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Frontispiece: the calligraphy in Chinese characters by Ven. Thích Huyễn-Vi reads:

Good men indeed go everywhere.
The good do not boast from desire for sensual pleasure
Touched by happiness or misery
Learned men do not show variation.

Dhammapada VI, v.83 (tr. K.R. Norman) © 1997 Pali Text Society

This is the foremost of those with faith,
For those who know the foremost Dhamma:
Having faith in the Buddha as foremost,
Worthy of offerings, unsurpassed.

Having faith in the Dhamma as foremost,
The peace of detachment, bliss;
Having faith in the Sangha as foremost,
A field of merit, unsurpassed.

Distributing gifts among the foremost,
Foremost is the merit that accrues;
Foremost their life and beauty,
Fame, reputation, happiness and strength.

The wise one gives to the foremost,
Concentrated on the foremost Dhamma,
Whether he becomes a deva or a human,
Rejoices in his foremost attainment.

Itivuttaka 90 (The Buddha's Sayings, BPS, p.68)
Householders and homeless alike, 
Each a support for the other, 
Both accomplish the true Dhamma – 
The unsurpassed security from bondage

From householder the homeless receive 
These basic necessities of life, 
Robes to wear and a place to dwell, 
Dispelling the hardships of the seasons.

And relying on one of good conduct, 
Home-loving layfolk dwelling in a house 
Place faith in those worthy ones 
Of noble wisdom and meditative.

Practising the Dhamma in this life, 
The path leading to a good bourn, 
Those wishing for pleasure rejoice 
In the delights of the deva world.

Itivuttaka 107 (The Buddha's Sayings, BPS, pp. 84-5)
years 1902 to 1914 concentrated their search on the Turfan Oasis and the sites of ruins located further to the west of the northern branch of the ancient Silk Road where the Sarvāstivādins, one of the early schools of Buddhism, had been prevalent. Most of the manuscripts found and brought to Berlin belong to Buddhist works. They are catalogued and described in 'The Catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts from the Turfan Finds' which has been appearing as Volume 10 of the series Verzeichnis der Orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland (Catalogue of the Oriental Manuscripts in Germany) since 1965. These texts constitute the main material used for the Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden und der kanonischen Literatur der Sarvāstivāda-Schule (Sanskrit Dictionary of the Buddhist Texts from the Turfan Finds and of the Canonical Literature of the Sarvāstivāda School) [SWTF], which is a project supported by the Academy of Sciences in Göttingen. To these materials are added fragments which belong to the same school and even sometimes to the same manuscripts and which are now kept in the collections of Central Asian manuscripts in London and Paris.

Wiesbaden 1983 (Veröffentlichungen der Societas Uralo-Altaica. 26), pp. 4-10.
5 Begun by Ernst Waldschmidt, ed. Heinz Bechert, Göttingen 1973 ff.

Dietz—Citta and Related Concepts

For the SWTF such fragments are drawn upon as belonging to canonical, paracanonical or commentarial works of the Sarvāstivāda school of Hinayāna Buddhism and as having been published to date. Mūlasarvāstivāda texts and the few fragments attributed to the canon of the Dharmagupta school are lexicographically explored that they belong to the Turfan collection of Berlin. Materials from non-canonical works and from Mahāyāna scriptures are excluded.

A Sarvāstivāda origin is assigned to the Abhidharma texts by Buddhist tradition. Almost all canonical Abhidharma works are lost in the original Sanskrit version and are mainly preserved in Chinese translations only. Therefore, the fragments of the canonical Abhidharma works and commentaries on them found among the Central Asian fragments are very important for the SWTF. Besides, the citations from canonical Abhidharma works found in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Abhidharmakośavyākhyā and Abhidharmadīpa were compiled by Bhikku Pāsadikā. They are taken fully account of in the SWTF.

My investigation into the notion of citta and the related concepts cetas and cetanā is based on these materials used for the SWTF. It may be noted that all three concepts are very rare in the Vinaya, viz. that part of the canon which is concerned with the regulation of the life within the community
of monks and nuns.

Of the four meanings found in MW (and PW) s.v. citta, i.e. a) ‘attending, observing’; b) ‘thinking, reflecting, imagining, thought’; c) ‘intention, aim, wish’; d) ‘the heart, mind; intelligence, reason’ the meanings b, c, d) are implied in SHT. Most common is citta with the meaning of ‘the heart, mind’ as the centre and focus of man’s emotions. Cetas is synonymous with this notion. The nature of citta is described as being constantly throbbing, wavering and difficult to be protected and saved from moral lapse. It is easily excited and depraved. In CPS a list of ten pairs of positive and negative characteristic qualities are quoted in the context of ‘the realisation of the knowledge of the way of thought’ (cetaparyayajñânasakhya). The mind is full of passion, hatred and delusion, confused, sluggish, agitated, not peaceful, not concentrated, not developed, not liberated. The mind has to be concentrated, tamed, controlled and protected, in order to be liberated from these bad characteristics. With reference to positive attributes we quite often find cetas instead of citta, mainly in verses metri causa.

9 Cf. Uv 31.8 spandanam capalam citta viksyayam durisvaram samahitam yujum karoti medhavii.
10 Cf. PrMoSu SA.2.3.4 udinravigirahatena citta tattvam grâmena sârdham [or mâtrgrâmam, or mâtgrâmasyântike] ... ; SHT (VI) 1398 R5 (avadhi)rajnirpahatena citta yâ s[t]rr\ll/.
11 This list was studied by Lambert Schmithausen, "Beiträge zur Schulzugehörigkeit und Textgeschichte kanonischer und postkanonischer buddhistischer Materialien", Zur Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hinayâna-Literatur, Part 2 (Symposion zur Buddhismusforschung, Ill.2), ed. Heinz Bechert, Göttingen 1987 (AAWG Nr.154), pp. 318 ff.
Cetas is found as a quasi-synonym or in close connection with citta in the following contexts: 1. in the phrase cetasā cīttam (ā)jñā, 'to know in one's mind the thought (of other beings)'; this phrase corresponds to Pāli cetasā cetoparivātakkam aṁāñāya, 'having known in one's mind the ways of thought (of other beings)' (cf. Vinaya I 5, 27 ff.). In Sanskrit we have cetasi cetahparivātarka udapādi, 'in (his) mind the consideration arose'. 2. In KaVā 117.1.5,7 both terms appear side by side: (tena mayā) [or (tena)] unmāḍavatā cetasā vipariṇācittena, 'by me [or him], whose mind was confused and whose mental faculties were impaired'. 3. In Dhsk(M) 27 R2 upeksā, 'equanimity', is defined in the following manner: cittasamatā cittaprasannatā cetaso 'nābhoh-(gata)/, 'equanimity, tranquillity of the mind, indifference of the mind'. In Abhidh-k-bh(P) 55.18 the compound citta-nābhohatā is used in a similar definition. 4. In relation to ekāgra, 'one-pointed, concentrated', ekāgratā, 'concentration', and ekottihāva, 'concentration' we find three synonyms, i.e. citta, cetas and manas.

Cetas is used as a technical term in the formula describing the attainment of the second absorption: 'By allaying discursive and initial thought, by subjectively appeasing the mind, with the mind fixed on one point (cetasā ekotihāvā), he enters and abides in the second absorption which is devoid of initial and discursive thought, is born of concentration, and is rapturous and joyful.' 5. Citta usually occurs with the verb vimuc, 'to liberate', and its past participle vimukta, 'liberated'. In the 'development of the mindfulness of in-breathing and out-breathing (ānāpānasmitihāvanā) the state of liberation of the mind (cittavimocanatā) is one of the attainments. On the other hand we find as the last of the ten 'powers' (bala) of a Buddha the realisation of ceto-vimukti, 'liberation of mind', which is always associated with prajñāvimukti, 'liberation by wisdom'. Both states effect the realisation of arhatship.

23 Cf. s.vv. ekāgramana, ekāgramanas.
24 Cf. Sang IV.4(2); Dhsk 14 R3 vitarkkavicāraṇaṁ vyupasamad adhyātmasaṃprastadāc cetaso ekotihāvāvād avitarkkam avicāraṁ samādhiyaṃ pritisukham dvītyyaṃ dhyānāṃ upasampadya; cf. SHT (I) 613 (= NBrSK p. 1139) R5 (reconstructed by Pischel) (vitarkkavicāraṇaṁ vyupasamad adhyātmasaṃprastadāc cetaso ekotihāvāvād avitarkkam)/(IV) 165 Fragm.15 V7 (cf. n. 2) //adhyātmikasamprastadāc cetaso/(VII) 1763 b V1 (cf. n. 9.10) //vyupasa[m(a)]dād adhyātmasaṃprastadāc[ce(ta)]s(a) //
25 Cf. above n. 17.
26 Cf. YL 118 R4 tataḥ puskarindhuvatī / cittavimocanatāyam; 125 R6 ///cittavimocanatāyam ////// and YL, p. 67.
27 Cf. SHT (IV) 623 BL.29 V1 ///vijñāgac cet[ōv]jīvakhya(sa) asidhyā- vīrgat prajñā/jīvamukti (sic) avidyā- vīrgat prajñā/jīvamukti; DbSū(1) (BBS) 223(2x) (see also CT 367: MS.484a R5); SHT (V) 1103 R6 anāsrayān ceto-vimuktiṃ praṇāvimuktiṃ (drṣṭa) e(va dha)rmasya abhiśayāsāsākṣātvyapasyam; cf. SHT (VI) 1226 Fragm.14 V1 ///.ām cetōmuktiṃ praṇāvimuktiṃ///; — Śro-Vimśa(vi) 781 V2 (cf. p. 782, n. 3); Hoemel, MR 4 V5.8 na cāsya ceto-vimuktiṃ praṇāvimuktiṃ paryādāta[ḥy] / ceto-vimuktiṃ praṇāvimuktiṃ paryādāta[ḥy] / ceto-vimuktiṃ praṇāvimuktiṃ paryādātā[ḥy] / ceto-vimuktiṃ praṇāvimuktiṃ paryādātā[ḥy].
28 Cf. BHSD s.v. ceto-vimukti.
Cetas as a synonym of manas occurs in the triad kāya, ‘body’, vacas, ‘speech’\(^{29}\), and cetas, ‘mind’\(^{30}\), in verses only. The same concepts (kāya, vācā, cetas)\(^{31}\) are found in Pāli texts, and also only in verses. With reference to the three instruments of action the most common triad is kāya, vācā, manas\(^{32}\), whereas Pāli texts have kāya, vācā, citta\(^{33}\). In STH no evidence for citta instead of manas is found in this context. The three ‘actions’ (samskāra) are kāyasamskāra, ‘bodily action’, vāksamskāra, ‘vocal action’, and manahsamskāra, ‘mental action’\(^{34}\). However, in YL we find (as in Pāli\(^{35}\)) the synonym cittasamskāra\(^{36}\).

The compounds cetaḥkhila, ‘mental barrenness’, cetovinibandha, ‘mental bondages’, cetahparyāya, ‘the way of thought, manner of mind’ and cetahsamādhi, ‘mental concentration’, always have cetas as the first member of the compound.

\(^{29}\) m.c. for vāc. Cf. SWTF s.v. kāya, 2 c α.

\(^{30}\) Cf. Uv 7.6 kāyena kuśalam kṛtvā vacasā cetasāpi ca; 15.2 sthitena kāyena tathātava(c)a cetasā.

\(^{31}\) Cf. Šamyuttanikāya I 93, 102; Anguttaranikāya I 63, 155; III 354; Therīgāthā p. 125, vs. 15; Suttanipāta 232.

\(^{32}\) Cf. PrMoSu final vv. 8, 9; Uv 7.11,12; 32.28; 33.16; DevEp 8,12; Dhsk 3 R6.9; 4 V1; 5 V7; 7 R1; 8 V8; 14 V3.6.

\(^{33}\) Cf. Šamyuttanikāya II 231, 271; Anguttaranikāya II 125; III 95 ff.

\(^{34}\) Cf. SWTF s.v. kāyasamskāra.

\(^{35}\) Cf. BW s.v. sankhāra, 2.

\(^{36}\) Cf. SHT (I) 687a BI.10[9] (YL p. 64) V5,6 prasambhati cittasamskāra[m] (āśvā)siṣyāmathi [or praśvā(siṣyāmathi)] śikṣati. Cf. also Schmithausen, op.cit. (n. 11), p. 356.

There are five kinds of cetaḥkhila, ‘mental barrenness’\(^{37}\), which impede any activity of the mind. These are according to the Dasottarasutta and Saṅgītisutta doubt about the teacher (sāstari), doubt about the doctrine (dharme), doubt about the training (śikṣāyām)\(^{38}\), doubt about the instruction (anuṣāsani) and being angry with fellow-students ((kupita(h)a) sabrahmacārisu). In the Pāli tradition this list is slightly different\(^{39}\). It comprises doubts about the teacher, doctrine, Order (saṅgha), training and being angry with fellow-students.

Another factor which impedes the right effort of the mind (citta) are the five cetovinibandhān, ‘mental bonds’\(^{40}\), which are related to attachment to the body, attachment to sense-pleasures, attachment to the association with laymen and ascetics, to not listening to the teaching and to the deficiency of striving after having reached a minor attainment. The last three of these five ‘mental bonds’ differ from those known to the Pāli tradition, where attachment to material shapes, a life given to eating and sleeping and the Brahmafaring with the aspiration after some class of gods are listed among the cetasā vinibandhā\(^{41}\).

The concepts treated so far are defilements by which

\(^{37}\) Cf. Daśo V.5 (see also SHT (III) 863 V2 ff.); Saṅg V.7 (cf. n. 45) (paṇca cetaḥkhilāḥ ... iha ... bhūṣuḥ sā[na]hi[(a)(i)] k[ām]k[s(a)]t[l(i)] ... /evam dharme śikṣāyām anuṣāsā[ny](ām) ... /saḥbrahmaca[ri]su) (cf. Pāli Dīghanikāya III 237f. satthari kahkhai ... dhamme ... saṃgha ... sikkhāyā ... sabrahmacariṣu kupito hoti).

\(^{38}\) According to the commentary on Saṅg V.7 śikṣā means the rules of the Prātimokṣasutta.

\(^{39}\) Cf. BW s.v. ceto-khila. In Pāli the third concept is saṃgha and anuṣāsani is missing.

\(^{40}\) Cf. Saṅg V.8(1a-5c).

\(^{41}\) Cf. BW s.v.
citta becomes the origin of bondage and misery. By training and development of citta, however, it is the means of realising full enlightenment and liberation.

Cetahparyāyajñāna, 'the knowledge of the way of thought (of other beings)'⁴², constitutes the third of the six 'superknowledges' (abhijnā)⁴³ which are acquired by remaining constantly engaged in the methodical meditation on the factors relating to enlightenment. By cetahparyāyajñāna one gains insight into the nature and state of the mind (citta) of other people⁴⁴. In this context cetas is used for the designation of the third 'superknowledge' cetahparyāyajñāna, whereas in the explanation of this 'superknowledge' the mind of other people is named citta. As for the concentration aiming at the 'superknowledges', in each case the opening phrase 'he directs his mind (citta) towards the superknowledge'⁴⁵ is employed.

In the Daśottarasūtra six kinds of cetasamādhi, 'men-

⁴² Cf. Saṅg VI.19 (see also DĀ(U.H.) MS.144 R4) saḍ abhijnāḥ / rddhivyayā (div)[y](at)ām śrotām cetahparyāyāḥ pūvenivāsa(ś) cuṭyla-(u)pa(pāda āsra vakṣā)yaḥ; cf. SHT (VII) 1689 e V4 divyaṃ (śrotāṃ) [cetaparyāja]ya (sic) pūr(e)ṇ/jñā[vā]ṣas cuṭy[ty][u][pa]///. Cf. the description of cetahparyāyajñāna, 'the knowledge of the way of thought (of other beings)': CPS E.21⁴⁶ ratrīyā pāścime yāme cetahparyāyajñānam prati-anubhavati; and cetahparyāyajñāna-sāksikīrṭīya, 'the realisation of the way of thought (of other beings)': CPS E.19 (see also DĀ(U.H.) MS.18 R4; cf. n. R4) pāścime yāme cetahparyāyajñānaṁ abhijnāyām cītām abhi[nirnāpya]ti). The Pāli term is cetopariyāna; cf. BW s.v. 'In Geistesdurchdringung (in der Drängdrung des Geistes der Anderen) bestehendes Wissen'.

⁴³ Cf. SWTF, BHSD s.v.

⁴⁴ Cf. MPS.19-20 (p. 434).

⁴⁵ Cf. CPS E.2,6,10 (see also DĀ(U.H.) MS.18 V3),13,19 (see also DĀ(U.H.) MS.18 R4),23; DĀ(U.H.) MS.75 V1; SHT (IV) 165 Fragm.15 R5 abhijnāyaṃ [or vdyāyaṃ] cītām abhinirnāpya]ti.

tal concentration⁴⁶, are taught. They are conducive to 'escape (from the world)' (nihsarana) and must be cultivated, developed and much practised⁴⁷ in order to prevent such defilements as malevolence etc. from corrupting the mind (citta). These 'mental concentrations' are the 'friendly' (maitra) mental concentration in order to overcome 'malevolence' (vyāpāda), the 'compassionate' one (karuna) in order to overcome 'injuring' (vihimsā), the 'sympathetic and joyful' one (mudita) in order to overcome 'dislike' (arati), the 'equanimous' one (sopekṣa) in order to overcome 'desire and malevolence' (kāmarāgavyāpāda), and the 'mental concentration beyond (any ideation of) characteristics (or mental images)' (ānimitta)⁴⁸ in order to overcome 'consciousness which is directed towards appearance' (nimittānaśīrī vijñānam).

With reference to 'the mastery of mind' (cetovasitvā) that is reached by arhats, cetas has to be considered as the

⁴⁶ Cf. Daśo VI.7(1-3)a,(4)a (see also SHT (VII) 1682 V2),(5)a; Saṅg VI.16 (maitr(o) [or karuno, or mudito, or (sope)kso, or (ānimitt(a)] me cetasamādhir āsena)to; Daśo VI.7(12)c,(3)c (see also SHT (VII) 1682 V2),(4,5)c nihsaranaṃ ... yaduta maitrās [or (karunās), or muditā, or sopekṣa, or (ānimitt(a)] cetasamādhirhi; Dhsk 26 V1,3 maittrai cetasamādhir; 4 (cf. n. 393) maitrī khalu bhave(c cetasamādhir divi- dhā); 26 V8; R6,8 paritattam maittrā [or apramāṇam maittrā, or aṃ maittrā] cetasamādhir samāpanā iti; R3,9 sarvāme phalāṃ paritattam maittrā [or apramāṇam maittrā] cetasamādhir iti vaktvāvah [or a]; — MPS 14,5,6,17,18 (see also SHT (I) 618 a V3) ānimittāmaṃ cetovasitvā cetasamādhir āsena śīrāv iṣyaṃ sampādem; RV 41,9; R2,3; Dhsk(M) 27 V2 paritattam [or apramāṇam] maittrā [or karunā] cetasamādhir samāpadaya [or sampāpadya iti].

⁴⁷ Skt. āsena bhāvito bhulikīto.

centre of meditation practices and of the resulting supernormal forces. According to a quotation from the Jñānaprasṭhāna the arhat is able to prolong or to cast off his vital energies (āyuhṣamskāraya) by means of ‘mastery of mind’[55]. According to the Abhidharmāvatārasāstra[56] ‘shame’ (hṛ) is characterized by citta vaśītā, ‘mastery of mind’, which prevents the ‘discharge’ of greed.

Although in the references evaluated here the terms citta and cetas have been close to one another or even synonymous, cetas seems to be used in a more technical sense.

The three concepts citta, ‘mind’, manas, ‘intellect’, and viññāna, ‘conciousness’, are regarded as quasi-synonyms in the material treated in the SWTF and are not differentiated[57].

Concerning these three terms Dhsk 5 R8[58] has to be mentioned where viññāna is defined in the context of the pratyayasamutpāda:

\[
\text{tat katarad viññānaṃ (}/) \text{āha (}/) \text{yat tad gandharvavasya caramam cittam mano viññānam ācītam upacitam pratiśhitam a[pra]na[tha]t an api vijñāna]t an arirodhitam aśāntikṛtam yasya vijñānasya samanantaram mātuḥ kukṣau kalalam ātmabhāvat abhisamāyurcchat[59]
\]

‘What is viññāna?’ ‘That which is accumulated, piled up[60], fixed, not cut to pieces, (not recognised), not suppressed, not allayed as the gandharva’s last (state of) mind, intellect, consciousness (thought-faculty) (and) with which viññāna (thought-faculty) immediately connected, the kalala coagulates in the mother’s womb to a self (proper nature).’

According to this quotation from the Dharmakṣendra, which is noteworthy in relation to our knowledge about ideas of rebirth, citta, manas and viññāna are not only quasi-synonyms, but also seem to be the substratum for future existence[61]. From the context in Dhsk one can see[62] that viññāna can be identified with gandharva. The importance of citta, ‘thinking,

cittam mano ‘tha viññānam ekātham.


[56] Cf. Abhidh-avat(K) II 386 b4 trṣṇāniṣyannavirdhikii (read “nisynda”) ... cittavatītāṃ hṛ[ī]i (read hṛ).

[57] Cf. AvDh 36; 47 yat tad ... cittam ma(no vijñānam); CPS 26.14 (yuṣmākam) ... cittam evañ / mana idam / vijñānam idam; cf. NidSa 7,3,7,8 yat punar idam ucyate cittam iti vā mana iti vā vijñānam iti vā; PañcaV 1 V5(2x) (cittam katarat ci)[it][ta]ṃ mano vijñānam, Dhsk 5 R8; 6 V2; 8 V4 yat tad gandharvavasya caramam cittam mano vijñānam ācītam ... [or vistaraṇa ...]; 26 V1; R8 (2x) tathāsamāpāṇasya yac cittam mano vijñānam idam ucyate maitrīsahagata(m) [or apramāṇam maitrīsahabhuvam] [ci][tita]; 2 (cf. n. 408) tathā samāpāṇasya yac cittam mano vijñānam idam ucyate parīttam maitrīsahabhuvam (/) citta yā cetanā vistaraṇaḥ yāvad. Cf. the differentiating meaning in Lambert Schmithausen, Alavavijñāna. On the Origin and the Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy. Pt.I.II, Tokyo 1987 (Studia Philologica Monograph Series IV), I 122 ff. Cf. Abhidh-k-bh(Pā) II 34.

[58] Cf. also Dhsk 6 V2; R2; 8 V4.

[59] The manuscript reads kalalātmabhāvo bhisammucchat; for the emendation see Dhsk 7 V7.

[60] Verbs deriving from the root ci ‘to heap up, pile up’ are often quoted as an etymological explanation of citta. Cf. Abhidh-k-bh(Pā) 61.23 cinoittti cittam. See also Schmithausen, Alayavijñāna, op.cit. (n. 51), I 123; II n. 1433.

[61] This reference seems to be an important step in the development of the idea of alayavijñāna. Cf. Schmithausen, Alayavijñāna, op.cit. (n. 51), II 302 ff., n. 239 ff. 

thought', in the intermediate state becomes evident when referring to two quotations from the Prājnāpītiśāstra\(^67\) found in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and Abhidharmadīpa, according to which the future existence is determined by the last thoughts occurring in the past existence.

One doctrine of the Sarvāstivādins is that there are five categories (vastu) into which all constituent factors (dharma) can be classified, i.e. 'matter' (rūpa), 'mind' (citta), 'mental factors' (caitasikā dharmāḥ), 'conditioned factors dissociated from the mind' (cittaviprayuktāḥ saṃskārāḥ) and 'the unconditioned' (asamskṛtāḥ). These categories are treated in detail in the Pañcavastu\(^68\), the fragments of which were edited by Junkichi Imanishi together with the remains of its commentary. In this Abhidharma work\(^69\) citta is defined as '(state of) mind' (citta), 'intellect' (manas) and 'consciousness (thought-faculty)' (viññāna) and as the six kinds of 'sense-perceptions' (viññānakāya).

