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ISSN 0265-2897 © 2004 Buddhist Studies Review

Buddhist Studies Review is the semi-annual journal of the UK Association for Buddhist Studies and is sponsored by the Institut de recherche bouddhique Linh-Son

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LEGEND AND CULT – CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE HISTORY OF INDIAN BUDDHIST STŪPAS

PART 1: THE ‘STŪPA OF KANIŚKA’

MAX DEEG

In the last few years the original ritual monument of Buddhism, the stūpa, has attracted attention on several levels of research and interpretation. Beyond the purely archaeological area, where a

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2 Only a few titles may suffice: Anna Libera Dallapiccola, Stephanie Zingel-Avé Lallement (ed.), The Stūpa: its religious, historical and architectural significance, Wiesbaden 1980; Mireille Bénisti, Contributions à l’étude du stūpa bouddhique indien: les stūpa mineurs de Bodh-Gaya et de Ratnagiri, 2 vols, Paris 1981; Sujata Soni, Évolution of stupas in Burma: Pagan period: 11th to 13th centuries A.D., New Delhi 1991; Bernhard Köler, Re-building a stūpa: architectural drawings of the Swayambhunath, Bonn 1992; Robert Knox, Amarāvatī: sculpture from the great stūpa, London 1992. Gregory Schopen has drawn attention to the position and function of the stūpa for the monastic community in a number of articles. On the excavation of one of the oldest stūpas at Gotihawa in Nepal, probably dedicated to a Buddha of the past (Krakuc-
considerable amount of knowledge has also been gained, scholars working on the stūpa, in general and specific cases, have to take account of research works that emphasise the symbolism and (even spiritual) function of the stūpa in the development of Buddhism as a religion.

Viewed from the standpoint of general religious studies, the stūpa is not only an interesting religious monument for the cult which underwent changes in form, function and symbolism, but in some cases also gives us information about what the Buddhists thought the cause for its construction to have been. The over reason is, of course, the enshrinement of a relic (Skt. sārīra, Chin. sheli 舍利), but often we do not have a relic in the stūpa and, in these cases, the monument was rather a caitya in the direct sense of the word, a memorial building which reminds the Buddhist of

6 I am not talking about strict etymology here, which sometimes connects the word with the root cī-(cīni), ‘to heap’, but about the traditional explanation according to which a caitya (or cetiya) derives from the root cī-, ‘to think of, to consider’; cf. Tucci, Stupa... op. cit., p.XI ff.; Kottkamp, Der Stupa..., op. cit., p.15 ff. According to the MPS [see next note] these are three types of stupas called sārīraka, containing an enshrined relic in the sense of the word paribhōjika, containing objects used by the Buddha, and uddeśika, commemorating places where the Buddha had stayed; cf. Mireille Bénisti, ‘Étude sur le stūpa dans l’Inde ancienne’, BEFEOSO (1960), p.50.

Deeg – Legend and Cult: 1. The Stūpa of Kaniška

an event in the ‘history’ of Buddhism. The Mahāparinirvānasūtra (MPS) informs us that, immediately after the Buddha had been cremated, his remains were distributed – not without conflicts arising among the parties wanting to obtain them – to several groups or persons who then enshrined them in stūpas, those being the first eight buildings of its kind according to the Buddhist legend; in MPS(S) there is even an episode where the Buddha prophesies to Ananda that these stūpas will be built and he praises the venerability of his relics. This and the depiction of stūpa veneration on early Buddhist reliefs, such as those at Sānchi, show that the adoration of relics and those at stūpas belongs to an early phase of the Buddhist cult.

The Buddhist legends also give us an aetiological story which is supposed to explain how these primary stupas were multiplied; the different stories of King Aśoka relate how the famous monarch took the relics out of the original stūpas, divided them and constructed 84,000 stūpas – the so-called dharmarājikās – over them, which were spread across the whole realm (Jambudvīpa). The pragmatic background for such an account was of course to explain the fact that some centuries after the Buddha’s death a

huge number of stūpas already existed\(^{11}\), each claiming to contain a relic of the Master, a conception leading to the discovery of 'original' Aśoka-stūpas containing the 'authentic' relics of the Buddha in medieval China.

Another possibility to justify the establishing of 'authentic' stūpas with sarīras was to substantiate the Buddha's having paid visits even to places where he could not have been during his lifetime. This was especially the case in the Indian North-west, in the areas of Swat\(^{12}\) and Gandhāra\(^{13}\), which were known in later texts through the conversions of human beings, yaksas and nāgas. In order to prove the truth of the legend, the Buddha was often said to have left his footprints\(^{14}\) or nails and hair which he was believed to have cut after the relevant event and over which a stūpa was built (nakhakeśastūpa). At the same time an extended cult of relics seems to have developed: not only parts of the body of the Buddha (sarīra in a stricter sense) but also objects which were said to have belonged to the Buddha came to be venerated.

Moreover, even for places where it was not at all possible to trace an event in the life of the Buddha, commemorative stūpas

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11 Cf. Kottkamp, Der Stupa... op. cit., p.3, n.2: 'daß eine forcierte stupa-Bautätigkeit in der Sunga-zeitlichen Epoche (ab ca. 150 v.Chr.) einsetze.'

12 The most famous of these sites being the place where the Buddha converted the nāga Apalāśa and left his footsteps and the mark of his garment on a stone, a story which is reported by the Chinese pilgrims but is also found in several Buddhist texts.

13 In Purusāpura, the present Peshawar, e.g. the Buddha's bowl (pātra) was shown, and another centre of relics was Nagarathāra (in present Afghanistan) with the cave in which the Buddha had left his shadow to tame a nāga, and – last but not least – there is the Kaniska-stūpa discussed below. That the 'production' of such a sacred site was connected with the Kusānas, probably especially with Kaniska, was already stressed by Étienne Lamotte (tr. Boin-Webb), History of Indian Buddhism from the origins to the Śaka era, Louvain-la-Neuve 1988, pp.336-7.

14 Probably the most famous example is the footprint on Adam's Peak in Sri Lanka. For an extensive discussion of these buddhapadas, see Anna Maria Quaggiotti, Buddhapadas. An Essay on the Representations of the Footprints of the Buddha with a Descriptive Catalogue of the Indian Specimens from the 2nd Century B.C. to the 4th Century A.D, Kamakura 1998.


16 See the summary of the discussion in Kuwayama, The Main Stupa... op. cit., p.2 f.

17 See also the relatively late reference to the stūpa (Kaniska-caitya) in the Tibetan Buddhist historiographical work known as the 'Bluc Annals' (15th C.): see George N. Roerich, The Blue Annals, Calcutta 1949, repr. Delhi 1976, p.25.

18 Translations of the relevant passages in these texts are the present author's. References to the older French and English translations are omitted because these works will be listed in the author's forthcoming "Dharmasucher - Reliquien - Legenden. Der älteste Bericht eines chinesischen buddhistischen Pilgerreise über seine Reise nach Indien: Das Gaoseng-Faxian-zhuan 高僧法顯傳 als religiogeschichtlich Quelle, Wiesbaden 2004.

19 See Shōshin Kuwayama (ed.), 'Huichao's Wang Wu Tianzhuguo zhuan, Record of Travels in Five Indic Regions, Translation and Commentary, Kyoto 1992 (in Japanese) 山正編，慧超往五天竺國傳研究，京都, p.21, line 128 f.: 'Three days' travel from this city (Puṣkalavati) to the west, there is a great monastery. This is the monastery where the Bodhisattva Vasubandhu and
Wukong

Some pieces of information repeated in genuine Chinese historiographical\textsuperscript{21} and Buddhist\textsuperscript{22} texts are referred to in texts found in Central Asia\textsuperscript{23} (see also below) and even the Muslim observer, Al-Birūnī, still deemed the site to be worth mentioning in his description of India\textsuperscript{24}.

There are several texts giving the legend of the foundation of the stupa through King Kaniska\textsuperscript{25} with a few variations of which the first Indian version in the Bhaisajyavastu of the Mūla-sārvastivādin Vinaya (MSV[S]) is cited:

'\textbf{The Exalted One came to Kharjurikā}. In Kharjurikā he saw little boys playing with small stūpas made of dirt. After having seen the little boys playing with small stūpas made of dirt he said to the yakṣa Vajrapāṇi: "Do you see, O Vajrapāṇī, the little boys playing with small stūpas made of dirt?" "Indeed, O venerable one." "There will be, 400 years after my Nirvāṇa, a king called Kaniska. He will erect a stūpa in this area, the name of which will be stūpa of Kaniska, and he will perform what should be performed for the Buddha after I have entered Nirvāṇa".\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{20} T 2089, p.980a22 f.復有... 王聖塔寺... (\textit{There is also... the monastery of the sacred stūpa of King Kaniska\texttextsuperscript{26}...}). While in Huichao\texttextsuperscript{27}'s report the monastery is mentioned first, the compound in Wukong\texttextsuperscript{28}'s account still seems to suggest that the stūpa was considered more important than the monastery which is not even mentioned by the earliest pilgrims Faxian, Song Yun and Huisheng.

\textsuperscript{21} See Weishu 梵書 p.102 (text after Kuwayama, \textit{The Main Stūpa... op. cit.}, p. 66 f.): 'From this city (Puruṣapura) ten miles to the east, there is a Buddha-stūpa, 350 paces in circuit and eighty \textit{zhang} high. It is said that since the first erection of the Buddha-stūpa until the 8th year of the (era) Wuding 842 years have passed, and that it is called the \textit{Stūpa of 100 \textit{zhang} (Baizhang-futu)}.' It is not easy to imagine what the Indian name of the stūpa should have been: *Satavyamastūpa (?); because there are no such Indian names indicating measures, the name could just be a Chinese invention. However, due to a contradiction found in the \textit{Weishu} (80 \textit{zhang} vs. 100 \textit{zhang}) it can be inferred that the number 100 stands for the extraordinary height of the building (see the discussion in Kuwayama, ibid., p.73 ff). In the same chapter of the same text is found another, slightly different description: 'Seven miles southeast where the capital is, there is a Buddha-stūpa, 70 \textit{zhang} high and 300 paces in circuit. This is the so-called Queli-stūpa.'

\textsuperscript{22} The Buddhist encyclopedia \textit{Fayuan-zhulin} 法苑珠林 of 668 by the monk Daoqian 道世 just repeats the text of Song Yun (T 2122, p.589a19 ff.).

\textsuperscript{23} In the Sogdian \textit{Aryavalkotesvaraya-namastasatatakottra} (cf. David A. Utz, \textit{A Survey of Buddhist Sogdian Studies}, Tokyo 1980, p.10, no.II.2) the line: \textit{nānācū baram awēn akenis astup barār farm} ('We bring homage to the farm [majesty] of Kanishka\texttextsuperscript{27}'s stūpa and vihāra', cited after Dobbin, \textit{The Stūpa and Vihāra... op. cit.}, p.44).

\textsuperscript{24} See Edward C. Sachau, \textit{Alberuni\texttextsuperscript{28}'s India}, London 1910, repr, Delhi 1992, I, p.11.

\textsuperscript{25} The disputed date of Kaniska has recently been determined with the help of new inscriptive material; cf. Nicholas Sims-Williams, J. Cribb, \textit{A New Bactrian Inscription of Kaniska the Great\textsuperscript{29}}, in \textit{Silk Road Art and Archaeology I} (1995/96), pp.75-142. The texts – except for the Vinaya passages and the Central Asian texts referred to below – are collected and translated in Kuwayama, \textit{The Main Stūpa... op. cit.}, p. 62, in Appendix A.

\textsuperscript{26} The context shows that the Buddha moved northwards to Swat and that the Kharjurikā mentioned actually was in the area of Gandhāra. Obviously the name was supposed to be the old one known in the Buddha\texttextsuperscript{30}'s lifetime.

\textsuperscript{27} On the construction of sand- and mud- or dirt-stūpas, cf. Kottkamp, \textit{Stupa... op. cit.}, p.151 ff, n.4; one \textit{locus classicus} is found in the second chapter of the Lotus Sūtra (\textit{Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra}) which could be a cross-reference to our story, because it explicitly mentions children erecting stūpas of sand: T 262, 8624 乃至童子戲 聚沙為佛塔… 'up to children playing and collecting sand to make stūpas for the Buddha.' This kind of miniature stūpa made of earth or mud (\textit{mrtpindād... stūpaṃ pratīṭhāpayet... 'should erect a stūpa from a ball of mud'} for the sake of gaining merit (\textit{puṇya}) seems to have been quite popular at least in the north-western part of India, as can be seen from certain passages in the Gilgit mss; see Gregory Schopen, \textit{Two Problems in the History of Indian Buddhism: The Layman Monk Distinction and the Doctrines of the Transference of Merit} in \textit{Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik} 10 (1985) pp.9-47, repr. in (and quoted after) id., \textit{Bones, Stones and Buddhist Monks, op. cit.}, pp.23-55, here p.50, n.61.

In the Chinese version of the same Vinaya (MSV(C)), translated by the famous Chinese pilgrim Yijing and sometimes differing considerably from the Indian text, it is only one boy who is playing with a stūpa\textsuperscript{29}.

The other versions of the story differ in one main point from the MSV in that they focus – following the prophecy of the Buddha – on the story of the erection of the stūpa, Kaniska being told the prediction of the Buddha after having seen a little boy building a stūpa made of dirt or manure.

The earliest remarks on the stūpa are found in Faxian’s pilgrim account, Gaoseng-Faxian-zhuan 高僧法顯傳 (GFZ; or Fuguo-ji 佛國記, ‘Records of the Buddhist Countries’), in the region around Puruṣapura / Falousha 弗樓沙:

‘Once the Buddha and his disciples travelled in this kingdom. He said to Ananda: “When I will have entered Nirvāṇa there will be a king called Kaniska. He will erect a stūpa here.” Later, when Kaniska was born, he was once out on a trip and the ruler of the gods, Sakra, wanted to awaken his faith. He transformed himself into a shepherd boy and built a stūpa on the road. The king asked: “What are you doing?” he answered: “I am making a stūpa of the Buddha.” The king exclaimed: “How meritorious!” Then the king erected a stūpa directly above the boy’s stūpa, more than 40 zhang high and adorned with several precious things. All stūpas and temples which were seen hitherto were not comparable with its splendour, beauty, majesty and dignity. It is said that in Jambudvīpa only this stūpa can be called high. After the king had finished his stūpa the little stūpa emerged (again) from the southern side of the big stūpa, about 3 chi high.’\textsuperscript{30}

The pilgrim Song Yun, who visited the northwestern regions as an unofficial envoy of the Empress-Dowager Hu 胡, and whose account is preserved in the ‘Records of the Monasteries (in the capital) Luoyang’, Luoyang-jialan-ji 洛陽伽藍記 (LJJ), then gives the whole story of the foundation of the stūpa by Kaniska:\textsuperscript{31}

‘Seven miles to the east of the city (Gandhāra = Puruṣapura) there is the Queli-stūpa. The account by Daoxiao says: “Four miles to the east of the city.” Now if one is to trace the origin of this stūpa it is where the Tathāgata, when he was living in the world and travelled this region together with his disciples, pointed to the east of the city and said: “300 years\textsuperscript{32} after my Nirvāṇa there will be a king in this country called Kaniska. He will build a stūpa at this spot.” (And) indeed, 200 (300) years after the Nirvāṇa of the Buddha there was a king in the country who was called Kaniska. (Once when he was) leaving the town he saw in the east four boys collecting cow-dung and building a stūpa about three chi [Chinese feet] high and suddenly dis-

\textsuperscript{29} T 1448, p.41b25 ff, Genben-shuo-yiqie-youbu-pinaiye-yaoshi 根本說一切有部毘奈耶事; ‘Then the Venerable One came to the village of Kharjūra. In this village there was a child who built a stūpa of dirt and played with it. When the Venerable One saw that he said to Vajrapāni: “Do you see that child building a stūpa of dirt and playing with it?” Vajrapāni said to the Buddha: “I have seen him.” The Buddha said: “After I have entered Nirvāṇa, King Kaniska (that means: pure gold) will erect a great stūpa at the place where (now) this child is playing and building a stūpa. (That stūpa) will be called Kaniska-stūpa (and Kaniska) will further Buddhism.”’ Cf. the French translation by Jean Przyluski, ‘Le nord-ouest de l’Inde dans le Vinaya des Mûla-Sarvastivaddhins et les textes apparentés’, in JA (1914), p.517, who gives a different transcription for the place-name: Youshulo 游樹羅, which does not agree with the Indian name Kharjūra (Kharjūrikâ; cf. Manjusritapatti, ed. Sasaki, Hon’yaku-mei-gi-daiji, Tokyo 1962, no.4212: pinḍa-kharjūra-vrksah) and is certainly a mistake, the T giving the right form Keshuluo 潮樹羅; K at-shye’-la (reconstruction) according to Edwin G. Pulleybank, Lexicon of Re-constructed Pronunciation in Early Middle Chinese, Late Middle Chinese, and Early Mandarin, Vancouver 1991.

\textsuperscript{30} T 2085, p.858b12 ff.

\textsuperscript{31} Song Yun’s co-traveller Huisheng 慧生 only says that Kaniska built the stūpa without giving any hint of the story: ‘There is the Queli-stūpa built 200 years after the Buddha’s Nirvāṇa by the king Kaniska...’ (Beiwei-seng-Huisheng-shi-xiu-ji 北魏僧慧生使西域記, T 2087, p.868b73 f.)

\textsuperscript{32} Yi-t’ung Wang, A Record of Buddhist Monasteries in Lo-yang, by Yang Hsüan-chih, Princeton 1984, p.239, n.177, emends to erbai ‘200’, with the quotation from the 7th-cent. encyclopedia Fayuan-zhulin 法苑珠林, for which I do not see any need, because most Chinese texts referring to the date of Kaniska in relation to the Parinirvāṇa of the Buddha do give higher numbers, Song Yun’s 300 years being the lowest; cf. Mizutani Shinjō, Daitō-saikiki, Tokyo 1971: 水谷真成 大唐西域記, 東京 (中國古典文學大系), 85b f., n.3.
appeared. The account by Daoyao says: “The boys (hovering) in
the air addressed the king with verses (gathā).” Astonished at
the boys’ action the king built a stūpa to shelter (the little
stūpa). The stūpa built of dung extended and grew high out (of
the king’s stūpa), 400 chi above the earth – then it stopped.
The king broadened the foundation of (his) stūpa to about 300
paces. The account by Daoyao says: “about 390 paces.” From
there on the constructed tree [= pillar] began to match (the
little stūpa). ... After the donation (of the king’s stūpa)
was accomplished, the dung-stūpa stayed three paces east
to the south of the large stūpa (in the same way) as at the beginning.”

The most extensive version is – as usual – found in Xuan-zang’s
‘Records of the Western World’, Xīyǔ-jī (XI) 西域記:

‘King Kanishka, in the fourth century after the Parimāvatī of the
Tathāgata, ascended the throne and ruled over Jambudvīpa. He
did not believe (in the retribution of) wrong and right deeds
and scorned the Buddha. Once, when he was crossing a grass-
covered marsh, he saw a white hare. He followed it but when he
had almost caught up with it (the hare) disappeared. (Then the
king) saw a little shepherd-boy who built a stūpa between the
trees, about three chi high. The king said: “What are you doing
there?” The shepherd-boy answered: “Formerly, the Sākyamuni
Buddha with his sacred wisdom made the following prophecy:
There will be a king in this country who will construct a
stūpa on this blessed land, collect a lot of my relics and will
enclose them in the (stūpa). The great king in his former
existences had amassed much merit. (He) has really met (the
right) time. Therefore I tell you now (of what the Buddha has
said) before.” After having spoken (the boy) suddenly
disappeared. The king, hearing those words, was more
and more delighted (and was) proud that his name was in the
great sacred prophecy. So deep faith arose (in him) and he revered

highly the Buddhist Dharma. He built a stūpa of stone around
the small stūpa and wanted to close it with force over (the small
one). (However,) adapting (its size) exactly (to the large stūpa)
the small (stūpa) stood always three chi higher (than the large
one). Through (continuous) heightening (the stūpa) grew up to
400 chi. At the foundation (the stūpa) measured one and a half
li in circumference. (When the stūpa) had reached five storeys
and every storey was) 150 chi high, (the king finally) succeeded
in covering the small stūpa. ... When the construction work
was finished half of the body of the small stūpa appeared at the
southeast corner of the big foundation. The king was displeased
and had it destroyed. Thereupon they stopped at the second
level of the (large) stūpa, (but) half the small stūpa appeared
again at its former place. Then the king refrained (from trying
to destroy the small stūpa) and sighed: “It is easy to fault in human
matters, (but) divine powers are difficult to resist. How should
(I) be annoyed?” After that he repented, resigned and went
back to the capital. The two stūpas are still visible to this day.”

That this legend was not restricted to the Chinese pilgrims’
accounts – creating the possibility that one pilgrim had copied the
story from another and eventually embellished it – and to the
region of the site of the stūpa proper is shown by the fact that even
a Khotanese version with a Sanskrit introduction was found in a
manuscript which Paul Pelliot had acquired in Dunhuang 敦煌
(P.2787) and had been translated and published by H.W. Bailey.
This version runs almost parallel to that reported by Xuanzang
except for the number of boys, being four as in the account by
Song Yun. The two accounts probably date from the same time,
showing that the legend was known beyond the boundaries of
India.

The differences in the three (respectively four) versions are
due to a process of extension which I have labelled elsewhere as
‘inflating legends’ (Schwelllegende)\(^3\), which means that in some

33 Again, there is no need to follow the emendation to sanbái-bu 300 pace: (Fayuan-zhulin) made by Wang, A Record... op. cit., p.240, n.183; Faxian and Xuanzang do not give distances but emphasise that the little stūpa was adjacent to the large one.
34 T 2092, p.1021a25 ff. [details of the construction omitted].
cases we can observe the addition of motives and details to one and the same legend reported in sources — mainly the Chinese pilgrim records but also translations of the legends into languages other than Indian — over the course of a few centuries. In the case of the Kaniṣka-stūpa most of the features of the legends are already there in the oldest version reported by Faxian. However, he does not indicate the material with which the little boy constructed his small stūpa-model. Moreover, since a source like the Shuijing-zhu 水經注, the ‘Commentary on the Water Classics’ by Li Daoyuan 麗道元, itself depending heavily on the GFZ and other itineraries and works earlier than the GFZ, does mention the material, it seems unlikely that this theme was not yet part of the legend. Xuanzang’s version relies heavily on Song Yun which becomes even more evident when clear references to Daosheng and Song Yun are made in the biography of Xuanzang in the Xugao-seng-zhuán 續高僧傳 (ZGSZ).

38 ‘There is also a country Purusa(pura). The lord of the gods, Śakra, took the shape of a little cowherd boy, amassed earth and built a Buddha-stūpa. According to the king of the land (dharmarāja: Kaniṣka) made a large stūpa, which is called (one of the) four “Great Stūpas” [?].’ (ed. Wang Guo-wel, Shuijing-zhuixiao, Taipei 1987, p.31王國維,水經注校, 台北). Luciano Petech, Northern India According to the Shui-Ching-Chu, Rome 1950, p.59, thinks that this passage is an abridged version of Faxian’s account, but this cannot be for two reasons: it differs from the GFZ in detail of indicating the material in and the Shuijing-zhu continues with a direct and marked-as-such (法顯傳曰: ...) citation from the GFZ on the Buddha’s alms bowl at Puruṣāpurā.


40 On these sources, see Petech, Northern India... op. cit., p. 4 ff. The passage cited could be a paraphrase from the lost Shishihui-zhi 釋氏西域志, attributed to the famous Shi Daosan 釋道安, which, after the GFZ, is the main source of the Shuijing-zhu.

41 T 2059, p.448c: ‘To the east of the city, there is the great stūpa of King Jiani (Kaniṣka). The foundation measures one jin and a half of the Buddha... In the stūpa is one hu of bone-relics (śarīra) of the Buddha... This (stūpa) is known in the world as the Quelí-stūpa. Empress-Dowager Hu of the North Wei (dynasty) in deep belief despatched the śramaṇa Daosheng and others, gave them a large banner, about 700 chi long, to go there and hang it on (the stūpa). This is

Consequently, two main versions of the legend of the stūpa can be discerned: the one found in the MSV which only relates the prediction of the Buddha’s reincarnation, and others (Faxian, Sung Yun, Xuanzang) focusing on how the stūpa was actually built by Kaniṣka. To decide which is the original version and which has been changed later, it would be instructive to think about the function of the legend. Why was it important that Kaniṣka built a stūpa (and a vihāra), and why did this have to be foreseen by the Buddha? What is the role of the stūpa, and why did it have to be connected to the episode of the stūpa built of mud by boys or a boy?

To begin with an answer to the first question: building a stūpa was important because this was what the prototype Buddhist ruler

exactly the stūpa (described). It is not possible to give the reason for the name Queli. The biography of Xuanzang, the Datang-Dacien-si-sanzang-fashi-zhuàn 大唐大慈恩寺三藏法師傳, does not give any further details on the stūpa: ‘8 or 9 li outside the city [Puruṣāpurā], there is a Pipal-tree... Beside it there is another great stūpa, which is the one King Kaniṣka had built’ (T 2035, p.230a).

42 This is also the version of the legend which was transposed to the famous Indo-Greek king Menandros / Milinda by Kṣemendra, the Kāśmirian author of the Aśvadānakalpatātā: chapter 57; (Śūpadāvadānam, ‘Legend of the Stūpas’, ed. P.L. Vaidya, Avadāna-Kalpatātā of Kṣemendra, Darbhanga 1959, II, p.341 f., l.28 f.); ‘13. Then the “Well-gone” (sugata: the Buddha) with his followers reached the village of Patala and delivered a noble speech on the Law to a householders called Potala. 14. He reached purification through the attainment of the moral commandments accepted by the “Well-gone” and had a stūpa of his (the Buddha’s) hair, nails and small portions of the body erected. 15. The Venerable said to Indra, who had come to see the place: “In this region a stūpa will be erected”. ’ Cf. Lamotte, History... op. cit., p.426. This shift from Kaniṣka to Menandros shows how constant and virulent these patterns and clichés of ‘Buddhist rulership’ were: they could even be shifted from a recent king to a former one.

had done: Aśoka. It is quite clear from the evidence of the legends 44 that Kanīśka was at least seen by the Buddhists not referring to what he considered himself – as a second Aśoka 45. To become a Buddhist cakravartin or a world-ruler, 46 he had to act according to the patterns of the Aśoka legend and that is how he is actually described: like Aśoka he first does not follow the Buddhist Dharma, like Aśoka he had a famous Buddhist teacher, the bodhisattva-poet Aśvaghosa. Consequently he also had to start his Dharma-reign by doing what Aśoka had done as a cakravartin: by building a stūpa. 47 The difference between the two rulers – at least for the tradition – is that Aśoka erected 84,000 stūpas and Kanīśka built only a single one 48, but a great one 49. That the actual

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44 Unfortunately, no vita or partial vita of the Kuśāna king has survived in an Indian language – if there was one at all. All our major sources are in Chinese with some minor ones in Tibetan.

