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THE PATH OF THE HOUSEHOLDER:
BUDDHIST LAY DISCIPLES IN THE PÂLI CANON

ROBERT BLUCK

It is often argued that Buddhism is an essentially monastic religion, where the lay people support the monks and practise morality, rather than aim for substantial spiritual progress themselves. This is tacitly assumed to be the case both historically and in many modern Buddhist communities. I will examine the extent to which this view is supported by the ancient Pâli texts. Was the original difference between monastics and lay Buddhists a qualitative one (where monastic status itself gave access to spiritual progress) or a quantitative one (where lay people simply had fewer daily opportunities for spiritual practice)? Or was it perhaps a mixture of the two?

A combination of modern commentators and Pâli texts in translation will be used to investigate the role of lay disciples in the Buddha’s time. I will look in turn at: the relative status of lay people and monastics; the teachings offered to lay people by the Buddha himself and by his senior monks; the categories of spiritual progress which could be made; and examples of both ordinary and exceptional lay people in the texts. This should allow a conclusion to be drawn as to whether the earliest lay disciples were ‘second-class Buddhists’ or not.

Conze argues strongly for the primacy of the monastic life throughout Buddhism:

In its essence and inner core, Buddhism was and is a movement of monastic ascetics ... The monks are the Buddhist elite. They are the only Buddhists in the proper sense of the word. The life of a householder is almost incompatible with the higher levels of the spiritual life1.

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The lay person's role is seen here as supporting the monks, their spiritual aspiration being faith in the Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha, together with the belief in karma and the wish to acquire merit to escape from 'the burden of his past misdeeds... Nirvana was too remote to aim at in this life'.2

Although there are large numbers of lay disciples in the Páli texts, even the term upáśaka for the 'devout layman (or laywoman - upáśikā) means one who follows, serves, attends or accords honour.3 Bowker defines upáśaka as 'one who sits close by', a layperson who has taken refuge in the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Saṅgha, and has 'undertaken the five precepts. Although far from the goal of arhat, they can acquire merit, especially through support of the Sangha, and can hope to reappear as a monk'.4 It seems from this that the limit of the layperson's spiritual activity is dāna (giving, generosity) and sīla (morality).

Richard Gombrich confirms that most of the Buddha's sermons to lay people concentrated on morality as 'the foundation of spiritual progress'. They did not provide such fertile soil for the Dhamma as the monks and nuns (although of course many sermons were given to lay people who then ordained). Despite very rare cases in the Canon of lay disciples gaining enlightenment, and examples of them making advanced spiritual progress,

These few religious virtuosos... do not invalidate the generalization that the Buddha expected those seriously interested in attaining salvation to become monks or nuns, that meditation was considered to be normally impossible for the laity, and that much of the Buddha's teaching was given only to the Sangha.5 This expectation has been made in much of Buddhist history. As Harvey states, 'most Buddhist schools see monasticism as a superior way of life, one that all should respect and aspire to join in this

or some future life'.6

Turning to the Páli texts themselves, there seems to be support for this view. The Buddha recalls his decision to leave home as a vital step in his search for enlightenment:

Household life is crowded and dusty; life gone forth is wide open. It is not easy, while living in a home, to lead the holy life as utterly perfect and pure as a polished shell. Suppose I shave off my hair and beard, put on the yellow robe and go forth from the home life into homelessness?7

This passage is repeated by the Buddha at the beginning of several discourses about the bhikkhu training in the holy life, as representing the initial feeling of a householder who wishes to make spiritual progress.8 He also describes one of the obstacles to Nibbāna as 'being caught by human beings', which he explains as the entanglements of the home life:

Here, someone lives in association with laypeople; he rejoices with them and sorrows with them... and he involves himself in their affairs and duties.9 Elsewhere he tells the bhikkhus plainly that there are the 'two pleasures' of home life and homelessness, and 'that of home-leaving has the pre-eminence'.10 He declares to the wanderer Vacchagotta that 'there is no householder who, without abandoning the fetter of householdership, on the dissolution of the body has made an end of suffering'.11 The Commentary explains here

2 Conze, op. cit., p.79.
11 MN I, 483; tr. Nanamoli, pp.588.
that even those very rare individuals who became Arahants while still laymen, immediately either were ordained or passed away. This may be based on the post-canonical *Milindapañha*, where it is explained that the householder’s situation is too weak to sustain arahatship.\(^\text{13}\)

Before considering these ‘very rare individuals’, let us look briefly at the first lay disciples, and then examine the standard moral teaching of the Buddha to lay people.

Schumann cites the *post-canonical Mahāvagga* of the Vinaya to show that the Buddha’s very first followers were not the five ascetics to whom the first sermon was preached at Isipatana, but two merchants named Tapussa and Bhallika, who offered him food in the fourth week after his enlightenment, taking refuge in the Buddha and the (as yet unpreached) Dhamma.\(^\text{14}\)

Soon after the first sermon, the Buddha preached the first ‘step-by-step discourse’ to a young man named Yasa, beginning with easily understood ideas such as alms-giving, moral rules and the futility of sense-pleasures, and moving on to teach the Four Noble Truths when he could see that Yasa would be able to understand. Yasa’s father came looking for him, listened to the first part of such a discourse, took refuge for the first time in ‘Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha’ and so became the third lay follower (upāsaka). Yasa became ordained, and his mother and ‘former wife ... took the threefold refuge, thus becoming Gotama’s first female followers (upāsikās).\(^\text{15}\) The fact that Yasa became only the seventh Arahant (again according to the *Mahāvagga*) shows that the establishment of lay-followers came at the very beginning of the development of Buddhism.

Schumann points out the important role of the merchant class (vessas) in disseminating the Dhamma to other lay people, carried ‘by means of the clumsy ox-carts of the trade caravans...’. But the Buddha’s teaching drew lay disciples from all classes, partly because ‘it did not stamp lay-followers as second-rate Buddhists’.\(^\text{16}\)

The teaching given to such lay people appears at first to be the conventional Buddhist morality. In a chapter on the lay disciple, the Buddha repeatedly emphasises the importance of the five precepts (avoiding killing, stealing, wrong sensuality, lying and intoxicants). Breaking them causes fear and rebirth in hell, but keeping them leads to confidence and rebirth in heaven. He further proscribes the five trades which break the precepts and so ‘ought not to be plied by a lay-disciple’ (trading in arms, human beings, animal flesh, intoxicants and poison).\(^\text{17}\)

When a lay-disciple asks how a monk and a layman should both act well, the Buddha replies that a monk should practise detachment, but a layman should keep the five precepts (or eight precepts on observance days), provide food for the monks, support his parents and ‘pursue a blameless career’. This moral life will ensure a favourable rebirth.\(^\text{18}\)

Ling uses the Pāli scriptures to build up a detailed picture of the ‘ordinary man’ (puthujjana) who has no glimpse of Nibbāna. He is seen as addicted to pleasure, with senses uncontrolled, greedy, and easily provoked to violence. He is distressed by pain, disease, old age and death, and may be tormented by sorrow, because he ignores the truth and fails to see things as they really are. However, this condition is not seen as final, and between:

‘the common people ... and the Sangha there exists an important relationship, not of reciprocity exactly, but of complementariness’.

This relationship is set out in the well-known *Sīgālaka Sutta*, which may be seen as a ‘vinaya for the householder’.\(^\text{19}\)
success in morality (gaining wealth, reputation and confidence; a mindful death and a favourable rebirth). Ling refers to this episode, commenting that for the Buddha, lay-followers:

had an important place in the scheme of things, and it was for this reason that he undertook to instruct them in detail in the matters of social morality, pointing out to them the advantages of moral uprightness and integrity. 23

But after this conventional teaching ‘the Lord instructed, inspired, fired and delighted the lay-followers of Pātaligāma with talk on Dhamma until far into the night’. 24 The text of this talk is not given, but it may well have been a version of the ‘step-by-step discourse’ where the Buddha goes beyond discussing morality and teaches the Four Noble Truths to those who are ready to hear the Dhamma in more detail.

There is further evidence of at least some kind of ‘complementariness’ between monastics and lay disciples. The Buddha praises ‘right conduct’ in both the householder and the monk, saying that they can both win through to the Path, the Dhamma, in this way. 25 When asked directly whether the monastic path or the way of the lay disciple is the right way, the Buddha replies that he praises ‘the right way of practice’: either the householder or the monk who is engaged in this right practice ‘is accomplishing the true way, the Dhamma that is wholesome’. 26 Elsewhere he defines this right practice as the Noble Eightfold Path and confirms that in this way the householder or the layman ‘attains the method, the Dhamma that is wholesome’. 27

Nyanaponika and Hecker provide a wealth of detail about the lives of eminent lay disciples, drawn from the Pāli texts. Bhikkhu Bodhi’s Introduction makes clear that the path of the monastic and that of the lay-follower are both leading in the same direction.

23 Ling, op. cit., p.103.
25 AN I, 69; tr. Woodward and Hare, I, pp.64-5.
26 MN II, 197-9; tr. Nyanamoli, pp.808-10.
Different guidelines are appropriate for lay followers and monastics, and the individual must choose between them:

But all such guidelines, originating from different starting points, eventually converge upon a single path, universal and unique, leading infallibly to the final goal. This is the Noble Eightfold Path, the way to the cessation of suffering.\(^{28}\)

The most important distinction within the overall category of sāvaka, the disciple of the Buddha, is not between monastics and lay people, but the spiritual distinction between ‘the ordinary disciples and the noble disciples’. Ordinary disciples (the large majority) are ‘still technically classed as worldlings or commoners (puthujjana)’. Despite going for refuge and practising dāna and sīla, ‘they have not yet reached the plane where liberation is irrevocably assured’. The noble disciples (ariyasāvaka), by contrast, have achieved ‘a radical transformation ... of the mind’, and have understood the Dhamma in a deeper sense.\(^{29}\)

It may be helpful to pause here to explain briefly the four important stages on the path to Nibbāna. Walshe describes these as follows:

1) The Stream-Winner (‘stream-enterer’ in Ńāṇamoli) has ‘glimpsed Nibbāna’, discarded three of the ‘five lower fetters’ (i.e. belief in a self ... doubt ... attachment to rites and rituals) and is thus assured of attaining Nibbāna within the next seven rebirths. 2) The Once-Returner has weakened the remaining lower fetters of sensuality and ill-will, and will attain Nibbāna ‘after at most one further human rebirth’. 3) The Non-Returner has abandoned sensuality and ill-will and all worldly attachments, and after death will attain Nibbāna after a heavenly rebirth. 4) The Arahant has destroyed the ‘five higher fetters’ (i.e. craving for existence in the Form World ... in the Formless World ... conceit ... restlessness ... ignorance), has attained Nibbāna, and ‘will attain final Nibbāna “without remainder” at death’.\(^{30}\)

The Dīghanaka Sutta gives a fascinating glimpse of what might be described as the parallel spiritual development of a monk and a lay person. The Buddha skillfully encourages the wanderer Dīghanaka to abandon his fixed views, explaining that all feelings are impermanent and that the ‘well-taught noble disciple’ regards them dispassionately and so obtains liberation. At this moment Dīghanaka saw the Dhamma, reached the Dhamma, understood the Dhamma, fathomed the Dhamma, overcame all doubt and perplexity, and became self-sufficient in the Master’s Teaching.\(^{31}\)

This is the standard description of one who becomes a Stream-Winner. Dīghanaka must have been a remarkable young man to progress so swiftly from a non-Buddhist to one assured of Nibbāna

Meanwhile the monk Sāriputta, who is fanning the Buddha, attains arahantship as he considers these words on liberation. This is highly significant, not only as Sāriputta was to become one of the Buddha’s chief disciples, but also since he ‘had been a bhikkhu for only two weeks and was still a stream-enterer’.\(^{32}\) But the sutta concludes with Dīghanaka (incidentally Sāriputta’s nephew) formally taking refuge as a lay-follower, in a passage repeated frequently at the end of suttas:

Magnificent, Master Gotama! Master Gotama has made the Dhamma clear in many ways, as though he were turning upright what had been overthrown, revealing what was hidden, showing the way to one who was lost, or holding up a lamp in the dark ... I go to Master Gotama for refuge and to the Dhamma and to the Sangha of bhikkhus. From this day forth let Master Gotama remember me as a lay follower who has gone to him for refuge for life.\(^{33}\)

This leads us on to the spiritual attainment of lay people in the

\(^{28}\) Nyanaponika Thera and H. Becker, Great Disciples of the Buddha, Boston 1997, p.xvi.

\(^{29}\) Nyanaponika, op. cit., pp.xvi-xix.


\(^{31}\) MN I, 501; see Nyanaponika, op. cit., p.xix.

\(^{32}\) Ńāṇamoli, op. cit., p.1276, n.730.

\(^{33}\) MN I, 501; tr. Ŋāṇamoli, p.606.
Pāli texts. In the Nalapāna Sutta, the Buddha explains that when he declares a particular bhikkhu to be an Arahant, Non-Returner, Once-Returner or Stream-Winner, it is not for flattery but to inspire others. These four categories are repeated for bhikkunīs, but only the last three are given for laymen and laywomen, implying firmly that arahanship was extremely rare for a lay person. In reply to Ananda’s questions in the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta about those who have died at Nādiyā, the Buddha says that ‘more than fifty lay-followers’ have destroyed the five lower fetters and become Non-Returners, over ninety have become Once-Returners, and ‘well over five hundred’ are Stream-Winners.35 This says something about both the size of the lay Buddhist community there and their remarkable spiritual progress.

Walshe states that there is ‘no scriptural authority’ for the widely-held view that ‘while lay persons can attain to the first three paths, only monks can become Arahants’.36 Schumann says that although the upāsaka might find it harder than the monk ‘to gain inner detachment and release from suffering’, the Canon lists ‘twenty-one householders who became Arahants without ever being monks’.37 Harvey gives further details of the attainments of lay people in the Pāli Canon and draws a similar conclusion:

The early texts do refer to many lay Stream-enterers, more than 1,000 eight-precept lay Non-returners (M I, 490-1), and a few lay Arahats (A III, 450-1). Indeed, while the conditions of lay life pose more obstacles, those who make the effort in spite of them can attain good spiritual progress.38

Both of these textual references are worth examining. In the Mahāvacchagotta Sutta the Buddha explains that more than five hundred bhikkhus and a similar numbers of bhikkunīs ‘abide in the deliverance of mind’ (i.e. have become Arahants). There are more than five hundred celibate laymen Non-Returners, and more than five hundred non-celibate laymen who are either Once-Returners or at least Stream-Winners. The same numbers and categories are given for laywomen.39 So in all three cases the number of monastic Arahants, lay Non-Returners and lay Once-Returners or Stream-Winners is over a thousand (perhaps well over, as the Buddha actually says ‘far more’ each time). Despite the lack of Arahants here – and assuming that the figures are genuine, rather than a later pious inflation – this is compelling evidence for the spiritual progress of lay people.

The ‘twenty-one householders’ listed as notable disciples in the Anghuttara-Nikāya include Tapussa and Bhāllika, Anāthapiṇḍika, Citta, Hatthaka, Mahāñāma, Uggā of Vesāli, Uggata, Sūra Amattha, Jivaka and Nakulapitā. Each of them is said to have ‘gone to the end, seen the deathless and had his being in the realization of the deathless’, because of their faith in the Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha, and also their ‘virtue, knowledge and release’.40 These are indeed ‘very rare individuals’, and it is worth looking at some of them in a little more detail, together with important laywomen.

In listing his chief disciples,41 the Buddha begins with forty monks and thirteen nuns, each with their special category of pre-eminence. The names of eleven laymen (given above) and ten laywomen follow. Of the laymen, Tapussa and Bhāllika are included as the first disciples; Anāthapiṇḍika is chief of alms-givers; Uggā is chief of those ‘who give rice gifts’; and Hatthaka is chief of those ‘who gather a following by the four bases of sympathy’ (i.e. ‘liberality, kind speech, a useful life and equal treatment of all alike’). Of the laywomen, Sujātā (who offered rice to the ascetic Gotama before his enlightenment) is included as the first laywoman disciple; Saṁvātī is chief of those ‘who live in kindliness’; and Suppīyā is chief of those who nurse the sick. These and others all appear as the exemplars of dāna and sīla which we would expect.

35 DN II, 92-3; tr. Walshe, pp.240-1.
37 Schumann, op. cit., pp.190-1.
38 Harvey, op. cit., p.218.
40 AN III, 450-1; tr. Woodward and Hare, III, pp.313-14.
41 AN I, 23-6; tr. Woodward and Hare, I, pp.16-25.
However, the layman Citta is described as ‘chief among my disciples, lay-followers, of Dhamma teachers’; the laywoman Khujuttarā is chief of those ‘of wide knowledge’; Uttarā, Nanda’s mother, is chief of those ‘of meditative power’ (these three categories have been applied first to monks or nuns); and the laywoman Kālli is said to have become a Stream-Winner after merely overhearing two yakkhas praise the ‘Triple Gem’.42

There are two implications here. Clearly these individual lay-followers have achieved deep understanding and practice of the Dhamma, but they may only be chief among an unspecified number of other laymen and laywomen who are Dhamma teachers, ‘of wide knowledge’, or advanced meditators.

Some of the ‘pre-eminent ones’ are elsewhere given as exemplars by the Buddha. A laywoman should encourage her son to become like Citta or Hattthaka, who are ‘the standard and criterion for my male disciples who are lay followers’. She should encourage her daughter to become like Khujuttarā and Velukantiyā, Nanda’s mother (presumably another name for Uttarā), who are ‘the standard and criterion for my female disciples who are lay followers’.43 The implication is that lay-disciples should not only aspire to gain merit by dāna and sīla, but also to acquire knowledge of the Dhamma, meditative powers and even perhaps to become Dhamma teachers themselves.

In the same passage, it is stated that those who wish to become monks should emulate Sāriputta and Moggallāna, while potential nuns should emulate sister Khemā and Uppallavanā. Hecker comments pragmatically that the lay and ordained ways of life are substantially different ‘and an example taken from one’s own background is bound to prove more effective’.44

There are other references to most of the lay Arahants listed above. The Buddha explains to Mahānāma that a lay-disciple develops his own welfare by faith, virtue, renunciation, seeing monks and hearing the Dhamma mindfully, reflecting on the meaning of the Dhamma. Similarly, he may help others to achieve this.45

In three identical suttas, Uggā of Vesāli, Uggata and Nakulapitā each come to ask the Buddha why some beings ‘attain Nibbāna in this very life’ while others do not. The Buddha gives them the same reply as he had to Sakka, lord of the devas:46 there are sights, sounds, smells, tastes, tangible objects and thoughts which are ‘desirable, lovely, agreeable, pleasing, sensually enticing, tantalizing’. Only by not clinging to them can one attain Nibbāna.47

Uggā of Vesāli is said by the Buddha to have ‘eight wonderful and marvellous qualities’, which not only include sharing his wealth and respecting the monks, but also understanding the Dhamma when the Buddha explained the Four Noble Truths to him. He listens attentively to a monk who preaches the Dhamma or ‘If he preach not Dhamma to me, I preach Dhamma to him’; devas come and praise the Dhamma to him, but he feels no elation.48

An almost identical story is told about Uggata, though here the eighth quality is ‘that the Exalted One should declare to me: “There is no fetter, fettered by which, Uggā, the householder of Hatthigāma shall come again to this world”. This may imply that he is a Non-Returner rather than an Arhat.49

The Buddha advises Nakulapitā, an old man in poor health, to train himself with the phrase: ‘Even though I am afflicted in body, my mind will be unafflicted’. Sāriputta explains that the worldling sees the body, feeling, perception, (mental) activities and consciousness (i.e. the five khandhas) as the self, as ‘mine’, and so suffers greatly when these inevitably change. But the disciple who is trained in the Dhamma does not have this false view and so can face change with equanimity.50

42 AN I, 25-6; tr. Woodward and Hare, I, pp.23-5.
44 Nyanaponika, op. cit., p.365.
45 AN IV, 220; tr. Woodward and Hare, IV, pp.149-50.
46 SN IV, 101; tr. Bodhi, op. cit., p.1192.
48 AN IV, 207-11; tr. Woodward and Hare, IV, pp.142-5.
49 AN IV, 211f; tr. Woodward and Hare, IV, pp.145-6.
Citta is even able to answer complex questions on the Dhamma put to him by bhikkhus, and to engage in detailed conversation about the liberation of the mind. On one occasion he explains to a group of senior bhikkhus the difference between the fetters and the sense objects, and they are so pleased by his answer that they 'declared that Citta must be in possession of the eye of wisdom which ranges over the profound teaching of the Buddha'.\footnote{Nyanaponika, \textit{op. cit.}, pp.367-9.} When his friend the naked ascetic Kassapa asks him how long he has been a follower of the Buddha and whether he had 'attained any superhuman distinction in knowledge and vision', Citta replies that he has followed the Buddha for thirty years, and he can 'enter and dwell in' the four jhānas 'to whatever extent I wish'. Moreover, if he were to die before the Buddha, 'it would not be surprising if the Blessed One were to declare of me: "There is no fetter bound by which Citta the householder could return to this world"'.\footnote{SN IV, 301; tr. Bodhi, \textit{op. cit.}, p.1329.} Again this implies he is a Non-Returner rather than an Arahant.

In the context of lay meditation, it is worth adding the example of Pessa the elephant driver's son. When the Buddha briefly describes the four foundations of mindfulness, Pessa praises his explanation but adds:

> From time to time, venerable sir, we white-clothed lay people also abide with our minds well established in those four foundations of mindfulness ... ardent, fully aware, and mindful, having put away covetousness and grief for the world.\footnote{MN I, 340; tr. Nāṇamoli, p.444.} The story of Anāthapiṇḍika, the rich merchant who becomes the chief patron of the Saṅgha in Sāvatthī, will be considered in more detail. The Buddha frequently gave teachings to Anāthapiṇḍika, which Hecker describes as 'a comprehensive code of lay Buddhist ethics ... from the simplest message to the most profound'.\footnote{Nyanaponika, \textit{op. cit.}, p.351.}

The Buddha explained that the householder's duty (i.e. offering robes, almsfood, lodging and medicine to the monks) is 'a path which brings good repute and leads to the heavenly world'.\footnote{AN II, 66; tr. Woodward and Hare, II, p.73.} The householder may win 'four kinds of bliss': ownership (from honest work); wealth (which facilitates meritorious deeds), debtlessness; and blamelessness (in actions, speech and mind).\footnote{AN II, 68; tr. Woodward and Hare, II, pp.77-8.} Wealth honestly acquired may be used to support family and friends, or to make offerings to the Saṅgha: if wealth is gained for these reasons, the noble disciple will not be upset whether his wealth is lost or increases.