Concentration of the mind pertains to three kinds of contemplative practices, viz. to the 'development of the mindfulness of in-breathing and out-breathing' (ānāpānasmiṭṭhāvanā)\(^60\), to the four 'constituents of magical power' (rddhipāda) and to the four 'applications of mindfulness' (smṛtyupasthāna). The development of the mindfulness of in-breathing and out-breathing' one practises to breathe in and breathe out 'in experiencing the activities of mind and body' (cittakāyasamkārapratīṣṭhānaḥ), 'in tranquillising the activity of mind' (prasrambhāti cittasamskārān), 'in experiencing the mind' (cittapratīṣṭhānaḥ), 'in rejoicing at the mind' (abhipradayāntī cittam), 'in concentrating the mind' (samādadhātī cittam) and 'in liberating the mind' (vimocayāntī cittam). The third of the four 'constituents of magical power' is citta[ttasamādhiprahānasam[sk]ā(rasa)manvāgata rddhipāda, the 'constituent of magical power that is possessed of concentration of mind with activities of striving'\(^61\). The third of the four 'applications of mindfulness' (smṛtyupasthāna) is the 'application of mindfulness with regard to the mind' (citta-smṛtyupasthāna). This application of mindfulness is defined as the six kinds of 'sense-perceptions' (viññānakāya) in the Saṅgītīpāraya and Prakaraṇa which agrees with the second definition of 'mind' in the Pañcavastu\(^62\).

The last meaning of citta that has to be mentioned here is 'intention, aim, wish'. In this sense citta usually is connected with the verb utpādayati and means 'a single deliberate mental act, the producing of intent'\(^63\). In the SHT-fragments we come across two phrases: 1. "bodhau cittam utpādayati, he produces the resolution to (obtain) enlightenment"\(^64\), and

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\(^{67}\) Cf. Abhidh-d(Pā) [5]; Abhidh-k-bh(Pā) [42];[175] gandharvasya ... dvayoś cittayor anyatarat [or anyatarānyatatacittam, or anyatarānyatara cittam] saṃmukhibhūtāṃ bhavaty anunyasaḥhagataṃṇa pratīṣṭhagataṃṇa. Cf. also the Sūtra-quotations in Abhidh-k-bh(Pā) [43] citte-nāyan loka niyata iti.

\(^{68}\) Cf. Pañcav 1 V1; 2 V3 pañca dharmāḥ [or 'ā] rūpaṃ cittaṃ caitasikā dharm(aś ci)](ta)pravajñāntāḥ samāskāraḥ asamskṛtan ca.

\(^{69}\) Cf. Pañcav 1 V5 (cittam katarat ci)itaṃ mano viññānāṃ / tat punaḥ katarat / [sa]n (v)ijñānāḥ(a)ka yāh.

\(^{60}\) Cf. YL pp. 63-84.

\(^{61}\) Cf. Saṅg IV.3(3); SHT (V) 1427 V2/3.

\(^{62}\) Cf. SaṅgPar IV.1(3) (p. 209) = Prak(Im) p. 8 R6 (cittasmiṭṭhānaṃ katarat ) sa vijñānakāyaś (caṇṭurviññānaṃ yāvad manaviññānaṃ).

\(^{63}\) Cf. BHSD s.v. cittotpāda.

\(^{64}\) Cf. BHSD s.v. utpādayati, and MPS 31 (= ST,II) 81 kaiśicī chr(ā)-v(akabodhau kaiśicī pratyekabodhau kaiśicī anuttarasamayaksambodhau cittaṃ ut[p]ādayat; cf. also Dḥ(U)H. MS.90 R3 (c.n. R3) [kaiś] (MS. [ke] c)c chrāvakabodhau citta[m ut]paditaṃ kaiś (MS. ke) c)c pratyekabodhau)]; SHT (VI) 1342 B6 kaiśicī chr(ā)ava/kabodhau cittāṇa utpādāṇī.
The term cetanā, in MW s.v. cetanā translated as 'consciousness, understanding, sense, intelligence', is clearly defined in Buddhist texts and as a technical term⁷⁰ means 'will, volition, intention'. The concept cetanā is not found in the Vinaya-fragments. In the Sūtrapitaka it is found only in those sūtras that contain lists of dogmatic terms, viz. in the Saṅgīti-sūtra and in the Daśottarasūtra. Cetanā meaning 'will, volition, intention' mainly occurs in Abhidharma works. In SHT we always find the word in this sense. In Saṅg VI.7 six kinds of cetanā are explained that develop from the contact with the six sense organs⁷¹. In PañcaV I V6 ff. cetanā is the third of about thirty 'mental factors (that are) associated with the mind'⁷². In Dhsk 4 R6 and 25 V10; 26 V1 the immovable underlying mental conditions of action are defined by a series of quasi-synonyms that starts with cetanā⁷³. In SHT (VII) 1760 that belongs to the Karmaprajñāpī, the good, bad⁷⁴.

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⁶⁵ Cf. BoL/VoD, Vin.Fragm., p. 202 Fragm.14 b1 tena bhikṣunā ṭṛśkṛtvā cittam utpādayitavyam vacā bhāṣitavyaḥ; MAV 9a.2 pratīmakaṃ smṛtim upasthāpya cittam utpādayati vacā ca bhāṣate; DA(U.H.) MS.133 R2 (cf. n. R2) ///[n]um cittam vā (cittam vā niścāryayitum); Dhsk 17 R5 cittam utpādayati vacā ca bhāṣate; Abhidh-k-bh(Pā) [50] (quotation from the Jñānaprasthāna) cittam utpādayati vacām ca bhāṣate.

⁶⁶ Cf. SHT (VII) 1704 leaf 195 R4 mrudunā cittena madhyānadhīmātrenā vṝtāḥ; 5 (= Abhidh-k-bh(P) 220.14) yo mruduna cittena madhyānadhīmātrenā vṝtāḥ (ksusamvāram samādatte); 6 (= Abhidh-k-bh(P) 220.15) (yas trividhena cittena trīṃ samvarān samādatte; SHT (VII) 1704 leaf 195 R3 yadi mrudumadyādhīmātrāni cittāni kāraṇāniśyām[te].

⁶⁷ Cf. the second reference in SHT (V) 1318 c A6 ///an[ene] kūṣāla-mūlēna cittotpādena/// (cf. Avadānāsataka 1 4,10,166 aṇena [...] kuśala-mūlēna cittotpādena deyādhammapatīyāgaṇa ca).

⁶⁸ Cf. BoL/VoD, Vin.Fragm., p. 202 Fragm.14 b3 ///(cit-to)tpādaṇapotha /// adhiśthānapoṇaḥ katamah ... (cf. Pos(Hu) 59 V9 (= §61) cittotpādena posadhaḥ 'Die Posadah-Zeremonie auf eigenen Beschluß'; cf. Pos(Hu) p. 347, n. 3: 'cittotpādena posadhaḥ ... ist vermutlich die Mū[la]sarvāvstvādā-Entsprechung zum Terminus der Sarvāvstvādān adhiśthāna-posaṭaḥ'; according to Pravār(Ch) n. 186 und 5.3.1 cittotpādaṇapotha and adhiśthāna-posaṭa are synonmys).

⁶⁹ Cf. Hoernle, MR 8 Fol.56 V3 dasā dharma mahāśakyasamvartaniyāḥ ... nyāttrapadānam (read yātra?) bodhicittotpādaḥ lathagata-bimabhakaraṇam ...
and neutral will\textsuperscript{76} as well as bodily (kāyakarman), mental (manaskarman) and volitional action (cetanākarman)\textsuperscript{76} are treated in detail. In a quotation from the Vibhāṣā the difference between the intention of murder\textsuperscript{77} and the actual deed is discussed. The fragments SHT (I) 624 and (VII) 1619 contain remains of the kārikās of Vasubandhu's Abhidharmaκośa. In kārikā II 24\textsuperscript{78} we come across cetanā, 'volition', as second member in a series of ten mental states present in every mind. In SHT (V) 1318 c A4, a parallel text to Avadānaśatakam, a story is told how members of a guild develop the intention\textsuperscript{79} to realize enlightenment (pratyekām bodhim sāksātkur-yāmeti). In YL 137 R\textsuperscript{80} a spark that has disappeared in the fire is called an embodiment of the will.

Regrettably, I can only provide a survey of the different uses of the terms citta, cetas and cetanā, but I hope that I have been able to give an impression of the great variety of the materials available in the Sanskrit manuscripts from the

\textsuperscript{76} Cf. SHT (VII; see also VIII, supplement) 1760 A(= V)2 (akusāla cetanā akusālā)[v]yākṛtālambanā; 4 iyam a[vāyār]{t}ā (cetanā); B(= R)1 (ceta)[nā k]{j}[uś]{s}alāvyākṛtālambanā; 3 iyam a[vāyār]tā cetanā kusāla(kusalavyākṛtālambanā).

\textsuperscript{77} Cf. SHT (VII; see also VIII, supplement) 1760 B(= R)4,5,6 katarac cetanākarma (cf. Tib. sems pa'i las) kānapratīsamyū(ktam) [or rūpajpratīsam; or (arūpyapratīsamukta)]

\textsuperscript{78} Cf. Abhidh-k-vy(Pā) [50] (Vibhāṣā) trikālayā cetanayā prāṇātīpātavadyena spryate ghataka iti / ... hanisyāmi hanmi hatam iti cāsya yadā bhavatīti.

\textsuperscript{79} Cf. SHT (I) 624 line 13; (VII) 1619 a V4; cf. Abhidh-k-bh(Pā) II 24 vedanā cetanā samjñā cchandaḥ sparśo matih smṛtiḥ / manaskāro 'dhimokṣaś ca samādhiḥ sarvacetasai //

\textsuperscript{80} Cf. YL 137 R4 ///[ag]{n}ajvālāṃtagatam agnīlilakam (MS. 'ām) cetanāyāḥ adhi[p]atirū[pa]m (ed., p. 49; 'Verkörperung des Gedankens').
Abbreviations

[The Pāli texts are quoted according to the editions of the Pāli Text Society]


AvDh = Arthavistaradharmañayā, in DĀ(U.H.).

BBS = Ernst Waldschmidt, Bruchstücke buddhistischer Sūtras aus dem zentralasiatischen Sanskritkanon I. Leipzig 1932 (Kleinere Sanskrit-Texte. IV); repr. Wiesbaden 1979 (Monographien zur indischen Archäologie, Kunst und Philosophie II).


DbSū(1) = Daśabalamūtrasūtra, in BBS, pp. 207-25.


Frgm.SĀ(4) = Fumio Enomoto, 'Sanskrit Fragments from the Samyuktāgama Discovered in Bamiyan and Eastern Turkestan', Sanskrit-Texte aus dem buddhistischen Kanon: Neuentdeckungen und Neueditio-

**Dietz**—*Citta and Related Concepts*


SaṅgPar = *Saṅgītārāma*, see Saṅg.

SHT = Sanskrit-Handschriften aus den Turfan-Funden.

Skt. = Sanskrit.


STT = Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfunden.


EDITORIAL STATEMENT

We apologise to readers for the late appearance of BSR 17 following a computer 'crash'. With great difficulty the text of No.1 was eventually retrieved and reset by David and Nancy Reigel of the Eastern School Press (to whom are gratitude is due) but the delay resulted in the journal's publication several months later than anticipated. No.2 has been correspondingly delayed whilst we acquired and mastered the techniques of a new computer and software program.

We should return to normality during 2001 when both issues will largely comprise papers delivered at the UKABS conference held at Bristol University in June-July 2000.

Please note the changes in subscription charges for BSR: after a decade of unchanged rates, rising production costs and postage levels have forced us to increase subscription charges as from the next issue.

Finally, we regret that our regular feature - the serialisation of the Ekottarāgama translation - has had to be held over until a later issue.

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Corrigenda to Buddhist Studies Review 17, 1 (2000)

In Collins Edwards, 'The Buddha: Friendship and Beauty':

p.50, l.13, correctly reads: ... JPTS XI, 1987, pp.51-72), who cites other examples (for instance Itivuttaka I, xvii; GS IV, 232 and 236)....

p.52, l.17 from below, to p.53, l.9, should be indented as with other citations in this article. The line references in the succeeding paragraph of p.53 should be amended as follows: (line 2 unchanged), (lines 20 and 29 now lines 16 and 23), (lines 1-6 now lines 1-5), (line 11 now lines 8-9), (line 27 now line 21).

THE VAIBHĀSIKA IMPACT*

Bart Dessein

The Vaibhāsikas, named after a Vībhāsa commentary on the original Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma works, are often defined as the Sarvāstivāda orthodoxy (of Kaśmira). 'Vaibhāsika' is only one of many names one encounters in reference to the 'Sarvāstivādins'. Under the general name Sarvāstivāda, different sub-schools figure: the original Sarvāstivādins originating from Mathurā, the Kaśmira Vaibhāsikas, the Western Masters of Gandhāra and Bactria who are also referred to as Bahirdeśaka (Outsiders), Aparantaka (Those living at the Western Border) and Pāścātaya (Westerners); and the Mūlasarvāstivādins. These names appear in a fairly strict chronological series. In connection with the Sarvāstivādins, we further have to mention the Dārśāntika-Sautrāntikas. All sources agree on the fact that the term Sautrāntika appears later than the term Sarvāstivāda. Of these names, the earlier ones (Baḥirdesaka, Aparantaka, Pāścātaya) refer to a geographical location, while the later ones refer either to a textual type or means of exegesis (Vaibhāsika, Dārśāntika-Sautrāntika) or to a dogmatic standpoint (Mūlasaṃśāstivādins). This seems to substantiate the standpoint of Erich Frauwallner (The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginnings of Buddhist Literature, Rome 1956) and Heinz Bechert (ed., Zur Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hinayāna-Literatur, 2 vols, Göttingen 1985-87) concerning the criterion upon which different Buddhist schools have been formed: disciplinary matters have led to the rise of distinct sects (nikāya); dogmatic schools have then arisen later from within Vinaya sects. David Seyfort Ruegg, however, argued that dog-

* This article is a slightly reworked and edited version of my lecture held at the XXIIth IABS Conference, Lausanne, 23-28 August 1999. Part of this paper had earlier been presented as a lecture at the same university, Section de langues et civilisations orientales, on 31 March 1998.
3 See ibid., p.106.
matics may also have given rise to different sects\(^4\). Also, different languages are suggested by Ruegg to have led to the rise of schools\(^5\). The question on the origin of sects and schools is thus obviously not easy to answer. When we focus on the Sarvāstivāda, a decision on the precise textual affiliation of a Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma text is further complicated by the mutual influences different schools and sub-schools had in the course of time. This is, e.g., most pronounced in the series of texts called ‘\textit{Abhidhammahṛdaya}’ to which we will return later. It is further known that monks ‘changed’ philosophical schools. A notable example for our purpose is Vasubandhu who, at first an adherent of the Sarvāstivāda, is reported to have shifted to the Mahāyāna. Such transitions undoubtedly left their traces in the works these monks compiled. Translations (for the Sarvāstivāda this is essentially into Chinese) of original Indian texts further show evidence that the philosophical branch that was dominant at the time of translation influenced the latter\(^6\). Finally, what is by modern scholars identified as a sub-school or sub-branch may not have been considered as such at the actual time. This is evident from the way the traditional eighteen schools are listed in the various sources. In the course of scientific research, many classifications of Sarvāstivāda works have been proposed\(^8\), but none of these classifications can account for the existence of multiple versions (either Indian or Chinese or both) of one and the same text, nor for the divergence in authorship these works were attributed to. Moreover, the reason – although not only the Vaibhāṣikas possessed a \textit{Vibhāṣa} literature – precisely why their \textit{Vibhāṣa} became authoritative is not explained by these classifications.

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Until the time of Aśoka the Maurya, who reigned ca.270-ca.230 BCE\(^9\), the spread of Buddhism had been limited to Central India. As is evident from the position and content of the Aśokan inscriptions, the religion was disseminated with the expansion of the Mauryan empire\(^10\). That a council was held in Pātaliputra, Aśoka’s capital, in the first half of the second century AB\(^11\), suggests that geographical expansion was instrumental in schisms in the community. Such phenomena would explain the geo-

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\(^4\) D.S. Ruegg, ‘\textit{"Uber die Nikāyas der Śrāvakas und den Ursprung der philosophischen Schulen des Buddhismus nach den tibetischen Quellen}’, in Bechert, ed., \textit{Zur Schulzugehörigkeit, op. cit.}, III 1, pp.111-26; here p.120: ‘Die Quellen, die der Aufspaltung einem dogmatischen Ursprung zuschreiben, sind dennoch sämtlich in die Vinaya-Unterabteilung vom tibetischen bsTan ‘gyur aufgenommen worden’.

\(^5\) \textit{Ibid.}, pp.116-17.

\(^6\) See Willemen, Dessein, Cox, \textit{op. cit.}, pp.77-8 and 89-92.


\(^9\) See E. Lamotte, \textit{History of Indian Buddhism from the origins to the Śakya era} (trans S. Boin-Webb), Louvain-la-neuve 1988, p.216, n.1.

\(^10\) See J. Bloch, \textit{Les Inscriptions d’Aśoka}, Paris 1950, pp.152-3, for the inscriptions of Kauśāṃbi, Sārnāth and Sāñcī; p.157 for the inscription of Rummindei; p.158, for that at Nigālī Sāgar; and p.154 for that at Calcutta-Bairāj.

\(^11\) AB = Anno buddhæ. As dates for this council, there are four possibilities: The \textit{Mahāprajātī-pāramitopadesa} gives 100 AB (T 1509, 70a8), the \textit{Samayabhigodaracanacakra} gives 116 AB (T 2032, 18a9; T 2033, 20a18), and the \textit{Nikāyabhedavibhāgyākhyā} by Bhāya gives 137 AB in the second list and 160 AB in the first list (Tanjur-Mdo XC, No.12). See also C. Prebish, ‘A Review of Scholarship on the Buddhist Councils’, \textit{Journal of Asian Studies} XXXIII, 2, pp.239-54, here p.252. After studying these four dates, André Bareau, \textit{Les premiers conciles bouddhiques}, Paris 1955, pp.88-9 and 108, favoured the date 137 AB. See also Willemen, Dessein, Cox, \textit{op. cit.}, pp.44-8.

graphical references we find in the names of some Sarvāstivāda sub-schools. Whether this diffusion led to a different interpretation of the Vinaya rules, or of Abhidharmic questions, is a point of controversy between the sources of the Northern and Southern traditions. According to the opinion of the Northern tradition, the schism between the Mahāsāṃghikas and Sthaviravādins was due to the doctrines (the five points) of a certain Mahādeva. The Samyabdhoparacanacakra and the Sarvāstivāda *Mahāvibhāṣa* fiercely attack Mahādeva’s view. The Vinaya literature of various schools claims that it was more or less strict adherence to the precepts (the ten lax practices) that caused the schism. The discussion is reported not to have been resolved, whereupon King Aśoka mediated and recognised the stance of the majority. This majority became the Mahāsāṃghika school. The Mahāsāṃghikas themselves indicate that they objected to the developments introduced into the Vinaya pitaka by the Sthaviravādins. A logical argument in favour of Vinaya matters that underlie the schism is that the Abhidharma literature of that moment belongs to what Collett Cox (op. cit.) described as the earliest Abhidharma works, i.e., Abhidharma works that resemble sūtras and do not yet show elements of sectarian alignment. In these early works we do not find marks of factional debate.

As they were rejected by the king, the Sthaviravādins are said to have moved to southern Kaśmīra. Also the *Mahāvibhāṣa*, a work that belongs to a younger category of philosophical treatises—polemical texts that recognise sectarian alignments—claims that the ‘Sthaviravādins’ moved to Kaśmīra. Since the *Mahāvibhāṣa* is a Kāśmīra work itself, the text seems to identify the Kaśmīri Sarvāstivādins with the Sthaviravādins. A clue to the solution of this problem may lie in the Samyabdhoparacanacakra. This work states that the Sthaviravādins split into the Mūlāsthaviras and Sarvāstivādins, whereby the Mūlāsthavira school supports Mahādeva’s points and the Sarvāstivādins reject them: This statement may be an attempt to support the claim that the Sarvāstivādins in Kaśmīra are the orthodox branch of the Sthaviravādins. When the *Mahāvibhāṣa* claims that the Sthaviravādins moved to Kaśmīra—a Vaibhāṣika area—after the king decided against their opposition to the five points of Mahādeva,

\[\text{12 T 1509, 78a19; T 2032, 18a9; T 2033, 18a19; Tanjur-Mdo XC, No.12. See also M. Hofinger, Étude sur le concile de Vaisālī, Louvain 1946, p.173; Bareau, Les premiers conciles, op. cit., pp.92 and 112; Prebish, op. cit., pp.251-2. See also Bareau, Les Sectes bouddhiques, op. cit., p.33.}\]

\[\text{13 T 2031, 15a15-23; T 2032, 18a9-14; T 2033, 21a15-25; [Abhidharma-}\]

\[\text{mahāvibhāṣaśāstra], T 1545, 510c23-512a19.}\]

\[\text{14 See Mahāsāṃghikavatya, T 1425, 231a29-b22; Pāli Vinaya, ed. H.}\]

\[\text{Oldenberg, Vinaya pitaka: II, Cullavagga, PTS 1964, pp.294-8; I.B. Horner,}\]


\[\text{guptakavatya, T 1428, 968c19-969c3; Daśādhyāyavatya, T 1435, 450a28-29;}\]

\[\text{Mūlasarvāstivātavatya, T 1451, 411c4-413c6.}\]

\[\text{15 T 1425, 493a28-c22. See also Hofinger, op. cit., p.173; Frauwallner, op. cit.,}\]

\[\text{pp.9-10; Prebish, op. cit., p.252. L.S. Cousins, The ‘five points’ and the origins}\]


\[\text{1991, pp.27-60, here pp.33-4, sees the Mahāsāṃghikas as ‘the conservative}\]

\[\text{party which has preserved the original Vinaya unchanged against reformist efforts to}\]

\[\text{create a reorganized and stricter version’. Concerning the etymological}\]

\[\text{interpretation of the term ‘Mahāsāṃghika’, see his p.34.}\]

\[\text{16 For a relative chronology of Sarvāstivādin works, see E. Frauwallner, (tr. S.F.}\]

\[\text{Kidd) Studies in Abhidharma Literature and the Origins of Buddhist}\]


\[\text{Also the observation by Lance Cousins (op. cit., p.47) that ‘The Vinaya of the}\]

\[\text{Mahāsāṃghikas seems to define abhidharma as the ninefold sūtraṅa which}\]

\[\text{‘suggests that early Mahāsāṃghikas (or some of them) may have rejected the}\]

\[\text{abhidharma developments’ is interesting in this respect.}\]

\[\text{17 See Frauwallner, The Earliest Vinaya, op. cit., pp.13-14, 16, 20 and 22; A.}\]

\[\text{Hirakawa, A History of Indian Buddhism— from Śākyamuni to Early}\]

\[\text{Mahāyāna, Honolulu 1990, p.119. See also Asokarājavadāna, T 2042, 111b28-}\]

\[\text{112b1, 116b1-10, 102b10-19.}\]

\[\text{18 T 1545, 510c23-512a19.}\]

\[\text{19 T 2031, 15b9-10; T 2033, 20b9-10.}\]
the Kāśmīri Vaibhāṣikas could claim that the legitimate stream of the Sthaviravāda, i.e., the Vaibhāṣika Sarvāstivāda, was in Kāśmīra. For this purpose, the Vaibhāṣika Sarvāstivādins, when charting the various schools of the Sthaviravāda, split the latter into the two streams Mulaśthavira and Sarvāstivāda. When we accept Vinaya grounds as the cause of the first schism (the ten lax practices), it appears not to be impossible that the Vaibhāṣikas deliberately claimed that Mahādeva’s five points were the cause of the schism in a need to reaffirm themselves. Although there is no agreement between the *Mahāvamsa* and the *Dīpavamsa* on the second council of Paṭaliputra, supposedly held in 238 AB, it does appear that the major challengers of the Sthaviravādins under Tissa Moggaliputta (Maudgaliputra) were the Sarvāstivādins of Kātyāyaniputra. In the council, Kātyāyaniputra and his supporters were declared to be wrong, whereupon one group of the Sarvāstivādins stayed in Magadha. Here, they somewhat later reappeared as a Buddhist school centred in Paṭaliputra and Vaiśālī, while the other group is reported to have gone to convert Kāśmīra. It is not without importance that this third Buddhist council is not mentioned in sources of the Northern tradition.

A people that has played an important role in the dissemination of Buddhism – and more precisely of Sarvāstivāda philosophy – from the Indian subcontinent to China, are the Yüeh-chih (Tocharians). Their political power was at its height in the Kuśāna empire that included Kāśmīra. The Sarvāstivāda school of Buddhism thus flourished in this Northwestern region during the heyday of Kuśāna power in the second century CE.

