CONTENTS

Frontispiece ........................................... i
Editor’s Note ........................................ iii
Legend and Cult – Contributions to the History of Indian Buddhist Stūpas. Part 2: The Stūpa of Laying Down the Bows – Max Deeg ........................................ 119
An Outline of the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda School of Indian Buddhism (II) – Eric Cheetham .................. 151
Vimalakirti in China – Paul Demiéville (tr. S Boin-Webb) ........................................ 179
Once Upon a Present Time – An Avadānist from Gandhāra – Tim Lenz ........................................ 197
Ekottarāgama (XXXIV) – tr. Thich Huyễn-Vi and Bhikkhu Pāsadika ........................................ 216
Review Article: Nominal Persons and the Sound of their Hands Clapping – Karma Phuntso .................. 225
Book Reviews ........................................ 242

ISSN 0265-2897 © 2004 Buddhist Studies Review

Buddhist Studies Review is the semi-annual journal of the UK Association for Buddhist Studies and is sponsored by the Institut de recherche bouddhique Linh-Sơn

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Editor's Note

With this issue I regret there will be a parting of the ways. After a spare time career spanning exactly forty years, during which I edited and contributed to, first the journals of the London Buddhist Vihāra, then this journal's predecessor for six years, Pali Buddhist Review, I have decided that now is the appropriate time to step down from literary responsibilities.

BSR was launched in 1983-84 as a collaborative effort between the Vietnamese Spiritual Advisor based in Paris as head of the worldwide network of Linh-So’n temples, his German pupil, Bhikkhu Pāśādika, and myself. By an act of kusālakarma we were able to meet in London and lay the foundations for a new journal that would specialise in Buddhism, preceded only by A K Narain’s launch of the Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, initially based at the University of Wisconsin, which has also appeared twice a year since 1978 (but has subsequently and regretfully dropped its book review section). This situation has remained unchanged: no other journal specialises in this field.

Since inception great strides have been made in production and technical skill: during the first decade of its existence, BSR was prepared on an electronic typewriter and only thereafter via the more sophisticated methods of a computer. From 1998 it became the official organ of the newly-formed UK Association for Buddhist Studies but even before this change the entire credit for producing such an attractive periodical goes to Sara Bein-Webb who is also relinquishing her position on the Editorial Board. She wishes to complete her life’s ambition of translating all the works of one of the foremost Buddhologist of the 20th century, Etienne Lamotte, whilst I wish to revive my neglected ambition to produce the definitive history of Buddhist studies in Europe.

In content, we can justifiably be proud of the scope of articles and reviews that have appeared over the years. This observation can easily be substantiated with reference to the four quinquennial indexes that have been included with the appropriate journal issue. Numerous papers have been specially commissioned from, in particular, the younger generation of Buddhologists and I hope that this trend will continue. New translations of classic texts have
also featured and here thanks are due to the combined pioneer work that has resulted in the serialisation of sūtras from the Ekottarāgama, whilst another enduring feature are K R Norman’s reviews of almost every new work from the PTS. Space prevents my mentioning everybody but I would at least like to express my appreciation to those colleagues on the Editorial Board whose advice and guidance have ensured the smooth production of a journal which aims to include material from all the Buddhist traditions. Especial thanks are due to Ven. Thich Tri Nhu (i/c Linh-Son, London) who has printed the journal since inception.

Dr Rupert Gethin from the Centre for Buddhist Studies at Bristol University has kindly volunteered to produce the next issue (22.1 – 2005) on an experimental basis in that, thereafter, a decision will be made as to whether it will prove more economical and practical to publish BSR on an annual basis. For the time being, the Editorial Address will be c/o this centre, University of Bristol, 3 Woodland Road, Bristol BS8 1TB (or via e-mail: rupert.gethin@bristol.ac.uk). Dr Elizabeth Harris (whose address appears on the inside back cover) will now handle all subscriptions and be responsible for the mailing lists of both members of UKABS and those subscribing (individually or institutionally) to the journal only. She may also be reached by e-mail: ejharris@gn.apc.org

Finally, I would like to thank everyone who has written or spoken to me over the years, encouraging me in my efforts and offering sound advice which has ensured a firm foundation and continuity of this very special journal.

Russell Webb

* * *

Please note corrections as follows: in BSR 20, 1 and 2 (2003) the frontispiece should read ‘in official style script (li-shu)’ rather than ‘in seal script’; in Vol.21, 1 (2004), read ‘in regular style script (kai-shu)’ rather than ‘in seal script’.

LEGEND AND CULT – CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE HISTORY OF INDIAN BUDDHIST STŪPAS
PART TWO: THE ‘STŪPA OF LAYING DOWN THE BOWS’
MAX DEEG

In Part I I discussed the Kaniska-stūpa and the legends and names connected with it. The Kaniska-stūpa is clearly an example of a monument which had become important in the Buddhist world in the time when the Kuṣāna dynasty reigned over north India. The origin of the stūpa I would now like to discuss probably goes back to a pre-Buddhist stratum1 and became incorporated, together with its aetiological story, in the Buddhist geographica sacra.

This stūpa – or more correctly caitya – is first to be found in connection with the Mahāparinirvāṇa of the Buddha. In the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra (MPS) the Buddha, who is dwelling in Vaiśālī and is asking Ananda to accompany him on a visit to the Čāpāl caitya, mentions several caityas, memorial stūpa-like constructions2, near Vaiśālī as especially pleasant places. It is there that Ananda fails to ask the Buddha to extend his life. The text is given in translation following Waldschmidt’s edition of the MPS(S):

'15. 7 (The Buddha) after having arranged his alms-bowl and garment went to the Čāpāl caitya. After having gone (there) he sat down at the root of a certain tree and dwelt there during the

1 The existence of stūpas prior to the Buddha’s Nirvāṇa, monuments for his disciples, can already be found in canonical literature; cf. Kevin Trainor, Relics, op. cit., p.33, n.4. There are also references to the caityas (P. cetiya) of yakṣas (P. yakkhā) such as Gomataka which the Buddha is said to have visited or to the caityas of the Vṛjīs (P. Vajjī) whose proper veneration – according to the Buddha in his well-known ‘political’ advice at the beginning of the MPS – guarantees the prosperity of this tribe-confederation (Trainor, ibid., p.34)

2 For the (material and partly functional) identity of stūpa and caitya, see Gregory Schopen, ‘The Stūpa Cult and the Extant Pāli Vinaya’, rep. in Bones, Stones and Buddhist Monks, op. cit., p.90 f. It is almost certain that in our context a caitya is meant to be a pre-Buddhist memorial mound.
day. 8. There the Venerable One spoke to the honourable Ānanda: 9. Pleasing, O Ānanda, is Vaiśāli, the land of the Vrijjis, the Cāpāla-caitya, the Saptamraka-caitya, the Bhupattra(-caitya), the Nyagrodha of Gautama, the Sāla Grove, the Dhūra-ṃkṣepana-caitya of the Mallas [and] the Makuta-bandhana-caitya.8

The Cāpāla-caitya occurring in the text has not been explained either etymologically or contextually as far as I know. The caitya

3 The P. reading bahuutta seems to be confirmed by the Tib. bu-ma-po (Walschmidt, MPS(S), p.205) and by Faxian’s translation Duozi-zhiti (T 7, p.191b15).

4 Walschmidt, MPS, p.204; cf. also Diqha-nikāya 3.3.2 (ed. Rhys Davids, Carpenter, PTS, II, p.102). Faxian’s translation closely follows the MPS(P) (T 7, p.191b15 f.).


6 Cf. e.g. Ernst Walschmidt, Die Überlieferung, op. cit., p.96 ff.; J.J. Jones (trans) The Mahāvastu, London 1949, p.248, n.3, only gives the usual Indian explanation – probably following the commentary to the Pāli (P) Udāna (Uđānattathakatha, cf. G.P. Malalasekera, Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names I, London 1937, repr. New Delhi 1983, p.863, s.v. Cāpāla-cetiya) or Buddhist-gos’sa’s Diqha-nikāya commentary, Sumangalavilāsini (ed. W. Stede, p.554) where the cetiyas are explained as vihāras – that the place was inhabited by a yakṣa called Cāpāla, which is not confirmed by the text of the MVu in question (see below), because the name Cāpāla is already the name of the caitya and not a derivation of a proper name for which we would expect a compound such as Cāpāla-cetiya. This stands true also for the whole list of caityas or stūpas mentioned in this episode.

7 The Tibetan Mulasarvāstivādin Vinaya gives mchod-rten, the usual word for stūpa. MPS(S) and MPS(P) consistently give caitya / cetiya respectively. The age of the idea of the Cāpāla-caitya is shown by an inscription related to a relief from Amarāvatī depicting the quoted scene dated to the second half of the first cent BCE: Koitsuكي田, Miyaji Akira (ed.) Sekai-bijutsu-daizenshu, Tōyō-ken, 13 (The Big Collection of World Art, Section Eastern Art, 13), Tokyo 2000, p.124 (pl.105), description by Miyaji Akira, p.399.

Deeg – Legend and Cult: 2. The Stūpa of Laying Down the Bows

The Stūpa of Laying Down the Bows seems to have been an important spot for the early Buddhist geographica sacra as it is also mentioned in the Divyāvadāna (Divy), Lalitavistara (Lal) and Mahāvastu (Mvu). It is said to have already been in existence in the lifetime of the Buddha, so in the course of its incorporation into the system of Buddhist monuments, its origin as a memorial monument and the corresponding story must have been projected backwards to the past, into a former life of the Buddha.

世界美大全集、東洋編、第13巻、東京 1969, p.300 = ed. S. Bagchi, Darbhanga 1970, p.245): ‘Then the Venerable One came from the big forest to the caitya Cāpāla. Th: Lichchavis asked: “Where is the Venerable One?” The monks said: “The Venerable One, O excellent ones, has gone from the big forest to the caitya Cāpāla for a heavenly stay.” Thereupon the Lichchavis said: “We want to give the caitya Cāpāla to the Venerable One and his community of hearers, we want to present (it to him).”’ The context here is the well-known potlatch-like contest in which the Lichchavis of Vaiśāli present the Buddha with several caityas or groves after the courtesan Āmapālī had earlier presented him with the Sāla Grove. The places which the Lichchavis actually give to the Buddha and the Saṅgha are: Mahāvannā, Cāpāla-cetiya, Saptamraka-cetiya, Bhupattra-cetiya, Gautamaka-cetiya, Kapinahya-cetiya, Markatālhadatā. There is another reference to a Cāpāla-cetiya in the eastern region (cf. the English trans. by Jones, 3, p.306): the Buddha tells the two merchants Trāpuṣa and Bhallika that this shrine should protect them at home and abroad. Jones, in a note to his translation (3, p.294, n.4), calls the shrine ‘mythical’ and not identical with the Cāpāla-cetiya in the MPS, but it seems that it was meant to be the same caitya but that there was indeed some confusion about the name. Jones also quotes the form Acāpala in the Lal, which I could not find there.

The Chinese pilgrims Faxian and Xuanzang agree with the MPS tradition by connecting the place where the Buddha gave up his ability to extend his life-span with a stupa. They give the further information that this stupa had been built in commemoration of events of an avadāna-story which is not preserved in any Indian Buddhist text but only in Sino-Buddhist translations, and this story seems to give the clue for an explanation of the name(s) of the stupa(s) or caityas respectively.

Faxian's report runs as follows:

'Three miles to the northwest of the city [of Vaiśāli] there is a stupa called "Laying down the bow-stick". The name [comes] from the [following] event: on the upper reaches of the river Ganges there lived a king. A consort of the king gave birth to a piece of meat. The main wife was jealous of her and said: "The birth you [gave] is an evil omen." Then [she] put the [piece of meat] in a wooden box and threw [it] into the river. Downstream there was a king who was on a pleasure trip. He saw the wooden box [drifting] on the water, opened [it] to have a look and he saw 1,000 infants who had a noble and special [appearance]. Thereupon the king adopted them and raised them. When they had grown up they became brave and strong. Wherever they turned to fight and to conquer the enemy was definitely destroyed [or] subjugated. Finally, they were supposed to attack the kingdom of their original kingy father. Thereupon the king became very depressed. The consort asked the king: "Why are you [so] depressed?" The king said: "That king has 1,000 sons who are unmatchably brave and strong and are going to attack my kingdom. That is why I am [so] depressed." The consort said: "Oh! king! Don't be [so] sad. Build a tower in the cast of the city. When the robbers come, put me on the tower. Then I will be able to repulse their [attack]." The king did as he had told him. When the robbers arrived, the consort [standing] on the tower addressed them: "You are my children. Why do you act against me in such a way?" They said: "Who are you to say you are our mother?" The consort said: "If you do not believe me. Look upwards and open your mouths!" She then took out her two breasts with her two hands. Out of each breast flowed 500

[streams of milk] pouring down into the mouths of her 1,000 children. [Thereby] they knew that she was their mother and laid down their bow-sticks. The two royal fathers contemplated [deeply] and both became Pratyekabuddhas. The stupa of the two Pratyekabuddhas still exists. When the Lord afterwards attained enlightenment, he told his disciples: "This is the spot where I laid down the bow-sticks."13 The 1,000 children were the 1,000 Buddhas of the Bhadrakāla."

Xuanzang gives a similar story, however, without providing or explaining the name of the stupa:

'It is said that not far from the place where (the Buddha) entered Nirvāṇa there is a stupa, which is the place where the 1,000 children had seen their father and mother. In former times there was a hermit living hidden in steep valleys. [Once,] in the second month of spring, [the hermit,] in a state of excitement, took a bath in the clear water. Soon after that a female deer drank from the water, conceived and gave birth to a girl of superhuman beauty; only her feet looked like deer-feet. When the hermit saw [her] he took her [as his child] and raised her. After some time he ordered her to seek fire. She went to the hut of another hermit and, wherever she put her feet, there were lotus-flowers [coming out of the ground]. When that hermit saw this he was deeply surprised and had her walk around his hut in order to get the fire. The deer-maiden did what she was told, received the fire and went back. At this time the king Brahmadatta was out of a hunting trip and saw the flowers. He investigated [the origin] of the footprints. He was highly pleased by the appearance of the girl, took her into his carriage and returned [to the palace]. The astrologers predicted that she would give birth to 1,000 sons. When the [king's] other wives heard this, they were planning plots against her all the time. When the time was ripe she gave birth to a lotus-flower. The flower had 1,000 petals and on [each] petal was sitting a [little]

12 Zhang 枝 (resp. 伎) without gong 箭 can mean ‘bow’ as is shown in Jizang’s 吉藏 發論疏 (T 1827, p.251b) where dhanaśūtra, the ‘compendium of archery’, is rendered as bingzhang-fa 兵杖法, ‘method of (handling) the military bow (lit. soldier’s stick).
13 T 2085, p.861c18 ff.
boy. The other wives slandered [her] and claimed that this was a bad omen. They threw [the lotus-flower] into the [river] Gaṅgā and [it] drifted away on the waves. King Uḍḍiyāna was on a pleasure trip downstream, saw the [flower] covered by a yellow cloud [and] floating on the waves, took [it out of the water], opened it and had a look: there were 1,000 little boys [in it]. He raised them and they became strong men. Relying [on the fact] that he had 1,000 sons, he extended his frontiers in all directions. Because his troops were [so] successful, he then turned against this country [Vaiśālī]. When King Brahmadatta heard this, he was shaken by the fear [that] his military power [could] not resist the opponent, and did not even think of opposing [them]. At this time the deer-maiden, knowing in her heart that those [1,000 warriors] were her sons, told the king: “The enemy is standing in front of the frontiers and everybody, of high and low rank, has lost courage, [but] your majesty’s consort with her simple loyalty is able to defeat the strong enemy.” The king did not believe her yet and was overwhelmed by fear. Then the deer-maiden climbed on a fortification tower and waited [until] the enemy arrived. After the 1,000 sons with their troops had encompassed the city, the deer-maiden told them: “Do not commit an offence! I am your mother and you are my sons.” The 1,000 sons said: “What fraudulent words!” The deer-maiden pressed her breasts with both hands and two streams [of milk] coming out in 1,000 jets entered their mouths in a supernatural way. Thereupon they threw away their arms, returned to their natural family [and] sent the troops back home. Henceforth both kingdoms had a good relationship and the people lived in peace and happiness.

From Xuanzang’s version it becomes evident that, before the story of the birth of the sons, there was another story of the birth of the mother, the deer-maiden found in several other Buddhist versions of the legend (see below). Therefore, the whole complex in its most extensive version seems to consist of four sub-legends: 1. the birth of the deer-maiden from the miraculous conception of a deer through an ascetic; 2. the deer-maiden, having become queen, gives birth to a strange foetus (lotus, piece of meat) which is abandoned in a river; 3. the foetus is saved downstream by a king (ascetic) and develops into many children who are fostered by the king; 4. the children, grown up, return to their mother’s country (attacking) and finally recognise their real parents. Faxian omits the story of the birth of the mother (1).

