Scythian prince, Azes I, seems to have dethroned Hippostratos, the last Greek king to reign in west Punjab, including Taxila and Puṣkulavati. There are Apollodotos overstrikes on Maues, and Azes I overstrikes on Apollodotos II as well as Hippostratos. Azes I, who was followed by Azilises, again followed by Azes II, established the Indo-Scythian dynasty in the region of west Punjab.

Highly controversial views about the relative chronology are expressed in the recent book by R.C. Senior and D. MacDonald, *The Decline of the Indo-Greeks: A re-appraisal of the chronology from the time of Menander to that of Azes* (Monographs of the Hellenic Numismatic Society, Athens 1998). In another important work, *From Gondophares to Kanishka* (Glastonbury, Somerset, privately printed) Bob Senior proposes that Gondophares (the First) should be placed in the last half of the first century BCE and replaced by Gondophares-Sases in the time frame of c.19-46+, and that there was only one Indo-Scythic king called Azes. His views, in my opinion, deserve serious discussion.

It is usually claimed that our knowledge of the Greek kings who succeeded Menander depends entirely on numismatic evidence (*op. rec.*, p.122; cf. Narain, *op. cit.*, p.101: ‘The slender thread of literary evidence breaks off’). Not a single king of this period is mentioned by name, except Apollodotos in the *Periplus of the Erythraean Sea*. —This view, however, is not entirely true. In a rather strange book, *The Greeks and the Mauryas* (Colombo 1971) by Senarat Paranavitana, the Sanskrit text (p.169) mentions the five sons of King Mayandendra (= Menander), viz. Sürāydārā (= Antialcidas), Appālādatta (= Apollodotos), Panthalayana (= Pantaleon), Yuvakradudha (= Eucratides) and Yuvasthadhimat (= Euthydemos). The last-named is also known as Sotara-Maga, the famous Soter Megas or, as we know from the Rabatak inscription, Vima Takti (or Takti). Other interesting names are also mentioned, e.g., Ahatākalyā (= Agathocleia), her husband Strātava (= Stratton), the Pārthava king Vindaparṇa (= Gondophares) and others. However, Ananda Gurge exposed Paranavitana’s ‘findings’ as a hoax in his essay ‘Senarat Paranavitana as a writer of historical fiction in Sanskrit’ (*Vidyodaya Journal of Social Science* 7, 1-2, 1996, pp.157-79).

Charles Masson is the name of a remarkable scholar who during the years 1833-37 excavated more than fifty Buddhist stūpas in the region of Kabul and Jalalabad, and collected some 80,000 coins, principally from the urban state of Begrām, to the north of Kabul. E. Errington (pp.207-37) has written an interesting paper about the Masson archives of the India Office Library, until now largely ignored.

Also very interesting is the report about the field research, initiated in 1991, by Maruko Tsuchiya (pp.353-90). Its purpose was, and still is, to study and identify ancient roads and travel routes, focusing on the path of the Chinese monk Fa-hsien (342-423, according to the latest Chinese estimate).

Chhaya Haesner writes about paradise scenes in Central Asian art. She concludes that the concept of a Buddhist paradise had already begun in the art of Bārhut in the second century BCE. The Buddhist Sanskrit text known as the *Sukhāvatiyūhāsūtra* seems to have been composed by the beginning of the second century CE. Devoted to the theme of Amitābha’s *Paradise*, it was extremely influential among
scholars and artists from Parthia, Sogdiana, Bactria and northwestern India, including Gandhāra. The cult of Amitābha was very popular in Central Asia, but the dated inscription of a Mathurā stele mentions the name of Amitābha, and the paradise scenes found in Central Asia can, as a rule, be traced back to Gandhāra. So the Indian background is beyond doubt.

To Haesner’s conclusions one might add that already in the third century BCE, by the time of Aśoka, references to a Buddhist paradise, svarga(loka) or Brahma-loka, are not unusual (Aśoka’s inscriptions, Mahāparinirvānasūtra, etc.).

I hope this brief review has shown how important it is not only to integrate numismatic, artistic and archaeological materials, but also to combine this with literary evidence, whenever available. The field covered here — the Indo-Iranian borderlands — is wide and very fertile one. Many discoveries undoubtedly remain to be made. Unfortunately, important discoveries are made without being properly reported. For instance, my friend Bob Senior informs me that only the year before last some Jewish artefacts, including a copper inscription in Hebrew, were found in Swat. In Mleiha, in present-day Sharjah, a city has been excavated in which the local currency consisted of tetradrachms imitating those of Alexander the Great but dating from 100 BCE - 100 CE. Amongst the finds were coins of Augustus and Tiberius as well as Indian coins from Gujarat. The finds in the south, Andhra Pradesh, etc., show the same picture, namely — as Bob Senior writes to me in a letter dated 27-Nov-99 — that the period 50 BCE - 50 CE must have seen a tremendous rise in trade between the Mediterranean and India and the flow of people and ideas must have been just as great (cf. V.V. Krishna Sastry, Roman Gold Coins: Recent Discoveries in Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad 1992, with my review in the numismatic quarterly FÆLLESÆMNØT 47, Skive 2000).

This is true and this again means that anyone taking an interest in the influence of Buddhism on the West — and on Christianity — can profit greatly from the study of a book such as this one, even though it is mainly concerned with coins, art and chronology.

 Chr. Lindner


The subtitle of this precious collection of texts from the meditation (dhyāna) tradition that were discovered in Dunhuang, and the reference to these texts as ‘a small portion the the “Dead Sea Scrolls” of Zen’ (p.5) both indicate that Jeffrey Broughton has a way with upāya. He actually reserves the term ‘Zen’ for instances where ‘the broadest possible understanding is desirable’, saving its Chinese equivalent ‘Ch’ an’ for technical contexts. So it appears that he offers at least two entrances to this well-presented volume of translations and commentary. In addition, Broughton includes two specialist essays on the stratigraphy of Dunhuang texts (Appendix A) and on the literary history of Early Ch’ an (sic) in general (Appendix B).

The lion’s share of these texts were first reproduced and published in 1935 by D.T. Suzuki in Japan. Known as the ‘Long Scroll of the Treatise on the Two Entrances and Four Practices’ (Ninyyuu shigyouron choukansa), they included the following items:
1. An anonymous biographical sketch of Bodhidharma (d.u.)
2. A treatise on the ‘Two Entrances’ (principle and practice) to meditation
3. A letter and poem from an anonymous student in praise of practice
4. Another anonymous letter on the identity of delusion and awakening
5. Miscellaneous records (zatsuroku) I and II.

Following Suzuki’s groundwork, the ‘Two Entrances’ and other fragments have been translated into Western languages (cf. John R. McRae, The Northern School, Honolulu 1986). Broughton now takes a new look at the ‘miscellaneous records’, a collection of named and anonymous sayings and dialogues attributed to the legendary meditation teachers Bodhidharma, Hui-k’o and others. Prior to Suzuki’s publication, these more or less colloquial fragments were largely unknown (although Broughton shows that several were still included in the tenth-century collection ‘Record of the Mirror of the Thesis’
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(Tsung-ching lu), pp.77-80); they have been ignored to date. As colloquial literature, however, they may bridge the gap between Confucius’ Analects and the later ‘recorded sayings’ (yu-lu) of famous meditation teachers. Broughton now includes a full translation of this ‘treasure store of dialogues and sayings of proto-Zen’ (p.6):

5. Record I (= Suzuki, zatsuroku I): written in rather colloquial Chinese
6. Record II (= Suzuki, zatsuroku II): written in highly colloquial Chinese

Comparing the Chinese texts of Records II and III, Broughton found a substantially higher occurrence of colloquialisms in the former (see also the glossary on p.166). This is not entirely borne out in translation: differences in style and rhetoric quality rather than in vocabulary appear to enliven Record II more than Record III, which in Broughton’s version indeed sounds like a relatively bland didactic text. In his translation of items 1 to 4, Broughton appears to remain at instances closer to the Chinese text than McRae (cf. Northern School, pp.102-6). This could be due to a shift in translation paradigms between the 1980s and the 1990s, but I would rather attribute it to the different audiences targeted by McRae then and Broughton now. McRae’s ground-breaking research on the formation of early Ch’an was aimed at a purely scholarly readership, while Broughton’s approach of upâya includes addressing a broader public as well. His presentation of the translations, with essential explanations in footnotes and more specialist observations referred to endnotes and commentary, suits this objective very well. At the same time it allows him a more direct rendition of the Chinese text.

One issue addressed in the commentary is the authorship of the biography, the ‘Two Entrances’, the letters and the records. Broughton further examines material from the seventh-century ‘Continued Biographies of Eminent Monks’ (cf. John Kieschnick, The Eminent Monk, Honolulu 1997) and exposes a probable connection between the well-known tradition that Bodhidharma transmitted the Laṅkāvatārasūtra to his successors and the biography of a seventh-century thaumaturge, Fa-ch’ung (p.65). Broughton also sheds some new light on the elusive term ‘wall-examining’ (pi-kuan), a meditation technique mentioned but barely described in the ‘Two Entrances’. A Tibetan translation of the ‘Two Entrances’ from Dunhuang glosses this term as ‘abiding in brightness’ (lham mer gnas na), an apparent reference to the Mahāyoga and Atiyoga (Rdzogs-chen) teachings on luminosity (gsal ba). Broughton concludes that this Tibetan translator ‘saw [wall-examining] not as a physical posture but as an analogue of tantric teachings on all-at-once perfection’ (p.68. This reading appears consistent with the sayings attributed to meditation teacher Yuan (d.u.) in Record II, a ‘Chinese Vimalakirti [. . .] who explains that [. . .] sitting in cross-legged posture is not necessarily quiet sitting, that quiet sitting is not the nonproduction of thought’ and also with the Dunhuang ‘Platform Sūtra of the Sixth Patriarch’ (Liu-tsu t’an-ching) which quotes Hui-neng (d.713?) as saying: ‘In this teaching “sitting” means without any obstruction [. . .] not to activate thoughts’ (tr. Yampolsky, New York 1967, p.140).