Under the Kuśāna king Kanishka (second century CE), Buddhism took rapid steps towards the Mahāyāna, and a Buddhist council was held. It is also the period of the compilation of the already mentioned explanatory treatises (vibhāsā) of which the Vaibhāṣika *Abhidharmamahāvibhāsāsāstra* (T 1545) is the best known example. The council of Kāśmīra appears to be a Vaibhāṣika Sarvāstivāda council, concerned with the *Jñānapratisthāna* and its explanation. The *Aṣṭa-granthā/Jñānapratisthāna* is the youngest of the seven Abhidharma works of the Sarvāstivāda school that became known as the Vaibhāṣika ‘canonical’ works. It was

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20 *Mhv V*, 280.
21 *Dīp VII*, 37 and VII, 44.


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20 *Mhv V*, 280.
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compiled in approximately the first century BCE. In his 'Life of Vasubandhu', Paramārtha (500-569) writes that Kātyāyaniputra compiled the Abhidharma of the Sarvāstivāda school and composed the *Aṣṭāgrantha in Kāsmīra*, while Hsūn-tsang (602-664) in his travel record, mentions that the *Jñānaprasthāna* was written in the neighbourhood of Činavati. That the work was written in Central India, and not the Northwest, is also mentioned in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, where the work is called *Jñānaprasthāna*. Two different translations into Chinese of this text are extant: one translation was made in 383 by Saṃghadeva and Chu Fo-nien in Ch'ang-an (T 1543), and the other was made by Hsūn-tsang between 657 and 660 CE (T 1544). The first is called *Aṣṭāgrantha* (T 1543), the second *Jñānaprasthāna* (T 1544). This confirms Paramārtha’s statement that the work has two names. As Paramārtha lived prior to Hsūn-tsang, this means that there are not only two Chinese versions of the text, but also two Indian ones: an *Aṣṭāgrantha*, translated 383 CE and a *Jñānaprasthāna*, translated 657-660. Having examined the two Indian versions, Ryogen Fukuhara concluded that the transliterations in the *Aṣṭāgrantha* indicate that the work is of Gandhāran origin, while the *Jñānaprasthāna* is a Kāsmīra Vaibhāṣika recension. That Paramārtha situates the compilation of the *Aṣṭāgrantha* in Kāsmīra, while Hsūn-tsang and the *Mahāvibhāṣā* locate the compilation of the *Jñānaprasthāna* in Central India, may then have to be explained as follows: Kātyāyaniputra wrote his *Aṣṭāgrantha* in Central India before the Sarvāstivāda school began to flourish in Kāsmīra. As is also apparent in the accounts of the first council of Pāṭaliputra, the Kāsmīri Sarvāstivādins wanted to present themselves as true heirs of the doctrine. Therefore, when re-editing the *Aṣṭāgrantha* as the *Jñānaprasthāna*, they kept referring to the work as *Aṣṭāgrantha* and mentioned Kāsmīra as its place of origin (Paramārtha’s account) or, for the same reason, referred to the work as the *Jñānaprasthāna* of Central India. The Kāsmīri Vaibhāṣikas composed their *Mahāvibhāṣā* based on the *Jñānaprasthāna*. This means that the latter was the version of the work recognised in Kāsmīra.


31 Po-sou-p’ an-tou Fa-shih Chuan T 2049, 189a1-6. See also T. Watters, On Yuan Chiwang’s Travels in India, 2 vols, London 1904, 1, p.294.

32 Ta T’ang Hsi-yü Chi, T 2087, 889b28-c4. See also J. Takakusu, op. cit., pp.84-5.

33 T 1545, 21c29. See also L. de La Vallée Poussin, L’Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, 6 vols, Brussels 1923-31 (repr. 1971), 2, p.147, n.4.


Consequently, the followers of Kātyāyaniputra saw this latter work as pre-eminent over other works. They even called it a body (śarīra), while the other works were called limbs (pāda). In the case of the Vaibhāṣikas, the formation of a (sub-)school clearly shows this to be a philosophical, no longer disciplinary, matter.

A parallel situation may be true for the Prakaraṇapāda. Like the *Aṣṭa-granthathā, the Prakaraṇapāda was also called 'Prakaraṇa-granthatha' 37, and as with the *Aṣṭa-granthathā/Jñānaprasthāna, there are also two Chinese translations of this work, by Guṇabhadra and Bodhiyasas, 435-443 CE (T 1541), and by Hsūn-tsang in 659 (T 1542). It is not impossible that the work was first called Prakaraṇa-granthathā (cf. *Aṣṭa-granthathā), and later, when recognised as one of the six pāda-treatises by the Kāśmīri Sarvāstivādins, was renamed Prakaraṇapāda.

Here, we reach the problem of the impact of the 'canonicity' of the Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma. From the outset, Buddhist councils played an important role in the canonisation of texts. This is already evident from the first council that, tradition claims, was held immediately after the decease of the Buddha, and at which, still according to tradition, Ānanda is said to have recited the Sūtra texts and Upālī the Vinaya texts. The importance of this alleged first council is that it was needed to justify the existence of a second council, held in Vaiśāli. The first one also serves to project the authenticity of texts back in time, to the lifetime of the Buddha.

Although tradition fixed the early Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma Canon at seven texts, it is untrue that during the early period only these texts were composed or that they were seen as a canonical collection from the outset. A postface to fascicle 24 of the *Aṣṭa-granthathāstra, written in 379 CE, gives the earliest dated reference to a set of seven texts. A reference to a 'six part Abhidharma' is further found in translations by Kumārajiva (died 413). Yāso-mitra's commentary on the Abhidharma-kosāabhāṣya gives the first listing of seven: the Jñānaprasthāna is the body (śarīra) and the six texts that constitute its feet (satpāda) are the Prakarana-pāda, Vijnānakāya, Dharmaskandha, Prajñāpātastrā, Dhatukīya and Samgītīparyāya. All this implies that the so-called Satpādābh-dharmathā is actually a Vaibhāṣika composition, recognising six treatises as the 'feet' (pāda), while the Jñānaprasthāna itself became known as the 'body' (śarīra) or main text. 38 This canonisation made the Vaibhāṣikas appear to be 'orthodox' Sarvāstivādins. In this respect it is to be noted that, e.g., the *Mahāvibhāṣa argues that the Abhidharma is the Buddha's teaching.

As the Jñānaprasthāna was promoted as the 'body' of the seven works by the Kāśmīri Vaibhāṣikas, their evident recognition of the Satpādābh-dharmathā left the Western masters, predecessors of the later Sautrāntikas, with sāstras which did not have a 'canonical' status. The importance of some 'canonicity' was – as outlined above – evident from the councils of Rājagṛha and Vaiśāli. The Western masters found the 'solution' to this problem by returning to sūtra-like philosophical treatises. Thus, they emphasised the Abhidharma-mahārāja (T 1550), a work by the Bactrian Dharma-sreṣṭhīn that is similar in purpose and that, according to Erich Frauwallner, is probably older than the Jñānaprasthāna. 39 The Abhidharma-mahārājasāstra served as a basis for the compilation of Upāṣanta's Abhidharma-mahārāja (T 1551), Dharmatrāta's Sam-yuktābh-dharmathāra (T 1552) and, eventually, Vasubandhu's Sautrāntika Abhidharma-kosā (T 1558/1559). As the oldest Abhidharma...

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37 La Vallée Poussin, op. cit., I, p.xxxii.

38 See also Takakusu, 'On the Abhidharma Literature…', op. cit., p.74.

39 T 1545, la8-c29. See also Cox, op. cit., p.23.

40 Frauwallner, Die Entstehung…, op. cit., p.71: 'Der Abhidharma-sūtra schließlisch ist die älteste Dogmatik der Sarvāstivādas. In ihm ist das Wertvollste, was in der Zeit des alten Abhidharma an Lehren geschaffen worden war, zu einem großen Gebäude vereinigt'. See also [Abhidharma/vibhaṣāstra], T 1546, 1b11 ff.
Buddhism works appear as collections of kārikās which are then explained, the series based on Dharmasrēṣṭhinī’s Abhidharmahrdaya and culminating in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa are also constituted of stanzas which are explained in a prose commentary. It is to be noticed that the Hṛdaya-works were often called ‘ching’ or ‘lun-ching’, i.e. sūtra

Having drawn our attention to Bactria and Gandhāra, we are confronted with the problem of the Sautrāntikas (Dārṣṭāntikas) and Mālasarvāstivādins. Sources from the Northwest place the origin of the Sautrāntikas in the fourth century after the Buddha’s Parinirvāṇa, i.e. about the time of Kuśāna (and Vaibhāṣīka) dominance. Kumāralāta is traditionally mentioned as the founder of the Dārṣṭāntikas, but modern scholarship does not agree on the dates of Kumāralāta, opinions varying from 100 years after the

Buddha’s Parinirvāṇa to the third century CE. In favour of an early date for Kumāralāta is that it is natural that the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas would refer to a master who lived before or at the same time as the compilation of the Vaibhāṣīka Jñānaprasthāna, i.e. a master who lived prior to the moment of formation of the Vaibhāṣīka ‘orthodoxy’. Tradition further sees Kumāralāta as the teacher of both Harīvarman and Śrīlāta. The latter was the direct teacher of the Sautrāntika Vasubandhu. An early date for Kumāralāta explains why he is referred to as the ‘mula-cārya’ (in contradistinction to the ‘ācārya’) of the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas: he was not necessarily the immediate teacher of Śrīlāta. In favour of a later date for Kumāralāta is the fact that he is mentioned with Aśvaghoṣa and Nāgārjuna in the *Mahāvibhāṣā. However, this would still place Kumāralāta no later than the early second century CE, i.e. in the period of Kuśāna power. It is very likely that the Sautrāntikas only felt the need to start to refer to a/their ‘mula-cārya’ (and call themselves ‘Sautrāntika’) after the Vaibhāṣīkas had organised themselves as ‘Vaibhāṣīka’, i.e. as the orthodoxy in Kāśmīra.

Because of their dominance, Vaibhāṣīka ideas were influencing the Gandhāran works. This is evident in the increase of Vaibhāṣīka positions in Upāśanta’s *Abhidharmahrdaya (ca. 300 CE)

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41 Upāśanta’s *Abhidharmahrdaya e.g. is called Fa-sheng A-pì-t’uan Hsin Lun Ching in the Ch’u San-tsong Chí Chi, T2145, 543c19, 621a5, 695c15, 720b12; Chen-yüan Hsin-ting Shih Chiao Mu-lu, T 2157, 954b14, 1043c26; in the Taishō Index Vol.1, p.417; and in the work itself (T 1551, 833c3-6). Ghoṣaka’s *Abhidharmāntarasanāstra (T 1553) is called Kan-lu-wei Ching in T 2145, 32b6 and in the Ta’ang Nei-tien Lu, T 2149, 231a19.

42 On the Dārṣṭāntikas-Sautrāntikas, see Cox, op. cit., p.40; See also J. Przyłęski, ‘Dārṣṭāntika, Sautrāntika and Sarvāstivāda’, in Indian Historical Quarterly 16 (1940), pp.246-54, here p.247.


46 Frauwallner, Die Entstehung... op. cit., p.103; Katō, Kyōryōbu no Kenkyū, op. cit., pp.58 ff; Cox, op. cit., p.41.

47 In Upāśanta’s work, T 1551, 841c17, 865a28 and 855c27, the masters of the Vibhāṣā are referred to. Taiken Kimura (Kimura Taika Zenshū, IV: Abidatsu-
and in Dharmatrāta’s *Samyuktābhidharmahrdaya* (beginning of fourth century)\(^{46}\).

The *Samyuktābhidharmahrdaya* refers to the following schools: Dārṣṭāntikas (pp.895c22, 903b6-7, 944a7), Dharmaguptakas (p.962a19-20), Vātsāputrīyas (pp.903b5, 962a19), the Kāśmīri (p.872-c28), and the Vaibhāṣikas (pp.882a18, 892a2). The work disagrees with the opinion attributed to the Dharmaguptakas. In one instance, the work disagrees with the Vātsāputrīyas and in another instance agrees with it. This seems to indicate that a strict Vinaya differentiation (Sarvāstivāda, Dharmaguptaka, Vātsāputrīya) does not necessarily indicate an equally strict Abhidharmic differentiation. In view of our above-mentioned sketch, it may be of no surprise that the *Samyuktābhidharmahrdaya* further disagrees with the Kāśmīra opinion and with one of the theses attributed to the Vaibhāṣikas. That the work does not agree with the Dārṣṭāntika thesis and with a second Vaibhāṣika thesis should – in view of what was outlined above – be explained as an instance of Vaibhāṣika influence on Gandhāran works. As we know that ‘Dārṣṭāntika’ is a pejorative term, it is equally possible that Dharmatrāta refers to some other Sarvāstivāda sub-group here.

It must have been the decline of Kuśāṇa and Vaibhāṣika power that enabled Vasubandhu (ca.400-480)\(^{47}\) to take a clear Sautrāntika viewpoint against the Vaibhāṣikas. The Gandhāra-Sautrāntika connection explains why, after the translation of the *Samyuktābhidharmahrdaya* by Samghavarman into Chinese in 434 CE (the fourth of four translations of the work into Chinese)\(^{50}\) had given rise to an ‘Abhidharma School’ in China, after the translation of the *Abhidharmakośa* in 565 CE, the ‘Kośa School’ supplanted the ‘Abhidharma School’ and the *Abhidharmakośa* replaced the *Samyuktābhidharmahrdaya*.

From a doctrinal viewpoint, Hsüan-tsang’s translation of the *Prakaraṇapāda*\(^{51}\) shows the Mulasarvāstivāda viewpoint. This also brings the Mulasarvāstivādas in close connection with the seven early canonical works. While both translations of the *Prakaraṇapāda* show the old Sarvāstivāda viewpoint, for Gunabhadra and Bodhiyaśas this appears to be Sautrāntika; for Hsüan-tsang Mulasarvāstivāda. It should further be noticed that the Mulasarvāstivāda tradition does not mention the Sautrāntikas\(^{52}\). This may also explain why, while the oldest Chinese tradition (fifth century) knows five Vinaya schools (Sarvāstivādas, Dharmaguptakas, Kāśyapīyas, Mahiśāsakas and Mahāsāṃghikas), in the seventh century, only four are differentiated: Ārya-Mahā-

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\(^{46}\) See my *Samyuktābhidharmahrdaya. Heart of Scholasticism with Miscellaneous Additions*, 3 vols, Delhi 1999.

\(^{47}\) On the discussion of one or two Vasubandhus and of a fourth or fifth century life-time of Vasubandhu, see Takakusu, ‘Life of Vasubandhu...’, *op. cit.*, pp.269-96; E. Frauwaldner, *On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the

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\(^{51}\) A translation of 16 volumes by Sanghadeva, most likely, however, not the work of Dharmatrāta, is dated 385-97; a translation in 13 volumes by Fa-hsien and Buddhahadra is dated 418; a translation in 13 volumes by Iśvara and Gunavarman is dated 426; and the fourth translation by Sāṃghavarman is dated 434.

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A WHISPER IN THE SILENCE: NUNS BEFORE MAHĀPAJĀPATĪ?

Liz Williams

The story in the Cullavagga 10 of the ordination of women into the monastic Sangha is accepted by scholars and monastics, both ancient and modern, as evidence for the Buddha's reluctance, or at least hesitation, to accept women as fully ordained bhikkhunīs. However, I argue that there is textual evidence to support the idea that there may have been bhikkhunīs in existence before the request for ordination by Mahāpajāpatī, and that there is evidence in the Therigāthā to suggest that bhikkhunīs were sometimes ordained by the Buddha in much the same way as bhikkhus, by the use of the formula, 'ehi bhikkhuṃ'. What I am suggesting is that the established argument, that the Buddha was reluctant to ordain women, is flawed, and therefore one aspect of the basis for the exclusion of women from the fully ordained monastic Sangha is weak and without substance.

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So, what is the evidence on which the Buddha's alleged reluctance is based? The most commonly quoted explanation given by monks and scholars is that the Buddha initially refused and that only after the intervention of Ānanda did he relent and allow women the opportunity to follow the holy life: moreover, this was only on condition that Mahāpajāpatī and all who followed her accept the eight weighty rules (garudhammas) which would have the effect of subordinating them to the bhikkhus. The ordination story is still recounted in universities and monasteries, where the current exclusion of women from the fully ordained Theravādin Sangha is being justified as acceptable. If the Buddha was reluctant to ordain women, then there is some justification for their exclusion. So ingrained is this interpretation of the text (Vin.II.253) that scholars of Buddhism, ancient and modern, male and female,


sāṃghika, Ārya-Thavira, Ārya-(Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda and Ārya-Sammātīya (Hsüan-tsang and I-ching)

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After the Sarvāstivāda school originated on – most likely – Vinaya grounds, its development took two philosophical-dogmatic directions: one was situated in Kaśmīra, where the seven Abhidharma works (i.e. with the inclusion of the Jñānaprásthāna) were put together. These Vaibhāṣikas became the dominant Sarvāstivāda sub-group and Vaibhāṣika viewpoints came to be considered as ‘orthodox’. The second direction was situated in places such as Bactria and Gandhāra where, modelled on the *Abhidharma-hṛdaya, a Bactrian compendium of Sarvāstivāda philosophy, a series of works called *Abhidharma-hṛdaya were compiled. The Kaśmīri orthodoxy spread to the bordering regions and influenced Gandhāran works. This is revealed in the two later Hṛdaya treatises. This growing influence led to a reaction by those Sarvāstivādins who had remained conservative and who referred to themselves as Sautrāntikas (and were called Dārṣṭāntikas by their opponents). The major work of this period is Vasubandhu’s Abhidharma-kosa. When the Vaibhāṣika doctrinal supremacy disappeared, the original non-Kaśmīri Sarvāstivādins renamed themselves as Mūlasarvāstivādins. This explains why Mūlasarvāstivāda texts do not refer to the Sautrāntikas, but show analogous doctrinal positions. The Mūlasarvāstivādins became the dominant group in the seventh to ninth centuries, a period in which their Vinaya was also finalised. Sarvāstivāda history is thus shown to have originated on Vinaya grounds, to have been further decimated on philosophical matters and to have known a philosophical restoration that was backed and followed by a Vinaya renaissance.

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Buddhist and non-Buddhist, continually repeat the story as Buddhist teaching. Even though many of these scholars are fully conversant with the original texts and must therefore be familiar with the canonical tradition of repeating a request three times before being accepted, they seem unable or unwilling to acknowledge the Buddha’s egalitarian principles, as seen for example in the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta (D.II,195). In this Sutta, perhaps the most comprehensive exposition of fundamental Buddhist teachings, the Buddha emphatically tells Māra that he will not enter Parinibbāna until all four classes of disciple are well-versed in the teachings and can teach them to others. This includes bhikkhus as well as laywomen and was stated to have been said shortly after the Buddha’s enlightenment and then repeated three months before his final Nibbāna. This would imply then that the Buddha knew he would ordain women as soon as he had attained liberation.

‘Evil One, I will not take final Nibbāna till I have nuns and female disciples who are accomplished ...’

Moreover in the Dakkhinavibhaṅga Sutta, the Exposition of Offerings in the Majjhima Nikāya (M.II.253), there is evidence that Mahāpajāpatī may not have been the first nun. In this sutta, the latter approaches the Buddha and requests him to accept a pair of new cloths, which she has spun and woven especially for him. The Buddha refuses them, saying,

‘Give it to the Sangha, Gotami. When you give it to the Sangha, the offering will be made both to me and to the Sangha’.

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2 Na tāvāham pāpīma parinibbāyissami yāva me bhikkhunīyo na sāvikā bhavissanti viyātā viṁittā ... pe ... (D.II.105). The English version is taken from Maurice Walshe, The Long Discourses of the Buddha, A Translation of the Dīgha Nikāya, Boston 1995 (first published as Thus have I Heard in 1987), p.246.

She repeats her request for a second, and a third time, after which, following the established pattern, the Buddha refuses three times. At this point in the Dakkhinavibhaṅga Sutta, Ānanda intervenes on her behalf, just as he does in Cullavagga 10 (Vin.II.254), the ordination story. He reminds the Buddha of how helpful Mahāpajāpatī has been to him. She was his nurse and foster-mother and suckled him when his own mother died.

Ānanda then elucidates Mahāpajāpatī’s debt to the Buddha, in that it is because of him that she keeps the five precepts. This clearly implies that this is meant to have taken place before she was part of the Sangha, members of which adhered to ten precepts for novices, and many more for those who had taken higher ordination. Although she is thus depicted as a lay person, it is also obvious that she is already a stream-enterer. Ānanda says,

‘It is owing to the Blessed One that Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī possesses perfect confidence in the Buddha, the Dhamma, and the Sangha, and that she possesses the virtues loved by the Noble Ones’ (M II.254).

These are the four factors of stream-entry, so the text intends to convey that Mahāpajāpatī has already attained this level of spiritual development, as had many laymen and laywomen in the Suttas. Later in the text of the Dakkhinavibhaṅga Sutta (M.II.255), the Buddha expounds the fourteen kinds of personal offerings, then the seven kinds of offering to the Sangha. He gives the descending order of karmic fruitfulness (puñña) accrued from

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3 A layman requests the ‘going forth’ three times, a sāmaṇera requesting the higher ordination (upasampāda) asks three times, lay people request the precepts three times; therefore to request something three times is obviously not a demonstration of reluctance but a recognised canonical tradition, not peculiar to Mahāpajāpatī’s desire for women to ‘go forth’.

4 All subsequent sutta references are taken from Bhikkhu Nanamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi, The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A New Translation of the Majjhima Nikāya, Boston 1995.

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gifts to:

Both Sanghas with the Buddha at the head,
Both Sanghas after the death of the Buddha,
The Order of bhikkhus,
The Order of bhikkhunis,
A given number of bhikkhus and bhikkhunis,
A given number of bhikkhus,
A given number of bhikkhunis.

If she is still a lay person, as has already been demonstrated by the fact that she adheres only to five precepts, then, if the ordination story is accurate, there would be no bhikkhunis in existence. It would seem then that this is evidence of the existence of bhikkhunis before Mahāpajāpatī requested the going forth. The only other explanation is that this sutta may be an assimilation of one story with another. Culla-vagga 10, then, looks as if it may have been added on by later compilers of the texts. Unlike bhikkhus, whose admission to the Order precedes all other rules specific to them in the text order as we have it, bhikkhunis appear throughout the Vinaya prior to the story of their admission. Certain rules are also laid down for bhikkhunis before any transgression takes place, which is another inconsistency.

There would appear to be a general reluctance to acknowledge that the Buddha elevated women from the socially constructed second class roles that were thought appropriate for them. Surely, one of the qualities of an enlightened being is that he can see beyond human prejudice. Why then do Buddhists, who see the Buddha as the ultimate paradigm of spiritual and ethical action, continually over-look and deny this aspect of his enlightenment?

In the Therigāthā commentary, most of the nuns refer in some way to their ordination. Of the seventy-three verses, twenty-four are ascribed to nuns who state that they went to the monastery of the bhikkhunis for their ordination. Twenty-two refer to ‘going forth’ in the presence of Mahāpajāpatī. Some refer to hearing the Buddha teach, and then being instructed by him to go to the residence of the bhikkhunis to be ordained. Only two, namely Vaddha-Mātā (ThigA 171) and Ambapālī (ThigA 207) refer to hearing the Dhamma in the presence of a bhikkhu, this being, on both occasions, their son. None refers to receiving the upasampadā from bhikkhus. Although an argument from silence cannot be taken as substantial evidence, in the compilation of seventy-three accounts, the law of averages would suggest that at least a few would refer to bhikkhus if indeed these were needed at the ordination of nuns, as suggested in Culla-vagga 10. There is, however, a whisper in the silence.

The first account in the Therigāthā, that of a certain bhikkhuni of Name Unknown (Thig 1), the bhikkhuni describes her attainment of the state of Non-returner while still a laywoman. She is then taken to Mahāpajāpatī by her husband, who says,

‘Let the reverend Sisters give her ordination. And Pajāpatī did so’.

This is worded similarly by Dhammapāla’s commentary on Thig, a translation of which has recently been published by the Pali Text Society, which states:

‘Like the lay disciple Visakhā for [his wife] Dhammadinā, he led her with great ceremony into the presence of Mahā-pajāpatī and said, “O noble lady [please] give the going forth [to this woman]. Then Mahā-pajāpatī Gotamī had her go forth and take full ordination”.

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5 William Pruitt (tr.) The Commentary on the Verses of the Therīs (Therighāthā-Atthakathā Paramattadīpani VI) by Ācārya Dhammapāla, PTS, 1998.


The bhikkhunī Bhaddā Kūṇḍalakesā, an ex-Jain, in both Norman and Rhys Davids’ translations of Thig, verse 109, refers to her ordination as being only by the Buddha himself.