45 Succeeding rulers of the northwest area (Gandhāra) even claimed him as their ancestor, as can be seen in the report by Wu Kong: ‘The king [of Gandhāra, called Rulūsoa 如羅麤] is a descendant of the ancient king Kanīśka’ (T 2089, p. 980a18). A monograph on the history of the legend of Aśoka and its functioning in the relationship between Saṅgha and state or ruler in Buddhist countries in Asia is still a desideratum; the content of one of the first chapters would certainly have been an investigation of the dependence of the Kanīśka legend on the Aśoka legend.

46 For an early reference to Kanīśka as a world-ruler (dīrgha 地主 = kṣitiśvāra) see Sūtrālaṃkāra, T 201, p. 272a19 ff.; trans. Huber, op. cit., p.80 ff. The setting in the beginning of this story recalls the legend of the Kanīśka-stūpa: Kanīśka, being on his way to Kaniskapura (Jinžha-cheng 華尼托城, originally Purusa-pura?) meets 500 [Buddhist stereotype number] begging boys (qier 乞兒) asking for a donation. For a discussion of cakravartin ideas in Kuśāna art see Giovanni Verardi, ‘The Kuśāna Emperors as Cakravartins – Dynastic Art and Cult in India and Central Asia...’ in East and West 33 (1983), pp.225-94 (with an appendix by Alessandro Grosso).

47 It is of some significance that in the Khotanese version of the legend the stūpa is called dharmarājikā, which is the well-known term used by the Aśoka legend (Skt, Divy) for the 84,000 stūpas the Mauryan emperor had built.

48 In Tāranathā’s history the activities of Kanīśka (Kanika) are extended to the building of four temples (originally stūpas?) in one in each direction; cf. Lama Chimpa & Alaka Chattopadhyaya, Tāranathā’s History of Buddhism in India, Delhi 1990, p.131.

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Shāh-Ji-Kī Dheri stūpa was really intended to be a symbolic replication of Aśoka’s stūpa-building is quite probable, based on the facts that it was important for Kanīśka to enshrine a relic of the Buddha and that the building is called a dharmarājikā, a name for the stūpas built by Aśoka. The stūpa was, as Song Yun 50 and his co-travellers Huisheng 51 and Faxian inform us, considered the most important and greatest one in the realms of the West.

If it is now clear why it was so important for Kanīśka to erect a stūpa, one may try to ask the subsequent question concerning the role of the legend. It is evident that the story is an aetiological one: it is intended to explain how Kanīśka came to build the stūpa. And, to go a step further, it is also possible to show how the story came into existence by arranging patterns again taken from the legend of Aśoka. Both legends belong to the same type of

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49 This is also what the king Kṛkin is said to have done in the age of the Buddhas Kāśyapa: Stūpa-laksāna (ed. G. Roth, ‘Edition of the Stūpa-laksāna-kārikā vivecanā) Including the Prakīrtīkā-caitya-laksāna in Bhikkhu Tampalawela Dhammaratana & Bhikkhu Pāsādika (ed.), Dhammadātā. Melanges offerts au Vénérable Thich Huyén-Vi, Paris 1997, p.214, §§ 6, 7): Vihārī-śa-hasatrayūṣa-prajāyāyam Bhagavatāḥ Kāśyapanāya Kanīśkā rājāḥ stūpāḥ kṛtaḥ... Cakravitāni bhūtēmanam mayam... stūpam kṛtaṁ iti. Roth (n.51) also refers to a similar passage in the Mahāvastu (ed. E. Senart, Le Mahāvastu, Paris 1882, I, p.60 ff.) where the cakravartin Dhraddhamu is said to have built a stūpa for the Tathāgata Aparajitadhvaja; both passages show that building a stūpa for the Buddha of his period was considered as a characteristic feature of a world-ruler. This is perfectly in line with the instructions of the Buddha in the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra that lay people should be concerned with the worship of the relics in the stūpa, the king being the layman of highest rank; cf. Gustav Roth, ‘Symbolism of the Buddhist Stūpa according to the Tibetan version of the Caitya-viḥāga-vinayadhiṣṭhāvā-sūtra, the Sanskrit treatise Stūpa-laksāna-kārikā-vivecanā, and a corresponding passage in Kuladatta’s Kriyāsangrahā, in Dallapiccola et al., The stūpa... op. cit., p.183; it should be mentioned that Roth sees in this text the oldest stūpa-reference in the Buddhist Canon, where a kind of symbolisation drawn from universal kingship can be clearly recognised. Which would make the responsibility of a cakravartin for the construction of the stūpa(s) the more understandable.

50 Huisheng (see note 51).

51 T 2087b6 f.: ‘This stūpa is considered to be the first in the western regions.’
Buddhist prediction-stories which Strong characterises with the attribute ex post facto. The prototype of the prophecy performed by the Buddha about a person who would become a Buddhist king (dharmaraja) is certainly found in the so-called Pāññāpradānāvadāna, the ‘Avadāna of the Donation of Dirt’, of the Aśokāvadāna (Sanskrit) which will be given in the translation by John Strong:

‘Soon the Blessed One came to the main road where two little boys were playing at building houses in the dirt’. One of them was the son of a very prominent family and was named Jaya, while the other was the son of a somewhat less prominent family and was named Vijaya. Both of them saw the Buddha whose appearance is very pleasing, his body adorned with the thirty-two marks of the Great Man. And young Jaya, thinking to himself “I will give him some ground meal,” threw a handful of dirt into the Buddha’s begging bowl. Vijaya approved of this by making an añjali. As it is said: He saw the greatly compassionate Self-Existent Lord whose body radiated a halo a fathom wide; his faith affirmed, and with a resolute face, he offered some dirt to the One who brings an end to birth and old age. After presenting this offering to the Blessed One, Jaya then proceeded to make the following wish (prāṇidhāna): “By this root of good merit, I would become king and, after placing the earth under a single umbrella of sovereignty, I would pay homage to the Blessed Buddha.” The compassionate Sage immediately perceived the boy’s character, and recognizing the sincerity of his resolve, he saw that the desired fruit would be attained because of his field of merit. He therefore accepted the proffered dirt, and the seed of merit that was to ripen into Aśoka’s kingship was planted. The Blessed One then displayed his smile...

The Venerable Ananda, making an añjali, then said to the Buddha: “Blessed One, it is not without cause nor without reason [that the Tathāgatas display the smile: why therefore has the Blessed One done so?]” And he added this stanza: ... O foremost of men, whose speech is like thunder, whose appearance is like that of the best of bulls, reveal what will be the fruit of the gift of dirt! The Blessed One said: “You are right, Ananda, completely enlightened Tathāgata Arhats do not display their smile gratuitously; rather they do so for both a cause and a reason. Ananda, do you see that boy who threw a handful of dirt into the Tathāgata’s bowl? ” “Yes, Bhadanta.” “Because of that meritorious deed, Ananda, one hundred years after the Tathāgata has attained parinirvāṇa, that boy will become a king named Aśoka in the city of Pāṭaliputra. He will be a righteous dharmanā, a cakravartin who rules over one of the four continents, and he will distribute my bodily relics far and wide and build eight-four thousand dharmanākās. This he will undertake for the well being of many people.” And he added: After I die there will be an emperor; his name will be Aśoka and his fame widespread. He will adorn Jambudvīpa with

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52 John Strong, The Legend and Cult of Upagupta. Sanskrit Buddhism in North India and Southeast Asia, Princeton 1992, repr. Delhi 1994, p.24; these stories differ from the prophecy episodes which stereotypically project the fruit of merit – becoming a Buddha, arhat, etc. – to a far future ahead.

53 The considerable popularity of the avadāna is shown by the fact that a fragmentary version – unfortunately ending before the episode discussed here: begins – is preserved in the Gilgit Buddhist manuscripts (Lokesh Chandra, Raghu Vira, Gilgit Buddhist Manuscripts (Facsimile Edition), Part 7, New Delhi 1974, pp.1508-17; cf. the synoptical table on p.5), but also by the various versions found in Buddhist narrative literature and by the depiction in Buddhist art, for which see Leo Both, Das Kapśavādāna und seine Parallelversionen im Piṇḍapātraśādāna, Berlin 1995, p.54 ff. There were at least two Chinese jīng (translations?) on these events which are now lost but registered in the oldest sūtra-catalogue, Chu-san-zang-ji, compiled by Sengyou (T 2145, p.2sb f.): Ayu-wang-hu-suobao-jing 吳王護果報經 (Sūtra on King Aśoka preserving his karma) and Ayu-wang-yu-to-suob-sheng-daijung-xi-jing 吳王於佛所生大敬信經 (Sūtra on the great reverence and belief of King Aśoka in the lifetime of the Buddha).


55 This should rather be rendered as: ‘playing with houses made of dirt’ which would include the natural translation of the compound pāṃśākāraśāla.

56 There follows a long description of the Buddha’s smile and an explanation of its meaning, which is omitted here because it does not contribute directly to the comparison of the two legends discussed here (on the Buddha’s smile, cf. Strong, The Legend... op. cit., p.62 f.).

my reliquaries and cause them to be honored by gods and men. His meritorious gift was just this: he threw a handful of dirt into the Tathāgata’s bowl. Then the Blessed One gave all the dirt to the Venerable Ānanda and said: “Mix this with some cowdung and spread it on the walkway (caṭikrama) where the Tathāgata walks.” And the Venerable Ānanda did as he was told.57

The Chinese versions, the Ayu-wang-zhuan58 and the Ayu-wang-jing59, differ only slightly from the Skt version in that the extensive passage about the smile of the Buddha is omitted.60

Also, the two Chinese pilgrims Faxian61 and Xuanzang62 allude to the story.

Comparing this plot with that of the legend of the Kaniska-stūpa, at first glance there seems no connection. This opinion, however, is not quite correct if one analyses both stories in the light of their historical contexts – the Aśokavādāna63 being certainly en vogue if not composed in the era of Kaniska – and especially in the light of the ‘symbolic semantics’ of the stūpa. It should first be kept in mind that the stūpa in India was conceived as an overturned alms-bowl64, allowing it to be identified


58 Translated by An Faqin 安法欽 of the Western Jin dynasty (end 3rd cent.); T 2042, p.99b9 ff., Ben-shitu-yuan 本施士緣/Avadāna of the gift of dirt’. Here, the two boys are building a whole city (tsing 成) with houses (shezhai 舍宅) and granaries (cang 倉) filled with gruel (qiu 糬), all made of dirt. The extension in the Chinese versions (see also below) explaining that the dirt was intended to be rice or grain by the boy seems to be based on practical considerations, explaining why somebody would give dirt as a donation.

59 Translated by Saghābhara (?)/Sengjiapulo 僧伽婆羅 of the Liang dynasty (beginning of 6th cent.); T 2043, p.131c9 ff. Here it is only after having seen the Buddha that little Jáya gives him sand (sha 沙) intended to be gruel (qiu 糬).

60 Cf. also the version in the Chinese ‘Sūtra of the Wise and the Fool’, Xianyu-jing 賢愚經 (story no.17: Ashujia-shitu-pin 阿輸迦施土品/ *Aśokapāṃśupratidāna-parvarta), T 292, p.368c5 ff., translated by Huïjao 慧覺 (mid-5th cent.): a group of boys is playing in the street forming – as in the Ayu-wang-zhuan – granaries and grains of dirt. Seeing the Buddha walking along, the desire arises in one of the boys to donate a handful of dirt-grain. He climbs on the shoulders of one of his comrades and the Buddha receives the donation in his alms-bowl. The Buddha then instructs Ánanda that he should smear the dirt on the wall of his cell in the Jetavana, explaining to him that the boy would become a world-ruler. The story then goes one step further when the Buddha explains the merit of the boy in a former life by serving another Buddha, relativising the function of the donation of dirt. This story was definitely the model for the late Chinese text referred to by Strong, The Legend… op. cit., p.65.

61 T 2085, p.863b23 ff.: ‘King Aśoka once was a little boy playing in the street. He met the Buddha Sākyamuni begging for alms. The little boy was delighted and donated to the Buddha a handful of earth. The Buddha accepted it (threw it) back into the dust (and) walked over the ground. As a result of that deed (the boy) became an Iron-Wheel-King and ruled over Jambudvīpa.’

62 XI 8, ed. Ji, p.631: ‘The Arhat (Upagupta) said: “The great king, by his power of merit, (will) occupy a hundred spirits (vākahī), by his generous vow, to protect the three treasures (triratna) – that is what he has vowed and now is the time (to fulfil it).” Therefore (he told) him extensively that his gift of earth (to the Buddha) was the reason for the Tathāgata’s prophecy that he would re- build the stūpa.’

63 This is not necessarily the same version as that found in Divy.; the Chinese versions do already point to the fact that there were differences in details, episodes and wording.

64 Cf. the remarks by G. Roth in 1. and 2. of his Introduction to his edition of the Stūpa-jāktṣa-kaṁkilā-vivecanam, pp.205-7. The description of the stūpa conceived as an alms-bowl upside down found in the text edited by Roth are: § 16 (p.217: pāṭrākṛti) and § 23 (p.219: tat-pāṭrākāraṁ sāṅkāryāṁ) ‘Its [the stūpa’s] form of an alms-bowl (means calmness)’. For the Chinese Vinayas, see Bareaux, ‘La construction…’, op. cit., p.234. There are other vessels (kumbhā, ghāta, kalasā, Th. bunt-pa) or instruments (ghanṭā or gāndhī) with which the dome of the stūpa is compared or denoted. The connection of the donations of dirt and the stūpa was already stressed by Paul Mus, Barabudur, esquisse d’un histoire du Bouddhisme fondée sur la critique archéologique des textes, Hanoi 1935, repr. New York 1978, II, p.288 f.; it is finally, in a slightly different context, found as a formula in the supplementary Sanskrit text of the Mahāpātri-nirvānasūtra, with parallels in the Divyāvadāna and the Mulasarvāstivādin Vinaya, where it is said that huge amounts of gold do not have the same value.
symbolically as the Buddha’s presence even when there was no relic enshrined. Exactly this aspect of Buddha-worship by means of a stūpa, seen as an alms-bowl turned upside down, is found in Xuanzang’s account in connection with the two merchants Bhallika and Trapuṣa.

‘Once, (when) the Tathāgata had (just) attained Buddhahood, he rose (from under) the Bodhi-tree and went to the Deer Park [mṛgadāva in Benares]. At that time two merchant-leaders (śresthīn) were stricken by the brilliant light, followed it to its origin and finally gave boiled rice (sweetened with) honey to the Buddha. The Honoured One explained the to them the merit (which) men and gods (can achieve) and they were the first ones to ask for the five rules [śīla of the layman] and the ten good conducts. After they received the teaching of the Dharma they asked (him to give them something) which they could venerate, and the Tathāgata subsequently gave them his hair and nails. The two merchant-leaders wanted to return to their country and asked (the Buddha to explain with which) ceremonies (they should) honour (the relics). The Tathāgata spread his sanghāti rectangularly on the ground, then his uttaraśāṅgha, (then) his samkāsamkāt. Further, he turned his alms-bowl upside down, put his staff upright on it, and consequently built a stūpa (of those items). The two accepted these orders (for building a stūpa), returned to their (home-) cities and erected (a monument) of veneration according to the instructions of the Holy One. This was the first stūpa in the period of the Dharma of Śākya (muni).

The whole episode of Jaya throwing a handful of dirt into the of merit as a pradaksinā around a stūpa with the relics of the Buddha, as donating a clod of earth (or mud, mrtukapiṇḍa) to the stūpa (Waldschmidt, ‘Der Buddha preist’, op. cit., p.424).

For the stūpa as a symbol of the Buddha’s presence, see e.g. Roth, ‘Symbolism of the Stūpa’, op. cit., p.186 f.


66 Reported as an insertion in connection with Bactria / Fühe-guo 縱喝國, XI 1, ed. Ji, p.122. The story is not known from other texts.

Buddha’s alms-bowl seems to represent the stūpas which he is to build in his future existence as King Aśoka and as a Buddhist cakravartin, the dirt being the material prescribed unanimously by the Chinese Vinaya translations and the bowl indicating the form of the stūpa (see above). The symbolism was adequately put into words by Paul Mus, even if one does not follow his almost transcendentally cosmological approach: ‘La scène du don de la Terre préfigurait ainsi par tous ses détails la construction du stūpa royal: elle symbolisait le don du monde, mais sous la forme symbolique du don architectural; elle annonçait le stūpa; c’était le symbole d’un stūpa.

In this context the throwing of dirt into the Buddha’s bowl – which is explicitly the cause for the Buddha’s prediction of Aśoka’s building of dharma-rājikā-stūpas in the future and his future status as a cakravartin – can be seen as running parallel with the

68 See Barea, ‘La construction...’ op. cit., p.232. The Mahāśāsaka and Dharmaguptaka Vinayas have the Buddha and his followers form the first stūpa by means of balls of dirt which, the Buddha declares, is more precious than gold or jewelry: ibid., p.259 f.

69 In this context it should be remembered that Jaya intended to donate the dirt as food and it should also be mentioned that the Theravādin and Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinayas prohibited the shaping of food as a stūpa, a rule which presupposes that this could be and actually had been done with the help of a bowl.

70 Mus, Barabudur, op. cit., p.289. By citing Mus – note bene – I do not dismiss Strong’s objection against the French scholar’s analysis and his own interpretation (op. cit., p.67) of the gift of dirt as bearing ‘negative and impure connotations’ and the ‘ambiguity of the episode’. But in the context of the Kaniṣka-story the gift of dirt certainly was taken as a symbol of donation given with ‘purity of intent’ (Strong, op. cit., p.64) and of the great karmic effect of the donor becoming a cakravartin – so strong was this idea that Kaniṣka trying to construct his stūpa had problems in competing with the stūpa of dirt, as can be seen in the stories of the Chinese pilgrims.

71 See the interesting statement of the Stūpa-lakṣaṇa (ed. Roth, p.210, §3.1): Dānam prthivī (trans. Roth: ‘The ground [represents] the gift (of a munificent donor’). Here the ground (prthivī) for a stūpa is the first step on the Buddhist way to perfection, beginning with generosity in donations (dāna) and ending with the Nirvāṇa. In the context of this equation the first step for Jaya on his way to becoming a future cakravartin, the ruler of the earth (prthivī), would
building of a stūpa of mud or dung by the boy, causing Kaniska to build his stūpa. The difference is that Kaniska has no story of former birth and that is the reason that the handling of dirt had to be transferred to the present time of Kanisha – a feature which the MSV takes back by re-transposing the building of the stūpa(s) to the present of the Buddha.

There is, however, one difference which makes it difficult to accept the Asoka story in the form preserved as a direct model for the Kanisha legend. It is the pranidhāna of Jaya, the Asoka-to-be, to become a world-ruler (cakravartin). Analysing the Asokāvadana, hints can be found that there was an older version with a simpler plot, which would eliminate all the illogical parts of the plot. It begins with the fact that there are two boys; only Jaya, the ‘victor’, plays a role in the plot, his counterpart, Vijaya, is of inferior origin and shows his secondary position even by his name, being a derivation with the same meaning as the former.

consequently be the donation of earth (prthiviḥ); this is exactly the way in which the motive has been taken up in Buddhist narrative literature (see Roth, ‘Symbolism of the Stūpa’, op. cit., p.54 ff.). This interpretation is in line with the pranidhāna performed by Jaya according to which the future cakravartin will be ‘king of the earth under one parasol’ (ekachetrāyam prthivyaṁ rajasyam). Even if the construction of stūpas is not mentioned here – the boy could not know what was necessary to become a cakravartin – the terminology (prthiviḥ, chaṭra) seems to indicate what the Buddha expresses in his prophecy: to become a dharmarāja / cakravartin, stūpas must be built.

\[\text{2}^\text{nd} \text{that the versions could be seen as belonging together may be found expressed by the} \ \text{Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra, Ch.2 (ed. Kern, Nanjo, p.501.11 ff.) where the donation or dedication of stūpas made of sand to the Buddha is ascribed to several boys: sikhātāmyān vā puna kūṭa kriyā ye kecid uddhisā āvinā stupaṁ; kumārakāh krūḍjā tatra tatra te sarvā bhuddhā abhūhā lābhāsam.}\]

\[\text{3}^\text{rd} \text{it is quite possible that the conception of Asoka as a cakravartin influenced the choice of this name standing in close semantic and formal connection with the Buddha’s epithet Jina also found in the text edited by Roth (see above).}\]

Vijaya may well have been introduced into the story as a kind of reflection of the future Asoka’s two sides, the dichotomy represented in the figure of his brother Vitaśoka, who has to be converted from his belief in heretic teachings to the Buddhist Dharma by Asoka, or in the early phase of Asoka’s life when he himself was called Candaśoka, ‘Asoka the Fierce’. This dichotomy would have been expressed by Jaya, the ‘victor’ and Vijaya, the ‘loser’, the interpretation of the last name not being usual but theoretically possible (see the use of vi- in Jakob Wackernagel, Albert Debrunner, Althindische Grammatik, Bd II.1, Einleitung zur Wortlehre-Nominalkomposition, Göttingen 1957, p.261) and in the context shown by the translation of the names of the boys in the Ayu-wang-chuan (T 2042, p.99b9 f.): ‘the first was called “virtue-victory” (Desheṣh [Desheng], ... the second was called “non-victory” (Wūshēng [無勝]) ...’, and by the glosses in the Ayu-wang-jung (T 2043, p.131e11 f.): ‘Sheye / Jaya is translated as “victory” ... Pishye / Vijaya is translated as “non-victory” ...’. By the revelations of Pinḍalūa Bhāradvāja later in the Asokāvadana it becomes clear that Vijaya was supposed to be Asoka’s future minister Radhagupta (see Strong, The Legend... op. cit., p.263), giving him a karmic prospect in the whole plot. That his role was not fixed can be seen in the version of the Xianyū-jing (see above), where it is the little boy on whose shoulder Asoka-to-be is mounting to donate the dirt who will become Asoka’s minister. In texts such as the Sūtrakārakāra which only allude to the story, there is never mention of a second person besides Asoka: ‘... therefore by (a small donation), in the future uncountable merit is achieved as (was done) by King Asoka as he gave earth with a pure heart’ (T 210, p.280a18 ff.; cf. the Huber trans., p.122).

\[\text{Strong, The Legend... op. cit., p.61. In the Theravāda tradition it is only the pranidhāna that has ‘survived’, the Buddha being reduced to some Pratyaekabuddha (P. paccakasattabuddha) of the past, Asoka (P. Asoka) to a honey-trader; cf. Wilhelm Geiger (ed.) The Mahāvastu, London 1958 (PTS), p.34, 549, trans. id., The Mahāvamsa or the Great Chronicle of Ceylon, London 1964 (PTS), I, p.30: “Now once, in time past, there were three brothers, traders in honey; one was used to sell the honey, two to get the honey. A certain paccakebuddu was sick; and another paccakebuddu, who, for his sake wished for honey, came even then to the city on his usual way for seeking alms... The trader, with believing heart, gave to the buddha who came there a bowlful of honey, so that it ran over the edge. As he saw the honey filling (the bowl) and flowing over the edge, and streaming down to the ground, he, full of faith, wished: “May I, for this gift, come by the undivided sovereignty of Jambudipa, and may my command reach forth a yojana (upward) into the air and (downward) under the earth... Asoka was he who gave the honey... “. Cf. the dis-
tions of the Aśokāvadāna seems to be to create a worldly counterpart to the Buddha – in other words: to create from Aṣoka what the Buddha did not become because he had chosen the religious path: a morally true king (dharmanā) – it was necessary to give to that individual the same meritorious acts (punyakarman) and vows (pranidhāna) as to the Buddha. What may be concluded from these observations is that the original pattern of the legend was perhaps void of the pranidhāna and gave only the prediction (vyākaraṇa) of the Buddha, as is known from other examples so frequent in Buddhist literature and which can be found, a little distorted, in the prophecy of Kaniṣka in the MSV. That this was really the case can be proved because there is no other (earlier) version of the Aśokāvadāna available, but it can be made plausible by that fact the Pindolā Bhāradvāja, when he relates the episode to Aṣoka, does not mention the pranidhāna but only the prophecy by the Buddha.16 Finally, the insertion of the pranidhana scene can be demonstrated by the strange narrative of the story: if the motif of the pranidhāna is eliminated from the plot17 it not only


cussion of the story by Strong, op. cit., p.66 ff. It is clear from the structure of this legend that it was remodelled, according to faulty patterns: three brothers, the younger (Aṣoka) being the virtuous one – the other two scold the younger brother for having given the honey to the Pratyekabuddha –, and substituting the concrete Sākyamuni by Pratyekabuddhas of an undetermined past. And even the Pratyekabuddhas are not behaving like ‘classical’ solitary Pratyekabuddhas: one of them is taking care of the others, a feature which runs contrary to a normal Pratyekabuddha’s behaviour.

16 Notice that the Stūpa-laksana text ranks the cakravartin before the arhat (Roth, p.210, [26]): Arhanta Cakravartissa Prayikeça Sa Jīnānā.

17 Divy, p.402.13 ff. (trans, Strong, p.263 ff.; ‘Finally, great king, I was right there when, long ago, as a child, you threw a handful of dirt into the bowl of the Blessed One who had come to Rājaţgṛha for alms, thinking that you would offer him some ground meal. Rādhagupta approved of your act, and the Blessed One predicted that one hundred years after his parinirvāna, you would become a king named Aṣoka in the city of Pātaliputra, that you would be a righteous dharmanā, a cakravartin ruling over one of the four continents, and that you would distribute his reliquaries far and wide and build the eighty-four thousand-chaṅghājīkās.”).