There is no direct parallel Buddhist story preserved in an Indian language, as far as I know, but there is an episode in the Avadānasātaka (AvS) in which at least the motif of the birth from a piece of meat (2) is preserved. AvS 68, called ‘The Sons’ (Pūtra iti), has obviously changed the motif of the abandoned sons attacking their relatives into a Buddhist edifying tale which has lost its complete narrative tension:

‘In Kapilavastu there was a certain Śākya, rich, wealthy... He married a wife from a family similar to his own. He played, had fun, and cohabited with his wife. His wife, while he was playing, having fun, and cohabiting with her, became pregnant. After eight, nine months she delivered. She bore a big, big piece of meat; after the sad parents and the other attendants and relatives living in the house had seen it (they said): “What is this, for heaven’s sake, that she has borne?” The householder entered the “lamentation-room”, put his cheek in his hand and stayed lost in his thoughts (such as): “Whom can I tell? Who will know what this is?” (Finally) the thought came to him: “The Venerable Buddha is omniscient, seeing everything. I will tell the Venerable Buddha – he will know.” He went to the place where the Venerable One stayed. Having gone there he asked the Venerable One. The Venerable One said: “You should not, householder, be afraid of this piece of (meat), do not be afraid! Put the piece of (meat) in a well-prepared piece of cotton, wipe it three times a day with (your own) hands and sprinkle it with ghee. After seven days it will then burst and 100 boys will be

14 XJ 7, ed. Ji, p.594 f.

15 The meaning of the birth of a piece of meat is – seen in the light of Indian in general and Buddhist embryology – one of prematurity because this state (pēṣa) is considered to be one of the first developments of the foetus.

16 Already L. Féer, Avadāna-Čātaka. Ceux legenides bouddhiques..., Paris 1891, repr. Amsterdam 1979, p.253 f., has pointed out the connections without, however, coming to a consistent analysis and conclusion.
born, (who) will become strong athletes." After having heard (the Buddha say) that, the householder was highly astonished and thought: "A well done acquisition (if) there are sons like these born to me." Then he did as it was (said). On the seventh day the piece of meat burst and 100 boys were born (from it), all beautiful, fair, pleasant, with all parts of the body and secondary parts of the body, strong athletes.17

The boys, after having wandered around, finally meet the Buddha18 and attain arhatship after having been taught by him and having received the permission of their parents to enter the Sangha.19 The Buddha then explains to the monks that these 100 beautiful boys have been born from a ball of flesh because they had, in the days of the Buddha Vipāsya, made the vow (pranidhi) to be reborn with a unified mind and body while venerating the stūpa of the Buddha.20

There is even a reflection of the motif of the mother ejecting milk into the mouths of her sons in the AvŚ 78, the story of Kacāṅgalā:21

17 Ed. J.S. Speyer, Avadāna-cātaka. A Century of Edifying Tales Belonging to the Hinayāna, St Petersburg 1902-06, 1, p.375 f., 1.5 ff.
18 Ibid., p.376, l.6 f.: ‘In the course of time they grew up, became strong and increasingly (powerful) and they all, carried away by their folly of youth, roamed about here and there (until finally) they came to the Nyagrodha Park. There they saw the Venerable Buddha...’
19 Ibid., p.376, 1.12 ff.: ‘They, after having seen the truth and having asked their parents for permission, were ordained in the Teaching of the Venerable One. (They)... reached arhatship.’
20 Ibid., p.378, 1.3 ff.: ‘Thereupon they all in one state of spirit and single-mindedly made the vow: “By means of this root of merit may we be reborn with one self, with one mind, with one body, with the same deeds, with the same dharma, with the same merit (leading to) the same Nirvāṇa.” (Having spoken) thus at this place, the adoration of the stūpa having been their last action, they faded away... Because of this they were born of one piece of meat.’
21 This is the reconstructed form from Tibetan for the Ms’s Kavaṅgalā. The person evidently corresponds to the nun Kavaṅgalā in the Pāli Canon (Aṅguttara-nikāya 5.54 ff.) who has, however, no story connected to her (cf. Malalasekera, DFPN, op. cit., I, p.482, s.v.) – the fact that even the commentaries remain silent about the legend seems to indicate that the latter was only known in the Buddhist world in the first millennium CE.
22 AvŚ, ed. Speyer, 2, p.41 f., 1.2 ff.
23 The sudden flow of milk from the breast in connection with dramatic events concerning the own son is also found in the story of the evil dreams of the Buddha’s mother announcing to her the imminent Parmīrvāṇa of her son (Mohemoye-jing 摩诃摩耶經, Pomu-jing 佛母經). Interestingly enough, the Jainist biography of the Jina Mahāvīra has a similar episode: in the Viṣṇupadāvatī 9.33 the brahmin woman Devaṇandā, who had received the embryo Mahāvīra before he had been translocated into the womb of the kṣatriya-woman Tisalā, shows all the signs of pregnancy, including the flowing out of milk from her breasts, after she meets her saint-turned ‘son’ (cf. Walther
that the episode had been de-dramatised by reducing the original motif of milk flowing into the mouth of the child from the breast of the mother to the attempts at embracing the Buddha.

The closest legend which I was able to find in Indian Buddhist literature so far is the legend of the Vṛjīṣ/Licchavis (P. Vājji, Licchava), e.g., in Buddhaghosha's commentary on the Mahānīkanikāya which, for means of comparison with other legends I give here in full:

'1. ... There at the city called by the name “at Vesāli”. This later through its expansion (visāλi-bhūtata) came to the name “Vesāli”.

2. There is the (following) old story: in the womb of the first queen of the king of Bārānasi was a foetus. When she noticed that she informed the king. The king cared for the foetus. The queen, her foetus being taken care of most diligently, entered the birth-chamber when the time to deliver the foetus had come. Towards dawn, the auspicious (hours), the delivery of the foetus began. And at a certain point of these (hours), around dawn, she had given birth to a piece of meat resembling a bhanduvakā-flower with a lacquered surface. (The queen) thinking: “The king, thinking that the other royal consorts give birth to sons resembling golden images, but the queen (gives birth only) to a piece of meat, will probably directly (purato) blame me,” and being afraid of (the king's) reproach, she threw that piece of meat into a bowl, closed (it), sealed it with the royal seal and had it thrown into the river Gaṅga. Though abandoned by men the gods prepared protection. They fixed a golden strip, on which was written by natural vermilion (ink): “This is the offspring of the queen of the king of Bārānasi.” Then, without any trouble such as fear of the waves, they started that bowl (drifting) on the river Gaṅga."

Schubring, Die Jainas, Tübingen 1927, p.4).


Deeg - Legend and Cult : 2. The Stūpa of Laying Down the Bows

3. At this time a certain ascetic lived on the shore of the river near the family of a cowherd25. He went down to the Gaṅga early and saw the bowl coming down (the river) and took it for rags from a heap of dust. Thereupon he saw the slip with characters (written on it) and the royal seal, broke it and saw the piece of meat. Having seen it he thought: “This is probably a (living) foetus, because it is not in a state of bad smell and stink.” He took it to his hermitage and put it in a pure space. Then, after half a month, there were two pieces of meat. When the ascetic saw this he treated them even more carefully. Then again, after half a month, each of the pieces of meat developed five growths destined to be hands, feet and heads. Again, after half a month, one of the pieces of meat became a boy looking like a golden image, the other one (became) a girl. Towards these arose paternal affection in the ascetic. And there was milk coming out of his thumb(s). And from that time on (the children) were fed with milk. The ascetic, after he had taken his food, dripped the milk (of his thumb) into the mouths of the children. Whatever entered their stomach was visible as if it had gone into a (transparent) jewel bowl. So they were without (visible) skin (nicchavi). Others say: their skin was clinging (so close) (lipā chavi) to each other as if they had been sewn together26. So, by having no skin or by their having skin clinging (to each other), they became named “Licchavis.”

Exactly the same is found in the commentary on the Rutanasutta of the Khud- dakapāṭha, the first part of the Khuddakakkāya, the Khuddakapāṭhājākkhāthā (also called Paramatthajāti), in the part called Vesālīvatthu (I was not able to check and quote by page the PTS edition, but compared both versions on the basis of the Chatthā Saṅgyana CD-Rom).

25 gopāka, or gopāka as it occurs later on, in the context here seems to mean not only 'guardian' but is also taken in a more literal sense.

26 This may refer to the state in which the two foetuses were still clinging together as if sewn (siv-) to each other in one piece of meat. This interpretation differs from that of Malalasekera, DPPN, loc. cit., who takes lina in the sense of 'thin'.

28 The translation of linū chavi is tentatively supported by the Chinese gloss, T 1462, p.743b27. "(the children) were called Liche-zi - in Chinese that means "with thin skin (?)" or also "having joint skin"."
4. The ascetic bringing up the (two) children went to the village for alms-begging after sunrise; late in the day he returned. The cowherds, when they realised what business he was engaged in, said (to him): "Venerable Sir! The bringing up of children is an obstacle to those who lead the homeless life; give us the children; we will foster them; do your own work." The ascetic answered "Very well!" The cowherds prepared the road, threw flowers (on it), raised flags and banners and, with sweet sounding instruments, came to the hermitage. The ascetic said: "(These) children are very auspicious; raise them with care (and), after having raised them, marry them to each other; after having pleased the king with the five products of the cow and having received land (from him) and founded a city, anoint the boy king", and gave (them) the children. They answered "Very well" and took the children and fostered them.

5. When the children grew up, they played with the other cowherd children (and), on occasions of dispute, hit (them) with hands and feet. They cried. When they were asked by their parents: "Why do you cry?" they said: "These orphans, having been raised by the ascetic, beat us too hard." Thereupon their parents said: "These children ruin other children, cause them harm. They should not be treated in a friendly way, they should be avoijd (vajjetabba)." Henceforth, this area was called "Vajjī" within a radius of 100 yojanas.

6. Then, after having pleased the king, the cowherds received this area. They founded a city there, anointed the boy when he was declared sixteen years old and made him king. They married him to that girl and made an arrangement not to lead a bride from outside (into this country) and not to give away girls from here to anybody else (as bride). After their first intercourse, two children were born (to them), a daughter and a son. In the same way sixteen times there were born two (children). Therefore not being sufficient to include the splendour of gardens, parks, resting-places and the entourage of the increasing number of their children, they enlarged the city three times in circles of (one) gavūta (quarter of a yojana). From its gradual extension (visālīkatattā) (the city) was given the name "Vesālī..."

This legend, with all the same details, is also found in the Chinese version of the Samantapāsādikā, the commentary on the Vinaya, translated by Saṅghabhadra/Senjiabato (僧伽跋陀) at the end of the fifth century, the Shanjian-lük-pipsosa 善見毘婆沙, T 1462, p.743a27-c24 32, but only a small condensed portion of it - the etiology of Vesālī - is found in the P Samantapāsādikā 33. The interesting fact of the story is that the birth of the children happens in the same way as in the legend discussed so far. The legend as a whole is clearly structured along the possibility of getting etymological explanations for the names Licchāvī, Vajjī and Vesālī in the framework of the P. If these somewhat illogical elements in the plot are omitted, the basic story runs as follows: queen gives birth to a piece of meat - she throws it into a bowl and then into the river (2) - ascetic finds the piece of meat and fosters it and the children are born from it respectively (3) - the children

32 This is clearly shown by the Chinese, which first runs parallel with the P, but then goes on with the legend after stating Foshijye: 'The master says: Now I will explain in detail the etiological story of Vesālī...'.
33 Ed. J. Takakusu, M. Nagai, Samantapāsādikā, Buddhaghosa's Commentary on the Vinaya Pitaka II, London 1969 (PTS) p.393 (on Parājika III): "At that time the Buddha, the Venerable One, dwelled in Vesālī, in the Mahāvāna, in the Kūṭagārasāla"; what is called here "in Vesālī" (means) in the city of female gender with such a name, having got this name; it is called "Vesālī" on account of its width caused by the augmenting of the encircling walls in order to construct this city.' The Sinhalese printed editions (Ssp., ed., n.6) add: 'This is a condensed account - the detailed account following the story of this (explanation) can be found by those who would like to in the Paramatthajottikā, the Khuddakāṭṭhakathā, in the commentary on the Ratnasutta.'
become rulers of the area obviously donated by their royal father. It seems, furthermore, that even the miraculous milk-feeding of the children has survived in the milk pouring out of the ascetic’s thumb. 

Now, the Pāli legend is declared by Buddhaghosa to be the foundation-legend of the Vṛjīs/Licchavis of Vaisālī, and it seems reasonable that the story the Chinese pilgrims relate for the stūpa/caitya near Vaisālī refers to the same events. If we try to bring the P story to a closer similarity with the legend – omitting, for instance, all the somehow illogical elements caused by the etymological features which would only function restrictively in an Indian language different from P (e.g. Skt) and the fact that by the topical setting of the beginning of the legend in Benares which excluded a returning of the Vajjīs/Licchavis to their parental home – reported by the pilgrims, we could construct the following plot: queen gives birth to a piece of meat (2) – she throws it into a vessel and into the river – downstream the piece of meat is found and the (many children) offspring of it are fostered (3) – the children return to their father’s kingdom claiming their right – parents and children are happily reunited (4) – giving the possibility for the same explanation for Vaisālī as a viśālī form of the adjective viśāla, ‘extensive, broad’, because the city had to be adapted to the number of sons having returned to their parent’s country.

The other versions of the legend of the deer-maiden and her sons are found in Chinese translations or compilations of Buddhist literature, the oldest being located in the anonymous sūtra from the Late Han period, *Da-fangbian-tobaoen-jing* 大方便佛報恩經, T 156, pp.138c25-140c12; the story plays in Benares (Boluoanai 波羅奈). 1. Birth of the deer-maiden (*lunū* 鹿女) from a deer and a rśi (*xianren* 仙人): the rśi once washed his garment on a stone near a spring in front of his cave. A female deer drank the water from the stone, licked its genitals (p.139a5: *xiaobian-chu* 小便處, lit. ‘the spot from where it urinated’), became pregnant and gave birth to a girl who is brought up by the rśi. Wherever the girl put her feet lotus flowers grew from her footprints. The king of Benares once saw her and made her his wife. After some time she gave birth to a lotus (*lianhua 麗華*) and threw it away into a pond. The king found the lotus and it was discovered that under each of the 500 leaves of the lotus sat a little godly boy. The parents had them brought up by the 500 consorts in the palace and when the boys had grown up they all became Pratyekabuddhas and finally entered Nirvāṇa after having performed the twin wonder (*shenbian 神變/yamaka-prātiḥārya*). The mother erected stūpas for her sons. This early Chinese version is very similar to the story found in the AVS, but has preserved more of the sub-stories: 1, 2 (birth of a lotus) and partly 3 (abandonment of the lotus-foetus in a pond under a coral (†)) where it is found by its own father.

The next Chinese version is found in Kang Senghui’s (康僧會) second half of the third century) collection *Liudu-jī-jing* 六度集經, T 152, p.14a26-c10. It contains all the sub-stories 1-4, giving the full range of the story to be compared with the legend recorded by Xuanzang. It gives a kind of framing story of a widow giving alms to an ascetic and vowing that in her next life she will give birth to 100 sons resembling the sacred man.

‘The mother (= widow), after she had died, her spirit moved on and became the child of a brahmin. Her spirit accumulated at

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34 This detail is proved to be original by the Chinese parallel: ‘His affection (towards the children) became strong as if they were not different from his own children. By the power of affection out of his two thumbs poured milk with one (thumb) nourishing the boy and with the other the girl.’ (T 1462, p 743b24 f). The disputing of the children with their comrades may be the surviving element of the fight against the parents.

35 For an abridged version of the story cf. Chavannes, *Cinq cents contes, op. cit.*, IV, p.98 f.

36 p.139c19.

37 ‘... once letting water come out from the upper part of the body and fire from the lower part of the body, (then again) letting water come out from the lower part of the body and fire come out from the upper part of the body...’ (p.140b27 f).

38 This story is connected with the Rṣipatana Park, Chin. 聖所遊居 (p.138a26) where the Buddha gave his first sermon.

39 ‘At the shore of this flower pond there was a large coral. Under the coral was a lotus flower having sunk into the water:’ (p.139c15 f).