‘Low on my knees I worshipped with both hands
Adoring, “Come Bhaddā!” the Master said.
Thereby to me was ordination given”
and
‘Having bent the knee, having paid homage to him,
I stood with cupped hands face to face with him,
“Come Bhaddā!” he said to me; that was my ordination”.

Dhammapāla’s commentary elaborates on this verse as:
‘Come Bhaddā! Go to the residence of the bhikkhunīs, and in
the presence of the bhikkhunīs go forth and be fully ordained”.

Even here, there is no reference to double ordination. Dhamma pāla then goes to extreme lengths to explain that there is no ‘Ehi bhikkhunī’ ordination equivalent to that for bhikkhus. His explanation appears to be merely a denial of something he is not comfortable with, that is, that the Buddha ordained women in the same way as men, implying an equivalent status to men. His opinion is that,
On still other occasions [something] is mentioned that is not possible, or that does not exist.

He also explains away the inclusion of ‘Come bhikkhuṇī’ in the Bhikhunī-Vibhaṅga (Vin.IV.214) by saying that
It is not an expression that makes clear the independent existence of full ordination of bhikkhuṇīs by [the formula] ‘Come bhikkhuṇī’ because there are no bhikkhuṇīs [admitted to] full ordination in this way.

This is merely a circular argument which adds nothing in the way of evidence or reasoning to support his contention. I would argue that the passage on Bhaddā Kūṇḍalakesā has just demonstrated that bhikkhuṇīs were indeed sometimes admitted to full ordination in this way, just as bhikkhus were sometimes admitted by the formula ‘Come Bhikkhu!’

Dhammapāla is thought to have lived in South India in the sixth century CE, so his commentary dates from almost a millennium after the time of the Buddha. His views of and attitude towards women are obviously coloured by the socio-historical context in which he was writing. Blackstone, in discussing the attitude of disgust and disapproval of the body and its functions in the Therī/Therāgāthā, recognises that ‘those bodies that are of an unspecified sex are designated female by the commentary’ (p.64).

Thus, even from the earliest days of the monastic Sangha, shortly after the decease of the Buddha, and for centuries later, women were denied the status, respect and recognition that was acknowledged by the Buddha. The same wariness and fear of women’s achievements has filtered down through the centuries to the present day, and is still reflected in the lack of opportunity for women to realise their aspirations and to offer a significant and valuable contribution to the Theravādin monastic Sangha.

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8 Rhys Davis, op. cit., p.154.
9 Norman, op. cit., p.182.
10 Pruitt, op. cit., p.106.
11 Ibid., p.380.
12 Ibid., p.379.
13 For a discussion of attitudes to the body in the Therī/Therāgāthā; see Kathryn Blackstone, Women in the Footsteps of the Buddha; Struggle for Liberation in the Therīgāthā, Richmond, Surrey 1998.
SAṅGĪTI AND SĀMAGGI: COMMUNAL RECITATION AND THE UNITY OF THE SAṅGHA

Asaṅga Tilakaratne

I

The Pāli word saṅgīti refers to ecclesiastical councils or ‘communal recitations’ (to borrow from L.S. Cousins1) held among the Thera-vādins on different occasions in their history. The historicity, function and role of these events in the history of Buddhism have been critically studied by a large number of Buddhist scholars, and I do not have anything new to add to this already existing vast knowledge. Nevertheless, the idea of writing on saṅgīti afresh comes from my feeling that the close connection between the act specified by the term saṅgāyana, or reciting together, and the phenomenon of unity in the Saṅgha (monastic community) has not been adequately emphasised. I suggest that the most important purpose of saṅgīti has not been understood in its proper context2.

In this paper I am going to argue that the fundamental purpose of the act of saṅgāyana and therefore the events described as saṅgīti is the assurance of the unity of the Buddhist monastic organisation. Every time a crisis arose in the Saṅgha we know that the early Buddhists engaged in the act of saṅgāyana in which the key activity was to recite together the Dhamma and the Vinaya. This basically has nothing to do with the memorisation or preservation of the Canon. At least, it was not its main purpose. I plan to show that the act of saṅgāyana, first and foremost, was meant to be a public expression of one’s allegiance to the organisation which was represented by the Dhamma and the Vinaya. I will further argue

2 Charles Hallisey’s useful discussion on Theravāda councils (‘Councils as Ideas and Events in the Theravāda’ in Skorupski, ed., op. cit., pp.133-48) refers to different purposes and uses of councils. The point of the present paper, however, is, while not denying that these recitals served various purposes, to show that the fundamental purpose of, at least, the three classical Theravāda saṅgītis was to preserve the unity and integrity of the monastic order.
that, in this respect, the recital of the Pātimokkha by the members of the Saṅgha every fortnight serves virtually the same purpose. Although only a representative number of the Saṅgha took part in the actual act of saṅgāyana, all including those who did not participate were expected to show their allegiance by accepting and abiding by what was recited. This is something which applied equally to the Pātimokkha recital. In a religious tradition where there is no reference to a divine point of origin this was thought to be the only way to express allegiance.  

II

A reader of the Pāli Canon, in particular its Vinaya and the Sutta Pitaka, is bound to be struck by a large numbers of instances where the unity of the Saṅgha has been spoken about. A well known line occurring in the Dhammapada (194), sukhā saṅghassa sāmaggi, says that the unity of the Saṅgha is happiness. As we will find shortly, the unity of the Saṅgha was seen as causing happiness not only in the Saṅgha but, ultimately, to the whole world. If Buddhism is considered to be a system concerned about individual liberation from Samsāra, one might wonder why there is so much emphasis on the unity of the Saṅgha, for liberation is ultimately one’s own personal affair. Contrary to such a view, the life of the seeker of Nirvāṇa has always been perceived as one in a community and hence community living has been considered very important. One might also see that the unity of the Saṅgha has been stressed because it was considered necessary for the preservation of the message of the Buddha for posterity and to ensure happiness to the entire world. A study of the Dhamma and Vinaya shows that sāmaggi of the Saṅgha has been emphasised on both grounds.

This feature of Buddhist monastic life can well be demonstrated with reference to the Vinaya Pitaka. The Uposatha-khandha of the Mahāvagga describes how the performance of uposatha gradually started and evolved. Once the act of uposatha was approved for the community it was mandatory that all members attend the function irrespective of their religious attainments. It was also the idea that this act should be performed in complete unanimity. As a result, an elaborate system was worked out to take the consent (chanda) and assurance of purity (parisuddhi) of the members who found themselves unable to attend due to illness.

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3 This way of arguing clearly anticipates the historical reliability of the accounts given in the ancient literary sources mentioned. There is no doubt that one can question the historical merits of these reports. The present account shows, at least, that what these sources say are consistent not only with one another but also with the religion and way of life upheld by the tradition represented in them.

4 S V, p.2.

5 The case of Mahākappina is revealing. Being an arahant ‘purified with the highest means of purification’ (...atha khar abham visuddho paramāya visuddhiyā) Mahākappina started wondering whether or not he should attend the uposatha assembly. The Buddha admonished him saying, Kappina, if you do not respect and take this act seriously, who will? (Vin I, p.105).
was included in the preliminaries (pubbakarana) which needed to be completed before the act of uposatha began.

The recital of the Patimokkha, the collection of rules (sikkhā-pada), was the key aspect of the uposatha assemblies. The ideal practice was to recite all the rules. If this was found impossible for some reason, then it was allowed to adhere to shorter versions. Every version of the recital, however, always ended with the following statement:

\[
\text{ettakaṁ tassa bhagavato suttaṅgataṁ suttapariyāpannaṁ anvaddhamasam uddesam āgacchati.}
\text{Taṁtha sabbeheva samaggehi sammodamānehi avivadamānehi sikkhatabbhaṁ ti:}
\]
This much is in the Vinaya rule, included therein, of the Blessed One, which comes up for recitation each fortnight. Herein all should train in concord and appreciation without dispute (emphasis added).

This stress on the need to follow the Vinaya in concord and appreciation without dispute provides us with a good clue as to why the act itself was compulsory.

While, on the other hand, the value of the unity of the Saṅgha was underscored, any schism of the Saṅgha, on the other hand, was treated with the utmost seriousness. Among the saṅghādisesa offences, offences next only to pārājika in gravity, there are two specifically connected with schism in the Saṅgha: one is in connection with any member who causes schism within the Saṅgha and the other is regarding those who support the crime of such a person. Both persons are guilty of a saṅghādisesa offence. Another offence belonging to the same category is to make oneself unavailable for admonition by the Saṅgha. This rule contains a phrase which characterises the mutually dependent nature of the Saṅgha. It is: aṇñam-aṇñā-vacanena, aṇñam-aṇñā-vuttāpanena – ‘mutual admonishment and mutual rehabilitation’. The relevant Vinaya rule says that one who violates this spirit of the Saṅgha is guilty of a saṅghādisesa offence.

In the discourses too, the Saṅgha sāmaggi features as a very important aspect of monastic life. There are several discourses in the Majjhima Nikāya where the harmonious life of the members of the Saṅgha is praised by the Buddha. The Āṭṭhakathāsutta (31) describes how the harmonious life of the elders Anuruddha, Nandiya and Kimbila came to be appreciated by the Buddha as living in concord, with mutual appreciation, without disputing, blending like milk and water, viewing each other with kindly eyes. The discourse ends with an interesting side-episode: a spirit named Dīgha Parajana appears before the Buddha to express his appreciation of the three Theras. To him, the Buddha makes the following remarks, which can be taken as a demonstration of the Dhammapada statement mentioned earlier:

And if the clan from which these three clansmen went forth from the home life into homelessness should remember them with confident heart, that would lead to the welfare and happiness of that clan for a long time. And if the retinue of the clan from which these clansmen went forth... the village from which they went forth... the town from which they went forth... the city from which they went forth... the country from which those three clansmen went forth from the home life into homelessness should remember them with confident heart, that would lead to the welfare and happiness of the nobles for a long time. If all brahmins... all merchants... all workers... should remember those three clansmen with confident heart, that would lead to the welfare and happiness of the workers for a long time. If the world

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6 Saṅghādisesa offences Nos 10 and 11.
7 Saṅghādisesa offence No.12.

with its gods, its Māras, and its Brahmās, this generation with its recluses and brahmins, its princes and its people, should remember those three clansmen with confident heart, that would lead to the welfare and happiness of the world for a long time.\(^9\)

The contrasting event which provided the background for these remarks was a dispute among some members of the Saṅgha who lived in Kosambi. The *Kosambiyasutta* (M 48) which refers to this incident contains an admonition to those monks by the Buddha. However, the Vinaya Piṭaka contains a detailed report of the incident, according to which the Buddha could not resolve the dispute at the first effort. The Buddha found that the monks who were involved in the dispute were adamant and not yet ready to see their fault. Leaving these monks the Buddha visits the three monks who lived in sharp contrast to the Kosambians.\(^10\) The *Mahāgānasutta* (M 32) too provides a similar example of a group of senior Theras such as Sāriputta, Moggallāna and Mahākassapa enjoying a harmonious life. In addition to such instances, there are a considerable number of discourses which refer to the unfortunate state of dispute among various religious groups caused by ideological differences. For instance, discourses such as *Dutthātaka, Pasūra, Cūḷavīyūha* and *Mahāvīyūha* of the Suttanipāta\(^11\) discuss how disputes have arisen among religious people and how the real sage keeps himself away from such disputes. Although these discourses seem to refer to disputes in a broader religious context, ultimately they highlight the way the disciples of the Buddha should react to such situations, whether among themselves or among religious people at large. The instances of glorifying the harmony of the Saṅgha have to be understood in the context of the case of the Kosambians and some other dissenting groups among the Saṅgha. The classic example of such a situation was Devadatta, who seems to have developed a kind of rivalry with the Buddha and his followers. He, in fact, was successful in making a schism in the Saṅgha and taking away a fraction of it with him. This, however, ended in failure and brought disgrace on Devadatta.\(^12\)

Although the story of Devadatta ends with his death, we cannot imagine that things became absolutely unproblematic afterwards. Further possibilities of dissension were lurking, and the last days of the Buddha, in particular, allowed such developments to surface. The *Mahāparinibbānasutta* starts with the Buddha’s mentioning the seven virtues of non-decline (*satta-aparihāniya-dhamma*) to Sunidha and Vassakāra, two ministers of Ajātasattu. Immediately after this discussion the Buddha starts reminding the Saṅgha of similar virtues in which a major aspect is frequent and harmonious gathering, which was taken as the key to the non-decline and longevity of the Saṅgha as a body.\(^13\)

In addition to the pending Parinibbāna of the Buddha, things that were happening among other religious groups too seem to have triggered concerns about the unity of the Saṅgha. The *Sāma-gāmasutta* (M 104) reports the troubled situation that arose with the passing away of the Jaina leader. According to the discourse, dissent first broke out in the monastic group. Subsequently this resulted in splitting the lay supporters into rival groups. Ānanda reports these events among Jaina followers to the Buddha and voices his concern that a similar fate could befall the Saṅgha once the Buddha is gone.\(^14\) The Buddha responds to Ānanda by


\(^{10}\) Vin I, pp.350-2.

\(^{11}\) Sn 780-7, 824-34, 862-77, 878-94, and 895-914.


\(^{13}\) D II, pp.76-7.

\(^{14}\) I thought, venerable sir: ‘Let no dispute arise in the Saṅgha when the Blessed One has gone. For such a dispute would be for the harm and unhappiness of
enquiring whether his disciples had any doubt about the Dhamma, taken as constituting ‘the thirty-seven dhammas that contribute to awakening’ (bodhi-pakkhiya-dhamma)\textsuperscript{15}. Ananda says ‘no’, but points out the possibility of disagreements on the Vinaya. To this the Buddha responds by saying that such disagreements will not be as serious as disagreements on the Dhamma, but instructs Ananda on how to deal with problems of discipline. The subsequent history of Buddhism, however, shows that things did not turn out exactly as the Buddha expected.

It seems that the point Ananda was trying to make in this discussion was that the Jaina disciples were disputing and ruining themselves because they were left without a refuge. What seems to have been meant by refuge is a substitute for the leader. In other words, the question for the disciples of the Buddha was: who will be taking the place of the Buddha once he attains Parinibbāna? It is not that the Buddha did not feel this need. His response is reported in the Mahāparinibbānasutta. Addressing Ananda, the Buddha says:

Ananda, it is possible that the following could occur to you: ‘the teaching no longer has a teacher, there is no teacher for us’. Ananda, that should not be understood in that manner; Ananda, the doctrine that I have explained and the discipline that I have prescribed will be your teacher at my passing\textsuperscript{16}.

\textsuperscript{15} Discussing the significance of lists in the Pāli Canon, Rupert Gethin draws our attention to what he calls ‘composite lists’, such as the ‘thirty-seven dhammas that contribute to awakening’, which were used for both mnemonic and religious purposes: ‘The Mātikas: Memorization, Mindfulness, and the List’ in Janet Gyatso, \textit{In the Mirror of Memory: Reflections on Mindfulness and Remembrance in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism}, Albany 1992, pp.156-7.

\textsuperscript{16} D II, p.154.

Although this may not be what the ordinary disciples expected, this definitely made the Dhamma and Vinaya the ultimate repository of the authority of the Buddha. The same is confirmed in the idea of the great indicators (mahāpadesa) which comes in the same sutta: In the absence of the Buddha to determine whether a statement is what is taught by him or not, it will have to be compared with the Dhamma and Vinaya. Philosophically, this was the exact situation which the Buddha anticipated even while he was living. Expressions such as yo dharmam passati so mam passati; yo mam passati so dhammam passati\textsuperscript{17} (whoever see the Dhamma sees me, whoever sees me sees the Dhamma) indicate that a sharp distinction was not to be made or, at least, the Buddha did not wish to make one, between him and what he taught. Therefore the real allegiance was to the Dhamma and Vinaya, and it meant that when the Buddha was no more the disciples unanimously accepted what the Buddha taught.

We can see, in this manner, that both the Dhamma and the Vinaya underscore the need for the unity and harmony of the Saṅgha. On the one hand, there was a very important religious reason for this, namely, that the practice of the Path leading to the cessation of suffering was seen as best done in a community characterised by mutual support. On the other hand, there were equally important historical reasons, such as the split of the Jaina community after the demise of its leader and also the instances of internal dispute among the Saṅgha itself, which made the Buddha and the leaders of the Saṅgha worry about the unity of the organisation. The rallying point was the Dhamma and Vinaya.

Allegiance to the Vinaya was expressed every fortnight in the act of uposatha\textsuperscript{18}. As we saw earlier, these recitals were always con-

cluded with the admonition that all should abide by it ‘in concord and agreement without dispute’ (samaggehi sammodamānehi avivadamānehi). No doubt the recital must have helped the Sangha to remember what they have to abide by, but the real meaning of this function was the assurance of the unity of the Sangha. It is an instance of the Sangha following the aparīhāniya-dhamma taught by the Buddha, namely, gathering in unity, leaving in unity, doing the ‘business’ of the Sangha in unity. This view can further be supported with reference to sāmagī-uposatha which was added to the other two uposathas that are usually carried out on the fourteenth or fifteenth day of the lunar fortnight, namely, catuddasi and paṇnarasi. The sāmagī-uposatha is to be performed whenever a schism of the Sangha has been resolved. What this means is that up to that point there had been a faction of the Sangha which did not abide by all the rules of the Pātimokkha, but now that they have agreed they have to show that by all reciting the Pātimokkha together. The undivided recital – ekuddesa – is a characteristic of the Sangha in unity. This purpose of the uposatha performance has been duly emphasised by Gombrich when he says:

It was the one thing which held the Sangha together. Each celebration, of course, was the announcement of the purity of a particular sangha and ensured their renewal of face-to-face relations... these regular compulsory meetings bound the Sangha together as a whole.

Pātimokkha, which constitutes the former and which was considered fundamental, has been taken as representing the Vinaya.

19 Vin I, p.537.
20 samaggo hi saṅgho sammodamāno avivadamāno ekuddeso phaśu viharatīti (‘for when the Community being in concord and in agreement and without disputes, holds undivided recitations (of the Pātimokkha etc.) then it lives in comfort’): Ven. Nāṇamoli, tr., Pātimokkha, Bangkok 1969, pp.74-6.

Borrowing from Durkheim, he calls this ‘the Sangha’s solidarity ritual’.

The recital of Pātimokkha is usually called uddesa which means ‘brief exposition’ in the context of the Dhamma. The term saṅgayana has not been used in this context, and the recital of the uposatha ceremony is usually done by one member while the rest of the monks are expected to listen to him attentively. Nevertheless, the actual meaning of the whole function is no different from a saṅgayana where both the Dhamma and Vinaya were recited. Therefore, pātimokkhuddesa can well be seen as a mini-saṅgayana performed every two weeks by the entire Sangha in small groups who are united in their religious practice.

III

In our discussion of the Sāmagīmasutta we saw that the Buddha was of the opinion that a dispute over a matter of the Dhamma would be more serious but, nevertheless, it seemed that the Buddha was confident that his followers did not have a dispute over his doctrine. In order that the disciples should not have any disputes over the Dhamma it was necessary, in the first place, for them to know what he taught. For this purpose the Buddha seems to have attempted to make frequent summary statements of his teachings. This practice appears to have been repeated more frequently when he was nearing his Parinibbāna. In the Mahāparinibbānasutta one often finds the following statement occurring:

(The Buddha staying at Vulture’s Peak mountain at Rājagaha would frequently make the following Dhamma remarks): the virtue is thus, concentration is thus, and wisdom is thus; concentration enriched by virtue becomes greatly fruitful and beneficial; wisdom enriched by concentration becomes greatly

fruitful and beneficial; the mind enriched by wisdom will be delivered very well from cankers, namely, the cankers of pleasure, becoming, views and ignorance. This, no doubt, was meant to be a summary of the entire teaching.

A very important discourse in this connection is the Saṅgītisutta of the Dīgha Nikāya which has been attributed to the theran Sāriputta. The discourse seems to be a systematic collection of all the important aspects of the teaching arranged in ascending numerical order, starting from ones and ending in tens. What is revealing is the following statement occurring at the beginning of the discourse:

Friends, what is that doctrine which is well proclaimed and well understood by our Fully Enlightened One, which leads to Nibbāna, is conducive for appeasement and well grasped by the Fully Enlightened One, which all must chant together, no one must dispute so that this noble way of life will be durable and long lasting, which, in turn will be for the welfare and happiness of gods and human beings?

At the end of the discourse the identical statement is mentioned as the answer to the question adding ayam (this) referring to the items of the doctrine that have been described. All the ten sections of the discourse, too, have the same question and answer at the beginning and end of each exposition. The recurring phrase saṅgā-yitabbam na vivaditabbam puts the exposition in context. It very clearly suggests that what was done by Sāriputta is a kind of prototype of a saṅgāyana, in which the Saṅgha would chant the entire teaching of the Master, thereby affirming that they were all united in accepting this teaching. The sutta is meant to contain the entire teaching of the Buddha in a condensed form. It makes available the teaching in one piece so that everyone knows what its content is, thereby removing any possible room for doubt.

Elaborating on ‘composite lists’ or lists of lists profusely seen in the Pāli Canon, Rupert Gethin cites the Saṅgītī- and Dasuttara-suttas as good examples of this category. On the former, he comments: ‘... it is hard to see in this much more than a convenient mnemonic device for remembering a large number of lists. Yet such an exercise as is carried out by the Saṅgītisutta is, I think, always looked on as preliminary: it sets out material that is then to be employed and applied in various ways. The context of the sutta and its emphasis on sāmaggī suggest that the composite list available in it was mainly meant to be ‘employed and applied’ as a comprehensive summary of the teachings of the Buddha, allegiance to which was crucial in maintaining the unity of the Saṅgha.

Commenting on the date of the sutta, K.R. Norman says that ‘the title, the fact that the authorship is attributed to Sāriputta, and the nature of the text, which is numerical on the līnes of the Aṅguttara-nikāya, all suggest that the sutta is a late one’. Norman does not say how late it could be. But the sutta itself provides a very good reason to believe that it was compiled by Sāriputta or by some other senior disciples of the Buddha before or immediately after the latter’s Parinibbāna. It is the same reason as mentioned in the Sāmagāmasutta (referred to above), namely, the recent death of Nīghantha Nātaputta, the Jain leader, and the subsequent controversy among his disciples. The Jainistic predicament has been described as being appatisarana or ‘without refuge’ and the damage

23 D II, pp.81, 123, 126 etc.
25 Ibid, p.211.
26 See n.15 for the complete reference, p.157.
28 The tradition, however, holds that Sāriputta predeceased the Buddha.
caused to the organisation has been attributed, among other reasons, to it. In turn, what Sāriputta is doing here is to explain the refuge the disciples of the Buddha have.

The commentary describing the term saṅgāyaṭiṭabbaṁ says 'saṅgāyaṭiṭabbaṁ ti samaggehi gāyaṭiṭabbaṁ ekavacanehi aviruddhavacanehi bhavitabbaṁ' (‘must recite’ means ‘must recite by being united, must be with unanimous words and noncontradictory words’) and affirms the close connection between the act of chanting together and the resultant unity. It further describes the term saṅgīti pariñāya, by which the discourse is referred to in the discourse itself, as saṁaggiyā kāraṇaṁ, ‘cause of further unity’. The close connection of saṅgīti in this context with saṁaggi is further supported by the commentator’s remark at the beginning and end of each section: iti eka-vasena dhammasenāpati sāriputto saṁaggiṁsato dassetīti. Iti eka-vasena saṁaggiṁsato dassetvā idāni duka-vasena dassetum puna desanāṁ arabhī. In this context, what is meant by saṁaggiṁsas cannot be anything other than ‘taste of unity (of the Saṅgha)’.

As O. von Hinüber too remarks, the sutta was ‘a joint recitation of the Dhamma in the presence of the Buddha, who approves what has been recited’ (emphasis added). He further remarks how the whole thing ‘strongly recalls… the account of the first council’.

This sitting and chanting together of the Dhamma, as in the case of the Pāṭimokkha, was meant to be a way of expressing allegiance to the doctrine. Like those who did not sit together to listen to the Vinaya, those who did not chant the Dhamma together or did not give consent to what was chanted were regarded as dissenting. In the subsequent history of Buddhism we see this more clearly.

It is clear that the Saṅgītisutta was compiled as a response to a crisis which was not actual but possible. On the one hand, the leader of the Jainas had passed away and his disciples were in disarray. On the other hand, the Buddha was nearing Parinibbāna and the same thing could happen in the Buddha-Säsana too. The Dhamma and Vinaya are the refuge once the Buddha has gone. The Vinaya is already being recited every two weeks. There does not seem to be any such arrangement with regard to the Dhamma. What Sāriputta seems to have initiated is the identical practice for the Dhamma. Sāri+gīti or act of saṅ+gāyana is very similar to the idea of eka+uddesa in the Vinaya. As ekuddesa cannot take place in a divided group, saṅgāyana too cannot take place in a divided group. The whole emphasis on saṅgāyaṭiṭabbaṁ na vivaditaṭabbaṁ in the Saṅgītisutta has to be understood in this context.