18 This is supported by the other version in Buddhist literature where no pranidhāna is found.

omits difficulties in the logic of the story, such as the Buddha’s having to realise the future of the boy although Jaya had just announced his pranidhāna with exactly the same content and Ananda’s having to ask the Buddha to explain the meaning of the donation and the Buddha asking – superfluously – Ananda if he had seen the boy donating the handful of dirt before performing his prophecy. Moreover, the story becomes smoother and narratively more consistent with the following sequence: boy makes a donation of dirt to the Buddha – the Buddha smiles and makes his prophecy which is at the same time a kind of karmic reward for the future. The little boy in the Kaniṣka legend could then be interpreted as having been moulded according to the boy Jaya who, supplied with some of the main features of the Pāṃsūparṇāvadāna, acts as a kind of reminder and messenger of the prophecy (vyākaraṇa) by the Buddha, admonishing Kaniṣka to fulfil his duty as a cakravartin: to build a stūpa.

Furthermore, the Aṣokāvadāna also seems to supply an origin for the fact that the model for the Kaniṣka-stūpa is constructed of dirt in most cases but of manure in the legend reported by Song Yun. The direct connection is the scene in which the Buddha asks Ananda to mix the earth of Jaya’s donation with cow dung and to scatter it on the path he is walking on. It is not clear what this
theme is meant to express\(^8\), but if the story was really the model for the Kaniska legend it appears at least plausible that there is an uncertainty as to whether the stupa was built of dirt or of dung. Finally, there is the possibility that the Skt word for dirt, or dust, pāṃśu, in the Aṣokāvadāna was interpreted as manure\(^9\) in the process of making the Kaniska story — the more because cow dung was really part of the story, being mixed with dirt by Ananda.

The pāṃśupradāna, the ‘donation of dirt’, performed by Aṣoka into the pātra of the Buddha was obviously used in a transformed shape in the Buddhist symbolic scenario connected with Kaniska: the donation of dirt became the building of a stupa of dirt because in the prophecy by the Buddha this donation was given as the karmic reason for Aṣoka’s constructing of the dharmarājikā-stupas and thereby becoming a caṇkravartin in the Buddhist sense\(^10\); seen in the light of the Aṣoka legend the constructing of a stupa of dirt was a clear hint for Kaniska to act like his pre-decessor. It is quite reasonable then to connect the bringing of the Buddha’s alm-bowl to Puruṣapura by the Kuśāna ruler with the same episode of the Aṣokāvadāna in which the bowl played such an important role.

To go back to the very first question concerning which of the two versions is the original one: in the light of the considerations above it seems clear that the MSV presents us with a secondary type of story in reducing the plot to the lifetime of the Buddha but transferring the theme of the boy’s (or boys’) building of stupas of mud or manure to a level of narrative time where it makes absolutely no sense, the boy(s) and the motif of mud or manure having nothing to do with Kaniska at all. This transposition and the restriction of the narrative time (lifetime of the Buddha) may well have been influenced by the Aṣokāvadāna (see above).

One point which still needs to be discussed is the somewhat strange name of the stupa found first in Song Yun’s account: Quelī-ta(雀離塔).\(^8\) It would be a marginal point if the name were restricted to that one text, but it occurs in Chinese translations of Buddhist literature before Song Yun’s travel account. The fact

81 This feature recalls the famous story of the Buddha Śākyamuni who in a former life spread his hair for his predecessor Dipaṃkarā, made a vow to become a Buddha in the future and received — as a kind of affirmation — the prediction from Dipaṃkarā which seems to be supported by the fact that the version of the pāṃśupradāna in the Nepalese Piṇḍapātraṇavadāna is actually placed in the lifetime of this Buddha; see both, Das Kapiśavādana... op. cit., p.58, who considers the discrepancy between the donation of dirt and a normal alms-giving as consistent for all versions. Strong — following Mukhopadhyaya — assumes that the manure with which Ananda mixes the dirt is a symbol for purity. In the framework of the Aṣokāvadāna the donation of dirt is interpreted by Upagupta as the reason for Aṣoka’s ugliness: Divy, p.388 f., trans. Strong, p.234 f.

82 Cf. Ralph Turner, A Comparative Dictionary of the Indo-Aryan Languages, London 1966, p.452b, no.8019, s.v., with the meaning ‘dung, manure’ for both Skt and New Indo-Aryan languages (e.g. Kāśmiri, Oriyā, Hindi) and the reference to pāśī (op. cit., p.459b, no.8139), ‘dry cowdung, manure’. Modern languages and the special meaning ‘fertilizer’ (in O. Böhtlingk, R. Roth, Sanskrit-Wörterbuch, St Petersburg 1855-75, IV, p.620, s.v. pāṃśu) 2) seem to indicate a ‘non-classical’, maybe originally euphemistic meaning ‘dung, manure’ of the word. This may also be supported by the analysis given for pāṃśu by Yaska, Nīrūka 12.19: ... pannāḥ sērata iti vā... (or, “fallen down (pāṃśu) lies”...) which does not really fit the meaning ‘dust, dirt’ but rather on a realistic background to the meaning ‘dung’. Both, Das Kapiśavādana... op. cit., p.54, speaks of a ‘Gemisch aus Lehmm, Sand, Kot u.a.’.

83 This conceptualisation of Aṣoka’s gift of the earth is clearly expressed by the

84 In Kumārajiva’s biography in the Gaoseng-zhuan 2, 高僧傳 (T 2059, p.19 f.), there is a big monastery in Kuča / Guic 雀離寺 called Quelī-dasi 雀梨大寺 which is called Quelī-dānings雀離大清寺 in a citation from the lost Shuzhixiyu 諸志西域紀 (end 4th cent.) in the Shuijing-zhu 2. This monastery is usually brought up in connection with the two monasteries called Zhaozhibu 這治處 reported by Xuanzang (XJ 1); both words and the name Quelī for the Kaniska-stūpa were explained by Paul Pelliot to be transcriptions of a Tokharian word such as *cākri or cūguri (see Tokh. cakka, cuki, sūke) meaning ‘monastery’ (vihāra); cf. Mizutani, Saiuki-ki... op. cit., p.15b, n.1. While this theory seems to fit for the Kuča monastery, it does not really explain why a stupa as famous as the Kaniska-stūpa would be denoted only by a word for monastery. It is, however, possible that the writing Quelī 雀離 in the Shuijing-zhu was a hypercorrection form (by the compiler of the Shizhi-xiyu-ji, Daos 道安 or by Li Daoyuan?) of a name like Quelī 淺離 in the Gaoseng-zhuan influenced by the knowledge that the Kaniska-stūpa bore the same name. Pelliot’s hypothesis at least makes the point that the name Quelī was a transcription.
that the Queli-si, being certainly the ‘monastery of the Queli-(stūpa)’, is found in avadāna literature beside such famous places as Čāndrakūta, Srāvastī, translated around the time of Faxian’s sojourn in India (between 401 and 405) shows that the name had a certain popularity even some time before and was well-known in the Buddhist world. But what did it mean? The first decision in analysing a Sino-Buddhist name or term has to be that of discerning if it was a transcription or a translation. In most cases this can be determined relatively easily — without enabling us necessarily to solve the subsequent question of meaning — but the example of Queli is and was a puzzling one. It can, however, be solved with the legendary background of the foundation of the stūpa and with the help of philological spadework.

First, Queli is not a translation, the binomial does not occur as an independent word in Chinese and a tentative translation such as ‘the stūpa of the oriole’ does not only neglect the second character li (lit. ‘to leave, to be separate from’) but also has no motivating support from outside the name and in connection with the aetiology of the building.

This stands firm despite the fact that Xuanzang and Yijing — the latter definitely depending on the former — report a Queli-stūpa in the precincets of the great monastery of Nālandā and give an aetiological story of the sermon of the Buddha delivered to a heretic brahmin holding a sparrow in his hand — a totally blind motif inserted into the standard theme of the Buddha converting a heretic. From the fact that this story is not known from any other Buddhist source and that the whole context of Xuanzang’s and Yijing’s report shows features of creating a sacred site of Nālandā, with visits by the Buddha and wonders, it seems possible that the story was reported by Xuanzang. It is remarkable that he does not say anything about the name of the stūpa. Yijing then, probably by the motif of the sparrow, identified it with the Queli which he certainly knew from the Chinese sources. Such a mistaking.

85 In the Za-biyu-jing 雜譬喻經 (T 207, p.522c15) translated or compiled by Daolüe 道略, avadāna no.1, and in the Zhongjing-zhuan-za-piyu 釈經撰雜譬喻 (T 208, p.535c4), said to be a compilation by Daolüe after a translation by the famous Kumārajiva, avadāna no.18. For the authorship of the two works, cf. Édouard Chavannes, Cinq cents contes et apologues extraits du Tripitaka chinois, Paris 1962, 2, p.1, n.1; Prabodh Chandra Bagchi, Le canon bouddhique en Chine. Les traducteurs et les traductions, I, Paris 1927, p.193.

86 The two collections do not give many concrete place names; the more significant it seems that the Queli-sis mentioned, in the case of T207 even in the first place. This may have something to do with the life of the compiler Daolüe, details of which are not known. The Chinese had, at least, some solid information on Gandhāra, considering the fact that in a passage from the unfortunately lost work Xiyouzhi 西域志, attributed to Shi Daoan and in this case: to be placed in the second half of the 4th century, cited in the Fayuan-zhuliu, a Chinese monastery with a stūpa founded by a Chinese envoy is mentioned in the capital (Purusapura) of the region (Jibin 捷賓 = Gandhāra): ‘In the capital of (Jibin) there is a monastery called “Chinese monastery” (Hao-si). In the east (when) the Chinese envoy (?) went there, he finally built a stūpa...’ (T 212a, p.589a2 f.).

87 Even for the Chinese the name was not clear, see the remark on the name in Xuanzang’s biography in XGSZ (cited above).

88 Cf. the remarks by Thomas Watters, On Yuan Chwang’s Travels in India (A.D. 629-645), London 1904-05, repr. Delhi 1976, I, pp.69 ff. and 207. See also Wang, A Record... op. cit., p.239, n.176: ‘The meaning of this renowned stūpa and its exact spelling remain controversial’; Iriya Yoshitaka, Rakuyo-garan-kō, Tokyo 1974, 入義園...洛陽伽藍記, 東京 p.111b, n.71: ‘...the original phonetic form of the designation Queli is unknown.’

reported by Xuanzang. It is remarkable that he does not say anything about the name of the stūpa. Yijing then, probably by the motif of the sparrow, identified it with the Quelit-ta which he certainly knew from the Chinese sources. Such a misinterpretation is not surprising as Yijing had not travelled the northwestern regions and knew this area only by hearsay.

One of the most prominent features of the legend is certainly the stūpa built of mud or dung. The differences between the sources, some mentioning mud, others dung or manure, may be explained by the influence of the Aśoka story, but it seems clear

93 Ibid, p.760: 'In the east, outside the wall and beside the tank there is the stūpa of the heretic who is holding a sparrow in his hands and asking the Buddha about the matter of life and death.'

94 ‘From there to the south-west there is a little caitya, about 10 zhang high; this is the place where a brahmin held a sparrow in his hand and asked the Buddha;’ (what is called Quelit-stūpa in the language of the Tang, is exactly this one.) (Datang-xiyu-qiufa-gaoseng-zhuan 大唐西域求法高僧傳 (XQGS), cited after the edition by Wang Bangwei, Datang-xiyu-qiufa-gaoseng-zhuan-xiaozhu, 'A commented edition of the XQGS', Beijing 1988 王邦維, 大唐西域求法高僧傳校注, 北京, p.115). It should be noticed that Yijing calls the little monument a caitya / zhidu 制底, not a stūpa, which was probably the accurate Indian term for it, which may then have caused him to insist that it was exactly this monument of which the Chinese texts speak as Quelit-stūpa.

95 Yijing got, for instance, the information about the monk Long(fa) 龍(法) who died in Gandhāra / Jianluo 簡陀羅 through monks coming from the north: ‘The dharma-master Long(fa)... reached Gandhāra, was stricken by a severe illness and finally died. That is what was heard from monks coming from the northern regions.’ (XQGS, ed. Wang, p.66).

96 On dung (P. gomaya) and mud (P. pamsu) as substances representing good luck, purity, etc., cf. Georg von Simson, ‘Etymologie des Mittel ideologischen Auseinandersetzung: Bemerkungen zum Agañānusatva des Dighanikāya’, in Peter Kosta (ed.), Studia Indogermanica et Slavica (Festgabe f. W. Thomas), Munich 1988, p.90 ff. The Khotanese version of the story has a final episode in which Kaniska’s religious teacher, the famous Asvaghosa (Asāgauṣa), shows his power to his royal pupil by having a Buddha image emanate from a ball of clay (āyusmiṇa paṇḍita) (Bailey, ‘Kanaiska’, op. cit., p.21) — unfortunately the ms. does not contain the end of the episode. An original pamsu could well have been the basis for a change to the word for ‘dung, manure’ (see above).

97 T 2092, p.1021b1 ff.: ‘(Once there was) a brahmin who did not believe that it was (a stūpa) made of dung and tried to check it with his hand. Therefore he made a hole. And although (the stūpa) was (already) some years old, the dung was not. He (tried) to fill it with incense clay, (but) did not become full. Today (the stūpa) is protected by a heavenly shrine.’


100 Cf. Turner, A Comparative Dictionary... op. cit., no.12241 атегор-, and no.12248 agherit- with reference to the entries no.4951 *chaka-, no.4952 *chakanas, no.4955 *chakara, all with the meaning ‘dung’, no.5007 *chakana, no.5008 *chakara, both meaning ‘made of dung’. For the change of *ʔ and ch in Middle Indo-Aryan, see Oskar von Hinüber, Das ältere Mittelländisch im Überblick, Vienna 1986, p.93, (§ 167).

101 The initial ch- for ʔ (see above) seems to be the normal correspondence for
name of the little stūpa – no longer clearly visible – having been transferred to the big one, too.

This word-form would correspond perfectly with the reconstructed form of Middle-Chinese *103*, being an alternative name for the famous stūpa of Kaniṣka

the ‘correct’ Skt šakṛ́(ka) in Gândhāri we have the example chada for Skt śabdā, see John Brough, *The Gândhāri Dharmapada*, Oxford 1962, p.101 (par. 50), who explains ś: ch as ‘sandhi-alternate’. For the phonetic representation of -r as -r̥, see v. Hinüber, *Das älteste Mittelindisch... op. cit.*, p.80 (§ 126); for examples from the Karakorum inscriptions, cf. Gérard Fussmann, 'Les inscriptions Kharoṣṭhī de la plaine de Chilas', in Karl Jettmar (ed.), *Antiquities of Northern Pakistan, Reports and Studies*, Vol.1: Rock Inscriptions in the Indus Valley, Mainz 1989, p.3 f. (Fussmann reconstructed the name Rāma(kri)śa for Rāma-kṛṣṇa) and catalogue entries by v. Hinüber in Martin Benson, Ditte König, *Die felsbildstation Oshibat*, Mainz 1994, pp.43a and 121b (no.10:2 and 56:1 for ri; r̥ for r is regularly found in the Central Asian Prākṛti documents, e.g. kṛś, which would correspond perfectly with the reconstruction of (śa)kṛ́: *chākṛ́-kārī, see Thomas Burrow, *The Language of the Kharoṣṭhī Documents from Chinese Turkestan*, Cambridge 1937, p.2 (§ 5). In proper Gândhāri -kṛ́- should be -kī (cf. Brough, *Gândhāri Dharmapada... op. cit.*, Index, p.299b). *chākṛ́-kārī could also have been a sanskritised form, where original r̥ was ren-dered ri; cf. Jakob Wackernagel, Albert Debrunner, *Altindische Grammatik, Bd. 1: Introduction générale par Louis Renou, Lautelehre, Nachträge*, Göttingen 1895 p.31 (par.28), and Nachträge, p.19, ad 31, 14. The form reconstructed – with the loss of the final -r or the Skt stem (?) – should have been rendered correctly by something like *quelijia 骑伽扥 in Chinese but the reduction of trisyllabic Indian nouns to Chinese binomials is quite a common transcription procedure.

Another possibility is that the underlying Indian form was a vrddhi form such as *chākṛ́-kā- in the meaning ‘(the stūpa) belonging to, originating from (the little) dung-stūpa’.

It should be mentioned that transcriptional forms which utilise a final consonant and an initial consonant of a Chinese syllable to represent a consonant cluster clusive + liquid (here: k + r̥) pronounced and written by one Indian syllable/character (ākṣara) are not very frequent. Examples of the type *śv-śv- are: kasātrā: chali / *qal-ľp ( útil, or Sānputra: Shelbfuus / *qal-li-pu/- 舍利弗, Pulleybank reconstructions; cf.also W. South Coblin, *A Handbook of Eastern Han Sound Glosses*, Hongkong 1983, p.252, nos 240 and 254); the underlying Prākṛti forms of the early transcriptional corpus very often give the assimilated cluster or original double consonants (-kk-, -tr-) in that same structure, e.g. sāṃpattī: sanbāṭī(Coblin, *ibid.*, p.243, no.42)

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ka104 and referring to the aetiological story connected to it. It fits well with the given context that it is only the version by Song Yun that reports this name of the stūpa and its model being constructed of dung. The name happened gradually to fall into oblivion105 – especially with the legend giving only dirt but no manure (Xuanzang, MSV, p.2787) – but at least the biography of Xuanzang and the *Weishu* 魏書 show that the identity of the Kaniṣka-stūpa and the *Queli-ta* was still known in China for quite a long time.

The story of the stūpa of Kaniṣka is interesting in showing the various aspects: it shows how, after the construction of a stūpa by a famous Buddhist ruler, the legend about its coming into existence was modelled according to the legend of the most famous stūpa-builder in Buddhist history, Asoka. In later times, then, the importance of the Kaniṣka-stūpa was even ‘upgraded’, connecting its existence with the duration of the Buddhist Dhāma.

al.). Unfortunately, the equally structured sakṛdāgamin has no representation of the sequence -kr- in the corresponding situohan 斯陀含 or xutuo han 须陀含.106

It should be remembered that Faxian did not give the name – a fact which is quite understandable because he does not mention the material, dirt, mud or dung, either. To him the stūpa was explained as Kaniṣka-stūpa. The same probably happened to Xuanzang. The references to the stūpa after Xuanzang only know of the famous royal founder but not about the legend of the foundation.

In the encyclopaedia *Fouzi-tongji* 佛祖統記 by the monk Zhipan 志磐 (mid-13th cent.) the stūpa is only mentioned as the ‘Great Stūpa’ (data 大塔 in Gândhāri (Jiantuoluo 健陀羅: T 2035, p.315a4 f., citing fragments of Xuanzang’s biography in the XGSZ).

*Weishu* 102, resp. *Beishi* 北史; see Kuwayama, *The Main Stūpa, op.cit.*, p.67.

In the case of Xuanzang’s biography it is, of course, not possible to say whether this information preserved in the circles around Xuanzang or added by the author of the XGSZ.

XJ 2, ed. Ji, p.243: ‘The Tathāgata made a prophecy on this stūpa: if it has burnt down and been reconstructed seven times, the Buddhist Dhāma will have vanished everywhere. In wise reports of the past it is said that [the stūpa] has already burnt down three times. When [Xuanzang] came to that country there had been a big fire just before and [the stūpa] could be seen reconstructed, but was not yet finished.’ Note that this motif is not found before Xuanzang. An overview on the Buddhist ideas of the decline of the Dhāma may be found...
AN OUTLINE OF THE YOGĀCĀRA-VIJÑĀNAVĀDA SCHOOL OF INDIAN BUDDHISM*
PART ONE
ERIC CHEETHAM

Introduction

This article is concerned with describing the essential teachings of the Yogacāra school in a structured way. The whole substance of this work is drawn from the writings of the founder of the school, Asaṅga, and of his brother, Vasubandhu. In addition, an extensive commentary on one of the earlier works has been used, that of the celebrated scholar-pilgrim, Hsüan-tsang.

Also, in the course of the article, reference will be made to some of the first Mahāyāna sūtras. These are not Yogacāra texts in the strict sense, but as the Yogacāra doctrine is often an expansion of sūtra themes, e.g. the Two Truths, the Great Way to Buddhahood and the dharmakāya, the Mahāyāna sūtras need to figure at times.

Two main themes occur throughout this article. One is the incidence of terminology, formulas and basic topics which Yogacāra retained from the earlier Indian Buddhist schools which preceded it and also from some of Sākyamuni's earliest recorded pronouncements.

The other theme will purport to show how Yogacāra further developed the deep (gambhīra) Dharma of the first Mahāyāna sūtras further to uncover the real nature of the Mahāyāna message. From that to construct a coherent and accessible system of doctrine and practice to achieve an expressed purpose of those Mahāyāna sūtras - Buddhahood for the Buddha's followers, and

* The author acknowledges with appreciation the critical suggestions received from Dr John Powers of the Australian National University, Canberra, during the preparation of this article.

to reveal the true nature of the world (saṃsāra).

ASAṆGA

There seems to be a general consensus among most Buddhist scholars today that Asaṅga was the founder of the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda (abbrev. Yogācāra) school. He is believed to have lived in parts of North-West Indian during the fifth century CE. At a later stage in his life he had the co-operation of his younger brother Vasubandhu in the development of the new school.

According to Paramārtha's 'Life of Vasubandhu'¹, Asaṅga's teachings from Maitreya persuaded him of the authenticity of the Mahāyāna branch of Buddhism and of the special sūtras. Although Asaṅga had long been a disciple in the Sarvāstivādin order, his encounter with Maitreya changed his doctrinal outlook and thereafter he became an ardent expositor and protagonist of the early Mahāyāna sūtras.

The tradition recorded by Paramārtha tells us that Asaṅga gained access to the Tuṣita heaven because of his mastery of special powers through meditation practice. There he found Maitreya, who answered Asaṅga's lifetime puzazzlement over the real meaning of sūnyatā. The supernatural exposition resolved all Asaṅga's difficulties and provided an advanced degree of enlightenment. The sūnyatā explanation he received was the Mahāyāna version of dharmanairatmya, as well as pudgalanairatmya. Of course, this new radical theme had already been systematised when Nāgārjuna founded the earlier Madhyamaka school.

Also, with the aid of Maitreya's tuition, Asaṅga began to perceive and to develop the characteristic doctrines of the new school of Yogācāra. Among others, one particular early Mahāyāna sūtra received his attention, the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra ², which set out several major doctrines associated with Yogācāra. In the course of a long career Asaṅga wrote commentaries on several Mahāyāna sūtras as well as a number of original works, several of which have been used here as source material.

THE THREE CHARACTERISTICS (lakṣaṇa)

Each of our main source books³ contains a description of the three lakṣaṇas (characteristics). Direct quotations will, however, be avoided as much as possible though the footnotes will provide the necessary references. But, of course, the explanations provided will be drawn from, and based upon, the texts indicated.

Parikalpita – Generally speaking, this word means: false imaginings, something which is only a figment of the imagination⁴. The word has other connected meanings. As the lowest of the three lakṣaṇas it is the most defiled. Consequently, unwarranted imputations are projected on to both 'external' and 'internal' dharmas. Basic to this common realm of existence is the major falsity (in terms of reality) of the bifurcation of subject and object, or of 'self' and 'other'. Another factor is the acceptance of general information about the nature of something and the need of language to communicate about it⁵.


² E. Lamotte, EM (cf. n.2). [There is a further transl. from the Chinese by Francis H. Cook, including the Trimsākā, in Three Texts on Consciousness Only, Berkeley 1999, as well as from the Sanskrit in Stefan Anacker, Seven Works of Vasubandhu, Delhi 1984]
⁴ EM, Ch. VI, section 3.

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¹ One of Walpole Rahula's sources in his entry on 'Asaṅga' in Encyclopaedia of Buddhism II, 1 (1966), pp.133-46.
² E. Lamotte, tr. L'Exlication des Mystères (Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra) (= EM), Louvain 1935. [There is an English transl. from the original Tibetan by John Powers, Wisdom of the Buddha, The Saṃdhinirmocana Mahāyāna Sūtra,
³ EM, Ch. VI, section 3.
⁴ F. Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary (=BHSD), 1st Indian ed.,
⁵ EM, Ch. VI, section 3.
Vasubandhu indicates that various mental objects arise due to karmic propensity. Imaginary notions are attached to these. In fact, these false attributions have no real nature. Parikalpita-lakṣaṇa can thus be generally characterised as sensory or mental objects imagined as real and conceived in terms of self and others. All of it is therefore deceptive and illusory. In Yogācāra terms this applies to the whole everyday world of people, places, ideas, and events.

**Paratantra.** – The second of the characteristics is paratantra-lakṣaṇa. The Yogācāra texts describe this in similar ways. Production due to causes, or, in more detail, whatever is dependent on others, discriminations produced by causes and conditions. This can be interpreted as referring to the formula of dependent arising (pratītyasamutpāda), in other words, the operation of the conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛtadharma).

Ordinarily the operation of the dharmas is obscured by the dominant worldly features of parikalpita. A proportion of the practice schemes of early Indian Buddhist schools was aimed specifically at bringing dharma perception within. This was in order to accentuate the effects of employing the four right efforts (saṃyakpradhāna) in weakening the activity of defiled (akusāla) dharmas and strengthening the presence of undefiled/good (kusāla) dharmas. And this, if successful, led the way to acquiring insight-knowledge (prajñā) in mainstream Hinayāna. In Mahāyāna and in Yogācāra it was arrived at through prajñāpāramitā, which is much more enhanced and somewhat differently orientated version.

**Parinispanna.** – This is the third laksana, sometimes called ‘own nature’ (svabhāva). Simply stated, it is ultimate reality. The BHSD gives it several meanings: completely perfected, arrived at the supreme goal, nature based on knowledge of absolute truth.

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6 Vasubandhu’s Trīṃśikā, vv.19-20. quoted in DMC, p.cxxxiii.
7 EM, Ch.VI, section 3.
9 BHSD, pp.325-6.

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10 DMC, pp.623-4.
11 Ibid., p.633.
12 Ibid., p.635.
14 DMC, p.637.
15 Ibid.
to the Buddha's recorded words in the old Pāli texts on the eighteen dhātus. Sākyamuni explained that the All is just six triads of eye, visibles and visual consciousness dependently arising. And so on for hearing, smell, taste, touch and the mentals. The particular consciousnesses connected with each of these sensory and mental faculties are the six consciousnesses as part of the eighteen dhātu scheme. Because each of the dhātu is a dharma or a collection of dharmas this formula represents the world and its beings.