40 Translated in Chavannes, *op. cit.*, I, p.80 ff.

41 This story – with modifications to the plot – is extrapolated in the version 2 of T 203, p.453b2 ff. (see below).
the spot where the brahmin had urinated. A deer licked the urine and became pregnant. When her time came (to deliver) she gave birth to a girl, who the brahmin raised. At the age of ten she had a splendid demeanour and had made progress in learning, (so that she could watch the house and the fire). (But because) she played with the deer she did not notice that the fire was extinguished. (When her) father came home he got angry and ordered her to go and procure fire. The girl went to a village and wherever she put her step a lotus flower sprang up. The firekeeper told her: “Go three times round my house, (then) I will give you fire.” The girl did as told. The flowers sprang off the ground and encircled the house three times. The people passing stopped (and said): “This is indeed too marvellous!” After some time the king got news (of this miracle) and ordered a fortune-teller to evaluate her. The master said: “She is of sacred offspring and (the signs) tell that she has plenty of good omens.” The king ordered a wise minister to make enquiries about (who she was) and to invite her with all formalities. Her beauty was so extraordinary that nobody in the palace could match her. She became pregnant and when (the time) came (to deliver) she gave birth to 100 eggs. The queens and royal consorts were indeed very jealous. They provisionally had carved a (piece of) banana tree in the form of a ghost. When the time of birth came close they covered her face with (her hair), painted a bad expression onto a (piece of) banana tree and showed it to the king. All these demonic creatures distorted the truth and the king was persuade (by their accusations against the queen). The bunch of wicked (women) put the eggs into a bowl, tightly covered its mouth and threw it into the river. Sakra, the lord of the gods, descended from heaven and sealed the mouth and all the gods watched and protected the bowl, made the current stop and placed themselves on the ground (like pillars). The king of the kingdom downstream, standing on his platform, saw from afar a bowl floating down the river, radiating and shining as if there were something supernatural (in it). He took (the bowl out) and had a look. He saw the seal of the lord (of the gods, Sakra) and when he removed it he got hold of the 100 eggs. He ordered (his) 100 wives to keep them warm. When the time had come the bodies developed and 100 boys were born. From birth on they had the knowledge of wise men, understanding (everything) by themselves without being instructed. The brightness of their appearance expanded the world (and) their auspicious signs were rare (to find). Their strength was extraordinary and their combined energy was 100-fold compared with (other) men. The sound of their voices was like the roaring of lions. The king equipped 100 white elephants with bridles made of the seven precious materials and gave them to his divine scions. (He) ordered them to attack the neighbouring countries. The four neighbouring countries surrendered and called (themselves) subordinates. Then they also attacked the country where they were born. The people in this country, (of) high and low (position), were indeed very frightened and trembling. The king said: “Who has the power to throw back this enemy?” His wife said: “May the great king be not afraid. Look from where this enemy attacked the city. Near that spot erect an observation tower (and I will) subjugate the (enemy) for the king.” The king looked from where the enemy came from (to attack) and erected an observation tower. The mother mounted the observation tower and raised her voice: “There are three major offences. Not to keep away from temptations (means) to commit culpabilities in this world and the other world, that is the first one. Not to recognise the parents from whom one has been born and to offend piety, that is the second one. To rely (on one’s own) strength (and) to kill one’s own parents (or) to direct poison against (one of) the three Venerable Ones 

42 That is: a Buddha, a Pratyekabuddha and an arhat.
Deeg - Legend and Cult: 2. The Stūpa of Lying Down the Bows

Version 1 gives as place the sub-story 1. the border-region of the Himavat (p.451c16: Xueshan 雪山) and as the name of the rśi *Devayana (?) / Tipoyan 提婆延. The name of the royal husband of the deer-maiden is given as *Udḍiyāna/Udḍayana (p.551c 26: Wutiyan 烏提延). The number of sons here is 500 and they are born as 500 eggs which the first queen, jealous of the deer-maiden, puts into a case and throws into the Gāṅaḥ, after replacing the eggs with strips of dough (mianduan 麵段). The name of the foster-father is *Saddharmabodhi (?) / Sadanpu. In this version at the moment the sons want to shoot at their own mother a saint (or saints) comes flying through the air and explains to the sons that they are about to fight against their own parents, the mother than performing the miraculous milk-feeding is a final proof (p.452b9 ff.).

Version 2 is set in Benares/Boluiouai-guo 波羅奈國 and a mountain called Xianshan 仙山 in Chinese, which is obviously a translation for a name corresponding to Rśipatana”, thus corresponding to the version in T 156. The king and royal husband is called Fanyu-guowang 梵豫國王/Brahmadatta rājā, showing the somewhat topical setting of the story. The number of sons here is 1,000. The mothers give birth to a thousand-petalled lotus flower which is put into a case and thrown into the river by the jealous queen, who replaces the lotus flower with a stinking ulcerated

will their hands could no longer bend the bows (p.452b7 f.). Then the 1,000 sons wanted to grasp their bows in order to shoot, (but) against their will they could not grasp (the bows) (p.453a18).

It is interesting enough that the enumeration of the cetiyas in the MPS(P) gives an Udena cetiya, P. Udena corresponding exactly with Udāyana, Faxian giving the exact parallel Youmuyan 優陀延 in his translation of the MPS. Has the king in this Chinese version preserved the name of the royal father of the Vṛjīś/Lacchavis?

* The king’s main queen was very jealous of the deer-maiden and said this (to herself): “The king now loves (her) very much. If she gives birth to 500 sons, then his veneration of her will double.” Not long after this (the deer-maiden) gave birth to 500 eggs and laid them in a basket. At that time the main queen took 500 strips of dough to replace the eggs, (put) them in the basket, scaled and closed (it) and threw it in the river Gāṅaḥ (p.452a2 ff.)

* Was this originally rśiparvata, P. -pabba: Chinese -shan 銖?
horse lung. The name of the foster-father is *Uddiyāna/Wuqiyan.

The pre-Buddhist character of the legend—presumed by the fact that the monument connected to it is known as pre-Buddhist by the MPS—may also be indicated by the fact that narrative elements are found not in Indian Buddhism but in the great Indian epics, the Mahābhārata (Mbh), and this, notably, not in some side-stories but in outstanding episodes of the main plot. In the Adi-parvan, for instance, we find the story of Dhrtarastra's wife Gandhari giving birth to a piece of flesh, out of which 100 Dhārtarāstras and the daughter Dhūśala is born:

Mbh 1, p.107.7 ff.: 'Vaisampāyana said: Gandhari once comforted Dvaipāyana, when he had arrived exhausted with hunger and fatigue. Vyasa granted her a boon. She chose a hundred sons that would be of equal station with her husband and herself. After some time she was with child by Dhṛtarāstra. For two years Gandhari bore her foetus without giving birth, and misery beset her. Then she heard that Kunti had borne a son, splendid like the morning son; and when she felt the hardness of her own belly she began to worry. Unbeknownst to Dhṛtarāstra, Gandhari, fainting with pain, aborted her belly with hard effort. A mass of flesh came forth, like a dense ball of clotted blood, and she made ready to throw it out after she had borne it in her womb for two years. Dvaipāyana divined it and came swiftly; then that best of mumblers of spells saw the mass of flesh. He said to Subala's daughter: "What is this you are about to do?" She truthfully told the great seer her mind: "When I heard that Kunti had borne her first son, splendid like the sun, I became so miserable I aborted my belly. A hundred sons you granted me before, to be sure, and now this mass of flesh is born to me for

50 'When the time was full (the deer-maiden), that is when she (was) to give birth to a thousand-petalled lotus flower. When the time had come that she wanted to deliver, the main queen covered her eyes with something, (did) not (let) her hear (anything) and looked herself. She took a stinking, ulcerating horse lung and placed it under the deer-maiden, took the thousand-petalled lotus flower, put it in a basket and threw it in the river.' (p.452c22 ff.)


Comparing the structure of the birth of the Dhārtarāstras and the structure of the legend discussed here, it is clear that besides...
the striking common element of the birth of many sons out of a ball of flesh, also the elements of abandoning a son who will endanger the continuity of the family or dynasty respectively, are all pointing to the Buddhist legend discussed here; even if this is not clearly brought out at this moment in the Mbh, it is evident that the motif of fighting against one's own relatives is omnipresent and became the overall dominant scenario of the epos.

There is, besides, another story in the Vanaparvan (Mbh 3, 292+293) which reflects the Moses-motif (child being abandoned in a casket thrown into a river and raised by a king) where the reader is told that Praeighthâ, alias Kunti, the later wife of Pându, had an illegitimate son with the sun-god Sûrya and therefore abandoned him in a basket (maâjûsâ) in the river Aâsâ. From there the basket travelled down into the rivers Camānantî, Yamanâ and Gaângâ until it arrived at Campâ. The boy was found by Adhiratha, a friend and herald (sûta) of King Dhrtarastrâ, who picked him out of the water and fostered him as his son under the name of Vasuṣeṇa or Vîṣa. When he grew up his mother Kunti learnt of his existence and his foster father sent him to the court of Dhrtarastrâ where the prince made friends with Duryodhana, learned archery (îsvastrakarman) from Droño, became famous for this skill and later on, in the great battle, the opponent of Arjuna.

It is also remarkable that other structurally similar elements are found in the subsequent plots, such as (Mbh 1, 109) King Pându killing a male deer (mrga) when mating with its female, the deer turning out to be an ascetic who cursed Pându. Further on (Mbh 1, 120) there is the story of the gî Gautama, who is a skilled archer, whom the apsaras (devakânyâ) Jâlapadi (does the name, 'netfeated', somehow reflect the wondrous feet of the deer–maiden in our Buddhist legend?) tries to seduce, but produces twin sons by having his seed fall on a reed stalk, the sons then become great archers too. Here we may have, split into two different episodes, the reflection of the deer–maiden and the gî causing her to become pregnant by her semen.


Cellana has bad feelings about the foetus in her uterus which has eaten the flesh of his own father and wants to abort the foetus. Being unable to press it out of her belly, after nine months a boy is born. Cellana, thinking that the offspring who has eaten the flesh of his progenitor will probably destroy his own family, has the boy thrown on a dung hill (ukurudiyā, Skt utkarikā). The king finds the boy because a strange light is radiating from the spot where he was thrown and the boy is taken back to the royal palace and is called Kuniya'. Because the boy's upper finger-joint (agganguliya) has been hurt when he was thrown on the dung hill he cries; his royal father appeases him by having him suck blood from his own fingertip and afterwards does so whenever the boy cries. When the boy has finally usurped his father's throne, he also wants to have two precious items in the possession of his younger brother Vehalla, a necklace and an elephant. Vehalla flees into the protection of his grandfather's kingdom and Kuniya attacks his relatives to get hold of the two desired items.\(^{58}\)

So, in that somewhat strange Jaina story\(^{59}\), we find the now well-known motifs of 1. battle between relatives\(^{60}\), 2. strange birth and abandonment of the protagonist\(^{61}\), 3. the drinking of liquid by the protagonist from his parent's body: the fact that the baby, babies in the P legend respectively, sucks the finger of his father, adoptive father, the ascetic, respectively is an interesting parallel between the Jaina story and the aetiological legend in the P commentary, though the sucking of milk from the finger is turned into the quite odd motif of sucking blood in the Jaina story which is, on the other hand, of consequence in the framework of the whole plot.\(^{62}\) The geographical setting of the fight at Vesali seems to indicate that this Jaina story was basically related to the legend under discussion here.

Going back to the Cāpāla-caitya and the other caityas mentioned in the MPS, there is no question that the bahuputakā-stūpa/bahuputtaka cetiya of the Skt and P texts – bahuputtra of the MPS(S) (and the Divy) is to be considered as a 'mistake' and goes back to the same name as proved by the Tibetan – stands in connection with the discussed legend: it is the stūpa or caitya which was built in commemoration of the avādāna of 'many sons' (bahuputra)\(^{63}\).

On the other hand, the dhūrāṅkṣepana-caitya (or – stūpa) of MPS(S) and Divy seems to relate to the legend too – as Rhys Davids has already pointed out in a short note\(^{64}\). As the MPS(P) does not have this name, it is reasonable that the name which has

\(^{57}\) The text gives an aetiological-cytomologial explanation of the choice of this name: the boy was hurt by a cock's feather (kikkuda-pičcha' ā); this 'etymology' is rather weak here from the standpoint of phonetic similarity: Kō(niya): ku(kkuda-).

\(^{58}\) On the possible historical background of this battle, see H. Jacob, 'Buddhas und Mahaviras Nirvana und die politische Entwicklung Magadhas zu jener Zeit', in Sitzungsbericht der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaft, hist.-phil. Kl., Berlin 1930, pp.557-68 (repr. in H. Jacob, Kleine Schriften 2 ed. B. Kölver, Wiesbaden 1970, pp.803-15). Kuniya is for the Jaina tradition the name of Ajātāsatru who, according to the MPS, wants to attack the Vṛjiss. 'So it seems that parts of the aetiological story of the Vṛjiss/Līchavis were inserted into the Jaina legend of the battle of Ajātāsatru-Kuniya against the state of Vaiśāli.'

\(^{59}\) Jacob, 'Buddhas u. Mahaviras', op. cit., p.566, calls it a 'märchenahta entstellte Kunde'.

\(^{60}\) It culminates here in the killing of ten (sic) half-brothers of Kuniya through the arrows (sic) of Cēdaga (Jacob, op. cit., p.567), turning the story to a dramatic end and reversing the motif of the bow to the party attacked; despite the setback for Kuniya he finally conquers Vaiśāli (loc. cit. and J. D-leu, Vīyā-hapannatti (Bhagavī). The Fifth Anuṣṭha of the Jaina Canon, Introduction, Critical Analysis, Commentary and Indexes, Delhi 1996, p.140 ff.).

\(^{61}\) If the connection between the various legends is accepted it seems clear that the efforts of the queen aborting the foetus is a kind of reflection of the birth of a piece of meat (mamsapesi) in the other cases – in fact, according to Indian embryology, it would have come out as a ball of flesh in the case of a successful abortion – and it seems that therefore the strange motif of eating flesh from one's own husband's body is related to the motif of the piece of meat.

\(^{62}\) The boy has eaten what was thought to be the flesh of his father in the maternal womb, so it is of consequence in a way of analogical thinking that he is appeared only by a part of his father's body. This, of course, was somehow considered as the reason why the boy finally attacks his relatives, proving the fears of Queen Cellana to be true.

\(^{63}\) The only clear reference to this connection I know is that of Hori in H's commentary on Xuanzang's XI: Horp Kendoku, Kaistesu-saiikiki, Toyoshima 1912, p.532, 堺謙德, 解説西域記, 縄島.

no correspondence in the MPS(S) is the alternative one: *sāraṇ-
dada*, which could have been interpreted as Skt “sāramadāda” in
the meaning of ‘giving (away) the arrow(s)” in connection with
the aetiologic story respectively: laying down (*nikṣepana*) the
bows (dāruṇa)67).

It seems that the text tradition (MPS) has split the various
names or epithets for the same caitya or stūpa into several monu-
ments because the context was not understood by the redactor or
redactors. This is somehow understandable because the differ-
ences in the various texts mentioning the episode show that the
nucleus must have been concentrated on monuments or on a
monument. Caitya in the context of the texts is used in a pre-
Buddhist sense68, which then must have been originally connected
with something which should have been recollected – something
which the Buddhist texts do not mention because it was pre-
supposed to be known or because it was not known exactly.

The accounts by the pilgrims who only report one stūpa in
the area of Vaishali, whose aetiologic story fits with the names
explained above and given in the lists of the Indian texts, would
suggest that at least in the period of the pilgrims – that is, from the

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65 Faxian, T 7 p.191b15, has Svuluo-zhitī 娑羅支提, which could be either
Sāla-caitya or Sāra-caitya. The final element -dada may, however, also just be a
twisted form in P; cf. the Skt epithet puran-tara: P purin-dada of the Buddha in
the *Vaṁśatām*. E. Waldschmidt, *The Vaṁśatām. An Eulogy of one hundred
Epitaphs of Lord Buddha spoken by the Gṛhapati Upanā(t)n*, Göttingen 1979, p.17.
66 Another possibility would be – if there is a correspondence to the epithet P
purin-dada and if the PTS Dictionary (p.469a, s.v.) is right to interpret P
purin-dada as an original Vedic purati-dāra, ‘fortress-breaker’ – to analyse the
name as ‘breaking (dṛ = dāra) of arrow(s).”
67 Dāruṇa usually means ‘yoke, pole, burden’ – the term dhrūpankṣepaṇa being
Delhi 1990, p.517b, s.v. – but if it is really connected with the legend discussed
here it could either have had a metaphorical sense: the sons laying down their
burden of killing, or dāruṇa here bears the meaning – although not found
elsewhere – ‘bow’ (the stick of the bow corresponding to Faxian’s zhēng ). Or
is dāruṇa-only a misunderstanding (misreading) of an original dhandu?
68 This has already been remarked by Eugène Burnouf, *Introduction à l’histoire
du Bouddhisme indien*, 1 Paris 1876, p.66, n.1, in his translation of the Divy text.

Deeg – Legend and Cult: 2. The stūpa of Laying Down the Bows

Gupta period on – but probably also before and possibly following
a tradition differing in this one point, one caitya was still shown as
connected with the legend of the deer-woman and her numerous
sons. If this is the case, the name cāpāla in the MPS should also be
connected semantically with the aetiologic story. Trying to fol-
low the logic of the old analysts – who were *nairuktas* in the tradi-
tional sense, following more of a semantic-contextual line than per-
forming a strict formal linguistic analysis69 – one can split the
name into two elements cāpa- and āla, the first element is a word for
‘bow’, rather unusual in Skt literature71 but already used in the
Mbh, where we also find – as we have seen above – fragments of
the avadāna.

The second part of the word -āla, however, is not so easily
explained as corresponding to ‘laying down (the bows)’ as Faxian
terms it. It could have been analysed as belonging to the root *vāl-
with the prefix ā- which is found in the *Đhūtapātha (Đhūtapū)72.