33 A revealing incident to this effect is reported in the Cullavagga. The elders who participated in the saṅgīti asked another elder, Purāṇa, who was travelling with a large gathering of monks, at least five hundred, to ‘submit’ himself to this saṅgīti. To this request, his response was:

‘Your reverences, well chanted by the elders are dhamma and discipline, and in that way I heard it in the Lord’s presence, that I heard it in his presence, in that same way will I bear in mind’ (tr. I.B. Horner, op. cit., p.402).

This response clearly shows that there was a considerable number of monks who did not accept the ‘version’ of the word of the Buddha determined at the First Council. It seems that the elders such as Purāṇa represented even more conservative a stance than that usually attributed to the Theravādins. There may or may not have been serious doctrinal or discipline-related differences, but we really do not know what, if any, such differences were. At this initial stage disagreements such as these may have not been taken as acts of splitting of the Saṅgha. It can well be imagined, however, that this type of difference of opinion may have led to fully fledged divisions among the Saṅgha in years to come.

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31 Ibid, p.977.
Once we have this close connection between saṅgiti and sāmaggi made clear, it is not difficult to understand what happened in the first saṅgiti immediately after the Parinibbāna of the Buddha. The Cullavagga, the locus classicus of the first and second saṅgiti, has this to say (attributed to Mahāthera Mahākassapa) on the origins of the first saṅgiti:

Then at that time, your reverences, one named Subhadda, who had gone forth when old, was sitting in that assembly. Then your reverences, Subhadda who had gone forth when old spoke thus to the monks: ‘Enough, your reverences, do not grieve, do not lament, we are well rid of this great recluse. We were worried when he said “This is allowable to you, this is not allowable to you”. But now we will be able to do as we like and we won’t do what we don’t like’.

‘Come, let us, your reverences, chant dhamma and discipline before what is not dhamma shines out and dhamma is withheld, before what is not discipline shines out and discipline is withheld, before those who speak what is not-dhamma become strong and those who speak dhamma become feeble, before those who speak what is not discipline become strong and those who speak discipline become feeble’.34

It is clear that the words of Subhadda have been perceived as a mark of things to come. It is also clear from the account that, while some disciples lamented the Parinibbāna of the Buddha, some others felt relieved. This is clearly a bad state of affairs. The Mahāthera Mahākassapa decided to hold a saṅgiti and, in doing so, we can see that he was not initiating something totally new or unheard of in the tradition. Now that the Master is gone, it was necessary to get all the members of the Saṅgha to reaffirm their allegiance to the Dhamma and Vinaya by chanting them together. We are told, however, that before chanting together, the members of the Council had to arrange the word of the Buddha into Piṭakas and their subdivisions. We can see that this historical literary exercise has had a great impact on the subsequent history of Buddhism. Nevertheless, it has to be seen, not as an end in itself, but only as a means and a necessary prerequisite to securing the allegiance of the Saṅgha to the word of the Buddha which was now to be considered the master. This way of looking at the Councils is supported by the following remarks by Norman on the procedure of the First Council: ‘... when it had been approved as a genuine utterance of the Buddha, the assembly as a whole confirmed their approval by repeating it together’.35

The fact that the Cullavagga refers to it as the ‘chanting of Discipline’ is revealing. This suggests that, for the Theravadā tradition, the event was, first and foremost, a matter concerning the behaviour of its members bearing direct implications for the wellbeing of the organisation. Therefore, it was necessary for this purpose to have the Vinaya well organised and accessible. In his account of the First Council, Buddhaghosa says that, on being asked by Mahākassapa as to what should be rehearsed first, the monks said: ‘The Vinaya is the very life of the Dispensation of the Enlightened One: so long as the Vinaya endures, the Dispensation

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34 Tr. Horner, op. cit., p.394. What Horner translates as ‘... before what is not-dhamma... not discipline shines out...’, Jayawickrama translates as ‘In the past, what was contrary to the Dhamma and the Vinaya prevailed...’. Here the crucial term pure, according to him, means ‘formerly’ although traditionally it has been understood as referring to the future (and hence Horner’s rendering). If we accept Jayawickrama’s translation, the statement by Mahākassapa has to be understood as indicating a serious problematic situation that existed during the time of the Buddha. The existence of such a serious situation, however, is not suggested by any other evidence. Nevertheless, if we accept Jayawickrama’s reading, it makes all the more clear why the first saṅgiti was required. See N.A. Jayawickrama, The Inception of Discipline and the Vinaya Nidāna, PTS, 1986, pp.4 and 97, n.4.

35 Norman, op. cit., p.8.
endures, therefore let us rehearse the Vinaya first. This answer not only reveals how the Theravādins felt about their own way of life but also indicates how they perceived the role of the First Council itself. Therefore, it is understandable why they called the event as something to do with the Vinaya.

36 Jayawickrama, op. cit., p.11.
37 E.W. Adikaram, however, feels that this attitude underwent a radical change within the Sri Lankan Theravāda tradition. Discussing the hardships faced by Buddhism which forced the monks to commit the Canon to writing, he says:

'The period witnessed a change in the attitude of the monks towards ‘living the life’. Perhaps because it was easier to be a learned man than a saint, or perhaps the difficulty, and therefore all the more the necessity, of preserving the texts was becoming more and more evident, the bhikkhus tended to think that pārīyatti (learning) was of greater importance than pātipatti (living the life). The Manorathapūrṇaṇi tells us that a discussion arose among the bhikkhus who returned from abroad after the famine “whether pārīyatti was the root of the sāsana or whether it was pātipatti (pārīyatti nu kho sāsanassa mūlaṃ udāhu pātipatti)”. After arguments had been adduced on both sides the dhamma-kathikas [preachers of the Doctrine] gained victory over the pamsukālikas [observers of the ascetic practice of wearing rags]. Practice was relegated to the background and preaching gained supremacy. The Sutta defeated the Vinaya. How different this was from the older attitude! “Vinaya nāma sāsanassa āyu” (Vinaya is the very life of the religion of the Buddha) cried out in bold terms the thers of old. The change in attitude, although no attention has been paid to it in the commentaries, is of the utmost importance in the history of Theravāda Buddhism. This school of Buddhism claims its descent from Upāli, the greatest Vinayadharma among the disciples of the Buddha. Mahinda, too, the founder of this school in Ceylon, insisted on the reciting of the Vinaya by a Ceylonese bhikkhu as it was only then, he maintained, that the sāsana would take root in Ceylon. Mahinda’s Buddhism was a religion predominantly of practice, and the victory, mentioned above, of Suttanta over Vinaya, would not have been one after the heart of the great missionary’ (E.W. Adikaram, *Early History of Buddhism in Ceylon*, Colombo 1946, pp.77-8).

The Second Council, according to the Theravāda tradition, was necessitated by a clear Vinaya dispute. The ten points brought forth by the monks of Vesāli are matters of discipline. The most important among these points was obviously the last, namely, that gold and silver were allowable. When the venerable Yasa refused to accept money and said to the lay followers not to offer money, the Vesāli monks naturally accused him of ‘reviling and abusing’ the lay followers and they carried out the formal act of reconciliation on him. Now this is clearly a situation in which what is not Vinaya was shown as Vinaya (and hence what is not Dhamma was shown as Dhamma). The subsequent account in the Cullavagga describes how Yasa, referring to the statements of the Buddha, had to establish his view before the laity as the right view. In the Council each of the ten points had to be repudiated, again, by showing how they go against the particular Vinaya rules laid down by the Buddha. These ten points, investigated by the Order, are matters that are against the Discipline, not belonging to the Teacher’s instruction.

The Cullavagga account of the Council does not give any particular details of how the Dhamma and Vinaya were chanted on these occasions. It may be because prominence had been given to


38 I.B. Horner, tr., op. cit., p.429.

39 The *Mahāvagga* account(4: 63-4), however, provides more information: All these (theras met) in the Vālikārāma protected by Kālāsoka, under the leadership of the therī Revata (and) compiled the Dhamma. Since they accepted the Dhamma already established in time past and proclaimed afterward, they completed their work in eight months: W. Geiger, *The Mahāvagga*, PTS, 1934, p.25.

This seems to suggest that additions were made to the already accepted scripture at this occasion. Although this is a possibility, we do not have any clue as to what they could have been. Whether such a thing actually happened or not, the
the settlement of the ten points by referring to the standard Vinaya. But the *Samantapāsādīkā* and other sources give details. It seems that such occasions as these may have served as opportunities when the ordinary members of the Saṅgha, who presumably did not know all the details of the Vinaya they were supposed to follow, could learn from the experts of the tradition. The Cullavagga refers, as in the case of the First Council, to the event as the ‘chanting of the Discipline’ understandably, because the convocation was necessitated by a dispute over the Vinaya. The monks who agreed with the interpretation of the ten points offered at this meeting may well have chanted the Vinaya and Dhamma as the final act of solidarity. The very act of saṅgāyana – chanting together – seems to have been taken as a public expression of allegiance to what was chanted together.

The historicity of the third saṅgāyana has been questioned mainly because the Cullavagga does not refer to it and the other sects do not mention it. Whereas the Chinese tradition goes along with the Cullavagga in referring to the first two Councils, it is said that it is silent about the third. Judging by the fact that the first two Councils were necessitated by crises triggered by the controversial behaviour of some members of the Saṅgha, we can conclude that the Third Council was an historical event, for all the existing sources (*Samantapāsādīkā*, the commentary on the Vinaya, the *Dipavamsa* (7: 34-59) and the *Mahāvamsa* (5: 229-74; 275-9)) unanimously tell us that there was a crisis within the Saṅgha during the period of Asoka. The most obvious aspect of the crisis was that the Saṅgha could not perform the uposatha due to the lack of unanimity among the members. The *Mahāvamsa* says that the king himself performed the purification and ousted those who held wrong views, thereby making possible the performance of the uposatha. Inscriptional evidence is there for Asoka’s keen interest in the unity of the Saṅgha, but this particular act is not corroborated by such evidence. But, as Gomrich says, ‘it is hardly out of character for a king whom we know to have put up an inscription telling the Saṅgha which texts to study’.

Immediately after this account the *Mahāvamsa* describes the *saṅgīti* undertaken by seven hundred learned monks headed by Moggaliputtatissa Thera (5: 275-9). It is in this *saṅgīti* that the Kathavatthuppakarana, which is designed to establish the Theravāda interpretation of the Pāli canonical view vis-à-vis the views of the other nikāyins, was compiled by Moggaliputtatissa Thera. When we put together the story of the non-performance of the uposatha for seven years due to the lack of unanimity of the Saṅgha with the writing of the Kathavatthuppakarana in order to refute the internal wrong views held by some groups of the Saṅgha, we can see that the situation was serious enough for a *saṅgīti* to be held. A reaffirmation of the allegiance of the Saṅgha to the correct Vinaya and Dhamma was very much in order.

The history of Theravāda counts three more *saṅgītis* and reports several other gatherings, too, as *saṅgītis* convened for various reasons, such as reaffirming textual accuracy, consolidation of the Sāsana, etc. On these occasions, the Dhamma and Vinaya may have been chanted as an expression of solidarity even if there was no immediate threat of a crisis in the Sāsana.

40 See Norman, *op. cit.*, p.10.
In a tradition in which the Canon was transmitted orally\textsuperscript{46}, the act of collective chanting may have proved extremely valuable. In addition to the practical value in enhancing each other’s memory and checking for any discrepancies, doing so must have helped preserve the Canon as a uniform text. There is no doubt that all these things were aims of a saṅgīti. Moreover, the tradition has it that the first and third saṅgītis were crucial in shaping the Pāli Canon, by arranging its constituent parts in the first and by adding a treatise to the Canon in the third. The Cullavagga accounts of the first and second saṅgītis could have been added at the second. A factor common to all the Councils, however, is that each of them was necessitated as a response to a particular crisis within the Saṅgha. This indicates that we need to view these acts of communal recitals as determined, first and foremost, by a very important communal requirement, namely, the assurance of the solidarity of the Saṅgha, as a group, to one way of behaviour (the Vinaya).

Discussing the Saṅgha’s duty to preserve the scripture, Gombrich says that ‘Buddhism is perhaps peculiar among world religions in the extent to which it depends on the preservation of its

\textsuperscript{46} The Pāli Canon was committed to writing in Sri Lanka during the reign of Vaṭṭagāmaṇi Abhaya (29-17 BCE). Ancient Theravāda authors refer to this event as the Fourth Council (catuttha saṅgīti). See Norman, \textit{op. cit.}, pp.10-11, for a discussion. There is, however, no evidence to show that the act of writing down the texts was caused by any crisis among the Saṅgha. Although the origin of the Abhayagiriya sect, owing to a split of the Saṅgha during this period, is taken by many as a major reason for this development, it is difficult to think that the division had developed into a fully fledged Vinaya difference necessitating a saṅgīti in the manner the first three saṅgītis were called for. This does not mean that the Dhamma and Vinaya were not chanted on this occasion. The act of writing surely must have required chanting. Furthermore, it is possible that all the monks gathered may have chanted together what they had just committed into writing. But still this event cannot be compared with the earlier events in India.

\textsuperscript{47} Gombrich, \textit{op. cit.}, p.152.
EDOUARD ARIEL: HIS LIFE AND PRELIMINARY PIONEER BUDDHIST RESEARCH WORKS¹

M. Gobalakichenane

Among the foremost French pioneers of Indology Abraham Hyacinthe Anquetil Duperron ranks first. Almost next to him comes Edouard Ariel, for whom Eugène Burnouf had much consideration but whose life and works unfortunately still remain unknown. This brief article aims to recall his short life and to throw light on his tremendous efforts to try and understand the new philosophies and religions of the distant countries and to begin to collect all materials related to them.

Born on 5 October 1818 in a modest family in the coastal commercial city of Nantes, he first held an administrative post in the Harbour Authorities of that town from 1 August 1836 to 1 December 1840. During his leisure time he studied literature, history and philosophy. On 7 December 1840 he was successful in obtaining a post in the Central Marine Administration in Paris where he was able to spend his free time on literary, historical and philosophical works. He was even able to conduct research on the Celtic origin of his native dialect and its Oriental affinities. He thus came to study Hebrew and Sanskrit.

In early 1844, at the age of 26, he was promoted to the first class of his grade in the Marine Administration and nominated for a posting at Pondicherry, the former capital of the French territories in India¹. He boarded the vessel 'Le Berceau' at Brest on 13 June 1844 and landed at Bourbon Island (now Réunion) on 21 September. From there he embarked on 'La Sarcelle' for the Coromandel coast and on 15 November of the same year finally reached the town of Pondicherry where he was unfortunately to expire in less than ten years.

¹ Translation from the French of a paper prepared for the XIIth IABS Conference held in Lausanne in August 1999.
¹ Situated at about 160 km south of Madras, transferred to Indian Union de jure in 1962.

Holding a post in the secretariat of the local government, he managed to study the Mackenzie collection of articles available to him, the Bāgavatham, Foucher d'Obsonville's publication, Supplément au voyage de M. Sonnerat dans les Indes Orientales et la Chine (Amsterdam/Paris 1785), a French translation of Ejurvētham². In the face of great difficulties, he succeeded in studying the local vernacular language, Tamil, for which his teachers were Ponnupillai, Suppiraya vubatthiar and Somasundara kavirayar. In his first efforts at translations from Tamil to French he was helped by Eugène Sicé.

A staunch admirer of ‘Ellys’ (F.W. Ellis), the British Indologist who had also been much attracted to the Tamil language and literature and who passed away prematurely, Ariel spent some ten years in Pondicherry collecting manuscripts and making drafts and notes which were brought to Paris after his death and are now kept in the Bibliothèque Nationale (Western and Oriental departments). The majority of them deal with Sanskrit and Tamil languages. Although he showed the greatest interest in languages and literature, his scientific curiosity extended to popular religious beliefs. He began to study Indian Buddhism and was interested by the Buddhist remains in Pondicherry, Tamilnadu and other regions all over India.

However, his interest was drawn as before by the historical, ethnological and philosophical aspects of the new culture he was contemplating there. He collected all the manuscripts and publications available and made copies of a large number of registers and documents of great value. He was in correspondence with the famous Orientalists of Madras (now Chennai), Calcutta, London and Paris. He was also able to share his own admiration for Tamil with Professor Eugène Burnouf, who thought that the spread of that language to South India was such that there was a need to set up a separate chair for its study in Paris and who urged Ariel to come back to France in order to take charge of it.

He translated some famous classical Tamil works such as Tirukkural³, Atticūdy⁴ and worked also on Sindāmani, Tirumuru-gāruppaṭai, Kadāmanjari, Kallādh, Prabulingaleelai and Tiruccirambaḷakkōvai. According to his notes he was also intending to bring out: a grammar of Tamil grammars and other studies – a dictionary of Tamil dictionaries – a French-Tamil dictionary – an introduction with notes to Kural of Tiruvalluvar – a study on the cerebrals in Tamil – a research study on South Indian history from Tamil monuments and remains.

Absorbed by his numerous studies together with his official post, he neglected his own health. When he fell ill his doctors advised him to return to France very urgently. But he wished to finish his research studies and worked harder than before with the desire of sailing for France at the earliest opportunity. Unfortunately, his situation became critical and, completely exhausted, he expired on 23 April 1854 in Pondicherry itself in his 36th year.

In his draft notes he collected all available scientific knowledge about the subjects he was studying. And, more importantly, the author has unearthed some related principally to Buddhism which throw much light on the knowledge of this belief in the mid nineteenth century and therefore measure the progress made in the second half of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. Although this shows his keen interest in this new philosophy and his method of research, his works not being completed and his hand notes being in great disorder, they unfortunately cannot inform us

² A translation made by anonymous members of the French East India Company, brought to France by M. de Modave and donated by Voltaire to the Bibliothèque Royale.


⁴ Translation published in JA, Jan. 1847.
about his own findings and discoveries.

Among the papers of his collection kept in the Bibliothèque Nationale we can quote: Naf.8883, NAF.8912, Naf.8914 and Naf. 8915, of which the first and the last seem the most relevant.

In Naf.8883, we find copies of extracts from English articles about Buddhism, Buddhist remains (arts and monuments) in India, Tibet, Nepal, Indochina and Indonesia (fol.226 to fol.268); Ajanta in fol.236 and Salsette in fol.256 (probably mention of the Kâñhëri caves: Canari supposed to be the work of Canaras, translation by Rev. Fletcher, July 1841); – mention of a seated Buddha south of Pondicherry, near Arikamedu (fol.227)5; – mention of the principle of not eating meat in China and Tibet (citation from P. Georges, Alphabeticaum Tibetanum), but nevertheless adding the detail that the Buddhist laymen do not kill but can eat meat (fol.261); – reference to Buddhist ‘monts’ (fol.247, 268)6.

In Naf.8912, we find a bibliography of non-Brahmanical religions, originating in India and exported and those which were imported. For ‘Indian’ Buddhism, the works Divyavadâna and Avadâna-sataka are cited as coming from Nepal; – Schlegel and Rémasat’s pioneer studies are reviewed in fols.241-2; – anti-Buddhist conflicts with Tamil quotations are found in fol.246; – the history of Kandyan kings in Ceylon is briefly given in fol.249; – a Buddhist naturalism about a ‘bengala’ tree is evoked in fol.265; – and Tamil gleanings on Buddhism are present in fol.266.

In Naf.8914, there are copies of extracts on Buddhism (Hodgson’s Sketch of Buddhism, Père Tachard’s Lettres Édifiantes), Jainism, Christianity and Shamanism; – the Kânâeri caves are cited (fols.225, 233 verso); – and also the Kârli caves (fol.236v);

5 Already mentioned by the French astronomer Le Gentil who had seen it there in 1769.
6 Although there might arise a confusion with monks, the context of Nepal shows that this can also be applied to holy mountains.

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– Fergusson and Cunningham are quoted in fols.118-19. Historical documents of the eighteenth century (e.g. concerning the French military and naval leaders Bussy and Suffren) related to the rivalries between the French and British are also present in this record.

In Naf.8915, some detailed notes on Buddhism are to be found: the Buddhists have a Trinity: Buddha the revealer, Dharma the revealed word, Sangha the flock of believers (fol.14); – extracts from Hodgson and of the translation of Valhentyn’s Account of Ceylon (fols.19-22); – the Buddha’s names in various countries: the Japanese worship under the name of Xakia and of Buddha, the Chinese under Fo-o or Fo, the Tonkinese under Baout and Thia, the Siames under Ponti-chaon and Soman-caudom, the Tibetans, Mongols and Calmukos (Kalmysks) under the names of Xaca, Xaca-muni, the Sinhalese under Boudhum and the Tamils under Baouth, Baoutha (fol.24); – an interesting French citation runs as follows: ‘Le Dieu qu’ils adorent est un fantôme don’t ils parlent en aveugles et ils ont si opiniâtres à soutenir leurs erreurs grossières qu’il est bien difficile de les guérir. Ils disent que le Dieu des Chrétiens et le leur sont frères, mais que le leur est l’aîné. Que si on leur demande où est leur Dieu, ils répondent qu’ils disparu et qu’ils ne savent où il est’ [‘The God whom they worship is a phantom of which they speak blindly and they are so opinionated in maintaining their gross fallacies that it is most difficult to cure them of them. They say that the God of the Christians and theirs are brothers, but theirs is the eldest. Should one ask them where their God is, they say he has disappeared and they do not know where he is’] (J.-B. Tavernier, Les Six voyages . . . vol.2, Paris 1676) (fol.25v); – this legislator’s name was not even of Indian origin (the citation refers to Beausobre’s history of the Manichaeans, vol.1, p.55), as according to Brochard’s sacred geography, it seems an Assyrian word!) (fol.39); – a translated passage from the German of Professor Lassen: ‘(Asokha or

7 This shows clearly if needed how obscure was knowledge about Buddhism in that period.
Dharmasoka) was apparently unknown to Sir William Jones; even as late as 1836, James Prinsep, when on the eve of his brilliant discoveries, considered him an “ideal personage”. Professor Horace Wilson, in the year of grace 1849, would seem to cling to the idea that he is only “the shadow of his name”. Mr Elphinstone despatches [sic] in a few sentences, and other historians make no mention of him’ (fol.49)8; - the lion has a clever reference to the name of the Buddha, Sakyasimha (the lion of the Sakyas). Such pillars were therefore called Simhastambhas, lion pillars. Asoka himself terms them Silastambhas, virtue pillars, because he has engraved upon them his laws and exhortations to good conduct. On this account they are also called Dharmastambhas (as even now in Tamilnadu and all over India) (fol.52).

In Naf.8900 we find a long list of E. Ariel’s research and study projects which might be tedious if reproduced here in full. Let us nevertheless say only that, in addition to the works listed in the beginning of the article, his intention was also to (fol.126) bring out a new edition of the Amarakosha based on several commentaries and the results of his general studies; - bring out an edition of the Prayogaviveka with notes and a reconciliation of the Tamil with Sanskrit and Pali.

In fact, even when he was busy with his studies and translations during the years 1848-54, he got true copies made by copyists from the original Tamil manuscripts kept by the descendants of famous Tamil families, which were amongst the manuscripts brought to Paris.

We should mention here that the important Private Diary of Ananda Rangappillai 1736-1761 (first published in an English translation in 1904-28 successively by Price and Dodwell) is based on a copy kept in Madras from the family manuscript made at the end of the nineteenth century9. The Chronicles of Viranaiker II (1778-1792), published in the original Tamil version in 1992 by the author of this paper, also owe their existence to the interest Ariel showed in the history of the Coromandel coast and Karnatica during the eighteenth century and his efforts to have copies made in the same period.

In his bequest to the Société Asiatique we find three statues of the Buddha, two in alabaster and a third in wood covered in silver leaf surrounded by a tree, according to the report of 14 December 1885 at the Société Asiatique by the then librarian Léon de Rosny10.

In his draft notes Ariel collected all information available in his time about the subjects he was studying. And, more importantly, he unearthed all information relating principally to Buddhism which throws light on the scientific knowledge of Buddhism in the mid-nineteenth century, and therefore measures the progress made during the last 150 years (we should keep in mind that the historicity of the Buddha was recognised in the later half of the nineteenth century). This attitude shows his keen interest in this new philosophy and his method of research.