Manas, the seventh consciousness - Manas is the first addition made by Yogācāra to the original formula of six consciousnesses as part of the dhātu scheme. It is placed in the sixth of the triads, alongside manodhātu, the mental organ element, and in certain aspects substitutes for it. According to the textual definitions manas is a dharma but it has multiple functions and associates. Primarily it has two functions. It can cogitate and reflect upon its objects. This object is constantly supposed to be the ātman. When it is transformed (parāvṛtti), however, it can cognise absence of self (nairātmya).

In its normal condition manas has four particular features: self delusion (ātmamoha) - self belief (ātmadrsti) - self conceit (ātmanamana) - self regard (ātmasneha).

These four, in their turn, produce various defiled associates (all upakliṣṭadharma) and because of this constantly enhanced combination become an obstacle to the practice of the Way. Such a centre, controlling forms of thought and cognition, is doubtless the reason why manas is the location of the idea of 'self' and 'me'.

As already indicated, however, manas is capable of transformation and refinement. This can result from fundamental Buddhist practices plus special Mahāyāna practices (more of this anon.) But it seems to occur in the upper reaches of the bodhi-sattva stages and leads on to one of the end goals, full and perfect knowledge (sarvajñāna). This implies a considerable degree of preparation for full implementation. In Yogācāra terms, however, the disturbed and restricted state of manas in its defiled state is the general condition of everyone.

From this textual information manas can be generally described as a mental focus and an intellectual faculty producing responses, decisions and judgements based on data supplied by the first six consciousnesses and mental objects. All this takes place within a particular dharma stream (pudgala, dharmasaṃtāna), but the same process occurs in every 'person'.

Ālayavijñāna (store consciousness). - The most important addition that Yogācāra made in the set of consciousnesses was the eighth, the store consciousness.

It should be noted that this eighth consciousness does not appear in the element of the eighteen dhātu scheme of all the dharmas. Thus it is something special needing much explanation. Our textual sources provided this in abundant measure.

Vasubandhu's verse is concise when he says that this ālayavijñāna is also called retribution consciousness (vipāka-vijñāna) and seed-carrier consciousness (sarbāṣṭikavijñāna). Furthermore, according to its main title, ālayavijñāna, it is the receptacle consciousness because it receives and retains all the traces (vāsanā) of every dharma activity. These deposits are seeds (bijā) which remain in the ālayavijñāna as potential causes until their eventual fruition.

Ālayavijñāna is the generative cause of all dharmas arising because its seeds (bijā) produce dharmas as and when conditions are favourable. Thus it is the medium of karmic actuation and so is

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16 Sānyutta-nikāya IV, 14 and 32.
17 Trimsākā, quoted in DMC, p.287.
18 DMC, p.287.
19 Ibíd., p.289.
20 A diagram of the eighteen dhātus will follow in Part Two.
21 EM, DMC and SGV.
22 Trimsākā, v.2b, quoted in DMC, p.103.
23 DMC, p.105.
also called vipākajñāna24.

The ālayavijñāna itself is said to be regarded by manas as the ‘inner self’. As such, the ālayavijñāna is grasped by manas in the same way that manas grasps everything else25.

Asaṅga makes a point emphatically in a new direction. He writes that dharmas arise due to the pratityasamutpāda, the twelve-linked chain of dependent arising. The twelve links distribute pleasure and pain. They also determine the existences in good or bad destinies (sugatidurgati)26. Asaṅga then concludes: the ālayavijñāna is a retribution consciousness provided with all the seeds (sarvabījakāryajāka) which produce the pratityasamutpāda and so all the existences in the triple world and all destinies arise from this consciousness27.

All these processes, actions producing seeds, seeds producing actions, show the ālayavijñāna to be a universal and unending conscious ‘atmosphere’ in which everything lives and dies according to karmic seed production and fruition. The Mahāyāna-samgraha expresses this in difficult language. Asaṅga says that all defiled (samkleśika) dharmas lodge (asmin alijante) in the ālayavijñāna as fruit (phalabhāvana) and the ālayavijñāna is present in these dharmas in the form of causes (hetubhāvāna)28. Furthermore, it is described as being like a violent torrent proceeding with all the seeds. This has not been revealed before, the Buddha is said to explain, because the ālayavijñāna is profound and subtle beyond the understanding of the uninstructed and foolish29.

On this textual evidence it can be said that the store consciousness is a stream of continuous consciousness of universal dimensions. The seed elements (bijā) stored in it are forever being activated into dharmas which by their actions and associations produce patterns and constructions of both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ composites. All this produces the beings, worldly perceptions and the responses to perceptions, of Samsāra.

This profound penetration to the ālayavijñāna gives rise, in Yogācāra, to a further significant doctrine, the teaching of vijnaptimātratā, with a literal meaning of ‘mere notional projections’, sometimes referred to as ‘representation only’. This has two main meanings. First, that all perceptions of ‘externals’ are the result of seeds and dharmas arising from the store consciousness (ālayavijñāna), so that all sensory perception is mind-produced and has no independent existence. The Mahāyāna-samgraha quotes the Daśabhūmikasūtra, saying ‘... in the Three Worlds there is nothing but mind (citta)’30. Hsuan-tsang himself says: ‘The word “mere” (mātra) does not deny dharmas so long as they are inseparable from consciousness...’31.

The second main meaning has to do with the ultimately false bifurcation of subject and object, sometimes given as ātman and dharmas. From this false apprehension arise all the defilements connected with grasping and selfishhood. Vasubandhu’s verses are terse as usual. He says that when no idea of object is considered this is the state of vijnaptimātratā, in which the apprehension of each object and the act of apprehension are absent32.

The actual apprehension of vijnaptimātratā is not a matter of reasoning or acceptance of scripture. Asaṅga tells us in detail how this ‘higher knowledge’ is gained. It becomes accessible in one of the more advanced stages of the bodhisattva process and results from training in the special insights concerning the nature of mental processes.

In fact, vijnaptimātratā or mere notional projections, as a penetration into a part of suchness (tathāta), occurs in the bodhisattva stage of ārāmanāmārga, where deep insight examination of

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24 SGV, p.32.
25 DMC, p.105.
26 SGV, p.37.
30 DMC, p.507.
31 Ibid., p.505.
32 Trimsākā, v.28, quoted in Ibid., p.xxxvii.
mental and external objects reveals the true nature (dharmatā)\textsuperscript{33}. Asaṅga tells us that at this stage the bodhisattva uses four examinations to realise that objects are simply mental words and the names of these objects are conceptual only\textsuperscript{34}. This is the actual full knowledge of vijnaptimātratā and, when gained, all ideas of self and others are dissipated because inner and outer no longer obtain, all is mind-made.

The indication here is that within the defined realm of parikalpita, i.e., most of the time, whatever is attributed to conscious experience has little to do with what is actually there. For vijnaptimātratā, externals and internals are simply names and concepts, part of sūnyatā.

**Bijas** (seeds, potentialities)

It has been seen above that the ālayavijnāna carries all the seeds (sarvabījaka). These seeds (bijā), or potentialities, are deposited by past actions of the stream and each of them will engender a particular dharma when the conditions are appropriate\textsuperscript{35}. The seeds are like dharmas, part of a cluster and series which resides in the ālayavijnāna. Unlike dharmas, they are not momentary. They can persist for aeons or moments, depending upon the presence of suitable conditions, i.e., existing dharmas, for them to fructify as a retributive cause\textsuperscript{36}.

In fact, the bijas are the Yogācāra medium for the transmission of karmic retribution, because the qualities deposited at their inception are retained and when the bijas engender a new dharma the results of these qualities are injected into that particular dharma. The moment that is done the bija disappears.

The combined result of the process is an unending cycle. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi summarises that bijas engender consciousness. This engendered consciousness creates and deposits/influences new bijas. Bijas thus created and increased by this imprinting (vāsanā) influence the engendered consciousness. The process evolves in a reciprocal manner in the cause and effect\textsuperscript{37}.

For the inhabitants of the parikalpita realm all, or most, of these arising seeds will be of the defined (kliṣṭa) variety. But because they all derive from past actions some of these may have been deposited by Dharma practice in past existences. Consequently, some seeds could be outflows of insight-knowledge (prajñā). They too will surface when conditions are suitable. So any present Dharma practice could well be augmented by exercise in the distant past. Or, as one might say, one may have inherent capabilities only realised under certain circumstances.

Seeds (bijā) are not special to Yogācāra, although their modus operandi certainly is. The question is asked by the Sarvāstivādins in the Abhidharmakosā, ‘What is meant by “seed” (bijā)?’ The answer given by Vasubandhu is that it is the five skandhas capable of producing a fruit by means of parināmavivesa. The latter is defined as the evolution of the series (saṃtāna) to the point when the necessary fruit comes into existence\textsuperscript{38}.

In this context of Buddhist schools prior to Yogācāra the bija seems to serve the same purpose. It is the medium of transmitting karmic effects, i.e. retribution (vijāka). Here it operates in a linear dimension by evolution of the elements of the stream of consciousness (dharmasamātāna). For Yogācāra, however, the seed (bijā) is deposited in the ālayavijnāna, which retains it outside the evolving stream until that particular stream produces conditions suitable for the seed to engender the dharma fruit.

**Vāsanā** (deposit, influence)

Closely connected with the ālayavijnāna and the bijas is another important Yogācāra doctrine. This is vāsanā, which has several meanings as noted above. It also has two main functions; the first

\textsuperscript{33} SGV, p.155, plus Hsūn-tsang’s commentary.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., p.161, plus Hsūn-tsang’s commentary.

\textsuperscript{35} DMC, pp.127 and 169; also Trīṃśikā, vv.18,19, quoted in ibid., p.xxxii.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., p.81.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., p.135.

\textsuperscript{38} Kosā, Ch.2, p.185.

This has already been mentioned in connection with the seeds (bijā). Vāsanā concerns the traces or impressions deposited in the alayavijnāna by every active dharma, i.e., every thought, word and deed of conscious beings. By this deposit or trace a seed (bijā) is delivered into the custody of the alayavijnāna. This seed carries the potentiality of a later result imbued with the karmic quality of the original act, or dharma. This is the first of the functions of vāsanā. Such a seed, in company with many others, remains in the alayavijnāna indefinitely until appropriate conditions obtain in the active world which would allow the seed to deliver its full potentiality by engendering a particular dharma as a retribution (vipāka) for the past actions.39

The second function of vāsanā is its capacity to influence (increase or diminish) previously deposited seeds in the alayavijnāna. Such influence (vāsanā) is thus capable of augmenting or weakening seeds or clusters of seeds already held in the alayavijnāna for future emergence as dharmas.

This influence, sometimes rendered as perfuming, can of course be of either a good or bad variety. Activity of a bad or depraved kind can be sustained or dispersed by the impact of appropriate actions and their outflow of influence.40 The constant resurgence of the passions is actually brought about by relevant seeds and the ongoing sustenance by similar vāsanā.41 In this way the seeds (bijā), following further influence (vāsanā), combine within the alayavijnāna to project the karmic results into a future existence. This occurs when suitable conditions, already existing, stimulate and encourage the seed clusters, reinforced by vāsanā, to emerge and engender new dharmas.

Such a karmic procedure of action and reaction, of short or long duration, has consequences for all the practice systems of Buddhist teaching, both mainstream and Mahāyāna. Asaṅga elaborates on this in his explanations of the special Mahāyāna and

Yogācāra forms of practice to be described here later. Asaṅga sets out the recommended methods as being based upon and drawn from the sūtra texts themselves.42 The special topics of the Mahāyāna deep-teaching sūtras have to be assimilated, pondered upon and absorbed by hearing (śrūta), or by reading them in such a way that seeds and future impregnation is channelled into and stored within the alayavijnāna. This is called śrutavāsanābijā and Asaṅga states that deposits of this kind are also the seed of the dharmakāya, the real body of the Buddha.43

From what the text explains later it seems to be the case that if some seeds are ‘cultivated’ by right practice they will grow into the dharmakāya itself, i.e. into full enlightenment. Asaṅga describes one of the main procedures which can produce this result. The texts and topics (the contents of the Mahāyāna sūtras) contain deep Dharma and insight-knowledge. These need to be accessed by close attention to them and allowing the impregnation of hearing (śrūtavāsanā) to saturate the mental series. Correct reflection (yonisomanaskāra) on the words and their import gives access to unfettered knowledge (nirvikāpakānā).44 This is part of the special practices of the bodhisattva process leading to Buddha-hood. In this manner vāsanā, bijā and the alayavijnāna all have a practice dimension when allied to the gambhīra Dharma of the early Mahāyāna sūtras.

As with the seeds (bijā) the idea and function of vāsanā are not a Yogācāra innovation. Vasubandhu, writing about the teaching of the Sarvāstivādins and others, says that bhāvanā perfumes and impregnates thought. Thus bhāvanā, or recalling and cultivating, is the equivalent of vāsanā.45 As well as this similarity of usage, the Sarvāstivādins had another special term which prefigures the Yogācāra use of vāsanā. This term is upacita, or accumulated act, i.e., an action reinforced by deliberate further approval.46

39 Tripūrāsa, vv.18,19, quoted in DMC, p.cxxxiii, also p.109.
40 Ibid., p.135.
41 Ibid., pp.581-5.
42 SGV, p.3.
43 Ibid., p.68.
44 Ibid., pp.68, 161.
45 Kosā, Ch.2, p.157; Ch 4, pp.248-9.
46 Ibid., Ch.4, p.242.
more technical precision this is a dharma-element followed by other dharmas of approval and, lacking any regret, thereby increases the retribution (vipāka) of the first dharma.

This procedure is almost identical to the effects of vāsanā on the bijas. The difference in Yogācāra is that this takes place in the ālayavijñāna, and not in the dharmasamāpṭāna. Here is one indication of the origin of this particular process.

The triple gnosis (śruta, cinta, bhāvanā)

The Yogācāra elaboration and combination of the ālayavijñāna, bija and vāsanā set down markers for the right practice necessary to fulfil the basic goal of all Mahāyāna: Buddhahood, or full enlightenment. This goal is often expressed in the early Mahāyāna sūtras, especially the Lotus (Śārdharmapundarikāsūtra), the Vimalakīrtinirdesa and the Sūramgamasamādhisūtra. Such right practice is generally known as the stages of the bodhisattva path. Yogācāra was mainly responsible for providing the detailed sequence of these practices contained in the whole extent of the bodhisattva path or process.

One of these is bahuśruta, literally meaning ‘much hearing’, but in this context meaning well-versed and well-acquainted with the content of the sūtras. Bahuśruta is also an umbrella term covering several other special teaching formulas. One of these is the title of this section. But bahuśruta needs to be presented first so that the intended purpose of the others can be perceived.

The basic notion of bahuśruta was well-known in pre-Buddhist times. It was then understood as referring to one who was learned and well-versed in the Vedas. In the earliest Buddhist records Ananda is portrayed as the highest example of Buddhist erudition in that he can recall all the teachings he had heard. For early Mahāyāna, Ananda was completely surpassed by the great bodhisattva Manjuśrī, who could recall and expound all the teachings of every Buddha, not just Śākyamuni. Asaṅga is explicit on the Yogācāra application of this word. He says that the bodhisattva perfumes his mental states (cittasamanthā) by much hearing (bahuśruta) of the Mahāyāna teaching. He reiterates the point by saying that these mental states (cittasamanthā) are perfumed by much hearing (bahuśruta) of the texts and topics of the Mahāyāna.

The primary formula associated with bahuśruta is the so-called triple gnosis of hearing or reading Mahāyāna topics (śruta), considering and pondering them (cinta) and meditative contemplation of all this (bhāvanā). As with several other key terms already mentioned, this formula was well known to the early Buddhist schools, particularly the Sarvāstivāda. Vasubandhu describes all three elements in his Abhidharmakośa. He describes śruta thus, ‘... a certainty which proceeds by means of knowledge called the speech of a qualified person. Cintā is given as, ‘... the certainty born from internal examination’. The third factor, bhāvanā, is rendered as, ‘... a certainty born from meditation ... so that the specific marks of all three are established.

Even before the time of the Abhidharmakośa some early Pāli suttas proclaim the same theme as the Buddha’s word. Thus we have the Buddha’s admonition to his monks that they should listen to the suttas attentively so as to understand, recite and master them. The Aṅguttara is more specific and comes close to the tripe gnosis above. It recommended listening to, reflecting upon and understanding the inner meaning.

51 SGV, pp.154-5, 159.
52 Kośa, Ch.6, p.143.
53 Ibid., pp.143-4.
54 Ibid.
55 Sarnyutta-nikāya II, 267.
56 Aṅguttara-nikāya V, 26.
Yogācāra inherited all this as common practice. Asaṅga puts the whole procedure in its wider context. He tells us that the sūtras teach Dharma meaning while the Vinaya puts it all into action. The aim is to liberate from Śaṁśāra and that is done by vāsanā. This influence or impregnation is achieved by śruta, cintā and, in place of the usual bhāvanā, Asaṅga gives us ‘... by cultivating tranquillity (samatha) there is, calming, and through insight (vipaśyāna) there is penetration’.

Further on in the same text Asaṅga expands on this by saying that the vāsanā necessary for enlightenment arises from the Dharma heard from the sūtras and received and understood correctly. These deposits (seeds) are carried forward by the retribution-consciousness (vipākavijñāna). The reason for the replacement of bhāvanā in the old triple formula is not stated. One possible reason may be the prominence given to samatha and vipaśyāna in the Sāṃdhinirmocanasūtra.

This sūtra was highly regarded by early Yogācāra and the text devotes a whole chapter to a detailed exposition of the various processes involved in these practices. It also defines the triple gnosīs but substitutes samatha and vipaśyāna for bhāvanā as the third factor. Because of the extensive instructions given in the Sāṃdhinirmocanasūtra and because of the usual contextual pattern of close and progressive attention to the contents of the Mahāyāna scriptures (and earlier Canons), Asaṅga may well have followed its example.

Whatever the reasons for the change they must have been strong to warrant altering such a well-established formula. At least part of the reason can be found in samatha and vipaśyāna themselves. Not only does the Sāṃdhinirmocanasūtra deal in considerable detail with samatha and vipaśyāna (the third part of the triple formula), it also sets out clearly what it is all for. The opening of Chapter 8 has the Buddha listing the twelve subdivisions of the Canon from sūtras through birth stories and exploits (avadāna) to instructions and explanations (upadesa). The text continues that all this is listened to attentively. Recollecting extracts all this is reflected upon and persistently recalled. The result is said to be a bodily and mental attitude called samatha, or calm tranquillity. Moving to vipaśyāna, the text tells us that once having gained the calm of samatha a penetrating examination of the Dharma extracts follows. This consists of perceived images in interior concentration which arise from what has been heard and recollected. These are subjected to investigation, examination, a survey and a judgement which is called vipaśyāna or penetrating insight.

The purpose is reiterated further on in the text. Here it says that samatha and vipaśyāna should be based on the Dharma in conformity with the teachings already received and adopted. The Sāṃdhinirmocanasūtra continues to analyse the various types and groups of these practices and their topics. Later, it tells us of the expected progress of this formulation of the triple gnosīs.

This sūtra again presents the third factor of the triple gnosīs (śruta, cintā, bhāvanā) as the pair of samatha and vipaśyāna. It also reminds us that only this pair is capable of penetrating the meaning and intention of the text in question. Śruta and cintā contribute to ‘deliverance’ but cannot, on their own, reach it.

All of this indicates the basic purpose of these special practices. In effect, the necessity of ‘much hearing’ (of the textual topics of Mahāyāna) called bahuśruta is brought about by the triple gnosīs of śruta and cintā and completed by samatha and vipaśyāna. Here we have one of the principle Yogācāra practice methods. A method which is a constant requirement throughout the process of

57 SGV, p.3.
58 Ibid., pp.67-8.
59 EM, Ch.8, sections 1-35.
60 Ibid., section 24.

Ch.8, Nos 2 and 3.
61 Ibid., No.4.
62 Ibid., Nos 2.
63 Ibid., No.24.
64 Ibid., No.24.
65 Ibid.
the bodhisattva stages (bhumis). The combination of bahuśrūta and the triple gnosis is based upon and employs the co-ordination of the ālayavijñāna, the bijas and vāsanā in a practice manner adaptable to all capabilities. And it is aimed at the realisation of the deep (gambhīra) teaching of the Mahāyāna sūtras and the subsequent explanation of them. Eventually, by means of the bodhisattva process (which uses this technique) the ultimate goal, also presented in the Mahāyāna texts, is brought within reach, i.e., full and perfect enlightenment.

At a much less elevated level the meaning of the word bahuśrūta and its associated methods of the triple gnosis was expanded from earlier times by early Mahāyāna and Yogācāra. It was intended to convey a being or beings, well acquainted with Mahāyāna sūtra contents and motivated to pursue deep Dharma. This word also implies a stream of consciousness (dharmaśamātā), impregnated (vāsita) with, and saturated by, Dharma assimilation from past existences. These propensities were accompanied by good roots produced by long-term engagement in right conduct and general outlook conducive to appreciating the content of the Mahāyāna sūtras.

THE THREE TURNINGS OF THE DHARMA WHEEL

Now that some of the main topics of Yogācāra have been presented, one of the matters with which this article is concerned can be addressed. This, as mentioned in the introduction, is the theme that Yogācāra preserved and made use of a number of technical terms and topics which were part of the corpus of early Indian Buddhist doctrine well before the Mahāyāna appeared on the scene as a distinct teaching. The importance of this feature, if it can be shown, is that it would help to illustrate that Yogācāra, with Madhyamaka before it, is firmly linked to the doctrines and practices of the first Indian Buddhist schools and in some cases to the original itself. The situation can be likened to a kind of evolution. Although the later forms are dissimilar in certain respects, they contain features or elements which point clearly to their parentage and to their part in a long development.

This picture is set out in a particular way by one of the early, Mahāyāna sūtras, the Samdhinirmocanasūtra. In this text the special teaching of the three turnings of the Wheel of the Dharma is explained. The first turning was at Vāraṇa, where the Buddha pronounced the Four Noble Truths (caturāryasatya) and other original formulas. This so-called Śrāvaka teaching is said to have been insufficiently explained and gave rise to some controversy. As a result of this the Mahāyāna was enunciated, in particular the doctrine of dharmanairatmya, i.e., all dharmas are without own-nature (sarvadharmanihsvabhāva). This was the second turning of the Wheel.

This too was considered as open to criticism and insufficiently explicit. So the Wheel was turned for the third time. Now the teaching of śūnyatā was explicit for both the Śrāvaka and the Mahāyāna. In this third exposition the text says it is unsurpassed, has an explicit meaning and causes no controversy.

What this does, amongst other things, is to show that the Dharma, as an expressed teaching, is capable of development and a deeper, more precise meaning. This is just what Yogācāra perceived and revealed, and in this way Yogācāra can be regarded as the third turning of the Wheel. It is certainly true that Yogācāra followed on this as a further teaching, requiring some knowledge of the earlier corpus for its own right comprehension.

Some of the evidence for this can be seen in the special terminology used here to set out the main doctrine of Yogācāra. For example, the ālayavijñāna, perhaps the fundamental Yogācāra teaching: at first sight the descriptions of the ālayavijñāna may be disconcerting to anyone familiar with the earlier mainstream teaching, even for some early Mahāyānists. But it has to be noted that a very similar theme formed part of the doctrine held by the mainstream Mahāsāṃghika school. They called it the root consciousness (mūlavijñāna) and it was spoken of as a 'hidden' teaching in much the same way as it is presented in the Samdhinirmocanasūtra, where the Buddha stated that the ālayavijñāna

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66 Nīl., Ch. 20, 21.
67 Ibid., section 30.
... is not revealed to the uninstructed'. The wording used by Professor A. Bareau deserves to be partly quoted to appreciate the similarity:

'There is a root-consciousness (mūlavijnāna) which serves as support for the eye-consciousness and the other sense consciousnesses, just as the root of the tree is the basis for the leaves...

Whatever the date of origin of the Mahāsāṃghika school it was certainly well before Yogācāra appeared, and this Mahāsāṃghika school undoubtedly formed part of the mainstream branches of Indian Buddhism.

The next terminological linkage is the seeds (bijā). It has already been shown in previous pages that this term was used by the Sarvāstivādin school, as recorded in the Abhidhammakośa. Also, its actual usage by the Sarvāstivādins is very similar to its purpose in the Yogācāra scheme, i.e., as the carrier of karmic results into the future. Here we have another case of Yogācāra reaching back into an early mainstream Hinayāna school's teaching to gain the basis for its own version.

Both vāsanā and bahusrūta, already presented earlier, are further examples of terminological linking between Yogācāra and the mainstream body of terminology. Vāsanā was part of the Sarvāstivādin technical terminology and it is defined in the Abhidharmakośa as the equivalent of bhāvanā. The meaning is also very similar, as something that influences and impregnates the mental series. But Yogācāra applied this, not to the mental series, but to the alavāvijnāna.

For bahusrūta there is a similar correspondence. This term was known and used from the earliest days of the Indian Samgha as referring to a monk who was well-versed in the canonical texts and who could recall them. In early Mahāyāna the word retained this meaning, except that the great bodhisattvas could both recall much more and express more deeply. Even more expansion in application took place in Yogācāra. Here the word bahusrūta was closely connected with Yogācāra usage of bijā and vāsanā to mean someone who has applied themselves both deeply and positively to the contents of the Mahāyāna sūtras and śāstras with the effect that a permanent and transforming impression is made on their mental series. This, in its turn, advances that person (pudgala) towards and along the bodhisattva process.

There are more linking features needing a place at this point, although they have not yet been presented in detail. They are the eighteen dhātus and the dharma elements. Both will be set out in Yogācāra terms below. Now, these need to be discussed briefly and set alongside the other terminology linking Yogācāra with the earlier Indian Buddhist schools and in some cases with the recorded words of the Buddha himself.

First, the eighteen dhātus (realms and domains) have been specified by the Buddha as the all or everything. These eighteen domains are the five senses, their respective realms, plus their respective consciousnesses, as well as the mental organ and consciousness and its mental objects (see eighteen dhātus diagram in Part Two).