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69 Cf. for that kind of ‘etymology’. M. Deeg, *Die altindische Etymologie nach
dem Verständnis Yāskas und seiner Vorgänger; eine Untersuchung über ihre
Praktiken, ihre literarische Verbreitung und ihr Verhältnis zur dieterischen
Gestaltung und Sprachmagie*, Dettelbach 1995, and for the tradition: Eivind
Many Chinese translations of Indian names – not least made by the pilgrims
who had been studying in Buddhist academic centres – and their later Tibetan
successors clearly indicate through their work that the *nairukt- or nirvacana-
method of explaining Indian words had a living tradition despite the fact that no
texts of this type were produced after Yāka’s Nirukta.
70 Cf. Böhlting & Roth, Sanskrit Wörterbuch, op. cit., 2, p.990 s.v.; 1, p.223a,
s.v. The word has relatively few correspondences in Middle-Indo-Aryan or new
Languages*, Oxford 1966, p.257b, no.4746, s.v.
71 It is, however, found in the Buddhist synonymic dictionary, *Nāmañjguś-
śanābhy by Amarasiriha, known as Amarkakośa*, 2.83 (edition V. Jhalakikar, 1907,
repr. Delhi 1990, p.200; on the dictionary in general see C. Vögel, *Indian
Lexicography*, Wiesbaden 1979, p.309) where cāpa in the dvandva dhanus-
čāpaṇa, introducing the lemma, may point out some common use of the word.
72 Cf. also the Chinese translation of Upāli as Jingū 近取 or Jinzhī 近值
‘close’ (tipāi) and ‘to take, to grasp’ (-l) – which shows that in this name the element -li was probably taken as belonging to lā-.
That this root was evidently used for eymologising Skt words ending in -la, is shown by the story of the name of Ceylon, Sinhala, given by Xuanzang. The meaning of ś-lā-, especially because it does not occur together with a prefix ś-, is not easy to determine, but the Dhātup gives for the root a rendering (ādānc ‘in the sense of to take’) which would not fit very well with the expected meaning but would mean just the opposite. There is, however, no doubt that vā-lā- is only a variant of the more common but also defective root vṝ-lā-, ‘to give (away)’

There is also the possibility — more elegant though avoiding a verbal etymon of the last member — that the name was analysed as cāpa + alāh in a kind of syntactical explanation meaning ‘(do) away with the bows!’ which would fit with the etiological story as well. Whichever of these two ‘etymologies’ was really made up by the etiological expounders, either of them would have been in perfect harmony with the climax of the etiological story and — even more important — would be the exact counterpart of Faxian’s translation of the respective stūpa: Fang-gongzhang 放弓杖, the (stūpa of) releasing the bows.

That the name was also explained in a different way is shown by the anonymous MPS, T 6 (p.180b12), where we find Jiji-shenide 汲疾神地, the ‘sacred spot “swift”’, cāpala being interpreted as a

derivation of capala, ‘swift, swaying, mobile’

What kind of story was this legend that was remembered for such a long period in the area around Vaisāli and that was marked by a monument that — despite the aetiological legend having been forgotten in general — kept on appearing in Buddhist literature?

The area near Vaisāli was the dominion of the former Vṛjji/Licchavi clan to which also belonged the caityas mentioned in the MPS. The legends given by Faxian and Xuanzang do not mention the name of the clan in the context of the story but, from the version found in the P commentaries, it is clear that the stories must go back to a common source. This original legend was — I think — the aetiological story of the origin of the Vṛjji/Licchavis.

As everywhere else in the world the Indian noble clans also claimed descent from to ancestors who had come from very special origins or circumstances. In the case of the Vṛjji/Licchavis, who were obviously proud of being a kind of aristocratic confederation without a clear royal house, such an etiological story about their own origin would naturally have involved an explanatory element giving the reason for there being no absolute monarchy with one ruler or ruling house but a confederation of several clans. The name of the city, Vaisāli/Vesāli, then — as can be seen from the legend in the P commentary — was also clearly connected with the purpose of not only explaining why the city was so huge but also of giving the reason for this: because the Vṛjji/Licchavis were so numerous.

Now, if the caityas mentioned in the MPS are related to the aetiological legend about the origin of the Licchavis, it is clear by their names that this legend must have existed in a form similar to those reported by the Chinese pilgrims (and in other Chinese versions) with the elements of many sons (bhāputrāka), the laying down of the bows (cāpala, dhūranīkṣeṇa = dhanunīkṣe-


74 Cf. Böhlting/Roth, Sanskrit Wörterbuch, op. cit., s.v. 1. lā, but also 2. lā das Nehmen, das Geben’.

75 This is not very conclusive from the standpoint of Skt word formation, because it presupposes two vṝdhīs of the stem and of the formant.

76 To give only a few examples, the story of Romulus and Remus, the already mentioned similar story of Moses, etc.

77 E.g. Sinhala, the ancestor of the Ceylonese, the founder of the Khotanese kingdom, etc.
panda? or arrows (śarandāda) and even the name of the royal father (progenitor princeps) may have been preserved in the Udena cetiya of the P list. The fact that there was a whole band of sons, young warriors, in the legend of the origin of the Licchavis would fit perfectly to explain the coming into existence of an aristocratic clan ‘republic’ that the Vṛjjis are thought to have formed. Even in the days of the Buddha the young Licchavis were renowned for their hunting with bow and arrow, which could point to ‘Jungmännerbünde’, institutionalised in respect of the origins of the clan. The Pāli aetiology for the name of Vesālī would – with 100, 500 or 1,000 sons coming home – even attain a higher degree of plausibility than with the regular birth of children.

The historical setting seems to be that the caitya or stūpa of ‘laying down the bows’ or ‘Many sons’ referred to the old legend of the Vṛjjis/Licchavis as it is related by Faxian and Xuanzang near Vaiśālī and it was thought to have been there that the Buddha gave up his will to extend his lifetime. It was well established from about the beginning of the Christian era – the period when texts such as the Divy, Mvu, AvS, Lal are supposed to have been composed. It still flourished under the Guptas when Faxian was travelling; in that time the name and its meaning in connection with the story were still known and explained in the local tradition. This local legend in a Buddhismised form then found its way into the Buddhist narrative literature (Chinese versions, AvS) where other elements can be found in the narrative tradition of the Hindus and Jainas. Monument and legend and their connection finally fell into oblivion from the seventh century CE: Xuanzang did still know the story of the monument but does not refer either to the name and exact position of the monument or to the laying down of the bows. Yijing, Huichao and Wukong do not refer to the existence of such a place – which is not very surprising with even the Parintvāṇa-stūpa of Kusinagara having fallen into a state of decay in their days.

To conclude the discussion about the two stūpas: it is usually assumed that Buddhist stūpas were once built as symbols of the Dharma or – in a more philosophical-buddhological framework of interpretation – as a representation of the Buddha’s presence after his Nirvāṇa. Too little attention has, however, been paid to the fact that some of the stūpas and the stories of their Buddhist origin – usually in the form of jātaka- or avadāna-like legends – and sometimes their interaction have a history of their own. A successful interpretation of these monuments can only be given by a careful evaluation of textual (usually, and for the Indologist unfortunately, not Indian), philological (which means here the analysis of names and their meaning) and archaeological data, which in some cases should be able to elucidate each other and enable the historian to write a puzzle-stone – be it only fragmented – in the history of Indian Buddhism, this being the only way to do it.

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78 The Tib. brten-pa-gton-ba for dhuraṃ kṣip-tyaj-munįj-follows the Skt closely.
79 Aṅguttara-nikāya III, 75 f.: While the Buddha dwells in the Mahāvāna a group of young Licchavis with the bows prepared and surrounded by their hounds (sambhūla Līchchhivakumārakā sajānī dhanukāni) Mss and Buddhaghosa in the Comm: dhanaṃ ōdāya kūkurasuṇghaparivutā) roam the forest. When they see the Buddha resting under a tree, they lay down their bows (sajānī dhanukāni nikkhipivā), restrain their dogs and revere the Buddha.
80 This may be the background to why the Licchavi Mahānāma subsequently warns the Buddha of the rude and reckless behaviour of these young Licchavis; Buddhaghosa in his commentary on the passage claims that these young men will later on belong to the ruling class of Vaijjas: ... vacchissanti Vaijrajāna (H. Kopp, ed., Manorathapārāṇī Commentary on the Aṅguttara Nikāya III, London 1966, p.261).
AN OUTLINE OF THE YOGĀCĀRA-VIJÑĀNAVĀDA
SCHOOL OF INDIAN BUDDHISM
PART TWO
ERIC CHEETHAM

Part One of this article set out certain of the doctrinal features of Yogācāra as well as basic practices. Part Two now completes these topics based on the same source material as used in Part One.

THE EIGHTEEN DHĀTUS (ELEMENTS); THE ALL

It has been shown here already that the six triads of the eighteen dhātu scheme (see diagram) are part of the Buddha’s original set of teaching formulas. These, and the elaborations in the Abhidharma texts, are part of Yogācāra’s pedigree from the early mainstream teaching. Asaṅga presents the explicit version of this same eighteen dhātu scheme in his Abhidharmasamuccaya.

The Yogācāra scheme of dhātus combines with two other ancient formulas, the five skandhas and twelve āyatanas (faculties and fields). As the skandhas and āyatanas are names for particular collections of dharma elements, when brought together within the eighteen dhātu framework they represent all dharma activity as a whole. Indeed Chapter One of Asaṅga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya sets out this combined scheme in detail, together with definitions of each of the dharmas involved.

The formula of the eighteen dhātus comprises six triads of elements: the five senses, i.e., organ, object and consciousness for each sense faculty of seeing, smelling, tasting and touching. Added to these is the sixth triad, which consists of mental organ, mental object and mental consciousness. The complete layout is given in the following diagram.

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\(^{33}\) Abhidharmasamuccaya trans., op. cit., Part I, Ch. One.
THE EIGHTEEN DHĀTUS IN YOGĀCĀRA

1. caksurādhātu (eye element)
2. rūpadhātu (form element)
3. caksurvijñānādhātu (visual consciousness element)
4. śrotadrāhātu (ear element)
5. śabdadhātu (sound element)
6. śrotavijñānādhātu (auditory consciousness element)
7. ghrāṇadhātu (nose element)
8. gandhādhātu (odor element)
9. ghrāṇavijñānādhātu (olfactory consciousness element)
10. jihvādhātu (tongue element)
11. rasadhātu (taste element)
12. jihvāvijñānādhātu (gustatory consciousness element)
13. kāyadhātu (body element)
14. sprātavijñānādhātu (tactile consciousness element)
15. kāyadhātu (tactile consciousness element)
16. manodhātu (mental organ element, manas)
17. dharmadhātu (mental objects element, i.e. viniyata (special)
18. manovijñānādhātu (mental consciousness element)

For the early schools the sensory objects were real entities which existed externally. Similarly, all the other dhātu combinations consisted of real fundamental elements (dharma) which appeared in consort with others and then disappeared only to be replaced immediately by further clusters of dharmas.

Asanga and Vasubandhu only go along with this so far. Yogācāra recognises all the dharmas as we shall see, and even adds some to the Sarvāstivādin lists. In particular, Asanga uses the eighteen dhātu scheme as an all-embracing framework for all dharmas, i.e. Samsāra. Again, an important dharma addition is made. This is manas, the seventh consciousness. The fundamental difference, however, is that Yogācāra does not regard any of these dharmas as being independent and really existing externals or internals. Instead, they are simply outflows from the alayavijñāna by means of engendering seeds (bijas).

Vasubandhu expresses this in brief. He says that the sensory consciousnesses depend upon the alayavijñāna and they manifest subject to causes and conditions. This refers to the Yogācāra teaching of vijñapattimātratā, sometimes called ‘representation only’. This topic will be expanded below, but at this point it is necessary to consider the main Yogācāra additions, one of which is within the eighteen dhātus. They are the seventh and eighth consciousnesses.

Manas, the seventh consciousness, is a dharma and is part of the eighteen dhātu scheme. It is located at number 16, the triad of mentality. As such it is numbered among the Yogācāra list of dharmas (see appendix list, No.89).

Although manas is listed as a dharma, its functions suggest it is not a single momentary entity as described in the old Abhidharma texts. Manas has multiple functions as described here earlier. Vasubandhu states that manas, the seventh consciousness, cogitates and deliberates. It also receives input from all the other consciousnesses and is closely associated with a variety of defilements in its parikalpita state. So, as a thought-centre applying examination and judgement to all this input, manas could be argued to be more than a single entity. The texts do not expand on this but it could be surmised that either manas is a ‘cluster’ of various dharmas, or the whole concept of dharmas was amended in the Yogācāra scheme of things. One thing is clearly expressed and that is that manas has the alayavijñāna, the eighth consciousness.

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81 Kośa, Ch.1, pp.5 and 6.
82 Vasubandhu’s Trīṃśikā, v.15, quoted in DMC, p.cxxxi.
83 Trīṃśikā, v.2, quoted in ibid., p.cxxiii.
84 Ibid., pp.289-303.
ness, as its basis and support as well as its object\textsuperscript{85}.

The ālayavijñāna, the eighth consciousness, however, does not figure specifically in any of the eighteen dhātus. This may be because of its definition as being the cause and conditions\textsuperscript{86} of all the elements. Here we probably have a reference to the bijas, which constitute the ālayavijñāna, these being the progenitors of all dharmas.

On the other hand, the eighteen dhātus do not include the conditioned/unconditioned dharmas within number 17, the dharma-dhātu\textsuperscript{87}. On this matter Yogacāra diverges from the early schools. In these, the asamskrta dharmas were shown as distinctly separate from the five skandhas which, in both Yogacāra and mainstream, are part of the eighteen dhātus. There is some explanation of this by Asaṅga, who says that all the dhātus are ‘knowable’ (jneya) and thus can presumably incorporate the eight asamskrta dharmas\textsuperscript{88}. A point, however, not readily explained is this: if the asamskrta dharmas have to be engendered by bijas (seeds) which can only come from the ālayavijñāna. The question is how is this possible for unconditioned elements which are said to have no independence or relationship with anything else? For example, is Nirvāṇa produced by a bija? Doubtless there is a quite satisfactory answer to this but, so far, it has eluded this writer.

The accompanying dhātu diagram sets out the eighteen dhātu scheme and its contents. The first five triads (Nos 1-5) have sufficient operational clarity to make further explanation unnecessary. Except in one regard. Again, Yogacāra deviates from the earlier Abhidharmas by placing the sensory organs in the first place of the triads (Nos 1, 4, 7, 10 and 13). The early schools explained the sensory process as a linkage between object, organ and consciousness. The object impinging upon, or being sought out by, the organ engenders a sensory result which is impressed on the corresponding consciousness. It seems that the Yogacāra

reverted to the Buddha’s original sequence\textsuperscript{89} here. In any case, all these elements arose from the bijas in the ālayavijñāna in related combinations, so that a primary, external object was redundant.

It is the last of the six triads that need some comment. With the addition of the dharma manas to manodhātu, No.16, the number of dharma consciousnesses within the eighteen dhātus is increased from six to seven. The eighth consciousness, the ālayavijñāna, is not part of the dharma list or the dhātu scheme. The second item of the sixth triad, i.e. No.17, is a collection of all the remainder of the Yogacāra dharmas as indicated by the headings appended to it.

With all this in mind it seems to be the case that Yogacāra made abundant use of the Buddha’s original eighteen dhātu scheme, with modifications which were dictated by the deep Dharmas’s revelations it unearthed. With Yogacāra, then, the eighteen dhātus combine all the dharmas of Samsāra, both conditioned and unconditioned. As a consequence the skandhas and all the āyatana, being collective names for particular dharmas, found a place within the overall dhātu scheme. The essential difference between this and the earlier schemes is that all of it is cittamātra (only mind-made), i.e., the product of bijas (seeds) emerging from the ālayavijñāna. In the parikalpa realm this situation is not known although it is never absent. Only by progress through the realm of paratantra to the parinispāna perceptions can reality be known.

It may be for this reason that Yogacāra has ambivalent attitudes towards these dharmas, e.g., the asamskrta and the viprayuktas and manas. If all dharmas are empty and mind-made, precision is superfluous except in the parikalpa realm.

THE YOGACĀRA DHARMA SYSTEM, A SCHEME OF DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE.

The Yogacāra system of basic doctrine and practice, like all the early schools of Indian Buddhism, incorporated a dharma scheme of some kind. That is to say, a collection of fundamental elements

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\textsuperscript{85} Tripṭikā, v.5, quoted in \textit{ibid.}, p.cxxv.

\textsuperscript{86} Abhidharmasamuccaya trans., \textit{op. cit.}, p.59.

\textsuperscript{87} \textit{Ibid.}, p.23.

\textsuperscript{88} \textit{Ibid.}, p.30.

\textsuperscript{89} Saṃyutta-nikāya IV, 15.
of conscious existence (dharma), each of which had specific functions and associations. At one time, opinions were expressed that the dharma schemes were the work of later masters and were not part of the original teachings of the Buddha. There are, however, many references to dharmas in the Pāli canonical texts and a part of these has already been presented above. Some of the difficulty has arisen because of the varied equivalents given for the word dharma/dhamma in English textual translations. An example of this can be seen in the various translations of the text of the Dhammapada I, one of which is quoted in the previous section. This first verse is critical evidence for dharmas being part of the Buddha’s teaching, yet the English rendering completely confused the meaning by not supplying the Pāli term and also by imprecise and various English words like ‘thoughts’. Another text can supply further evidence in this regard. It is related in the Pāli Vinaya-piṭaka and elsewhere, where; Asvajit, one of the Buddha’s first disciples at Vārānasī, met Sāriputra before the latter joined the Buddha’s following. Sāriputra asked Asvajit who his teacher was and what teaching he followed. Asvajit answered in a short verse as follows:

Ye dhammā hetu prabhāvā hetun teṣam tathāgato āha
teṣam ca yo nirdhavo evaṁvādi mahāsāramapāḥ

Translating from Lamotte’s French, this can be rendered as:

‘Of dharmas which arise from a cause
The Tathāgata has proclaimed
The cause as well as their stopping’. Thus teaches the great ascetic.