The interaction between Chinese Ch’an texts and Tibetan esoteric Buddhism in Dunhuang is further analysed in Appendix A. Broughton includes Records I-III of the Anthology in his list of ‘the oldest Ch’an books available to us’, all dated prior to 710 (p.101). During the following century, a ‘middle stratum’ of Chinese and Tibetan Ch’an texts developed, including a ‘Treatise on [Bodhidharma’s] Settling Is and Is-not’ (P’u-t’i-da-mo Ting shih-fei lun) attributed to Shen-hui (d.756) and ‘Master Mo-ho-yen’s Ch’an All-at-Once Entrance Gate (Mkhan po Ma-ha-yan gi bsam gtan cig car ‘jug pa’i sgo), but also a text on Insight Luminosity (Gsal ba shes rab). When the third stratum developed during the tenth century, Dunhuang had become isolated from the ‘neo-Ch’an’ revival in (Southern) China. Instead, the younger Dunhuang Ch’an texts show an ongoing interaction with Tibetan Tantrism (p.104).

Partly referring to this stratigraphy, Broughton drafts a ‘lineage chart’ for two parts of the Anthology: the biography and Records I-III in Appendix B (p.106). The biography figures at the beginning of a long series of transmission records (ch’uan-teng lu), while Records I-III are among the earliest instances of recorded-sayings books
(yu-lu) which Broughton traces back to the Vimalakirtinirdesasūtra. It is noted that in one of these texts Hui-neng is juxtaposed with Shen-hsiu, his opponent in the Platform Sūtra. Broughton proposes that the document in question, entitled ‘Former Worthies Gather at the Mount Shuang-feng Stūpa’ (Hsien-te chi yu shuang-feng shan t’a) ‘clearly antedates the creation of that polarity’ (p.109). Yet more attention is given in this appendix to a long forgotten meditation teacher whom we now get to know from the Anthology, Master Yuan, in Broughton’s words maybe ‘our earliest “Zen master”’.

Well, maybe not. I am afraid that we still do not know enough of what exactly was a ‘meditation teacher’ in pre-Tang China to identify Yuan as a ‘Zen master’. The several texts in this Bodhidharma Anthology fall short of defining these ‘meditation teachers’ in the manner Shen-hui’s writings and the Platform Sūtra helped to define an entire ‘Southern meditation tradition’ during the eighth century. In view of Broughton’s skilful presentation of all this fascinating material to both scholars and lay people, this is probably no case of inadvertent anachronism. The problem touched upon here is validity; to address it in full requires more space than this delightful little book has.

Kees Kuiken


Suzuki Shunryū (1904-71), to give the academic transcription of his name, was one of the first Sōtō Zen masters to teach in America on a permanent basis, coming to San Francisco in 1959 and remaining in California until his death. This volume is a true American ‘Recorded Sayings’ text, produced by two American disciples on the basis of tape recordings of his lectures between late May and early July 1970 on what is termed in Chinese the Ts’an T’ung Ch’i — not the alchemical text of the same name, but the later Zen poem attributed to Shih-t’ou, the great eighth century master. It goes without saying that practitioners of Zen, especially those attuned to the Sōtō approach, will find much in these transcripts to edify them.

Students of Buddhism will further find this a precious example of how Zen ideas contained in the textual heritage of the school were communicated to an American audience at this important formative stage in the establishment of East Asian Buddhism in North America. The transcriptions are, of course, not verbatim and, unfortunately for the academic reader, much in the way of Suzuki’s explanation of the Chinese characters of the original texts has been cut out, but enough remains to get a good idea of his approach to his source, and of his students’ reactions, together with his responses to them. Also included are the text of the Ts’an T’ung Ch’i both as now established by the Soto-Shu Liturgy Conference, Green Gulch Farm, 1997 (pp.21-2; Chinese text and romanised Japanese reading on pp.23-4), and as rendered into English by Suzuki himself in the course of his teaching, partly on the basis of familiarity with the English versions then in existence, such as those by R.H. Blyth and R. Masunaga (pp.190-1; cf. pp.17-18). At the end of the book, inevitably for Zen, comes a lineage chart (pp.[193-4]), identifying the masters cited in academically romanised Chinese and Japanese; the final page, equally if not more true to the Zen spirit, carries an action photograph of the great man being slapped by his laughing wife.

In short, there is much here to interest those working on contemporary Buddhism, and even those who work on the eighth century in China might be refreshed to see how a veteran Japanese master like Suzuki managed to communicate at least something of that age to young Californians twelve centuries later.

T.H. Barrett


This is a veritable tour de force by an author who has dedicated his life to the study and practice of the teachings of the Buddha, worked
out from the Pāli discourses in the Sutta Pitaka which he regards as the nearest source of the Buddha's actual verbal message. He is not alone in this, but the question is still very much under discussion. He first encountered Buddhism in 1945, at the age of twenty-two, in the benign atmosphere of an English prisoner-of-war camp where Paul Debes, by then a seasoned student of Buddhism with a period of meditation in pre-war Ceylon behind him, conducted seminars on Buddhism for his fellow prisoners. When in post-war Germany Paul Debes founded his (still highly respected) Buddhistisches Seminar für Seinskunde, Schäfer became, together with Hellmuth Hecker, his close collaborator. They formed an influential triumvirate, with Debes the towering figure within it, spreading the message and advising on its practice independently of any historical tradition or contemporary Buddhist movement. The author even gave up his successful career as an attorney in middle age and has dedicated the last forty years to his studies, leading a modest, deceptively uneventful life in the ancient city of Heidelberg. He spent ten years writing this *magnum opus*.

The book takes the form of the author's conversations with two friends, one male and one female, more or less newcomers to Buddhism but with some general knowledge of it. They initially hold some misconceptions about it, but appear to possess the required intelligence and capacity to grasp progressively deeper topics, and they are eager to learn. Needless to say, this is, for the most part, a fiction. Some of the book's long lecture-like sections and quotations from the Pāli discourses would tax the patience of anyone in a single session. Still, a few passages do give an impression of genuine conversations or answers to questions put to the author by his friends or visitors. The method adopted enables the author to formulate initially some complicated tenets of the teaching in simplistic or even naive terms and put those formulations into the mouths of his questioners before embarking on deeper explanations. Its disadvantage is that it contributes unduly to the size of the book, but Schäfer is confident that earnest seekers will not be frightened away.

The title of the book is telling. It counters the widespread opinion that the higher stages of Buddhist practice, to say nothing of the final goal, can be pursued effectively only in a monastic setting or by renunciates with an ascetic life-style. Even some academics, e.g. Conze, regarded 'pure' Buddhism as a religion for monks; popular Buddhism of the masses was diluted and contaminated by other traditions. But the author resolutely maintains that the Buddha presented even the highest teachings and appropriate instructions for practice to all, monks and 'householders' alike. He has identified some 360 discourses directly addressed to householders and these form the basis for his book. In addition he utilises some discourses delivered to monks of which the Buddha expressly stated that they may be passed to followers living in homes.

Schäfer covers some points of general and scholarly interest. One concerns the 'original' language of the Buddha's discourses. Here he follows the results of a symposium dedicated to the problem, as summarised by H. Bechter (*Die Sprache der ältesten buddhistischen Überlieferung*, Symposium zur Buddhismus II, Göttingen 1980): there was no 'original' language of Buddhism, the discourses were conducted in the closely related vernaculars of the regions in which the Buddha moved. They were fixed by monks in Pāli, a kind of *lingua franca* everybody in those regions understood, preserved in memory and kept in authentic form through periodic recitations in assemblies until written down in first century BCE Sri Lanka. As to the reliability of the texts, the author points to the long period of the Buddha's teaching activity and the fact that his many discourses could be tested against each other and supplement each other without inconsistencies. The Buddha himself relied on their preservation and refused to appoint a successor, instead advising his followers to be guided by the teaching he was leaving behind, not just in their beliefs, but in practice to verify them in their experience.

Academics will hardly follow this advice, but Schäfer has done so and now presents his testimony. Even so, academics may find many of his expositions thought-provoking and useful, not least also the many passages translated by the author from Pāli. They might not always find his rendering to their liking, but they will learn how early Buddhist teachings are understood by a significant section of the contemporary Buddhist movement in the West.

Among the basic teachings discussed is Nibbāna. The author of
course stresses that this is not a ‘nothing’, but freedom from suffering and dependence and the highest salvific state which cannot be described in words. However, he suggests that it can be distantly gauged from the smile of some statues of the Buddha which indicates that his is a state of invulnerability. As to the goal to the goal he rejects the idea of a gradual progress through its eight stages in the sequence in which they are presented, but accepts their division into three gradual stages of progress: virtue (silā), mental concentration (samādhi, the author’s term is *Herzenseiningung*, perhaps ‘unification of the mind’) and wisdom (paññā). The author’s rendering of silā and, particularly, samādhi illustrates here his approach to translating Pali terms. It also shows the difficulty of trying to transmit the flavour of his German into English. But the main point he wishes to make here is that the gradation of the path into these progressive stages indicates that meditation without the basis of virtuous conduct (in deeds, words and thoughts) cannot lead to spiritual progress.