This major formula is basic to all the early mainstream schools and had to be known and understood. It is also fundamental to Yogācāra, which accepted it and employed it as central to the Yogācāra system. Asaṅga, in fact, used the formula as the overall framework for his version of the dharma scheme, of which more anon. Thus Yogācāra employed this fundamental formula (with certain additions and interpretations) going back to the recorded words of the Buddha and the Canons of most, if not all, of the mainstream schools.

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69 Kośa, Ch.4, p.248.
70 Śūraṅgamasaṃâtihāsītra trans., op.cit., p.208.
71 Samyutta-nikāya IV, 14 and 32.
It is a similar, if rather more complicated, story with the dharmas. The details of the particular Yogācāra dharma system will be set out in later pages. At this point it needs to be shown how Yogācāra inherited the original dharma scheme, which had been elaborated in the Abhidharma texts. Perhaps the most significant item in the records of the Buddha’s words on dharmas is to be found in Dhammapada I, which has the Pāli text of the first verse: ‘Manopubbañgama dhammā’ etc., given as ‘Mind precedes all mental states’.

Another example is found in the Aṅguttara: ‘Whether or not the Holy Ones appear in the world, the essential nature of things pertaining to things (dhammānām dharmatā) remains stable’.

More examples of this major topic will be given here later. Suffice to say that a good proportion of the theses of the Sarvāstivādins concerns dharmas and citta and the Sarvāstivādins are one of the first separately identified schools of Indian Buddhism. Other mainstream schools disagree on the quality and substance of dharmas, e.g., the Bahuśrutas, Lokottaravādins, Andhakas and Prajñāptivādins.

Furthermore, that great compendium of mainstream Hinayāna doctrine, the Abhidharmakosā by Vasubandhu, devotes significant parts of Chapters 2 and 4 to defining dharmas.

Yogācāra also had a dharma scheme of its own, as we shall see, which was derived from the earlier systems of the mainstream Hinayāna schools, particularly the Sarvāstivāda. This is confirmed when the two detailed lists are compared. Of the 100 dharmas

75 Cf. Bureau, Les Sectes bouddhiques ..., op. cit., for analysis and appendages.
76 J. Takakuski, The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy, Honolulu 1947. Dharma sheets at pp.72 and 94. N.B. some items of the Hossō sheet have been amended here (in the following pages) in the light of Asaṅga’s own listing in the

listed for Hossō, i.e., the Japanese form of Yogācāra, over sixty are common to both Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra. The rest are specific Yogācāra additions to the old scheme. Not only that, but many of the definitions of the dharmas in common use are virtually unchanged by Yogācāra. That is not to say that the Yogācārins just adopted the old dharma system. Far from it. Their additions to it and their basic reinterpretation of the whole system shows that the Yogācāra scheme was substantially developed from the previous dharma teachings.

All of these examples of change and evolution of the earlier scheme of dharmas serve as an illustration of the topic of the three turnings of the Dharma Wheel.

The teaching of the three turnings of the Dharma Wheel has been described at the beginning of this section. In effect, it sets out a three-stage progression of main teaching topics. These develop the earliest formulas, i.e., the Four Noble Truths, into the Mahāyāna form of sūnyatā. Furthermore, there is a development between the second and third turns of the Wheel which involves a more explicit exposition of sūnyatā for all the Buddha’s followers, both Hinayāna and Mahāyāna. Such a progression is evident in each of the six examples given above (ālayavijnāna, bija, vāsanā, bahuśruta, eighteen dhātu and the dharmas). Each of these originated in the earliest Buddhist teachings and each of them was revised and reformulated in the Yogācāra system – they represent a direct linkage with the early Buddhist schools and to some of Śākyamuni’s own recorded words. They are some of the first phase doctrinal topics and special terms taken up by Yogācāra. More of the same are spread throughout Asaṅga’s own works, especially the Mahāyānasamgraha and the Abhidharmasamuccaya.

In the Mahāyānasamgraha, as an example, in the Introduction (prastāvāna), the Abhidharma is discussed. In Chapter III Sampāra and Nirvāṇa feature, as well as the five mārgas. Chapter V
focuses on śīla, citta and prajñā. And in Chapter X the five skandhas appear and there is an exposition of the Buddha’s attributes. All these topics figure prominently in the earlier Dharma teachings. Here, however, they are all reoriented and expanded to conform to the Yogacāraya system.

In the light of this, it is possible to see Yogacāra as a further teaching, going deeper and more explicitly into the original doctrines. Just as suggested in the Samdhinirnayasuttra, in fact, a pattern of a very ancient practice may also be seen here. The Vimalakirtinirdeśasutra has an early section in which Vimalakirti questions the arhat Mahākatayāṇa on his practice of explaining in detail some of the Buddha’s brief sayings. In a sense, early Mahāyāna and Yogacāra follow this same practice in a rather more expanded manner, and developed in depth. Thus it can be said that Yogacāra, by retaining and developing the ancient teachings and terminologies, demonstrates its ancestry. In so doing it shows how it is firmly linked to and is part of the evolution of Indian Buddhism as a whole.

(To be concluded)

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EKOTTARĀGAMA (XXXIII)

Translated from the Chinese Version by Thich Huyên-Vi and Bhikkhu Passadika in collaboration with Sara Boin-Webb

Twelfth Fascicle
Part 21
(The Triple Gem)

9. 1 Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was staying in Śrāvasti, at Jetū’s Grove, in Anāthapiṇḍada’s Park. Then, in time, many bhikṣus put on their [outer] robes and took up their alms-bowls [in order to] enter the city to beg for alms-food. Now the following occurred to that group of bhikṣus: At this time it is still [too] early for us to enter the city and beg for alms-food. Now all of us could go to the whereabouts of the adherents of other teachings (anyātīrthya) and brahmin [ascetics]. – So all of them went to the place where [the followers] of other teachings and brahmin [ascetics] were. Having arrived, they exchanged friendly greetings[2] [with them] and sat down at one side. Then the brahmin [ascetics] asked the [Buddhist] śramaṇas: The hermit[3] Gautama always deals with sense-pleasures, forms, feelings and perception.[4] How does he differ from [us when] he deals with these [topics]? What we deal with likewise is what the ascetic [Gautama] treats, and what he treats likewise is what we deal with. The teaching he sets forth and the teaching we set forth are identical; his instructions and our instructions are the same. – When that group of bhikṣus had heard this statement, they rose from their seats and left together without any good or bad words, [but] thinking: We should go to the Exalted One and ask him about the meaning of this [statement].

After their [almround and] meal, that group of bhikṣus went to the place where the Exalted One was. On their arrival they bowed down their heads at his feet and sat down at one side. They told the Exalted One what they had been asked by the brahmin [ascetics].

1 See T2, 604c7 ff.; Hayashi, p. 198 ff.
2 Lit.: ‘they enquired after each other’.
3 See Soothill, p. 416a (道士, mārgapuruṣa).
4 The Pāli parallel (for references see below, n. 14) has kāmānaṃ... rūpānaṃ... vedanānaṃ pariḥkṣaṇam pariḥkṣāpeti.
whose statement] occasioned [their – the bhikṣus’ – uncertainty] to persist. – When you are asked this question by [adherents of] other [teachings and] brahmin [ascetics], the Exalted One said to the bhikṣus, you should reply to them in this way (prakāra), viz. with a [counter]-question: As for sense-pleasures, what is enjoying (āsvāda) them like and what is their wretchedness (ādīnava) [because of which] they should be given up (vātaj)? As for forms,... as for feelings, what is enjoying them like and what is their wretchedness [because of which desire for them] should be given up? – When you reply to the brahmin [ascetics] with a [counter]-question thus formulated, they will fall silent and make no reply [on their part]. However, should there be anyone who has something to say, he will be unable to explain this [matter] in a profound way. [The followers of other teachings] will be all the more confused (sam-vāmuh) and at their [wits’] end; for this is not their field (viśavya). To be sure, O bhikṣus, I tell [you that] there is nobody [in the world with its] Māra, Māra gods, Śakra and Brahmā, the four World-Guardians, [with its] śramaṇas and brahmins, human and non-human beings who could explain this [matter] in a profound way except (T2, 605a) the Tathāgata, the Fully Enlightened One, [anyone among] the many noble [disciples] of the Tathāgata [or] anybody who has received my teaching.

As for sense-pleasures, what is enjoying them like? There are the so-called five sense-pleasures. Which are the five? When the eye sees forms eye-consciousness is caused to arise [or, followed by] excessive fondness (bhakti) [for forms], ever-present in mankind [and giving it] complete satisfaction (pariśoṣa). When the ear hears sounds, the nose smells scents, the tongue recognises flavours and when tangible things are felt with the body [the respective kinds of consciousness are] caused to arise [or, followed by] excessive fondness [for the respective sense-objects], ever-present in mankind [and giving it] complete satisfaction. Now when on account of these five sense-pleasures [one’s] mind experiences pleasure and pain, this is called enjoyment of sense-pleasures.

As for sense-pleasures, what is their wretchedness? Now there is a son of good family who – for his livelihood – trains to become proficient in many a field: either in farming or writing or [public] service or calculating or pretension to empowerment or engraving or courier service or royal service. He does not avoid [exposing] his body to heat and cold, [and in his] training he works hard and zealously, [taking great] pains and without sparing himself. Becoming rich and making a fortune by taking so much trouble – that is great wretchedness for the sake of sense-pleasures. In this world all suffering is due to the attachment (sneha) to and desire (abhidhyā) for them.

[If], however, that son of good family works so hard but does not gain any wealth, he worries too much and his suffering is indescribable. [In this situation] he thinks to himself: I have achieved something that deserves praise; I have applied all methods and carried out all plans, and yet I earn no money. If one compares the performance with its outcome, one should think of giving up. – This points to the desirability of giving up sense-pleasures.

Furthermore, while carrying out his plans, that son of good family may earn money; and with that earned money he may, in an intelligent manner, undertake a big project. Continually he is on his guard for fear that the king might order [his property] to be confiscated, that thieves might secretly steal it, water might sweep it away [or] that fire might consume it. It, moreover, occurs to him: [If I] try circumspectly to hide [my money] in a [secret] storeroom, [I will] be apprehensive about its future loss. [If I] want to invest [my money in the hope of making] a profit, [I will] be apprehensive about the risks; or a wicked son will grow up in my family and [eventually] squander my property. – On account of [all] these sense-pleasures [taken to require possessions as a prerequisite] create sheer distress. All this

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5 Whilst above in the EĀ text four topics are mentioned, viz. three tallying with those of the Pāli parallel and additionally ‘perception’, in this place saṃjñā is omitted.

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7 Lit.: duḥkhasukhacittā against the Pali sukhām somanassam.
8 I.e. 權詐. Could this be a sarcastic allusion to the profession of a lawyer?
9 Lit.: 'not at his own pleasure'.
11 I.e. 大患. Cf. Karashima, p. 185: 患悩, 'distress, suffering'.

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[suffering] is due to (pratiśya) and has its roots (mūla) in sense-pleasures which cause this havoc (apakṣāla, vikāra).

Now although that son of good family always concerns himself with safeguarding his money, after some time it is confiscated by the king, thieves rob him of it, it is swept away by water, it is consumed by fire, it is hidden in a storeroom and thereafter its [whereabouts] are uncertain, it is made good use of [by way of] investment [for the sake of high] returns, but without getting any, [or] a wicked son growing up in his house [eventually] squanders his money [so that] of a considerable fortune not even a fraction is left. Consequently he worries too much and suffers, becoming his breast and wailing: The money I had earned before has gone now, it is lost. – Accordingly, he is thrown into confusion and becomes mentally deranged. This is the meaning of [what has just been said, viz.] sense-pleasures create sheer distress. [All] this [suffering] is due to and has its roots in sense-pleasures so that one does not attain the Unconditioned (asamskrta).

Furthermore, due to sense-pleasures and being rooted in them, [adversaries] put on armour and attack each other. In doing so, they face units of [war] elephants, of the cavalry, infantry or war chariots. On seeing the cavalry, the [war] elephants, the war chariots or infantry they charge at them. They put each other to the sword or shoot each other dead; with lances and battleaxes they cause blood and gore. As sense-pleasures are related to this [blood and gore], they create sheer distress which is due to and has its roots in them, causing this havoc. Moreover, due to sense-pleasures and being rooted in them, [adversaries] launch fierce attacks either on city gates or on its ramparts, putting each other to the sword, shooting each other dead, piercing each other with their lances, knocking down [and cutting off] each other’s heads with iron discs or killing each other with molten iron. [As a result of all this,] they suffer too much and die in huge numbers. Accordingly, those who enjoy sense-pleasures are subject to impermanence. Everybody [one day] meets his end (ni-vyṛt), [being subject to] transformation (parināma) without there being any [real] standstill. Being in the grip of sense-pleasures and [therefore] being subject to impermanence and transformation, this is what is called sense-pleasures creating sheer distress.

How should one give up sense-pleasures? When someone succeeds in practising the overcoming of sensuous greed (kāmarāga), this is called their renunciation. The so-called śramanās and brahmīn [ascetics] who do not know of sense-pleasures as entailing sheer distress, also do not know where to begin [in order to] give them up. [Those] šramanās and brahmīn [ascetics] do not really know of the department (īrīyāpatha) pertaining to them; they are not [real] śramanās and brahmīn [ascetics] and are unable to give rise to their realising [the ultimate goal] and perfect mastery over themselves. The śramanās and brahmīn [ascetics] who perfectly know of sense-pleasures as entailing sheer distress, are capable of really and unpretentiously giving them up. They know of the department pertaining to śramanās and brahmān [ascetics]. They have given [rise] to their realising [the ultimate goal] and perfect mastery over themselves. This is what is meant by giving up sense-pleasures...

Addendum to EA XVI

At BSR 11, 1 (1994), pp. 54-62, a translation of the EA version of the story of King Māndhātṛ is given. Mention should be made of D. Schlingloff, King Mandhatar’s Rise and Fall, Interpretation of the Bagh Painting Based on the Line drawings in J. Marshall, The Bagh Caves, 1927, and the Identification of M. Zin in East and West 51 (2001), Munich 2003. This brochure also contains a comprehensive bibliography (literary versions of the Mandhatar story, Pāli and Sanskrit texts, Chinese and Tibetan translations). Many thanks are due to Prof. Schlingloff for offprints of his publications.

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12 Lit.: ‘of a very large figure [he] does not get one’.

13 I.e. 自遊: cf. Soothill, p. 414b: 遊 = vikṛḍiṇa; see also BHSD, p. 482: ‘vikṛḍiṇa something like easy mastery... perfect mastery’.

OBITUARY

RIA KLOPPENBOR (8 March 1945 – 4 October 2003)

It is with deep regret that we record the passing of the distinguished occupant of the Chair of Asian Religions at the University of Utrecht. Born with the imposing nomenclature Maria Anna Gertruida Theresia Kloppenborg, Ria (as she was affectionately known) read Sanskrit, Pāli, Tibetan and the cultural and political history of South and South-East Asia at Utrecht under Jan Gonda and at Leiden under David Seyfort Ruegg. She obtained her doctorate for a pioneer study of Buddhist asceticism which was published as The Paccekabuddha (Leiden 1974; abridged ed., BPS, Kandy 1983) which included a translation of the Khaggavīṣāna Sutta accompanied by relevant passages from the canonical commentary to the Sutta-Nipāta. Appointed Associate Professor in 1970, she also taught Indian Religions at Tilburg Technical University (1977-79) and in 1979 was invited to occupy the additional post of Associate Professor in the Department of South Asian Languages and Culture at Groningen, teaching Sanskrit, Pāli, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit and Cultural History. In 1988, at Utrecht, she was promoted to full Professor of Asian Religions and the Science of Religion, responsible for not just the classical languages involved but for the wider fields of Buddhism, Hinduism and Comparative Religion.


RBW

In her life Ria proved to be an inspiring teacher and scholar. Students who followed her classes would not forget this experience easily and many of them wrote their MA or Ph.D theses under her diligent guidance. Ria would take you on a journey through time and space, her teaching would confront you with a unique way of associating facts and incidents from the remote past and from far off countries with modern actuality. She was able not only to accomplish this if it came to the wider cultural similarities or differences but even where the personal emotional sphere was involved. For Ria her commitment to her studies and students was closer to a way of life than to a mere ‘profession’. Humanity and the human condition prevailed in all aspects of her teaching and writing. For Ria her working approximated to an art form and amidst her manifold publications there are translations of ancient texts that can be considered as literary reworkings of the originals. She would never accept a translation that merely reflected the contents of the work instead of giving proper attention to the literary merits of the original. Her fascination for the arts moved beyond her academic undertakings: she was a painter of mainly Buddhist themes and was also a musician. She often travelled to Asia and many of her students accompanied her on trips to India, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand. Occasionally, Ria’s house would change into an open forum in which friends and relatives would display their proficiency in music, poetry and dance.

Ria understood that the essence of Asian studies was not only a matter of academic research because Asian traditions may confront the West with new impulses. For this reason she was working over the last six years of her life with a group consisting of psychotherapists and psychiatrists who were trying to find and construct connections between modern psychotherapy and Buddhist techniques of meditation. [The working group, Psychotherapie en Boeddhishe, was established in 1998. Attention is drawn to her relevant writings in this field: ‘Auto-nomie en (non)identiteit. De boeddhistische weg tot bevrijding en de psychotherapie’, Humanisme en boeddhishe, ed. Fons Elders, Nieuwkerk aan de IJssel 2000, and ‘Boeddhistische psychologie en westerse psychotherapie : niet-Zelf en zelf’, De moderniteit van religie, ed. G.Helleman, et al., Zoetermeer n.d.]

At the beginning of 2003 it became clear that Ria was ill, but the fact that her illness [cancer of the pleura] would have such a devastating effect was unexpected. She died in the company of dear friends.

I will remember, working under Ria as a post-graduate student, how she inspired her protégés, how she could stimulate and at the same time slow them down if their ideas were too far-fetched. Her combination of scholarly research with a feeling for the
aesthetic was fascinating. The parties would continue till the early morning with breakfast in the garden and the songs of the first birds...

Paul van der Velde

When I came to Holland in 1985 I was on the point of giving up Buddhist studies. I had been working with a supervisor who had never written a thesis, had only published a single article and who was, therefore, unequipped to provide the necessary encouragement and support. I then had the very good fortune to be introduced to Ria Kloppenborg who ensured that I persevered. She arranged a research position for me and I duly defended my doctoral dissertation, ‘Debates and Case Histories in the Pāli Canon’ (Utrecht 1991), Chapter V of which was published in BSR 9 (1992, pp.117-36).

Besides her own research, Ria’s special gift was to provide people with ideas that went beyond the limits of ‘normal science’ with the opportunity to work out these ideas. The result was that many people benefited apart from myself. It was particularly dear to her heart that the teachings of the ancient texts should be made useful through being combined with contemporary knowledge in many fields, including ‘personal growth’ and psychotherapy. Thus, she encouraged me in my explorations of Buddhist psychology which, today, has taken the form of vipassanā combined with breathwork (– for further information see www.i-breathe.com). Ria, I share this puñña with you.

Joy Manné

~ REVIEW ARTICLE ~

ON TRANSLATING THE SUTTANIPĀṬA

K. R. NORMAN

1. INTRODUCTION

One of the best aids available for anyone trying to understand and translate a Pāli canonical text is the commentarial tradition. The commentaries which are available to us represent the accumulated wisdom of the commentarial tradition at the time of their composition, as well as containing in the lemmata the forms of the canonical texts which were current at the time the commentaries were compiled.

Another aid is what might loosely be described as philology. In the case of a Pāli text this means an understanding of the development of the Pāli language, including grammar and syntax, vis-à-vis Sanskrit and the Prakrit dialects, a knowledge of metrical matters, and a comparison with the vocabulary of Brahmanical and Jain parallel compositions.

It is alleged that there is an opposition between tradition and philology when translating Pāli texts, but it is more accurate to think of a complementary relationship. The best translations will result when tradition and philology are wedded together and the results obtained by the usage of one method are compared with and controlled by those obtained by the other.

For anyone trying to translate the Suttanipāṭa (Sn) the commentarial tradition is especially rich. It consists of Nidd I & II, Pj I & II and Nidd-a I & II¹. Nidd I and II (the commentaries on the Atthaka-vagga, the Pārāyana-vagga and the Khaggavisāṇa-sutta) are especially helpful because they were made early enough to be included in the Pāli Canon. Professor von Hinüber (=OVH) has

¹ The abbreviations of the titles of Pāli texts are those adopted by A Critical Pāli Dictionary, ed. D. Andersen, H. Smith, H. Hendriksen, Copenhage 1924 ff.
given information about a tantalisingly small fragment of another Sn commentary which has been discovered in Thailand2.

A recent translation of Sn3 by N.A. Jayawickrama (=NAJ) claims to be based primarily upon the commentarial tradition. His notes at the end of each sūta frequently consist of quotations from the commentaries. He states (p.i): ‘In preparing this translation ... [I] was most indebted to Pj II and Nidd I and Nidd II in conveying the meanings as intended by the Buddhist tradition which goes back to at least 2 millennia. The rejection of this tradition would have resulted in many pitfalls that in certain circumstances can result in micchādītthi – heresy – from the orthodox point of view.’

NAJ’s translation is accompanied by an edition of the text. He states (p.i) that this is ‘more or less a transcript’ of the PTS edition4, with a few changes based on printed editions in Sinhalese script, and Bapat’s Devanāgarī edition5.

With reference to the text he has translated he notes (p.i): ‘The readings traditionally accepted as correct by the Commentators and their successors and the copyists of the manuscripts have been given preference rather than to arbitrarily emended readings on the grounds of metre or parallel versions seen in versions posterior to Pali.’ He continues (p.ii): ‘My main concern was to translate every word of the text following as far as possible the sequence of words in Pali and even bringing out the emphasis in the text keeping in mind the early history of Buddhist thought.’

A glance at the variant readings recorded in the critical apparatus of the PTS editions of Sn and the commentaries on it, and a comparison of the various editions of Sn might possibly suggest that an element of caution is needed in following NAJ in this practice, e.g. the PTS edition has -iḥāyin ‘learner’ in 85 where, as NAJ notes (p.41), Sinhalese editions read -kхаyin ‘teacher’. Cf. samānabhāvanī in 702 where, as NAJ notes (p.279), Pj II reads ṭhāgam.

It is, in fact, worthy of note that variant readings and interpretations had already developed by the time of the commentaries, as can be seen from the pāṭhantaras they sometimes record and the alternative explanations they give. As Grace Burford has pointed out6, the commentaries on Sn represent a rather mixed bag of preservation and innovation. Sometimes the commentaries simply preserve the teachings recorded in the original text. In other cases their interpretations alter the significance of the verses as originally stated. It is clear that the commentarial tradition of interpretation developed and changed between the time of Nidd I and II and that of Pj I and II.

2. RECENT TRANSLATIONS

I should like to examine some aspects of NAJ’s translation to see how far his claim is justified, and at the same time to compare it with two other translations which have appeared in England in the last twenty years (a) K.R. Norman, The Group of Discourses (Sutta-nipāta) I, PTS London 1984 (= GD), and (b) H. Saddhatissa, The Sutta-nipāta, Curzon Press, London 1985.

(a) My own translation is, in part, two translations, since at the end of each sūta in the first edition (1984) and in the paperback edition (1985) alternative translations by I.B. Horner and Walpola Rahula (=IBH and WR, from here on, IBH implies IBH and WR) are given. In the introduction to my translation Richard Gombrich (=RFG) states7, ‘[Miss Horner and Dr Rahula’s] combined erudition here presents the meaning of the Sutta-nipāta substantially as it has been handed down in the Theravādin

3 N.A. Jayawickrama, Suttanipāta – Pali Text with Translation into English and notes, University of Kelaniya 2001, pp.vii, 435.
5 P.V. Bapat, Sutta-Nipāta, Poona 1924.
7 Norman, GD, p.v.
tradition. [Mr Norman] has used the methods of historical linguistics and drawn on his unrivalled knowledge of Middle Indo-Aryan philology in an attempt to arrive at the text's original meaning.' Somaratne similarly states, ‘KRN often finds himself rejecting the traditional interpretation in favour of historical and philological interpretations', but in his review of GD Cousins questions the accuracy of RFG's statement.

The aim of my translation, as of those I have made of Theragāthā and Therīgāthā (Elders’ Verses I & II, London 1969, 1971), was to produce a literal, almost word-for-word, translation which I hoped would, when considered alongside the original Pāli, adequately convey my understanding of the original speakers' words, i.e. to give the meaning of the text as it was intended by the original speakers, or as it was accepted by the first hearers. This is not necessarily, therefore, the meaning it had for the later commentators, or even for Nidd I and II. In particular, in all my work in the field of Pāli I have been mindful of the fact that the Āsokan inscriptions and some Jain texts probably predate the Pāli commentaries and may well give guidance about the form and meaning of some early Pāli vocabulary.

(b) The stated purpose of Saddhatissa’s translation was to present the spirit of the text in contemporary language. He adds end-notes to some suttas, but rarely comments on the text. In Cousins’ eyes his translation goes some way in the direction of giving the general reader the feel for the contents of the Sn. In my review of Saddhatissa’s work I drew attention to some of the splendid phrases which it contains.

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10 Saddhatissa, op. cit. p.vii.

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3. INVESTIGATION

My investigation is restricted to a small selection of words:

(1) 3 visosayitvā:

Brough very plausibly suggested that the original reading should be va sosayitvā, not visosayitvā, thus giving a comparison to balance the comparisons with va or īva in 1-2 4-5. The error (if it is one) is older than the commentary, which gives no hint of va. I translated in accordance with Brough’s suggestion:

NAJ supplies ‘(like)’ in the translation, but makes no comment on the text.

KRN: ‘Like one drying up’.

IBH: ‘by drying up’.

Saddhatissa (= Saddh) states: ‘On the analogy of these [two] stanzas, therefore, I feel that the reading has been corrupt, even during the commentary period. I would suggest that it reads as saritaṃ sighasaram va sosayitvā and have translated it accordingly’ – ‘like drying up’. It is not clear from this if Saddhatissa was aware that Brough had already made this suggestion.