Desirable things such as long life, beauty, happiness, fame and a favourable rebirth cannot be obtained by prayers or vows, but only by following an appropriate path of life.\footnote{AN III, 46; tr. Woodward and Hare, III, p.38; see Nyanaponika, \textit{op. cit.}, pp.351-3.} The conditions for winning desirable things such as wealth, a good report, a long life or a favourable rebirth are: 'Perfection of faith, perfection of virtue, perfection of generosity, and perfection of wisdom'.\footnote{AN II, 47; tr. Woodward and Hare, III, pp.39-40.}

The Buddha also gave Anāthapiṇḍika a step-by-step discourse, beginning with dāna and sila and 'the futility of sensual pleasure; but seeing that he was 'ready in heart and mind', he also explained the Four Noble Truths to him, with the result that the merchant understood the Dhamma and became a Stream-Winner.\footnote{AN II, 66; tr. Woodward and Hare, II, p.74; see Nyanaponika, \textit{op. cit.}, p.354.}

Elsewhere stages of practice are described, leading from dāna through sila towards the gaining of insight. One might offer a meal to the Saṅgha, or to the Buddha himself, or even build a monastery:

> But better yet would be the going for refuge to the Buddha, the Dhamma, and the Saṅgha. And this deed would be perfected if one observed the Five Precepts. It would be better still if one could imbibe a slight fragrance ... of loving-kindness (mettā). Best of all, however, would be to cultivate, even for the time of a finger-snap, the insight into impermanence.\footnote{Nyanaponika, \textit{op. cit.}, p.339.}

52 SN IV, 301; tr. Bodhi, \textit{op. cit.}, p.1329.
53 MN I, 340; tr. Nāṇamoli, p.444.
54 Nyanaponika, \textit{op. cit.}, p.351.
On another occasion the Buddha urged Anāthapiṇḍika and 'several hundred lay followers' not to be satisfied as householders with providing for the needs of the Saṅgha: 'May you also from time to time strive to enter and abide in the joy of (inner meditative) seclusion'.

With a similar audience, the Buddha declared to Sāriputta that a 'white-clad householder' (i.e. an upāsaka) who keeps the moral precepts, and who can 'obtain at will the four lofty mental abidings which bring happiness in the present', may if he wishes declare himself to be a Stream-Winner, 'assured of final enlightenment'. These 'lofty mental abidings' are not the four jhānas, as one might expect, but instead are an unshakeable faith in the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Saṅgha, and the possession of noble virtue.

When Anāthapiṇḍika is seriously ill, Sāriputta and Ānanda visit him, and Sāriputta urges him to train himself not to cling to 'what is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, encountered, sought after, and examined by the mind'. Anāthapiṇḍika is profoundly affected by this teaching and begins to weep, explaining that 'I have served the master and the spiritually accomplished monks for a long time, yet I have never heard such a profound discourse'. Sāriputta says that this kind of teaching will not be clear to lay followers, only to monastics. But Anāthapiṇḍika replies:

Venerable Sāriputta, let such talks on the Dhamma be given to white-clad lay followers too. There are those with just a little dust on their eyes. If they do not hear such teachings they will be lost. Some may be able to understand.

Nāṇamoli comments that although Sāriputta's statement does not imply an exclusiveness in the Buddha's teaching, 'such talk leading to complete detachment' would not be appropriate for lay people who 'must look after their families, possessions, and occupations'. But worldly concerns no longer apply here to Anātha-

pipiṇḍika, who is almost on the point of death. His plea to Sāriputta echoes Brahmā Sahampati's request to the Buddha after his enlightenment, when he is inclined not to teach:

Let the Blessed One teach the Dhamma. There are beings with little dust in their eyes who are wasting through not hearing the Dhamma.

There will be those who will understand the Dhamma.

Hecker comments here on the difference between hearing the teachings and actually practising them: this is 'the essential difference between the methods the Buddha used to teach householders and those he used to teach monks'. Lay people saw the teachings as 'a matter of knowledge', while for monks 'the Buddha introduced the practice that would lead to complete liberation even in this life'. This is why Anāthapiṇḍika had not heard the teaching in this form:

In his dying hour he was already far removed from worldly concerns and, while thinking of the Dhamma, had renounced attachment to worldly possessions as well as his body; thus he found himself in a situation comparable to that of the most advanced monks.

This is reminiscent of a passage where Mahānāma asks the Buddha how one 'wise lay follower' should comfort another who is seriously ill. The Buddha replies that he should be urged to take comfort in his loyalty to the Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha, and in his possession of the noble virtues. He should be encouraged progressively to let go of the attachment to parents, to children, to sense-pleasures, and to fix his mind on higher and higher heavenly realms. Finally he should be encouraged to 'direct it to the cessation of identity' (i.e. to the attainment of Nibbāna). If he is able to do all this:

then Mahānāma, I say there is no difference between the lay follower who is thus liberated in mind and a bhikkhu who has been liberated in mind for a hundred years, that is, between one liberation and the

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64 Nyanaponika, op.cit., p.360; MN III, 261; see Nāṇamoli, pp.1110-11.
65 Nāṇamoli, op.cit., p.1351, n.1306.
67 Nyanaponika, op.cit., p.361.
68 Id., ibid.
In conclusion, the spiritual progress of the early Buddhists in the Pāli Canon depends on their understanding and practice of the Dhamma, rather than their status as lay people or monastics. If the latter are more likely to make substantial progress, this is because of their unique situation. The householder who is fully engaged in working and supporting his or her family may have to concentrate on dāna and sīla, and the teachings offered to lay people by the Buddha and by senior monks usually concentrate on various aspects of these two methods of acquiring puriṇa, 'merit' or 'karmic fruitfulness'. But teachings on the Four Noble Truths, or on various aspects of meditation, may also be included if the hearers are seen as ready to understand more of the Dhamma. While many became Stream-Winners, those lay disciples in particular who have a measure of independence from worldly ties, or those who are coming to the end of their lives, seem to have a genuine opportunity to become Once-Returners, or even Non-Returners, and (in very exceptional cases) Arahants.

So the difference between monastics and lay Buddhists in the Pāli Canon is more quantitative than qualitative. The monastic life provides ample opportunity for spiritual progress, but of course the individual monk or nun has to make the effort for themselves. The household life has many distractions, but for the determined lay disciple these need not be barriers to spiritual progress. In the Pāli Canon – and by implication in historical and contemporary Buddhism – the progressive path of morality, meditation and wisdom is open to monastics and lay-followers alike. The essential distinction, both then and now, is not between the monastic and the lay-follower, but between the ‘ordinary disciple’ (who may still be a devout Buddhist rather than a merely nominal one), and the ‘noble disciple’ who has glimpsed Nibbāna and who is genuinely committed to the understanding and practice of the Dhamma.

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2 In the Theravāda tradition there is another source relevant to this issue, a Sāṃśrutīya list of sixteen incidents transmitted by Daśabalaśrīmitra in his Sāṃskṛtasamskṛtaviniscaya. It is probably a Dhammarucika list in a Sinhalese work of the fourteenth century or earlier called Deśī Karmaya, which allegedly describes thirty-two such incidents. The manuscript of this work is preserved in the British Library; see K.D. Somadasa, Catalogue of the Hugh Neville Collection of Sinhalese Manuscripts in the British Library 2 (Pali Text Society, 1989), pp.122-3. See also Paul Harrison, ‘Some Reflections on the Personality of the Buddha’, The Otani Gakuhō LXIV, 4 (1995), p.11. Since this is a very late work it does not fall into the scope of our discussion of the debate on the physical body of the Buddha in the period of the early Buddhist schools.
3 (1) The Pālaccāsātasthavrāvādāna, T 199, 190a-202a, (2) the Xingqui jing, T 197, 163c-174b, (3) the Bhaisajyavastu of the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya, T 1448, 94a-97a, (4) the Lokānuvartanasūtra, T 807, 751b-753c, (5) the Pushāningwushiyuansheng Jing, T 812, 773a-774c, (6) the Upayakausalyasūtra, T 310:38, 594c-681c; T 345, 156a-165c, T 346, 166a-178b, (7) the Mahāyānasa-dharmakāśāstra, T 310:9, 154c-157a, T 314, 767b-769a, (8) the Tathāgata-pratisthāna-sparśasāntaśilāsūtra, T 692, 788a-c, T 693, 788c-790a, T 694, 790a-796b, (9) the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra, T 1509, 121c, (10) the Mahāyāna-vatārakāsāstra, T 1634, 37b-c.
4 (1) the Upayakausalyasūtra, translated by Goschos Grub (Chi. Wu Fucheng) based on Dharmarakṣa rendition (T 345), (2) the Upayakausalyasūtra, translated by Dānāsūla, Karmavaran and Ye šes śes ṅam from Sanskrit, (3) the Bhaisajyavastu of the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya, (4) the Lokānuvartanasūtra and (5)
The Buddha’s bad karma refers to ten problematic incidents that happened in the life of the historical Buddha. They fall into three categories: slander from enemies, assaults from enemies and physical illness. It was probably the Sarvāstivādins who attributed different stories to each of the ten incidents and explained them as the remaining effects of bad karma performed in the previous lives of the Buddha. The following is a summary of the ten bad karmas according to four main texts in which the full stories are given: the *Pubbakkammapilotti*, the *Pañcāsāvatsthavirāvadāna*, the *Bhāsāya-vastu* and the *Xingxing jing*.

(1) It is the remaining effect of the bad karma of his slandering an innocent Pratyekabuddha in a former life that the Buddha suffered the slanderous accusation of Sundarī.

(2) It is the remaining effect of the bad karma of his slandering a bhikṣu of six psychic powers in a previous life out of jealousy that the Buddha suffered the slander of Cîncāmānavikā.

(3) It is the remaining effect of the bad karma of his wrong accusation of the sage Iśigama of unchastity as a brahman teacher together with his five hundred pupils in a previous life that they all suffered slander when Sundarī was murdered.

(4) It is the remaining effect of the bad karma of the Buddha murdering his brother for wealth in a former birth that Devadatta threw a boulder at him and a splinter wounded his foot.

(5) It is the remaining effect of the bad karma of his feeling of joyfulness upon seeing fish being killed in a previous life that the Buddha suffered headache when Viḍūdhaha killed his kinsmen.

(6) It is the remaining effect of the bad karma of his cursing the disciples of the Buddha Vipaśyin saying, ‘These bald headed śrāmaṇas should be offered coarse barley’ that the Buddha ate horse barley for three months.

(7) It is the remaining effect of the bad karma of his killing a visiting wrestler in a match as a wrestler of a king in a former life that the Buddha suffered backache.

(8) It is the remaining effect of the bad karma of his administering a wrong purge to the son of a respectable man as a physician in a former life that the Buddha suffered diarrhoea or stomach troubles.

(9) It is the remaining effect of the bad karma of his reviling the Buddha Kāśyapa saying, ‘Bald headed śrāmaṇa, enlightenment is difficult to obtain’ as Jotipāla in a former life that the Buddha performed six years of severe austerities.

(10) It is the remaining effect of the bad karma of his knocking over the bowl of a Pratyekabuddha in a previous life that the Buddha returned with an empty bowl from a Brahman village.

Sometimes the texts also mention another bad karma in addition to the above ten, but this is late in origin since it is not mentioned in the *Nīkāyas and Āgamas* nor in the *Pubbakkammapilotti*. In a previous life the Buddha killed a merchant with a spear during a voyage in order to save 500 others. As a result, he suffered in hell for a long time and as a result of this bad karma he suffered from the wooden thorn (*khādīra*) that pierced his foot during an alms tour.

Except for the *Pubbakkammapilotti*, which divides the incident of Devadatta into four and makes the number of bad karmas twelve, all the other texts mention ten unskilful deeds. The stories attributed to the ten incidents in all these texts are almost exactly the same and even the names of the people concerned are quite similar except for certain negligible details. This suggests that these ten bad karmas originally derived from one tradition, probably the Sarvāstivādins who collected them together in support of their concept of a human Buddha.

The texts related to the bad karma of the Buddha can be divided into two groups: those texts accepting the bad karma of the Buddha and those texts rejecting the whole matter. The first group probably belongs to the Sarvāstivāda because the theme of these texts is in conformity with their concept of the Buddha that, as a human being, the Buddha had performed bad karma in his previous lives. The second group presumably belongs to the Mahāsāṅghikas, since these texts are in accordance with their concept of the Buddha, who is transcendental and above our empirical world and, as such, not affected by any bad karma.
First, let us discuss the group of texts that accept the bad karma of the Buddha. They include the *Pubbakammapiloti* of the Pāli *Apadāna*, the Mālindaṇḍaka, the Pañcasatāsthāvīravadāna, the *Xingqixing Jing*, the Bhaisajyavastu of the Mulasarvāstivāda Vinaya, the last of which survives in both Chinese and Tibetan translations.

The earliest record of the Buddha's bad karma is perhaps found in two texts: the Chinese translation of the *Pañcasatāsthāvīravadāna* and the *Pubbakammapiloti*. The former and the Pāli *Apadāna* in which the *Pubbakammapiloti* is found are similar but not identical, as pointed out by Lamotte. These two texts record only the bad karma of the Buddha and good karma is not mentioned. The only difference is that the bad karma of the Buddha is mentioned at the end of the *Pañcasatāsthāvīravadāna* while the *Pubbakammapiloti* is at the beginning of the Pāli *Apadāna*. Heinz Bechert is of the opinion that the Pāli *Apadāna* is derived from a recension of the *Anavataptagāthā*, which is part of the Mulasarvāstivādin Vinaya. Walters thinks that the author of the *Pubbakammapiloti* may have drawn his account from a non-Theravāda school of the ‘Hinayāna’. If this is the case, the Hinayāna school must be the Sarvāstivāda, because their *Divyāvādaṇa* shows that the Sarvāstivādins knew of the bad karma of the Buddha. The text uses the Sanskrit equivalent term *karmaploti*.

6 T 199, 190a-202a. This sūtra was translated by Dharmarakṣa in 303 CE. The Buddha's bad karma is found in the last part of the sūtra, 201a-202a.
7 T 197, 163c-174b. The whole sūtra is devoted to an explanation of the ten bad karmas of the Buddha.
8 T 1448, the part on the bad karma is found in pp.95a-97a, the last part of the *Bhaisajyavastu*.

Guang Xing – The Bad Karma of the Buddha

quite often, usually in a stereotyped phrase by which hungry ghosts (*preta*) inquire of the Buddha the cause of their fate, asking, 'what is this strand of karma?' It is particularly important to note that the *Divyāvadāna*, in one place, specifically states that 'the previous strands of karma have been disclosed at the Great Lake Anavatapta [by the Buddha who was] with the disciples'. So the Sarvāstivādins knew not only the term *karmaploti*, but also the actual context of the discourse delivered by the Buddha.

This strongly suggests that the Sarvāstivādins were perhaps the first to have collected all the bad karmas of the Buddha and compiled them together in order to support their teaching that the Buddha was basically a human being. This was then transmitted to its sub-sects and also influenced other Hinayāna schools.

Walters also thinks that there is a second possibility that the tradition concerning the bad karma may have been invented by the Mahāsāṃghikas since the *Mahāvastu-avadāna* mentions a detailed story about the Buddha being slandered by a woman as a karmic effect. This possibility can be ruled out because the *Mahāvastu* probably did not originally belong to the Lokottara-vāda, but to another Thaviravāda school. The reason for this assertion is that the passage describing the transcendental Buddha is found only in the introductory portion of the *Mahāvastu*, not in the text itself. Scholars are of the opinion that, over the course of time, the *Mahāvastu* had been revised by the Lokottaravādins by adding the introductory chapters.

The Bhaisajyavastu of the Mulasarvāstivāda Vinaya, which survives in both Chinese and Tibetan translations, mentions the bad karma of the Buddha at the end, and Lamotte thinks that it is

13 Walters, *op. cit.*, 78. *Divyāvadāna*, p.150: *Anavatapta mahāsārasi śrāvakākāśaṃ dharmam pūrvakā kharaploṭi vyākṣita bhavati* Dr Tadeusz Skorupski orally informs the present writer that this *karmaploti* in the *Divyāvadāna* is one of the ten inevitable actions of the Buddha.
14 Walters, *op. cit.*, 78.
15 N. Dutt, *Buddhist Schools in India* (Delhi 1978), pp.75-7.
an incorporation of the *Pañcasatāsthavirāvadāna* with some additions. The section related to the bad karma of the Buddha is named the *Anavataptaśāstra* in the Tibetan translation. The Mulasārvaśīvāda is most probably derived from the Sarvāstivāda, because the term Mulasarvāstivāda is not mentioned in the earliest Chinese translations of Buddhist texts, and found only in the translation by Yijing, who was active towards the end of the seventh to the beginning of the eighth century. On the other hand, the term Sarvāstivāda had already been mentioned in the translations by Paramārtha, who was active in China in the middle of the sixth century. Since the *Bhaisajyavastu* belongs to the Mulasarvāstivāda, it must have been shared with the Sarvāstivāda. If this supposition is true, the *Pañcasatāsthavirāvadāna* must belong to, or is at least connected with, the Sarvāstivāda.

The *Xingqixing Jing* [Sūtra on the Former Practices of the Buddha] probably also belongs to the Sarvāstivāda. This sūtra contains ten stories solely devoted to the ten bad karmas. The versified introduction to this sūtra informs us that it was preached at Lake Anavatapta at the request of Sāriputra who asks the Buddha why he suffers from the ten bad karmas. The ten stories that follow are all independent works, each consisting of two parts: the prose section, followed by the verse section, which in fact reiterates what is said in the prose section. These ten stories are quite similar to those found in the *Pañcasatāsthavirāvadāna* and it seems that the author of the *Xingqixing Jing* had gathered his material from the latter. This is particularly true with regard to the verse section.

Our analysis of the five texts which accept the Buddha’s bad karma strongly suggests that they came from one tradition, which most likely originated with the Sarvāstivādins. They collated the bad karma not so much for the purpose of supporting the doctrine of their concept of the Buddha, but to refute the concept of the transcendental Buddha of the Mahāsāṃghikas.

The second group of seven texts rejects the whole idea of bad karma and considers it as a skillful means (*upāyakausālaya*) of the Buddha to save sentient beings. This group apparently belongs to, or at least preaches the doctrine of, the Mahāsāṃghikas. They are seven altogether: (1) the *Lokānuvartanasūtra*, which survives in both Chinese and Tibetan translation, (2) the *Pushaxingwushiyuansheng Jing*, (3) the *Upāyakausālayasūtra*, which survives in three Chinese and two Tibetan translations, (4) the *Mahāyānadasādharmasūtra*, which survives in two Chinese translations, (5) the *Tathāgatapratibimbapratisthitānusamsāsāstra*, which survives in three Chinese and one Tibetan translations, (6) the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* attributed to Nāgārjuna, and (7) the *Mahāyānāvatārakāsāstra* of Strīramati.

The *Lokānuvartanasūtra* teaches the idea that the Buddha’s appearance in this world is nothing but a deliberate manifestation for the sake of sentient beings. It seems that the text reacts to...
and also rejects the Sarvástivādin view that the Buddha genuinely suffered the remaining effects of bad karma.22 Scholars such as Paul Harrison have already pointed out that this text belongs to the Lokottaravāda, a sub-sector of the Mahāsāṃghikas.23

The Pushaxingwushiyuansheng Jing [Sūtra on (the Marks of) the Buddha’s Appearance as (a Result of) Fifty Causes of the Bodhisattva Practice] is somewhat similar to the Lokānuvartana. The text says that the body of the Buddha is free from any bad smell or blemish, and that no bad karma can reach it. This sūtra basically teaches the same doctrine on the concept of the Buddha as the Mahāsāṃghikas.

The Upāyakausālyasūtra belongs to the Mahāyāna or Mahāsāṃghika-Mahāyāna, because at the end it states that the teaching of upāyakausālya is not to be given to inferior people who have little merit, or to the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas. It emphasises that only the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas are able to understand this profound teaching.24 At the end, the sūtra states: 'In summary, the remaining effects of the bad karma manifested by the Tathāgata are ten and they should be known as the Buddha’s upāyakausālya. The Buddha made a display to demonstrate that

there is a consequence to every action. This is for the sake of the common people who have bad thoughts and revere the non-Dharma, it is not because the Buddha had any bad karma’.25 So the compiler(s) of the Upāyakausālyasūtra must have known of the debate on the bad karma of the Buddha between the Sarvāstivāda and the Mahāsāṃghikas.

The Mahāyānadaśadharmakāsūtra treats the ten bad karmas as a secret teaching of the Buddha and states that only the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas are able to understand it.26 The text asserts that it is not correct to say that the Buddha suffered the retributions of bad karma because he demonstrated them only for the sake of and in sympathy for future generations of sentient beings.

The Tathāgatapratibimba-pratishānumatsāsūtra is a Mahāyāna

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22 T 807, 753a, lines 11-12.
23 The similarities between the Lokānuvartanasaūtra and the relevant part of the Mahāvastu of the Lokottaravāda were first discovered and demonstrated by Takahara Shin'ichi in his article ‘Mahāvastu ni mirareru fūkutokuron’, in Fukaoaka daigaku sanjōgoshïden kinen ronbunshō, Jinbunhen (1969), pp.117-41. Shizutani Masao commented upon this in his Shoki daibōkkyō no seiritsukakutei (Kyoto 1974), pp.282, 315-18. See Harrison, op. cit. (n.20), p.213.
24 T 345, 165c, lines 12-15. Nandi's Chinese translation is somewhat different, 'Good man, I have finished explaining and revealing my ingenuity. You should keep this a secret and not speak of it to lowly, inferior people who have few good roots. Why? Because even Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas cannot comprehend this sūtra, much less can lowly and inferior, ordinary persons believe or understand it. Ordinary people cannot learn ingenuity, and so the Sūtra of Ingenuity is of no use to them; not a single ordinary person can accept and practice it. Only Bodhisattvas can learn and teach the doctrine of ingenuity' (Garma C.C. Chang's translation ‘On the Pāramitā of Ingenuity' in A Treasury of Mahāyāna Sūtras, Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1983; Delhi 1991, p.464).
25 T 345, 165c.
26 The Ratnakūtasaūtra, T 310b, 154c-157a, and the Mahāyānadaśadharmakāsāsūtra, T 314, 767b-769a. Lamotte translates the relevant passage into French which is again rendered into English by Sara Boin-[Webb] as follows: 'How do Bodhisattva Mahāsattvas understand the Tathāgata’s cryptic words (samādhīyabhāṣā)? Bodhisattva Mahāsattvas are skilled in understanding exactly the deep and secret meaning hidden in the Sūtras. O son of good family, when I predicted to the Śrāvakas their obtaining of supreme and perfect enlightenment, this is not correct; when I say to Ananda that I have back-ache, this is not correct; when I say to bhikṣu: “I am old, you should get me an assistant (upasthāyaka)”, this is not correct. O son of good family, it is not correct that the Tathāgata, in various places, triumphed over Tīrthikas and their systems one after another; it is not correct that an acacia thorn (khadirakantaka) injured the Tathāgata in the foot. When the Tathāgata again says: “Devadatta was my hereditary enemy, he ceaselessly followed me and sought to flatter me”, this is not correct. It is not correct that the Tathāgata, on entering Śrāvasti, went on his alms-seeking round in Sālā, the brahmans’ village, and returned with his bowl empty. Neither is it correct that Cīcāmāṇavīka and Sundari, attaching a wooden dish to their stomachs [so as to simulate pregnancy], slandered the Tathāgata. It is not correct that the Tathāgata, while dwelling earlier in the land of Verājā, spent the varga season in eating only barley'. Here one sentence is missing: 'I said to Maudgalyāyana: “You go and ask Jivaka, the physician, I am ill, what should I take?”', this is not correct'. See E. Lamotte, The Teaching of Vimalakīrti, English translation by Sara Boin (London 1976), p.297.
text praising the immense merit of making Buddha images. One such merit referred to in the text is being free from the retributions of bad karma.\(^{27}\) Then a question arises in the text on whether the Buddha himself had made any image in the past for he encountered many unpleasant events in his life, such as the Devadatta incident and his illness. The sūtra answers this question by saying that the Tathāgata has an eternal body, the dharmakāya, which is free from all bad karma, and that those incidents were only demonstrations for the sake of saving sentient beings.

The Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra mentions bad karma when discussing the power and light of the Buddha.\(^{28}\) According to this text, although the Buddha appeared to have backache, stomach troubles and other problems, they were but skilful means (upāya-kauśalya) of the Buddha. The real body of the Buddha, in fact, was perfect and without any illness because the Buddha had already eliminated all bad karma and completed kusaladharmas when he attained enlightenment. It is explicit that the śāstra refutes the assertion that the Buddha had bad karma, and the author definitely knew about the debate on bad karma. He refuted the Sarvāstivāda position by adopting the Buddhology characteristic of the Mahāsāṃghikas.

The last text on this issue is the Mahāyānāvatāraśāstra of Sthiramati which mentions some of the problematic incidents in the life of Gautama Buddha.\(^{29}\) The text, however, states that it is wrong to say that the Buddha suffered the remaining effects of bad karma, because he had eradicated all unskilful deeds and had immeasurable virtues.

The debate on the bad karma of the Buddha between the Mahāsāṃghikas and Sarvāstivādins lasted several centuries and has led to the question concerning the Buddha’s lifespan that eventually contributed to the establishment of the concept of the sambhogakāya. This debate also provides evidence on the ways the early schools debated the Buddha’s identity and how they compiled texts to support their arguments. This suggests that many sūtras were compiled and written by different schools in support of their doctrinal teachings.

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\(^{27}\) The three Chinese translation of the Tathāgatapraśārikābodhisattvahusāsāsasūtra are: T 692, translated under the Eastern Han dynasty 25-220 CE; T 693, translated under the Jin dynasty 317-420, and T 694, translated by Devaprajñā in 691. However, only the last one mentions bad karma. What is more, in the latter half of Devaprajñā’s translation, the dialogue is mainly conducted between the Buddha and the Bodhisattva Maitreya concerning the merit of making Buddha images. However, in the middle of this dialogue, the sūtra mentions that a person doubted whether the Buddha did make images in the past and thus bad karma is introduced. So the subject is most probably inserted in the text later when bad karma became an issue of debate. According to Bunyiu Nanjio (A Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripitaka, Delhi 1989, p.76), there is also a Tibetan translation of the sūtra similar to the first two Chinese translations.

\(^{28}\) T 1509, 121c.

\(^{29}\) T 1634, 37b-c.
AN INTERPRETATION OF ‘RELEASED ON BOTH SIDES’
(UBHATO-BHĀGA-VIMUTTI),
AND THE RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE STUDY
OF EARLY BUDDHISM

ALEXANDER WYNNE

In the Tapussa Sutta (TS) of the Aṅguttara-Nikāya (A IV.448; navaka-nipāta, mahāvagga, XLI), the Buddha describes his own path to liberation. When he was still just a Bodhisatta, he attained the four jhānas and then the four formless spheres (the infinity of space, the infinity of consciousness, nothingness, and neither-consciousness-nor-unconsciousness). Finally, after reaching the 'cessation of consciousness and sensation' (saññāvedayitanirodha; henceforth 'cessation'), his corruptions (āsavā) were destroyed by insight (pāññāya). This means that the Buddha attained liberation whilst in the state of cessation. However, the Buddha did not acknowledge (neva paccaññasim) his awakening to the world until he attained and emerged from the nine meditative states (nava anupubbavihārasamāpattiyo) in forward and reverse order (anulomapatiłoman). One half of this requirement had been fulfilled (the meditative states in forward order), and so it seems that the Buddha could not declare his liberation to the world until he had emerged from the meditative states in reverse.

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1 Originally presented at the UKABS conference, SOAS, 3 July 2001. All Pāli citations are from Pali Text Society editions. Pāli text in parenthesis is the reading that is included in the Burmese text of the Chaṭṭha Saṅggāya, Vipassanā Research Institute (VRI) version 3. The word vimokkha is written vimokha and vimokkha in the PTS and VRI editions. I follow the PTS readings editions, although they do not consistently adopt one form or another. In the main body of the text, I always use the form vimokha.

2 A IV. 448.4.

3 A IV. 448.8.
order. This done, he declared his awakening to the world, following which the knowledge and vision arose in him 'unshakeable is my liberation of the mind, this is my last birth, now there is no more re-becoming'.

In the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta (DCPS), we are told a different story: the object of liberating insight for the Buddha is 'the pure knowledge and vision of the Four Noble Truths, [each] in [their] three revolutions [and] twelve modes [in total]'. The format in which the Buddha's liberation is described uses exactly the same construction as the TS yavakkīvaṁ... neva tāvāhām... abhisambuddho ti paccaññasī. Similarly, in all other accounts of the Bodhisatta's awakening where the same pericope occurs, the Buddha declares his liberation to the world immediately after he had attained liberating insight (without mentioning any meditative states); immediately following this is the realisation that he is in his last birth and that there is no more re-becoming. All of these cases differ from the DCPS in that the object of liberation is not the Four Noble Truths. This is of little matter: they are obviously only mechanical applications of the same pericope in different contexts. The DCPS is a special case, for it is traditionally held to be the Buddha's first sermon. The Buddha's description of the content of his liberating insight in this Sutta is therefore of great importance. In addition, the description of the Four Noble Truths as the content of the Buddha's liberating insight is attested in the Khandhaka of the Vinaya-pitaka (Vin), in a form that repeats the DCPS verbatim. Even the same yavakkīvaṁ pericope is used. What is more, the most common theory of liberating insight in the Sutta-pitaka makes the Four Noble Truths the content of liberating insight: one need only mention the path described in the Sāmaññaphala Sutta and all the other identical descriptions in the Silakkhandhavagga of the Dīgha-Nikāya. Other autobiographical suttas where the Four Noble Truths are the object of the Bodhisatta's liberating insight are the Bhayabherava Sutta (M No.4), the Dvedhāvitakka Sutta (M No.19), the Mahā-Saccaka Sutta (M No.36) and the Bodhirājakumāra Sutta (M No.85).

We therefore have two alternative theories of the Buddha's liberation. In one (the TS), the Buddha passes through the formless meditations and attains liberating insight whilst in the state of cessation. From this state the Buddha must return in order to declare his liberation to the world, and indeed to know that he is in his last birth. The authors of the other account (DCPS, Vin) did not see the need to add such a pericope: after liberating insight (into the Four Noble Truths), the issue of returning from a transconceptual state in order to declare liberating insight to the world and to have the knowledge of being in one's last birth is not addressed. Nothing is said about the meditative states. However, when the Four Noble Truths are the object of liberating insight, they are usually preceded by the four jhānas. It is probable that the same tradition is behind the DCPS account. If this is so, we can conclude that the realisation of the Truths in the DCPS, as well as the subsequent declaration and knowledge of no more rebirth, is understood to occur in the fourth jhāna. In any case, the tradition behind the DCPS did not see the need to distinguish these different events in terms of meditative states. The TS set itself off from this idea: it asserted that the Buddha's liberating insight is of a different order to the subsequent declaration and knowledge that there is no more rebirth.

These two theories are contradictory. Firstly, the object of liberating insight is different. Secondly, the meditative state in

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4 Reading anuloma- with samāpajjim pi and -patilomaṁ with vaṭṭhāhīm pi in the phrase ... na evaṁ anulomapatilomaṁ samāpajjim pi vaṭṭhāhīm pi. In other words, at the point of attaining liberation, the Buddha has only done half of what needs to be done to make his declaration to the world: he has attained the meditative states necessary for liberation, but has not retracted back through them and returned to a more normal state of mind in which he can make the declaration to the world.

5 A IV.48.18.
6 S V. 420 ff.
7 S V. 422.
8 S V.420.
9 S II.170-1, 173, III.28-30, 59, IV.11-12, V.203, 205-6, 228, 422; A I.258-60, IV.56, 304, 448.
A I.260, S II.173, S III.30 and S IV.11-12 differ in that they describe what beings (sattā) must do to attain liberation. But these passages follow and merely repeat what has been described for the Bodhisatta.

10 Vinaya-pitaka, Mahāvagga 10-11.
which liberating insight is attained is different: saññāvedayitanirodha for the TS, unstated in the DCPS (possibly the fourth jhāna, and certainly not saññāvedayitanirodha). We have two different theories of liberating insight. They were probably held by different groups of early Buddhists. Is there any other evidence in the Sutta-pitaka that these two theories of liberating insight are rivals?

2

At the very end of the Mahānidāna Sutta (Dīgha-Nikāya), the Buddha explains what he means by the term ubhātobhāgavimutto, ‘released on both sides’. The two ‘sides’ or aspects of liberation are, not surprisingly, meditation and insight. The insight component is said to be the attainment of the ‘corruptionless (anāsavāṇi) release of mind (ceto vimuttī), release by insight (paññāvimuttī)’, here and now because of the destruction of the corruptions (āsavāṇa na khaya). In other words, this is what is essential for the attainment of liberation. It is, however, a standard formula used to describe liberating insight – usually it comes after the four jhānas or it is an alternative to the knowledge of the Four Noble Truths (which is usually the final liberating knowledge of three that come after the four jhānas). The meditative aspect of ‘release on both sides’ is the ability to attain the eight vimokhas – and these include the formless spheres found in the TS – in forward and reverse order, wherever, whenever and for however long one wishes. This makes the attainment of the formless spheres irrelevant to the attainment of liberation: compared with

the TS, their soteriological value is demeaned. In addition, the Sutta adds that ‘there is no other “release on both sides” higher or loftier than this release on both sides’. So the authors of this section of the Mahānidāna Sutta must have been aware of a different version of the concept, and they wished to stress that their idea was the better one. What is the other version of ‘release on both sides’ to which it is a reaction? Does it have the same derogatory appraisal of the formless attainments?

The only other relevant version of ‘released on both sides’ is found in the Kitāgiri Sutta (M 1.447-9). There, it tops a hierarchical list of seven types of spiritual aspirant. Richard Gombrich has examined some of the terms in the list and concluded that it is a late scheme. It is the highest two attainments that are of interest. Second from top is the one released by insight (paññāvimutto). He does not attain the formless meditations, but his corruptions are destroyed by insight. The highest individual is the one ‘released on both sides’. He attains the formless meditations and his corruptions are destroyed by insight. The factor that differentiates him from the one released by insight is the fact that he has attained the ‘calm formless vimokha’ (just like it is in the Mahānidāna Sutta). Both types are liberated, but it seems that the one ‘released on both sides’ has a more complete type of liberation because of his meditative skill. But there is more to it than that. The notion of ‘release on both sides’ does not have the same negative appraisal of the formless spheres as does the Mahānidāna Sutta. It seems identical to the path of formless meditation that we have seen in the TS where, after having attained the highest vimokha (cessation), one attains the liber-

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11 The section D II.68.25-71.29 has no connection to the rest of the Sutta. It is certainly a later stratum of the Mahānidāna Sutta.
12 D II.71.22.
13 The pericope replaces 4NT (i.e. it is the third of the three knowledges) without any meditation mentioned at: D III.281; M I.35, 71, 367, 482, 496, II.22, III.12, 99; S II.214, V.305; A 1.256, III.19, 29, 83, 281, V.14, 36, 200, 340.
14 The pericope comes after four jhānas without being part of the three knowledges at: D III.78; A I.220-1, 236, II.23, 36, 37, 214, III.114, 119, 131, 134-5, 142, 262, IV.140, 141, 314, 315, V.10, 12, 132, 210.
15 D II.71.18 ff.
16 ubhātobhāgavimutto also occurs in the same context, as one term of a sevenfold list, but without any explanation, in the following places: D III.105, 265; M 1.439, A I.73-4; A IV.10, 77-8, 215, A V.23.
17 Richard Gombrich, How Buddhism Began (London 1966), pp.106-7: ‘I think that almost every feature of the list of seven types can be traced back to scholasticism in this sense: a dependence upon words, at the cost of disregarding what those words were originally intended to describe’.
18 M 1.747.38.
ating insight that destroys the corruptions. I draw this conclusion because the Kitāgiri Sutta says that it is only after having attained the formless vimokhas (the summit of which is cessation) that one’s corruptions are destroyed by insight. In other words, I think that this version of ‘released on both sides’ means that the adept is meant to attain the formless vimokhas in succession before attaining liberating insight whilst in the state of cessation.

What on earth is going on here? One might think that the Sutta-piṭaka does not allow for the possibility that experiences of liberation can be qualitatively different. But this is not the case. The path to liberation which progresses through the jhānas and culminates in understanding the Four Noble Truths seems to be completely different from the progression through the formless vimokhas that ends in cessation and paññā. In each case the practices that bear directly on liberation and the state of liberation itself are envisaged in different ways. Put quite simply, it is hard to imagine that the same spiritual teacher could have taught both methods and goals. In the Kitāgiri Sutta, the highest spiritual

20 I think the gerund phassitvā followed by paññāya c’ assa disvā āsavā parikkhigna honti is sequential – the corruptions are destroyed once the eight vimokhas have been attained in sequence. We can compare the standard description of the attainment of cessation and insight with the version of ‘released on both sides’ here.

M I.160.7: puna ca paraṁ bhikkhavo bhikkhu sabbaso nevasaññanā- saññiya yatañam samatikkamma saññiya yada yadā samyakṣa yathā yathā vissimpajja viharati, paññāya c’ assa disvā āsavā parikkhigna honti.

M I.477.30: ekacco puggalo ye te santā vimokha atikkamma rūpe āruppe te kāyena phassitvā viharati, paññāya c’ assa disvā āsavā parikkhigna honti.

Both versions describe the transcendence of the earlier stages followed by an identical pericope used for the attainment of insight. The sequence and final stage of it are succinct. Only the Kitāgiri Sutta is more succinct. It is not difficult to explain why it is so succinct: it is trying to put in one sentence the whole formless path that ends in liberating insight. How else would an author condense the formless path into one sentence?

21 I cannot expand upon this point here. My feeling is that the formless path gradually reduces awareness until it ceases, whereas awareness is present in the fourth jhāna (upekkhāsaṁparipuṇuddhi ‘the purification of indifference and awareness’); this makes these paths irreconcilably different.

Wynne – ‘Released on Both Sides’

type termed ubhato-bhāga-vimuttī resembles the aspirant who has progressed through the formless meditations and attained cessation along with insight – just like the Bodhisatta had done in the TS. I propose that the list of spiritual types found in the Kitāgiri Sutta, or at least the highest types in its hierarchy, was formulated by those early Buddhists who advocated formless meditation as a path to liberation. With the term ubhato-vibhāga-vimuttī placed above paññā-vimuttī, they wanted to say that their version of the path and goal was superior to those paths that avoided formless meditation. But, as we saw in the Mahāniddāna Sutta, this move was not appreciated by all, perhaps by the majority of the early Saṅgha. Some argued against the idea by proposing a rival notion of ‘released on both sides’, in which the position of the formless vimokhas and cessation was little more than ornamental. And their version of liberating insight is in line with the path of jhāna.

3

There are a number of suttas that are quite hostile to the idea that the path of formless meditation is orthoprax Buddhism. For example, the Mahā-Cunda Sutta (A III.355-6 = chakka-nipāta XLVI) describes a debate between preachers (dhammayoga bhikkhu) and meditators (jhāyi bhikkhu). The former are said to penetrate the doctrine (atthapada, literally ‘purposeful words’) with their insight (paññā); the latter are said to touch the deathless realm (amatam dhātum) with the body (kāyena phusivā), a phrase that is synonymous with the attainment of the vimokhas and cessation. Both camps are completely at odds with each other, and the debate seems to be between intellectual and non-conceptual theories of liberating insight. There is further evidence: in the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta (D II.156), there is a debate about the meditative state in which the Buddha died. Ananda thinks that after passing through the four jhānas in succession, and

22 Kāyena + ṣvās plus applied to the eight vimokhas at: A II.87, 89-91. It is applied to the formless states (āruppas) at: M I.33, 477-9; S II.118, 123 A II. 316, A V. 11-12. It is applied to the jhānas only by association with the formless states (i.e. in the anupubbavīhāra schemes) at: A IV.451-53.

23 Louis de La Vallée-Poussin pointed this out with reference to the same text in the article ‘Musila et Nārada’. Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques 5, 1937, pp.189-222.

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then the four formless *vimokhas*, the Buddha has gone into Parinibbāna (i.e. died). But Anuruddha corrects him – the Buddha has only attained the 'cessation of consciousness and sensation'. It is then said that the Buddha retraced his steps until he was again in the first *jhāna*. Finally, he ascended to the fourth *jhāna* and entered Parinibbāna. Is this an accurate historical account? Surely, a better explanation is that the state in which the Buddha died was vitally important, and the advocates of different spiritual practices wished to have him die in the meditative state that they held to be the most soteriologically relevant. This is not an historically accurate account, but the result of an argument between the advocates of two different meditative practices (and hence theories of liberating insight). If this is so, we see that the advocates of the four *jhānas* had the upper hand in the debate.

In these two examples, the formless meditations have two rivals: an intellectual theory of liberating insight, and the *jhānas*. It is possible that these two rival theories might have been held by one and the same group of monks: the liberating insight into the *atthapada* of the Mahā-Cunda Sutta might refer to the liberating insight into the Four Noble Truths (after the attainment of the four *jhānas*).

This brings us back to the TS, DCPS, the *Mahāniddāna Sutta* and the *Kitāgiri Sutta*. Given the debate concerning the soteriological efficacy of the formless meditations, it seems quite clear what is going on. Let me plot the probable course of events. The *Mahāniddāna Sutta* knows that the *Kitāgiri Sutta* is an attempt to elevate the path of formless meditation. It therefore suggests an alternative version of *ubhaya-bhāga-vimutti* where the attainment of the formless realms has less importance – they are not part of a more complete type of liberation, but are in fact dispensable, just a quite pointless meditative skill. On the contrary, what is soteriologically relevant for the *Mahāniddāna Sutta* is a version of insight that is associated with the path of the four *jhānas*. With the TS and DCPS, we see the same two competing theories: the formless meditations as a path to a non-conceptual sort of liberation for the former, and the Four Noble Truths (most obviously connected with the *jhānas*) as part of an intellectual theory of liberating insight for the latter. The TS makes a point of mentioning meditative states, deliberately setting it off from the DCPS tradition. It is therefore later than the DCPS. Arranging the texts chronologically, we have the DCPS first. Then we have the TS and probably the *Kitāgiri Sutta*, roughly contemporaneous. Finally, latest of all is the latter section of the *Mahāniddāna Sutta*.

In attempting to interpret the term *ubhaya-bhāga-vimutti*, we are thrown into a world of doctrinal debate that has received little attention in the study of early Buddhism. There are many divergent opinions in the early texts and one cannot simply claim that the doctrinal formulations of the four *Nikāyas* form a homogeneous whole. What implications are there for the study of early Buddhism?

First of all, opinion about the purpose of the formless *vimokhas* was varied. The position held by some, that *saṁvedayitanirodha* is the indispensable prerequisite for liberation is one that receives less attention. Originally, this idea was probably only a minor view. The four *jhānas* are less problematic: it is asserted over and over again that they alone are the meditative states necessary for the attainment of liberation. It is therefore more likely that they represent the earlier doctrinal understanding. I seriously doubt that the understanding that the attainment of cessation is the necessary prerequisite for the attainment of liberation belonged to the earliest phase of Buddhist thought.

Secondly, my analysis of the TS and DCPS questions the authenticity of some autobiographical accounts of the Buddha's life. There are three key events in the Buddha's life that would have been crucial for making doctrinal points: the awakening, the first sermon, and the Parinibbāna. All these accounts, as we have seen, might have undergone numerous editorial phases because of the wish to make doctrinal points. We saw this process in operation in the account of the meditative states attained at the time of the Buddha's Parinibbāna. How else can we explain the texts?

One might think that this sort of approach will only lead to negative results and explain the material away. But I do not see it like this at all. The positive outcome should be that we should gain a better understanding of how the suttas came to assume their extant form. We might therefore be able to stratify the ideas and regain the earliest doctrinal formulation – what is closest to the
Buddha. The *Tapussa Sutta* might never have been uttered by the Buddha, but by drawing out doctrinal inconsistencies and debate in the early material, we might be able to find out what he did say.

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**RED RUST, ROBBERS AND RICE FIELDS: WOMEN'S PART IN THE PRECIPITATION OF THE DECLINE OF THE DHAMMA**

**LIZ WILLIAMS**

The lack of a current female monastic Order in Theravāda Buddhism is often substantiated by reason of the Buddha’s initial reluctance to ordain women and by his alleged prediction that the lifetime of the true Dhamma would be significantly diminished by their presence. I have argued previously¹ that the argument of his reluctance is seriously flawed; I intend in this paper to demonstrate that the real precipitation of the decline of the Dhamma was in fact facilitated by the monk Sudinna and that there is no textual evidence, other than the story in *Cullavagga* X, that women were at all culpable.

It is said in *Cullavagga* X,

> If, Ānanda, women had not obtained the going forth from home into homelessness in the dhamma and discipline proclaimed by the Truth-finder, the Brahma-faring, Ānanda, would have lasted long, true dhamma would have endured for a thousand years. But since, Ānanda, women have gone forth ... in the dhamma and discipline proclaimed by the Truth-Finder, now, Ānanda, the Brahma-faring will not last long, true dhamma will endure only for five hundred years (Vin II: 256).²

The Buddha then proceeds to liken the presence of women in the Saṅgha to a household with few men which would easily fall prey to robbers, a diseased rice field and a sugar-cane field attacked by red rust. This is the only reference to women’s culpability in the downfall of the teachings. Elsewhere in the Vinaya (see below), the Saṅgha as a whole is cautioned over its behaviour and its effect

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on the Dhamma.