Schäfer insists that more than half of all discourses directed to householders reach far into the peak dimensions of the teaching and that the frequent deep expositions of the four so-called noble truths are of that order, but he does not like the traditional (and linguistically hardly accurate) rendering of *ariya* as ‘noble’, preferring to call them ‘salvific’ (*Heilswahrheiten*). In speaking to householders, the author insists, the Buddha had the same objective as when instructing monks — the achievement of salvation. The difference, in the author’s view, is only in the ‘gear’ (*Gangart*) recommended. A householder’s progress might be likened to travelling slowly up a steep hill in top gear, while a renunciate may proceed more quickly like a car on the motorway in fourth gear. There is an implied warning in this metaphor with respect to radical methods, possibly directed at indiscriminate propagation of the so-called insight (*vipassanā*) meditation: a car driven up a steep hill in top gear is bound to stall.

The metaphor has a further implication. What is the point of crawling in first gear on the motorway? So why be a monk with a lukewarm commitment to the pursuit of the final goal? Yet many monastic communities in Buddhist countries show little actual renunciation in the spirit of early Buddhist discipline and resemble comfortable ecclesiastical institutions. Sometimes the impetus to correct the decline of standards in monasteries comes from lay circles. This, we may add, is nothing new; similar instances are described even in the Pali Canon. This strengthens the author’s point of view about the basic equality between monks and laity as recipients of the Buddha’s message of final salvation. He even rejects altogether the term ‘laymen’ in the Buddhist context, because of its misleading overtones. Both monks and ‘laymen’ can be, and remain for life, ‘worldlings’. But if both are earnestly committed, both can make progress towards liberation, the only difference being the ‘gear’ in which they drive forward.

The ‘gear’, however, is important. The Buddha did not withhold the truth from anybody, but he knew exactly which ‘gear’ to advise each individual to apply. A housewife might get only a briefing on the ethical principles of behaviour in running her household. On the other hand, he delivered the discourse on the *satipatthāna* method (M 10 and D 22) only to monks. The author seems adamant that the successful application of this method can occur among non-renunciates only in exceptional cases and can be practised fully only by a Non-returner. How then can a householder get that far?

Well, the answer to this question is what the bulk of this book is all about. It just cannot be summarised. The author presents it in a gradual way during his fictional conversations in four parts on several hundred pages. The first part poses the question: ‘How does an independently thinking person arrive at truth?’ Truth here means, of course, the Buddha’s teaching and in the last instance the final enlightening knowledge, but before that one has to learn a whole graded set of true pieces of knowledge about oneself and the world and absorb them fully. Some are ‘obvious’ (*sanittihika*), like growing old or death, or even the effect of one’s deeds on one’s future, but if the last one entails the outlook on future lives and their quality, i.e., the doctrine of rebirth and karma, it is not so obvious. Therefore, Schäfer shows the reader step by step how he can start appreciating the not so obvious truths, many of which go against the grain of today’s shallow attitudes. However, the book is written for independent thinkers who are not swayed by trendy ideas and pressure
groups. So the author includes, in the second part, the theme 'How can we live in the manifoldness (Vielfalt)?' — meaning the world of manifold pressures, distractions and temptations. The answer, in a nutshell, is mindfully (with sati). Living mindfully in the world is the householder’s equivalent of a monk’s training in the technicalities of the satipatthāna method. Only is it not, in the author’s explanation, a method of mindfulness (sati) with direct insight, but a mediated mental recollection (anusatī) of doctrinal patterns — of the example of the Buddha’s personality, the excellence of his teaching, the admirable qualities of his accomplished disciples, the merits of a virtuous life, the liberating effect of abandoning obsessions such as pride, etc. This practice of recollection of doctrinal patterns will guide the follower in the right direction, help him in deepening his understanding and in the gradual appropriation of the three stages of the eightfold path while living in the world. It will even bring him, if consistently applied, to the safe position of Stream-entry from which the qualities needed for the final accomplishment can be developed.

This truly is an open challenge to the received wisdom stemming from those Theravāda circles which have popularised the satipatthāna method of meditation and interpreted it as the only or sole way (ekāyana magga) on which safe spiritual progress can be achieved (cf. Nyanaponika Thera, The Heart of Buddhist Meditation). The author questions the translation of ekāyana magga as the way and points out that it can just as well be understood as meaning ‘one-way path’ (like one-way street), i.e., a path leading to one goal, which applies equally also to other methodical devices such as anusatī and others enumerated in other contexts.

The third part, ‘Conditions of all suffering and its abolition’, explains also, in connection with the doctrine of karma and rebirth, the topic of other, ‘unseen’ dimensions of existence which cannot be classified as material, as is, not with full justification, done with respect to the visible universe. This, in fact, impinges on the very problem of the nature of existence itself. After all, even the so-called material world is known only through perception which is a mental process and that is how it is dealt with in Buddhist analysis, which concerns itself not with the metaphysical nature of the perceived world in itself, but purely with the problem of liberation from being dependent on it. Here Schäfer, and the ‘Debes school’ of Buddhism, if one may allow oneself to call it so, face in some formulations a veritable tight-rope walk along the trap of idealism — if not solipsism, because one knows about the existence of other beings only through one’s perceptions. The trick is to avoid (as the Buddha of the Pāli discourses did) making a definite statement about the perceived world which could be interpreted as an ontological proposition. The author seems to have stopped short of getting on the tightrope, while Paul Debes, in my understanding of his writings and verbal pronouncements, not only walked the tightrope but strayed with at least one foot into the trap. But this question would require a deeper analysis and a separate article.

The fourth and last part expounds the practicalities of the path under the heading ‘The way of peace’ in four sessions, entitled ‘Through wholesome behaviour (sīla) to peace of mind (samādhi), ’ ‘Through inner peace (samādhi) to clear knowledge (pāthānā), ’ ‘Liberating knowledge (Klarwissen)’ and ‘Definitely safe — anusatī (follower) and sotāpanna (the one who has entered the stream).’ The exposition of the path which the author presents here is a comprehensive one, no shortcuts are considered. However, as the title of the last session indicates, he finishes by describing the criteria of Stream-entry. No doubt, that is the achievement with which any householder as an earnest follower would be satisfied, for from that vantage point the goal is in sight.

It was a constant struggle when writing this review to resist the temptation of going into more detail and giving a fuller account of all the question and answer sessions, so absorbing is the reading of this book. The important themes of the early Buddhist teachings reappear several times in it in ever new formulations, each time with the intention of deepening the reader’s understanding, and each time supported by extensive extracts from the suttas. Schäfer’s terminology and the structuring of his expositions, although fully conforming to the basic doctrine, are clear and he avoids specialised jargon and stereotyped phrases. Every Pāli expression is carefully rendered into German in the way in which the author has come to understand it after
so many years of preoccupation with texts and after deep reflection on their meaning, always bearing in mind the purpose of it all, namely, the practical application of the teaching in life. The wording of his sentences is precise, logical and in elegant German. Remarkably, all the sentences are easily understood, even though they are on occasions quite long and adorned with elaborate subclauses. The references to texts, secondary literature and numerous other quoted or utilised works are immaculate. At the end one finds a list of all suttas addressed to ‘non-ascetics’, an extensive and comprehensive index of names, themes and concepts and even of verses quoted and also a separate index of parables and metaphors. The book must have been in demand, because a revised edition is to appear later this year. It is hardly conceivable that this book could be translated into English, but there is no doubt that anyone interested in or studying Buddhism would benefit from reading it, no matter how much reading or work s/he has already done in the field. A further bonus derived from it is that, short of reading the whole Sutta Piṭaka, it provides one with a reliable basis and guidance in getting to know the most pertinent portions of it, whether for the purpose of personal practical application or theoretical study.

Karel Werner


Drawn together for a conference held in 1996 at the International Institute for Asian Studies in Leiden, between the covers of this small volume are to be found ten contributions to the (mainly anthropological) study of pilgrimage and its significance to Himalayan peoples. Of mixed value in themselves, if this collection stimulates the reader to further studies then he or she will be pleased to note that the volume ends with an extensive and excellent bibliography of the currently proliferating sources in this field.

Tibetan records clearly indicate that the rugged landscape of the roof of the world has been held in awe by its inhabitants since time immemorial and the history of the introduction of Buddhism to that place is traditionally told as a tale of subjugation and conversion of the very land itself. Add to this fact that a large proportion of the population is nomadic or semi-nomadic, and it comes as no surprise to learn that the notion of pilgrimage is widespread and immensely popular. Indeed, in her opening article, ‘Reflections on Pilgrimages to Sacred Mountains, Lakes and Caves’, Katia Buffetrille begins with the words: ‘In Tibet, pilgrimages are one of the most important religious demonstrations of the lay people’. She then goes on to describe the recent great upsurge in pilgrimage activity in Tibet as a result of the slight ‘liberalization’ of the repressive anti-religious rule imposed on the population by China. In the following article, Wim van Spengen outlines the importance of pilgrimage to the local and national economy and a particular aspect of this theme is explored in further detail in the chapter on ‘Hindu Trading Pilgrims’ by John Clarke. The economic value of pilgrimage would, in fact, be hard to overestimate in a region as barren as the Tibetan plateau where the only trade networks are traditional routes of pilgrimage, connected by neither road nor rail.