Little of his research studies has come to the knowledge of the public, although a few French Indologists in the second half of the nineteenth century seem to have based their work upon his collection and even sometimes his drafts. His name remains forgotten even in Pondicherry and France, mainly because of a lack of interest in Tamil and Dravidian studies and because of his short research life. In Paris, we badly lack a catalogue of Tamil manuscripts, which number about 550, most of which is Ariel’s

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8 See note 6.

9 However, the Paris copy due to Ariel’s efforts is more complete and can be used to check and fill the gaps in the English version, 1736-61.

10 ‘La Bibliothèque tamoule de M. Ariel de Pondichéry’. Curiously, however, E. Drouin, in his report published in JA XIX, 1892, talks of two gilded statues.
collection. We hope French scholars will give sufficient attention to him in the future.

As we have already noted, he passed away without having either the time to write his articles and essays based on his own findings and understanding or the opportunity and pleasure of publishing them. Nevertheless, considering the amount of his work and his several thought-provoking notes collected before the age of 36, Edouard Ariel deserves much more attention and consideration from the academic world and research scholars on Indian Buddhism.

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SOKUSHIN-JÖBUTSU-GI: ATTINGING ENLIGHTENMENT IN THIS VERY EXISTENCE*

Janice Clipston

The inception of Shingon Buddhism coincided with what was to be considered as the dawn of the age of Mappō, the latter day of the law, in which enlightenment was thought to be virtually impossible to attain in one lifetime. Kūkai (Kōbō Daishi, 774-835), generally acknowledged to be the founder of Shingon, took exception to this premise and, accordingly, became absorbed with the ways in which Buddhahood was to be actually realised. Analysis of the ancient controversy regarding the inherent nature of humankind resulted in the conclusive argument that, unless humankind was originally enlightened, then there could be no such thing as enlightenment. This is a reasonable position to hold, for the concept of Buddha-nature, an imperative of the Mahāyāna tradition, has confirmed that it is this seed of potential (or actual) Buddhahood which allows for the eventual enlightenment of all sentient beings. However, this was to take place over several lifetimes. Kūkai controversially claimed that enlightenment was possible in this very lifetime, could be instantaneous and would be realised in this very body. The theory of Sokushin-jōbutsu-gi, then, represents an attempt to offer practical realisation of the Mahāyāna premise of universal enlightenment. These assertions were, and are, clearly controversial ones and the object of this paper will be to formulate a critique of these claims. Primarily, I will present an analysis of exactly how Kūkai viewed Reality. I will then begin to offer discourse on the problems associated with the theory of Sokushin-jōbutsu-gi.

The commentary on the Mahāvairocanasūtra states:

The voiced syllables themselves are the empowerment bodies of the

Buddhas, and these empowerment bodies become all bodies in all places, so that there is no place they are not\(^1\).

Kūkai expanded the meaning of the term 'preaching' so that it might stand for 'not only verbal manifestation, but also gesture, colour and form, in fact, for all objects of sense and thought'\(^2\). From this it is possible to infer that the Ultimate Truth is present in all things and, as such, is available in the phenomenal realm. Indeed, this text leads commentators such as Yamasaki to state that, 'the Buddha and the unenlightened individual, composed of the same substance, are as inseparable as the moon and moonlight'\(^3\). It is this designation of 'substance' which poses the most serious problem, for this offers firm ground from which to posit the total identity of Mahāvairocana and humanity, contradicting the process philosophy of Buddhism. However, there is some disparity amongst scholars regarding this issue. Academic opinion shifts from the total identity of the Buddha with the world to partial identity between the Buddha and the world. Of course, there are many issues associated with both stances.

Kūkai's theory of Reality, it must be said, is problematic. We must note, at this point, that Kūkai held mind and matter to be identical. This is explicitly outlined in the *Sokushin-jōbutsu-gi*:

> Matter is no other than mind, mind no other than matter. Without any obstruction, they are interrelated. The subject is the object; the object the subject. The seeing is the seen, and the seen is the seeing. Nothing differentiates them\(^4\).

Although Exoteric Buddhism speaks of the Perfection of Buddhahood in the Body, it is far more inclined to consider the body as corruptible, subject to decay and bound by karmic energies to the uncompromising rotations of the Wheel of Life. As such, enlightenment is only realised in the mind that has transcended the body and is freed from physical encumbrances. The Shingon doctrine, by contrast, claims that Buddhahood is attained in both the body and the mind. As Snodgrass comments:

> The attainment of Buddhahood is an Awakening to the Knowledge that the fleshy body, just as it is and precisely in its present state of impurity and imperfection, is non-dual with the Dharma Body of the Tathāgata\(^5\).

It is this designation, then, crediting matter with the same character as mind, which forms a contradiction to some Mahāyāna philosophy. It is possible to say that, to some extent, the Mahāyāna philosophers contended that matter was unreal. In brief, claiming that it was illusory solved the problem of accounting for the imperfect nature of the phenomenal world. Shingon seemingly rejects this stance. As Snodgrass comments:

> Esoteric Buddhism accepts that the dharmas are transitory and fleeting, but totally rejects the view that they are in any way unreal. Even though the things of the sensible world are ephemeral and ever changing, they are real, just as they are\(^6\).

In other words, Shingon attempts to account for the world, not by denying its reality, but by emphasising it. All individual constituents are held to be real because they are parts of the Ultimate Reality. However, this reality cannot be seen from the phenomenal viewpoint, because the human consciousness lacks the ability to see these parts in their complete state. This is a kind of monism, a view of reality in which everything is Buddha. In brief, we have total identity of Mahāvairocana and the Universe. This is a difficult position to defend. Initially, if we are the Buddha, and by the same token *everything* is the Buddha, then there can be

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6. Ibid., p.12.
no external relationships, no duality. This often seems to be Kūkai's desired philosophical stance and, as such, would come closer to Mādhyamika thought. Indeed, it is from this doctrinal position that Kūkai approaches the theory of śūnyatā. However, this is redefined and presented from the opposite angle. As we know, Mahāyāna Buddhism claims that 'Samsāra is Nirvāṇa and Nirvāṇa is Samsāra'. Kūkai's theory of reality represents his own explanation of that famous and perplexing dictum.

It would seem that, instead of maintaining that all is emptiness in the 'transcendent' definition of emptiness, Kūkai turns this around and says that emptiness is indeed the true visible nature of all phenomena. Of course, with any such an admission there is an inevitable corollary, for Kūkai is then forced into the position of conceding that all must be phenomena, or rather, all phenomena must be transcendent. As Tanabe highlights:

Even the transcendent body of the Buddha manifests itself in the world. Even the world of sound – the wind in the pines or the call of a bird, for instance – are prechings of the Buddha.\(^8\)

This erases the perennial problem of vicesitude between the transcendent and the phenomenal. However, it then throws up many more problems in its wake. Primarily, if all is Buddha, then we must accept the 'bad' as well as the 'good'. Accordingly, then, if the 'wind in the pines' is the 'voice' of the Buddha, then so also must be the roar of the hurricane! In short, if we are to say 'all is Buddha', if we are to accept that 'all objects of sense and thought' are manifestations of the Buddha, then we must accept not only the 'good' but also the 'bad'. This is an inevitable consequence, for, having established identity we cannot then proceed to pick and choose which particular bits are Buddha and which are not!

We can consider two options in order to propose a solution to this particular problem. The first is to seek resolution in the fundamental philosophy of Tantric Buddhism. For the Tantric practitioner the tendency to differentiate 'things' is quelled by ridding oneself of desires and aversions. This means, in effect, that everything is to be seen as the same. The world is not divided into those things one likes and those things one dislikes. All things are to be regarded, quite dispassionately, as equal, through experience of those things. The ultimate aim of this technique culminates in the practitioner regarding all phenomena as in a state of equipoise. This means that, if Mahāvairocana represents the cosmos, and the cosmos represents Mahāvairocana, even the grotesque and the terrible must be aspects of the Buddha. This is clearly Kūkai's position in the Konshōmyōkyō himitsu kada.

When held by the eye of enlightenment, the miraculously swift yakṣas, the dark spirits, will reveal their secret identity. The reality of Hārītīś, child-eating demonesses, is nothing but emptiness. Do not become attached to names and forms of things that are but accidental. Forget names and forms and see their reality. You will immediately arrive at Nirvāṇa.\(^9\)

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\(^7\) Hakeda, op. cit., p.33.

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The question here must be, can it reasonably be said that a dharma is 'empty', if it has svabhāva? For this is what Kūkai appeared to suggest. If this is so, then various objections can be raised. In the first instance, if we are to posit a dharma with svabhāva, then this svabhāva must be defined. This is indeed a difficult task! As Th. Stcherbatsky aptly comments, 'What is dharma? It is inconceivable! It is subtle! No one will ever be able to tell what its real nature (dharma-svabhāva) is! It is transcendent! (The Central Conception of Buddhism, first publ. London 1923, repr. Delhi 1994, p.75).

To claim that this svabhāva is 'emptiness' may then seem to pose a solution to the problem. For, it could be argued, 'emptiness' is a sufficiently abstract concept to satisfy the above criteria. However, it could be said that, in the very moment 'emptiness' is defined as svabhāva, this abstract quality is lost! As S. Anacker states, 'The state of realising the Emptiness of all events is to Vasubandhu, as well as to Nāgārjuna, a state where all mental constructions dividing reality into discrete entities are absent, and there is seeing of everything "as it
However, this is a difficult view to cultivate and is obviously only apparent from the elevated position of enlightenment. So, how is one to relate to this concept from the limited phenomenal stance? Kukai commented thus:

The attributes are many, but they are one;  
Though they are one, they are many at the same time.  
Thus, the name ‘Suchness of Oneness’ is called for.  
The oneness here is the oneness of multiplicity;  
Namely, the infinity (of Suchness) is the oneness.  
Hence Suchness does not stand for permanency;  
It is the Self-identity of particulars of semblance.

This is a purely theoretical explanation which, although conceptually feasible, does not offer much insight into how we can see the unity of the cosmos as a practical, experiential dimension. Apparently, a more practical explanation is available through study of mandalas. The mandala is divided into several compartments, in which are depicted various deities, some of whom are often represented by letters. The mandalas of Shingon are said to be symbolic representations of the two major texts and, as such, aids to understanding. The mandalas depict the whole universe as a manifestation of the Buddha Vairocana, the manifestation is twofold and is divided into the categories called Diamond or indestructible and Womb or material and perishable. In other words, one reflects the ‘Buddha Realm’ and the other represents the phenomenal world. However, it could be argued that, if all is

one and interrelated, then we should not have such a separation. For, can it reasonably be said, at one and the same time, that although all is the same, all remains separate? Snodgrass explains the dynamics of this concept thus:

The two mandalas embody complementary aspects of Reality, those relating to sentient beings and the Buddha; to delusion and Awakening; to the relative and the Absolute; to the conditioned and the Unconditioned; to the phenomenal and the noumenal, the mundane and the supra-mundane. These complementsaries, and the mandalas that embody them, are “dual and yet non-dual” (nijifuni). The mandalas show them as dual, but they really interpenetrate, so that Knowledge is inseparable from Principle and Principle wholly merges with Knowledge. They are two aspects of a single dharma, which are simultaneously fused and disparate.

This is undoubtedly an extremely difficult concept to grasp, from our limited phenomenal viewpoint. Is not the very fact of separation indicative of difference? And, if this is not so, we still have to accept that the things of this world are transient and ever changing. In which case, it could be said that so also must be the Buddha. Of course, the implications of this are why should we have faith in something that seems just as fleeting as our own lives and our own world? Moreover, this brings us back to the problem of the undesirable elements of the world.

Alternatively, we can view the identity between Buddha and world as partial. This is the preferred position assumed by many commentators. For example, Tanabe claims:

Despite all of the emphasis placed on the identity between ordinary beings and the Buddha, Kukai knew that a real separation still remained. The Buddha does not stand apart from people, and for ordinary believers it is more practical and rational to understand that what is

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10 Hakeda, *op. cit.*, p.79.

11 However, this symbolism is by no means clear. After much study of available material, and much soul searching, I would tend to agree with C. Eliot who suggests that the mandalas are not intended for the layman, are not evident to the novice, but require further explanation. This explanation comes in the form of the ‘secret teaching’ which is accessible only to the initiate (*Japanese Buddhism*, first publ. London 1935, 3rd ed., 1964, p.334).


required is a communion between the two parties rather than an experience of exact identity\textsuperscript{14}.

This ‘communion’, then, took the form of partial identity. And this, I would claim, was the compromise Kūkai often had to make. In the Unği gi (The Meanings of the Word Hüm), we find the following:

Through the eyes of the Buddha, the truth can be perceived that both the Buddhas and all sentient beings are abiding on the same ground of deliverance. There is no distinction between this and that; they are nondual and equal. No increase or decrease is called for; they are, like a perfect circle, perfect in themselves (as to their intrinsic nature)\textsuperscript{15}.

We must note that it is only in the final comment, a rather subtle afterthought which appears in parenthesis, that we find the ‘truth’. In ‘our intrinsic nature’ we are Buddha. Accordingly, then, even though we are originally enlightened, we must refine this perfection, we must seek to transcend the muddy waters of humanity and rise towards the purity of enlightenment. This purity of the intrinsic nature gives reason to the practical aspects of Buddhism. If between man and Mahāvairocana there was absolutely no distinction, if we were of exactly the same ‘stuff’, then it could be claimed that there was little need even to practise Buddhism in the first instance. However, it must be said, if only the intrinsic nature of everything is Buddha, it is difficult to avoid some notion of duality, some semblance of a Self, which would obviously be anathema to many Buddhists.

Many Shingon Buddhists speak openly of the Self\textsuperscript{16}. However, I would argue that Kūkai sought to avoid such a position. Accord-

\textsuperscript{14} Tanabe, op. cit., p.297.
\textsuperscript{15} Hakeda, op. cit., p.252.
\textsuperscript{16} However, according to Tomio, this is not any kind of immutable, permanent Self, an Ātman. This seems to be regarded as a dynamic entity, ‘the root scriptures all point out that the nature of Self is void of all permanency. This Self does not lie in the heart; the heart does not lie in the Self. In the nexus of activity, which creates this very Self, lies the origin of the world and the

ingly, then, there is some confusion in Kūkai’s work. The tension between maintaining tangible links between Mahāvairocana and the world, whilst remaining true to Mahāyāna Buddhism, of which Shingon claims to be the most genuine representative, is evident. Unsurprisingly, amongst the scholars who interpret these works there is also confusion regarding the status of the enlightened person. For Snodgrass, as we have seen, the Shingon doctrine means ‘that Buddhahood is attained in both the body and the mind, just as they are here and now, in their untransformed and impure state\textsuperscript{17}. For Kūkai, however, and it must be noted this is in contradistinction to his earlier referred to position, enlightenment must be realised:

If you realize what your mind truly is, then you understand the mind of Buddhahood. If you realize the mind of Buddhahood, then you understand the mind of sentient beings. Those who realize the oneness of these three minds – the minds of practitioners, Buddhahs and sentient beings – are perfectly enlightened\textsuperscript{18}.

Realisation occurs through the action of Shingon practices. However, the devotee must have complete faith in the power of these practices. Shingon practice involves a complex type of meditation incorporating several aspects of ritual, which are collectively referred to as ‘The Three Mysteries’. Specifically, these are mūdras or ritual hand movements, yoga or deep meditative practice and mantras, which are symbolic words or sounds. These relate, accordingly, to the common human faculties of body, mind and speech. It is claimed that through these common attributes, in Shingon one can attain Buddhahood, for these are the ‘secret language’ of the Buddha. It is apparently quite possible to improve one’s position in this world through Shingon practice, for magical powers are assigned to the Three Mysteries. This would seem to
suggest the actual transcendence of our own, quite mundane, faculties, allowing a theoretical explanation of exactly how we can realise enlightenment in this body. However, as Hakeda highlights:

Kūkai interprets the Three Mysteries as expressions of the compassion of Mahāvairocana towards sentient beings. He holds that faith comes through the grace of the Buddha; it is not acquired by the individual but given19.

This firmly puts us back in our very human place! Yet, it is still maintained that grace is not to be understood within a noetic context. We cannot realise enlightenment without effort on our part, the ‘grace of the Buddha’ will not save us unconditionally, we must have faith and we must practise in order to cultivate our real nature. Evidently, then, there is a reciprocal relationship between Mahāvairocana and humankind which proves acceptable, in my view, to maintaining the partial identity of Buddha and humanity. If enlightenment is something that is given and received, then the resulting system is clearly a dualistic one, and the premise that between man and Buddha there is no distinction is negated.

Now, as has been confirmed, Kūkai considered humankind to be originally enlightened. However, as we have seen, he often seemed to be at variance as to the exact nature of this enlightenment. On occasions it would appear that we are perfect, just as we are, or actually enlightened. Yet, on others, it would seem that only elimination of the three defilements, the impediments of greed, anger and delusion, or klesas, would reveal the Buddha-nature, the pure, original state of mind. However, one must enquire if, as Kūkai claimed, mind and matter are exactly the same as the Ultimate Reality, then why are we not enlightened already? It would seem reasonable to say that we are obviously not enlightened. Therefore, there must be something that we must realise, and something that we must rid ourselves of, to become enlightened. If the thing to be gained is wisdom, and the thing to be lost is ignorance, yet all is the same, we have a paradox. What is this ignorance? Or, to put it another way, what exactly are the defilements? If they are emotion then they must be a combination of mind and matter – or brain impulses and sensory impressions; in which case, would they not then share exact identity with the Ultimate Reality? On the other hand, if they do not, then it must be admitted that they are some sort of extraneous power, and therefore different from the Ultimate Reality.

This is an extremely sensitive area, and one which demands precise definition. If the seed of enlightenment is not covered with klesa, Kūkai seems at a loss to explain the undeniable evils of the world and the unenlightened state of humankind. If humankind is Buddha, ‘just as it is’, and this seed is in fact the fully ripened fruit, then Kūkai must explain how the Buddha is himself evil and ignorant. Evil and ignorance cannot be denied, since we are in the midst of them. The logical outcome of this argument dictates that, if everything is the Buddha, ‘just as it is’, the Buddha must contain evil and ignorance. This seems an untenable position to hold. However, chaper 4, fascicle 2 of the Mahāvairocanasūtra reads as follows: ‘I am devas, nagas, demons and other spirits’20. In Kūkai’s perception, the ‘I’ refers to the Tathāgata Mahāvairocana.

Kūkai further claimed that enlightenment could be instantaneous. Does this mean that we do not have to follow a steady path of improvement in order to refine the Buddha-nature, but can realise enlightenment in a flash of insight, as it were? Although this would accord well with the theory of ‘momentariness’, we must not forget that most of us are an immeasurable distance away from perfection in our ordinary lives. Enlightenment is not a minute step away for most of us, in fact there is a huge gulf to ford. Accordingly, although insisting that enlightenment could be instantaneous, Kūkai still maintained that a person must go through different stages in order to become enlightened. Proposing ten stations of being, corresponding not merely to states of consciousness, but also the schools of Buddhism, Kūkai formulated a progressive path to enlightenment. Kiyota sum-

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19 Hakeda, op. cit., p.92.

20 Abe, op. cit., p.338.

marises these as follows: ‘The first six are the stages within the six destinies, the following two, the Srāvaka and pratyeka-buddha, represent Hinayāna, and the last two are Mahāyāna’21. Kūkai treated the philosophy of these schools to a series of refutations in order to prove the superiority of the ultimate state of consciousness, the tenth stage, which was only to be realised in the Shingon School and could be done so in one lifetime.

Of course, the immediate objection to this system of progression must be the finite nature of one lifetime. The brevity of one lifetime is undeniable, so was it perhaps rather unrealistic to imagine that these ten stages could possibly be traversed in such a short time? In defence of this position, we could accept the suggestion that this may have been possible for certain spiritually evolved individuals. However, this is seemingly not an option for, as Snodgrass claims, ‘Esoteric Buddhism... teaches that a perfect understanding of the doctrine of non-duality is not a prerogative of the gifted but can be grasped by men of small spiritual capacity’22. If this is so, then it could be suggested that to expect the ‘man of small spiritual capacity’ to transcend the complex philosophy of all these schools, not to mention the extremely challenging obstacle of one’s own ego in one lifetime, is indeed to hold an unrealistic view of human nature.

Now, clearly, even if this view of human nature escapes accusations of idealism, it must still be an extremely positive one. Any such view requires, at least in the preliminary stages, a strong belief in the inherent goodness of all sentient beings. Kūkai is believed to have held a very positive view of human nature, insisting that all creatures were potentially (or actually) enlightened. However, it must be said that, although Kūkai

21 M. Kiyota, Shingon Buddhism: Theory and Practice, Tokyo 1968, p.51. The development of the human consciousness was outlined in the Hīn-kyō (The Precious Key to the Secret Treasure). In this work, the progression of human-kind was chartered from an animalistic being, suffused with the grossest passions, to one who realised the most sublime state.


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displays this attitude in his later work, in his early writings we find the following view:

In the triple world (i.e., the six destinies), Madmen do not know their madness; Among those from the four births (mammals, birds, fish and gods), The blind are unaware of their blindness. Birth, birth, birth and birth, They are blind at the beginning of birth; death, death, death and death, they remain blind even in death23.

This can hardly be described as optimistic, and, indeed implies that the journey to the realisation of enlightenment is certainly a long one. Again, in the Sokushin-jōbutsu-gi, we find the following:

Observe the precepts sincerely and practice the samādhi of Mahāvairocana... Those who behave differently are those who offend the teachings of the Buddhas. They are called icchantikas (cursed ones) and will sink forever into the sea of suffering, nor will they ever escape24.

Icchantikas were, in early Yogācāra thought, considered as those individuals who had committed the most heinous acts and were thus far too wicked ever to realise enlightenment. Obviously, then, this statement conflicts with Kūkai’s premise that all sentient beings naturally posses the bodhicitta, or seed of enlightenment.

With an abstract concept of Reality comes the danger of removing all links with this life. In short, the transcendental and the phenomenal become too remote from each other. Despite the Mahāyāna premise, which maintained the identity of Nirvāṇa and Samsāra, this world, for many ordinary people, seemed too removed from Reality. Kūkai, on the other hand, maintains a strong identity with the world in a concrete sense. Indeed, it could be suggested that this is over-stressed – leading to the problems discussed above. Explanations pertaining to the realisation of enlightenment are indeed complex and, it is said, cannot be under-

23 Yamasaki, op. cit., p.134.
24 Hakeda, op. cit., p.95.
stood by rational means. Enlightenment cannot be described, conceptualised or even imagined, but must be experienced. Academic analysis can therefore only point out various pitfalls and inconsistencies, true comprehension is denied us. The depth of the question leaves our limited phenomenal intellect reeling and there are points at which one should simply cease to argue. The Esoteric traditions are at a distinct advantage here for they can claim that only they hold the key to the secret treasury of Ultimate Truths, only they know the secret of Sokushin-jöbutsu-gi. And they may well be quite justified in this claim! We simply cannot know. According to Kūkai, it is only from the tenth stage of realisation, when the practitioner has knowledge of the Supreme Esoteric Path, that Reality can be seen.

Now opens the store of mystic words
Where the hidden treasures emerge into the daylight
Where all the virtues and powers materialize.
The Buddhas in the innumerable Buddhist Kingdoms
Are nothing more than the Unique Buddha in the depths of our soul;
And the lotuses of gold, as many as the drops of water in the ocean,
Are our body.25

Janice Clipston

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BOOK REVIEWS


Volumes XXII-XXIV (1996, 1997, 1998) of the *Journal of the Pali Text Society* were noted in an earlier number of this Journal (BSR 16, 2, 1999, pp.232-5). Volume XXV has now appeared. It contains:


An appendix supersedes the discussion about *tassa-pāpiyāsikā* which appeared in SVTT II. There is an additional bibliography and list of abbreviations, and an index of Pāli and Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit/Sanskrit words quoted.

Peter Skilling: ‘The Sixty-Four Destructions according to the Saṃskṛtāṃśaṃskṛta-viniścaya’ (pp113-19). This article gives a translation and the text in the original Tibetan, Pāli or Sanskrit of a citation in prose and verse about 64 destructions of the world or universe given by Daśabalaśrīmitra in his Saṃskṛtāṃśaṃskṛta-viniścaya (Tibetan) and found in similar passages in the Abhidhammatthavibhāvīni and Visuddhimagga (Pāli), the Lokaprajñāpti (Tibetan) and the Abhidhammakośabhāṣya (Sanskrit).

G.A. Somaratne: ‘Intermediate Existence and the Higher Fetters in the Pāli Nikāyas’ (pp.121-54). This article considers the non-returner type (anāgāmi) called *antarāparinnābāyin* and the higher fetters of existence (*uddhambhāgiya-saṁyojana*) with which such a person is said still to be tied.