It is said at Vin III:10, that the company of bhikkhus present in Gotama’s Saṅgha is

Devoid of immorality, devoid of danger, stainless, purified, based on the essential. Sāriputta, the most backward of these five hundred monks is one who has entered the stream, not liable to be born in any state of woe, assured, bound for enlightenment.5

This is in response to Sāriputta’s enquiring of the Buddha as to the reasons why the ‘Brahma-life’ has lasted longer under some previous Buddhas than it has under others. The Buddha lists three previous Buddhas, being Vipassin, Sikhin and Vessabhu, who were ‘idle in preaching Dhamma in detail to the disciples’ (Vin III: 8), and who did not have the binding element of the Suttas or other texts, or the Pāṭimokkha to maintain and support monastic purity. The consequence of this was that, after the enlightened ones had attained final Nibbāna, there were fewer and fewer bhikkhus, leading to the eventual demise of the Dhamma. The Buddha uses the simile of an unbound pile of flowers being scattered by the wind:

Inasmuch as they are not held together by a thread, even so, Sāriputta, at the disappearance of these enlightened ones, these lords, at the disappearance of the disciples enlightened under these enlightened ones, those last disciples of various names, of various clans, of various social strata, who had gone forth from various families, caused this Brahma-life rapidly to disappear (Vin III: 8).6

He then describes the reverse situation during the time of the Buddhas Kakusandha, Konāgamana and Kassapa, who had the advantage of having recourse to the oral texts and who had the Pāṭimokkha binding the Saṅgha together, and who therefore, ‘established the Brahma-life for a very long time’ (Vin III: 9).

At this point, there is no suggestion of any danger to the life of the present Dhamma as all the existing members of the monastic Community have, at the very least, attained stream-entry. It is obviously seen as inevitable that the Dhamma will eventually decline, no matter what the circumstances, but that the purity of the Saṅgha is vital to the cohesion of it and is a significant influence on the duration of it.

Sāriputta then urges the Buddha to ‘make known the course of training for disciples’ so that the ‘Brahma-life’ will last for a long time. The Buddha responds by saying,

Wait, Sāriputta, wait, Sāriputta. The tathāgata will know the right time for that. The teacher does not make known, Sāriputta, the course of training for disciples, or appoint the Pāṭimokkha until some conditions causing the cankers appear here in the Order (Vin III: 9).5

He then goes on to list the circumstances causing the cankers to appear. They will only appear when the Order has attained long standing, has attained full development, has achieved the ‘greatness of gain’ and has attained great learning. Obviously then, as the Order is, as yet, seen as totally pure and the Saṅgha is in its infancy, there is no need for the formulation of any rules. There is no suggestion here that the existing lifetime of the Dhamma is in imminent danger of declining, nor is there any suggestion that the admission of women to the Order will have any impact on it.

The existence of the present dispensation is seen as beginning with the Buddha’s first sermon, the Dhammacakkappavattana, when Koṇḍañña ‘enters the stream’, ‘plunges into the Dhamma’ and with insight sees crucial aspects of the Dhamma, i.e., that conditioned phenomena can be transcended and Nibbāna attained.

And while this discourse was being spoken, there arose in the Venerable Koṇḍañña the dust-free, stainless vision of the Dhamma: ‘Whatever is subject to origination is all subject to cessation’.6

At this point, it is said that a cry went up among the gods that the Dhamma-wheel had been set in motion. The message then rippled through the universe that an event of cosmic importance

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5 Ibid., p.18.
had taken place. Moreover, it is said that the motion of the Dhamma-wheel cannot be stopped by anyone in the world.

A parallel narrative of a major cosmic event is given at Vin III: 19, when Sudinna, a bhikkhu who has shown great determination in overcoming his parents' dissent at his ordination and then resisting their attempts to coax him back to lay life with offers of wealth, succumbs to temptation and has sexual intercourse with his former wife. Sudinna has tainted an organisation that was formerly pure with danger and immorality. The mythological element is again employed to illustrate that a major cosmic event has occurred, i.e. the precipitation of the decline of the Dhamma. Again, a 'cosmic ripple' is said to go up through the various layers of gods, causing the earth to shake. When the Buddha is informed of Sudinna's offence, he rebukes him, saying, 'Foolish man, you are the first-doer of many wrong things' (Vin III: 21)." Sudinna, then, has breached the boundary of purity that was essential for the flourishing of the Dhamma. He has provided the means by which the Pātimokkha has had to be formulated, in direct opposition to Kondañña who had been instrumental in the setting in motion the Wheel of Dhamma. In both cases, news of the event was said to ripple up through the various levels of Gods, implying that the two events have a parallel, if opposite, significance. The Buddha then lays down the first parājika rule that, 'Whatever monk should indulge in sexual intercourse is one who is defeated, he is no longer in communication' (Vin III: 21).

The steady decline is then begun as more and more monks commit offences necessitating Vinaya rules. This laxity within the Saṅgha is stressed ubiquitously by the Buddha himself as the cause of the decline of the Dhamma. In the Samyutta Nikāya (SN II: 224) the Buddha lists five detrimental causes which lead to the decay and disappearance of the true Dhamma:

What are the five? Here the bhikkhus, the bhikkhuṇīs, the male lay

followers, and the female lay followers dwell without reverence and deference towards the Teacher; they dwell without reverence and deference towards the Dhamma; they dwell without reverence and deference towards the Saṅgha; they dwell without reverence and deference towards the training; they dwell without reverence and deference towards concentration. The reverse situations which will lead to its non-decay and non-disappearance are then listed. Obviously then, the whole Community is responsible for the well-being of the Dhamma.

At SN V: 173, the monk Bhadda asks of Ānanda, 'Friend Ānanda, what is the cause and reason for the decline of the true Dhamma? And what is the cause and reason of the nondecline of the true Dhamma?" Ānanda responds by explaining that it is by cultivating the four foundations of mindfulness that the Dhamma is preserved, and by neglect of these that its lifetime is diminished. Ānanda is traditionally considered to be a reliable source of information because of his long association with the Buddha as his faithful and constant attendant, and because of his prodigious memory. Therefore, any teaching given by Ānanda is acknowledged as being equivalent to hearing it directly from the Buddha himself.

Another cause for the Dhamma's demise is said to be the arising of a 'counterfeit' Dhamma. At SN II: 224, Kassapa asks the Buddha why there are now fewer arahats and more precepts than previously. The Buddha replies to Kassapa by explaining that, 'There is no disappearing of the true doctrine, Kassapa, till a counterfeit doctrine arises in the world; but when a counterfeit doctrine does arise, then there will be a disappearance of the true doctrine'. He then reiterates the caution (as above) that it is when all four elements of the Saṅgha, monks, nuns, female lay-followers and male lay-followers are negligent in their behaviour and observance of the rules, that the Dhamma will be short-lived.

What then, of the account in Cullavagga X: that it is the

follows?

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7 BD I, p.37.
9 BD I, p.38.
admission of women into the monastic Order that will lead to the eventual downfall of the teachings? Why, after all the cautions given to the members of the Sangha and even to lay people on the maintenance of discipline, would the Buddha himself precipitate its downfall by admitting women if they would cause its demise? Sponberg\(^\text{13}\) hears a 'multiplicity of voices' in early Buddhist texts and, rather than a literal, historical account, suggests a symbolic or mythical process of mediation by which the problems posed by the existence of a female Order were reconciled. The 'problem' posed by women in the Order does not seem to have been apparent during the Buddha's lifetime. Many nuns speak of their spiritual quest and, indeed, their attainment of the ultimate goal in the \(\text{Therigāthā}\). None of these women refers to ordination by both Orders, yet they achieved equivalent spiritual goals to men. There are no records of any questioning of the Buddha's decision to admit women during his lifetime. It would appear that problems only arose after the demise of the Buddha, when social and cultural norms were being challenged by the presence and the attainments of women in a society which had deep roots in Brahmanism, where the most common and acceptable role for a woman was that of wife and child-bearer. Perhaps because of the necessity for so many Vinaya rules, caused by infringements by both men and women, a scapegoat was needed to explain the diminishing standards of monastic behaviour. Who better, then, than women, who were occupying the privileged position previously held by men in society and by monks in the Saṅgha?

Nattier\(^\text{14}\) lists seven causes of the demise of Buddhism which she labels 'internal', that is, shortcomings on the part of Buddhists themselves (pp.120-1). She sees the repeated admonitions to monastics to maintain their commitment and practice as another teaching on impermanence. Not only is human rebirth precious, but the life of the Dhamma is transient. While human efforts can contribute to the longevity of it and human failings cause its decline, Buddhism, like all conditioned phenomena, is subject to decay (p.286), one of the most fundamental teachings of Buddhism. The decision made by the Buddha to admit women, contradicting all his other admonitions and thereby contributing to the early decline of the Dhamma, Nattier sees as a 'somewhat convoluted attempt by the early Buddhist community to resolve a complex and pressing set of issues related to the presence of women in the saṅgha' (p.121).

Whether women are any more responsible for the demise of the Dhamma than men remains a matter of conjecture, but the responsibility for the initiation of the decline of a formerly pure institution remains unequivocally with Sudinna.

\(\text{Liz Williams}\)

\(^{13}\) A. Sponberg, 'Attitudes toward Women and the Feminine in Early Buddhism', in J. Cabezón (ed.), \textit{Buddhism, Sexuality and Gender}, SUNY 1992, pp.3-36.

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5. Part I of A Dictionary of Pāli by Margaret Cone, covering letters A-Kh. £25.00

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1. The Casket of Medicine, J Liyanarate's translation of the first 18 chapters of the Bhesajjamaṇjūṣā.
2. Summary of the Topics of Abhidhamma and Exposition of the Topics of Abhidhamma, a translation by RP Wijeratne and Rupert Gethin of the Abhidhammasaṅgaha and its commentary, the Abhidhammatthavibhāvī.
3. Journal of the Pali Text Society XXVII.

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EKOTTARĀGAMA (XXIX)

Translated from the Chinese Version by Thich Huyên-Vi and Bhikkhu Pāsādika in collaboration with Sara Boin-Webb

Eleventh Fascicle
Part 20
(A Spiritual Friend)

10. 1 Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was staying in Śrāvasti, at Jetū's Grove, in Anāthapindada's (T2, 601a) Park. Then the Exalted One said to the bhikṣus: There are two [kinds of] practice (dharma) by means of which an ordinary worldling (prthagjana) obtains great merit, reaps outstanding karmic rewards (phalavipāka), [finally] tastes the Deathless (āmrtaṇa) and realises the state of the Unconditioned (asaṃskṛtasthāna). Which are the two? a) Treating one's father and mother with great respect (pājā); it is because of [honouring] these two persons that one obtains great merit and reaps outstanding karmic rewards. And, furthermore, one obtains great merit and... rewards b) by treating a bodhisattva who has to wait for only one more birth [before realising Buddhahood] (ekajāti-pratībuddha) with great respect. It is, O bhikṣus, because of practising generosity (dāna) towards these two [groups of] persons

1 See T2, 600c29 ff.; Hayashi, p. 186 ff.
4 Cf. Karashima, p. 531: 一生處處... "(a bodhisattva, who will take up a (buddha's) place in his next life" ekajāti-pratībuddha. See also A. von Stael-Holstein (ed.), The Kāśyapa-parivāra. A Mahāyāna-sūtra of the Ratnakūṭa Class, Shanghai 1926, p. 1: bodhisattvasahatsra... ekajāti-pratībuddha yad utānunātasyāmy samyaksambhodhau. For further references see BHSID, p. 152, s.v. ekajāti", and E. Conze, Materials for a Dictionary of the Prājñāpāramitā Literature, Tokyo 1967, p. 139.

Thus and with the parente... to the Buddha’s words, the bhikṣus were pleased and respectfully applied themselves to practice.

11. ‘Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was staying in Śrāvastī,... the Exalted One said to the bhikṣus: [I] tell you that the kindness (sādhu) of two persons can never be repaid. Of which two? Of one’s father and mother. Even if someone, O bhikṣus, should carry about his father on his left and his mother on his right shoulder and if he should do so for countless years; if he should [take care of them by providing them with] clothing, food, shelter and medicine to cure illness and emaciation, and should they even [while being carried] on his shoulders, pass stool and urine [that he would have to put up with], he would still be unable to repay [their kindness]. You should know, bhikṣus, that because of one’s father’s and mother’s acts of kindness one is deeply indebted (bhāra) to them: One has been embraced and reared by them, all the time and ever ready to protect [their children], and never losing time in perfecting [their children’s] becoming aware of the wider world. It is on account of this ‘skill in means’ that one appreciates how difficult it is to repay [one’s parents’] kindness. Therefore, O bhikṣus, one should treat one’s father and mother with great respect and never be remiss in one’s filial duty. Thus, O bhikṣus, you should train. – After listening to the Buddha’s words, the bhikṣus were pleased and respectfully applied themselves to practice.’

12. ‘Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was staying in Śrāvastī,... Then the Venerable [Mahā]panthaka said to his younger brother Cudāpanthaka: If a person is unable to keep [in mind] the rules of moral conduct, he should return to [lay life] and wear the white robe [of a layman]. – On hearing these words Cudāpanthaka went out of the gate of Jeta[vana] Monastery and stood [aside] weeping. While the bhikṣu was standing outside the gate, with his immaculate ‘divine eye’ (divyacakṣus) the Exalted One saw him beside himself and weeping-bitterly. Rising from his quiet abiding (vihāra) and seemingly taking his walking-exercise (cankrama), the Exalted One went out of the gate of Jeta[vana] Monastery and asked Cudāpanthaka: Why, bhikṣu, are you weeping bitterly? – Exalted One, replied C., my elder brother wants to expel me, [saying] that if a person is unable to keep [in mind] the rules of moral conduct, he should return to [lay life]... and that he should not stay here. That is why I am weeping bitterly. – Do not be afraid, bhikṣu, said the Exalted One, [I] will see to it that [you] will realise the Highest, Full and Complete Enlightenment (anuttarā samyaksambodhi); you would not become enlightened due to your elder brother Panthaka. – Then the Exalted One took C. by the hand, returned [with him] to the vihāra and had him sitting down on the spot and holding a bamboo broom, [saying to him]: What do you call this [object]? Pronounce the word for it. – Now C. managed to pronounce ‘bamboo’, but he could not remember [the word] ‘broom’, and while he managed to pronounce ‘broom’, he forgot [the word] ‘bamboo’.

Venerable Cudāpanthaka continued enunciating ‘bamboo broom’ for several days. Consequently the defects (mala) in his pronouncing ‘bamboo broom’ were gone, and he thought to himself: What is this dispelling (prahāna) like, and what are defects like?

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5 The fact that here only one group of persons, viz. one’s parents, are mentioned, clearly bears out Bareau’s observation (n. 4 above) about Mahāyāna ideas and teachings that later on were inserted in EA which probably formed part of the canonical texts of a school deriving from the Mahāsāṃghikas.

6 Cf. BSR 18, 2 (2001), p. 222, n. 10; 報恩 renders kṛta jñā and also means ‘to repay a kind act’.

7 As in the corresponding Pāli text (see n. 9 below), the Chinese has no verb in this place. The editor of A has inserted a verb supplied by the commentary. Lit.: ‘becoming aware of sun and moon’.


Ekottarāgama XXIX

Nalanda ed., A I, p. 59: mātu ca pitu ca). Cf. the English transl. at F.L. Woodward, Gradual Sayings I, PTS, 1932 ff., p. 56 f.: ‘Monks, one can never repay two persons, I declare. What two? Mother and father...’ Apart from the exaggeration in EA, viz. carrying on one’s shoulders one’s parents lit. ‘for a thousand ten thousand years’, against the one hundred years in the Pāli text, the EA version is shorter and considerably simpler than the Pāli.


11 Ibid., p. 86 (道).

12 Ibid., p. 332 (卿).
There is a defect when there is grime on a slate [roof, for instance], and getting rid [leads to] cleanliness (parisuddhi). And again it occurred to him: Why has the Exalted One given me this lesson? Now I should think about this matter. – This train of thought occasioned further thinking: Now there also is dirt (rajás) on my body; I am myself an illustrative example (upamā); what is getting rid like, and what are impurities like? – Then he reflected: The impurities are the fetters of the mental defilements (kleśā), and getting rid corresponds to insight-knowledge (jñāna). Just now I am able to sweep away these mental defilements with the broom of insight-knowledge.

Venerable Cūḍapannavathu’s [story] is that the Exalted One said to the bhikṣus: There are these two character traits (dharma) to which one should not be devoted or excessively attached [because they lead to] man’s misfortune (vyasana) and desertion (utsarga). Which are these two character traits? a) All that can be subsumed under hatred (dveṣa) which one should not give oneself over to... [leads to] man’s misfortune and desertion; b) the refusal to help (upakāra) [others] and lack of courtesy (anuna...)

13. ‘Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was staying in Śravaṇabhūtisūtra... the Exalted One said to the bhikṣus: There are these two character traits (dharma) to which one should not be devoted or excessively attached [because they lead to] man’s misfortune (vyasana) and desertion (utsarga). Which are these two character traits? a) All that can be subsumed under hatred (dveṣa) which one should not give oneself over to... [leads to] man’s misfortune and desertion; b) the refusal to help (upakāra) [others] and lack of courtesy (anuna...)

15 Cf. J I, pp. 114-20, i.e. the paccuppavannavatthu, ‘story of the present’ in the Cullakaśṭhitīṭaka relating to Cullapannathu. For the English transl. see R. Chalmers, The Jātaka I, The Cambridge University Press, 1895; PTS reprint, 1957 ff. pp. 14-8. Cf. also BSR 11, 2 (1994), pp. 160-7 (with references to Sanskrit and other sources bearing on Cullapannathu). Whilst in J the reason is given as to why Cullapannathu was so inordinately bad at memorising, the EA text (corresponding to J I, pp. 116-8) conveys a fresh account of Cullapannathu’s becoming an arhat after receiving the decisive instruction from the Buddha. The meditation aid C is given in J is ‘a perfectly clean cloth’ (vāyu) which he has to handle while repeating rajoharanam (‘removal of impurity’). Cf. also R.D. Vadekar (ed.), Milindapanha, Bombay 1940, p. 171: rathāgato therassa Cullapanna... The meditation aid is the ‘bamboo broom’ for sweeping away the impurities. The fact that insight-knowledge as a result of satipaṭṭhāna practice is mentioned in this EA passage no less than six times is a reminder of a verse in the Milindapanha (loc. cit., p. 362), attributed to Cullapannathu: yadā kileṣa upatantī sāmānayaupadhamasatā | satipaṭṭhānakalākute hantābā te punappunam ti ||... ‘When there is harassment of the mental defilements, of the destroyers of the virtue of reclusion, again and again they should be smitten with the club of mindfulness applied.’

The representation of C. in this EA text is in marked contrast to the one given in BSR 11, 2.


13 Lit. ‘destroy, decay’ (败). Cf. Mahāvyutthi, 2572: antarāhāna = nub pa for which latter the Zaṅkan Dockian (Peking 1985) s.v. inter alia has 貥敗 (‘decline, fade away’).
which one should not... [lead to] man's misfortune and desertion. These are, O bhikṣus, the two traits of character which one will not be happy with and to which one should not be devoted.

Furthermore, bhikṣus, there are two character traits which do not [lead to] man's misfortune and desertion. Which are the two? a) One's overcoming hatred which [makes for] man's complete satisfaction (partīsa) and b) all that can be subsumed under helpfulness and courtesy and which is most appreciable and respectable, [making for] man's complete satisfaction. These are, bhikṣus, the two... [making for]... satisfaction. Now on account of what (ko 'rthah), why (kasmāt) have I just mentioned all that can be subsumed under hatred and lack of helpfulness and courtesy on the one hand, and one's overcoming hatred and all that can be subsumed under helpfulness and courtesy on the other? – The Exalted One, a bhikṣu affirmed, is the chief master (svāmin) of all teachings. Would the Exalted One be kind enough to give us an explanation. Having listened, all bhikṣus will be much obliged and respectfully apply themselves to practice. – Listen attentively, responded the Exalted One, and take heed of what [I am going to say]. It is appropriate that I throw light (nir-vidis) on what has been said. The [above first] two character traits, O bhikṣus, are due to desire (trṣṇā) because of which they come into play, arise, are effective and manifest themselves. One should train to dispel this desire without letting it arise [anew]. Thus, O bhikṣus, you should train. – After listening to the Buddha's words, the bhikṣus were pleased and respectfully applied themselves to practice.'18

17 In general 慈愛 means 'affection, love' (sneha); at Foguang, p. 4107, however, it says that affection is an obstacle to obtaining release from Samśāra and realising ultimate freedom; cf. Soothill, p. 325: 慈愛, 'grace and love; human affection, which is one of the causes of rebirth'. Here, tentatively, the two characters are taken to mean upakāra, anumaya (after Hirakawa).

18 In a way the above-mentioned two character traits 'making for man's complete satisfaction', viz. overcoming hatred and 'all that can be subsumed under helpfulness and courtesy', are reminiscent of D III, p. 232: Catiāri samgahavatthānī... and of A II, p. 248 (253); ...Dānaṃ, peyyavañjan, athacariyā, sa-mānattatā. Imāni kho bhikkhave catiārī sahagahavatthānī ti; F.L. Woodward, Gradual Sayings II, p. 253: 'Monks, there are these four bases of sympathy. What four? Charity, kind speech, doing a good turn, and treating all alike...'
OBITUARIES

MARIANNE WINDER (10 September 1918 – 6 April 2001)

Associated with the Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine for over thirty years, Miss Winder died peacefully in her adopted home, London. She was born in Teplíz, near Prague, in the dying days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, just prior to the declaration of independence of what is now the Czech Republic. The elder of two daughters of the distinguished Jewish writer and literary critic, Ludwig Winder, the whole family emigrated to England after the Munich Agreement of 1938 effectively sealed the fate of their country.

After the War, she majored in German philology and in 1953 was appointed Assistant Librarian at the Institute of Germanic Studies, London University. By the end of the following decade she occupied the equivalent position at the Wellcome Institute where she was to remain until retirement.