Chapter 4 tells us the tale of 'Jigs-med nam-mkha'i rdo-rje, an early twentieth century Tibetan Bon-po pilgrim in India who, it appears, was the first Tibetan lama to take advantage of the modern printing facilities available in Delhi for the production of Tibetan texts. Then, in Chapter 5, Hanna Havnevik indulges her passion for gender studies in an analysis of the life of the female lama rJe-btsun bLo-chen Rin-po-che and her forty-year quest for sacred sites in the Himalayas.

The volume then turns away from personal biography and the thoughts and habits of pilgrims, moving instead towards the sites and routes marked out upon the ground. This is by no means a simple transition from the animate world to the inanimate, for the pilgrimage sites themselves are regularly conceived as pulsating with life and energy. Thus the sacred sites may be considered as the abodes of deities, or as the very embodiments of the deities themselves. Following the Indian tradition of Cakrasamvara in which the tantric mandala is thought to exist spontaneously in several locations at once, both physical and metaphysical, many of these pilgrimage sites are also mapped out as terrestrial mandalas. The most important of these sites
in Tibet seems to be Mount Kailasa, and no less than three of the remaining chapters in this book have chosen to focus on this site in one way or another. The first of these, by W. Callewaert, is a purely personal record of a visit to the site in 1996, and from this chapter we get a feeling of vast space and immense beauty coupled with the insensitive and pointless brutality of the Chinese occupation. The sacredness of Mount Kailasa in Indian and Tibetan literary sources is briefly explored in Chapter 8 by Andrea Loseries-Leick and the particular themes of ‘ascetism, power and pilgrimage’ in relation to Mount Kailasa are taken up from Indian and colonial sources in Chapter 9 by Alex McKay. But most of this, of course, has already been well documented in numerous publications devoted to Mount Kailasa in much greater detail than is possible here, and so there is little in this volume that adds significantly to our knowledge or understanding of the place.

Sikkim is also mentioned a number of times in this volume and finally moves centre stage to become the topic of Chapter 7 in which Brigitte Steinmann reviews an English-language document written in 1908 on the history of that land as seen from the perspective of its king. How outraged its author would have been had he lived long enough to witness the Indian annexation of his beloved kingdom as its twenty-second state in 1975. A truly fascinating paper that, for me at least, proved to be the highlight of this somewhat disappointing book.

The difficulties and dilemmas faced by pilgrims operating in a sacred environment pressed down under the thumb of an invading godless army is a recurring motif met with in all the papers that deal with the current era. The final contribution of the series, therefore, addresses just this problem by taking the case of Jiuzhaigou, a Tibetan Bon-po village community in northwest Sichuan Province. Under a communist régime, however, pilgrimage is here referred to simply as ‘tourism’ and promoted entirely as a means of boosting the local economy. Thus, the former sacred site of pious pilgrimage is now referred to in the guidebook as ‘a holy land of Nature to which thousands upon thousands of tourists pay homage’.

Another thing which these various papers seem to show, over and over again, is the perhaps alarming discrepancy that is often to be found between the way in which Buddhism is actually practised and understood (in this case, by pilgrims engaged in the worship of sacred sites) and the theoretical norms of their religion as expounded in literature. Most of us in the Western world have come into contact with Buddhism through its vast array of literature, so that our comprehension of what Buddhism ‘is’ is not influenced by the behaviour of our neighbours. This is, of course, not at all the case for semi-literate yak herders wandering across the windswept Tibetan plateau. For them, the ecstatic visionary experiences of meditating hermits schooled in the subtleties of Buddhist philosophy and yoga mean little or nothing. Understanding only that such-and-such a mountain or such-and-such a lake are somehow sacred, they go there to picnic and pray to the local deities for an abundance of livestock and wealth. The scholarly guidebook to the holiness of the site, printed in the local monastery, may well eulogise the area as an earthly manifestation of the mandala of Cakrasamvara and may describe the pilgrim’s peripetia in terms of a sādhana leading to enlightenment, but in practice this may have little significance to the proud Khams-pa on horseback who gallops along the circumambulation route, taking pot shots with his rifle at any game he spies along the way. This, however, may have been the case for centuries so that when we speak of ‘ancient Buddhist tradition’ we are actually witnessing here a genuine revival.

Martin Boord


I must say that, contrary to expectations, I have truly enjoyed reading this remarkable little book. Written by a scholar, it is not at all scholarly and yet presents the fruit of much scholarship. Here, indeed, is a book that offers its readership a panoramic view of Mahāyāna Buddhism, beginning with the story of Śākyamuni and moving inexorably towards its visionary goal of a politically enlightened society in which all people enjoy equally the fruits of health, liberty and happiness.
Referred to by Thurman as the 'politics of enlightenment', the ideas promoted in this book are not at all revolutionary according to the Dalai Lama in his foreword. 'Naturally,' he says, 'when you transform your individual mind, the whole society is transformed'. The tradition of non-violence, optimism, concern for the individual, and unconditional compassion that developed in Tibet, therefore, is seen as the natural culmination of a slow 'inner revolution' that began 2,500 years ago with the Buddha's insight about the end of suffering. How that insight arose is beautifully told in this book, but only in brief because its true aim is not to be a history of Buddhism but rather to be a guidebook by means of which humanity may be led forward in a democratic manner towards the establishment of a utopian society of enlightenment. Such a society, it is argued, would continue to enjoy the benefits of all modern technologies but would free the Western mind-set from the tyranny of materialism that currently enslaves us all.

Thurman's reasoning is clearly set out here in the form of a rather 'preachy' survey of world history, during the course of which he continuously compares the development of the industrial West with the spiritual East. In particular, he focuses upon Tibet, for Robert Thurman gained all his personal insights as a result of the training in wisdom he received under the tutelage of Tibetan masters. Indeed, he was actually the first Westerner in history to have taken (in 1965) full ordination as a Buddhist monk in the Tibetan monastic tradition. Equipped and made strong by his insights, then, Thurman here demonstrates just how we have erred in our perception of ourselves and life's meaning and offers us a timely corrective for our gross misunderstandings of reality. Countless writers before him, of course, have presented Buddhism in simple terms for the benefit of individual readers, but Thurman has gone a step beyond this and developed his thoughts into a system of radical politics by means of which the whole of society may become transformed en masse.

Towards this end he offers some ideas based on 'enlightenment principles' that he feels may be used as a political platform. 'This platform,' he says, 'is based on the five principles of the politics of enlightenment: transcendent individualism, nonviolent pacifism, educational evolutionism, ecosocial altruism, and universal democracy'. The key issue here, he feels, is to inspire the people of the world to a realisation that all the practical problems of world management are truly soluble. Once this has been accepted, and self-indulgent apathy has been replaced by genuine concern for the welfare of the planet, all we need to do is vote for enlightened leadership. This is all good stuff. Let us hope that somehow other the message can be got out to reach those who need to hear it, for preaching to the converted has little practical impact.

Martin Boord


The contemporary spate of books and articles which purport to tell us why Buddhists made or did not make images continues to propel traditional Buddhist scholars into a new and different world. But here we need not despair as the author claims to provide us with a road map of how to negotiate the terrain of unfamiliar verbiage. Or, at least, at the outset, he tells us that this is what he is going to do. What we get, however, is a series of red flags warning us to walk on by.

*Imaging Wisdom* gives us a flag, as do the chapter titles: Chapter One is 'Imagining Images', Chapter Two is 'Present Presence, Present Absence', Chapter Three is 'Imaging and Imagining the Buddha'. For all this concern with images and 'imaging' (which can mean 'portraying', 'reflecting', 'mirroring', 'describing', 'imagining vividly', 'typifying'), only sixteen figures appear in the book. Indeed, the book is not about 'imaging' but rather about talking about what the author thinks about 'imaging' in the light of what a very diverse collection of other authors think about 'imaging'. The word itself takes on a magic quality that creates, it seems, a religious exegesis of its own, not unlike Mahendra's *Unfolding a Mandala*, which the author freely refers to here.

For additional authority, the text is interspersed with translations from Pali and Sanskrit writings, indicating that the author has read (or has had read for him, as we know nothing of his Buddhist
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Mary Stewart


This is self-evidently not a book about Buddhism, and fuller accounts of its strengths and weaknesses will doubtless be forthcoming from Buddhists to write on the subject, Śāntideva. Once I have laid this more textual, and more philosophical foundation, I shall then turn to the ways in which this most important, most abstract, of concepts is visually represented in the two most [italics mine] prominent forms of Pāla-period [sic] sculptural representation of the Buddha, the bhīmisparsamudrā... and the dharmacakrapravartanamudrā [sic] forms' (pp.79-80).

Interestingly, while an argument is developed again quoting textual sources, including art historians Susan and John Huntington, Joanna Williams, and Vidya Dehejia, the bulk remains a textual interpretation — i.e. his selected readings — projected backwards onto Pāla period Buddhists. That this might be specious is hinted at in the end of the chapter: 'What a medieval Indian Buddhist would have seen in such an image [of the Buddha], what sorts of connections he or she would have made, and what sorts of reactions such vision would have entailed or provoked, would have very much been an open-ended issue, and, again, very much context bound’ (p.112).

Need we say more? For all the apparent erudition there is not one clear explanation as to what the logical connection is between critical scholarly labours of the twentieth century in a number of questionably-related fields and a handful of Buddhist images of the eighth-twelfth centuries: Not one. Thus, this book and the premises it is based upon raise a serious concern with regard to what is being passed off as valid criticism in Buddhist scholarship. Reading through to the end we are none the wiser as to the hows and whys of Buddhist 'imaging', or why 'imaging' is a valid descriptive. If anything, it is even harder to understand how and why the editors of the Curzon Critical Series in Buddhism, of which this is a part, allowed this to be published in the first place.