Junko Matsamura: ‘Remarks on the Rasavāhīni and the Related Literature’ (pp.155-72). This article is intended to bring to the attention of those interested Dr Matsamura’s edition of vaggas V and VI of the Rasavāhīni which was based on her Gottingen doctoral thesis. Although it was written in English, it

This publication is introduced by its author on p.xv as the first part of a planned larger publication devoted to the Sūtrasamuccaya (SS). What he there refers to as his preliminary English translation of this text already appeared in Linh-Sơn — Publication d’études bouddhologiques (Joinville-le-Pont 1978-82); the announced final version of his translation does not seem to have yet appeared.

The importance of the SS lies in the fact that it represents a thematic anthology comprised of extensive selections from canonical texts (Śūtra) concerning eleven topics of prime importance to the practitioner of the Mahāyānist path. These are: (1) the rarity of the appearance in the world of a Buddha; (2) the difficulty of finding a human existence, which enables one to practice the Dharma; (3) the difficulty of encountering circumstantial conditions suitable for spiritual practice; (4) the difficult achievement of full confidence (śraddhā) in the teaching (sāsana) of the Buddha; (5) the rarity of sentient beings (sattva) who generate the Mind of Awakening (bodhicitta); (6) the difficulty of achieving Great Compassion (mahākārūnapāla); (7) the difficulty of eliminating the things that impede the preceding; (8a) the difficulty in earnestly realizing the relevant factors (dharma) whilst remaining a lay householder, (8b) the mistaken practices of householders, (8c) the mistaken practices of householders attached also to enjoyments and a living, and (8d) the need for a person who practises earnestly to follow a spiritual mentor (kalyānāmitra); (9) the rarity of sentient beings having true and correct conviction (adhimokṣa) concerning the Buddhas’ Parinirvāna; (10) the rarity of sentient beings having conviction concerning the Single Vehicle (ekayāna); and (11) the difficult achievement of engagement respecting the vast greatness of the Buddha and the Bodhisattva. The most extensively treated topics in the SS are 7, 8c and, above all, 10; the section on the last topic also contains quotations of texts concerning the tathāgatagarbha theory (interestingly in the version of the Lankāvatārasūtra rather than of the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra or of other standard scriptures dealing with this theory). These eleven topics attest to the importance of this anthology of canonical texts for the person cultivating the Great Vehicle. Some canonical materials parallel to the contents of the SS, but differently arranged, are to be found in Sāntideva’s Śiksāsamuccaya, which is extant in Sanskrit.

The SS is now accessible only in a Tibetan translation from c.800 by Ye šes sde and his team — here published in a romanized edition based on the Beijing, sNar thān, sDe dge and Co ne prints of the Tanjur — and in a Chinese translation by Fa-lu (Dharmarakṣa?) from soon after the year 1000 — here reprinted in facsimile from the Taishō edition. In the Tibetan tradition the work is ascribed to Nāgārjuna, the source of the Madhyamaka school who lived in the early part of the first millennium CE; the authorship of the SS in the Chinese version is uncertain.

For the historian, an important feature of the SS consists in the fact that it yields a terminus ante quem for (at least significant portions of) the texts of Sūtras quoted in it. Problems that, however, arise in this connection are attributable, firstly, to the possibility that, as an anthology, the SS could in principle have been open to expansion and interpolation in the course of its long transmission; and secondly, to the fact that Nāgārjuna was not the author of more than one important Indian Buddhist master, and it has therefore to be ascertained whether the Nāgārjuna to whom the compilation of the SS has been ascribed is the same as the author of the Madhyamakakārīkās, and hence the source of the
Madhyamaka school. It is remarkable that the Chinese version of the SŚ is, by Chinese standards, fairly late. At the same time it is to be noted that in his Madhyamakāśāstrasūtra (verse 10) Candragīrī, who lived in the seventh century, i.e. about half a millennium after Nāgārjuna I, has counted the SŚ as one of the latter’s works; he has also referred to it in his Madhyamakāvātatārābhāṣya (p.402) in connection with the ekāyāna doctrine. The second part of the publication under review will no doubt explore in detail the above-mentioned matters arising in connection with the SŚ.

The editor considers the SŚ to be comprised of five ‘parts’ (pp.xvii-xviii). This is not strictly accurate since Tib. bām po, here rendered by ‘part’, normally refers not to a part of a text as defined by its contents but, rather, to a fascicle as determined by its physical length. A question arises also concerning the extent to which it will be appropriate to ‘amend’ without hesitation (p.xvii) quotations in a non-Kanjur text such as the Tibetan version of the SŚ by means of corresponding Sūtra passages from the Kanjur, or by means of corresponding passages from the Tibetan version of Śāntideva’s Śikṣāsamuccaya which is of course a Tanjur text, but a quite separate one belonging to a different author. The Tibetan translation of the SŚ may represent a textual transmission that is parallel to that of the Kanjur. In the course of its long transmission first in India and then abroad, the text of the SŚ may well have been influenced by corresponding canonical passages in Sūtra collections; but, in principle, textual traditions that are distinct should no doubt be kept apart in a critical edition.

To the present volume there is appended a helpful concordance between the edited Tibetan text, the Taishō edition of the Chinese and the four above-mentioned editions of the Tanjur.

This valuable publication is very much to be welcomed. It is hoped that the final translation and study, already announced in 1989 as ‘to be published, hopefully, in the near future’, will appear soon.

D. Seyfort Ruegg

Book Reviews


Lamotte’s La concentration de la marche héroïque was published in Brussels in 1965 and again anastatically reprinted ten years later. Most welcome now is the English translation of this important study, seeing the light of day after more than thirty years. In the meantime Sara Boin-Webb, as the official translator of Lamotte’s oeuvre, very successfully translated his Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, his Histoire du bouddhisme indien and other voluminous works of this great Belgian scholar. The Concentration of Heroic Progress (here-under abbreviated to Šgs) has in so far profited from its rather belated publication, as ample opportunity presented itself for updating the bibliography and enhancing the work as a whole. It can be said that Šgs is, indeed, a stroke of luck because the translator, while rendering the French version into English, was able to consult Lamotte about difficult points or proposed improvements so that the English translation of Šgs can be regarded as an authentic new version that has expressly met with the original translator’s approval.

The beautifully produced Šgs has no less than five prefatory parts providing useful information on the work in the context of Buddhist studies in general. Thus, in his introduction as technical editor, A. Skilton mentions that the index to Šgs has been expanded, the bibliography revised and supplemented, and that minor typographic errors of the French edition have been corrected. In Lamotte’s preface to the original French edition, reference is made to the well-established custom with those who translated the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa into Chinese that they also translated Šgs. Accordingly, it has also been Lamotte’s wish to conform to this custom since the two early Mahāyāna discourses are ‘closely related through their ideas and complement each other’ (x). A special feature is Lamotte’s
foreword to the English edition, being of Buddhological and Indo-
logical interest. Here is hinted at the school affiliation of the Vima-
lakśītinirdesa and of Šgs: "Along with the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras, they set out the Madhyamaka, the 'Philosophy of the Middle Way'" (xi). In some detail, the difficulty of translating the term 'Sūramga-
ma' is dealt with. Lamotte's rendering of 'marche héroïque' was not
unanimously accepted and occasioned an interesting philological de-
bate which the author records. He, moreover, offers an estimation of
the Khotanese Šgs fragments. As for attempts to reconstruct the Ur-
text of a sūtra in general — or of Šgs in particular —, 'by submitting
the material at our disposal to a process of textual criticism is', ac-
gording to Lamotte, 'an enterprise which is bound to fail. Each recen-
sion requires its own study' (xv). Here one can readily agree with the
author.

The prefatory parts (viii-xviii) are followed by 'Abbreviations and
Bibliography' and 'Additional Bibliography of Related Works' (xix-xxviii). On p. xxvii, three modern translations of the Śālistamba
Sūtra are mentioned. As for this discourse, two more bibliographical
items can be added: a) F. Tola, C. Dragonetti, 'Śālistambasūtra: El
Sūtra del Śālistamba', in El Budismo Mahāyāna: Estudios y Tex-
tos, Buenos Aires 1980, pp. 37-62; b) J.D. Schoening, The Śāli-
stamba Sūtra and its Indian Commentaries; Vol. I, Translation with
Annotation, Vol. II, Tibetan Editions (Wiener Studien zur Tibetolo-

The introduction to Šgs (pp. 1-106) is an exhaustive treatment of
the subject matter of the discourse and its historical background,
dealt with in chapter 1; in chapter 2, the Chinese and Tibetan ver-
sions of Šgs are discussed and placed in their respective historical
setting; a concordance of the Šgs translations concludes the intro-
duction. The key subject of Šgs, as its title already indicates, is 'con-
centration' (samādhi). In his disquisition, Lamotte refers to and
quotes from a number of Mahāyāna sources such as the Mahāyānist
Mahāparinirvānasūtra. On p. 38 is found the following sentence,
translated by Lamotte from the Chinese version of this latter discou-
s: 'The Tathāgata being endowed with the Śūramgamasamādhi, how

can you tell him to remain somewhere?' After this sentence begins a
new paragraph in which Asaṅga's Mahāyānasamgraha (also trans-
lated by Lamotte) is referred to. In this place another work, also
attributable to Asaṅga, may be mentioned which contains a quotation
from Šgs, viz. the Yogācārabhūmi. For a comprehensive study of
the 'Nirvāṇa Section' of this treatise see L. Schmithausen, Der Nirvā-
ṇa-Abschnitt in der Vinītavasamgrahani der Yogācārabhūmi (Österrei-
Schichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Veröffentlichungen
der Kommission für Sprachen u. Kulturen Süd- u. Ostasiens, Heft
8), Vienna 1969, who states on p. 7, op. cit., that in Yogācāra Bud-

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The second half of the present work consists of Lamotte's translation of Kumārajīva's Chinese version of Šgs, accompanied by copious notes in which the Tibetan text of the discourse is often referred
to as well as Pāli and Buddhist Sanskrit sources for stock
phrases in support of the given translation (pp. 107-241). The book is concluded by a helpful synopsis of formulas and stock phrases and the index (pp. 243-73). The present Śgs translation is a very careful piece of work and on the whole impeccable. In a few places, all the same, Lamotte's translation can be criticised.

On p. 15 the first Dhyāna is said to be characterised by 'reasoning' (raisonnement') (vitarka), etc. (T.W. Rhys Davids translated the term in the same way). Since 'reasoning' means 'the process of thinking about things in a logical way' or even 'the act of drawing conclusions from premises', this rendering does not seem appropriate in the given context. Cf. L.S. Cousins, 'Vitakka/Vitarka and Vicāra, Stages of samādhi in Buddhism and Yoga', in IJI 35: 137-57, 1992; he draws attention to the definition of vitakka as 'the fixing of the mind on an object of thought or sense'. In conclusion, he writes: '...vitakka at its weakest results in a tendency to speculate and fix upon ideas. More strongly developed it is the ability to apply the mind to something and to fix it upon (a meditative) object. Vicāra at its weakest is simply the tendency of the mind to wander. More highly developed it is the ability to explore and examine an object. In one way we can say that vitakka is 'thinking of something, whereas vicāra is 'thinking about' that same thing.'

On p. 20 Lamotte translates a canonical passage where it says that a person having jñānadarśana, knows that his body '...born of father and mother, is a heap of boiled rice and gruel'. As for the Pāli canon, this passage is found at D I, 76, 17-8: mātā-pettika-sambhava odana-kummas- upacayo. Lamotte's translation is identical with the one in J. Bloch, J. Filliozat, L. Renou, Canon bouddhique Pâli, Suttapitaka, Dīghanikāya, p. 68f. The French translation is possible, but unsatisfactory whilst T.W. Rhys Davids' - though a bit free - is to be preferred: 'it is continually renewed by so much boiled rice and juicy foods' (Dialogues of the Buddha I, PTS 1899, p. 87). Rhys Davids' understanding of the compound is corroborated by Suman galavilāsinī I (Nālandā ed.), p. 244: odanena ceva kummasena ca upacito vañdhito.

On p. 47 it is stated that for the Mādhyamika the Tathāgata 'ultimately amounts to a body of teaching (dharmakāya)'. This rendering is a literalism, and 'body of ultimate truths' seems preferable. For the many shades of meaning of dharmakāya see P. Williams, Mahāyāna Buddhism, the Doctrinal Foundations, London and New York 1989, pp. 171-5. On the same page prapañca is translated by Lamotte as 'definition' (definition), whereas the whole gamut of meanings ('diversity, diversifying speech' etc.) does not cover this meaning.


Given the contents of the present book making accessible to the English-speaking world in a thorough and at the same time attractive manner an early Mahāyāna discourse and its history in China, Tibet and Central Asia, one has to be profoundly thankful to E. Lamotte and S. Boin-Webb about whose work the former writes in his foreword: '...she has discharged this heavy duty with an eagerness and talent to which I am happy to pay homage'.

Bhikkhu Pāsādika


The present publication presents a German translation of Ubdhatasiddhasvāmin's Viṣeṣastava (or perhaps, to judge by the critical apparatus, Viṣeṣastava), a hymnic eulogy of the Buddha in 76 (or 77) stanzas, and of its extensive commentary by Prajñāvarman (completed, according to its colophon, by Sa skya Panḍita). Facing the translation of the VS on alternate pages there is an edition, based on the five main editions of the Tanjur (including the dGa' ldan ms.), of the Tibetan versions of these two
works no longer available in the original Sanskrit. The Tibetan translation of the basic text dates from c.800 CE, and that of the commentary from the time of Rin chen bzaṅ po (958-1055). The date of the author of the eulogy is uncertain. But – based on the identification (suggested by M. Balk, *Untersuchungen zum Udbhatasiddhasvāmin* [University of Bonn thesis, 1988], p.186) of the commentator Prajñāvarman with the translator of that name who worked in Tibet – it is suggested that the *terminus ad quem* for Udbhaṭasiddhasvāmin (mTho/Tho btsun grub rje) is the late eighth century or the start of the ninth century (p.13); Schneider considers that it may well be older. Tāranātha has placed him and his brother Śaṃkarasvāmin in the time of (a) Rāhulabhadra (who could be the contemporary of either Nāgārjuna I or a Deutero-Nāgārjuna).

The text belongs to what may be called Buddhist devotional literature, the object of the eulogy being the Buddha himself. Related works are the *Śarvajñāmahēsvarastotra* in 20 stanzas, apparently by the same author who there presents the Buddha as the true and genuine possessor of qualities commonly ascribed to Maheśvara/Siva (this work has been separately studied by Schneider, *Berliner Indologischer Studien* 8 [1995], pp.153-87); and his brother Śaṃkarasvāmin’s *Devāṭisāyasvattra/Devata-vīmarśāstuti* (edited and translated by Lobzang Norbu Shastri, *Supra-divine praise* [Sarnath 1990]). Another work by Prajñāvarman, his long commentary on the canonical *Udbhavanarga*, was investigated, *op. cit.*, by M. Balk.

The very considerable Buddhist literature of eulogy and devotion fills the first volume of the Tibetan Kanjur, of which a text based on the main editions has been published in Chengdu in 1995. A commentary on the VS from the nineteenth century is found among the collected works of (Bras Mi rāg mkhan sprul) Blo bzaṅ skal ldan. And after an edition it was published in 1957 in Beijing at the time of the international Buddha Jayantī celebrations at the instigation of Śes rab rgya mtsos – then head of the Chinese Buddhist Association – a commentary on it was completed as recently as 1995 by bSe sgraṅ bLo bzaṅ dpal ldan chos kyi rdo rje (the *Thub dbaṅ dgyes pa'i mchod sprin*, published in 1996 in Beijing). The text thus remains popular even now, and it has recently been republished several times also in India. A new publication on it is: S.T. Naga, *A Note on the Viṣṇaparṇī*, *The Tibet Journal* XXIII.2 (1998), pp.49-83, which contains an English translation of the eulogy.

A noteworthy feature of the two texts included in the volume under review is the fact that they contain much valuable material relating to the Brahmanical/Hindu traditions as known to Buddhists which is of great interest to the student of Indian religions. They document the remarkable symbiosis (probably a more accurate term than syncretism) of the Buddhist tradition with Brahmanism/Hinduism springing from the heritage shared by Buddhists with the ambient religions. Udbhaṭasiddhasvāmin is described both as a Brahman (bram ze) and a (Buddhist) Upāsaka (dge bsān) in the colophon of his *Śarvajñāmahēsvarastotra*. In Buddhist tradition as reported by Tāranātha (rGya gar chos byur, pp.51-2), moreover, Udbhaṭasiddhasvāmin and his brother figure as having originally been Saivas; but after a pilgrimage to Kailāsā – the famous mountain in western Tibet sacred to both Hindus as the abode of Śiva and to Buddhists as a holy place (gnas) – where Mahādeva/Maheśvara/Śiva manifested himself as really a Buddha, he followed his brother in becoming a confirmed Buddhist. The VS and its commentary also contain numerous references to Brahmanical schools of philosophy.

The many references of religious and philosophical interest in these two works have been conveniently assembled together in Schneider’s introduction (pp.34-40). In this informative introduction (pp.9, 16 f.) Schneider makes much of what he calls the apologetic, polemical and anti-Brahmanical/anti-Hinduistic stance of the two works. It is certainly true that, like a number of other Buddhist texts, they find a good deal to criticize in what Buddhists have often regarded as the externalism and automatism of much of Hinduism. But it is perhaps an oversimplification to speak here of polemics and anti-Brahmanism/anti-Hinduism. The Buddhist critique in fact operates at least partly within the traditional frame of the hierarchical superordination of Buddhism to Brahmanism and in terms of the contrast between the transmundane (loko-
ttara) and the mundane (laukika), a structural (rather than secular) contrast familiar from many sections of Buddhist literature. Schneider writes about this relationship between the two religions, and on its possible dating (p.11 ff.). He does not note the interesting, and fairly early, case to be found in the Abhisamayalamkāra (ii.1) where – developing an idea adumbrated in the Astasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā – the lower level of ordinary divinities (deva) is described as being so to say outshone (or indeed scorched: dhyāmi-kr-) – or, according to a variant reading, as blacked out (syāmi-kr-) – by the grand effulgence of the Buddha’s supernal teaching, which relates of course to the transmundane level. Appended to the book are extensive textual critical notes, a discussion of cited texts, a Tibetan glossary and a glossarial index of proper names.

This is a meritorious publication that very usefully draws attention to an interesting text and to an important but little-explored religious and cultural situation.

D. Seyfort Ruegg


This is a critical edition of the Sanskrit text of Prajñākaragupta’s commentary on seven of the most obscure and ambiguous verses in Dharmakīrti’s celebrated Pramānavaśātikā (see most recently the discussions by Oetke and Franco et al. in Shoryu Katsura (ed.), Dharmakīrti’s Thought and its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy, Vienna 1999 – not listed by Motoi Ono).

A cursory reading of the Sanskrit suggests that the editor has performed a careful and sound piece of work. In a few cases I am not sure about the readings or punctuation of the text but I shall have to suspend my final opinion until I see the annotated German translation expected to appear as part two of this project soon. (On p.69, l.4, tad anispattir must be read as one word to make sense: tadanispattir.)

In the Introduction the editor discusses relevant issues such as the title of the text, the Sanskrit text and manuscript, the (excellent) Tibetan translation, quotations in other sources, as well as other ancient commentaries, etc. This provides several new and useful pieces of information, but surely the editor must revise the date traditionally assigned to Dharmakīrti in the light of recent research. The fact that Dharmakīrti was known to Bhavya, Kumārila and Dharmapāla makes the suggested dating 600-660 quite impossible.

To the bibliography of this useful edition must also be added Shigeaki Watanabe’s edition of Prajñākaragupta’s Pramānavaśātikākārāra and Pramānavāśātikākārāra 2.1.abc and 2.4.d-2.5.ab: Sanskrit Text and Tibetan Text with Tibetan-Sanskrit Index. It appeared in the Journal of Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies 23 (2000), pp.1-88.

The language of Prajñākaragupta is fairly simple, but his style is extremely abstract and typical of Buddhist scholasticism. For those who wish to form an opinion of how Indian philosophers struggled to define ‘correct knowledge’ this new edition is a welcome addition to the existing primary and secondary literature on pramāṇa.

Chr. Lindtner


It is impossible to summarise the contents of this volume, which, along with a second volume, aims at being a translation and edition of the fourth and last chapter of Dharmakīrti’s perhaps
most important work, the Pramāṇavārttika – a sort of extensive commentary on the Pramāṇasamuccaya of Dignāga.

Providing a brief introduction to our text, Tillemans explains (p.xv): ‘Now, a parārthānumāna, as found in Dharmakīrti’s later works and in post-Dharmakīrtian logic, is an argument form consisting of two statements which show the means of proof (sādhana) for a proposition in question (sādhyā). The first state-

ment shows that the reason (hetu) entails the property to be proved (sādhyadharma), while the second shows that the “property-bearer”/”subject” (dharmin, pakṣa) of the argument is indeed qualified by this reason. Thus, the classic illustration of this form is “Whatever is produced is impermanent, like a vase. Now, sound is produced”. Hearing and understanding this verbal form serves to lead the opponent (prativadīn) to the understanding that the reason, “being produced”, possesses the three characteristics (rūpa) necessary to establish the proposition in question, viz. that sound is impermanent. Once the opponent has this understanding that the reason possesses the three characteristics, the actual inferential cognition will arise in the next moment’.

So, a parārthānumāna is a sort of scientific proof, as the Bauddhas in the tradition of Dignāga see things. Dharmakīrti, therefore, takes great pains to discuss each word in Dignāga’s definition, and to refute the positions of various opponents, Śāntkhya, Nyāya, etc. Ultimately, inference for others always depends on personal experience. A statement in itself proves nothing about the reality of the facts (vastubala) it expresses itself about. It merely helps others in seeing what one has experienced oneself. The two fundamental verses of Dignāga are still available in Sanskrit (op. rec., pp.9 and 47):

parārthānumānam tu svadṛṣṭārthaprajakāśānām /
tatrānumeyanirdeśo hetvārthaviśayo mataḥ //

svārūpepaśvā nirdeśaḥ svayam iṣṭo ‘nirākṛtaḥ /
pratyakṣārthānumānāptaprasiddhena svadharmini //

The first line must be corrected to parārtham anumānap tu so as to meet the metrical requirements, and the final mataḥ should be read as yatāḥ, to be consistent with the Tibetan (gaṅ phyir) and with the syntax. In Sanskrit manuscripts it is often difficult to distinguish a ma from a ya.

Much of the translation presented here is ‘a considerably revised version of what had appeared in a five-part series in the Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens, and in the Swiss-Asia Society’s journal, Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques, under the title “Pramāṇavārttika IV”’.

Many of the verses are difficult in several ways, syntactically, historically, or otherwise. Tillemans makes free use of all the available commentaries of Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi, etc., and he deserves credit for having for so long put so much energy into the anything but easy task of presenting this abstruse scholastic treatise in a form that is about as accessible as one can fairly expect. In many cases other readers will not agree with his interpretations. (I noticed misprints in the Sanskrit, all obvious, on pp.56, 66, 69, 76, 78, 92.) Can the reader make sense of translations such as ‘to have the goal of the reason as its object’ (p.10, etc.)? It (i.e. hetvārthaviśayo) here means ‘has to do with the meaning of reason’, or the like.

As for the date of Dharmakīrti and Bhavya (p.xiv) it must be kept in mind that Bhavya knows Kumarīla, and Kumarīla knows Dharmakīrti (who also knows Kumarīla). Bhavya also knows Dharmapāla, who also knew Dharmakīrti and Bhavya (to whose Tarkajvalā he alludes). Hence, Bhavya, the author of the Ratnapradīpa, cannot possibly be placed much later than Dharmakīrti. All of these philosophers must, therefore, have flourished in the second half of the sixth century CE.

Let us hope that Tillemans, in the midst of a busy life only too full of distractions, finds the leisure to prepare the second volume expected to contain the last part of the fourth chapter of Dharmakīrti’s great work!

Chr. Lîндтнер

This large book is Steven Collins' most substantial contribution to the study of what I shall call traditional Buddhism to date. Indeed, in some ways, it might be better viewed as three books and for this review I shall consider each of the three separately. The long introduction (117 pages with 24 additional pages of prefatory material) is largely concerned with theoretical issues and with an attempt to offer a framework for the rest of what is said. Part One (164 pages) addresses the subject of Nibbāna (Nibbāna) from several different angles, while Part Two (273 or more pages) is concerned with other Buddhist idealised goals. I shall address these three in reverse order.