(2) 35 visāṇa:

Nidd II (Nāgārī [Nalanda] ed.) 248,6: yathā khagassā nāma visāṇaṃ ekam hoti adutiṃ, evam eva so pācēkabuddho takkappo tassadiso tappaṭhāgā. Pj II 65,10-11, written some 600 years later, gives a similar explanation: khaggavisāṇakappo ti, etthā khaggavisāṇaṃ nāma khaggamigasīvag.

NAJ earlier, although quoting both Nidd II and Pj II, nevertheless insisted that the comparison was not with the horn, but with the animal. He has now changed his mind about visāṇa. He says (p.26): ‘I have retained the translation of visāṇa as horn’. In his translation of the Gāndhāri version of the Rhinoceros Sūtra,

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14 op. cit., p.2, n.2.
Salomon too has changed his mind, but in the opposite direction\(^{16}\).

NAJ: ‘alone like the horn of a rhinoceros’.

KRN: ‘solitary as a rhinoceros horn’.

Saddh: ‘alone like a unicorn’s horn’.

(3) 78 saccāṃ.

Pj II 148,14-16: niddānān ti chedānām uppātanaṃ, karana-vacanatthe c'etaṃ upayogavacanāṃ veditabbaṃ, ayaṃ hi ettha attho: saccāna karami niddānaṃ ti.


NAJ notes (p.38) that Pj II explains this as an accusative used in the sense of an instrumental, but he does not say that the commentary in fact gives two explanations. Nevertheless, he does not follow the commentary in taking it as an instrumental, but translates as an accusative:

NAJ: ‘I make truth my weeding’.

KRN: ‘I make truth my weeding-[hook]’.

Saddh: ‘I make truth the destroyer of weeds’.

(4) 84 magga-jina:

Pj II 162, 7-8: magga-jino maggena sabbhakilese vijitāvi ti attho. As the commentary makes clear, the tradition took this as meaning ‘conquering (all defilements) by means of the path’.

There is, however, evidence for the use of ānā in comparable references, cf. magga-ānā in Pj II 490,24 (ad 698), and -ānū in contexts with words meaning ‘know’: magga-ānū maggavidū maggakovoṭo, Nidd I 446,25.


The ending -ānū is to be derived from -āna\(^{17}\). Although jina may indeed be derived from Skt jīna, the existence side by side of mārga-jīna and mārga-jīna as epithets of the Buddha is remarkable, and I assume that jīna is here derivable from jīa, with a svarabhakti vowel.

NAJ: ‘the winner of the path’, but he accepts (p.41) the possibility of mārga-jīna ‘knower of the path’.

KRN: ‘[the one who] knows the way’.

IBH: ‘conqueror (by means) of the way’.

Saddh: ‘has won the path’.

(5) 143 abhisamecca:

Pj I 236,11-14: santām padaṃ ti upayogavacanām, tatha lakkhaṇato santām pattabbato padaṃ, nībbanass' etaṃ adhi-vacanān; abhisameccā ti abhisamāgantvā; sakkiti ti sakko, samattho paṭibalo ti vuttaṃ hoti.

If santām padaṃ is indeed a synonym of Nibbāna, then it is inappropriate to say that the subject of the sutta has already obtained it. For this reason RFG claims\(^{18}\) that abhisameccā is an absolutive being used as an infinitive (of purpose), and translated ‘in order to attain’. In making this claim he states that he is following a suggestion of mine. I can find no evidence that I have ever stated such a thing in writing, but it is not impossible that I have at some time referred orally to Sen who states\(^{19}\) that infinitive forms can sometimes carry the sense of the absolute, and absolute forms can sometimes carry the sense of the infinitive. The examples of the latter usage which he gives from Asoka (dasayītā janam, savam paricajitpa) are, however, in fact absolutes in both form and meaning.

The use of infinitives as absolutes certainly occurs in Pkt\(^{20}\).

\(^{17}\) For the ending -ū < -a, see GD, p.200 ad 167.


\(^{19}\) S. Sen, Historical Syntax of Middle Indo-Aryan, Calcutta 1953, § 158.

\(^{20}\) Ibid., loc. cit. and F. Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar (BHSG), New Haven 1953, § 35.54.
but as far as Pāli is concerned, I have no certain example of this usage. In my note on 424 I gave as an alternative explanation for *dāthu the possibility that it is a genuine absolutive in *-tu, of which there are examples in the Asokan inscriptions. I now favour that explanation, and no longer see it as an infinitive with *-m lost metri causa. If there are no certain examples in Pāli of an infinitive being used as an absolutive, then the chances of the usage being reversed, i.e. absolutive for infinitive, are reduced.

Gombrich follows the commentary and states that *tam sāntam padam ‘the peaceful state’ is rightly explained as Nibbāna. NAJ too follows the commentary in this, but does not follow the commentary’s explanation of *abhisamecca. He states that it is in form an infinitive, not an absolutive. He compares Skt abhisametyai, and says (p.59) that *abhisamecca should be equated to abhisametavē in meaning. He is therefore assuming that abhisamecca is to be derived from *abhisamecc. This is a very interesting suggestion, but one which is impossible to prove or disprove. An original *abhisamecc could well have been misunderstood and changed to abhisamecca. The suffix -ecce < -etvai would, however, be unique in Pāli, as far as I know, and since the formation abhisametyai is very rare in Skt, it would seem to me to be very unlikely that such a formation would continue to be used in Middle Indo-Aryan.

Saddhatissa also translates *abhisamecca as though it were an infinitive, but gives no justification for doing so. It is interesting to see that Nāṇamoli’s translation seems to be an attempt to mix together an absolutive and an infinitive: ‘The state of peace to have attained’.

My explanation of the problem is to say that the commentary is wrong in saying that sāntam padam means nibbānam, but correct in saying that *abhisamecca is an absolutive. I take sānta literally as ‘peaceful’. It is used often enough as an epithet of a bhikkhu

(6) 239 sātam aṭhamānā: Pj II 284.3-4: sātan ti santo ariyā. aśamāṇā ti bhūṇjāmānā.

As NAJ notes (p.99), the commentary explains sātam as a nominative plural. NAJ rejects this, but also fails to follow the commentary’s explanation of aśamāṇā. He prefers to take this as passive, with sātam as the genitive plural of the agent. He translates as though the participle were a finite verb: ‘... are consumed (by) the virtuous’, but the connection between this and the finite verb bhaṇanti in pāda 9 is unclear in his translation. I take the commentary’s aśamāṇā as active, agreeing with the subject of bhaṇanti, and assume that sātam is to be taken with dhammāṇa in accordance with the doctrine of the good.


(7) 303 308 552 raṭhesabha: Pj II 332.22-23: raṭhesabho ti mahāraṭhesu khattiyesu akampiyaṭṭhena usabhasadiso.

NAJ: ‘the conqueror in chariot (of war)’.

21 GD, p.237.
22 Gombrich, op. cit., p.15.
24 For this and other variants of aṭhamānā, see M. Cone, A Dictionary of Pāli, Part I, a-kha (NPED), PTS Oxford 2001, p.265, s.v. asaññī.
KRN: ‘the lord of warriors’, and (more literally) ‘a bull among heroes’.

Saddh: ‘the lord of chariots’.

NAJ states (p.124): ‘Pj explains -sabho as usabhasaciso, prob [ably] it is an aluk-samāsa rathe + sabho (cf. antevāsika) with sabho derived from root sah, to overpower.’ He adds (p.232): ‘an aluk samāsa with rathe and sabho, a variant of saho, from an earlier root *sabh. It is strange that he does not follow the commentary’s explanation of ratha = khatiya + usabha (in the form isabha).


(8) 372 378 1003 1147 vivatta-cchadda.

Pj II 365,28: vivattacchaddo ti vījattarāgadosamohidāno.

Pj II 450,23-25: vivattacchadda ti ettha rāgadosamchāmanādiṭṭhi-avijjāduccarīcchadhānehi sattahī pañcičhanne kīسانhākāre loke tām chadanaṃ vījattetvā.

I earlier accepted the view that this word and Skt vighustaśabda, which occurs in Buddhist Hybrid Skt texts in contexts where Pāli has vivattacchadda, were related⁵¹, but I took the Skt form to be the original and translated it as ‘of wide-spread fame’⁵². In so doing I had overlooked the existence of Pkt vivattacchauṃ in a list of epithets describing the Jina⁵³. Although Pāli chadda can be derived from Skt śabda, there seems to be no way in which Pkt chaum can be so derived. I was then forced to the conclusion that -chadda and -chauma were both to be derived from Skt chadman.

It then follows that vighustaśabda must be an incorrect backformation from something like *vihuttachadda. The commentary derivation is therefore correct, and the only point of doubt is the translation to be given for -chadda.

The explanation given by the Jain tradition differs from that given in Pāli. Referring to the genitive/dative form in -ānaṃ, it states: vyāvyrttaadabhiyadh, gātā-karmānī saṃsāro vadd vaddad tatt vyāvyrttaṃ kṣīnam yebhyas te⁵⁴. The word is translated by Jacobi as ‘who have got rid of all unrighteousness⁵⁵, and by Williams as ‘who have thrown off all travesties’⁵⁶. In Skt chadman has the meaning of ‘deceit, disguise’, and in the second edition of GD I adopted this meaning for the compound, and translated it as ‘with deceit removed’.

NAJ: ‘who has rolled back the veil (of roots of evil)’, ‘... the veil (of ignorance)’

KRN: ‘with deceit removed’.

IBH: ‘the veil drawn back’.

Saddh: ‘who has torn asunder the veil of evil’.

(9) ājīhagamā 379:

Pj II, 369,16: ajihagamā ti adhi-agamā, gato ti vuttaṃ hoti.

NAJ’s statement (p.157) ‘There is no pf [i.e. perfect] jagāma may prove somewhat surprising to his readers. It is, however, a consequence of his stated (p.1) rejection of ‘arbitrarily emended readings on the grounds of metre’. It is, therefore, a reference to my decision to accept, for the purposes of my translation, OvH’s conjectured jagāma’⁵⁷.

26 M. Monier Williams, Sanskrit-English Dictionary (= MW), Oxford 1899, s.v. ratha.
28 GD, p.62.
29 H. Jacobi, The Kalpasūtra of Bhadrabāhu, Leipzig 1879, p.37, §.6; see also
30 H.D.T. Sheth, Pāisasaddamahapāḍava, Calcutta 1928, s.v. viaṭa.
33 See MW, s.v. chadman.
34 O. von Hinüber, ‘Zum Perfekt im Pāli’, Zeitschrift für Vergleichende

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The Trisūtbhā metre of the cadence of pāda c is incorrect, since we need a long penultimate syllable. OvH’s suggestion that we read here an historically correct perfect form jagāma, which despite NAJ does occur in Pāli at Ja VI, 203,2* (glossed as gato, 203,5’), not only corrects the metre, but also gives a better sense, since we need the translation ‘went away’, which a form from adhigam- would not give, as can be seen from its occurrence in S: yo nājihagamā bha vesu saram, ‘... not found any essence in existences’, where Saddh translates as ‘does not see’ and NAJ as ‘has not experienced’. The commentary tries to solve the problem by assuming that adhigam- can have the correct meaning, and explains it as gato.

If we accept that the original reading was jagāma, we can surmise that, as the perfect tense began to go out of use in Pāli and the form was no longer understood, jagāma was replaced by ājñhagamā – the initial a-being in crisis with the final -ā of manta-yītvā (but the Sinhalese Buddhajayanti edition reads -tvā ajjha-).

NAJ: ‘went away’.
KRN: ‘went away’.
Saddh: ‘went away’.

(10) 523 khetta-jina:

Pāda a of 524 explains khetta-jina as meaning khetāni vīceyya kevalāni, and Pj II 428,27-29 explains vīceyya as both vīceyya and vījeyya: tāni vīceyya jētvā abhīhavītvā vīceyya vā aniccādībhāvena vīcīvītvā upapārikkhitvā. The double explanation is repeated: etesam khetānam vijittattā vicitattā vā khetta-jina (429,6). This doubtless goes back to an earlier version of the sutta where, in a dialect where both -c- and -j- became -y-, the word appeared in the ambiguous form *vījeyya.

The Buddhist Hybrid Skt of the Sabhiya-sutta, however, has kṣetra-jīvo at this point, and the explanation given there is:

kṣetraṇi saṃyama kevalāni

Sprachforschung 96 (1982-83), pp.30-2. It is accepted by NPED, p.86, s.v. adhigacchati.

Norman – On translating the Suttanipāta

divya[m] manuṣam yam ca brāhmaṇ kṣetraṃ sa sarvamulākṣetrabandhanāt pramukto kṣetrajīvo tāyī pravuccati thathvāt (Mvu III 398,19*-399,2*).

In view of the equivalence, and of the existence in Pāli of the words khetta-nīna and khetta-nī nu and of the words kṣetra-vid and kṣetra-vidyā in Skt35. I think that the Buddhist Hybrid Skt reading is the correct one. I therefore take khetta-jīna as being derived from kṣetra-jīna36, with a svarabhakti vowel (see the note on magga-jīna above) and in pāda a (and 524d) I translate it as ‘field-knower’.

NAJ: ‘the winner of the field’.
KRN: ‘field-knower’.
IBH: ‘field-conqueror’.
Saddh: ‘world-winner’.

(11) 649 no:

Pj II 471,9-10: ajānantā no pabrunti ... ajānantā yeva eva va-
danti.

NAJ states (p.254) that Pj is silent on no, and he wonders if it is a variant of nu. As can be seen, however, the commentary is not silent, but explains it as = yeva. It is, therefore, the equivalent of the emphatic particle eva.

NAJ: ‘the ignorant do proclaim’.
KRN: ‘only the ignorant say’.
IBH: ‘truly the ignorant say’.
Saddh: ‘these ignorant ones say’.

(12) 664 bhūnahu:

Pj II 479,3-4: bhūnahu bhūtihanaka vuddhināsaka.

In view of the fact that bhūnahu is to be derived from Skt bhrūnahan “embryo-killer”, the commentary’s explanation ‘de-
strover of growth’ is not unreasonable. PED’s ‘a destroyer of beings’ is not far off the mark, and it is not clear why Saddh and NAJ translate the way they do. NAJ comments (p.266): ‘-nahu prob[ably] from -ghna, (root han) with metathesis’, but his ‘treacherous’ does not reflect the presence of either bhū or han.

NAJ: ‘treacherous’.
KRN: ‘abortionist’.
IBH: ‘a destroyer of growth’.
Saddh: ‘slanderous’.

(13) 704 967 tasathāvara:

Nidd I 448,12-19: tasā ti yesam tasinā tanhā appahinā, yesaṅ ca bhayabhervā appahinā, kimkāraṇā vuccanti tasā? te tasanti uttasanti paritāsanti bhāvantī santasam āpajanti. tamkāraṇā vuccanti tasā. thāvarā ti yesam tasinā tanhā pahinā, yesaṅ ca bhayabhervā pahinā. kimkaraṇa vuccanti thāvarā? te na tasanti na uttasanti na paritāsanti na bhāvantī, santasam na āpajanti, tamkāranā vuccanti thāvarā.

To follow the commentary would give the translation ‘those who tremble and those who do not tremble’ but, as Somaratne states, this gives the wrong idea. In my opinion it is better to follow the meanings of Skt trasa and sthāvāra and the Jain compound tasathāvāra.

MW (s.v. trasa): mfn. moving, n. the collective body of moving things (opposed to sthāvara), MBh xii f.; Jain.; and (s.v. sthāvāra): standing still, not moving, fixed, stationary, stable, immovable.

NAJ: ‘feeble and strong’, ‘the trembling and the stable’.
KRN: ‘both moving and still’.
Saddh: ‘weak or strong’, ‘feeble or strong’.

(14) 1040 1042 sibbanī:

Nidd II (PTS) 276,8: sibbanī vuccati tanhā.

38 Somaratne, op. cit., p.4.

Th-a 278,28 (ad Th 663): sibbaniṃ, taṇhaṃ.

A III 400,1-2: taṇhā sibbanī; taṇhā hi naṃ sibbati tassa tass’eva bhavassa abhinibbattiyaṃ.


NAJ (p.390) states that sibbāni can be equated to ‘the sewing’, and declares that PED ‘seamstress’ (= sibbanti) is unlikely. Nevertheless, the form of the word suggests that it refers to an agent, not to an action. If, then, taṇhā does the sewing, it is not too inappropriate to regard taṇhā as a sewer, i.e. seamstress.

NAJ: ‘the fabric (of craving)’.
KRN: ‘seamstress’.
IBH: ‘desire’.
Saddh: ‘patchwork world of greed’.

4. CONCLUSIONS

It is clear that when NAJ follows the commentaries blindly he is sometimes led to mistakes in interpretation, e.g.:

(i) 704 967 tasathāvara:

It is also clear that, despite his claim, NAJ does not always follow the commentaries, e.g.:

(ii) 78 saccam
(iii) 143 abhisamecca
(iv) 239 satam aṇhamāna
(v) 303 308 552 ratthesabha
(vi) 664 bhūnahu
(vii) 1040 sibbanī

40 Cf. MW, s.v. sīvanī: ‘needle’.

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He also admits that alternative interpretations to those given by the commentaries are possible, e.g.

(viii) In 3 he inserts '(like)'.
(ix) In 84 he accepts the possibility of a development from mārga-jña.

NAJ's translation is clear and easy to read. It is, however, clear that despite his statement that to reject the commentary tradition would have resulted in many pitfalls, he has in a number of places rejected that tradition, and in at least one case (his interpretation of abhisamecca) has made enviable use of the philological method of which he speaks so disparagingly.

The volume contains a slip of paper listing a handful of corrections. In his review Somaratne adds a few more, and use to date has revealed another dozen or so. None of them will cause confusion to readers.

K. R. Norman

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Somaratne, op.cit., p.4.
Maskell’s edition, have not been added (cf. von Hinüber, JPTS 21 [1995], pp.131-3). Not only is the wording of the text as such much better, it is also superior from an interpretative vantage point. Thus Maskell (157,2-3) did not recognise, unlike Norman/Pruitt (278, 5*-6*), that bhikkhuñinaññā hitatthiñaya, Pātimokkha pakāsaya, van nātho tassa dāne so, sampatto vannākkhamaṃ is an ordinary śloka (the same holds for [Maskell] 14,34-5 = [Norman/Pruitt] 23,6*-7*). Moreover, that the text of the Pātimokkha on which the Kkh comments is placed at the beginning of each section is very user friendly. Immensely helpful too are the indexes, three of which give quotations and parallel passages from the Kkh. No.4, though curiously omitted from the table of contents (p.xiii), lists all words occurring in the text, a most valuable research tool.

This edition tends a very reliable text of the Kkh. Naturally there are places where a better reading might have been desired. A few random remarks, jotted down while going through the text, may attest to this point:

22,14: Read manasikaritvā as one word (cf. 22.10/16: manasikarotha). The same holds good for manasikarotha, 22,17, and manasikaromā, 22,21. Correct the index (p.541 s.v. manasi) accordingly.
33,15: Read (with e.g. B⁹ C⁶ [=Maskell]) uṇmattakakhiṭṭha-cittavedanaṭṭānam as one word and correct the index [S.v. uṇmatta] accordingly.
35,10: Read with Maskell (=C⁶) nānataṃ as against nānattaṃ, which does not scan with the cadence of an even śloka pāda.
48,16/51,3: Read iti-cittamano (cf. 51,3: iti-cittamano ti iticitto itimano).
61,26: Read kāyappatibaddhā (instead of kāyāppatibaddhaṃ).
151,8: Read tividhā pī (instead of tividhāpi).

Minor though it is, a point of criticism concerns the treatment of the final -m as -m. There is some confusion here, and it would have been wiser to keep -m before vowels and h- (and possibly before all labials) and -m before all other initials irrespective of the readings in the sources By so doing, some of the footnotes would have become superfluous and quite a number of ‘double’ entries in the index could have been avoided (cf. e.g. nānābhāṇḍa-paṇcakam / nānābhāṇḍa-paṇcakam [p.499a]. Printing errors seem to be very rare and negligible (on 96,10 the number of the foot-

note after chiddassa should be 9 and not 7; and in footnote 9 chidassa should be corrected to chidhassā).

Parallels between Vinayapiṭaka and Samantapāsādikā (Sp) have been recorded using small letters printed above the line (“*”). Sometimes it takes some searching to detect the beginning and the end of a parallel. More problematic is that in the case of the (iti)citations of the Kkh only the end of the citation is marked off by signs such as *+, +с, or #. In each case the source has to be consulted to elicit the beginning of such a citation. It would have been more helpful to indicate, using the same sign (e.g. *+, +с, …), where an iti-citation actually starts.

Though a lot of parallels have been given there are surely many more, e.g. 72,13-14 = Sp 595,11-12; 219,24-29 ≠ Sp 870,35-871,4; 228,4-13 ≠ Sp 1409,25-36 (a long list of additions will be found in the detailed review of the book by Dr Petra Kieffer-Pülz, which is to be published in ZDMG). According to the ‘index of parallel passages’ (pp.381-5) there are only two to a text other than the Sp, viz. to Ps IV 43,4-6 and 43,6f. on p.273 (ad Kkh 273,25-274,1). Correct this to: Kkh 274,1-275,12 ≠ Ps IV 43,8-44,25 ≠ Sv 1041,7-1042,11.

This excellent edition paves the way for a translation of the text. Indeed no less is promised by the authors on p.xviii. Needless to save this is highly welcome news.

Thomas Oberlies
(University of Göttingen)


V. Fausboll’s edition of the Jātakatthavannanā, with more than 3,100 pages in six volumes, is by far the longest single work published by the PTS. Anyone trying to trace the occurrence of a specific word in the text has in the past faced a gigantic task.

The current availability of the Burmese, PTS, Siamese and Sinhalese versions of the Pāli Canon on CD-ROM or the internet has made it possible for readers to use the search engines associated with those versions to find any word they require, but this solution suffers from the obvious drawback that it can only be used when one has a computer to hand. To solve this problem Professors Yamazaki and Ousaka, whose indexes to the Dhamma-

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Book Reviews


V. Fausboll’s edition of the Jātakatthavannanā, with more than 3,100 pages in six volumes, is by far the longest single work published by the PTS. Anyone trying to trace the occurrence of a specific word in the text has in the past faced a gigantic task.

The current availability of the Burmese, PTD, Siamese and Sinhalese versions of the Pāli Canon on CD-ROM or the internet has made it possible for readers to use the search engines associated with those versions to find any word they require, but this solution suffers from the obvious drawback that it can only be used when one has a computer to hand. To solve this problem Professors Yamazaki and Ousaka, whose indexes to the Dhamma-
pada, Dīgha-nikāya and Vinaya-pitaka have already been published by the PTS, have now put all students of Pāli further into their debt by producing a computer-generated index to the Jātakathavānīna.

Like the work on which it is based, this index is the largest of its kind which the PTS has published. With more than 730 A4-size pages it is almost exactly the same size as the PTS's Pāli-English Dictionary, and compiling it was not an easy task. Realising as he progressed just how large the text was, Fausbøll began to abbreviate some of the most common words and phrases, prefixing lists of these to Volumes IV and V. Unfortunately for those wishing to generate indexes by computer, his abbreviations were not always consistent, so that (as Margaret Cone points out in the Preface) B. by itself stands for Bodhisatto, but in the combination A.B. it stands for Bārānasiyam. Fausbøll also saved space in the commentarial passages in Volume VI by abbreviating words and phrases in the lemmata, often giving only the first element of a compound, and not separating words in the same way as they appear in the verses.

In most cases the compilers of this index have restored the full form of abbreviated words, so that Bodhisatto, for example, appears in place of B. The abbreviation p. is, however, listed instead of pubbe. Differences of word separation have been normalised, e.g. yamme at VI 579,8% is corrected to yam me, as in the verse (579,5%), but truncated compounds in lemmata have been left in their truncated form.

Fausbøll usually put double hyphens after truncated lemmata, and this normally shows up in the index as a single hyphen. So, for example, the texts reads pāthīnavanā at VI 449,10%; the lemma at 450,7% is pāthina - , and this is listed in the index as pāthina-. The presence of the hyphen therefore shows that it is a truncated form.

Some hyphens in Fausbøll's text seem, however, to have defeated the compilers' computer. The phrase pakkhīva at VI 449,3% appears as pakkh - - in the lemma at 449,29%, but no entry pakkh- appears in the index. In the narrative pokkharavassam occurs at VI 586,31, and is listed, but p-vassam which occurs as an abbreviation of this at 586,32 does not appear, either in that form or as pokkharavassam. The sandhi consonant d is correctly extracted from yadesa at VI 198,12, but not from the more obvious ya-desa at VI 198,8%.

Some obvious misprints in Fausbøll's edition have been corrected, e.g. candālo at VI 213,19 is listed as candālo. Other misprints are not corrected, e.g. mahāsattasa which occurs as a mistake for sattassa at III 298,9. Nor are such obvious errors as araḷha and āropentu corrected to araḷha and āropentu respectively. Kevatta and Kevattā are not corrected to Kevatta, nor is luddā corrected to luddā.

The compilers of the index have not followed the Critical Pāli Dictionary's convention of adding an acute accent to line numbers to denote quotations from the commentarial passages with the result that, except for words which are followed by a hyphen, readers have no way of telling which forms occur in commentarial passages, and which in narrative passages.

Occurrences in verse are shown by adding an asterisk to the page number, instead of the line number as in the Critical Pāli Dictionary. Line numbers are shown by a superscript numeral, instead of a lower case numeral in a smaller font size.

Usage of the index will probably accustomise readers to such idiosyncrasies, and they will then be able to appreciate more fully the compilers' achievement in producing this invaluable work.

K.R. Norman


This volume comprises selected papers given at two conferences in 1990 at Arizona State University and the University of Chicago on the themes of 'Interpretations of the Jātaka Tales in Southeast Asia' and 'Buddhist "Life Stories": Sacred Biography in Southeast Asia' respectively. The theme of sacred biography spans a variety of subject disciplines, including history of religions, history of art, and anthropology, and the individual contributions focus variously on Buddhist texts, art, myth and ritual.