Mary Stewart

credible selections from the Canon. So, as well as being a book about opinions about ‘imaging’, and about books and texts, it is also a brilliant illustration of how, by picking and choosing, it is possible to create any conclusion desired. Furthermore, it is predicated on the notion that by placing the issue of how and why Buddhists made images in the Indian Pāla period (roughly eighth through twelfth centuries) within a twentieth century semiotic theoretical framework, the author has determined not only the ‘how and why’, but ‘what’ was most important with regard to Buddhist images in the Pāla period.


Then there are the sources quoted: Picasso, Clifford Geertz, Michel Foucault, William Robertson Smith, Tomoko Masuzawa and Catherine Bell. How or why they might relate to the topic of Pāla period Buddhist ‘imagery’ is not established. There is a definition quoted from Monier-Williams’ Sanskrit dictionary for paramparā which is introduced not for Buddhist purposes, but to legitimise via Sanskritising the idea that there is a ‘lineage’ to the ‘issues’ that ‘we scholars find important’.

Jumping into the middle of the book, to the central notion of Chapter Four, ‘The Image of Wisdom’, the author tells us that in the previous chapters he has ‘argued that the construction of visual images serves to mediate, in a metapragmatic manner, between the wish for a present Buddha and the reality of his absence. In this chapter, I will now turn to the specific dynamics of, [sic] wisdom, prajñā, as it relates to these issues’ (p.79). Again, little flags are there to guide us: ‘... mainstream Mahāyāna’... ‘primarily the Prajñāpāramitā... genre, along with the work of one of the most important medieval...
historians of the Ming and Manchu dynasties in China. But it does touch upon Buddhism, and it may be of interest to those working on similar topics in Buddhist studies, particularly topics involving funerary rituals. The chief message of the book is that rituals of filial mourning, that is, rituals close to the heart of Confucianism, and so fairly stable throughout time, were actually susceptible not simply to change but also to deliberate manipulation, especially insofar as they involved an area where the ruler might lay obligations upon his subjects.

Read as a contribution to historical debate, there were certainly one or two points in this work which seem puzzling. In charting the rise of the more ‘internal’ approach to ritual in the Ming, surely the deadlock caused by inability to resolve ritual issues over the elevation of the imperial nephew Shizong to the throne, described by Carney T. Fisher in his book _The Chosen One_ (Sydney 1990), must have played a part. And surely, (p.159, n.14) Italo Calvino’s _Invisible Cities_ is not ‘about’ Kublai Khan in any meaningful sense — though to anyone familiar with the writings of Jonathan Spence (Kutcher’s teacher) and his critics, at any rate, it will be quite clear what this particular footnote is ‘about’.

Plainly, too, to readers of this _Review_ it will be of much greater interest to discover that Kutcher feels that the great eighteenth century Qianlong emperor showed a more Buddhist than Confucian attitude to mourning his emperor (p.169), though to be honest, the language used, if not conventionally Confucian, does not strike me as conventionally Buddhist either, and the phrase Kutcher translates ‘Perhaps all grief is joyfulness’ I suspect means no more than ‘for [mourning observances] stimulate sad thoughts’. Even so, full marks to him for noticing the strong Buddhist interests of the Manchu rulers — though few Sinologists seem to be interested in pursuing the matter, the Qianlong emperor actually studied Sanskrit in his youth with a Tibetan mentor and, throughout his reign, showed a willingness to publish Buddhist literature in a variety of languages, including also Manchu, Mongol and Chinese. There was much more Buddhism around in late imperial China than most postwar Western scholars would credit (for one must exclude old hands like F.D. Lessing, who had a fairly sure sense of what they were writing about), and it is good to detect at least some dawning awareness — or rather rediscovery — of that indubitable fact.

_T.H. Barrett_


This book has an ingenious title. While ‘Practically Religious’ describes the kind of Japanese religiosity which is focused on the acquisition of ‘practical benefits’ (genze riyaku), it also neatly targets the English-language reader’s most likely prejudice: that petitionary prayers for health, wealth and educational success are practically, but not religious (not so religious, for example, as the ‘pure’ Buddhism thought to be embedded in canonical texts). The thesis advanced in this book, jointly authored by two experienced scholars of Japanese religions, is that the quest for genze riyaku (translated variously as ‘practical benefits’, ‘visible benefits’ or ‘worldly benefits’) not only forms the basic pattern of religious (including Buddhist) practice and belief in Japan, but is also fully sanctioned by canonical texts including the Lotus Sūtra which offer practical benefits such as health, peace of mind and prosperity to their devotees. The thesis is substantiated in a wide-ranging discussion of ordinary, mainstream shrine-temple religion which the authors argue is underestimated as a vital major component in the ‘common religion’ of Japan. The discussion deliberately eschews more than passing reference to the ‘new religions’ of Japan in order to make the point that the common religion of worldly benefits is vigorously alive in the more traditional forms of religiosity.

The volume begins with an introduction to this-worldly benefits in Buddhism, Shinto and Japanese religion in general, within which the authors propose ‘common religion’ as the most appropriate name for the transectarian phenomenon of genze riyaku and argue against the widespread view that it is a secondary form of religiosity. Rather more credit might have been given here to Michael Pye who first
developed the notion of a ‘common language’ in Japanese religion and has written about ‘This-worldly benefits in Shin Buddhism’ though these works do not appear in the Bibliography*. Chapter One on ‘Benefits in the Religious System’ identifies the types, geographical locations and innovatory forms of *genze riyaku* and includes a case study of the Kawasaki Daishi. This Buddhist temple, properly known as Heikenji, is the most frequently visited temple in Japan, second only to the Meiji shrine in Tokyo in the number of visitors it attracts at *hatsumode*, the ‘first visit’ of New Year. This fact alone strongly supports the authors’ contention that when it comes to *genze riyaku* any strong distinction between ‘Shinto’ and ‘Buddhism’ is unsustainable.

Chapter Two examines the scriptural foundations of *genze riyaku* thought and practice with special reference to the Lotus Sutra and the Flower Garland Sutra, rejecting various current interpretations by sectarian Buddhist scholars in Japan (and scholars of Buddhism outside Japan) who are disturbed by the prevalence of petitionary prayer among temple devotees and who interpret *genze riyaku* faith as either skillful means or superfluous accretions from folk religion. The authors argue instead that *genze riyaku* faith and practice are manifestly integral to Buddhist scripture and practice. ‘The conflict...is between these popular practices and sectarian orthodox doctrines based on notions of true and false religions. And for the resolution of that tension we have no conceptual category to suggest’ (p.101).

Chapter Three, ‘Buying Out Chance’, elaborates on the idea of ‘luck’, emphasizing that the religious practice of ‘opening one’s luck’ (*kaiun*) in the Japanese context is far from a lottery; it is understood to have a moral dimension. Benefits are believed to come from the gods when sincere rather than selfish prayers are backed up by (rational) efforts to achieve the desired goal and by faith in a successful outcome. Chapter Four deals with the ‘Gods, saints and wizards’ who provide worldly benefits, with a case study of the ubiquitous Kōbō Daishi and a discussion of the impact of the Meiji-period *shinbutsu bunri* (separation of Buddhhas and Kami). Chapter Five, ‘The Dynamics of Practice’, explores many interesting aspects of the common religion of *genze riyaku*. Chapter Six explains how *genze riyaku* are marketed through narrative, advertising and now the internet, and Chapter Seven surveys a range of ‘Guidebooks to Practical Benefits’ published from the nineteenth century up to the present day.

Overall, this work is an extremely useful contribution to the literature on Japanese religion. It is the only full-length study of *genze riyaku* and the aim of the volume, which is ‘to bring the topic center stage in the study of Japanese religion and give it the prominence it merits’ (p.36), has undoubtedly been achieved. Many of the conceptual categories employed in the understanding and representation of Japanese religions are at least called into question by the authors’ emphasis on faith in this-worldly benefits as the ‘common religion’ of Japan. There are, nevertheless, some questions to be raised.

To begin with, the authors steer well clear of any suggestion that Japanese religion is a contested arena of belief and action; the model of religion adopted here is essentially systemic and functional. ‘This common religion’, say the authors, ‘provides an open-access, total-care system for its members’ (p.31). Issues of gender, power and authority in Japanese society are not brought into focus. The picture selected for the front of the book, which shows a middle-aged woman bowing to the male deity Daikonoten, might have suggested they would be and it is notable that on the evidence of this book the socially approved *genze riyaku* activities are organised almost entirely by men and very largely for women. The authors’ view of such ‘deeper’ issues is clearly stated in the Introduction: ‘we want to affirm here that it is important to pay attention to the simple and direct and not always seek deeper and more complex meanings and “answers” to questions that are, like Japanese religion itself, direct and readily understandable without recourse to abstruse speculations that make

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things more indistinct than they actually are and often lead to the erosion of clear arguments and to the privileging of theory over reality’ (p.18). Bypassing unnecessary ‘theory’ to get at ‘reality’ seems a commendable aim, but in practice things may turn out not to be so straightforward. On the question of whether belief or practice has primacy in the ‘common religion’, for example, the authors say on pp.126-7 that ‘As the question of whether belief is a necessary component of religious practice has been discussed elsewhere, we shall merely reaffirm here the primacy of action over belief’ (my italics). Yet later in the book the opposite theory (or account of reality) is affirmed when the authors criticise scholars for missing ‘the central meaning and core dynamics’ of Shingon Buddhism in Japan and for ‘failing to recognize where the heart of its ritual sophistication and doctrinal dynamics is located’. The authors cite in support of their view an ‘authoritative’ Shingon handbook which ‘makes it very clear [that Shingon’s heart] lies... in this living saviour — a belief supported by rituals and doctrines — that is the core of Shingon Buddhism’ (my italics).