Sāriputra was so impressed by this terse statement about the arising and stopping of dharmas that he went straight to Sākyamuni for more. The rest, as they say, is history.

Bearing in mind the place and the persons involved in this

90 See Part One, The three turnings of the Dharma Wheel, p.[22], n.73.

episode, one cannot get much closer to the original teaching than this. But, as mentioned, there are considerably more textual references to dharmas which can be found in the Buddha’s recorded pronouncements. They would be tedious to quote in detail, but some of the reference details are given in the footnote below, to be consulted if required.

So again, Yogācāra will be seen here as adopting and adapting original and early canonical teaching to a deeper and more explicit system, though one which is undisputedly derived from its Buddhist precursors and from Buddha originals.

On this evidence the dharmas and their groupings are not just the product of academic embellishment by idle monks in a hot climate. Doubtless this also took place. But it is clear that dharmas were fundamental to the original teaching of the Buddha as well as to the early Abhidharma masters.

Why then are dharmas so important? In the first place they are the result of Buddhist psychological analysis which lays bare the actual entities causing the suffering of all beings. Secondly, once dharmas are brought into view they can be pacified by special practices and, as a result, according to the final passages of the Satipaṭṭhāna, Nirvāṇa can be attained within seven days.

For these and other reasons dharmas remain fundamental to Yogācāra just as they did with its forbears. The more profound insights of Yogācāra, however, required some changes to the old usages. Nonetheless, Yogācāra never lost sight of the primary purpose of bringing dharmas into view. Dharmas always were the basis of right effort, and to facilitate this practical end, i.e., the acquiring and sustaining of wholesome dharmas and the elimination of the defiled and unwholesome variety, the dharma listings were divided into separate categories. For Yogācāra these are:

citta (mentals)

92 The Heart of Buddhist Meditation (Satipaṭṭhāna), tr. Nyanaponika Thera, Colombo 1954, pp.125, 139-40; Samyutta-nikāya II, 25, and Kośa, Ch.3, p.72; Kośa, Ch.2, pp.215, 310; ibid., Ch.1, p.11; Lamotte, Traité II, op. cit., p.912, quoting the Sātālamkāra.
caitasika (mental associates)
rūpa (physical faculties)
viprayuktā (distinct from other mentals)
asamāyikā (unconditioned)

The largest of these categories is the second, the caitasika. This is subdivided into sub-sections which comprise over fifty separate dharmas. The sub-sections include dharmas classified as good/wholesome, bad/defiled, and indeterminate. Such subdivisions are intended as an aid to right cultivation, as mentioned earlier.

Before turning to a detailed presentation of the Yogacāra dharma scheme, it is necessary to set out one of the major Abhidharma developments which Yogacāra accepted. The Abhidharma explains the purpose of Dharma/dharma practice. Vasubandhu says that without the discernment of dharmas, i.e., bringing them into awareness, there is no subjugation of the passions (kleśa), and hence there is no release from Samsāra. Here is a concise statement of doctrine and necessary practice which Asanga would rework later. Indeed it can be seen as the raison d'être of all dharma schemes in mainstream Hinayāna and Mahāyāna.

The dharma topics above which Yogacāra took over had a further outcome. It is the doctrine of the dharmasamātāna, or mental series. This is a combination of the basic themes of no-self (anatman) and impermanence (anityatā). It means, generally speaking, that although dharma elements are real (for the Abhidharma), they appear and disappear with minute duration. Consequently, change, rapid or otherwise, is a constant and therefore the dharmas exist in a related sequence with no permanent self/soul. Vasubandhu expressed the case precisely, so his short statements are worth quoting:

‘By series (samātāna) we understand material and mental elements uninterruptedly succeeding each other in a procession which has action as originating cause.

The successive moments of the procession are different,'94


\[93\text{Kośa, Ch.1, p.5, v.3.}\]

\[94\text{Ibid., Ch.9, p.296}\]

\[95\text{Ibid., Ch.3, p.33.}\]

\[96\text{Ibid., Ch.2, p.194 and n.3.}\]

\[97\text{Ibid., Ch.2, p.153.}\]

Cheetham – The Yogacāra-Vijnānavāda School

therefore there is evolution (paripāma), transformation of the series.'

Again, Vasubandhu notes:

‘Dharmas, being momentary, exist in series...’.95

Yogacāra would agree with the basic idea of this, which they called cittasamātāna, but its explanation of exactly what the statements meant would differ. This is due to the emergence of its special doctrine of the ālayavijñāna, bija and vāsanā which made a linear production of successive dharmas obsolete. For Yogacāra there certainly was succession and transformation, but these were dependent upon the seeds (bija) from the developments in the ālayavijñāna and vāsanā. In this case, therefore, the result was similar but the direction of the causal production differed.

Another feature of dharma activity linked to the dharma-samātāna is the notion of ‘clusters’ of dharmas. This too is accepted in the Yogacāra dharma scheme. This notion is implicit in the circumstance that no dharma is considered to arise singly and alone. Always there are accompanying conditions (pratyāya) and associates. The Abhidharma text specifies a basic twenty-seven dharmas in every dharma cluster. A further ten dharmas are added to this if one accounts for the category of mahābhūmikas which are present at every moment.96 Thus every single dharma becomes a multiple entity by reason of its necessary associates. One of the old categories of Sarvāstivādin dharmas emphasises this factor. This is the category of samprayuktās, i.e., mental associates indicating the group of dharmas which are capable of linkage to form a cluster. Yogacāra employs the same theme by its term citta/caitta, i.e., mentals and mental associates. An example of Yogacāra usage has been shown above concerning the multiple entity of manas.

So much for similarities and adoptions by Yogacāra from the
Sarvástivādins and others. Now we can turn to what the Yogācārins changed in their own dharma scheme to take account of its deeper perceptions of the Dharma in general.

Perhaps the most important change by the Yogācārins to the meaning of the dharma scheme was that they denied the existence of external objects as separate from the mind, *citta*. Asaṅga puts the case for this, i.e., for *vīññaptimātratā* in his *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*. He quotes Mahāyāna sūtras to the effect that the whole world is nothing but mind (*citta*) and that there is no external object. In respect of dharmas and *dhātu* this means that the *rūpadharmas*, i.e. *dhātu* Nos 2, 5, 8, 11 and 14, are not external to the perceiver. This is emphasised, again by Asaṅga, when he explains the form element (*rūpadhātu*) and visual consciousness element (*caksurvijñānadhātu*). What happens is that the eye perceives forms and then visual consciousness reacts to that visible form; it is also (and this is crucial) the result of accumulated seeds arising in the *ālayavijñāna*. All the sense consciousnesses arise from the store consciousness and that is why all of that is projected notions only (*vīññaptimātrā*). Even more radical is Vasubandhu when he writes that neither the *ātman* nor dharmas exist and so all is mere consciousness.

All the pre-Mahāyāna schools taught *anātman* but that dharmas were real. In Yogācāra (Vasubandhu) dharmas too are not real existents. That is not to say that they are not there. They are 'mind-made' and all arise from the *ālayavijñāna* by means of active seeds (*bijā*).

So, despite the protestations that dharmas do not exist, Yogācāra then sets out to define and categorise each of its 103 factors in its dharma scheme! This is not as aberrant as it seems because, as will be seen and as already shown in the section on *bahuśrūta* and dharma practice, all dharmas have a purpose. This purpose is to become the means to pass out of the *parikalpīta* realm, where the defiled dharmas are rampant, and into the *paratantra* and *parinibbāna* realms, where the dharmas can be perceived as they really are: empty (śūnya) and markless (anātman), and where in their real nature they are all the same (samatā).

This perception is only reached in the upper levels of the bodhisattva stages where dharma activity is then a pure (anāsrava) process and leads to a fundamental turning around in the depth of consciousness (asrāyaparārthī). In order to attain that close approach to full enlightenment the dharmas have first to be identified and then cultivated through the perfections (pāramitā). This, of course, starts in *parikalpīta* where false imagination dominates. Hence the necessity of penetration to the operation of dharmas (*dharma-pravicaya*) and so they all have to be brought into view, defined and employed by right effort.

For this purpose lists of both the Sarvāstivādin and Yogācāra dharmas are appended. Here, some of the special features of the Yogācāra scheme are presented.

Controversially perhaps, although the store consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) is called the eighth consciousness in the *Vīññaptimātratāsiddhi* and elsewhere, the Sanskrit stanzas of Vasubandhu do not call it so. Its names have been given to us here as *vipākavijñāna* and *sarvakāśijñānā*. Added to this the *ālayavijñāna* does not figure in either the eighteen *dhātu* or in the Yogācāra list of dharmas, although *manas* appears in both. It may be postulated from this that the *ālayavijñāna* is not a dharma, at least in the generally accepted sense of that word. Some of the definitions of the *ālayavijñāna* given by Asaṅga appear to support the idea that it cannot be a dharma.

For example, Asaṅga says in his *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* that all produced dharmas arise from the store consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) and they are then formed into the chain of dependent arising (*pratīyāsamutpāda*). Further on in the same text Asaṅga
says that the *ālayavijnāna* as retribution consciousness holds all the seeds (*bijā*) and because of this all the destinies and existences arise from this consciousness.

The *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* expands these by stating that the retribution consciousness (*ālayavijnāna*) is homogenous, continuous and capable of sustaining body and life and preventing these from being interrupted. Again, it states that this consciousness is called *ālayavijnāna* because it includes all defiled dharmas.

These definitions, among a number of others, make it difficult to see how the *ālayavijnāna* can be reckoned among the other single function elements of very short duration, especially in view of the negative evidence that it does not figure in the eighteen *dhātus* or the Yogacāra dharma list. So, whether or not it is the eighth consciousness, it can hardly be of the same kind as the other seven consciousnesses. By its function and titles it seems to be unique and of a different nature to the dharmas contained in the eighteen *dhātus*.

The Yogacāra dharma list is arranged under the five headings of the *skandhas*. The group of mental associates (*samprayukta*) comprises *skandhas* two, three and four. They include such sub-groups as the wholesome (*kusāla*) and unwholesome (*akusāla*) and the derived and secondary defiled dharmas (see dharma list). In all, this group is composed of fifty-five separate dharmas, which is over half the total. This is the group which produces most of the ‘clusters’ and, because all the defilements and passions arise from it, it is a major constituent of the realm of *parikalpita*. As such, it provides the focus for most of the early dharma practice.

Also included among the fourth *skandha* are the dharmas of the ‘distinct from other mental’ (*cittaviprayuktasamskṛta*) subsection. This is a strange example of Yogacāra adaptation. The original Sarvāstivādin list contained thirteen of these. The Yogacāra, despite its seeming ambivalence on dharmas in general, adds ten more to these making a total for this sub-section of twenty-three. The Yogacāra additions themselves are also rather strange. Such items as rapidity (*java*, No.83) and succession (*anukrama*, No.84), time (*kāla*, No.85) and region (*desa*, No.86) once again do not seem to conform to the general idea of a dharma as an irreducible element of conscious existence. On the other hand, as part of the *skandhas* they do seem to connect the so-called personality (*pudgala*) to the surrounding world. All the dharmas of the *skandha* groups are conditioned (*samskṛta*). The last group of the set is outside the group of the *skandhas* but is contained within the eighteen *dhātu* framework.

This is the section of the unconditioned (*asamskṛta*) dharmas. Here again Yogacāra expanded the original three dharmas to eight. Comment has already been made on this section above. The Yogacāra additions comprise three types of suchness (*rathatā*) and two extra types of ‘stopping’ (*nirodhā*). Why these extra are necessary seems problematical and, anyway, how can there be more than one kind of suchness? This, together with the already mentioned difficulty of unconditioned, i.e. unrelated and unconnected, dharmas being produced by *bijas* from the *ālayavijnāna* makes the additions to this section strange indeed. Further comment will be made in these questions below.

Regarding the detail of the practice dimension of dharmas, this can now be set out. There will be little surprise if it is said that the preliminary practice system in Yogacāra is similar to that of the earlier schools, i.e., to bring dharama elements into focus and build a body of good roots, i.e., wholesome dharmas, to sustain more advanced practices. Such is the first of the old progressive phases of the five paths (*mārga*). The first path is called *sambhāramārga*, or path of acquiring equipment. This preparatory stage is also part of the Yogacāra bodhisattva process in that it is necessary to accumulate the *mokṣabhāgīyas* (dharmas of or aids to deli’erance). These are faith (śraddhā), energy (vīrya), mindfulness (*smṛti*) and

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106 DMC, p.227.
109 *Trīṃśikā*, v.1.

some wisdom (prajñā)\textsuperscript{110}. These are all dharmas as can be seen by
the notes attached.

The process continues by entry into the second path called
prayogamārga (path of preliminary or focused exercise). This
comprises four more features common to both mainstream Hina-
yāna and Mahāyāna, i.e., the nirvedabhāgiyas.

In Yogacāra, however, these four features have the same
names as before but their definitions and aims vary. The four are
called usmagata (heats), mūrdhāna (summits), kśānti (patience)
and laukikāgradharma (supreme worldly dharmas). All eight
together are the ingredients of the good roots (kuśalamūla)\textsuperscript{111}.
The aim of these practices in Yogacāra is described and clearly set
out in the Vījnaptimātratāsiddhi. The aim is to gain access to the
third path, the path of vision (darśanamārga), and for that the
ingrained conception of subject and object needs to be
removed\textsuperscript{112}. If successful they lead to the realisation that these
dharmas do not exist other than as vījnāptimātra (mere notionals
projections)\textsuperscript{113}.

The next stage of this process is called darśanamārga, the third
of the five paths. Here the first ‘vision’ of reality is gained with the
appearance of nirvikalpapajñāna, i.e., knowledge free from false
imagination and discrimination. This reveals the two sūnyatās, i.e.,
of pudgala and of dharmas\textsuperscript{114}.

In the same stage of darśanamārga, as a conclusion of the stage,
the higher comprehension (abhīsamāya) is attained\textsuperscript{115}. This
amounts to an actual realisation of the non-duality of all dharmas
and the real\textsuperscript{116} meaning of the Dharma and the Three Jewels. On
completing the darśanamārga there is entrance into the first of the
ten stages (bhūmi)\textsuperscript{117} which is sometimes referred to as the path
proper, i.e. all preliminaries are fulfilled and the progressthrough
the stages has begun. At this point also calming (samāthā) and
insight penetration (vipāśyāna) continue to function as described
above in the section on bahuśrūta. At the darśanamārga stage
and beyond, however, insight penetration predominates\textsuperscript{118}.

Now, from the first bhūmi onwards the unobstructed know-
ledge (nirvikalpakajñāna) is constantly activated. The presence
of this special insight-knowledge is established when praṇāpāramitā
is attained in the sixth bhūmi. This form of perfected insight cuts
off forever the secondary defilements and the seeds (bijas) of
the grasping at subject and object (grāhakaugrāhya)\textsuperscript{119}. This cutting
off contributes to the eventual demolition of the two barriers
(āvarana) of defiled dharmas (kleśa) and false or incomplete
knowledge (jneyāvarana)\textsuperscript{120}. Here we have the start of the
fruition of all the earlier acquired knowledge of the dharma elements
and the practice of right effort (samyagdāma) to subdue defilements.

By these processes of passing through the stages (bhūmi), one
of Yogacāra’s primary goals is achieved. It is the ‘transformation
of the base (āśrayaparārvtti). The base referred to is the
fundamental stratum of both pure and impure dharma activity
as well as the bijas which produce them in the ālayavijñāna.

These various attainments just prior to the ‘transformation
of the base’ mark a convergence, in some respects, of the doctrines
of the Madhyamaka and Yogacāra. The stage of the sixth perfection
involves praṇāpāramitā (perfect insight-knowledge) and this
conveys the comprehension that all dharmas are marked by empti-
ness (sarvadharma sūnyatālaksana). Indeed they are emptiness
itself. This in turn brings about the full acceptance that dharmas
do not arise (anupattikadharmakṣaṇī). With that, the crucial and
specific Yogacāra theme of the ‘transformation of the base’
(āśrayaparārvtti) comes to be.

\textsuperscript{110} DMC, p.679.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., p.681.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., p.691.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., p.699.
\textsuperscript{116} SGV, p.160.
\textsuperscript{117} DMC, p.701.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., p.695.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., p.703.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., p.705.
All this may serve to illustrate how dharma schemes underlie most of Yogācāra doctrine and practice and, of course, most of the rest of Indian Buddhism. For Yogācāra in particular the point reached at this stage is tantamount to entry into parinirūpa (ultimate reality). It should be noted, however, that defined dharmas of all kinds constitute the parikalpita experience. Yet it is the true nature of these same dharmas which emerges in the higher stages.

Beyond that, as we shall see next, the true dharma nature takes on its supreme form, the fulfilment of the original aspiration to perfect enlightenment, the final flowering of the bodhicitta.

THE DHARMA AS THE DHARMAKĀYA

After passing through the series of the path of vision (darśana-mārga) the next ascending sections are the six perfections (pāramitā) within the corresponding bodhisattva stages (bhūmi). All of this is part of the fourth of the paths called bhāvanāmārga, meaning path of continuous cultivation, or bringing into existence. This too refers to the dharmas, and the changes to them which are brought about in this process produce some very advanced staging posts in these higher levels of the Way.