The theme of sacred biography, which Juliane Schober claims to be a 'lacuna' in Buddhist studies, encompasses a remarkable variety of topics, and the book is divided into four main sections. The first of these deals with the Jātaka stories. Frank E. Reynolds
demonstrates how the Jātaka highlights three different lineages of Gautama: a lineage of successive Buddhas, a family lineage and a lineage of previous lives. Mark R. Woodward's contribution consists of detailed textual analysis, showing the links between the biographical and the philosophical. Robert L. Brown explores Buddhist monuments in which Jātaka scenes are depicted, focusing on the Ajantā cave paintings, Chula Pathom Chedi and Wat Si Chum in Thailand, the Ananda Temple in Pagan, Burma, and Borobudur in Java. He argues that the inaccessibility of the scenes and their lack of narrative content indicate that their prime purpose was not didactic but rather an attempt to 'historicize and manifest the presence of the Buddha' (p.74).

Part Two focuses on textual sources relating to sacred biographies of other enlightened beings. John S. Strong demonstrates how the post-canonical story of Gautama's 'Great Departure' signals a parallel between the homeless and the householder, and between monks and laity. Reginald Ray offers a study of longevity amongst Buddhist arhats, with special reference to Nāgārjuna, suggesting that its causes lie in the arhat's accomplishment through meditation and his being needed by other sentient beings to whom he vows aid. Jonathan S. Walters discusses three biographical texts from the post-Asokan empire, Cariyāpiṭaka, Buddhavamsa and Aparaṇa.

The third section focuses on the theme of 'kingship'. Forrest McGill discusses some paintings that are now housed in the Phoenix Art Museum depicting scenes from the Vessantara Jātaka (the 'Great Life'), in which the Buddha-to-be is born as King Vessantara. He questions whether the motives of Buddhist laity in donating such pictures is really to 'meet Maitreya', arguing that such expressions of devotion belong to what Melford Spiro called 'the rhetorical mode of nibbāna Buddhism' (p.208), and suggesting that their motives are probably pragmatic in nature. Thomas John Hudak's contribution, which follows, is an analysis of the structure and stages of compilation of the Panyatā-sīlaka stories. The section ends with Paul Christopher Johnson's discussion of the Siamese Buddhist king Mongkut, who successfully predicted a total solar eclipse on 18 August 1868. Mongkut has served to reinforce the view that Buddhism is the 'religion of reason', but Johnson is rightly critical of such claims. Arguing that rationality is not absolute but is something that is negotiated within a culture and historical period.

The book's final section consists of anthropological contributions. Juliane Schober discusses Mahāmuni, the Buddha's living twin, whose image is said to have been cast during the Buddha's lifetime. James L. Taylor focuses on Ajaan Man Phuuruiethato (1870-1949), arguing that his hagi-legends resulted in local recitals being institutionalised into nationally acclaimed personalities. Gustaaf Houtmann writes on U Ba Khin (1899-1971), one of the precursors of the vipassanā revival, raising the question of the relationships between biography, 'sacred biography', hagiography and history.

Schober's collection of papers is unashamedly a set of proceedings from academic conferences. At times the material is difficult, even dense, and it is unlikely that it will attract interest beyond academic circles: it is certainly not an introductory book, or one for the general reader. Much of the book's merit lies in the conceptual mapping of concepts: the editor emphasises Stanley Tambiah's notion of 'indexal symbols', arguing that the study of sacred biography opens up themes that are germane to a variety of academic subject areas, but also throws up contrasts between a religion's past and its uptake by present-day supporters. The book is not only a valuable contribution to Buddhist studies but also a salutary counter, on the one hand, to traditional Buddhists who regard sacred biography as fact and, on the other hand, present-day Western Buddhists who regard their religion as the unsullied 'religion of reason'.

George Chryssides
(University of Wolverhampton)
Nonetheless, to scholars interested in the presentation of Theravāda teachings in the Canon this will prove a valuable resource. In the book, Anderson surveys the range of occurrences of the Four Noble Truths throughout the Canon, and is brave enough to tackle the Abhidharma uses of the formula. Overall the writing is precise and the arguments follow relatively clear paths. There is more to this work than just a description of where the Four Noble Truths occur and how they are described in canonical material. The central plank of the analysis is a distinction between the Four Noble Truths as ‘symbol’ and as ‘doctrine’. Anderson approaches the Truths both as a doctrine – as a ‘right view’ to be attained – and also as a symbol. The symbolic power of the Four Noble Truths is at its most evocative in the accounts of the life of the Buddha, and Anderson contrasts this with their use elsewhere, where they form part of a wide network of teachings.

After a generally clear introduction, the first chapter, ‘Cultivating Religious Experiences: Doctrine and Ditthi’, begins with a concern for the ‘various relationships between sacred texts and the actual behaviors of religious practitioners’ (p.30). However, it mostly consists of a study of the notoriously awkward notion of ditthi. While there is a good engagement here with the various types of samma-ditthi (right-view), it would have been interesting to see the Sutta-nipata verses (in the Aṭṭhakavagga) which equate right-view with no-view brought into the discussion.

In the second chapter, ‘Stories and a Symbol of the Buddha’s Enlightenment’, Anderson suggests that in the Nikāyas the Truths are often seen as a symbolic expression of the Buddha and his achievement, as she writes (p.79): ‘they are an encapsulation of a particular body of claims about the Buddha and his teachings.’ There is a useful line of thinking here, but there is a question over its accessibility to a wide audience. The material is often technical and becomes embroiled in concerns over whether the Four Noble Truths were present in the earliest forms of the suttas she examines. While clearly an important concern, the discussions of this often interrupt her broader line of thinking and might have been better located in an appendix.

The third chapter, ‘Analyzing the Four Noble Truths’, examines how the teachings of the Truths are integrated with other aspects of the Dhamma – particularly how they fit into the analytical scheme of the Buddha’s teaching. The Truths are here seen as part of a body of teaching – not the symbol of that teaching, or even perhaps its summation: ‘Within the networks of the Buddha’s teaching, the four noble truths are one doctrine among others and are not particularly central’ (p.85). This chapter concerns the patterns of the Truths’ occurrences in the text and allows Anderson also to assess the, rather limited in her view, extent to which the suttas present the Truths as emblematic of the Buddha’s enlightenment.

In the fourth chapter, Anderson moves to look at Abhidhamma versions of the Truths. Her concern is to identify whether there is a pattern to their usage with the mātikās of the Abhidhamma. Her typically Buddhist response (yes and no) indicates that the Truths are analysed systematically as part of a web of doctrine in the Abhidhamma, as we might expect – forming a central element in the outlining of the suttas that the texts represent. Anderson closes her analysis, which traces a useful path through the Abhidhamma material, by reiterating one of her central concerns about the Truths as propositions when she writes: ‘in the analytic networks of the Tipiṭaka, the four noble truths are no more or less important than any other relevant teaching of the Buddha’ (p.127).

The fifth chapter, ‘The Four Noble Truths and the Path’, examines the relation of the Truths to the Path. The author begins by comparing the way in which, although the idea of a Path is strong, there is, in the Pali Canon, ‘the absence of an overarching and comprehensive structure of the path to nibbāna’ (p.131). Here Anderson is interested in how the Truths work as more than pure propositions, that is: how they operate as teachings. In the account given, she discusses the effect of hearing the Truths and the extent to which they compare, in terms of efficacy, with other elements of the teaching. There is some interesting discussion here, with a well-justified concern with the pedagogical deployment of the Truths. Not all scholars will agree with her conclusions, but by this stage of the book Anderson is addressing important issues and pulling together a broad range of canonical and commentarial material.

In the sixth chapter, Anderson engages with what seems rather a mammoth task: to examine ‘Studies of the Four Noble Truths in Europe and the United States’. While this is interesting and has some engaging discussion, there are two problems with this
chapter. Firstly, it is unable, given its size, to address the breadth of this topic and one can read it as being somewhat selective. Secondly, the topic breaks up the overall argument of the book. While the author is able to make links to her broader lines of thought, this chapter might have been better employed as the starting point for a follow-up work rather than as a component of this one.

In conclusion, there are two key roles for this volume. Firstly, it is a fantastic resource for scholars — it gathers together much useful material, as well as prodding us into re-thinking the way we approach doctrinal teachings — demanding we consider the symbolic as well as propositional value of teachings.

Secondly, although its impact may be limited in this respect by its technical content, it may help to combat a problematic tendency in the representation of Buddhism. In all too many teaching contexts (be it secondary schools or universities), the Four Noble Truths are treated as both a 'Buddhist creed' and a handy summation of the teachings of the Buddha. Whatever we think of Carol Anderson's claim that the Truths were absent from the earliest strata of the Pali Canon, we can all benefit from being reminded of how the Truths, particularly as teachings — as expression of doctrine — are integrated within a broader range of ideas. While I think her closing lines (p.231) do not make this as clear as she does elsewhere, Anderson offers an intriguing study into what it is that makes the Truths occupy their special place in Buddhism — and her use of the idea of them as symbol here is powerful and provocative.

David Webster
(University of Gloucestershire)


This book consists of two parts: a thoroughly annotated translation of the Treasure Store Treatise (part two), and two chapters placing this work in its intellectual and historical context (part one). Although it follows the traditional model of translating and philologically dissecting Buddhist texts, the book's main intent is polemical. As indicated by the title, *Coming to Terms with

*Chinese Buddhism*, the author clearly intended to use this text to make a point about how we tend to interpret Chinese Buddhism. Sharf explains in his introduction that Chinese Buddhism has traditionally been seen as the product of a confrontation between two civilisations, the Indian and the Chinese. In this 'master narrative,' the sinification of Buddhism is regarded as a gradual inculturation process of the 'foreign' religion into Chinese society, a dialectic process in which the paradigms of Indian Buddhism were gradually transformed in accordance with Chinese conditions. Sharf rejects this dominant interpretative model and proposes that we stop measuring Chinese Buddhism against a normative model of Indian Buddhism but instead regard it as the product of forces acting within Chinese society alone; the direct impact of Indian Buddhism, for example through its missionaries, was negligible, he argues.

The Treasure Store Treatise (Pao-tsang lun, T 1857, 45.143b-150a), then, is an ideal example to show the internal dynamics shaping the Chinese Buddhist tradition. A short work traditionally ascribed to Seng-chao (374-414), it shows some striking similarities with the Tao-te ching, whose famous opening sentence it appears to parody. While the Tao-te ching starts with 'The Way that can be talked about is not the Constant Way. The name that can be named is not the constant name,' the Treasure Store Treatise opens as follows: 'Emptiness that cannot be deemed empty is not true emptiness. Form that can be deemed form is not true form.' Although this at first sight cheap Buddhist pastiche of a Taoist classic may not seem like an 'important work that merits study,' Sharf convincingly shows that it is both important in understanding a certain phase in the historic development of Chinese Buddhism, and is symptomatic of the way Chinese Buddhist intellectual discourse operates.

In the first chapter, the author tries to find out when the Treatise was actually composed and how it came to be associated with Seng-chao. Both external and internal evidence suggest that the text cannot predate the late eighth century; citations of its title or quotations attributed to it do not appear before the ninth century, while the style and some circumstantial evidence further confirm that it came about in early Chan milieu (mainly the Ox Head school) ca. 800. It is well known that throughout the eighth century, Tang emperors held the Tao-te ching in high regard,

giving it an unassailable status which in turn elevated the status of Taoist clergy. At the same time, Taoism was consolidated as a legitimate part of mainstream literati culture. In this context, rather than directly engaging Taoism in a debate on which tradition was superior, the Buddhist milieu behind the Treatise appropriated Taoist rhetoric to further their own cause. However, while declaring all doctrines to be expressions of a single truth, it is unmistakable that this truth is Buddhist (p.76). Seng-chao, then, was an ideal author to hang the Treatise on, as his style was celebrated for 'recast[ing] Buddhist thought in an idiom familiar to and esteemed by literary Chinese' (p.37). Moreover, this style of exegesis had become current in seventh and eighth century Taoist circles, commonly known as the Twofold Mystery Taoism; besides the Ox Head school of Chan, the Twofold Mystery circles were another important intellectual component of the Treasure Store Treatise.

The second chapter delves into what Sharf calls the 'hermeneutics of sinification' (p.132): this refers to the main interpretative concepts used by texts such as the Treatise. While we mostly try to explain the conceptual framework of Chinese Buddhist texts according to categories outlined in specific sūtras, translated into Chinese but deemed to reflect Indian originals fairly accurately, the author calls attention to the persistence of indigenous Chinese hermeneutics. More specifically, he proposes that the 'Cosmology of Sympathetic Resonance' (kan-ying) is paramount in understanding the argumentation of Chinese Buddhist texts. Originally, this refers to an understanding of a set of basic correspondences between various phenomena; in one famous example from the Han dynasty, a palace bell suddenly started ringing of itself. According to the court astrologer, this was because a mountain had collapsed: 'Mountains are mothers in relation to bronze. When the mother collapses, the child cries.' It was later confirmed that a mountain had indeed collapsed (p.82). Rather than a specific theory, this correlative thinking is a mode of theorising (p.81), which the author also discerns in Buddhist philosophical discourse. The impact of Chinese cosmology can be seen in particular in the case of the translation of the Buddha-body theory from India to China. While neither the Indians nor the Chinese ever settled on one single version of the Buddha-body theory - though the trikāya theory, positing three bodies, appears to be the most common, the numbers range from two to ten - Sharf notes the special importance of the resonant- or response-body (ying-shen) of a Buddha in China. Although this term was sometimes used as an equivalent of the sambhogakāya or the nirmāṇakāya, it gradually developed into a generic term for any corporeal body of a Buddha responding to the needs of suffering beings. While this is still broadly in line with the standard trikāya doctrine, the author shows how the power to produce such bodies was often interpreted in terms of the traditional Chinese theory of sympathetic resonance (p.111).

The translation of the Treatise takes up the bulk of this book. The original text consists of only three short chapters, but the author has divided the text into paragraphs, which are put in bold face and followed by extensive notes on the key terms, expressions and concepts. It is therefore easy to read the highlighted text first and the author's comments later. In general, the quality of the translation is very high, striking a delicate balance between a faithful rendering of the original and clear readable prose. Despite the revisionist attempt, this work stands out for its clear prose, eschewing the post-modern jargon and style that are often the staple of revisionist works.

In sum, I found this book a welcome addition to the field of Chinese Buddhist studies. The assertion that traditional Chinese cosmology remained a core component of Chinese Buddhist thinking will force everyone in the field to reconsider the way we approach at least some of the texts of the Chinese Buddhist tradition. However, I cannot help but find the contention that traditional scholarship on the sinification of Buddhism has mistakenly assumed that this process was a 'dialogue' between distinct entities is somewhat overblown. Although the author is certainly right in calling attention to the internal dynamics of Chinese Buddhism, I do not think that previous scholars working on the sinification of Buddhism regard Indian Buddhism as a normative, constant ideal, even if they did not spell this out. Ironically, I think that Sharf's own work can be seen to confirm the validity of earlier periodisation models by showing the gradual dissociation in the eighth-ninth centuries of Chinese Buddhist terms from their Indian equivalents, thus hinting at a transition from 'independent growth' to 'appropriation'. Also, if previous scholarship is guilty of essentialising Indian and Chinese Buddhism, then
what is the use of a term like sinification, which assumes this essential distinction between the two? Even if the author manages to eschew an essentialising discourse on Indian Buddhism, is not 'the ubiquitous and persistent influence of Chinese cosmology' (p.132) a statement that essentialises Chinese ways of thinking? Finally, I think the book would have benefited from an overall conclusion that took up some of the arguments never fully developed in the text; these include the impact of Taoism on Chan, and the nature of Chinese Buddhist schools (now relegated to an appendix on esoteric Buddhism in China, which argues that there never was a distinct esoteric sect in China). But these concern the presentation of the author's arguments; with the arguments themselves I find myself in full agreement.

Sem Vermeersch  
(Keimyung University, Daegu, S. Korea)


With her book, Liz Wilson highlights one of the key Buddhist practices, namely that of contemplating the impermanent body as a means to seek detachment from the material world. She argues that the post-Asokan Buddhist texts discussing this contemplation are heavily gender influenced. She thereby focuses on the South-East Asian tradition. The author meticulously shows how the Buddhist narrative is marked as masculine to the extent that women are conscious of themselves only as perceived by men. This is the result of the fact that female bodies are presented as prime symbols of impermanence, to be observed not as persons but as ‘walking corpses' (p.2 et passim).

In this context Wilson discusses several themes: celibacy and the social world, the Buddhist construction of the body, horrific figurations of the feminine, temptation, and the nuns' monastic life. She thereby emphasises the macabre figurations of women as object lessons, not only for men but also for women. The ‘male gaze' (p.14 et passim) is thus prominently present, and even women learn about impermanence by observing female bodies or even their own body (pp.106-7, 123, 148 ff.). Masculine horrific figurations are rare exceptions (p.105 ff.). Women thus incorporate evil and even actively promote it. They are Māra, or at least daughters of Māra (pp.36 ff., 93, 124, 179). They captivate men (p.68) and they deceive their victims through the power of illusion (p.71).

However, by highlighting the evil of women, the author somehow overemphasises their negative role. Buddhist texts, and certainly the earlier ones, not only see women as object lessons and blameworthy beings. The rules imposed on the first nun Mahāprajāpati (p.145) also incorporated an institutional aspect (cf. A. Spoonberg, ‘Attitudes toward Women and the Feminine in Early Buddhism', in J. Cabezón, ed., Buddhism, Sexuality and Gender, Delhi 1992, pp.3-36). Just as is the case in lay society, women had to play a subordinate role. Still, like their male counterparts, they could reach arhatship and thus were not ‘evil' in the ascetic and negative view of women seems to me to be a later but even stronger evolution (cf. A. Hierman, ‘Chinese Nuns and Their Ordination in Fifth Century China', Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 24.2, 2001, pp.275-304). When women were first seen as institutionally dangerous to the Buddhist community, they then became regarded as constituting a danger to the ascetic life of that very community. But even then, they were not merely considered to endanger one man in particular but rather the community as a whole. A man committing sexual intercourse was therefore not ‘defeated [by evil]', as the term pā戒ika is explained on p.24, but should be expelled from the community so that this weak element can be eliminated (the idea of expulsion is related to the etymology of the term pā戒ika. ‘Defeat' is a later evolution. Cf. O von Hinüber, A Handbook of Pali Literature, Berlin/New York/New Delhi 1996, p.10). The negative evolution of the perception of women did not stop there, however. From a danger to the community of monks as a result of physical attraction, women evolved into beings incorporating danger. They are evil. They are now the daughters of Māra. They represent impermanence and constitute object lessons for both men and women.

I thus can only agree with Wilson’s conclusion (pp.7, 192-3) that there is no decline in androcentric thinking in the millennium.
after the death of the Buddha. On the contrary, women evolved into personifications of impermanence and decay, as a result of which the semantic fields of womanhood and attachment to the evil world inevitably became even more related than ever before. The author's lively work exemplifies this in a very clear and straightforward way.

Ann Heirman
(University of Ghent)


The literature at the interface of Buddhism and Western psychology was first established in 1894 with the publication of Enryo Inoue's Eastern Psychology (Tokyo). Buddhism has since been approached from a number of Western psychological perspectives, such as psychoanalysis, behaviourism, cognitivism, to name but a few. However, this edited volume of thirteen essays is the first sustained contribution to this embryonic dialogue between Buddhism (in particular a socially engaged Buddhism) and community psychology. Buddhism and psychology are approached here both comparatively and integratively. The book is divided into four sections: section one, 'Foundations', section two, 'Healing and Psychotherapy', section three, 'Empowerment, Responsibility and the Challenges of Change', and the concluding section, 'Future Debates: Global Impact'. These contain three, four, five and one essay respectively.

Regarding the content of each of these sections, I find only section one to be problematic. Chapter one is an essay by the editors entitled 'On the Path of the Buddha: A Psychologist's Guide to the History of Buddhism', and chapter two is co-editor C. Peter Bankart's essay, 'Five Manifestations of the Buddha in the West: A Brief History', which contextualises the twentieth century engagement of Buddhism with Western psychology into five phases (Freudian Psychodynamics, Jungian Analytical Psychology, NeoFreudian Eclecticism, Behavioural Pragmatism and New Age Consciousness). However, also included in the same section is Edward S. Ragsdale's comparative essay, 'Value and Meaning in Gestalt Psychology and Mahayana Buddhism', which I suggest is an altogether incongruent inclusion under the theme of 'foundations'.

The book's thesis is that Buddhism and psychology normally focus their attentions only on the individual, and these essays argue for a move 'beyond the individual to the community and global level' (Dudley-Grant, Bankart and Dockett, p.3), and the consequent broader alleviation of suffering. Thus, much of this work deals with both in broader forms, those of socially engaged Buddhism and community psychology.

For those whose areas of interest and research are the promotion and continuation of a comparative and integrative dialogue between Buddhism and Western psychology and the relating of Buddhism to global concerns, I find that the major successes of this book are: firstly, the further development of a recently established dialogue between Buddhism and community psychology; secondly, that all of these essays achieve, to a greater or lesser extent, the book's promised move of refoosing concern and action from the individual to community, which is undertaken through a wealth of approaches. These essays contribute to the alleviation of what the authors propose as community/global problems, such as value conflict; alcohol and drug abuse; limited notions of responsibility; the language of biological determinism in the human services; ethno-political conflict, and the environment.

In chapter three, Ragsdale argues for a commonality of response from both Gestalt psychology and Mahayana Buddhism to the question of values as either absolute or relative. He posits that both find a 'relational' and middle way between these conflicting extremes (p.71). Thus, for him, constructing a less volatile way to negotiate global value conflicts would thereby constitute an alleviation of the suffering one encounters as co-terminus with such value conflicts.

Debating questions of value as foundationally absolute or relative could proceed ad infinitum. Thus I find Ragsdale's challenge potentially fruitful when he questions 'whether problems of ethics and value can be resolved within this duality' (p.71) and suggests this alternative response. However, his essay also raises questions on the comparative method which characterises a number of essays on this book, and these will be touched on shortly.
Firstly, these essays constitute a selection of the integrative approaches to Buddhism and community psychology. In chapter nine, Edward A Jason and John Moritsugu’s ‘The Role of Spirituality in Community Building’, Buddhism is employed to energise community psychology’s vision (p.201); in chapter eight, Kathleen H. Dockett’s ‘Buddhist Empowerment: Individual, Organisational and Societal Transformation’, integrates so-called ‘Buddhist empowerment’ as found in Nichiren Buddhism with community psychology as a resource for the transformation of individuals, organisations and society.

However, problems arise for this book when a number of authors uncritically employ the method of comparison for similarity rather than difference when approaching the Buddhist traditions at hand. The problem with a comparative method which is eager to establish similarities while unable to deal with differences is that it tends uncritically to impose contemporary understandings and concerns on a profoundly different historical and cultural milieu. Ragsdale wants to distance himself from this method and he suggests a ‘mutual illumination’ of Gestalt psychology and Mahāyāna Buddhism, which he claims will avoid the ‘risks of comparing traditions so widely separated by time, culture, and institutional nature’ (p.72). Call it semantic nit-picking, but to claim that Mahāyāna Buddhism (pre- the formulation of the discipline of psychology in the late nineteenth century) requires ‘illumination’ from mid-twentieth century Gestalt psychology can imply that Mahāyāna Buddhism is veiled in an interpretative darkness which requires the illuminating force of Gestalt psychology.

My reservations regarding such claims by Ragsdale and others is that, although he attempts to respect issues of ‘time’, ‘culture’ and ‘institution’, these positions can in fact reflect an ideology of, if not cultural imperialism, then of epistemological imperialism.

Facing similar problems in chapter six is Belinda Siew Luan Khong, in her ‘Role of Responsibility in Daisenanalysis and Buddhism’, wherein she argues that an ‘enlarged notion of responsibility’ (p.157) will emerge through the engagement of early Buddhism and Daisenanalysis. Khong argues for a reciprocal understanding, whereby ‘each perspective is made more meaningful by an understanding of the other’ (ibid.), which is roughly akin to Ragsdale’s ‘mutual illumination’.

I find Dockett’s essay is one of the more considered and promising contributions to social activism and change. Dockett gives a detailed discussion of her proposed Buddhist empowerment to be deployed on the following levels: for the individual – commitment, stress resistance and personal control (pp.177-85); for the organisation and community – belief systems, opportunity for the organisation and community – belief systems, opportunity (p.185); and for the role structure, support system and leadership (p.191), society – ‘changing large social structures and institutions’ (p.191), particularly through the work of socially engaged Buddhist action and movements as detailed by Dockett (pp.191-3).

Another important contribution is chapter five, that of Polly Young-Eisendrath’s ‘Suffering from Biobabble: Searching for a Science of Subjectivity’. Young-Eisendrath argues for a move from contemporary, harmful use of the language of biological determinism in the human services, which she describes as ‘biobabble’ (p.125), to an integration of Buddhism and psychology which will ‘diminish the effects of biobabble’ (p.128).

Young-Eisendrath gives a particularly pertinent example of the problem with the use of biobabble, whereby its use eliminates the role of meaning and intentions in the development of societies and people. In this story the ‘master molecule’ of the gene, falsely endowed with an autonomous power, overrides the effects of personal desires, intentions, and actions (p.127). To challenge such determinism, she incorporates the Buddhist concept of karma, which does not deny action, volition and intention. Indeed, for her, this combination would constitute a ‘new science of subjectivity’ (p.125) which recognises, firstly, the impermanence of suffering and thus the possibility for change and, secondly, the capacity for alleviating suffering.

I contrast Dockett’s and Young-Eisendrath with less promising contributions, such as that of Richard P. Hayes in chapter seven, ‘Classical Buddhist Model of a Healthy Mind’. Hayes suggests that a ‘classical program’ (p.162) for achieving such a healthy mind is to follow the Buddhist path of ethics, meditation and compassion. On achieving this healthy mind, he suggests that out of that state should come a broader concern for others, and points to the Cakkavattisihanāda Sutta (which contains advice for families and government) as part of that ‘classical program’ to bring about an “ideal society” (p.166).
In Hayes’ favour, I find his account of the Buddhist path to be wholly consistent with traditional scholarship in this area, and his essay is the most grounded in primary source material, that of the Pali Canon. However, whilst he demonstrates that early Buddhism did indeed have broad community and societal concerns, I find that his proposal of a ‘classical program’ fails to convince as a contribution to contemporary/global suffering, as it remains too simplistic and even idealistic. Hayes writes that, ‘if one patiently works at expanding the circle of friendship to include all of humanity, and then all of life, before one knows it, fear gives way to trust, despair to hope, arrogance to confidence, competitiveness to cooperation, anxiety to serenity and folly to wisdom. And then, without giving the matter any further thought, one shines as a beacon by which others can also find their way’ (p.179). Thus, ‘before one knows it’ and ‘without giving the matter any further thought’ one will ‘shine as a beacon’, just like that!