Some ambiguity also surrounds the range of meanings encompassed by the term ‘worldly benefits’ itself. The discussion of Jōdo Shinshū’s approach to worldly benefits (officially this huge Buddhist sect rejects outright the practice of genze riyaku) suggests that Shinshū followers do not in fact go short of such benefits. This is partly because they engage in petitionary prayers for money, health, business success, etc., at other temples and shrines regardless of their own sect’s teaching, but also because the ‘spiritual boons and general virtues’ of Jōdo Shinshū such as ‘transcendence from past karma, becoming a Buddha in this body (sokushin jōbutsu),... deliverance from the fear of death’, etc., need also to be understood as ‘benefits’ of faith in Amida, albeit ‘realizable primarily as doctrinal assertions’ (pp.134-6). If such intangibles as beliefs in spiritual promises are to be understood as ‘this-worldly benefits’, this really does raise the question of what religious goals could possibly fall outside the conceptual category of ‘genze riyaku’ and if the answer is ‘none’, then we have to ask whether a better term than ‘common religion’ for genze riyaku faith and practice might simply be ‘Japanese religion’, in which case both ‘this-worldly’ and ‘spiritual’ goals, such as those relating to the afterlife, could be studied together.

Other issues might be raised: in (a very interesting) Chapter Two the authors criticise, to the point of dismissing, the modern or ‘postmodern’ views of a number of Japanese Buddhist ‘theologians’, citing (in a somewhat literalist way) selected scriptural passages to show that all such modern attempts to relegate genze riyaku to the realm of ‘skilful means’ or ‘folk religion’ finds no scriptural support. It seems to me to be confusing the study of religions with theology. It is surely incumbent on modern Buddhist scholars in Japan to engage with issues in their own traditions, but in a book about the phenomenon of the religion of worldly benefits in Japan I would suggest that what we really want to know is how influential such views might be or become, not whether they are ‘right’ or not.

Finally, there is the question of how if at all the ‘common religion’ of worldly benefits in Japan is to be located in a comparative religious context. At a Roman Catholic church in Scotland some time ago I noted amongst the prayers to the Virgin written on cards pinned to the wall a request to ‘please bring my son to Christ and find my daughter a flat [apartment]’. This accidental ema is a reminder that worldwide Catholicism, and Hinduism, and Buddhism, and many other contemporary religions practised in countries other than Japan offer a host of examples of what is described in this book as the integration of the secular and the sacred, in the sense of a religiosity which combines the quest for ‘worldly’ benefits through petitionary prayer addressed to a variety of saints with more spiritual and transcendent goals. These observations, of course, only reinforce the well-aimed thesis of Practically Religious regarding Japanese religion, but I did find it slightly odd that the example chosen by the authors to problematise ‘elite’ and ‘popular’ religion was drawn not from living contemporary religion elsewhere, but from pre-Reformation English Catholicism (pp.24-7).

This book is a reliable and many-faceted account of the ‘common religion’ of Japan, which is of course mainly Buddhist in character. The volume has its strengths and weaknesses, but it will remain for many years essential reading for anyone interested in Japanese
religions or in Buddhism in general as it is practised and understood in
the world. I can personally testify that whoever visits an appropriate
bookstore, sincerely requests this book and donates the requested
amount for it will undoubtedly receive a very significant worldly
benefit (genze riyaku).

Brian Bocking

_Ancient Buddhist Scrolls from Gandhāra_. The British Library
Kharoṣṭhī Fragments. Richard Salomon with contributions by Ray-
xx, 273 pp. £50.00 (cloth); £25.00 (paper). ISBN 0-7123-4610-4;
0-7123-4611-2.

This beautifully produced book provides a preliminary account of the
contents and significance of the collection of twenty-nine birch bark
scrolls containing Buddhist texts acquired by the British Library in
1994 through an anonymous benefactor.

The birch bark texts are probably the oldest Buddhist or even
Indian manuscripts known to date. They were found, it seems, in an
inscribed clay pot and are written in the so-called Gāndhārī language
and Kharoṣṭhī script. They probably date from around the early
decades of the Common Era. Ancient Gandhāra, corresponding to
modern northern Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan, was an important
centre from which Buddhism was transmitted to China and other parts
of Asia and was, as known from other sources, also a very important
point of contact between India and the Western world even before the
time of Alexander the Great.

The contents of this volume, which is intended as a general intro-
duction to a series of studies of these manuscripts, are briefly as
follows:

The first chapter provides background information about the geo-
ographical setting and early history of Gandhāra, including Buddhism,
and previous discoveries of early Buddhist manuscripts in that area.

The second chapter discusses the contents of the BL Kharoṣṭhī
collection. In the third chapter, the reader will find information about
previous discoveries of Kharoṣṭhī manuscripts found in Chinese
Central Asia, Afghanistan and other regions.

The fourth chapter discusses the origin and character of the
collection. Chapter Five informs us about the format, material and
construction of the scrolls. Chapters Six and Seven deal with the
palaeographic and linguistic features of the scrolls and the date of the
manuscripts.

With this background, the author in the final chapter attempts to
provide a preliminary evaluation of the new corpus, his main point
being that these texts most probably belonged to a Dharmaguptaka
monastery near Haḍḍa in Afghanistan.

In an appendix Raymond Allchin describes and evaluates the
inscribed pots and potsherds in the collection of the British Library.
Good references and an index conclude this volume which also con-
tains many fine photographs.

Since, as the author himself points out (p.23), less than a quar-
ter of the texts have been definitively identified, it would surely be
premature to rush to any conclusions about the significance or general
importance of these scrolls. ‘The best-represented genres are poetic
compositions and compilations such as the Dhammapada, the Anavatap-
gathā, and the Rhinoceros Horn Sūtra; texts in the avadāna and similar
genres, relating pious legends of various kinds; and lengthy comment-
taries on various groups of verses’. Fragments from Abhidharma texts
tend to confirm what we already knew, namely that Gandhāra was an
important early centre for Abhidharma studies. But we should be
careful in drawing conclusions from what has or has not survived.
There are apparently no Vinaya texts, but a Buddhist Sangha without
a Vinaya being a _contradictio in adjecto_, there must have been Vinaya
texts, transmitted orally or in written form. Reports from earlier
explorers, such as Honigberger and Masson, allow us to infer that
many birch bark manuscripts have been lost, even in recent times.

As for the script, only one text is in Brahmi, the rest, as said, in
Kharoṣṭhī. That this script, again, is based on Aramaic, widely used in
the Achaemenian Empire, there can be no doubt.

For the student of Buddhist doctrine none of this seems very
promising. From the point of view of the history, transmission and
spread of Buddhism and its languages, it is a different matter. There
can, already at this stage, be no doubt that the scrolls are important for
the new light that will be shed on the textual and sectarian history. Some of the new texts are important for their references to the Indo-Scythian rulers, the mahāksatrapa Jihonika and Āśavarman, previously known from inscriptions and coins. They seem to belong to the early first century CE (pp.10, 37, 141) which may roughly also be the period to which the scrolls belong.

The general significance of Gandhāra in cultural history has to do with the fact that the area has served as a centre and gateway to India, first for Indo-Aryan immigrations, then for the Bactrian Greeks, Scythians, Kuṣāṇas, etc., and finally for the Muslim invasions. This is not new, but new discoveries are still being made in many areas. The meeting of the Greeks and Indians forms a fascinating and multi-faceted field of cultural studies. The scrolls can hardly be said to be sensational in the sense that they force us to change any established views in a fundamental manner. Rather, they provide new details to a familiar picture.

In writing this lavishly illustrated book, Richard Salomon has attempted, as he is not unaware of, to serve two masters, in itself a demanding and honourable ambition. He has written for the specialist and the nonspecialist alike. Specialists will look forward to the documents themselves being published in facsimile and critical editions, and will suspend judgement about various hypotheses advanced by Salomon until then. It is difficult to judge to what extent the nonspecialist can benefit from consulting this book on Kharoṣṭhī fragments. The general readership that Salomon may have in mind would do well in taking the first steps into this interesting area by consulting some of the older but still readable standard works not mentioned in the references, viz. W.W. Tarn, *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1951; repr. 1966), and A.K. Narain, *The Indo-Greeks* (Oxford 1957; repr. 1962). A summary revised version of the latter is provided by Narain in the second edition of the *Cambridge Ancient History*, vol.8 (Cambridge 1989), pp.388-421. The fine pioneering book by H.H. Wilson, *Ariana Antiqua. A Descriptive Account of the Antiquities and Coins of Afghanistan, with a Memoir on the Buildings called Topes* by C. Masson, originally published London 1841, was reprinted in good quality by Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, Delhi 1997. H.G. Rawlinson’s *Bactria, the History of a Forgotten Empire* (London 1912; repr. Delhi 1978) still serves as a general introduction to the history of Bactria, ‘the pride of Ariana’, as Strabo praised this fertile land.


It is to be hoped, therefore, that the work of Richard Salomon, along with other scholarly contributions, will help to arouse a general interest in this important area. Scholars, whether writing for specialists or nonspecialists, will, in reconstructing the past, always do well in trying to combine the evidence derived from different fields, viz. numismatics, epigraphy, linguistics, archaeology and art history. In particular, if I may add so, one would be delighted (but also probably naive in expecting) to see the authorities in Afghanistan recognising that they, too, have an interest and a duty in supporting the scholarly work being done in these areas.