The first concern here seems to be to overcome the barrier (āvaraṇa) of the defilements/passions (kleśa) still remaining. By repeated access to the unobstructed knowledge (nirvikalpaka-jñana) both barriers of defiled dharmas and incomplete knowledge (kleśa and jñeyāvaraṇa) are dissipated and entry into the parinirūpa realm is gained. This highly charged cultivation of good and special dharmas, i.e., prajñā, opens the way to purifying the ālayavijñāna of defiled seeds (bijā) and results in the ‘inner transformation or turning of the base’ (aśrayaparāvṛttī)\(^{121}\).

It is of some interest to note that in this same bhāvanāmārga not only is perfect wisdom gained at the sixth bhūmi, i.e., full comprehension of sūnyatā, but the Śrāvakā path to Nirvāṇa is also fulfilled\(^{122}\). This seems to refer back to the statements in the

\(^{121}\) Ibid., p.707.

\(^{122}\) SGV, p.262-3.

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Cheetham - The Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda School

Samdhinirmocanasūtra already mentioned concerning the three turnings of the Wheel by which both major branches of the Dharma (Śrāvaka and Mahāyāna) are incorporated in the explicit teaching of the third turning.

Such constant cultivation of dharmas produces the ‘inner transformation’ (aśrayaparāvṛttī) which can be of six kinds\(^{123}\). These different kinds concern the purification of the dharma stream, the fading of the false and the appearance of reality by overcoming the final barriers (āvaraṇa). The sixth kind is actually defined as where the bodhisattva penetrates to the lack of self-existence of the dharmas (dharmanairātmya) and realising that Samsāra is forever calm and should not be abandoned\(^{124}\).

By this point in the bodhisattva process several kinds of what are usually lumped together as ‘meditation’ have been either perfected or highly refined and concentrated. These are practices already prescribed here such as dharma-pravijñā, sāmaṇtha and viṇāya, samādhi and dhyāna. The last practice will have already been perfected by the fifth pāramitā. This allows access to the sixth, prajñāpāramitā, which is the pattern throughout, i.e., specific types of ‘meditation’ practice produce the highest goals in the upper stages. This means that such meditative practices have to be cultivated and intensified as the first bhūmi is approached. From this point on the defiled dharmas (already perceived and worked upon earlier) are gradually transformed and their bijas eliminated from this particular dharma-saṁśāpta\(^{125}\).

As if to reinforce the notion that the dharma elements are central to this whole process it is said\(^{126}\) that all ten bhūmis have a self-nature comprising all the good conditioned (samskrta) and all the unconditioned dharmas. Furthermore, accession to the tenth and final bhūmi provides mastery of all dharmas\(^{127}\).

\(^{123}\) Ibid., p.723.

\(^{124}\) Ibid.

\(^{125}\) DMC, p.723.

\(^{126}\) Ibid., p.711.

\(^{127}\) Ibid., p.741.
A clear distinction is made between seeds (bijā) and their respective dharmas when manifesting. An example is given that the arising of some defiled (kṣaṇa) dharmas is cut off at the stage of the first bhūmi, whereas the defiled seeds (bijā) are cut off progressively by means of special meditation practice during the passage through all the ten bhūmis. Thus the seeds (bijā) which can give rise to supreme enlightenment (anuttarasāṃyaktambodhi) can only operate when the two barriers (āvarana) of defilement (klesa) and incomplete profound knowledge (jñeya) are cleared away.

All this is part of the continuing process of dharma purification which lies at the heart of the ‘transformation of the base’ (āśraya-parāvṛtti). Indeed the word ‘base’ (āśraya) is said to be the store consciousness (ālayavijñāna) wherefrom all the seeds (bijā) arise. And the purpose of it all is suggested when it is said that the Buddha’s body of enjoyment (sambhogakāya) is produced by part of the process of the ‘transformation of the base’ (āśraya-parāvṛtti).

The purifying of the dharmas is again referred to when it is said that of the eighteen dhātus, i.e., the person and the whole of Saṃsāra, Nos 1-15, are always impure (āśraya) until full bodhi. But Nos 16, 17, and 18 can be either pure or impure. For a Buddha, however, all eighteen dhātus are pure. Here, the Buddha is usually referred to as the dharmakāya, a term redolent with several meanings. In this context it is defined as the three bodies (trīkāya), i.e., the body of true nature (svabhāva), the body of enjoyment (sambhogakāya) and the appearance body (nirmanakāya). Vasubandhu’s Trīṃśikā states with finality that ultimate attainment is the pure dhātu, i.e., the dharmakāya.

This dharmakāya is also said to be the support and base (āśraya) of sovereignty over all dharmas. And yet the Vījñaptimātratāsiddhi states that the dharmakāya appears when both the ālayavijñāna and the bijas are stopped. This supreme state, i.e., the real body of the Buddha and supreme enlightenment, is attained by the unobstructed knowledge and penetration (nirvikalpakāryā) focused upon the deep teaching/Dharma of the major Mahāyāna sūtras plus the fulfilment of passage through all ten bhūmis. Here is a clear reference to the previously mentioned main practice system of the triple gnosis (sruta, cintā, samatha/vipasyana).

In all this, both Aśaṅga and Vasubandhu are elaborating in what had earlier been presented in such basic Mahāyāna sūtras as the Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā and the Sūramgamasamādhi. In these can be found statements such as: The true nature (tathatā) of the Tathāgata and the tathatā of all dharmas are single, non-dual, not divided. Or: Tathāgatas are neither born nor die because of their complete synonymy with the true nature of dharmas.

Such is the unsurpassed peak (bhūtakoti) of all Mahāyānist endeavour. All the details above set out the means whereby this supreme aim is attained. It should therefore not be wondered at that the dharma elements should figure so prominently throughout the whole process. In doing so, of course, Yogacāra also continues and consolidates the similar tradition among the very earliest Indian Buddhist schools, even the recorded teaching of the Buddha himself. The sublime aim of the further teaching, i.e., that of the first Mahāyāna sūtras, is the reason why Yogacāra

128 Ibid., p.743.
129 Ibid., p.767.
130 Ibid., p.705.
131 Ibid., p.797.
132 Ibid., p.789.
133 Ibid., p.793.
134 Trīṃśikā, v.30.
135 Ibid.
136 SGV, p.266.
137 DMC, p.797.
138 SGV, pp.274-5.
140 Cf. Sūramgamasamādhisūtra trans., op. cit., p.166.
constantly emphasises attention to dharma, i.e., dharmaprabhavacaya. Right effort (samyagvyāma) in this area produces insight-knowledge (prajñā) and prajñā opens the gate to all the rest.

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Several concluding remarks may now be in order. On the basis of the textual extracts given above, the two main themes of the article have been outlined. Of course, much more textual material could have been used, but it is hoped that the extent has been sufficiently wide and apposite to underpin the main propositions. These are that the main Yogacāra doctrines are derived from and are extensions of the topics of the Buddha's recorded teachings and of the mainstream Indian Buddhist schools.

Also, that Yogacāra presents a coherent system of doctrine which is closely allied to necessary and related practice. Indeed, as in earlier schools, doctrine and practice are inter-related and inter-dependent. The difference between Yogacāra and the earlier mainstream Hinayāna is that the Yogacāra is dependent upon and elaborates the deep teaching of the first Mahāyāna sūtras. This reflects Asaṅga's own experience (and that of his brother Vasubandhu) of being grounded in the Sarvāstivāda and then progressing into the further teaching of first phase Mahāyāna.

Despite the amount of detailed exposition here, there remain some very puzzling and unresolved questions (it is ever so).

Having just outlined the dharma scheme of Yogacāra, it may be as well to start here.

The question arising is: what is the status and qualities of a 'dharma' in Yogacāra? In the early Abhidharma the answer was clear. A dharma is an element which lasts only an instant and is immediately replaced by another. Even so, each dharma has different characteristics and a karmic outflow. For Yogacāra, dharmas have no external existence and are all 'mind made'.

Furthermore, although manas is listed as a dharma which is within the eighteen dhātus, its functions, as defined, cannot be carried out by a single, instantly disappearing entity. For manas to

be a dharma it has to have qualities of considerable duration, or to be a complex or cluster of related dharmas.

Turning to the group of cittviprayuktas, items such as Nos 83, java (rapidity), and 84, anikrama (uniform succession), and 88, sāmagrī (totality of causes and effects), do not fit into the usual idea of a single dharma element.

Again, why add so many dharmas to the old list if, as Vasubandhu says, dharmas do not exist? And, strangely, most additions are made to the most problematic groups, i.e., viprayuktas and asamskrta dharmas. The latter raise their own difficulties. They are classified as dharmas and therefore are brought into being by seeds in the store consciousness. Yet by definition these dharmas are non-arising and unconditioned and so cannot be produced.

One speculation to conclude. Asaṅga is said by some to have been the founder of the Tathāgatagarbha school as well as of the Yogacāra. The Tathāgatagarbha teaching followed quickly upon the establishment of Yogacāra. According to Tathāgatagarbha texts the final phase of the process is the transformation of the refined dharmas into their intrinsic purity and true nature. At that point the pure Tathāgatagarbha is revealed, although it is always present. Is Asaṅga further refining his Yogacāra theme of the ālayavipraśāti by introducing the Tathāgatagarbha? If so, it may be questioned whether the ālayavijñāna and the Tathāgatagarbha are not similar or even the same.
Section I. The 72 *samskṛta* (conditioned) dharmas (A, B and C)

A The 11 dharmas of the rūṇapakṣandaḥ are:
- visaya (domain)
- indriya (organ) or
  - (visible) 1. rūpa āyatana (faculty)
  - (sound) 2. śabda āyatana (faculty)
  - (odour) 3. gandha āyatana (faculty)
  - (taste) 4. rasa āyatana (faculty)
  - (tangible) 5. sprastavya āyatana (faculty)

B The 60 dharmas of samskārakṣandaḥ

B1 The 46 samprayukta-dharmas, i.e. associated with thought

i. 10 mahābhūmisās:
- 12. vedanā (skandha) feeling, sensation (great, always present)
- 13. saṃjñā (skandha) perception, notion, idea
- 14. cetanā volition, will, intention
- 15. chanda desire for action
- 16. sparśa contact (qualified as contiguity)
- 17. smṛti recollection, memory, mindfulness
- 18. prajñā insight/wisdom
- 19. adhimokṣa approval, acceptance, recognition

ii. 10 kuśalamahābhūmisās (wholesome)

- 22. śraddhā acquiescence, faith, adherence, confidence (in)
- 23. virya energy
- 24. upēkṣā equanimity, balanced composure
- 25. hṛtī respect, veneration of virtuous qualities/persons

iii. 2 akuśalamahābhūmisās (unwholesome)

A. The 11 dharmas of the rūṇapakṣandaḥ are:
- visaya (domain)
- indriya (organ) or
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- 25. hṛtī respect, veneration of virtuous qualities/persons

B2 The 19 samskārakṣandaḥ dharmas (v. above)

C. The 11 dharmas of the prāśrābdhi are:
- sprastavya āyatana (faculty)

D. The 32 apraśrābdhi, i.e. unconditioned dharmas

- 32. āhīrya disrespect, lack of regard for virtue

E. The 60 dharmas of samskārakṣandaḥ

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- 13. saṃjñā (skandha) perception, notion, idea

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- 22. śraddhā acquiescence, faith, adherence, confidence (in)
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- sprastavya āyatana (faculty)

D. The 32 apraśrābdhi, i.e. unconditioned dharmas

- 32. āhīrya disrespect, lack of regard for virtue
B2. The 14 citta-viprayuktas, i.e. dissociated from thought

58. aprati possession and retention
59. aprati non-retention, non-possession
60. sabhāgata compatibility, similarity of

61. asamjñika unconsciousness, unawareness
62. asamjñisamāpatti meditative state of unconsciousness, attainment of consciousness
63. nirodhasamāpatti meditative state of stopped thought and mental activity

64. jīvita life force, quality of continuity
65. jāti birth, arising, production
66. sthiti duration, abiding
67. jarā ageing, decay
68. anityatā impermanence, instability
69. nāmakāya names that prompt ideas
70. padakāya meaningful phrases
71. vyañjanakāya syllable, vowel and consonant sounds

C 72. vijnānaskandha is a single dharma - simple, unmixed consciousness of a particular object.

Section 2. The three asamkrta (unconditioned) are:

73. akāśa space
74. pratisamkhyānirodha total stopping by insight (= Nirvāṇa)
75. apratisamkhyānirodha stopping/disjunction by lack of cause

Asaṅga’s List of Yogacāra dharmas
as contained in the Abhidharmasamuccaya

1. samkrta dharmas
The five skandhas (aggregates, conditioned)

Skandha one, rūpa dharmas (aggregates of matter)
The 10 āyatanas

dharmas number

1. caksurdhatu, eye element
2. srotradhatu, ear element
3. ghrānadhatu, nose element
4. jihvādhatu, tongue element
5. kāyadhātu, body, touch, tactile element
6. rūpadhatu, form element
7. sabdadhātu, sound element
8. gandhadhātu, odour element
9. rasadhātu, taste element
10. sprāṣṭavyadhātu, tangibility element

dharmas types and numbers in skandhas two, three and four

a = 5 sarvatraga, universal
b = 5 viniyata, special
c = 11 kusala, wholesome
d = 10 akuśala, unwholesome, defiled
e = 20 upaklesa, secondary unwholesome
f = 4 anyyata, indeterminate

Total 55 dharmas in skandhas two, three and four

a = sarvatraga, universal

Skandha two, vedanā (aggregate of feeling)
11) a. vedanā, sensation

Skandha three, saṃjñā (aggregate of perception)
12) a. saṃjñā, perception

141 Abhidharmasamuccaya trans., op. cit.
Skandha four, samskāra (aggregate of formations)
13) a. cetanā, volition aroused by contact with the organs
14) a. manaskāra, attention
15) a. sparśa, contact

b = 5 vinayata, special
16) b. chanda, desire
17) b. adhimoksa, resolve
18) b. smṛti, recollection/mindfulness
19) b. samādhi, concentration
20) b. prajñā, insight-wisdom

c = 11 kuśāla, wholesome
21) c. śraddhā, confidence
22) c. hri, respect (self respect)
23) c.apatrāpya, integrity (modesty)
24) c. alobha, non-covetousness (absence of greed)
25) c. advesa, non-hatred (absence of hatred)
26) c. amoha, non-delusion (absence of delusion)
27) c. virya, vigour
28) c. práśrabdhī, aptitude
29) c. apramāda, vigilence
30) c. upekṣā, equanimity
31) c. avihimsā, non-injury

d = 10 akuśala/kleśa, unwholesome, defiled
32) d. rāga, greed
33) d. pratigha, irritation
34) d. māna, conceit
35) d. avidyā, ignorance
36) d. vicikitsā, doubt
37) d. satkāyadrṣti, view of individuality
38) d. antagrahadrṣti, idea of grasping extreme views
39) d. dṛṣṭiparāmarśa, adherence to views
40) d. śīlavrataparāmarśa, adherence to observances/rituals
41) d. mithyādrṣti, false views

e = 20 upakleśa, defiled/unwholesome
42) e. krodha, anger
Besides the importance it holds in the perspective of Indian Buddhism, the Vimalakirti Sutra (Vkn) is of interest in that it is one of the rare Buddhist works which were truly integrated into the Chinese cultural patrimony. In the literary and artistic field, as well as that of philosophy and religion, it was of considerable influence in China. It was much read, by the laity as well as monks, and with no distinction between schools or sub-schools: it made way for an abundant exegesis, very diverse in tendencies or nuances, of which only a small part remains. It never ceased to inspire Chinese poets, painters and thinkers. Through its contents as well as its form, there is hardly any foreign text, before modern times, which so touched Chinese sensibilities.