Although a number of essays here are based on primary source materials, the majority are based on secondary, and mainly twentieth century, source materials on Buddhism, which emerges as problematic, especially if the implication is that these understandings are the same as early Buddhism’s. To obtain some sense of the authors’ particular understandings of dependent origination (paticcasamuppada) and Buddhism in general, I shall locate their versions of this concept which, according to the editors in chapter one, is the concern of almost every chapter in this volume, ‘either directly or indirectly’ (p.20).

Rita Dudley-Grant, in chapter four, ‘Buddhism, Psychology and Addiction Theory in Psychotherapy’, finds her source on dependent origination in R. Metzner’s 1996 article, ‘The Buddhist six-worlds model of consciousness and reality’ (Journal of Transpersonal Psychology 28, pp.155-66). Belinda Siew Luan Khong, in chapter six, presents dependent origination as traditionally understood by early Buddhism, when she writes that it ‘originally applied to the aggregates that constitute the human being’ (p.147), but she then goes on to claim that it refers to the ‘indissoluble unity of human beings with all other beings’ (pp.150-1). Kathleen Dockett, in chapter eight, informed by Nichiren Buddhism, understands dependent origination as referring to the ‘oneness of self and environment’ (p.179) and as a ‘deeply ecological Buddhist principle’ (p.180), whilst also taking from Kenneth Kraft’s 1996 essay, ‘Engaged Buddhism’ (in A. Kotler, ed., Engaged Buddhist Reader, Berkeley, pp.64-9), the meaning of this concept as an ecological principle of interdependence. Dockett and Doris North-Schulte, in chapter ten, find their source in the third president of Soka Gakkai, Daisaku Ikeda’s article, ‘In search of new principles of integration’ (Seiko Times, March 1993, pp.33-9), for whom dependent origination is ‘the web of all life that binds all people’, whilst they themselves understand dependent origination as an integrating principle ‘for uniting self and other’ (p.234).

Shuichi Yamamoto, in chapter eleven, ‘Environmental Problems and Buddhist Ethics: From the Perspective of the Consciousness-Only Doctrine’, is the sole author in this work to quote the abstract form of dependent origination, as found in the Sanyutta-nikaya, which is as follows: ‘That being, this comes to be; from the arising of that, this arises; that being absent, this is not; from the cessation of that, this ceases’ (S II 28). But again, there is no referencing. The editors, in chapter thirteen, ‘On the Path to Peace and Wholeness: Conclusion to Psychology and Buddhism’, do not indicate where they sourced their dependent origination as ‘mutual interdependence’ (p.281).

I find deeply problematic the (mis)interpretations of dependent origination as ‘unifying’, as a doctrine of ‘oneness’ and as an ‘ecological principle’ that ‘binds’, for three reasons. Firstly, it could be argued that this theme of unity is alien to the doctrine of dependent origination, and owes more to contemporary interpretations and concerns from the influence of the ecologising of Buddhism. Understanding dependent origination as a unifying concept can be traced to the Taoist-influenced Hua-Yen (Flower Ornament) Buddhism. Hua-Yen Buddhism’s favourite imagery is that of the Jewel Net of Indra, whereby the net is constructed so that at each node there is a jewel, which in turn reflects all other jewels in the net. As Francis H. Cook writes in his Hua-Yen Buddhism: The Jewel Net of Indra (University Park/London 1977, p.2), ‘the Hua-Yen school has been fond of this image... because it symbolizes a cosmos in which there is an infinitely repeated interrelationship among all members of the cosmos. This relationship is said to be one of simultaneous mutual identity and mutual interdependence.’ This imagery of mutual identity, interconnectedness and unity has been appropriated to develop many contemporary ecological interpretations of Buddhism, but none of the...
authors indicates such a source. I do not suggest that Buddhism cannot contribute to contemporary ecological concerns, just that one has an awareness of the problems of reading back of ecology into early Buddhism.

Secondly, and alternatively, this theme of unity and oneness might be more representative of Advaita Vedānta's doctrine of the atman/brahman identity than of early Buddhism. Thus, I suggest that if the authors were in search of a unifying monism to apply to contemporary global issues, then perhaps a book on Psychology and Advaita Vedānta would have been more applicable.

Thirdly, and most importantly, this book's theme of oneness and unity of individual and global community rests mostly on false assumptions regarding the doctrine of dependent origination, that the individual is necessarily unified or at one with the global community. Dependent origination/arising, as found at Sāṃyutta-nikāya II 28, means that all phenomena arise in accordance with conditions, which does not imply that all phenomena are unified or that the individual is necessarily unified with the global community. But this is not to suggest that dependent origination is not a foundational source of relating the individual to community, as one has only to consider the formation of the Sangha and the fact that the Buddha taught the Dhamma for forty years after his Enlightenment. However, these understandings of dependent origination are, as I have demonstrated, a mixture of contemporary interpretations and vague unreferenced versions of this concept. Moreover, they are also based on obscure and generalised versions of Buddhism, not to mention the distorting reading back of contemporary ecological/global concerns into early Buddhism.

This treatment of dependent origination is a real problem for this book and such a central theme, to my mind, should have been addressed in a more critical fashion, but also more specifically texturedly based, which would have lent the work greater credibility, particularly for the readership of interested Buddhist scholars.

Issues raised by the book are, as shown, the comparative method, and Young-Eisendrath's essay also raises questions which feed an already well stuffed belly of a debate, that of nature-nurture. But a central issue raised by, but not referred to in this book, is that of the validity of Buddhism and psychology as cross-cultural categories. Can one apply Buddhism and psychology to the issues dealt with in this book, irrespective of the cultural diversity?

However, these problems aside, this book is important as the first sustained foray into this newly established dialogue between Buddhism and community psychology. The editors conclude in their final essay that 'Buddhism and psychology can forge a bond that can be mutually enhancing for the benefit of our society' (p.285). However, what I concur with and find admirable in their conclusion is the importance of what the editors suggest was the 'overarching theme' of this book, that of 'peaceful solutions to the terror, fear, and ethnic warfare that has been one of the greatest challenges to freedom in the twenty-first century' (p.277).

Stephen Dewar
(University of Stirling)


Comparisons between the Buddha and Jesus of Nazareth have intrigued scholars and seekers for over a century. In the introductory essay to _Buddha and Christ_, Robert Elinor traces the history of writings that have suggested significant parallels, starting with Ernst von Bunsen's _The Angel-Messiah of Buddhists, Essenes and Christians_ (1880), followed by Albert J. Edmunds' two-volume _Buddhist and Christian Gospels_ (1902) and Rudolf Seydel's _Die Buddha-Legende und das Leben Jesu nach den Evangelien_ (1884), translated into English as _Buddhism in Christianity_ (1909). More recent, and much better known, is Roy C. Amore's _Two Masters, One Message_ (1978) and, within the last decade, Thich Nhat Hanh's _Living Buddha, Living Christ_ (1995) and the Dalai Lama's _The Good Heart: A Buddhist Perspective on the Teachings of Jesus_ (1996) have added momentum to the debate about whether there might be some historical influence between Buddhism and Christianity, or whether the two religions are particular expressions of some archetypal reality that transcends both.

Amore gained recognition for his contention that Jesus was influenced by Buddhism. Elinor and Borg, by contrast, both support an archetypalist position, Elinor describing the two religions as 'local inflections of a universal archetype' (pp.15-16),
and Borg - drawing on William James - contending that 'the most satisfactory explanation for this similarity of underlying structure is not cultural borrowing, but commonality of religious experiences' (p.10).

Elinor's *Buddha and Christ* explores the parallels principally through art. The book is superbly illustrated, with over a hundred plates, mostly in colour, and carefully cross-referenced with the text, thus providing illustration rather than mere decoration. The author starts with artistic portrayals of the lives of the Buddha and Christ, and 'images of incarnation'. He considers Christianity's ambivalent attitude to images, particularly evident in the contests between iconoclasts and iconodules, noting that Buddhism has been much less prone to such controversy. The first part concludes with a chapter on 'resurgent symbols', highlighting artistic portrayals of key concepts that are germane to each religion.

The second part of Elinor's book takes a more diachronic approach: there is a chapter on early images of the two founder-leaders, followed by an account of how Buddhist and Christian art develops as each religion is propagated worldwide, beginning with Asoka in the case of Buddhism, and Constantine in the case of Christianity. A final chapter deals with twentieth century art, and includes material on theatre and film.

In some parts of the book Elinor makes comparisons between the two religions; in other places he allows material from only one religion to develop in its own right, for example in his exposition of bread, wine, fish, lamb and shepherd as symbols of Christ. While this has the effect of giving the book a slightly untidy structure, the author avoids the temptation to create false parallels or to contend that the two religions are really 'saying the same thing'. His conclusion is that religious art is a symbolic process, which expresses the 'nameless' and points to a shared and more ultimate religious experience.

*Buddha and Christ* is not a closely argued book and Elinor - although a scholar himself - does not break any fresh ground in Buddhist or Christian scholarship. The book's merit lies in providing an informative and reliable commentary on some very fine illustrations. If, as a result, the book is more of the 'coffee table' than the academic variety, it still performs an important role.

*Jesus and Buddha: The Parallel Sayings* is also of the coffee table variety, but differently so. Its illustrations evoke rather than inform and tend to be of landscapes, seascapes, flowers and fruit, rather than specifically religious imagery belonging to either tradition. The book is arranged around a number of themes, such as 'compassion', 'wisdom', 'temptation' and 'miracles', and each page presents a pair of parallel sayings of Jesus and the Buddha. The Buddhist verses tend to be drawn mainly from the Pāli Canon, although there are one or two Mahāyāna passages.

The book contains an introduction, written by Jack Kornfield, and a slightly longer Editor's Preface by Borg. Borg is an accredited Christian scholar and an important contributor to the 'Jesus debate': he regards Jesus as a religious mystic rather than a political agitator or an apocalyptic, and hence his favoured view of Jesus of Nazareth fits in well with the concept of the Buddha as a religious teacher who gained enlightenment through meditation. Although one might argue that the extensiveness of Buddhist scriptures is bound to allow comparisons with Christian sayings, some of the parallels that Borg identifies are uncanny. For example, Jesus' saying, 'Do not store up for yourselves treasures on earth... but store up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust consumes and where thieves do not break in and steal' (Matthew 6:19-20; p.50) is paralleled with the Buddhist text: 'Let the wise man do righteousness: A treasure that others can not share, which no thief can steal; a treasure which does not pass away' (*Khuddkapatha* 8:9). Borg identifies many more.

Whether such parallels can wholly be explained in terms of a shared archetypal reality demands much more discussion than Borg is able to provide in a brief introduction. One remark, however, is worth querying. Borg states, 'Because the Buddha lived about five hundred years earlier than Jesus, the direction of borrowing would have been from the Buddha to Jesus' (p.10). This is not necessarily so: traditions develop, and it is equally possible that Christian tradition percolated through into later forms of Buddhism: it cannot be safely assumed that, when Buddhism or Christianity attributes sayings to the Buddha and Jesus respectively, such sayings are authentic. Further research is needed to establish the pedigree and relationship of such sayings, and no doubt future scholarship will see further research on this important subject.

George D. Chryssides

*University of Wolverhampton*

NOT AT ALL UNEXPECTED – This essay reviews a rather unusual subject, a book by Paul Williams, its ex-Buddhist author (Professor of Indian and Tibetan Philosophy at the University of Bristol) has thought it worthwhile to write upon his decision to convert to Roman Catholicism. From the tone of this work the author’s writing is more one of self-justification than a balanced account of his spiritual journey. Though it purports to record this, the understanding of the Dharma displayed by Williams (W) is remarkably deficient. And if not so in his lectures, then the book displays an astonishing ignorance of the accepted meanings of the Dharma’s teachings. Admittedly his understanding may have been twisted by his conversion but he has not honestly presented the clarity of the Dharma. The material offered below attempts to demonstrate this. It is divided into two sections, Buddhist and Christian, though in the book the teachings of these two intermingle.

BUDDHIST – The author nowhere quotes the Buddha’s words, neither from the Sanskrit sūtras nor the Pāli suttas. This is surprising from a learned teacher of the Dharma as W was, both in his university classes and in his books. I find the author’s avoidance of any texts attributed to the Buddha as evidence of his unwillingness to face the teachings of the canonical texts. Another notable omission in the book is the absence of what could loosely be called Buddhist saints (apart from Shinran, pp. 102, 104, whose ideas W. plays with), a sign perhaps that the author does not wish to recognise that the Dharma’s practice leads to the evolution of wonderful people. No mention is made of Milarepa, for instance, or other great practitioners. According to him ‘saints’, I suppose, must be Christian and preferably recognised by the Catholic church.

Though W refers to his Going-for-Refuge and names his Gelugs Geshe as his teacher for this and though he was subsequently a Buddhist for twenty years, it does not seem that he was heart-stirred by the Dharma. His attraction to it was mostly to its philosophy, views and logic. It seems as though whatever meditation he was taught never took root in this dryness and so produced no fruits of practice.

Views and concepts after all, whether Buddhist or Catholic, are just collections of words to be used only as props – from Buddhist understanding – until the liberating experience of the way things really are dawns. Attachment to views (how many times the Buddha has referred to this in the Sutta-nipāta or Majjhima-nikāya) is so popular though it leads only to aridity. ‘I – or we believe’ is after all a central feature in many religious systems, but when they are regarded comparatively it would be hard to justify why one believes in this but not in that. Beliefs are without end, while changing from one to the other depends upon conditioned factors in this life and, as the Buddha demonstrates, from past lives. But whatever is believed, Christian or Buddhist, that is not known. Believers only believe, they do not know from their own experience what is true everywhere and at all times. The Dharma points to this which is beyond all views and beliefs. Though one may have faith in a certain set of beliefs, the various Christian creeds for instance, or the various qualities of the Three Jewels, this faith does not guarantee truth. Only wisdom, prajñā, can do that. We find, looking around this world, an astonishing array of beliefs, all proclaimed as true by their upholders, many of whose views contradict the beliefs of others. The end result of this tangle of beliefs is bigotry, persecution and oceans of blood shed. This is certainly true of the Christian sects, including RC, who have been responsible for much human suffering, all in the name of ‘true’ religion. It is interesting that Buddhists, by contrast, who do not encourage adherence to unverifiable dogmas, have been largely free from the tendency to persecute those of other opinions. They have not fomented any religious wars (Crusades, Jihad), in fact they have welcomed Christians who went to preach in Buddhist lands. For example, during the reign of King Narai of Siam (1657-88), French Catholic priests arrived there with a diplomatic mission and were welcomed by the king and given permission to preach. But just imagine, if Buddhist monks had accompanied the Thai mission to Paris during the same king’s reign – what sort of reception would they have encountered in France, a country only recently ‘pacified’ by the king and the RC church after the persecution of Protestants – which included the Massacre of St Bartholomew’s Day? Would they have been invited to teach the Dharma in Paris? As W remarks elsewhere, the RC church has
not been notable for its tolerance, nor would our author think so highly of it if it had.

Turning now to other aspects of the Dharma, W's book does not reflect much understanding of the Four Noble Truths or of the Buddhist teaching on existence (bhava). In fact, he finds descriptions of Samāsāra negative. This is not surprising in view of the usual Christian view of God's creation as 'good', a view that ignores the general bloodiness of existence and the immense sufferings which inevitably follow from the craving to exist, to be. From the Buddhist angle, Samāsāra's depiction is a fair one which fits all the facts that can be observed in the human and animal realms. Buddhists make no effort to avoid the dark sides of life which Christians and Muslims, in proclaiming the goodness of creation, are loathe to see.

Nor does he show much comprehension of karma (p.82 ff.). He has made some particularly fatuous attempts with logic to destroy the teachings on karma and its results. I suppose that his book, upon his conversion to Roman Catholicism, would be an unlikely place to look for a clear exposition of the subject, though as he must be a learned person, one would hope at least for an honest presentation.

Rebirth stirs W to ire and he devotes several pages of shaky logic trying to refute it (p.198 ff.). The Buddha, after all, emphasised practice in this life. How many people know clearly about past lives and who would be able to claim, unless conceited, their future state? It is the present one that is important because the present moment is the only time in which the Dharma can be practised. W ties himself up in several knots over rebirth but at least he does mention the na ca sa na ca anyah (neither the same nor different) description of a 'person' between the last life and this one, or between this and the next. He expresses moral reservations that the recipient of kamma's results will not be the same person as the doer of it. The Buddha has already mentioned this wrong view (an eternalist one) that the doer will be the same as the receiver. But surely this is not a problem. If we get out our photograph albums we may see there pictures of ourselves at different ages. Then if we ask whether the person represented in a certain photo taken twenty years ago is the same as myself now, or different from me, neither extreme answer will be satisfactory: there is no problem once we use the formula 'neither the same nor different'. As Catholicism is an eternalist view we would hardly expect the converted W to be pleased with the Buddhist recognition of impermanence. (But are Catholics exempt from impermanence then?)

Buddhists, indeed anyone, if they practise the path of Dharma may at least expect excellent states of future existence. If they are more devoted and develop wisdom and compassion, they will certainly experience stages of liberation. (This W is unwilling to admit.) Of course, those humans who choose to ignore goodness and practise evil may expect painful future states. Infinite births we may have had in the past (but they have all gone) but none of us need look forward to an infinity of Samāsāra in the future, though W seems to think that this is the fate of all Buddhists. This may in some minds be complicated by the bodhisattva vow to liberate all beings, an undertaking which develops loving-kindness and compassion. However, as the Sixth Patriarch of Chinese Ch'an remarks, 'all beings' are the greedy being, the hateful being and the deluded being in one's own mind, thus bringing us directly into present-moment awareness.

However, the meditative practices taught in the Dharma are devalued by W because they says they are merely manipulations of the mind or rather ego, producing only another altered state of consciousness which has, in his opinion, nothing to do with purity or enlightenment, nor has it any value in Christian mysticism. The latter is viewed by him with suspicion and even the great mystics of both Eastern and Western Christianity are criticised (see pp.55, 66). If faith/belief is required, words will be enough just to believe.

He refers at various places in the book to the fact that he reckons himself 'a hopeless Buddhist' (p.98) and he also emphasises his sinfulness. This, of course, will fit him for entry into Christianity which tends towards depredation of one's own efforts as well as emphasising the sinful nature of humanity. Obviously he has seen no spark of his bodhicitta. But one wonders what dark deeds he has done to roll around so in his puddle of muck. It appears that the emptiness of all dharmas, including the unskilful ones, had been no consolation to him, nor had he, apparently, help from Tārā and other bodhisattvas.

We come now to W's strange remarks about hell (p.97 ff.). He seems to understand that he will be reborn there (according to the Buddhists) for leaving the Dharma! But nowhere in the Pāli
tradition could such a result follow from the cause of changing religion. I doubt that it exists in Mahāyāna either, as I have never heard of such a teaching. As W has received some Tantric transmissions he is burdened with the idea of the Vajra-hell into which corrupt practitioners are said to fall, but surely he will be exempt from this as his practice was, according to him, so poor. Though the threat of Vajra-hell exists for those who use Tantric practice for their own egoistic ends, its threat could have been only a small impulse in his conversion.

His view of hell, apparently a permanent state, is defined as the absence of God or a turning away from him. As Buddhists of every persuasion have no belief in a Creator God, it seems that they should, according to this definition, be fated to hell, whatever good things they do and whatever stages of holiness in the Dharma they reach (p.160).

Finally, in this section, W makes reference to some Buddhists who say that the Buddha was an agnostic in the matter of a Creator, rather than denying such a being (p.25). W here upholds the Buddha's words and Buddhist tradition generally, which certainly does deny a Creator. No doubt W as he is now would like to smuggle a God into the Dharma and in the following section he has tried to do so. His truth, what the Buddha called a pratyekasatya or individual 'truth', cannot conceive any truth where God is not, in which it is possible for human beings to wake up without reliance on a Creator. A Buddha or many Buddhhas are inconceivable to those whose truth is rooted in the God-concept, nor apparently would there be any value in their Awakening experience since it does not concern God. What then of the great benefits that have manifested to millions of human beings in many cultures, of the countless awakened disciples and bodhisattvas who have dispelled suffering and brought happiness?

CHRISTIAN - When W speaks of his conversion as 'unexpected' it is obvious even to one who does not know him that it could be seen reasonably as expected. First, even in his present life he had a Christian upbringing in the Church of England, though a Buddhist would say that it is likely that W has Christian vāsanā (tendencies) from past lives. Second, the type of Buddhism he was attracted to is rather dry with much theory, logic and philosophy. So he exchanged C of E views/beliefs for Buddhist ones and later exchanged that set of drṣṭi (views) for the RC set which he now proclaims to be unaveringly true. Third, W had doubts, a common feature of the psychology of intellectuals. Vākītā is the scourge of intellectuals who like to play with views. Given all these factors, is it any surprise that he converted? It could even happen that in the future he will lose faith in the RC church and take up something else. Mind has infinite possibilities to change in this way when given the right conditions. W actually wants to be told what to think and believe. This signals that he distrusts his own mind (a dualistic phrase if ever there was one) and wishes to lean on an exterior authority which will tell him what is true and what is error. He expounds this desire, as though it were a virtue instead of a relinquishment of innate wisdom, in the section, 'Tell me what to think' (p.137, also p.146). But mind, anyone's mind, cannot be disciplined in such a way: 'You must think in this way, not that way'. Such a crude discipline must involve suppression if it is to work at all. Can truth then be arrived at by way of suppression of thoughts that one should not think? No good will come of treating the mind in this way. Even if one has learnt thoroughly a set of Thou shalt nots, still mind, due to its previously established thought-patterns (samskāras), will continue to think accordingly. A 'truth' founded upon this sort of mental 'discipline' will be only as true as everyone else's beliefs, which they also regard as 'true'. Of course, the history of the Roman church shows that it has been keen to enforce its beliefs on others. If they did not accept them then the Popes and bishops leaned on the secular arm for crusades, or on their own priestly enforcers of the Inquisition. Presumably W in this day and age would not support such bloodthirsty methods. However, it is worth reflecting that his Buddhist views would not have been viewed in the past by his church with tolerance. Though now they have no powers to enforce conformity, there is no doubt that should the present liberal climate change, RC authorities, and others like them, would seek again to tell people what to think.

W spends quite a long time trying to justify such dubious ideas as 'God is perfectly merciful and just' and 'God who really cares' (p.114). Neither of these statements is obvious from the state of his supposed creation. If indeed he exists then of creation it must be said that he did a rotten job. Using words like 'just' or 'merciful' or 'really cares' of God would be meaningless unless they are equal at least to the highest and most exalted practice of them.
among humans. An examination of this world, supposing it to be the creation of such a being, does not reveal justice, mercy or any trace of really caring. In writing this, I do not refer only to the human world, though that is quite a sufficient demonstration of God's non-existence, but also to animals – they suffer in ways even worse than us. When tourists around here in Australia gaze at rainforest trees with their burden of mosses, fungi, lianas and epiphytes, or when they go snorkelling and wonder at the colours and shapes of fish and corals in the Great Barrier Reef, they see mostly only the beautiful side, not the bloodstained one. Had God with his supposed virtues arranged all this, one would expect that some traces of that virtue would be visible to us. As Huxley rightly remarked of the human and animal condition: 'Nature red in tooth and claw'. Buddhist logicians have pointed out that the nature of a Creator and his Creation could not differ. Thus a compassionate Creator's work will show evidence of his compassion.

It is not surprising that W struggles to explain the problem of evil (p.43 ff.). He tries, unconvincingly, to argue that God's intention was pure in every respect of creation and that evil was and is the choice of human beings. While Buddhists would agree that individual humans choose to do evil, they would also ask why a compassionate God, who would presumably rejoice in the salvation of all his human creation, nevertheless placed obstacles in their way by giving them the possibility to choose evil. It is like a man who sets out to succeed in a business but then deliberately places circumstances in his way that will ensure that his business will collapse. Such pungent criticism can only be answered by God-believers with efforts to block further investigation, such as, 'We cannot know God's purpose' or 'The mystery of God is too profound for human minds'.

Our author, now in the RC fold, is anxious to demonstrate that his erstwhile fellow practitioners have an 'explanatory gap' (p.19) in the teachings. This strange expression is elsewhere referred to as the 'necessary being' (p.16), in other words, an attempt to smuggle God into the Dharma. This attempt appears to be quite dishonest for W knows very well that in 2,500 years of the Dharma's teaching there has been no recourse to the idea of a Creator God in the Jewish, Christian or Muslim sense. The Buddha spoke of his teachings as a 'seamless cloth' with no rents or patches, nothing needed to be added or taken away. A God introduced into the Dharma would indeed be an unseemly patch, an unnecessary addition.

Finally, W shows from time to time a sentimental regard for English cathedrals (p.150), deploring their denudation during the Reformation and even suggesting that some of them ought to be returned to their 'rightful owners'. He has an attachment to the Great Catholic Past of Britain which is again an example of grasping at the romantically beautiful while completely disregarding the darker side of the Catholic church. Included in this is the glorification of martyrdom, which he mentions with approval in an effort to show that the Buddhist emphasis upon the promotion of happiness for oneself and for others is misguided. But it seems that the martyrdom of the Christian saints could be included in what is now called masochistic behaviour. Could the enjoyment of suffering in order to attain heaven be a good thing (p.61)? Such an attitude resembles the conduct of Jain monks who tortured themselves in order to burn away their evil karmas, an episode that evoked the Buddha's gentle and dryly humorous admonishment.

As a book it is rather 'bitty' with some sections unrelated to the rest. For instance, W draws in such varied topics as Contraception, Great Cathedrals, the Empty Tomb, More on drinking Wine, Musing on Relics, and so on, an array of subjects that could hardly be treated adequately in a text only 210 pages long. Certainly the whole work is unusual – there are few twenty-year Buddhists who would even contemplate conversion to the Roman church, let alone actually do it – but one which this reviewer does not think has been well-explored. Perhaps the worst feature of the book is the twisting of Buddhist teachings by an author who knows very well what the Buddha taught but now refuses to recognise this. Even so, for the author, I wish only happiness in his not so unexpected change.

Laurence-Khantipalo Mills
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