The second Part gathers together a treatment of almost every kind of idealised situation described in the literature of traditional Southern Buddhism: heaven realms, idealised kingship of the past or future, jātaka materials, future Buddhas and so on. There is more such material than is often realised and Collins collects much of it here. Literary themes perhaps dominate in his approach, but since he seeks to draw both 'etic' and 'emic' perspectives, the result is a wide-ranging coverage unmatched in any previous account. The majority of scholars who have looked at this kind of material in recent decades have relied on (often rather poor) translations and have not really understood the texts in their literary and historical contexts. In striking contrast to these flawed attempts, Collins has a sound knowledge of both the language and the texts. Indeed, for the purposes of this book he retranslates many of the most important sources and summarises others – five appendices (57 pages) are given over to this and a few other texts are translated in the body of Part Two.

The first Part focuses on the specific subject of Nibbāna. Collins remarks (p.xiv) that he knows 'of nothing said about nirvana which is genuinely new and valuable, ever since the fierce debate between La Vallée Poussin and Stcherbatsky came to an unresolved end in the early 1930s' and goes on to make the somewhat bold claim that what he has to say is new. With some qualification, as we shall see, I think this claim is probably correct. The first two chapters give a thorough description and discussion of the textual evidence and imagery related to Nibbāna. The final chapter in this Part, entitled 'Nirvana, time and narrative', draws especially on concepts from literary criticism to put forward the view that Nibbāna represents 'closure'. This is an interesting way of looking at it and probably essentially correct. Is it new? In one sense not. After all, Buddhists have long regarded Nibbāna as the end of what can be said; in this sense it has always been seen as the point of closure for all discourse. However, the formulation which Collins adopts here is significantly different to anything explicit which Buddhists themselves have said about it and it represents in many ways an important step forward in scholarship.

In the General Introduction Collins introduces and contextualises a great many different ideas drawn from a number of scholarly disciplines: historical and literary studies, philosophy and social science, including social anthropology. The problem here is something of an embarras de richesse. There is a great deal with which one agrees and equally a fair amount with which one would like to take issue. Either way, one great value of this book is the introduction to Southern Buddhist studies of many important concepts from other fields of study. I can only address a few of these – firstly, one with which I disagree. Collins makes great use of a periodisation of human history into three stages: pre-agricultural, agrarian and modern. This absurdly lumps together in one category every human culture throughout the world from the Bronze Age until the rise of modern society. Collins is aware that such a periodisation has been severely criticised, but argues that it can still be used as a deliberately simple analytic model. I particularly don't agree with the label of 'modernity' here. Much of the world has changed so radically in the last forty years that to refer to the industrial societies of the nineteenth and the earlier part of the twentieth century as 'modern' is wholly inappropriate.

Related to this is the description of 'agrarian' society. Traditional Buddhism existed in such a society. So it is particularly
germane to the subject of this book. The problem I have is with the use of a certain type of terminology. An example would be the distinction between a ‘tribute-giving’ and a ‘tribute-taking’ class. I think this kind of analysis assumes a degree of simplicity and naivete which is unlikely ever to have been the case. No doubt, it is true that no-one likes paying taxation and many would avoid doing so if they could. But it is a gross over-simplification to suppose that people can only do so because they will be imprisoned if they don’t. Nor is it in any way adequate to describe their acceptance of the necessity as the result of ‘ideological domination’. Such trivialisations are inadequate for present-day society – they are equally inadequate for such societies of the past.

Of course, Collins in fact puts forward descriptions which are rather more sophisticated than I can possibly present here. So I will turn to aspects of what he has to say which I evaluate rather more positively. He makes much use of the term ‘imaginäre’. The expression itself I do not like. For me it belongs with ‘religious virtuoso’, ‘scholasticism’ and the like! One can hardly fault the denotation, but the connotations are sufficiently loaded to make these terms inappropriate for neutral scholarly use. But I do agree with his substantive point. In the post-canonical Pāli texts (at least) we find put forward an elaborate and highly consistent world-view, enduring over something like two millennia. Collins adopts the expression ‘Pali imaginäre’ for this. I suppose his principal reason for doing so is a wish to avoid the reifications inevitable with the use of expressions like ‘Buddhism’ or ‘religion’. There are obvious advantages to this. He need not be concerned with other traditions which can be labelled ‘Buddhist’ nor indeed with the overall religious traditions either in Southern Asia in general or in specific countries such as Burma.

Collins describes what he is doing as ‘decentering and recentering nirvana’. I think he is quite right to suppose that much of the problem with scholarly discussion of Nibbāna has been a tendency to contextualise it in accordance with assumptions ultimately derived from Western thought. As he comments: ‘... Buddhist felicities are not a random collection of good things, but a coherent imaginäre constructed and completed by narratively

unimaginable nirvana’ (p.116). In effect then, for Collins, the multiple goals of traditional Buddhism – rebirth in heaven, future life in the company of Metteyya Buddha and the rest – are integrally related to the goals of ascetic and meditational practice. This is certainly right and to the extent that this is the first book to seek to present that coherence in detail it is a major advance in Buddhist studies.

L.S. Cousins

Book Reviews


The primary focus of this book is conditioned origination (pratītya-samutpāda) as explicated in several Yogācāra texts, particularly the Abhidharmasamuccaya, the Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya and the Yogācārābhūmi. Their positions are compared to those of the Abhidharmakaśa and the Abhidharmakosabhāṣya (attributed by Buddhist tradition to Vasubandhu) and a range of other texts including the Daśabhūmikasūtra. The author demonstrates an impressive command of a range of languages, providing translations from Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese and Japanese materials. He primarily concentrates on how the various members of the (generally twelvefold) chain of conditioned origination are explained in Indian sources, comparing and contrasting the formulations of both Mahāyāna and non-Mahāyāna Abhidharma writers.

Kritzer begins with a discussion of the authorship of the Abhidharmasamuccaya and the Yogācārābhūmi, both traditionally attributed to Asaṅga, but indicates a number of reasons for doubting this association. The next section juxtaposes translations from a number of texts dealing with various aspects of conditioned origination. This section is particularly effectively presented, as it allows the reader easily to compare key doctrinal points in the Abhidharmasamuccaya and –bhāṣya, sections of the Yogācāra-
bhūmi and the Daśabhūmikasūtra. In the next section he meticulously compares these formulations in the light of both Buddhist tradition and contemporary scholarship, delineating the respective formulations of these texts. This leads to an analysis of various positions attributed to Vasubandhu in the Abhidharmakosā and -bhasya and in his later Mahāyāna works. The scholarship in this section is impressive both for the range of sources Kritzer considers and for the careful translations he provides from Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese sources.

In his analytical remarks Kritzer points out that, although the Abhidharmasamuccaya and Yogācārabhūmi are generally classified as Yogācāra texts, their discussions of conditioned origination contain little distinctively Yogācāra vocabulary and often share both terminology and doctrinal standpoints associated with Sautrāntika and other Abhidharma systems. He also notes that the Abhidharmakosabhāṣya – considered by Buddhist tradition to be a critique of Sarvastivāda doctrines from a Sautrāntika perspective – actually shares much more in common with the Yogācārabhūmi than with the positions of Indian thinkers generally considered to be ‘Sautrāntikas’. He concludes on p.279 that ‘if we call Vasubandhu a Sautrāntika, he is a different kind of Sautrāntika than, for example, Harivarman or Śrīlāta’.

The actual significance of this insight may not be as great as Kritzer appears to believe. One significant problem with his analysis is that he tends to treat doxographical categories as rigid designators, and appears to believe that Buddhist thinkers like Vasubandhu consciously saw themselves as upholding particular philosophical systems and working strictly within their doctrinal parameters. If, however, Buddhist tradition is correct in maintaining that Vasubandhu freely critiqued Sarvastivāda positions in the Abhidharmakosabhāṣya and again switched affiliations upon his conversion to the Mahāyāna, it would appear that he was more concerned with articulating consistent and defensible philosophical positions rather than attempting to adhere dogmatically to any particular ‘system’. This is actually the most plausible conclusion of Kritzer’s own analyses of Vasubandhu, but his reliance on arbitrary doxographical designation prevents him from seeing this.

Perhaps because Kritzer mainly treats philosophical doctrines within the boundaries delineated by later doxographers, he generally fails to recognise that the texts he discusses are philosophical texts written by philosophers. His essentially doxographical approach tends to simplify and reduce the arguments and analyses of Asaṅga, Vasubandhu and other Buddhist thinkers to discussions of which ‘school’ a particular text or section represents. This overlooks the fact that Vasubandhu was an original thinker who was willing to reconsider his former views (and those of his teachers) and who demonstrated a flair for articulating and defending innovative ideas. Because Kritzer tends to ignore the possibility that the people he analyses may have been independent-thinking philosophers rather than sectarian dogmatists, he also fails to consider what is at stake philosophically in the various positions he studies or why a given position might have been chosen in preference to others.

Another problem with Kritzer’s approach is the confidence he shows in pronouncing some texts as ‘early’ or ‘late’. He appears to have a chronology in mind for the composition of the texts he considers, as well as for sections within them, but is not clear on how he arrives at it. He indicates at the beginning of the work that his analysis builds on Lambert Schmithausen’s monumental Alavijñāna (Tokyo 1987), but he fails to make clear the bases of his own chronology. On p.159 he indicates that he is aware that at present little is known about the actual chronology of Indian Buddhist texts, but this statement appears to be at odds with the general confidence he exhibits in making pronouncements concerning relative dates of composition.

This is a dense work, clearly intended only for specialists, which is made unnecessarily obscure by the author’s persistent use of technical terms without either translating or explaining them. Specialists in Yogācāra studies and Abhidharma will be familiar with terms such as cittavipaśyuktasamśāra – which is used throughout the book but never translated or explained – but it would be helpful for non-specialists had Kritzer at least provided an initial translation of the numerous (and in some cases fairly obscure) technical terms he uses. Even in a work intended mainly for
a small specialist audience technical terms should be translated or at least explained so that a non-specialist reader has some hope of understanding it.

Despite these criticisms, Kritzer's work represents a significant contribution to Yogacara studies. He is meticulous in his translation and analysis of texts, and both careful and restrained in drawing conclusions. In addition to surveying an impressive range of Indian Buddhist materials in several languages, he makes another important contribution in considering Japanese academic studies of these topics. He also demonstrates a thorough familiarity with the secondary literature in Western languages and uses this knowledge effectively in a number of places by considering various positions carefully in the light of Yogacara texts. There is much here of interest for specialists in Yogacara studies, and the work is well worth careful reading. It also opens up a number of important questions for further study and highlights some previously unnoticed doctrinal connections between the positions of various Abhidharma writers and systems.

John Powers


That there is more than one way to present a general survey of Indian Buddhism becomes obvious not only when this work is compared with other introductions to Buddhism, but even when one compares the different contributions contained in this volume, and, finally, when one compares it with the previous survey of Buddhism by the late Andre Bareau which appeared in 1964, also in the series 'Die Religionen der Menschheit', Vol. 13.

The largest amount of space has been assigned to Johannes Bronkhorst (pp. 23-213), who has chosen not to accumulate as much factual information as possible, but rather to attempt, as he says, to render the relationship between certain fundamental Buddhist teachings comprehensible. Bronkhorst wants to understand the Buddhist teachings in relationship to their historical, cultural and intellectual surroundings (p. 26).

Accordingly, he writes about 'Die Lehre des Buddhas' (pp. 26-76), 'Die Ordnung der Lehre' (pp. 76-127), 'Mahayana' (pp. 173-83), concluded by some final remarks, 'Schlussbetrachtungen'.

In many ways the reviewer does not share Bronkhorst's views concerning the historical development, etc., of Indian Buddhism. This brief review is not the proper place to discuss the differences (see my contribution 'Buddhism as Brahmanism' in Indologica Taurinensia XXIII-XXIV, pp. 217-46, which can be seen as a sort of review of previous expositions of early Buddhism).

One of the most remarkable ideas expressed by Bronkhorst concerns the likelihood of Greek philosophical influence on Sarvastivada in Gandhara (pp. 124-5), the question he asks is whether the Buddhists learnt the art of rational discussion from the Greeks (p. 125).

The late Hans-Joachim Klimkeit writes about 'Die Heilsgestalten des Buddhismus' (pp. 215-79). For him the life of the Buddha is legend (five different layers, p. 219) and religion, rather than factual history. He usually follows the views of Schlingloff, Waldschmidt, von Simson (esp. on the astronomical background of the seven Buddhas, p. 237), Luders and other fine German scholars. Also, he is aware of Christian parallels, but apparently not of their deeper significance. Thus, in the excellent chapter on Maitreya, the episode about the latter found in the Divyavadana is surely related to the episode of Jesus in Gethsemane (p. 239). And does the name of the Bodhisattva Ksitigarbha not remind us of Jesus in the bowels of the earth (Matthew 12:40) (p. 268)?

Petra Kieffer-Pulz has written a very good, detailed and systematic survey of all aspects of the life of the Buddhist Sangha (pp. 281-396). Finally, S. Lienhard has written about the traditional Buddhism of Nepal, Jens-Uwe Hartmann about Buddhism in Afghanistan and Central Asia, Ian William Mabbet about Buddhism in Burma and Thailand, and Jacob Ensink about Buddhism in Java and Bali, etc.
As the editor-in-chief, Heinz Bechert, explains in the Introduction, this is only the first of three volumes. A second volume will deal with Theravāda and Tibetan Buddhism, a third with Buddhism not only in East Asia but also Europe and North America. Bechert is modest enough to confess that these volumes are not intended to replace earlier standard works (by Lamotte, etc.), but rather to supplement them.

As long as one is receptive to the view that there are many ways to write a 'Gesamtdarstellung' of Buddhism, there is no reason not to recommend this work to all who take an interest in Indian Buddhism.

Chr. Lindtner


The problem of teleology (explaining apparent goal-oriented processes in nature and human behaviour) is a tricky one even in Western philosophy and scientific thought. Studying it in the context of the doctrine of karma is an ambitious task and it involves the problem of how human actions bring about rewards or punishments via external events believed to be results of those actions, even if they are manifested long after their performance, perhaps in future lives. Aware of this fact, the author admits that his material is quite limited, but he thinks that even so it could be useful to future writers on Indian philosophy. But first he surveys the controversies around mechanical explanations (which admit of only 'proximate' [i.e. preceding] causes of events) and teleological explanations (which allow also for 'final' or 'ultimate' causality, i.e. processes guided by future goals yet to be achieved). These controversies already started with ancient Greek atomists, heavily criticised by Plato, and still continue now in biology even after Darwin's non-teleological theory of evolution, and even in psycho-

logy (as reflected, e.g., in the opposing systems of behaviourism and psychoanalysis).

Turning to the Indian attempts to describe a 'mechanism' which would explain long-term karmic retribution (seemingly a typical goal-oriented process), the author maintains that some Indian thinkers also did so in non-teleological terms. He then discusses five classical systems of Hindu philosophy (leaving out Vedānta) and, on the Buddhist side, the ideas of Vasubandhu and early Yogācāra. A short section is dedicated to a text of the Yogavāsiṣṭha tradition called Mokṣopāya-śāstra, and at the end Jainism gets a couple of pages.

Sāṅkhya is singled out first, because it fully accepted teleological explanations; nature (prakṛti) is goal-oriented, serving the purpose of the puruṣa (which is, ultimately, his liberation), however much the logic of this stance may leave to be desired. When considering the position of the classical Yoga system, the author, as is usual albeit not fully justified, does so in conjunction with Sāṅkhya; he regards the Yoga Sūtra as well as Yoga Bhāṣya as presenting the Sāṅkhya philosophy, although he notices there some traces of explanations in terms of proximate causes.

Vaiśeṣika, in association with the logic of Nyāya, tried, in direct opposition to Sāṅkhya Kārika, to explain human behaviour in non-teleological terms: it sees it as motivated by past experiences which lead to avoiding what brings suffering and seeking what brings happiness. The author regards this as 'a quasi behaviourist view'. Even liberation seems to fit in: the experience that in essence all activity leads to suffering results in the decision to abstain from all activity and thus obtain liberation. Explaining the mechanism of karmic retribution is another matter, however, and it led to the later development of the theory of dharma and adharma as unseen (adroṣta) qualities of the soul. This in turn brought about the introduction of the creator God which meant, of course, the abandonment of the non-teleological stance. The notion of God who looks after the process of retribution seems to be, for some thinkers such as Śaṅkhara, the clean solution to the problem, but it does not in fact amount to explaining karma at all. (That is perhaps why the author did not have to concern himself
with the system of Vedānta.) When the author tests, on this point, the combined Sāṅkhya-Yoga, as he understands it, it appears to him to have remained faithful to its intrinsic teleological explanation even in later stages of its development when it also played with the notion of a creator God without, however, ascribing to him a role in the karmic process – which leaves some logical problems unaddressed.

One thinker who succeeded better than others in accounting for karmic retribution in non-teleological terms was, in the author's view, Vasubandhu of whom he, for the purposes of his exposition, assumes that he wrote both the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya from the point of view of the Śautrāntika school of Buddhism and the Viṃśatikā which takes the stance of Yogācāra (presumably written, as the tradition has it, after Vasubandhu converted to this school). It goes without saying that it had to be achieved without the help of a creator God. The goal-oriented processes which bring karmic retribution, in other words the series which connects a deed with its fruition, is a sequence of mind-events arisen from intentional action in which there is no trace of teleology, yet it also affects the (presumably external) world which is shaped by the power of the deeds of all living beings, although the Bhāṣya text admits that the process is in essence incomprehensible, as the Buddha himself had remarked. This was, of course, a gap in the logical sequence of explanations which the enquiring mind could not leave untouched. How can mind-events bring fruition in the external world? The gap was bridged in the Viṃśatikā by the adoption of the idealistic view which does away with the external world, replacing it with an intersubjective world of mind-events, a product of the series of volitions of all beings. These volitions are ultimately born of ignorance, as transpires from the dependence chain known as pratītyasamutpāda. When this is understood, usually in terms of understanding the Four Noble Truths, ignorance is lifted, volitions cease and liberation is achieved.

The author only touches upon the different solution of the Sarvāstivāda school with its insistence on the permanent existence of not only the present but also the past and future, and dedicates further space to the discussion of the origin of Yogācāra idealism. Here he draws a lot on the work of Lambert Schmithausen, who sought this origin in the method of meditational practice which involved visualisation. The author differs from him, pointing out that meditational experiences are also called upon to confirm ultimate tenets by non-idealistic schools, e.g. Vaiśeṣika, and that there were compelling reasons for thinkers such as Vasubandhu to turn to idealism in the course of a purely conceptual search for explanations. In the process the complications around the concept of ālayavijñāna and its role in generating idealistic notions, as well as its link with explanations of karmic fruition, are also extensively discussed. In the end the author admits to the hypothetical nature of both his and Schmithausen's conclusions. Many other factors, too, may have played a role in the appearance of Yogācāra idealism.

The short piece on Mokṣopāya-Śāstra was added by the author presumably because it is similar to Yogācāra. In fact, it even appears to border on 'subjective illusionism'. A contrast is then provided by a section on Pūrva-Mimāṁsā, the orthodox Brāhmaṇical theory of ritual sacrifice which is karma par excellence: the ritual act, if correctly performed, brings about results, such as wealth and heaven, but by what mechanism? The system, on the whole, does not concern itself with this problem, although the question does crop up in commentaries. But it was only Śābara who seems to have attempted to address it seriously, in psychological terms. Other commentators would seem to have assumed that karma can somehow look after itself. The closing note on Jainism, which does not accept the notion of a creator God and holds a realistic view of the world, points out the ease with which the Jaina tradition treated the problem. Conceiving karma (generated by individual actions) as something like dust particles which stick to the soul and drag it down into the material world, it explains liberation as the purification of the soul from these particles so that it then rises to the top of the universe. Jainism, however, completely fails to explain how this dust-like karma is able to influence the world at large.
This publication is a collection of uneven germinal academic papers connected by a common theme as expressed by its title. It represents, as far as it goes, a useful aid for further research, with its wealth of references and extensive quotations from modern publications as well as original Sanskrit sources. Its style of argumentation is typical for academic papers, with minute analyses of subtle points from different angles, leading to tentative conclusions which would need to be looked at again in the course of further research. But its style of writing is clear and easy to follow—which is a great improvement on an earlier publication of the author (reviewed in BSR 5, 1988, pp.80-7).

Karel Werner


This is a Festschrift in memory of Frederick J. Streng (1933-93), scholar and former president of the Society of Buddhist-Christian Studies. The collection consists of dialogues involving thirteen academics, roughly half being Christian and half Buddhist. The book’s pattern consists of pairs of exchanges on a selected topic, with a Buddhist essay followed by a Christian response, or vice versa. The discussion spans a range of topics, including the nature of interreligion dialogue, Buddhist and Christian views of ultimate reality, nature and ecology, social engagement, and ultimate liberation.

Inevitably the dialoguers are not a typical cross-section of the Buddhist and Christian communities. All are academics, and the Buddhists are all Westerners, presumably converts to Buddhism in later life: Alan Sponberg, for example, belongs to the Friends of the Western Buddhist Order (p.149). All the Buddhist contributors seem to come from the Mahāyāna tradition, and none seems to belong to monastic communities. All this gives the book a distinctive bias, although few, if any, interreligious dialogues achieve a typical cross-section of dialogue partners.

The discussants show an awareness that other forms of Buddhism abound, although Winston L. King, mentioning a Sinhalese monk who claimed to worship the Buddha, describes his words as 'atypical and strictly unofficial, even “heretical”' (p.53). This raises the question – which none of the discussants address – of who ‘owns’ a religion and is entitled to pass such judgements about authenticity; after all, both the major Buddhist traditions consist overwhelmingly of lay followers, who ‘pray’ to the Buddha (or buddhas and bodhisattvas) seeking pragmatic benefits. Being Western academic converts, the Buddhist discussants appear to espouse a sanitised and intellectual version of the religion, although it is to King’s credit that he does not use the Sinhalese monk to make false identity claims about Buddhist and Christian devotion.

The dialogues, in fact, are marked by a healthy refusal to seize on apparent parallels between Buddhism and Christianity. Thus, neither Bonnie Thurston, Malcolm David Eckel or Paula M. Cooey, in their discussions of ‘ultimate reality’, maintains that the various Christian concepts of God are equivalent to concepts such as śūnyatā or the Dharma-kāya – an identification previously made by earlier pioneers of inter-faith dialogue, such as John Hick. On environmental ethics, Alan Sponberg notes (no doubt echoing FWBO founder-leader Sangharakshita) that Buddhist ethics is not based on rights, but on the individual’s progress towards Nirvāṇa (p.118). Sallie King notes that Buddhist attitudes to the treatment of animals are more influenced by the notion of interdependence, since humans and animals alike are enmeshed in Saṃsāra (p.173).

My concerns about this volume are mainly concerns about the nature of interreligion dialogue itself. Winston King and David Chappell discuss whether there are ‘non-negotiables’ in dialogue (pp.51, 61), Eckel says that ‘bridges can be built’ (p.80), and John P. Keenan, in his exposition of the New Testament Letter of James, claims to use ‘the philosophical tools of Mahayana thought...as a lens’ (p.186). Such statements raise fundamental
questions about the purpose and nature of dialogue. To speak of 'non-negotiables' seems to imply that dialogue is some kind of bargaining, in which the various parties can be expected to modify their previously held positions. It is difficult to see what Eckel's 'bridge building' amounts to when he suggests – rather implausibly, in my view – that the Christian teaching of incarnation can be understood by comparing it with invoking God's power by means of a mantra. Finding points in common has been pursued in interreligious dialogue, but surely understanding and respecting differences are to be valued more highly, both intellectually and morally? Eckel's analysis of James, competent and enlightening as it is, really only makes a few sideways glances at parallel concepts in Buddhism ('hearers of the word' and śrāvakas, 'doers' and bodhisattvas, 'bridling one's tongue' and abhilāpa-vasanā – 'permeations of language' (p.193)); there is no real Mahāyāna philosophical analysis of the text, and indeed, apart from these few Buddhist asides, this essay could equally have come from a Jewish or Christian scholar.

At times it is difficult to tell who are the Buddhists and who are the Christians in these dialogues, but the discussions are non-adversarial and, as the editors point out, there is much interdependence of ideas in the volume. As the editors state, 'Not everyone can say simply, "I am a Buddhist" (as opposed to Christian) or "I am a Christian" (as opposed to Buddhist)' (p.xviii). It was of course Christian scholars who devised labels such as 'Hinduism' and 'Buddhism' as ways of pigeon-holing large groups of people who did not espouse Christianity. If inter-religious dialogue causes a blurring or even a removing of these labels, this will be an interesting outcome.

George D. Chryssides

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