She continued to research not only German but medieval and Renaissance literature. Her long-standing interest in Buddhism matured into a passion for Tibet, its language and culture. Mastering Tibetan at nearby SOAS, she was ideally suited to fill the post of Curator of Oriental Manuscripts and Printed Books, newly created at the Wellcome Institute in 1970. Immediately she had the unenviable task of organising and cataloguing the Institute’s Oriental holdings based, partly, on a 1954 handlist of 3,000 Sanskrit Mss. As a result of her thorough and conscientious groundwork, the Wellcome Library’s Oriental collections not only occupy an unrivalled position as a primary resource for the study of medicine in Asian cultures but are acknowledged as one of the major Oriental collections in the West. Winder also pursued her research in Tibetan medicine and collaborated with Rechung Rinoche Jampal Kunzang in his seminal study, *Tibetan Medicine illustrated in original texts* (London 1973; rev. ed., Delhi 2001).

On retirement in 1978, Winder was appointed Consultant in Tibetan Medicine which enabled her to continue her work on the *Catalogue of Tibetan manuscripts and xylographs, and the catalogue of thankas, banners and other paintings and drawings in the Library of the Wellcome Institute* (published 1989). In 1985 she participated in an international workshop on the study of Indian medicine. Her paper ‘Vaidûrya’ was published in the proceedings entitled *Studies in Indian Medicine* (ed. D Wujastyk and G J Meulenbeld). The following year, she organised a conference on ‘Aspects of Classical Tibetan Medicine as reflected in Central Asia’ and with it staged a major exhibition (‘Body and Mind in Tibetan Medicine’) for which she produced the catalogue. The conference proceedings were edited by Winder and appeared in 1993 under the title *Aspects of Classical Tibetan Medicine*.

She acted as a consultant for the book, *Eastern Healing: The practical guide to the healing traditions of China, Tibet and India*, compiled by Jacqueline Young and published just before her death. Winder was preparing to contribute a chapter describing some of the thankas in the Wellcome Library for a book commemorating the 150th birth anniversary of Sir Henry Wellcome in 2003 and had selected the material with which to illustrate her contribution.

Marianne Winder will be remembered, not only for her scholarship and for the contribution she made in her fields of expertise, but also for her warmth, loyalty and sense of humour. Her circle of friends was drawn from the several areas her life touched upon – from her early days in Prague, from the difficult years as a refugee during the War, from the world of academia, from those who shared her enthusiasm for Tibet, its people and culture, and from the Buddhist faith she embraced.


DAVID NEIL MACKENZIE (8 April 1926 – 13 October 2001)

The polyglot philologist and the world’s leading authority on modern Kurdish, a Fellow of the British Academy, Emeritus Professor MacKenzie, died in Bangor, North Wales, after a lifetime devoted to the study and understanding of Iranian languages.

Born in London, under W B Henning he read Persian at SOAS (1948-51), obtained his doctorate in 1957 and was appointed Lecturer in Iranian Languages in 1961 (becoming Reader in 1965). In
1975 he was appointed to the Chair of Iranian Languages and Literatures at Göttingen, a post he held until retirement in 1994 when he returned to the UK. Apart from his Festschrift, Corolla Iranica (ed. R E Emmerick and D Weber, Frankfurt 1991), two volumes of his collected papers appeared in 1999 under the title Iranica Diversa.


RONALD ERIC EMMERICK (1937 – 31 August 2001)

After his mentor (Sir Harold Bailey), the world’s foremost authority in Khotanese died in the saddle at Hamburg. Professor Dr Emmerick was born in Sydney and read Classics and Modern Languages at the local university (1955-59) and Oriental Studies (i.e., Sanskrit and Iranian under H W Bailey) at Cambridge (1959-67), becoming Research Fellow at St. John’s College. Between 1964-67 he held the post of Lecturer in Iranian Studies at SOAS and obtained his doctorate in 1965. From 1971 he directed the Iranian Department of the Seminar für Geschichte und Kultur des Vorderen Orients, Hamburg University.


BOOK REVIEWS


In a broader sense caiiya (Pāli cetiya) refers to any funeral monument, a tree associated with it, and even the area reserved for such a monument as a place of ancestral worship. In the narrower sense it refers to the mound covering the burial of a person to be remembered. In the Buddhist context the mound developed into a structure usually called stūpa (Pāli thūpa). The origin of burial mounds has been traced far into Indo-European prehistory outside India to the so-called kurgans, burial mounds for tribal chiefs. Pre-Buddhist worship of cetiyas in India is attested by, among others, the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta where the Buddha, while staying at Cāpāla-cetiya, is praising the pleasantness of several other cetiyas around Vesāli, no doubt located in wooded groves. Cāpāla was a yakka (tree spirit), so the Buddha might have been resting in the shadow of his tree, unless the commentary is right in stating that a vihāra had been built there earlier specifically for the use of the Buddha, who is supposed to have stayed there on several previous occasions.

The worship of caiiyas in the narrow sense of burial mounds of spiritually accomplished personages in the Buddhist context is established in the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta under the term thūpa, when, quite in keeping with the ancient custom afforded to deceased rulers, the Buddha describes to Ānanda the burial of a rāja cakkavatti, a 'wheel-rolling' king or a king above other kings, who ruled in righteousness and therefore is worthy of a stūpa. He then instructs him that his own remains should be treated in the same way, because a Tathāgata is also worthy of a stūpa as is a Pacceka-buddha as well as an accomplished disciple of the
Tathāgata. The main reason for this ostentation is the opportunity it provides for others to gain merit: whoever will place flowers or other offerings at a stūpa, thinking of the accomplishments of the buried person and thus becoming gladdened at heart, will after death reach heavenly realms.

As is further reported in the sutta, the Buddha’s remains were enshrined in eight stūpas erected by different recipients of the relics. These were again divided and distributed around the country by Asoka with stūpas built over them, and the worship of stūpas with relics of the Buddha or other holy persons has continued ever since. In the Visuddhimagga, it goes under the term cetiya and the two designations become practically synonymous, although occasionally the broader meaning of the term cetiya as any object or shrine worthy of reverence did not entirely disappear.

For lack of relics, other sacred objects came to be enshrined in stūpas for worship, such as texts of sūtras, and finally the stūpa or caiṭya as such sufficed for the purpose without containing anything, and even in miniature form. It became a symbol standing for the Buddha, the Enlightenment or the final nirvāṇa. One early sect belonging to the Mahāsāṃghika movement even became known as Caitika; it had further sub-sects, but nothing is known about its approach to caiṭya worship. Perhaps the last step, however, in the form of caiṭya worship was taken when it became enough to bear in mind the shape of a caiṭya and pay respect to it mentally in order to obtain the benefit from it, as is evident from the texts in the book under review.

The three texts critically edited here from manuscripts kept in Calcutta, Tokyo, London and Berlin are comparable in contents. The first one, which gives the story in more detail and with fewer gaps, is written in ‘more or less’ correct Sanskrit and its style dates it to about the sixth century CE or later. The other two are in Hybrid Sanskrit with Newari influence and may not be much later than the first one. In the story Subhūti the Elder (sthavira) asks the Buddha, here called Śākyasimha, in front of a great assembly, to expound ahorātravrata, ‘the rite of day and night’. Śākyasimha does so by recalling how in a distant past a certain Vasubandhu, disciple of the Buddha Vipaśyin, explained the doctrine to King Indraprṣṭha of Gandhāvāṭī in Purvavidhe. Vasubandhu described the rite as one which was practised by all Buddhas, who gained Enlightenment through it. All others who perform it will have their share of perfect wisdom. Even just rejoicing in or hearing about it will safeguard one from low rebirth and secure reaching the Abode of Victors (jīnālayā) in the long run. The rite requires preparing an elaborate setting with a caiṭya hall and a dharmadhātumāṇḍala, and involves fasting, bathing, ritual worship, meditation, recitation of what is termed heart-mantra and taking a vow to attain Enlightenment, while holding a vajra. All that lasts a day and a night. The worshipper then becomes a bodhisattva and in due course reaches the jīnālaya. The manner in which the rite is performed differs according to one’s caste; those of low birth and outcasts may worship only from a distance.

The Buddha then gives examples of achievements of individuals who venerated a caiṭya by performing the rite. They include Indra, who thus became a bodhisattva, while some nāga kings even made it straight into the jīnālaya. The occasion when it became clear that it was enough just to bear in mind the shape of a caiṭya and worship it to get results is related in a story about eight nāga maidens who happened to disturb some sages during their performance of the rite. Cursed by the sages to become shells (śambuka), the maidens asked them for forgiveness and instruction on how to escape from the curse and were told to keep in mind the image (bimba) of a caiṭya, mentally circumambulating and venerating it. Living as shells in a lake, while following the instruction, they were caught by a fisherman and eaten by his wife who in due course gave birth to them as her daughters, who grew up with their minds still set on righteous behaviour as a result of their practice in shell form. This brought them into conflict with their parents, since they would not help them in their trade in fish and were cruelly beaten. Remembering the Three Jewels, they made caiṭyas in sand and worshipped them. When again beaten till they fainted, they were consoled by a Pratyekabuddha who pre-
dicted their future birth as daughters of a king. In that existence they then could practise the rite fully and reap its highest reward.

The texts are certainly important as an example of the development of a particular form of popular worship which is ancient in origin and still very much alive. The mixture of Buddhist and Hindu elements in them would also merit analysis and they will no doubt be of interest also to linguists. The author, in fact, has been preoccupied with some aspects of their stories for a number of years and they also attracted the attention of other researchers concerned with legendary materials, as is obvious from the bibliography. The texts are presented with all variations found in the different manuscripts and exhaustive cross-references and mutual comparisons of the three. The very few minor mistakes (e.g. samsāre instead of samsare, p.40, v.251) do not pose problems. My only complaint is that the author does not use italics in the English text for Sanskrit expressions, although he does so for titles of works.

Karel Werner


As in the preceding serial divisions of SWTF, also in the present fasc.11-13, the introductory remarks are followed by lists of newly added abbreviations including a) the bibliography of additional texts which are lexicographically exploited and b) of further publications related and relevant to the SWFT project. In respect of additional textual material, in fasc.12 it is stated, as in the preceding fasc., that in principle only such texts are drawn upon for dictionary-making as are strictly speaking edited texts rather than publications giving the impression of being provisional transliterations of manuscripts. The additional texts listed under a) include, for instance, the fragments Nos.823 (first publ. in Sanskrithandschriften aus den Turfanfunden II, ed. by E. Waldschmidt, W, Clawiter, L. Sander-Holzmann, Wiesbaden 1971) and 1752 (first publ. in op. cit. VII, ed. by H. Bechert, K. Wille, Stuttgart 1995) which have been identified by L. Schmithausen (see his publications, respectively in P. Kiever-Pülz, J.-U. Hartmann (eds.), Baudhavidāyasuddhākarah (H. Bechert Festschrift), Swistal-Endendorf 1997, pp.559-69, and in P. Harrison, G. Schopen (eds), Sāryacandrāya (A. Yyama Festschrift), Swistal-O. 1998, pp.143-56) as belonging to the Jñanaprabhāsā. By comparing these fragments with the corresponding Chinese translations of the foremost Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma work, Schmithausen has succeeded in placing the fragments in their correct context and thereby improving the decipherment of the original Sanskrit. Further lexicographically relevant texts are, for example, J.-U. Hartmann, ‘Neue Fragmente aus dem Yogalehrbuch’ (in Festschrift Dieter Schlingloff, ed. by F. Wilhelm, Reinbek 1996, pp.127-35), N. Yamabe, ‘New Fragments of the Yogalehrbuch’ (in Kyōshū Ryūkoku Tanki-daigaku Kiyō 43 (1997), pp.11-39) and G. von Simson, Prātimokṣaśāstra der Sarvāstivādins II (critical ed., transl., word index, addenda to part I), Göttingen 2000.

What can be said of the preceding fascicles of SWFT also applies to fasc.11-13: they prove an indispensable research tool both for the Buddhologist and Indologist, and they may even prove a mine of information for scholars of other fields.
As for the entry gandharva, i.e. in its first meaning of ‘intermediate being’ or ‘being existing in an intermediate state’, references are given that should be considered particularly noteworthy in terms of the history of religion and perhaps even history of science. The references are places in the Dharmaskandha (Dhsk) and Abhidharmakośabhāṣyā (Abhidh-k-bh), the latter being a quotation from the Prajñāpāramitā. The intermediate being of the Dhsk, awaiting its entry into a [new] womb, in later centuries was to play the pivotal role in the Bar do ’thos gro/literature. Recently, the concept of gandharva has again occasioned a PhD project started by C. Haas of Würzburg University in which a history of ideas concerning gandharva from Vedic times up to its Buddhist and Vedantic usage is being compiled. The Prajñāpāramitā quotation cited by Vasubandhu clearly anticipates what in the last century was one of the chief discoveries of Freudian psychology, viz. that of the Oedipus complex. Very few scholars have drawn attention to this fact which has largely gone unnoticed.

Regarding references, for instance those s.v. gandharva on p. 185, for users of the dictionary it is good to recall that V (= Vorderseite) stands for ‘recto’ and R (= Rückseite) for ‘verso’, whereas in the original Dhsk edition ‘r’ is the more common abbreviation for recto and ‘v’ for verso.

On p. 241, catuvarga-viśuddhi has been translated as ‘die vier Stände betreffende Reinheit’ (purity with regard to the four classes). Although this translation is not incorrect (as a blanket term ‘Stand’ covers such meanings as ‘social position, rank, class, etc., even ‘caste’), in the context gathered from the references provided under the entry, viz. of instances of Brahminical and Buddhist controversy over varṇa, it does seem more appropriate to translate the above entry as ‘die vier Kasten betreffende Reinheit; ‘classes’, ‘upper/lower classes’, including ‘Standesdunkel’ (vain opinion of oneself as belonging to a certain class), are universal things, whereas ‘castes’ and the ‘caste system’ — irrespective of whether defended or criticised — are uniquely a perennial Indian phenomenon and are best designated as such.

On p. 348 under the entry tad 2 d y, part of a Vibhāṣā quo-

tation, i.e. Abhidh-k-bh(Pā) [328], is dealt with. In his collection of Abhidharmakośabhāṣyā citations the compiler read — as mentioned in the present fasc. on p. 360 — the sentence in question as yāt yathāpi tadvyaparopakāha pūrvaṃ saha vā kālam kuryād iti, tad 2 d y is rendered as ‘wenn’, following de La Vallée Poussin’s translation (Abhidh-k IV 151) ‘lorsque’, by reading tad vyaparopakāha. The above tadvyaparopakāha (an attempt to avoid error with the help of reading a tatpurusa compound) is rather make-shift and the interpretation tad = ‘when’, on the other hand, is problematic too because, as far as could be checked, dictionaries do not give this particular meaning. For yathāpi tad Paramārtha (T 29, No.1559, 2421c23) simply has ‘if’ whilst Xuánzàng (T 29, No.1558, 86b10) translates ‘how? namely thus’. The Tibetan version (Conc. Tanjur Microfiche ed., Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, New York, LMP 020, 062 7/9, vol. 61 (Ku) fol. 204b3-4) has: ...bka’ stsal pa yod de/ ’di lta ste gsod pa po shar ram mnām du sī bar gyur bd la’u bo’ zes gsun s, and the wording corresponding to yathāpi tad is ’di lta ste, i.e. tad-yathā/ yad idam, ‘as for example / namely’. Probably the references and the contextual clues to the meaning provided by BHSD s.v. yathāpi (1) (p. 442 f.) clinch the issue: yathāpi tat, ‘of course because’.

The users of SWFT owe a great debt of gratitude to all those who are involved in bringing out the dictionary – nowadays one fascicle yearly, an enormous task and a tremendous amount of work — by means of their meticulously and judiciously tapping the sources.

Bhikkhu Pāśādika

The first edition, published in 1986, was soon sold out, and the past fifteen years have witnessed a considerable progress of research in the area of Middle Indic (MI) studies. Hence a second revised edition was called for.

The book, now as then, is mainly intended as a supplement to the comprehensive grammars of Prākṛt by Richard Pischel (1900), and of Pāli by Wilhelm Geiger (1916). The overall arrangement of the material has not been changed, but the individual paragraphs have been thoroughly checked or even rewritten.

After an Introduction (§ 1-12), in § 13-69 the author first presents the sources, viz. the Inscriptions (Asoka, after Asoka, coins and seals), and literary ones. The latter are divided into religious texts (Buddhist and Jaina), secular texts (narrative and Kunstdichtung), the Dramas, the Indian grammarians and Indian dictionaries. The third chapter (§ 70-102) provides a survey of the MI languages according to the literary transmission: Pāli, Ardhamāgadhī, Bhāṣā and Viṃṭhasā, Sauraseni, Māgadhī, the development from Pāli to Mahārāṣṭrī, Gandhārī and Paścātī.

The main body of the survey is 'a historical grammar of MI' (§ 103-500). It deals with the phonetic rules of vowels and consonants, and with the forms of nouns, pronouns, numerals and verbs. An extensive index of subjects, words and sources concludes the survey. References to recent secondary literature are so copious that the survey often assumes the character of a bibliography.

Many issues are still obscure, uncertain or controversial. The historical development of MI starts with the Vedic language and ends with Aprabhramśa, which is also where the survey ends. The semantic and syntactical aspects of MI are not dealt with. No agreement has yet been reached as to which language was spoken by the Buddha (p.64). Pāli is considered a 'Western' MI language, and a 'Kunstprache'. 'Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit' (BHS) seems to have been the language of the Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravāda, and can thus be traced back to the official language of Asoka (p.98). On the whole the author has given us a sound and useful survey of the historical development of the phonetic and formal aspects of MI.

Now and again there is room for uncertainty. For instance, the reviewer does not feel so sure that pratyeka-buddha should be traced back to a hypothetical prāpteyabuddha (p.193), or that the -jina in mārga-jina should be accounted for as deriving from -jina. In both cases, 'correct' phonetical constructions have little or no support in semantics. Also, I would hesitate in explaining Skt. pratyūṣa as the result of a 're-Sanskritisation' ('resanskritisiert') from MI paccūsa, assumed to have been derived from a Sanskrit form never (?) actually met with: pratyūsas (p.206). It occurs in the phrase rātyāh pratyūsa-samaye, e.g. Catusparisatsūtra 24g4 etc. Would the authors of the text have been so ignorant of Sanskrit as to have been unable to 'reconstruct' the 'correct' (but not attested) form practus(h)-samaye? On the other hand, I admit that I can offer no alternative explanation.

These are just a few examples among many. To be fully convincing, forms and sounds should not merely be explained by reducing developments to certain phonetical and morphological rules; the semantic aspect must not be ignored.


As was already noticed by most of the reviewers of the first edition (p.13n for ref.), it is hardly necessary to conclude that this Überblick remains an indispensable supplement to Pischel and Geiger.

Chr. Lindtner

‘Indian Philosophy in 35,000 words?’ asks the author, not without reason, in her Preface. However, she did accept the commission, when approached, to write the book for the publishers of the ‘Very Short Introductions’ series which was praised by a reviewer as a ‘new concept’ and ‘a thoroughly good idea’. As a student, more than half a century ago, I read and frequently returned to refresh my memory to Otto Straus, Indische Philosophie (Munich 1925), a brilliant exposition, only about a third longer than the present one. So there was a need felt for this type of manual even then (the list of the German series given at the end of the book comprises forty titles, the Oxford one has forty-seven).

The author went about her task with obvious confidence. Chapter 1, ‘Reason and Belief’, points out the difference between philosophy and religion, the latter being soteriological and the former, in modern times, primarily investigative, although there is also some common ground. Indian philosophy is still, like the ancient European one epitomised by Socrates, preoccupied with seeking wisdom and, in addition, it also relies on the methods of cognitive insight, or ‘yogic perception’, which can be ‘developed by means of mental disciplinary exercises’. Karma in both senses (as ritual and moral action) and rebirth ‘are characteristic aspects of Indian world view’ since the Upaniṣads. It could have been mentioned, though, that hints about rebirth are found already in the Rg Veda and it was a teaching known since earliest times in Greece (Orphics, Pythagoras, Empedocles, Plato), to say nothing of Celtic Druids and probably other Indo-European traditions.

When dealing with ‘The Brahmanical Beginnings’ in Chapter 2, the author even presents the whole Vedic period, including the early one, as dominated by ritual. Although she finds the ancient cosmic speculation in the Vedas ‘extraordinary in its extent and profundity’, for her it still only ‘suggests a considerable degree of analytical thinking on the part of the ritualists’ (my emphasis). In this statement she obviously relies on the most conservative authors who still hold an outdated view of the Vedic mind. J. Gonda and others have shown the ritualist trends to be a secondary, albeit widespread, development in which portions of the Rg Veda with its mystical insights and cosmic speculations (meant for the elite of selected pupils of seers) were adapted for ritual purposes by subsequent generations of priests. The most philosophic and often analysed hymn, RV 10, 129, appears in the book, without a word of commentary, in O’Flaherty’s most pedestrian translation (even Macdonell’s old translation would have been infinitely preferable). Strauss characterises the hymn as the most magnificent attempt to tackle the question of the origin of the universe and gives its interpretation two pages, as it anticipates the most profound questions elaborated by later systems and uses for the first time some important terms which survived into the classical period. The idea of oneness and plurality, also anticipated in this hymn, is well explained by the author, but only later, in the context of the Upaniṣadic teachings.

The author is at her best in Chapter 3, ‘Renouncing the Household: The Buddha’s Middle Way’. Steering away from the fallacy of interpreting anattā as denial of selfhood, she correctly points out the Buddha’s avoidance of any such ontological position (with his focus shifted to epistemology), and she comes close to realistic personalist interpretation of khandhas ‘as a five-fold apparatus’, this last term later (p.90) replaced by the more suitable structure (my emphases). Her explanation of dependent origination, ‘a profoundly radical metaphysical teaching’ yet ‘designed to include and reject all possible per-mutations of metaphysical positions taken by others’ could hardly be bettered within the same space.

Chapter 4, ‘Issues and Justifications’, turns attention to language, its relation to reality and some logical problems in connection with polemics between systems. These are traditionally counted as six within the Hindu tradition and are dealt with in the usual pairs: Vaiśeṣika with Nyāya, Yoga with Sāṅkya, and Mimamsā with Vedānta in Chapters 5, 7, and 8. Even where the
interest of the system is directed to philosophical and logical problems, the author does not fail to point out its concern for soteriology. That is, of course, the primary aim of Patañjali’s Yoga where the author, having dealt with the meditation method, rather skilfully shows how it is possible that achieving the goal by devotion to īśvara may mean ‘single-mindedness’ rather than ‘worship’ and ‘does not necessarily imply devotion to an actual deity’. In the atheistic Sāṅkhya scheme of cosmic evolutes of prakṛti leading to a cognition-dependent world of experience, the author recognises a possible link to early Buddhist epistemology.