The doctrines of the Prajñāpāramitā, close as they are in certain regards to ancient Taoism, take on in the Vkn an aspect infinitely better adapted to Chinese taste than the terminable developments of the large Sanskrit summaries which contained thousands or myriads of ślokas, or than the increasingly condensed manuals, Vajracchedikā, Hṛdaya, etc., whose redaction veers towards mnemotechnical preservation for initiates. It is not surprising that one of the first Chinese literati who took an interest in these doctrines, the statesman Yin Hao of the Eastern
Chin (d. 356), after having suffered political and military reverses set to reading Buddhist texts in his old age, preferred the Sūtra of Vimalakīrti to the Prajñāpāramitā texts which he found either too long or too short.1

The Vkn is a work of art. The scene-setting is conducted with the skill of a dramatist. The dialogue sparkles and recalls the expository methods of Confucius, Mencius and Chuang-tzu. The most abstruse theories are illustrated by lively anecdotes beloved of the Chinese. Paradox and irony are handled by a masterly hand, such as in the famous episode of Sāriputra, that holiest of holy men of the Small Vehicle, the foremost of the Buddha's disciples in wisdom (prajñāvatām agra), whom a malign goddess covers in flowers which he cannot shake off and who ends up seeing himself changed into a woman (Ch.VI). This story, aimed at scandalising the orthodox2, was nonetheless to inspire one of the most gracious rituals of Chinese and Japanese liturgy, that of the scattering of flowers (san hua). The puritanical clericalism of the Hinayana, so contrary to Chinese ethics, was the subject of a subtle satire. The only one of the interlocutors to find grace in the eyes of Vimalakīrti is the Bodhisattva Māṇjuśrī, the crown prince (kumārabhūta) who bore five twists of hair (pañcacrakra) whereas the monks with shaven heads, śrāvakas or arhats, are derided (Ch. III). Was the author of this glorification of the layman a layman himself? Vimalakīrti is, basically, aggressively lay*: a 'retired gentleman' (chiū-shih), as an upāsaka is called in Chinese, a ‘householder’, learned, rich, respected, a guildsman, a businessman whose dealings do not dirty the hands, a benefactor who, if necessary, haunts bad places there to do good works, but without any impure contact defiling him any more than mud defiles the lotus (Ch.II). He resolves the old Chinese dilemma between activism and quietism (t'ung and ching); Sāriputra's passive meditation (Ch. III, p.43) is the subject of censure which during the T'ang period the anti-quietists of the southern branch of the Dhyāna school were to highlight. Vimalakīrti participates in the action without ceasing to be in quietude; he adapts himself to every situation, 'responds', reacts to every external appeal without being concerned. His reflexes are so disinterested, his freedom so perfect, he displays such mastery of himself and the world that the laws of common morality, even those of nature, mean nothing to him. At his command rice increases to feed the visitors who come to his room, and the latter grows to the size of a universal auditorium. Such wonders are qualified as inconceivable, 'unthinkable' (acintya). As the commentator Seng-cho' observed, the notion of 'unthinkable' is at the heart of the sūtra. All duality is declared illusory, every logical contradiction dodged; the third party is not excluded, categories of normal thought are transcended; all discursiveness is vain. The path of deliverance passes by the passions; Enlightenment is the round of rebirth itself. Opposites are reconciled. The truth is 'unthinkable' and derives from silence. One might well be reading Chuang-tzu. Perhaps it is unwarranted to attribute to Vimalakīrti the virtues of a literate Confucian and the bearing of a Taoist aristocrat.4 In any case, it is quite clear that such a type of Buddhist had everything to beguile the Chinese literati, so reasonable that the last word in philosophy was for them always to deny reason.

It is indeed among the literati nourished by Taoist philosophy,

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2 By praising Vimalakīrti as highly as the Buddha himself, the sūtra thus shocked the hierarchal sense of the orthodox Chinese, as it appears from a text by Fu-li of the T'ang (T 211, p.551a) cited by Ch'en Yin-ch'ueh in his 'Postface au texte de Touen-houang d'une “amplification” du chapitre du Sūtra de Vimalakīrti intitulé “Les questions de Maṇjuśrī sur la maladie”', Bulletin de l'Institut de recherches d'Histoire et de Philologie de l'Academie Sinica II, Peking 1930, pp.6-7.
3 The least paradox attached to Vimalakīrti is none but the size of his dwelling, 'ten feet square' (fang-chang), recorded in the ruins of Vaiśali by the T'ang Chinese travellers, which in China became a designation of the monastic cell, then of the monks themselves or more especially of the head abbots of monasteries. Cf. Vkn trans., pp.cii-ciii.
4 See, for example, J. Gernet, Entretiens du maître de Dhyāna Chen-houei du Ho-tso [670-762], Hanoi 1949, pp.5, 35, 58.
in the intelligentsia of the Eastern Chin (317-420), that the Vkn was to claim its first success in China. At that time, the Sanskrit text had already been translated at least three times; about the middle of the fourth century, the Chinese monk Chih Min-tu made a synthetic edition of it. Chih Min-tu was known through his own exegesis of one of the theories of the Prajñāpāramitā, interpreted in the spirit of specifically Chinese gnosticism known as the Dark Learning (hsüan-hṣüeh), which had been in fashion since the revival of Taoist philosophy at the end of the Han. He was in contact with the circle of aristocrats who had emigrated into the region of the lower Blue River and Chekiang after the fall of the Western Chin, and cultivated the philosophy of the Dark Learning while combining it with Buddhist ideas mainly taken from the Prajñāpāramitā (or the Vkn).

His colleague Chih Tun (Chih Tao-lin 314-366) also frequented the great minds of the south, particularly the group of literati who resided in the region of Kuei-chi, near Shao-hsing in present-day Chekiang. Chih Tun excelled in the art of philosophical debate as it was practised by this group under the name of 'pure conversation' (ch'ing-t'an): somewhat like the lion conversations of Mallarmé, but which took place in a less enclosed atmosphere, since nature, the open air of the mountains, the beauties of the countryside were always appreciated by those Chinese given to subliminal abstraction. Chih Tun had written, taking his inspiration from the Vkn, a short treatise on the identity of matter (rupa) and emptiness (śūnyā) or, in the terms then in usage in Chinese philosophical problematics, of the world of 'there is' (yū) and that in which 'there is nothing' (wú).

7 See Vkn trans, p.xxx-xxxi.
8 Zürcher, Buddhist Conquest, pp.100-2; see also my article of 'La pénétration du bouddhisme dans la tradition philosophique chinoise', Cahiers d'histoire mondiale III, 1 (Unesco, Neuchâtel 1956), pp.24-6.
9 Sun-ch'o (ca. 300-380) wrote his praise in verse (Zürcher, p.352, n.78).
10 Placed on the lips of the Bodhisattva Priyadarśana, version by Chin Ch'ien, T 474, ii, p.531b7. It seems that half a century later the Chinese collaborators of Kumārajīva remembered the terms used by Chih Tun in their new translation of this passage, T 475, ii, p.551a20, Vkn trans., p.195 (Zürcher, p.362, n 215).

In the three centuries following the Vkn, the works of Chih Tun were the subject of much interest. Chih Tun's writings were translated into Sanskrit and Chinese, and became the basis for many popular commentaries. His influence extended far and wide, and his ideas were taken up by many of the great Buddhist scholars of the period. The work of Chih Tun is characterized by a deep sense of the interconnectedness of all things, and a profound appreciation of the subtleties of language and thought. His writings are full of philosophical insights that continue to influence contemporary thought.

a ‘eulogy’ in verse in hymnic style\textsuperscript{14} to the ten comparisons in the sūtra (ball of foam, bubble, mirage, etc., Ch.II, 9), and there is recorded of him, admittedly much later, an anecdote which was current in the Buddhist circles of Canton\textsuperscript{15}. At the time of his tragic execution in the public marketplace of that town, in 433, Hsieh Ling-yūn, who had a fine beard, purportedly gifted it to a monastery bearing the name of Jetavana (Chih-yuăn ssu), so that it could adorn a statue of Vimalakirti. The latter must therefore have appeared from then on in the Chinese temple iconography, and with the long beard of a Chinese sage as he was often to be depicted later. The first image of Vimalakirti was supposedly the work of the great painter of the time, Ku K'ai-chih (ca. 345-411), who also frequented the K'uai-chi circle and was linked with the family of Hsieh Ling-yūn: ‘He was the first to create an image of Vimalakirti; he depicted him with a clear (spare) and emaciated look, which showed his sickness, leaning on an arm-rest and forgetting the word\textsuperscript{16}. These last two expressions come from Chuang-Izu, who used them to describe Taoist ecstasy; the Taoist cult was practised in a hereditary way in Ku K'ai-chih’s family. However, perhaps the attitude he had given to the sage was rather inspired in him by that of the adherents of ‘pure conversation’, of which Vimalakirti was to become a kind of paragon or patron. The painting was done on a wall of the Wa-kuan ssu, a monastery founded in about 363-365 in Nankin, the capital of the Eastern Chin. We are told that the monks made an appeal for funds to the

\textsuperscript{14} T 2103, v.x, p.200a. It is already Kumārajīva’s version (T 475, i, p.329b15-21) which seems to follow Hsieh Ling-yūn. He groups in two, four of the comparisons to reach a total of ten.

\textsuperscript{15} It is recorded in a collection of T’ang anecdotes, the Sui-T’ang chia-hua by Liu Su (ap. T’ang-jeä shiu-hui, ed. 1869, fasc.II, p.7a), with regard to an imperial princess who, at the time of Chung-tsun (705-710), had the beard brought from Canton to Ch’ang-an by ‘relays at the gallop’ to amuse her in her games. Also see Yeh Hsiao-hsiieh, Hsieh Ling-yūn shih-hsiuán, Shanghai 1957, pp.180 and 215.


worthies of the imperial court. Ku K’ai-chih put down his name for the largest sum, a million sapeks. When his payment was claimed, he asked that a wall be prepared and shut himself in for more than a month. Before pointing up the eyes’ to give life to his portrait, he invited the monks to make visitors pay at the rate of one hundred thousand sapeks on the first day, fifty thousand the next, and what they liked on the third. The million was quickly reached\textsuperscript{17}. The greatest painters of the Southern Dynasties, Lu T’an-wei in the fifth century, Chang Seng-yu in the sixth, attempted to imitate his masterwork, without either being able to equal it. The paintings by Ku K’ai-chih, Lu T’an-wei and Chang Seng-yu were preserved until the T’ang period when, during the great proscription of Buddhism in 845, that by Ku K’ai-chih was transported to a temple in present-day Chenkiang, downstream from Nankin, from where it was again transferred, some years later, to the T’ang imperial collection. The poet Tu Mū had ten copies of it made before it was transferred to Chenkiang\textsuperscript{18}. All this had disappeared before or under the Sung (960-1280).

It is therefore mainly in the second half of the fourth century that we see the V kn gain favour in the scholarly circles of the Eastern Chin, in south-east China; it was clearly adopted there as one of the texts that all highly cultured Chinese should know. One can imagine the sensation that must have been caused in those circles – most particularly in the community of Lushan, on the middle Blue River, whence towards the end of the fourth century

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., Acker pp.378-9.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., Acker, pp.193, 372, 376, 379. Cf. also P. Pelliot, ‘Les transferts de fresques...’, Revue des arts asiatiques V, 1928, p.207, and ‘Les déplacements de fresques...’, ibid. VIII, 1934, p.218. The temple in Chekiang was burnt down under the Northern Sung in 1100; only one of its buildings survives in which Mi Fu (1051-1107), the famous painter and art critic, in the first years of the twelfth century set up his studio which he gave the name of Vimalakirti (Chung-ming-chia); cf. Acker, pp.375, n.5, 382. – There is also mention in the Chen-kuan kung-ssu hua shih by P’e Hsiao-yüan of a scroll illustrating the Vimalakirti Sūtra, painted by Chang Mê of the (Eastern, 317-420) Chin, as well as of a pienhsiang by Yüan Ch’ien of the Sung (420-478) who purportedly illustrated more than five hundred scenes from the sūtra; cf. Soper, op. cit., pp.35, 57.
the centre of Buddhist intellectual had moved – by the new
translation of the Sanskrit text compiled in the north, at Chang-
an, under the auspices of those potentates of barbarian origin who
had forced the Chinese legitimacy to leave their country in the
south-east with their nobility and élite. For this translation, Kumārajīva benefited from the co-operation of every-thing that
Buddhism then considered the most cultivated in northern China.
At the head of an impressive team of collaborators, including
twelve hundred monks expert in matters of doctrine (i-hsiëh), was
the great Seng-chao (374-414)19, the strongest philosophical brain
of the period, a precocious and fulgent genius who, since child-
hood, had acquired the very best of Chinese culture; he had
studied the classics and historians, then the Taoist philosophers,
before converting to Buddhism precisely through having read the
Vkn.20 He himself specifies that Kumārajīva’s Chinese redactors
should pay particular attention to the style of the new trans-
lation.21 This translation is one of the most brilliant of the whole
Chinese Canon; its high literary quality had a great deal to do with
the lasting acclimatisation of the sūtra in China. Commentaries
were written by the best disciples of Kumārajīva, Seng-chao
himself, Chu Tao-sheng (d. 434), famous for his flamboyant
theories on ‘suddenness’ and on bodhi that can be accessible to
those damned by predestination (i-chhántika), Hui-jui (alias Seng-
ju, 352-436), of whom only a preface remains22, Tao-jung23, and
doubtless yet others, without counting all those who devoted
themselves to the oral explanation of the text.24 From this first

19 Dates by Tsukamoto Zenryū, Jörø kenkyū, Kyoto 1955, pp.120-1 (English
translation in Silver Jubilee Volume of the Zinbun-Kagaku-Kenkyuuso, Kyoto
1954, pp.581-3).
20 Lives of Seng-chao in the Kao-seng chuan, T 2059, vi, p.365a, and in a T’ang
commentary rediscovered in Tun-huang, T 2778, p.510a-b.
21 Prefaces by Seng-chao, T 1775, p.327b13-15, and Chu san-tsang chi-chi, T
23 Kao-seng chuan, T 2059, vi, p.363c.
24 In his ‘Introduction to the history of studies on the Vimalakīrti Sūtra in

harvest of Chinese exegesis, nurtured by oral teachings from
Kumārajīva, but the Sinological interest of which far exceeds the
Indological value, there exists only a combined commentary in
the name of Seng-chao, and which includes glosses attributed by name
to Kumārajīva, Seng-chao, Chu Tao-sheng, Hui-jui and Tao-
jung, this is an important document on the evolution of thought,
not only Buddhist, in China at that time.

From then on we would see commentaries proliferating
throughout China, in the south as well as the north: at first rather
in the south where, alongside numerous monks, many laymen set
their hand to the work of exegesis; among them we find imperial
princes such as Hsiao Tzū-liang (460-494), of the Southern Ch’i,
and even emperors such as Kao-t’i of the same dynasty (479-502)
or Wu-ti of the Liang (502-549) whose eldest son, Hsiao T’ung
(501-531) compiler of the Wen-hsüan anthology, had taken as his
secondary honorific name (hsiao-tzu) the first two syllables of
Vimalakīrti’s name in Chinese, Wei-mo. Their commentaries are
unfortunately lost, like most of those of that period.26 It was

p.83, Kasuga Reichi lists some thirty disciples of Kumārajīva who were devoted
to the study of the sūtra.
25 ‘The annotated Sūtra of Vimalakīrti’, T 1775. This work would have been
compiled at a comparatively late date, perhaps under the T’ang in 760
(Tsukamoto in Jörø kenkyū, p.147). A certain number of glosses by Chu Tao-
sheng have been translated by W. Liebenthal in Monumenta Japonica XII,
Tokyo 1956, pp.74-100.
26 The first commentaries preserved whole, after that of Seng-chao and the
others, are those of Hui-yian (523-592), T 1776, and Chih-i (538-598), T 1777,
both of the Sui. Anonymous fragments of the Northern and Western Wei
(386-556) have been rediscovered at Tun-huang, in manuscripts dating from 500
(T 2786) and 539 (T 2769, with a note from the Northern Chou, 562); cf. Yabuki
Yoshiteru, Meisha youn, Tokyo 1933, p.22, or Ono Gemmyō, Bussho kaisetsu
daijiten XI, Tokyo 1935, pp.116b, 123b. For a formidable bibliography of
Chinese exegesis, including lost works, see the introduction by Fukaura Masabumi
to the Japanese translation of Kumārajīva’s version in ‘Budō boudhique’,
Kokuyaku issai kyō, Kyōshū-bu, VI, Tokyo 1932, pp.304-7, and especially the
work by Kasuga cited above, n.24. At the end of the Sui period (613), we can
mention the commentary by Prince Shōtoku (T 2186), the first patron of Bud-
under these two dynasties, the Ch'i and the Liang (479-556) that the exegesis of the Vkn was at its most flourishing in the period of the Southern Dynasties, so much so that, according to gossip reported by the philosopher Chu Hsi (1130-1200), who was fiercely opposed to Buddhism and had the cheek to attribute to Chinese forgers anything that he dared not consider devoid of any value in Buddhist literature, this sūtra was supposedly a forgery concocted in the entourage of Prince Hsiao-Tzu-liang.

In the north, under the Wei of the T'o-pa clan (Northern Wei, 386-534) who had succeeded the Ch'in of the Yao clan (Later Ch'in, 384-417), protectors of Kumārajiva, and other somewhat ephemeral small barbarian dynasties, the Vkn was to know a fortune of another kind than that in the south-east, but no less illustrious. Here, relations were closer with India and Central Asia; the leaders were not pure Chinese, their reactions to Buddhism were not the same as in Nankin or Chekiang. Hardly any of the commentaries written under the Northern Wei, which do not seem to have been very numerous, remain; from the beginning of the fifth century, the intellectual elements of the Buddhist community had for the most part surged back to the south. However, the iconographical documentation leaves no doubt about the diffusion of the Vkn in the Wei empire. In the rock sculptures of Yun-kang, as from the mid-fifth century, then more often in those of Lung-men, near Loyang where the dynasty transferred its capital in 494, we see the appearance of the couple, Vimalakirti and Maṇjūśrī, sometimes combined with portraits of the Buddha Śākya flanked by two bhikṣus or again two bhikṣus and two bodhisattvas, as if Vimalakirti was a match in the predication of the Great Vehicle to the Buddha of the two (or three)

Vehicles. Should we see in this illustrations of the teaching of the Single Vehicle (ekāyāna) as it is taught by the Lotus Sūtra (Saddharmapundarīka)?