*Chr. Lindner*


The *Samyuktābhīdharmahrdaya-sāstra* (*Tsa A-p'ì-t'an Hsin Lun Ching*) of Dharmatrāta is a Sarvāstivādin manual of Abhidharma, probably composed at the beginning of the fourth century CE in Gandhāra. It is one of three works which in one way or another take as their starting point Dharmaśrī’s (or, according to Dessein, who gives
work, on the other hand, is a self-conscious expansion of Dharmaśreṣṭhīn’s:

I pay homage to the venerable Dharmaśreṣṭhīn; I humbly accept what he has said. I, Dharmatrāta, explain what has not yet been explained by him (p.2).

Dharmatrāta more than doubles the number of verses for comment, bringing the total up to 596 and making his work more than twice the length of Upāsānta’s; he also adds a chapter. Turning to Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa, Dessein refers to Kimura’s conclusion that the Kośa ‘is nothing more than an enlarged re-edition of the *Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya-sastra*. In 1923 La Vallée Poussin noted the debt that Vasubandhu owed to Dharmatrāta’s treatise (L’Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu I, lxiv), but Dessein goes on to set out in some detail how the Kośa, following the basic format, rearranges and adds to the material inherited from the *Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*. Dessein then briefly discusses the place of Ghoṣaka’s *Abhidharmāmrta-sastra (A-p’i-t’an Kan-lu-wei Lun*) in this tradition, concluding that it is of ‘minor importance’ in the development of Abhidharma leading to the Abhidharmakośa.

In his translation Dessein has basically opted for more or less ‘total translation’: Abhidharma technical terms are rendered into English, and Sanskrit technical terminology is not given in parentheses. (But not all Buddhist technical terms are translated: some terms such as kṣaṇa, mukhṛta, bhikṣu, bhikṣuni, etc., are given in Sanskrit.) Lamotte in the preface to the re-issue of La Vallée Poussin’s original translation of the Abhidharmakośa in 1971 commented that while the translation was French in its syntax, La Vallée Poussin had retained the technical Buddhist Sanskrit terminology as the only way of presenting Buddhist thought to a specialist readership in a way that was at once precise and nuanced:

François par la syntaxe, sa traduction est indienne par le vocabulaire en ce sens que les terms techniques sont maintenus dans la version sous leur forme sanskrit originale. Cette méthode, déconcertante pour les non-initiés, se révèle pour les spécialistes comme la plus valable, car elle seule permet de saisir, dans sa spécificité et ses nuances, la pensée bouddhique.
In places one feels that Dessein might have taken more heed of this remark:

"Factors" is 'grasping'. Because of grasping a specific nature is called 'factor' (p.9).

This is largely obscure unless one registers that 'factor' here represents dharma and 'grasping' dhāraṇa. Compare Vasubandhu's bhāṣya to Abhidh-k I2b, svālakṣaṇa-dhāraṇād dharmaḥ, which appears in La Vallée Poussin's translation from the Chinese as 'dharma signifie: qui porte (dhāraṇa) un caractère propre (svālakṣaṇa)'. Fortunately Dessein's very full notes and technical glossaries do allow a reader, such as the present reviewer, who has no Chinese to get back to the technical Buddhist terminology.

In other places, Dessein's English is somewhat opaque and one wonders whether he has always understood the technical system of thought that underlies his text. As presented in Dessein's translation, the technical details of how the abandoning of specific categories of defilements leads to the attainment of the fruits of stream-entry, once-return and non-return seem both inconsistent and at odds with the Abhidharmakośa. Thus it is initially stated (p.333) that by cutting off up to five of the nine categories of defilements relating to the kāma-dhātu one becomes a stream-enterer, which is in agreement with the Kośa (Abhidh-k VI 30a). But then we are told (p.334) that with the (prior?) abandoning of the (laukika?) bhāvanā-mārga of five categories of defilements one becomes a once-returner at the conclusion of the dārsana-mārga. This appears to be a contradiction. The immediately following verse (245) and its explanation are once more in accord with the Kośa (Abhidh-k VI 30-31): with the prior abandoning of six, seven or eight categories, one attains the fruit of once-return. So is there a difference of view between Dharmatrīta and Vasubandhu here? Despite the fact that he details doctrinal differences between the Kośa and the present text, Dessein makes no comment here. Or is the text corrupt? Or is Dessein's translation at fault?

While this may not be La Vallée Poussin's Kośa, nonetheless in presenting an English translation of the *Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya-sāstra furnished with copious notes and full technical glossaries Dessein has made a valuable contribution to the study of Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma. Those of us who up until now have not had access to the Chinese text of the *Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya-sāstra must be grateful to Dessein for allowing us to gain a more concrete sense of the manner in which Vasubandhu's Kośa should be seen as a product of a tradition of writing summary Abhidharma manuals. Like their monastic brothers in southern India and Sri Lanka, the monks of Kāśmira and Gandhāra continually borrowed from and reworked the materials they inherited from their predecessors. Their concern was not so much with making original contributions to the development of Buddhist thought, as with witnessing and documenting a particular tradition of exposition of and commentary on the Buddha's word.

Rupert Gethin

[Ed. The Abhidharmahṛdaya has been translated by Charles Willemen under the title The Essence of Metaphysics, Brussels 1975; Louis de La Vallée Poussin’s version of the Abhidharmakośa has been translated into English by Leo M. Pruden as Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam, 4 vols, Berkeley CA 1988-90]


The acronym PIATS stands for Proceedings of the Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, and this acronym is now also applied retrospectively to the previous published IATS seminar proceedings, going back to Zurich 1977 (Brauen and Kvaerne) and Oxford 1979 (the late Michael Aris and Aung San Suu Kyi). PIATS 8 (Bloomington 1998) is currently in preparation by Elliot Sperling and we can expect to see it within a year or so from the time of writing (early 2000). IATS seminar 7 was held at the beautiful Schloss Seggau, near Graz, Austria, between 18-24 June 1995, and its proceedings, PIATS 7, appeared in stages over the years 1997-98. It is by far the largest and most resplendent of the series so far, comprising
no less than seven immaculately and elegantly produced large format (A4) volumes, filled with the finest academic research and scholarship relating to Tibet. The volumes contain many illustrations and photographs, including some fine colour reproductions. Nearly all the contributions are in English, although a handful are in Tibetan, French or German. Ernst Steinkellner and his team, especially his co-editors Helmut Krasser, Michael Torsten Much and Helmut Tauscher, are to be congratulated and thanked for the immense effort of co-ordination and editorship that has made this possible, as are the organisers of the various seminar panels, who went on to produce the volumes from their panel proceedings.

Volumes I and II contain the main body of the papers, those that were not in one of the specialised panels. Covering a very broad range of material, these volumes carry the generalised title *Tibetan Studies* and are edited by Krasser, Much, Steinkellner and Tauscher. Apart from some important front matter, the contributions are arranged alphabetically by author, from As to Ks in Vol.I (47 contributions, pp.1-549) and Ls to Ys in Vol.II (52 contributions, pp.551-1103). Clearly, with 99 contributions over 1,100 pages in these first two volumes alone, it is impossible to review each item separately, but it is noteworthy that the standard was generally very high, and a number of milestone papers appeared. One of these is of such usefulness that it has been placed un-alphabetically at the head of Vol.I as part of the front-matter: this is the proposal for a standardisation of Kanjur and Tanjur sigla put forward by Paul Harrison and Helmut Eimer. Up to now, textual scholars have used a bewildering array of sigla for these canonical collections, clearly an annoyance and inconvenience for all concerned. Harrison and Eimer have thus come up with a list of single-letter sigla, using all letters of the alphabet apart from I, R, V, X and Z, to signify the various Kanjur and Tanjur collections. It seems that their proposed sigla have a very good chance of becoming established, and hopefully represent a further step forward for the sub-discipline of Tibetan canonical studies. Subsequently, inspired by this, but with so few single-letter sigla left to draw upon, David Germano and myself (RM) have devised for our electronic editions a list of distinctive two-letter sigla to represent rNying ma tantra collections, which of course have some significant shared tantric materials with the Kanjur collections, and thus need on occasion to be edited alongside them. Elsewhere in Vol.I, Cristoph Clüppers has produced a fascinating study of Tibetan administrative documents from the dGa’ldan Pho brang, drawing on invaluable materials that all too few scholars have attempted so far. Franz-Karl Ehrhard has an important account of his discovery of rNying ma’i rgyud ’bum manuscripts in Nepal, while, using Chinese sources, Roger Greatrex has made a lively study of Bon po tribute missions in the Chinese imperial court between 1400 and 1665, thus deepening perspectives on the historically significant themes of the rGyal rong Bon po’s relations and conflicts with the Chinese Empire that he raised at PIATS 6, with his paper on the First Jinchuan War of 1747-49. Other significant papers in the volume include Yael Bentor on fire offerings, Geoff Childs on Himalayan Buddhism, Hanna Havnevik on the famous twelfth-century female guru, Jetsun Lochen, and David Jackson on a printed edition of rNgo gSod-pa’s Ratnagotravibhāga Commentary. Needless to say, these were not the only valuable papers in Vol.I — for example, there were excellent contributions in philosophy from authors such as Cabezón, Dreyfus, Franco, Iwata, Kapstein and Kellner — but space does not permit further elaboration. Vol.II was likewise very valuable: here one might single out Giacomella Orofino’s discussion of Shia Islamic elements in the Kalacakra-tantra, and also David Seyfort Ruegg’s ongoing discussion of the term von mchod. Jan-Ulrich Sobisch produced a very interesting paper on the Three Vows theories (sdom pa gsum). Tsering Thar presented a study of the Gra lag monastery in Khams, while Peter Schwieger wrote on the traditions of Buddhist practice on the 10th day of the month associated with Padmasambhava. Together, the first two volumes provide a very useful collection of scholarly pieces on specialised topics in Tibetan studies.