In Chapter 6, ‘Things and No-things’ on ‘Developments in Buddhist Thought’, she is impressed by the ‘profundity of Buddhist philosophy’, containing ‘some of the most radical propositions in the history of human thought’. Space is given to the Sarvāstivāda, Lokottaravāda, Sammatiya, Saṅgharṣaṇa and Abhidharma before the concept of emptiness, Nāgārjuna and the Mind-Only school are tackled. This chapter contains some of the most felicitous formulations on difficult topics. The book finishes with a ‘Postscript: From Classical Thought to Modern Day’. The new flowering of Indian philosophy was occasioned by the founding, by the British, of educational establishments in the nineteenth century and their further development. However, it has led to the Western-influenced tendency to separate philosophy as an academic discipline from the more profound world-view of classical India which, the author hopes, will eventually also receive attention from professional philosophers.

The style of the author is very clear and readable. The structure of the book, with frequent chronological tables, explanatory notes containing definitions and summaries in shaded boxes and a good index, makes it into a convenient little reference compendium. The list of recommended reading is a bit limited, but there is, of course, no problem for interested readers to graduate from there to further sources. Commendable is the fact that correct transliteration of Sanskrit names with diacritical marks is used throughout.

Karel Werner

Book Reviews


What this book is querying, as far as I can assess it, is its own imaginary notion of modern histories of medieval India. It suggests that there are ‘modernist historical agendas’ regarding the medieval history of South Asia ‘as a dark prelude to an enlightened modernity’. In his Introduction Inden complains that textual sources are wrongly construed as ‘monological utterances’ with ‘an identifiable essence’ which is ‘the property of discrete individuals or subjects’, the authors; so Inden calls this trend ‘authorism’. Others assume that ‘textual essences ... belong to the objective linguistic structures’, a position he calls ‘contextualism’. The remedy is to treat texts as ‘dialogic utterances’.

That will nicely ‘destabilize the existing images of a medieval India’ and textual sources can then be seen as ‘participating in ongoing debates about how the human world should be ordered’. Then ‘the traditions of which they are parts can be seen as something belonging to the living present and not as mere monuments of a dead past; thus ‘texts and the world (context) are remaking or reworking one another’. This enlightened stance has been arrived at by a group engaged in a colloquium (‘Texts and Knowledge of South Asia’) on the Chicago University campus after twenty years of deliberations. Inspiration has been sought and found in the works of ‘new historicists’, ‘poststructuralists’, ‘deconstructuralists’ such as Derrida, ‘post-Hegelians’, and ‘heterodox Marxists’, particularly Voloshinov. The three subsequent essays are intended to demonstrate the results of the adopted new approach.

The first essay, ‘Imperial Purāṇa: Kashmir as Vaishnava Centre of the World’ by Inden, homes in on a regional specimen of purāṇic literature, the Vīṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa, to assure us that its author ‘was a complex agent, one that made and remade itself as it made and remade its text’. The result was ‘both a narrative and discursive text’. (What a discovery!) Of course, the text has to be
viewed also in its ‘historical situatedness’, since politics plays a substantial role in it: the composition of the text and the empire building became ‘mutually articulative’. By his novel treatment of this *purāṇa*, the author deems himself to have created ‘new historiographic possibilities’.

The third essay, ‘Royal Eulogy as World History: Rethinking Copper-plate Inscriptions in Cōla India’ by Daud Ali, bypasses the documentary contents of the inscriptions and, in focusing on their ‘eulogistic preambles’ seen as ‘dialogical utterances’, interprets them as ‘the practice of making historical texts tied in with a world history’. The conclusion is that India is not a land devoid of history as ‘Orientalists and Indologists for a long time have asserted’.

The second essay, ‘Buddhist History: The Sri Lankan Pāli Vamsas and Their Commentary’ by Jonathan S. Walters, may be of more interest to readers of this journal. The author challenges the ‘common-sense’ understanding of history in the *vamsas* (whose history from the early nineteenth century until recent times he surveys in an appendix) as mere chronicles of events. Instead he regards them as ‘successions of the Buddha’s presence’; ‘they were written within (and should be understood within) a temporal and causal framework different from that which we know in the modern West’. That framework is given not by the chronological *vamsas*, but by the *Buddhavamsa* which ‘constitutes the actual beginning of the Dipavamsa, the Mahāvamsa and its commentary the Vamsatthappakāsīni’. The *Buddhavamsa* being a ‘biography’ of Gotama and twenty-four previous Buddhas, six of them of the present world age and the others belonging to pre-primordial ‘incalculable (asatīkheya) periods, it introduces an ‘unfathomable (acintyā) dimension of time-space that cannot be conceived in terms of calculable time and casual connections alone’. Yet this ‘incalculable time … overlaps with the calculable’, since Gotama as Bodhisattva meets all the previous Buddhas. The overlap extends into the future as another Bodhisatta is nearing its mission as the future Buddha Metteyya/Maitreya, which has immense soteriological relevance for those who do not achieve cessation during the present Buddha era. The intervention of

‘incalculable history’ into the chronicle *vamsas* occurs when Mahinda Thera, on converting King Tissa to Buddhism, tells him that this is the fourth time that the practices of the Buddha have been instituted on the island. The authors of the *vamsas* saw the events of their time in terms of the incalculable past and that influenced the chronological system they employed. The author then engages in a complicated and detailed analysis of the chronicles and the political and monastic circumstances and disputes (between the Mahāvihāra and Abhayagiri Vihāra) which they describe, reading them ‘dialogically’ rather than ‘monologically’, and concludes that ‘Theravāda Buddhism itself, as an independent disciplinary order, only began to exist in the third or fourth century A.D., and “orthodox” Theravādin thought did not gain ascendency over “Mahāyāna” Theravādin thought, even in Sri Lanka, until the ninth or tenth century’. When ‘the monological essence of “Buddhism” begins to recede’, then instead of ‘single “Buddhist history”’, one gets ‘a history of multiple Buddhist representations of the Teachings and Discipline’ and ‘some important mainstays in Buddhological scholarship’ must be reconsidered, including the supposed antiquity of the Theravāda tradition. (The author favours Sarvāstivādins as the successors of the old Sthavira line; they were mistakenly expelled by Aśoka, but when he saw his mistake, he gave them Kashmir.) Several other ‘mainstays’ to be reconsidered could not be mentioned in this review because of space and the difficulty of summarising them in clear language.

I do not wish to reject totally the possibility that the authors have made some positive contributions to scholarship in their chosen areas which could provide a few hints for rethinking certain issues in the history of South Asian religions, even though they are clouded by jargon-like language and obscure style. I suspect that few scholars not privy to discussions of the Chicago colloquium for at least the past ten years will be able to utilise this book easily. Fewer still may be willing to tackle its language and style.

Karel Werner

Naive scholars of early Buddhism were inclined to believe that this religion arose out of the deeply felt conviction of its founder that life was painful, and that a way had to be found to escape both from present suffering and from its repetition in future lives. He subsequently found a way, precondition for which was the need to abandon one’s home and family. These scholars will have to change their views if they are convinced by the arguments presented in the book under review. ‘Painful’ (dukkha) no longer primarily means ‘painful’ but has become a term for ‘experience’ (e.g. pp.121-2; ‘dukkha refers to experience, mediated by means of one]s cognitive apparatus’). The need to leave one’s home is due to a literal interpretation by the Theravāda Buddhist tradition of the house metaphor often used in the Canon (p.104). Indeed, ‘The account of the Buddha’s leaving of his wife and son in order to seek Enlightenment... has no historical foundation. Rather, it [is a metaphor which] makes the point that in the following of a spiritual path it is not necessary to follow the Brahmanical injunctions to the householder life’ (p.208). The real aim is the achieving of psychological detachment. ‘What really matters is understanding one’s experience: it is this, no more and no less, that brings liberating insight’ (p.107). More precisely (p.78), ‘[the khandhas] are what one needs to understand about oneself if one is to achieve liberation from the cycle of lives as the Buddha did’; ‘the khandhas, as the experiencing apparatus of the individual, constitute the focus of the Buddhist teaching: it is this that one needs to know and understand about oneself’ (p.96). Hamilton does not bother to point out that this particular liberating insight is rare in the Canon [it seems to occur primarily in the Samyutta-Nikāya/Samyukta-gama; cf. Choong Mun-keat (Wei-keat), The Fundamental Teaching of Early Buddhism. A comparative study based on the Sūtrāṅga portion of the Pāli Samyutta-Nikāya and the Chinese Samyukta-gama (Wiesbaden 2000), p.34f. Hamilton does not comment on the fact that the Samyutta-Nikāya considerably deviates from the other Nikāyas in some respects (see L. Schmithausen, ‘On some aspects of descriptions or theories of “liberating insight” and “enlightenment” in early Buddhism’, Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus. Gedenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf, ed. K. Brunn & A. Wezler, Wiesbaden 1981, pp.199-250, esp. p.214, n.15)], and in any case is but one of the rather numerous liberating insights found in it [see Schmithausen, op. cit., pp.211-12: ‘The principle that Enlightenment and, analogously, Liberating Insight are essentially characterized (and perhaps rendered effective) by the fact that... their content must consist of, or at least contain, the most fundamental truth, can be observed to have been validated also in later periods, for we find that such concepts also were taken to be constitutive or essential to both as are expressive of what was, later on, regarded to be the most fundamental truth. E.g., in some obviously more or less later descriptions of Enlightenment or Liberating Insight, the Comprehension of the four Noble Truths is supplemented or even supplanted by the Comprehension of Origination-in-Dependence (pratītyasamutpāda) ... In most of the Hinayāna schools ... it was in its turn later superseded by the doctrine of the non-existence of a substantial self or person (juddgala-ñairatmya)]. But then she makes very little effort to allow the texts speak for themselves at all. It soon becomes clear while reading this book that it is Hamilton who presents her own ideas. Arguments and philosophical reasoning replace textual reference, and textual citations are particularly rare. Perhaps significantly, Hamilton hopes ‘that this book will contribute not just to Buddhist Studies but to broader discussions about issues such as the epistemology, identity, and the nature of experience’ (p.7). It is only by ignoring the literal meaning of terms like dukkha, and by ignoring what the texts themselves say what the Buddhist teaching is all about, that Hamilton can understand the central focus of the teachings in terms of understanding experience and the factors of the cognitive process by which this occurs’ (p.122).
If the primary sources do not get their due, the secondary literature does not fare better. More than one hundred and fifty years of intensive Buddhist research are brushed aside with some critical remarks (pp.9-10). Of the 128 entries listed in the bibliography, hardly more than half are actually referred to in the text and notes; there is reason to believe that at least a number of the remaining items have either not been read or not been understood. Not even the publications in English of some of the most important recent scholars in the field (e.g. Schmithausen, Vetter) have been included in the bibliography. The names of five, and only five, modern Buddhological scholars have found their way into the index: Collins, Gethin, Gombrich, Harvey and Masefield. This list itself is symptomatic of the total neglect of non-British scholarship in this book.

Chapter Two (pp.33-49), which deals with the for early Buddhism important topic of ‘The Indian Context’, has no real references at all, neither to primary nor to secondary literature. This would be irritating in the best of circumstances; it is worse in a chapter that propounds highly dubious opinions such as the pre-Buddhist existence of yoga-like practices in India. It has been known for a very long time that classical yoga arose under the influence of Buddhism, many centuries after the Buddha, and that the term ‘yoga’ in earlier literature refers to something different altogether. It would have been courteous on the part of Hamilton to inform her readers where she got her idea, but she does not do so. Arguably the most important group of people that constituted the context in which Buddhism arose, viz. Jainism, is not mentioned and does not figure in the index.

It has already been pointed out that Hamilton’s arguments are not usually based on a close scrutiny of the texts. The few times that more than irreducible Pāli or Sanskrit expressions are cited, the results are less than impressive. The expression anattā is regularly mentioned without any indication as to what compound it is; yet this makes an enormous difference. By itself, anattā can mean ‘not the self’ or ‘without self’, In the Pāli texts it only means the former, a fact that has escaped Hamilton, judging by her paraphrase ‘anattā – selfless, or not self’ (p.116). In later developments of Buddhism the second interpretation gained ground. Connected with this second interpretation the Sanskrit expression nairātmya came to be used, which means ‘selflessness’. Hamilton translates it ‘not-permanent-selfness’ (p.121) which is not only grammatically incorrect, but would make an important philosophical development in Mahāyāna Buddhism incomprehensible.

What is more, such mistakes and inaccuracies are particularly embarrassing in a book that vehemently criticises the fact ‘that whole books and articles are written pedantically analysing linguistic variations’ and proposes ‘a genuinely empathetic approach’ in its stead (p.10).

It is possible that scholars of ‘epistemology, identity, and the nature of experience’ will find something that is worthwhile in this publication. Scholars of Buddhism, on the other hand, are well advised to look elsewhere for inspiration.

Johannes Bronkhorst
(University of Lausanne)


The Sanskrit title (‘A small bamboo box of sundry jewels’) of this voluminous Festschrift may not accurately describe its size, but the epithet ‘sundry’ fits it very well. Thirty-three pupils and colleagues of the celebrated recipient, some of illustrious reputation, others less well known, contributed their ‘jewels’ (in English, German and French) to the box on the occasion of her retirement from active university service and the variety of themes dealt with reflects, in the editors’ view, her own manifold interests. Eleven contributions are of a linguistic nature, ranging from ‘A Collection of sentences for the students of Sanskrit’ to the analysis of a deficient Sanskrit text written by Anna Leonowens (of The King
and fame) in somebody's guest-book, with some important contributions of a grammatical and lexicographical nature in between. Three articles deal with themes belonging to the Vedic-Brāhmaṇic-Hindu tradition; one is on the concept of *pralaya* or the periodic dissolution of the universe, one analyses the language of the *Svētāsvatara Upaniṣad* and one traces the evolution of the Vijnūṣī concept of *vibhūjī* or the effective presence of God in the world. Jainism also receives attention in three papers, viz.: an illustrated study of the function and symbolism of the stick (*danda*) worn by Jaina monks (and called *le baton monastique* by the author), a study of a small compendium on logic by Sidhasena, a medieval Jaina monk, and an illustrated article on sacred mountains and Jaina alchemy.

The remaining papers deal with Buddhist topics or contain elements which would be of interest to Buddhist scholars. Heinz Bechert (Göttingen) describes the circumstances around 'The earliest reliable information on the central conception of Buddhism in Western writing' in the 1691 report by Simon de La Louberè who visited Siam twice as an envoy of Louis XIV. It described Nirvāṇa in a way which G.R. Welbon called 'an amazingly modern evaluation of the term' (in his *The Buddhist Nirvāṇa and Its Western Interpreters*, Chicago 1968, p.21). This contrasts with some erroneous interpretations by even some nineteenth century scholars. There are other correct items of information on Buddhist teachings in this remarkable report.

Harry Falk (Berlin) surveys old inscriptions on water pots, bowls and lamps possessed by Buddhist monks which warn against their theft; sometimes with the owner's name on them. Why he calls the inscriptions 'spells' is not clear to me. Fumio Enomoto (Osaka) questions the received wisdom of regarding the Mūlasarvāstivāda as a branch of Sarvāstivāda and concludes that the former is just another name for the latter, although the school possessed two versions of Vinaya. From the article by Jens-Uwe Hartmann (Munich) one learns about large numbers of Buddhist manuscripts, often just single pages, which reach Europe's markets from Afghanistan and fetch high prices. Apart from those looted from the Kabul Museum, there are also new ones, presumably discovered by people sheltering from the war in caves. Some also come from Pakistan where the middlemen quickly realised the lucrative value of this merchandise. None of the manuscripts is accompanied by information about where they came from. The author deals with an assembled partial collection which represents a Sanskrit section of the *Dirghāgama* of the Sarvāstivādins which is not known from any translation into Tibetan or Chinese, but has parallels in the Pāli *Dīgha-Nikāya*.

Akira Yuyama (Tokyo) considers the *Mahāvastu-avadāna*, a hybrid Sanskrit Lokottaravādī text containing a large variety of materials, verging on the encyclopaedic, which is not extant in any other Asian language.

Several papers involve Tibetan sources. Siglinde Dietz (Göttingen) discusses and presents the text of the *Kālyugaparīkathā*, a discourse known only in Tibetan translation and ascribed to Mātṛceṭa, who is well known from the Tanjur as the author of another two works. The notion of *kālyuga* stems, of course, from Hindu sources, but the text gives it a Buddhist slant, particularly when describing the deterioration of morality and natural processes. The progressive corruption of the Saddharma by deceivers is mentioned in this context. Then there is an investigation of the source of an earlier edition and translation from Mi la ras pa, and another one on polyandry in the Khotanesi *Rāmāyana* (Sitā becoming the wife of both Rāma and his brother Lakṣmaṇa) composed by a Buddhist monk and set in the Bhadrakalpa, an age blessed by five Buddhas; it ends with the identification of Rāma as the Buddha in the manner of the *Jātakas*.

Günter Grönbold (Munich) chose an intriguing title 'From teeth cleaning to immortality' for his study of medicine and alchemy based on the *Kālacakra-tantra*. It is about cleansing, healing and breathing practices known from Hindu Hatha-yoga texts, and about specific Tantric procedures for achieving long life by consuming unappetising substances from the human body. The interpretation of these procedures on the spiritual level involves the theory of Tantric metaphorical language. Lambert Schmit-

Hausen (Hamburg) presents and translates (into German) two Sanskrit fragments (from Turfan) of the Prakāraṇa, a late Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma text, alongside its two Chinese translations. Michael Hahn (Marburg) undertook to correct the Sanskrit text of the hymn Devatavimārasāstuti by Śaṅkaraśāmin, previously known only in Tibetan translation from the Tanjur, but in 1990 an Indian scholar published an imperfect edition of the hitherto unknown original. The hymn extols the superiority of the Buddha over the Hindu gods. One comparative paper, by Desmond Durkin-Meisterernst (Munster), studies similarities and differences in the Roman Catholic, Zoroastrian and Buddhist use of ‘Instilling Terror as a means of religious instruction’. He starts with James Joyce’s gruesome description of hell given to schoolboys in The Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, partly based on The Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius Loyola. The Zoroastrian examples are taken from a Middle Persian text and the Buddhist ones from the Sogdian ‘Sūtra of the Causes and Effects of Action’. His conclusions are somewhat drastic.

The starting point of László Vajda (Munich) in his paper on Theodor Benfey’s work on the Pāñcatantra is the generally accepted impression that Benfey regarded almost all European fairy tales as derived from India. The author singles out the so-called ‘Shylock motif’ (‘pound of flesh’ as compensation). This motif does exist in India, not only in the Pāñcatantra, but also in the Mahābhārata and the Jātakas: a king saves a dove pursued by a falcon which protests its right to the prey, so the king gives it the equivalent amount of flesh from his own body. Some variations of this story are even more gruesome than the one in Joyce’s book and truly off-putting. The author traces the origin of the story to the archaic institution of granting asylum. Annemarie Mertens (Zurich) tackles the question of the legitimisation of rulership on the basis of an inscription of the Khmer Buddhist king Jayavarman V (968-1001) who presented himself as a bodhisattva, but the Hindu tradition of sanctioning kingship also makes itself felt. Ulrike Roesler (Marburg) ponders on the fact that while written versions of stories from the Indian and Tibetan narrative literature are subjected to critical textual research, their oral tradition is still alive and so there is here a field of tension or interaction. She chooses for illustration a story from a Tibetan commentary on a work ascribed to Nāgārjuna. Numerous versions of the story are known from Hindu and other Buddhist sources, including Jātakas, and also from Aesop and contemporary Asian and European folklore. In the Tibetan version it is about a cat, while other animals appear in some other versions. The cat stole a mālā from a monk, put it round its neck and, pretending to be a lama who observed the precepts, came to be accepted by a community of mice as their religious instructor, but secretly devoured the last departing mouse after every sermon. When the mice became suspicious, they managed to hang a little bell round the cat’s neck which alerted them so that they looked back and saw when next time the cat jumped to seize its prey. A bell round a cat’s neck, although not present in other Indian sources, Hindu or Buddhist, is a motif which reached Europe. But in the version of the story the author read in her childhood, the mice did not manage to accomplish the deed. That accounts for the proverb, current in medieval Europe, ‘to bind a bell to a cat’ when referring to a nearly impossible task. I gather that ‘to bell a cat’ meaning ‘to perform a bold act’ is also an English proverb derived from Aesop, although rarely used nowadays.

This tome is obviously for specialists in several different fields. Whoever finds a useful article in it will be helped in his own research by extensive references in the footnotes which accompany almost every article.

Karel Werner


The time span of the fifty papers included in this collection ranges from 1956 to 1999, thus covering the best part of the author’s
distinguished scholarly career. The Foreword by Paul Dundas of Edinburgh University provides a fitting biographical background for it. Born into a South Indian Digambara family, the author obtained Jain secondary education in Maharashtra and graduated in Sanskrit and Prakrit studies from a college affiliated to Bombay University (1947). Encouraged to study Pāli scriptures the better to understand Jain sources, he spent two years in Colombo studying particularly the Abhidhamma-pitaka. A lectureship in Pāli at Banaras Hindu University followed (1952). His work on the newly-found manuscript of the Abhidharmadipika with commentary, a Vaibhāṣika work directed against Vasubandhu, earned him a lectureship (1956) and PhD degree at SOAS in London where he subsequently became Reader in Pāli and Buddhist Sanskrit until 1967, when an offer of a professorship brought him to Michigan University and finally to the University of California at Berkeley (1972) where, it seems, he still teaches in the Graduate School. Throughout his career he has specialised in both Buddhist and Jain studies. Several of his works were also published by the Pali Text Society.

The introductory paper 'States of Happiness in Buddhist Heterodoxy' is the latest one from the harvest of his research studies, having been presented at the Fourth Annual Conference of the UK Association for Buddhist Studies in London on 28 June 1999. In it he delineates the fine distinction between the Brāhmaṇic and Buddhist understanding of sukha in both the context of saṃsāric experience and when applied in descriptions of the final state of deliverance, and suggests its interpretation also from the vantage point of the Bodhisattva Path. Then a paper on 'Buddhist Studies in Recent Times' (1956), now somewhat outdated but still very useful, is followed by a section entitled 'Buddhism and Jainism' containing seven papers. The one on Śrāmanas: Their Conflict with Brāhmaṇical Society' (1970) starts with Dharmakīrti's scathing condemnation of 'five marks of crass stupidity' – the unquestioned authority of the Vedas, the belief in a world creator, in purification through ritual bathing, in hereditary castes and in practices of mortification to atone for sin. While the first four still neatly fit the Brāhmaṇic-Hindu tradition, the last one was the mark of non-Buddhist ascetic movements. Although in conflict, the two trends have a common origin and the author traces ascetic tendencies to the Vedic munis and the vrātya phenomenon. However, when dealing with the emergence of the notions of transmigration and emancipation, he underestimates, I think, their Vedic roots now widely recognised (cf. among others, Sadashiv A. Dange, 'Metempsychosis and the Rigveda', Journal of the University of Bombay XLIII/79, 1974). The heterodoxy of Śramaṇa movements is most obvious in descriptions in Pāli Buddhist sources which also include the earliest references to Jains. The greatest conflict of Buddhism with Brāhmaṇism stemmed from the Buddha's advocacy of the life of homelessness as being almost a norm for all men and women intent on salvation, no doubt one among several reasons why Buddhism eventually all but disappeared from India. (Other reasons are investigated in the piece on 'The Disappearance of Buddhism and the Survival of Jainism in India: A Study in Contrast'). Modifying and partially incorporating Śramaṇā ideals and even giving them opportunity for their effective articulation helped to revive the Brāhmaṇic tradition, to a large extent in the form of Gita's theism which became a rallying point against the onslaught of Islam.

The next paper skilfully traces the evolution of the notion of sarvajña, omniscience, up to the Upanisads and then shows how it was attributed in Jainism not only to Mahāvīra, but to all freed souls, while with respect to the Buddha it was understood in the sense of the later term dharmajña, which is not 'all-knowledges', although it does have certain superknowledges which Arahats need not have, as a further paper, 'On the Ignorance of the Arhat' (1992), establishes.

The first (1958) of eight papers in the section 'Abhidharma Literature' tackles the theory of 'Two Vasubandhus'; the author favours the older tradition about Vasubandhu's conversion. The second article, 'Buddha's Prolongation of Life' (1958), suggests that this disputed idea from the discourse on the Buddha's last days eventually led to the Mahāyāna conception of the Trans-
The incomplete oldest known copy of which, in Laotian script, is dated to 1589. (Another edition of this collection was published as Zimmé Panñāsa in Rangoon in 1911, presumably on the basis of a manuscript found later and dated 1807.) Poetic versions and dramatic adaptations in Burmese and Thai vernaculars are also known. Illustrations of the story on reliefs at Borobudur (eighth cent.) were already recognised by Oldenberg in the nineteenth century. Reliefs 1b, 1-20 are now safely identified as such. By thorough and complicated comparison and analysis of existing versions of the story the author convincingly argues that the Borobudur panels are not based on the Divyāvadāna version as has been universally assumed. They reflect more closely the Pāli 'apocryphal jātaka' version (such as the correct number of depicted kinnarīs as seven) with some additional features known only from the Khotanese version, the assumption being that what the creators of the panels had as their source must have been some other common version hitherto unknown from which at some date the Theravādins of South-East Asia rewrote the story in Pāli in 'perfect imitation of a classical jātaka'. (The hypothesis of unknown collections of stories as the basis for the Borobudur reliefs was later, probably independently, also suggested by A.J. Bernet Kempers, Ageless Borobudur, 1976, pp.108-9.) The author’s analysis also interprets anew the relief 1b, 18, generally regarded as the ‘recognition scene’ with the standing figure taken to be Sudhana, although it is more ornately bejewelled and has a halo. The author identifies him as Sakka (Sakra, Indra) who, according to the Pāli version, came from heaven to help Sudhana recognise his wife among the seven identical kinnarī princesses. Most authors of books on Borobudur (including Louis Frédéric, Borobudur, 1994) do not explain the jātaka character of the depicted story because of the assumption that it illustrates an avadāna, not taking into account its Mahāvastu version where it is called ‘Kinnari-jātaka’. But even the Divyāvadāna identifies Sudhana with the Buddha in a past life (when he was training for virya-pāramitā by overcoming various hardships in search of his lost wife). The Mahāvastu identifies Manoharā as Yasodharā and cendent Buddha of immeasurable life elaborated in the trikāya doctrine. The paper ‘The Vaibhāṣika Theory of Words and Meanings’ (1959) shows how even the concept of apauruṣeya used by Mimāṃsakas for the Vedas, crept into Buddhist argumentation. The author’s thorough knowledge of the Abhidhāmādipā, referred to above (and described in a further paper), is utilised in the piece on ‘The Sautrāntika Theory of Bija’ (1959) which seeks to explain the operation of kusala and akusala dharmas. Even the potential for liberation is viewed as a hidden seed, mokṣabija, visible to the Buddha in prospective Saṅgha candidates. Two papers (1959 and 1977) explore the relations between Vaibhāṣika and Theravāda Abhidharma, one dealing with the category of viprayukta-samskāras and the other with prajña and dṛṣṭi. The little-understood and neglected phenomenon of memory, in contrast to the attention given to the concept of sati/smṛti in the sense of ‘mindfulness’ or ‘awareness’, is explored in the last paper of the section, ‘Smṛti in the Abhidharma Literature and the Development of Buddhist Accounts of Memory of the Past’ (1992). It is interesting to note that the first hint of a direction in which to proceed was found by the author in the work of Nyanaponika Thera, Abhidhamma Studies. One of the results of the author’s investigations is the recognition of the Theravāda concept of bhavaṅga as a clear anticipation of the Yogācāra alavijñāna, ‘the multilayered storehouse of all seeds’ which accounts not only for the operation of karma, but also of memory.

Some of the six papers in the section ‘Jātaka and Avadāna Literature’ have a direct link to the author’s works published by the PTS. The first, ‘The Story of Sudhana and Manoharā: An Analysis of Texts and the Borobudur Reliefs’ (1966), is about a love story which became the most popular avadāna/jātaka in Northern India in two Sanskrit versions: Mahāsāṅghika and Mulaśarvāstivāda, and was translated into Chinese, Khotanese and Tibetan. It is included in three Sanskrit redactions in the Mahāvastu, Divyāvadāna and Kṣemendra’s Avadānakalpalatā. At some stage a much enlarge Pāli version appeared in South-East Asia in the Paññāsa-jātaka, a collection of fifty ‘extra-canonical’ jātakas,
other versions have further identifications.

The Paññāsa-jātaka is brought, in the next paper (1979), into connection with accounts by Fa-hsien (Faxian) and Hsuan-tsang (Xuanzang) about the legendary first Buddha image, since it contains a slightly different version of the legend in one of its ‘apocryphal jātakas. Another of them, which has an interesting parallel in the Chinese translations of the (lost) text of the Sanskrit Ekottarāgama, provides material for a further article, ‘Padipadānajātaka: Gautama’s Last Female Incarnation’ (1989). The fruitful Paññāsa-jātaka is then again more fully dealt with in the last paper of the section, ‘The Apocryphal Jātakas of Southeast Asian Buddhism’ (1990).

Of the three papers in the section of Mahāyāna perhaps the most interesting is ‘Stages in the Bodhisattva Career of the Tathāgata Maitreya’ (1988), extracted from a vast number of texts, early and Mahāyāna, canonical and non-canonical, and expounded on the pattern of four stages outlined in the Mahāvästū. It is crowned by a survey of the possible origin of Maitreya’s status as the future Buddha which is universally accepted in Buddhist circles. A comparison is also made with the Jaina tradition of Mahāpadma, the future Jina who, at present, is not in the Tusita heaven like Maitreya, but in hell. This paper is exceptionally well documented, not only by references to Pāli and Sanskrit sources, but also by extensive quotations from them. The last section, ‘Ritual texts’, contains three papers – on a paritta manuscript from Cambodia (1965), a Buddhist work in use among Jainas in Gujarat (1968), and an ‘apocryphal’ sutta from Thailand (1992).

The range of the author’s knowledge of relevant sources is astounding. The papers in this collection are products of immaculate scholarship. The additional information incorporated in extensive and copious notes is enormous. The book is also a pleasure to study and could not doubt be a source of inspiration for other scholars for many a further research project.

Karel Werner

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The translation and interpretation of Zen texts from China, Korea and Japan continues apace, demonstrating conclusively the wide range of view inherent in East Asian Buddhism. At first, when few works had been translated, interpreters tended, perhaps understandably, to produce simplistic understandings based on inadequate knowledge of the sources. Such mistakes are no longer so tolerable today.

In the first of the works reviewed here, Michael Saso provides a translation of a very early manual of meditation by the revered Tientai (j. Tendai) Master Chih I (j. Zhi Yi) who lived between 538 and 587. At this early date Chinese meditation was still strictly modelled on methods of Indian origin and lacked the later forms developed to suit Chinese culture. The Indian practices of śamatha (calming the mind) and vipaśyāna (insight into the nature of mind) were known in China as related activities of Stop and Look, terms summarising the nature of these twin approaches based on earlier Abhidharma literature. It was not until Master Hung Chih Chen Chueh (1091-1157) combined these two approaches into a common system known as Silent Illumination (mo chao) that the modern practice of Ch’an meditation developed, being taken later to Japan and reformulated as shikantaza by Master Dōgen.

Chih I’s presentation of Stop and Look is profound yet straightforward and certainly accessible to beginners including lay practitioners. Indeed, using this text, it would be possible at least to start meditation without a teacher. He provides ten chapters detailing the manner in which a beginner can establish a good basis for meditation through purification of the senses and desires and harmonising body and mind through care in regulating eating,
sleeping and breathing. He ends by relating meditational methods of teaching and by offering useful tips about meditation and health.

Essentially to Stop means to examine closely a present situation without judgement and to come to rest in the present moment whether this be on the cushion or in everyday life. Look means seeing experience in the light of the Buddha's teaching, especially the 'Law of Co-dependent Arising'. This enables the practitioner to perceive in a heartfelt manner that all things are basically lacking in any inherent existence as entities, but are rather all part of an ongoing process wherein cause leads to consequence under the influence of context. Such insight reduces the habitual tendencies to attach to wanted things or people as if they were permanently available.

The text bases the practice firmly in the established thought of the Mahāyāna, particularly the Prajñāpāramitā and Madhyamaka literature. This creates a paradox when we find Saso in his introduction arguing, as did Daisetz Suzuki early in the last century, that a Zen based in ineffable experience could be practised within any religion. Saso remarks, 'Christians, both Protestant and Catholic alike, use and teach Zen methods in a purely Christian context. Zen is thus a contemplative method, not a belief system' (p.xiii). It is this erroneous bias in Western understanding of Zen that has allowed so-called Christian Zen to develop within a kind of philosophical vacuum – inadequate theology and non-existent philosophy adulating uninterpretable experience. To find Saso repeating this viewpoint is disturbing for, as post-modern writers and contemporary Ch'an masters such as Master Sheng-yen have pointed out, no practice can develop without a relationship to the ideas that sustain it.

Of course, the mere practice of Zen meditation, formal sitting and regulation of mind, may be used by anyone of any religion and indeed has its parallels within most of the great world religions. And it is indeed beneficial. Yet the adoption of this method by Christians is a sign of a weakness that denies or overlooks their own meditative traditions. Chinese and Japanese meditation methods are rooted in the Dharma of the Buddha and cannot lead to an understanding of 'enlightenment' outside that context. Whatever may be experienced by Christian meditators faithful to a deistic theology, however blissful or insightful, cannot be the same experience of liberation that comes through insight into śānti (emptiness). It will be some other condition determined by the context of their faith. As Chih I says, the practice of meditation develops within reliance on the teachings of the masters.

Haskel's translation of the story of the Japanese master Tōsui introduces a parallel theme in which the question of the relationship between an institutional life of monastic formality and the nature of Zen insight comes into focus. In an extended and historically fascinating foreword, he describes how Buddhism during the Tokagawa period fell under government control and became organised hierarchically as a highly formalised 'church' system. The free and open style of interaction between master and disciple had already been rigidified through the use of formalised expressions in the solving of koans and in the understanding of Dharma so that the spontaneity and naturalness of Ch'an was being replaced by a ritualistic and authoritarian form of transmission.

These social contexts of Japanese Buddhism seem to have been one main reason for the appearance of highly rebellious monks who deserted the formal institutions of their time to recapture a sort of crazy naturalness that accepted transience and mortality as the natural run of things. Their subsequent notoriety, fame and appreciation showed that these men were well and truly genuine practitioners of Zen. Tōsui (d. 1683) seems to have been the first and perhaps the most extreme of such masters, perhaps becoming an exemplar for later revolutionaries such as Ryōkan (1758-1831) and Ikkyū, whose lives were in many ways similar to his. After severe training Tōsui had become the abbot of a monastery, yet he decided to leave and live simply as a beggar or cheap artisan, homeless and unkempt, among the ordinary people, shunning all who tried to trace his whereabouts and learn from him. So successful was he that relatively little is known about him.
Nonetheless, his notoriety as a great and exceptional master did not escape those remaining in more orthodox surroundings. The celebrated scholar and Sōtō Zen master Menzan Zuihō laboriously put together all that could be found about Tōsui and eventually published his Tribute (Tōsui oshō densan) which is this text translated here.

Undoubtedly the social conditions of Buddhism in Japan were a seedbed for the activities of these sensational masters who took the daily life of the poor as their environment of practice far from the securities of monastic or ‘church’ establishments. The fact that they manifested profound practice under conditions of an often quite pathetic daily life is a lesson for contemporary practitioners. Perhaps they show a way out of the sentimental New Ageism and self-comforting idealisms of many contemporary Westerners and suggest a View and a Way whereby the Dharma may confront the destructive trivialities of consumerism. These lives should be read and carefully considered by all of us who live so comfortably, attending our sitting groups once a week and believing we know something of Zen.

John Crook


Is being a Buddhist incompatible with being a Christian? As the title implies, the author believes it possible for forms of Buddhism to develop in the West that blend with aspects of Christianity. Pym relates how, some forty years ago, he came to a Buddhist meeting by accident and heard a monk preach on the Kālāma Sutta – in particular, the Buddha’s injunction not to accept his teaching on blind faith but to test it out against one’s own experience. Born a Roman Catholic, Pym became a Buddhist but because his Buddhist group folded, he joined a Quaker meeting, which he regarded as the nearest available form of spirituality.

belonging, as are the ancient creeds in Christianity.

The Buddha’s advice that one should test out his teaching against one’s own experience is often construed as a recommendation of relativism or eclecticism. I believe this is an error into which Pym falls: the Buddha’s advice is more accurately construed as someone declaring that it is raining outside and inviting me to check this statement against my own experience. There is a sense in which I can decide for myself what the weather is like, but there is only one right view of the weather at any one time and place. Likewise the Buddha’s ‘right view’ is a view that the disciple is meant to confirm by his or her own experience; ‘right view’ does not mean ‘any view’.

Attempts to harmonise different religious traditions often lead to undue ‘world ecumenism’, albeit with the best intentions. Pym is no exception: although he rightly claims that Buddhism has historically drawn into itself aspects of the indigenous religions it has met, he goes on to write:

When I am told that the Unborn, or Love, or Life or Light is not the same as God, or that Nirvana or Sukhavati differs from the Kingdom of Heaven, I wonder what authority the speakers have. I find it helpful to challenge them – and myself – in the manner of the old Zen masters (p.151).

In fact, one could cite much authority: Buddhists themselves do not square Sukhavati and Nirvāṇa, and the Diamond Sūtra, to name but one text, rejects the notions of Nirvāṇa as a metaphysical place which people ‘enter’. Christianity typically holds that God is ‘a person’ (or ‘three persons’), a notion that has no foundation in any historical Buddhist account of the Unborn.

Pym’s book is pleasant rather than profound, and I am sure that Buddhists, Christians and unaffiliated seekers alike will find it helpful. As the sub-title suggests, the author seeks to bring Buddhism ‘into everyday life’, not the philosophy seminar, and with the former purpose in mind, I believe this book is successful.

George Chryssides
(University of Wolverhampton)


These two titles are not being reviewed jointly because they share much in common (apart from the same Belgian publisher), but rather for the convenience of the reviewer who lays no claim to being an expert in the field of Indian numismatics or in that of Uyghur literature.

The absolute chronology of India’s first coinage is closely related to the expansion of Magadha, and to the date of the Buddha. It is generally assumed that Indian coinage originated in the North-West under the influence of Persian and Greek coin models. Probably the first Indian coins came into being around 500 BCE or a bit later. There are good and independent arguments to this effect. Some locally produced Kabul coin types that may represent an earlier stage in the development of indigenous Indian coinage follow the Persian weight standards but the devices are Greek inspired, as in the case of the types showing two bull’s heads face to face, reminding us of the early electrum coins of Lydia.

From the time of Candragupta and his dynasty, the Mauryas, India entered an imperial phase and the coinage was from now characterised by the small and thick 5 punch silver kārśāpana, of 3, 4 grammes. The local punchmarked silver coins, restricted to certain well defined areas in India, Narbada and the Ganges valley, belong to the period before the Mauryas. Even if Kosala coinage may be slightly earlier than that of Magadha issues, it seems to terminate near the point where Magadhān kārśapanaṃ II/III are introduced. Magadha’s expansion thus points to a time around 400 BCE. Probably, a well developed Indian coinage existed at the time when Magadha began its expansion.

The first coins were produced by impressing single punches on a piece of silver. Copper coins were unknown before the third

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century BCE. Gold coins show Greek influence, they are extremely rare and probably not earlier than the second century BCE. The place of origin of the first coins, it is assumed (p.11), is the upper Indus valley, in the Taxila region of Gandhāra (present-day Pakistan), from early times a region of great wealth.

An archaic coinage is represented by the thick, round, scythe silver coins of double kārṣāpāna standard, i.e., about 7 grammes weight, with the deeply impressed ‘pulley’ design. These coins were probably struck by the rich state of Avanti in the fertile Narbada-Bombay-Ujjain area, with the famous seaport, Broach.

Kosala, as we know, was one of the most powerful Ganges valley kingdoms of the sixth century BCE. Eventually, it lost its independence to the rival kingdom of Magadha. Eight different types are attributed (by Hardākar) to Kosala. It was suppressed shortly after the death of the Buddha. Kāśi Mahājanapada is represented by coins from the decades around 500 BCE. The Magadhan coins, losing weight and becoming smaller, are characterised by a sun symbol and a six-armed (Greek) symbol. Later on, many varieties are known. The final products of Magadha’s rise to imperial power were the small silver kārṣāpānas with five different punch-marks. The devices on these kārṣāpānas were plants, animals and human figures, or of geometrical and abstract character. The manifold symbolism is still a puzzle. Interestingly, in the Mahāvagga, there is a reference to money-changers. Upāli’s mother says: ‘If Upāli studies coins, his eyes will suffer’. The Mauryan silver coins, and their imitations, continued to circulate, even around 200 CE.

Local Ujjain copper coinage seems to have started around 200 BCE. It was an important trade centre (Barygaza, etc.). There are no Greek elements to be seen on Ujjain’s coinage.

About fourteen Sātavāhana kings are known from numismatic testimonies. They ruled in the Deccan, central India, and the Andhra region. Roman gold and silver money point to the flourishing of Indian trade with Rome from the first century BCE to the second and third centuries CE. It was under Gautamiputra Śātakarni that the empire reached its greatest extent. The instal-

lation of a regular Sātavāhana silver coinage is to Gautamiputra’s credit. His son was the first to strike silver portrait coins, distantly inspired by Indo-Greek silver drachms. The inscriptions of these rare and splendid coins are bilingual (northern Prākṛt, southern Dravidian). Gautamiputra should now be dated at least as far back as the middle of the first century CE — or even sixty years earlier (according to Bob Senior).

The humped bull/elephant silver issues of the Audumbha show close similarities in design and metrology to the silver coins of the Indo-Greek king Apollodotos (ca. 180-160 BCE). The name of this famous people is obviously to be brought into connection with the word udumbara, the celebrated fig tree. Silver coins from this area were issued in the name of Mahādeva.

The Yaudheyas, mentioned at the time of Alexander’s invasion, also issued coins (p.51). Eventually, they lost their freedom to the Indo-Scythians and the Kuṣānas (p.51). Another strong centre of trade was Kauśāmbi, in the middle Ganges valley region, which also issued its own coins.

Taxila, in modern Pakistan, was one of the oldest of the numerous cities of ancient northern India, huge, rich and mighty. Trade flourished even before 500 BCE. First under Persian then under Greek control, Taxila formed a part of the Mauryan empire until it regained its freedom after the death of Aśoka. Some fifty years later the Indo-Greek king Agathokles (190-180 BCE) made Taxila a province of his empire. Most coins are in copper, some inscribed, some in Brahmi script, others in Kharoṣṭhī. To begin with, the Mauryan influence was stronger than the Greek one.

Part Two of this fine book is by Osmund Bopearachchi, who writes about the Indo-Greek, Indo-Scythian and Indo-Parthian kings — the reconstruction of their history largely depends on numismatic evidence. In recent years a large number of Greek, Bactrian, Indo-Greek, Indo-Scythian, Indo-Parthian and Kuṣāna (Kushan) coins have been found in Pakistan and Afghanistan (even here in Denmark, I may add, such coins, seldom of the finest quality, were widely offered for sale at very modest prices, which is no longer the case). When it comes to Greek coins,
Bopearachchi’s excellent catalogue contains two coins, one struck in the name of Alexander in the Babylon mint, and one imitation of the Athenian ‘owl’, struck in Bactria.

There is an excellent bibliography, to which may be added a reference to Hans Haas, ‘Das Scherzlein der Witwe’ und seine Entschreibung im Tripitaka, Leipzig 1922 (for its valuable study of Kaniska and Gondophares coins, pp.129-47). Among the most recent works, R.C. Senior’s magnificent three volumes, Indo-Scythian Coins and History, published by Classical Numismatic Group Inc., Lancaster, Pennsylvania and London, appeared too late (summer 2001) to be included. Also, Shankar Goyal’s very useful survey, ‘Historiography of the Indo-Greek Coinage’ (The Adyar Library Bulletin 64, 2000, pp.179-209). While in no way replacing old classics such as M. Mitchiner’s nine volumes of Indo-Greek and Indo-Scythian Coinage, London 1975-76, W. Pieper and O. Bopearachchhi – not to forget Brepols – clearly deserve our praise for having produced this splendid and indispensable volume on ancient Indian coinage.

Johan Elverskog’s Uyghur Buddhist Literature, the first volume in the Silk Road Studies (SRS), is a reference manual of published Uyghur Buddhist literature. Providing, as it does, a systematic and exhaustive survey of recent information on the places where the documents are kept, of the texts, the editions and the secondary literature, it is an indispensable tool – to quote Alois van Tongerloo – ‘not only for specialists in the field of Altaic, especially Turcological or Mongolian, Iranological, Sinological or Buddhological Studies, but ... also... for a larger public of students interested in Asian religions and cultural history in general’.

In the Introduction, Elverskog writes about the discovery of Uyghur Buddhist literature, the historical background, also providing an overview of this literature. Under non-Mahāyāna texts (pp.17-49) we find 25 entries. There are fragments from at least 13 Mahāyāna sūtras. Also, there are various commentaries, as well as Chinese apocrypha (pp.86-104), and even a few Tantric texts (pp.105-25). Finally, among ‘Other Buddhist Works’, we find specimens of Uyghur Buddhist poetry, a biography of Xuanzang by

Huili, texts of confession and, among the most important of them all, the Maitrisimit nom bitig. To the exhaustive bibliography one may wish to add some of the well-known pioneering contributions by Danish scholars, Vilhem Thomsen (1842-1927) and Kaare Grønbech (1901-57), cf. reference in my Dannebrog på stepperne, Copenhagen 1988.