Vol.III is edited by Helmut Eimer, and is called *Transmission of the Tibetan Canon*. It has six papers and 158 pages in total. First comes a repeat of the sigla proposals from Eimer and Harrison placed at the head of Vol.I. Next comes Jens Braarvig’s analysis of the Phug brag version of the Aṣṭāyamatirīdeṣa, through which he approaches...
The problem of the two Kanjur recensions that feature so largely in the findings of Eimer and Harrison. The Phug brag has two significantly different versions of the Akṣayamatānirdeśa that pertain to both a and b Kanjur recensions, so Braarvig can fruitfully bring this factor into play in his analysis of the early Kanjur traditions as a whole. Eimer's paper is 66 pages long and seeks to explore two early Sa skya pa Tantra catalogues as sources for the Narthang Kanjur. The bulk of this major piece of scholarship comprises an immaculate synoptic edition of Grags pa rgyal mtshan's Kyé'i rdo rje'i rgyud 'bum gyi dkar chag and of 'Phags pa Blo gros rgyal mtshan's rGyud sde'i dkar chag, along with full concordances with several important Kanjur editions and Bu ston, as well as an index of titles. This is an extremely significant contribution. Both these early Sa skya hierarchs included notable sNga 'gyur sections, containing such well-known rNying ma tantras as three separate scriptures from out of the copious gSang ba snying po corpus, along with the lHa mo sgyu 'phrul and the Thabs kyi zhags pa. The Phur pa rtsa ba'i rgyud kyi dum bu is of course also present. This raises the question of the possible value of surviving rNying ma collections in providing another avenue of analysis for Kanjur scholars — hermatically sealing off the study of the two traditions might not be the best way to go about the study of either collection. The other papers in this volume are also of great interest: Akira Saito looked at Bu ston and the Spydod 'jug, Peter Skilling made a remarkable contribution entitled 'From bKa' bstan bcos to bKa' 'gyur and bsTan 'gyur', and Vladimir Uspensky reconstructed a Tibetan catalogue from the texts in the St Petersburg Mongolian Kanjur manuscript.

Vol.IV is called Tibetan Culture in the Diaspora; it has nine contributions, 119 pages, and is edited by Frank J. Korom. Korom himself provides a short but valuable introduction, with a substantial bibliography attached, and his analysis shows how even though (to use Appadurai’s terms) the Tibetan refugees are now deterritorialised, nevertheless yearning for Tibet as a place has become a central organising metaphor manifest throughout refugee artistic culture. This suggests that ethnic Tibetans, despite the partial statelessness of their erstwhile homeland, nevertheless display staunch yearning for and loyalty to Tibet as a place, whether real or imaginary. Thomas Methfessel provides comprehensive statistics on the refugee populations, an indispensable grounding for any of the growing number of scholars of the Tibetan diaspora. Rinzin Thargyal looks at the question of whether there has been a process of secularisation among exiled Tibetans. He brings into his analysis the Tibetan notion of chos (= Skt. dharma) and concludes that it is a paradoxical term which in itself is inherently mutable, and also can potentially embody democratic notions of equality. He also concludes that by certain measures there has not in fact been significant secularisation among Tibetan exiles. Space unfortunately does not permit a review of every paper, but mention should be made of Mona Schrepff's discussion of problems raised by the radically changed contexts for the contemporary performances of Tibetan religious dances, and of Toni Huber's analysis of the emergence of a 'green' consciousness as a very modern development in Tibetan exile culture, cultivated especially in Dharamsala.

Vol.V was edited by the late Dr Graham Clarke of Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, who died tragically on 3 February 1998, before the volume was printed. Nevertheless with the help of his widow, Jinch'ai Clarke, Prof. Steinkellner was able to produce the book more or less exactly as Graham had envisioned it. It has xx + 199 pages, with ten articles and a number of plates, tables, maps and even a glossary. Clarke's own introduction is 45 pages long and, in addition, he contributed a further paper of 24 pages on socio-economic change and the environment in a pastoral area of the Lhasa municipality. BSR is probably not an appropriate forum for a detailed review of a highly technical and specialised volume on the economics and environmental conditions of Tibet under Chinese rule, but perhaps one could mention that this book reflects the (not infrequently controversial) preoccupation of Graham Clarke: to bring concrete analysis of the contemporary economic actualities of Tibet into the foreground, rather than moral, political and historical considerations. However, there were some heated exchanges during the conference panel and this volume brings together the voices of well-known critics of Chinese colonialism, such as the sociologist Dr Ronald Schwartz of Newfoundland, with spokespersons for Chinese colonial rule, such as
Lobsang, the Deputy-Governor of Gansu Province, who although an Amdo-ba as his name suggests, nevertheless as a senior cadre, remarks in typically Han-Marxist language that the ‘backwardness’ of ethnic Tibetans (this time in matters of animal husbandry) should be remedied by applying the Marxist ‘productive force’ of more scientific education, and the establishment of a ‘co-operative economy’ according to the principles of Marxism (p.78).

Volume VI is called Tibetan Mountain Deities. Their Cults and Representations, edited by Anne-Marie Blondeau. It is in many respects a continuation of the work done by the Franco-Austrian research project run by Blondeau and Steinkellner, who are in fact already joint editors of the published round table discussions of this project that emerged from the same publishers only two years earlier (1996) as Reflections of the Mountain. Essays on the History and Social Meaning of the Mountain Cult and the Himalaya. The PIATS volume under review has 214 pages and 13 contributions. Perhaps because so much of the Tibetan material was so recently dealt with in the landmark publication of 1996, this volume extends its range beyond ethnic Tibet proper to significantly related materials on Tibet’s borders: thus as well as sections on Tibetan Cultures (pp. 17-108), there are also sections on Linguistic and Cultural Borders (mainly the Southern Himalayas) (pp.109-96), and on Mongolian, Turkic and Tungus Perspectives (pp.197-214). Once again, limitations of space prevent us reviewing all the contributions. Katia Buffetrille looks at pilgrimage to mChod rten nyi ma in Tibet, at the northern gateway to Sikkim: immersion in the perilously icy waters there is said to have the special power to purify incest, perhaps, Buffetrille argues, in the manner of a trial by ordeal in which the yul lha sits as judge. Hildegard Diemberger and Guntram Hazod present complementary studies that examine what Blondeau refers to as ‘the extreme typological complexity’ characteristic of such deities: while elevated as monastic protectors (chos skyong) in some contexts, they continue to be worshipped as yul lha and pho lha in other contexts, thus in the case of Pho lha lHa btsan sgang dmar even accepting a bi-annual sacrifice of a sheep in some contexts. Hazod makes an historical study of bKra shis ‘od ‘bar, a similarly complex figure.

Finally, Volume VII, The Inner Asian International Style 12th—14th Centuries, edited by Deborah Klimburg-Salter and Eva Allinger, represents an important contribution to Tibetan art history. It illustrates a trend in recent Tibetan studies for sensitivity towards the complexities of history and acknowledgement of problems with simple classificatory schemas. The volume has 169 pages and eight contributions. The focus in this work is on a period prior to the time which has generally been identified with the development of specifically Tibetan styles of art. On one hand, in these papers we find recognition of various foreign influences in early Tibetan art and the sharing of certain artistic elements found in different Asian Buddhist contexts, but at the same time, in many of the examples under consideration, we find Tibetan creative inputs, regional variations and diversities even within single areas and time periods. Klimburg-Salter’s introduction discusses these issues, pointing out that complexities are only to be expected in a context in which artists were itinerant, paintings portable and the religious orders associated with specific art styles not confined to clearly defined geographical boundaries. In considering relations between artwork from Bihar and Bengal, and early Tibetan paintings, Claudine Bautze-Picron demonstrates that although the principle of conservatism was accepted in connection with iconographic features, innovation was possible in the treatment of decorative features, but some elements which had been iconographic came to be considered as decorative outside India. Ursula Toyka-Fuong looks at Pāla influence in Grotto 76 in Dunhuang, dating from the late tenth to early eleventh centuries, while noting features unusual for Pāla art. Kira Samossiuk examines two twelfth to thirteenth century style Tibetan thangkas found at Kara Khoto, while Allinger looks at a single Green Tārā, drawing attention to the integration of the Pāla style seen in the central figure with an essentially Tibetan treatment of the landscape. Heather Stoddart’s piece on an early Tibetan book cover discusses the context of a shift in orientation from Central Asia and Kashmir to India in the early eleventh century, and shows that Tibetan artists worked in what is termed the ‘Indian’ and other foreign artistic traditions. Similarly, we find evidence of Tibetan artists making use of Indo-Nepalese styles in...
Amy Heller’s article on sculptures which probably date from mid-eleventh to mid-twelfth century, located in caves near the Tibetan border with Sikkim. Christian Luczanits details a number of styles which can be found in early Western Tibetan art, elaborating on a distinctive style traceable to the early thirteenth century, associated with Central Tibetan influences and especially that of the 'Bri-gung-pa school. As is doubtless essential in a book on art history, all the articles are appropriately illustrated with good quality photographs, many in colour.

Robert Mayer and Cathy Cantwell

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