Both titles under review would have benefited from the assistance of a proof-reader more familiar with Sanskrit. But this is a minor matter. Elverskog also deserves praise for his careful work in an important though somewhat remote area of Buddhist studies.

Chr. Lindtner


The book under review constitutes a collection of twenty-three articles prepared in honour of Manfred Taube in recognition of his contribution to Tibetan and Mongolian Studies in Germany from the 1950s up to the present. While this is not the place to profile Taube’s pre-eminent position in Tibeto-Mongolian research, which he enriched in the course of fifty years with ten books and catalogues, forty research articles and more than eighty reviews (for publication details the reader is referred to Taube’s bibliography included on pages xvi-xxix of the Festschrift), it is perhaps worth noting that Taube is one of the last representatives of a great but now rapidly dwindling brand of scholars equally at home in the Tibetan and Mongolian cultures. Trained in the 1940s at the University of Leipzig by Friedrich Weller in the disciplines of Indology and Sinology, Taube also soon acquired proficiency in Tibetan as well as Mongolian. His early work, focusing on Mongolian grammatical studies (his doctoral dissertation (1957)
examined the *Jirüken-ü-tolta-yin tayilburi* by the well-known scholar bsTan 'dzin grags pa, was followed in the 1960s by in-depth research on selected aspects of Mongolian and Tibetan culture, medicine, language and history. Although Taube’s contributions to those fields are substantial and remain important points of reference up to the present day, he is probably best known for his numerous catalogues of Tibetan works found in collections kept in libraries throughout Germany and beyond. His first major study of Tibetan bibliography, analysing the Tibetan blockprints included in the *T’ien ch’ing hao* from Beijing, was submitted as Habilitationsschrift at Leipzig University in 1965. This study inspired further research into the Tibetan literary tradition and led to the production of no less than eight catalogues and handlists. Many of them are now considered landmarks in Tibetan bibliography and have set a standard for current cataloguing work and are widely consulted as important reference works. His contribution to the Verzeichnis der orient-alischen Handschriften in Deutschland (Tibetische Handschriften und Blockdrucke 1-4, Wiesbaden 1966), his catalogue of Tibetan manuscripts in the Turfan collection of Berlin (*Die Tibetica der Berliner Turfansammlung*, Berlin 1980) and the more recent *Mongolica der Berliner Turfansammlung* (co-authored by D. Cerensodam, Berlin 1993), in particular, have long become indispensable tools for Tibeto-Mongolian literary studies. Owing to the political realities in what was then the GDR, much of Taube’s research, almost invariably written in German, was published in journals not easily available to colleagues working on the other side of the Iron Curtain. For this reason, the complete bibliography included in the *Festschrift* is especially welcome, since it will alert subsequent generations of scholars to Taube’s significant if somewhat under-publicised output.

As can be gleaned from the contribution profile, the themes that feature in the articles cover a wide range of topics and reflect, very appropriately, the broad purview of Taube's own research. Perhaps influenced by my personal Tibetological focus, I liked in particular the contributions of Cüppers, Schwieger and Jackson, all of which address, in a convincing analytical fashion, important aspects of Tibetan history. Cüppers' study of the Bhlaṅ dor gyal bar ston pa'i draṅ thig dvaṅs šel kyi me løṅ fcer gcig pa composed by sDe srid Sāriṣ rgyas rgya mtsho (1653-1705) discusses administrative guidelines (to be) observed by officers of the dGa' ldan pho bran bureaucracy and provides a fascinating glimpse into the largely unexplored ideals and workings of the Tibetan government of that period. Schwieger and Jackson, on the other hand, devote their articles to the profiling of two historical persons who, in very different ways and in different time periods, influenced the intellectual and historical culture of Tibet. Equally of interest are the Buddhological contributions. Eimer's analysis of the structure of the Phug brag Kanjur, for example, contains important material that will allow us, one day, to ascertain the history of this maverick Kanjur whose organisation and content are notorious for its independence from the other Kanjur traditions. More could, should - and no doubt, in time will - be said about the content of the other contributions, since many incorporate interesting material on selected aspects of Tibetan and Mongolian culture, but this, alas, is not the appropriate place. Let me conclude by congratulating Manfred Taube, the contributors and, of course, the members of the editorial team who put this Festschrift together in this fine publication. The erudition displayed in many of its articles render it a fitting celebration of the life and work of one of Germany's leading scholars in the fields of Tibetan and

Mongolian studies.


Janet Williams sees her book as a contribution to the 'budding renaissance of apophatic theology through an analysis of certain central source-texts'. The understanding of apophasis on which it builds is initially a Christian one and in her Introduction she gives a well-referenced description in recent work of a consensus that there are two meanings of the term apophasis or negation. There is a negation (apophasis) which is complementary to affirmation (kataphasis) in generating statements about 'God' and there is an apophasis which is the negation of both affirmation and negation and in its focus on the inadequacy of language generates no statements about 'God'. The author then states the necessity for a debate which has emerged from studies in Middle and Neo-Platonic discourse within Christian theology to be pursued in a wider context. Her own contribution to this broader field is this book's examination of Patristic Christian and Sōtō Zen Buddhist texts. She also sees the source of the emphasis on the nondual and undifferentiated nature of Ultimate Reality (notice the shift from the word 'God'), to which the language of apophasis bears witness, as lying 'more in the nature of experience of the divine, than in any logical analysis of it'. Negation is not 'purely verbal' but 'an integral part of an existentialist orientation' (p.9).

Before Williams looks at the three individual authors, Chapter 2 deals in depth with the Graeco-Christian background to the ideas of Dionysius and Maximus, and Chapter 3 with the Buddhist background to Dōgen. The main body of the book (Chapters 4-6) then provides a rigorous and scholarly examination of the key
Christian texts of Dionysius the Areopagite (also called Pseudo Dionysius), Maximus the Confessor and the key Buddhist texts of the Zen master Dōgen. The discussion in these chapters seeks to demonstrate that within Christianity and Buddhism there are threads which share something of the same logic about the negation of negation, which is the second meaning of *apophasis* described at the beginning of the book. In addition, Williams points out that since ‘all these works are situated on the cusp of profound social change’ and in ‘turbulent times’ that the ways of thinking and experiencing they explore are helpful for our own social contexts. She comes back to that issue of contemporary relevance in her final chapter.

The author is uniquely qualified to deal with this breadth of material, having degrees in both classics and theology and having spent some years working in Japan and gaining first-hand knowledge of the Japanese language and of the practice of Zen. She is able to work with the texts of Dionysius and Maximus in their original languages, consulting dictionaries as listed. With regard to Dōgen’s work, though, she admits a lack of expertise in what she calls his ‘eccentric Japanese’, which means that though she refers to the original texts, she relies upon the judgement of various published translations rather than her own and she acknowledges the advantage of having pre-publication sight of the Nishijima and Cohen translation of the *Shōbōgenzō*. Williams’ decision to deal with each figure separately and in his own context is a wise one, not only from the point of view of the reader who is unlikely to be familiar with all three figures, but also because there is no danger thereby of suggesting similarities or analogies which do not exist. Her own considerable scholarship is supported by careful footnotes and bibliography.

It is the section on Dōgen that will particularly interest most readers of this review. Williams affirms Dōgen’s orthodoxy in presenting the Buddhist Way: ‘He intends the practitioner to cease grasping and clinging to phenomena and to concepts, and sees the way to achieving this detachment as being through an understanding of impermanence and emptiness. Similarly he shares the traditional concern to guard against a nihilistic understanding of impermanence and emptiness’. The author focuses on the major themes in his writings of ineffability, nondualism and emptiness along with other themes such as the use of affirmative speech, the constant work of ‘going beyond Buddha’. There are also two very original and interesting case-studies based on the image clusters of Dōgen’s use of flowers and the metaphor of dessication (Japanese *ko*, ‘withered’ or ‘dried up’). Dōgen’s understanding of the ineffable is ‘not as that which human words and concepts cannot begin to describe, but as that which will never have been described completely ... All words can preach the Dharma to those who listen’ (p.173).

The concluding chapter highlights methodological issues and the importance of the earlier separate treatment of the Christian and Buddhist writers and texts with the words, ‘This work must therefore take as its starting point the assumption that the negative traditions in Japanese Zen and Patristic Christianity are fundamentally different. It does, however, affirm the legitimacy of seeing analogous features in different places whilst acknowledging that any naming will emerge from a particular standpoint and that there is no universal or impartial position from which to view the material’. So Williams states that for her the work emerges from a familiarity with the Christian tradition engaged in a growing encounter with Zen Buddhism and assumes more familiarity with Christian philosophy than Zen. For this reason she finds the use of the term *apophasis* appropriate, rather than Nishitani and Abe’s *zettaimu* ‘negation of negation’. However, in establishing a standpoint, Williams also describes an open-ness to the other and the adjustments that open-ness demands to the acknowledgement of the limitedness of one’s own position. She refers to this kind of approach as described in the bases for interfaith dialogue used by the Christian Paul Knitter and the Buddhist Masao Abe, whose idea Williams discusses. Her concluding chapter continues by looking at the ‘substantial analogies’ for which the earlier chapters have provided material in an imperative rather than a comparative method and with a diatopical hermeneutic. This complex termin-
ology is dependent on the work of Raymundo Panikkar. She sees the reasons for picking out the apophatic strain in her chosen writers, despite the considerable differences in their backgrounds and the emphases of their worldviews in the round as more than historically interesting and aesthetically satisfying. She is interested in 'what the traditions of apophasis might offer to those who choose to appropriate them now' and in what ways it might address and influence contemporary concerns. She also asks whether apophasis coincides with any familiar critical or spiritual methodologies and whether it might be adapted by the resources of modern spirituality (p.197).

The answers to these interesting questions are introduced in the final pages of the book, which look at the modern concern to express God 'beyond' or 'without' Being; the theological and philosophical revival of kenosis; the work of the Kyoto School; post-modernity; the plural context and the need to address the religions and a religious Other and those forms of spirituality which 're-integrate the psychic and the corporeal, intellection and activity' (p.226). These are large topics which are (understandably, given the main focus of the book) touched upon relatively briefly, and I found the ending rather abrupt. It gave me a sense that I should start the book's journey of exploration again from the beginning, for this is a book that needs cyclical reading. By that I mean that an engagement with the methodological and existential issues raised in the concluding chapter are important for a reading of the main body of the text and, once they are placed on the agenda, make one want to start again and work through the material with yet further levels of engagement. To say this is not a criticism, but an acknowledgement of the dense and thought-provoking richness of the issues and the inherent interest of the material that is being analysed. Those who wish to continue their analysis have a full bibliography of primary and secondary texts from which to choose and the index enables ease of access and re-entry into Williams' text.

Peggy Morgan
(Mansfield College, Oxford)
Under Theory and Information in Greek Ethnography: On τούποι, Fabulous Peoples in Greek Sources, India and Ethiopia – the Old Confusion, and The Northern Paradise.


The main conclusion, as said, is that our sources refer to Northwest India, now Pakistan and part of Afghanistan. The references (pp.237-64) include not only classical and Indian texts, but a huge number of monographs and articles. An Index locorum and an exhaustive General Index (pp.269-93), with maps, conclude this encyclopaedic survey of the period before Alexander.


Then we learn of Ancient Diplomacy: Megasthenes: The Man and his Mission, Literary Conventions and Traditions vs. Observations on the Spot, Castes or something else: Megasthenes on Indian society.


Chapter VI, on Greeks in the East: The Seleucids and the East,

Asoka and the West, Between Two Cultures, Hellenism in the East, Easternmost Greek Epigraphy, Kings and Their Coins, Graeco-Bactrian and Indo-Greek Onomastics: A Survey, Greek Gods Abroad, and Yavanas in Indian Sources.

Finally, India and the Greek West: Unchanging Literary Image, Growing Commerce, Islands of the Ocean, and India and the Hellenistic World: Conclusion.

Again the book concludes with exhaustive references (pp.351-400) and a General Index (pp.401-39).

KK deserves great credit for having collected virtually all the ancient literary sources pertaining to this issue, for presenting them systematically, and for analysing them critically. His discussions and evaluations are always conducted with erudition and good sense. He has succeeded well in presenting his philological colleagues with what must be considered an indispensable standard work on Graeco-Indian relations, and I do not hesitate to agree with him that ‘India’ here mainly refers to the Northwest (recent works that appeared after KK’s books tend to support his thesis, cf. my review of Coins, Art and Chronology: Essays on the pre-Islamic History of the Indo-Iranian Borderlands, and Ancient Buddhist Scrolls from Gandhāra, in BSR 17 (2000), pp.81-4 and 110-13).

Among the references, etc., that seem to have escaped KK’s attention I may be permitted to mention:

In a note to G.A. van den Bergh van Eysinga, Indische Einflüsse auf evangelische Erzählungen, Göttingen 1904, Ernst Kuhn pointed out, referring to the Physiologus ‘die wichtige Übereinstimmung des Kapitels vom χοραγόδος mit Rgveda I, 50 und Atharvaveda I, 22’. Kuhn wrote ‘... der Name des Vogels χοραγόδος selbst ist offenbar nur volksetymologische Umgestaltung des indischen hārdrava’. In his English translation of the Saddharmapuṇḍarika II, 78 (Oxford 1884, p.50), H. Kern pointed out that Sanskrit karketana, a kind of cat’s eye, according to the dictionaries, ‘rather looks as if it were the Greek χοραγόδος (− as in Revelation 21, 19, I would add, in which there are numerous other echoes from the Saddharmapuṇḍarika). Since

the Psalms (in the Greek of the Septuaginta) also belong to the Hellenistic period, it would be interesting to have a discussion of the fact, pointed out by Indologists long ago, that Psalm 139 seems to be based rather closely on Atharvaveda IV, 6. See Hans Haas, with reference to earlier contributions, 'Das Scherflein der Witwe und seine Entsprechung im Tripitaka, Leipzig 1922, pp.99-105.

Of course I realise that these references to the Bible — numerous others could be added — brings me into a field KK did perhaps not intend to move into, viz. the Jewish literature of the Hellenistic period. Nevertheless, to the extent that it is written in Greek, it cannot really be isolated from the manifold issues pertaining to the theme 'India and the Hellenistic World'. As Strabo put it, there was hardly a place in the world where there were no Jews — including the Northwest.

For a good survey of this, see e.g. Franz Susemihl, Geschichte der Griechischen Litteratur in der Alexandrinerzeit I-II, Leipzig 1891-92. Susemihl is also still important for many of the other Hellenistic authors mentioned and discussed by Karttunen. The chapter of 'Die jüdische-hellenistische Litteratur' is found in vol. II, pp.601-50. The main standard work is of course still Emil Schürer's inexhaustible Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes in Zeitalter Jesu Christi I-II, Leipzig 1901-09. An excellent survey is provided by Otto Stählin in 'Die hellenistisch-jüdische Literatur', in Iwan von Müller's Handbuch VII, II, 1, Munich 1920, pp.535ff. ("... in den letzten Jahrhunderten v. Chr. Geb. fanden sich Juden in allen Ländern der zivilisierten Welt", op. cit., p.537).

If one had to point out a major (though excusable) weakness in KK's books, it would be this general neglect of Jewish Hellenistic literature. Another point has to do with Greek philosophy and India. On the whole I am far less sceptical of possible mutual influence than KK seems to be (at least in 1989). Referring to Guthrie's celebrated volumes on Greek philosophy, I fully agree when KK finds it 'astonishing that India is not mentioned at all in the indexes of his two volumes on Plato' (I, p.109, n.60).

It has proved difficult to identify the tamālapatra, which in Greek became μαλάβαθος, nicely and convincingly explained as having been wrongly divided as a neuter τὰ μαλάβαθια, for which the corresponding singular μαλάβαθος was then natural (III, p.157, n.203), which also explains how Pātaliputra likewise becomes τὰ Παλάβαθος. A hint may perhaps be had from the name of the future Buddha Tamālapatracandanagandha, in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka (ref. Edgerton, BHSD, p.25). Cf. also, for a possible source of confusion, tālamastaka?

As for the nard or spikenard (1997, p.161), Lat. nardus/nardum, with reference to Mark 14, 3-4 par etc., p.161 — is it really correct to assume that the Greek (and Latin) name seems to be derived from Semitic, mentioned as nērdî in the Canticum? Its ultimate origin, as KK notes, seems to be OIA nalada, Pāli narasa. Is the Semitic not just an imitation of the Indic or Greek word? Likewise, I find it hard to believe that χαράγγδος/σμαράγδοι, clearly related to OIA marakata, were both 'actually borrowed from Semitic'. How can the Greek and OIA come so close to one another if they were originally borrowed independently from Akkadian bārāqta or Hebrew bārēqet? The simple hypothesis seems, here also, more preferable. In other words, I think (giving just these examples from among many) we must be more open to the possibility that 'Semitic' often 'imitates' OIA/Greek. Further studies of the usage of suspect 'loanwords' in Jewish Hellenistic literature must be made before final decisions can be made. A useful reference here would have been: S. Krauss, Griechische und lateinische Lehnwörter in Talmud, Midrasch und Targum 1-2, Leipzig 1892. A similar book on Indian loan words among Jews is a desideratum.

Strabo et al. (I, p.264) inform us that Candragupta was succeeded by his son Bindusārā, who in Greek sources is called Ἀμίτραχάτις and the like. According to Buddhist sources Ajātāśatrū was the son of Bindusārā. Is it not tempting to ask whether the Greek form is simply a translation of the name Ajātāśatrū? True, the form Amitraghātā is attested by Mahābhāṣya III, 2, 87 — but can we be sure that the two names do not refer to the same person? There seems to be some sort of confusion at play here. Antiochus I sent Daimachus to his court, and this Daimachus
wrote not only on India, but also πέρι εὐθείας. That may well have been a book on the Dharma, as in the Greek inscription of Aśoka where Dharma is translated by εὐθεία. A book also on ‘Buddhism’ in other words. If so, what a loss!


It has been a great pleasure for the reviewer to read these two books. The author has spared no efforts to trace down virtually all the relevant Greek and Indian sources. His critical judgement on their meaning and value is, as a rule, balanced and convincing. I hope his work can contribute to a revival of Graeco-Indian studies - to ‘Northwest Studies’, or Bactrian and Gandharan studies.

Karttunen writes that he is presently working on a third volume, one on India and the Roman West. A fourth volume on late Antiquity will conclude the series. We surely wish the Finnish scholar the best of luck. His work is an important one. Above all, we shall be anxious to see how he handles the problems relating to Indian – Northwestern – influence on Jewish Hellenistic literature. This is really a new, difficult but also very important field of research. Also, the relations between Greek/Indian/ Hellenistic religion/philosophy may turn out to have been much more intimate than generally assumed. Karttunen has provided the handy work of reference from which further discussions can start out.

Chr. Lindtner


This book is the result of ten years travelling by the author and is in essence a ‘collection of extracts’ from his sketchbook and diaries, and is not claiming to be ‘more than an interpretation of circumstances and events as I [the author] perceived them. They are not necessarily correct’ (p.7). Mistakes certainly abound, ranging from misspelled geographical names (Tin Sian Mountains instead of Tianshan mountains, in the caption for the first illustration) to factual errors some of which are quoted below. The model of Holcroft, himself an ex-army officer, is Colonel Frederick Gustavos Burnaby, ‘the classic Victorian Empirical [sic] hero’ (p.9), and the book seems to be a late descendant of certain nineteenth-century travel diaries, with little attempt to search for deeper understanding of strange countries and customs, always observing everything with the eyes of the superior British traveller. There is a temptation to describe the repellent and exotic everywhere, and the historical facts and legends quoted are often simply heard from local guides, written down and not checked for accuracy on return.

To quote just one obvious example, under the heading ‘Silk: the Legends’ it is explained that around 500 CE a Chinese princess smuggled the silk worms to Constantinople in her knickers [sic] and then Holcroft says, ‘As a result, Byzantium becomes the great silk-producing centre, spreading silk through Western Europe. The Silk Route as such collapses and the Sea of Spice Routes take over. China goes into decline and total isolation for 2000 years until today. And this is all the result of an angry princess and her knickers!’ (p.10). I am sure everyone will see how laughable this comment is. First of all, since 500 CE only 1500 years have passed – so much for accuracy and exaggeration. More importantly, Holcroft completely overlooks the most flourishing period of the Silk Road, and one of the strongest dynasties in China: the Tang [618-906]. It is not even worth investigating the background to the legend here, which of course remains unconfirmed at this point.

Europe is simply illustrated by a view of Prague (not mentioned in the text), Burgos in Spain and St Petersburg and Moscow in Russia. What eating a pig’s head in Spain has to do with the Silk Road remains a mystery to this reviewer. Of course, Holcroft’s sufferings and ailments are amply described in the book, unlike in
the case of true travellers, such as Sir Aurel Stein, who remained modestly silent about life-threatening experiences. The often unsympathetic nature of his observations can be seen written on a sketch of Mashed in Iran: 'The noise is horrible. Thousands of Ayatollahs “wailing” their heads off'. About Chinese he simply says in an almost offensive way, ‘The ability for mass-cooperation is reflected in Chinese characters. The population could act with “hive-like” instinct because the written language is in fact pictorial i.e. illiteracy did not exist’ [sic]. Did Holcroft ever spend more than five minutes looking at Chinese characters, the complexity of which puts our own alphabet to shame? Far from being pictures everybody could understand, as this reviewer thought everybody knew, the ability to read Chinese takes long years to achieve and the mastery of several thousand characters is essential for the native Chinese and the foreigner alike. Furthermore, certainly in the early nineties, it was completely acceptable to travel alone in China even as a woman, and it was never felt that the Chinese could not comprehend why a solitary traveller was not part of a group. Holcroft is no pioneer in any of the busy tourist areas that he visited!

The book ends abruptly in Guilin with no attempt to explain how this links to the Silk Road. Obviously the author does not follow any of the traditional Silk Routes in a systematic way, but we simply see the somewhat coincidental sum-total of several journeys, much like a popular travel diary of an artistically minded participant of various exotic package tours. Holcroft also shows a mild interest in modern events such as the Bosnian war and the collapse of the Soviet Union, but these are not well researched or integrated either. The main feature of the book, the watercolour illustrations are pretty, with architectural detail well observed, but unexciting. The book might make a good coffee table book or a reasonable present, but only if the factual errors do not deter the reader. The text is definitely of no use to those who have travelled in the area or studied the region. As Buddhism is barely mentioned, this book would be of little interest to readers of this journal.

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