In fact, in these same sculptures, the questioners of the Vkn are still more often found to be associated with the propounders of the Lotus, the Buddhā Śākya and Prabhūtaratna. In the Wei caves at Lung-men, Vimalakirti and Maṇjūśrī appear above niches in which are enthroned either Śākya and his acolytes, or the two Buddhā of the Lotus. This is notably the case for the cave known as Pin-yang, which is purportedly due to the emperor Shih-tsung (Hsiu-ku-wu- ti, 500-515); indeed, in 509, in one of the halls of the palace in Loyang, this emperor personally explained the Vimala-kirti Sūtra to his assembled clergy and courtiers. Also translated by Kumārajiva, the Lotus Sūtra thus shared with the Vimalakirti the favour of the Chinese faithful, until the arrival of soteriological doctrines based on devotion to Maitreyā, then to Amīta. Scenes from both sūtras are equally found combined in the decoration of steles or icons of

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29 This is suggested by Tsukamoto Zenryū in the lengthy study he devotes to ‘Buddhism of the Northern Wei as it appears in the cave art of Yun-kang and Lung-men’, forming a chapter of his book ‘Studies on the history of Chinese Buddhism: the Northern Wei’ (Shina byakū-shi kenkyū: Hoku Gi hen), Kyoto 1942, p.543. – On Vimalakirti and the Lotus Sūtra in the Wei iconography, see also LeRoy Davidson, The Lotus Sūtra, op. cit., pp.32-5, 50-3. In La Chine et son art, Paris 1951, p.106, R. Grousset writes that the monk T'än-yao, promoter of the cave sanctuaries of Yun-kang, [tr.] ‘based his doctrine on the Lotus of the Good Law and on the teachings of the Arhat[]’ Vimalakirti’, and refers in a note to one of my articles in which I say nothing of the sort, for the good reason that I have never seen anything on it (not even in the long chapter devoted to T'än-yao in the book by Tsukamoto, pp.1131-65). – Chavannes did not recognise Vimalakirti in either Yun-kang or Lung-men. With regard to the Pin-yang cave, he writes that the two personages, one of whom holds a ‘fly-whisk’ and the other a ‘branch’ (probably the ts'än ping mentioned in the 894 inscription), must have been ‘two famous Buddhist scholars’ (Mission archéologique I, p.556).

30 Wei shu, viii, Annals of Shih-tsung, 2nd Yong-p'ing yr. Cf. Tsukamoto, pp. 395 and 530; Kasuga, p.97a, n.3. – The Pin-yang cave was wrecked by plunderers, and the figure of Vimalakirti is now to be found in the United States (Sickman and Soper, The Art and Architecture of China, Pelican History of Art, 1956, p.294).
the Northern or Eastern Wei. On the reverse of a bronze in the
Umehara collection in Tokyo, dating from 482 and therefore more
or less contemporary with the Yun-kang sculptures, we see Sākya
and Prabhūtaratna flanked externally by Vimalakirti and Mañ-
juśri.31 A stele from Ho-nan, a little later (mid-sixth century) and
at present preserved in New York, consists of the Buddha pre-
aching at the top and, in the lower register, Vimalakirti and Mañjuśri
flanking the scene of Sāriputra and the goddess of the flowers.32
This association seems to have been quite general in the China of
the Southern and Northern Dynasties.33 Under the Sung, about
the middle of the fifth century, the monk Pu-ming had the
pentential task of chanting the two sūtras.34 In the same period
(459), the monk Seng-ch'ing, born of a Taoist family, conducted
his self-cremation in front of an icon of Vimalakirti which he had
made with his own hands, in the presence of the Prefect of Shu
(Ch'eng-tu in Szech-ču'an) and a large public; in fact, it is usually
on the authority of the Lotus Sūtra that the practices of self-
cremation are carried out.35

We are now in a very different atmosphere from that of
the educated philosophers of the Eastern Chin who had been the first

to extol Vimalakirti in China. The worship of the holy layman
circulated among the people. We note cases of bibliolatry. At the
beginning of the seventh century (618), in Chi-chou in Hopei, a
devotee was stricken with a serious illness because he had torn a
manuscript of the sūtra, and was only cured after having offered
forty new scrolls.36 The recitation of the sūtra procures supernor-
mal powers: exorcism of demons, curing of the sick, rescues at sea.37

Further evidence of the popularisation of the Vkn is supplied
on the literary level by manuscripts of the T'ang or of the Five
Dynasties (ninth-tenth centuries) rediscovered in Tun-huang. The
‘romancing’ of the sūtra had, moreover, started in the period of
the Southern and Northern Dynasties. Chi-tsang of the Sui (549-
623) refers in his commentaries to Chinese apocrypha in which
Vimalakirti is endowed, as is appropriate for the hero of a
romance, with a properly constituted family, grandfather, parents,
wife and children, whereas, in the sūtra itself (trans, Ch.VII, 6,
p.180), he expressly refuses to answer questions posed to him
concerning his family: his mother, he says, is prajñā, his father
upāya, etc. However, in the Tun-huang documents, it is quite
another matter. Kumārajīva’s version gives way here to one of
those developments in (recited) prose and (chanted) verse which
are called ‘texts of scenes’ (pien-wen) and which, aimed at
illiterate or barely literate listeners, are the origin of literary
narrative in vulgar Chinese and of the Chinese novel. It was a work
apparently without precedent in Chinese narrative literature, as
much through its wide and epic tone, Indian-style, as its extra-

31 LeRoy Davidson, pp.32-3 and pl.3.
32 A. Priest, Chinese Sculpture in the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York
1944, pp.30-3 and pl.40-52. Cf. LeRoy Davidson, pp.36-7 and pl.15, which
mentions several other similar stelae preserved in the United States; Sickman
and Soper, pp.38-9 and pl.44.
33 According to Soper, Literary evidence, p.221, the Vimalakirti Sūtra was,
after the Lotus, the most often cited sūtra in the Kao-seng chuan (T 2059,
beginning of the sixth century): twenty-eight times (a half less than the Lotus).
My own index of the Kao-seng chuan, compiled by a good Japanese archivist,
records twenty-three mentions of the Vimalakirti as against fifteen of the Lotus.
In the Hsiu kao-seng chuan (T 2060, ca. 667), there are no more than twelve
mentions of the Vimalakirti as against one hundred and forty-nine of the Lotus.
34 Kao-seng chuan, T 2059, xii, p.407b; cf. Soper, p.225.
35 Ibid., xii, p.405c; cf. J. Gernet, ‘Les suicides per le feu chez les bouddhistes
chinois du Ve au Xe siècle’, Mélanges de l’Institut des Hautes Études chinois
and Suicide, in preparation].
36 Ming-pao chi cited in Fa-yüan chu-lin, T 2122, bxix, p.877b, and T'ai-p'ing
kuang-chi, 1926 ed., cxvi, p.32a-b.
37 Fukuura, Kokuyaku issaikyō, Kyōshū-bu, VI, p.307. The institution of
the Japanese ritual called the ‘Vimalakirti assembly’ (Yüma-e) dates from
the curing at Nara, in 656, of the minister Fujiwara no Kamatorii thanks to
the recitation of the chapter on sickness, recommended to the empress Saimei by
a Korean nun; cf. M.W. de Vissier, Ancient Buddhism in Japan, Leiden 1935,
p.10, 596 ff.
38 Cf. Tèh'en Yin-k'iiue (above, n.2.), p.429. These apocrypha do not doubt to
the development of the details of (supposed?) Indian texts such as the
‘epigonical’ sūtras, T 477-480, on which see Vkn trans, pp.cvi-cvii.
ordinary size; some thirty scrolls or volumes (chüan), of which numerous fragments exist, without counting prologues in verse (ya-tso wen) which serve to introduce the sessions, with chanted invocations which the listeners repeated in chorus. The proportions of the development were up to forty times larger than the canonical text.

The ‘texts of scenes’ were sometimes illustrated by ‘depictions of scenes’ (pien-hsiang), painted on scrolls which the reciters or their assistants exposed to the public eye along with the recitation, as is still done in Japan, Tibet, Italy and other countries where the art of oral story-telling survives. They were also painted on the walls of temples; the rock sanctuaries of Tun-huang include fifteen pien-hsiang from the Vān painting all kinds of scenes taken from some ten chapters: sometimes the holy man is lying on his sick-bed, at others he is debating with Mañjuśrī, etc. The latter is usually holding a ju-i, a kind of sceptre which, at the outset, seems to have served as a back-scratcher and which was also used in China as a ‘play-thing’ well before it became an attribute of Buddhist monks. As for Vimalakīrti’s attribute in Chinese iconography, rather than a fan as Western archaeologists often define it, it was a fly-whisk, an instrument of purification such as was wielded by the adherents of ‘pure conversation’; it is designated in Chinese by terms which have nothing to do with Buddhism either, ‘deer’s tail’ (chu-wei), ‘conversation stick’ (t’an-ping), etc. One


42 Of the most exploited scenes is that of the goddess of the flowers. We also see the magic bowl, surrounded by five personages who must represent the five hundred householders of Vaisāli, Ratnakūṭa and the others. I know no figure Vimalakīrti than that of cave 149, which dates from the T’ang. It gives an idea of what must have been masterworks of the great painters of the period, Wu Tao-tzü, Sun Shang-tzü, Liu Hsing-ch’en, Yang T’ing-kuang and yet others who had depicted Vimalakīrti on the walls of monasteries in both capitals, Ch’ang-an and Loyang. Later on, too, the theme of Vimalakīrti was always to be treated with partiality by Chinese painters.

It was the same with the poets. It is well known that Wang Wei (701-761) took as his personal honorific the two syllables Mo-chiē which, preceded by Wei, his official personal name, form the Chinese transcription of the name of Vimalakīrti. One can only suppose that he was guided in this play on words by his mother, a

43 For example Gray, pl.48.
44 Gray, pl.31B; Tun-huang pi-hua, pl.100. Nevertheless, it is not evident that these personages are five in number as Gray says, p.30.
45 Numbering by P. Pelliot; 103 according to the Tun-huang Institute. Cf. Pelliot, Les grottes de Tun-houng VI, pl.324 (Matsumoto, pl.46a and pp. 145, 150). There is a superb photograph of details in Tun-huang pi-hua, pl.141. It is mistakenly, it seems, that Gray (pp.25-6) attributes to this cave No.322 of the Tun-huang Institute.
46 As well as other large towns such as Ch’eng-tu. Cf. Matsumoto, pp. 162-3; Kasuga, p.108a-b; Ackler, pp.257, 272, 289, 361, etc. Mention can be made here of the scene from the Vimalakīrti Sūtra modelled in clay, about the beginning of the eighth century (711), at the base of the five-storied stūpa of the Horyūjì, near Nara, and which is doubtless an imitation of the pien-hsiang of the T’ang, with details recalling the Tun-huang paintings (see, for example, Matsumoto, pp.163-4 and fig.33).
47 Li Lung-mien under the Sung, Indra (Yin-t’o-lo) under the Sung, Indra (Yin-t’o-lo) under the Yin, Lo Ping under the Ch’ing, etc. Cf. Kasuga, p.111; Visser, pp.594-5; Matsumoto, p.163, notes according to the Hsüan-ho hua-p’u ten paintings of Vimalakīrti that existed in the collection of the emperor Huisung of the Sung in the Hssuan-ho period (1119-1126). The Li Lung-mien in the National Museum of Tokyo is far from having the vehement energy of the Tun-huang portrait (cf., e.g., A. Guiganino, La pittura cinese, Rome 1959, pl.147).
fervent adherent of the Dhyāna-master Pu-chi (652-739), of the northern branch of the Dhyāna school. Wang Wei composed in his sumptuous prose the inscription on a stele of Hui-neng (638-713), patriarch of the southern branch, and allusions to Vimalakīrti abound in it. In two poems which he addressed to one of his sick friends, an upāsaka named Hu (Hu chu-shih), when sending him a gift of rice, he alludes to theories in the Vīraṇa on sickness and on the magic rice of the Sugandhakūta. Another great T'ang poet, Po Chü-i (772-846), was called on in 826 to represent Confucianism in an inter-religious debate held before the emperor Ching-tsung on the occasion of his birthday: he chose as subject the passage of the sūtra (Ch. V, 10) on Mount Sumeru entering a mustard-seed; and in a poem written in his old age, when he was sick, he compares himself to Vimalakīrti. We could go on forever citing all the Chinese poets who celebrated Vimalakīrti. As an example, I will attempt to translate a northern Sung piece, dedicated by Su Shih (Su Tung-p'o, 1036-1101) to a statue modelled by a T'ang artist, Yang Hui-chih, and which he had an occasion to admire in the monastery of Fung-hsiang, not far from Ch'ang-an in Shensi, where he lived from 1061 to 1064:

THE IMAGE OF VIMALAKĪRTI
MODELLED BY YANG HUI-CHIH OF THE T'ANG
AT THE MONASTERY OF THE CELESTIAL PILLAR

Formerly Tsü-yü, sick, was about to die,
When Tsü-sü went to question him,
Tsü-yü slackly dragged himself towards a well, where he settled,
What has Creation done with me!

Now, when I see this Vimalakīrti, ancient model,
With his prominent sickly bones like dessicated tortoise,
I know that the perfect man goes beyond births and deaths.
Since his body is but a transformation like a floating cloud.

Worldly people, assuredly, are plump and fine-looking;
Their body is not sick, but their spirit is meagre.
In this old man, the mind is intact, the basis is sure;
While talking and laughing, he would make a thousand

When he was alive he was questioned on the Law;
Lowering their heads, they were quiet: it is in spirit that

48 Liou Kin-ling, *Wang Wei le poète*, Paris 1941, p. 15. The Vimalakīrti Sūtra is often quoted by T'ang Dhyāna-masters, who were in many ways closely linked to the Taoist tradition of the Buddhism of the Six Dynasties. The most frequently invoked passages are those where it is a question of Vimalakīrti’s silence, the obtaining of deliverance though misdeeds and, in the southern branch, (Hui-neng, Shen-hui, Huang-po, Lin-chi, etc.) the condemnation of Sāriputra’s quietism. Commentaries on the sūtra by Dhyāna adherents were few in number and are, moreover, nearly all lost (Kasuga, pp. 105b-107b); the school hardly ever practised exegesis.


50 Wang Yu-ch'eng chi III, pp. 8a-9b (Sū-pu ts'ung-k'an ed.) According to a note which might date back to the original edition of poems by Wang Wei, these two pieces imitate the manner of Wang the brhamacārin (Wang Fan-chih), a Buddhist poet of the vultureg to whom are attributed a large number of texts rediscovered in Tsin-huang and which seem to date from the eighth-nineteenth centuries (cf. *Annaire du Collège de France*, 57e année (1957), pp. 354-7; 58e année (1958), p. 386-90; 59e année (1959), pp. 437-8).


52 T'ung-p'o hsien-sheng shih III, pp. 10b-11a (Sū-pu ts'ung-k'an ed.). Yang Hui-chih was an eighth-century painter who, in despair at never equaling his friend and rival Wu-Tao-tsü, ended by burning his brushes and becoming a modeller (cf. Acker, *texts*, p. 280, n. 7). Wu Tao-tsü himself also purportedly modelled statues of Vimalakīrti and Mañjuśrī (Pelliot, *T'oung Pao* XXII, 1923, pp. 287-8).

53 Chuang-tzu, Ch. VI, ed Wieger, p. 256. Tsü-yü was a 'fool' with a deformed body and the soul of a saint.

54 Chih-jen wai sheng-sū, a mixture of Taoist and Bud-dhist expressions.

55 Cf. Vimalakīrti Sūtra, T 475, 1, p. 539b20 (trans., Ch. II, 9, p. 34).

56 That is, a thousand heroes. An allusion to a poem by Tso Sū of the Chin (d. 306) on historical themes, in which there is a question of the sage Lu Chung-lien who, during the siege of Han-tan, about 257 BCE, made the Chin army recoil through his discourses (*Wen-hsian*, xx; cf. *Shih-chi*, bxxiii).

He remains as he was before his death.

The old countrymen, the village women, spare him not a look;
Sometimes a field rat comes to bite his moustache.
The sight of him makes distraught men flee:
So who will question the wordless master for me?

The Sung poet's attitude is remarkably close to that of the first Chinese literati who, six or seven centuries earlier, had known and adopted Vimalakirti. The latter remains for Su Shih a type of sage in Taoist style, incomprehensible to the common worldling: the 'field rats' have nothing to do with this aristocrat of holiness. In fact, his popularisation was never to go very far. In contrast to other pien-wen which are at the origin of the vulgate literature of modern times, the large development rediscovered in Tun-huang was to have hardly any posterity in the Chinese novel or theatre.

We have to wait until our own times for Mei Lan-fang, the greatest actor in contemporary China (1893-1961), to stage the episode of the goddess of the flowers which, however, like the rest of the sūtra, lends itself so well to dramatic elaboration that one might wonder if there did not exist in India or Serindia theatrical versions of the 'philosophical drama' of Vimalakirti.

57 An allusion to Vimalakirti's silence, as it was interpreted by the Dhyāna school: supreme knowledge is of the spirit, not of the letter; each person must realise this for himself.
58 An allusion to Hsieh Lung-yün's beard ('moustache' because of the rhyme).
59 Cf. Choung-tzu, Ch. VII, ed. Wieger, p.266, where it is a matter of a fortune-teller who claimed to predict people's death, but who, confused by the master of Lieh-tzu, ended up by fleeing distraught.
60 A play on words on the term chieh, 'to question, search', which is also the last syllable of Vimalakirti's name in Chinese.
61 This is what is remarked by Tch'en Yin-k'iu in his article cited above (n.2).
62 T'ien-nü san hua, of which there exists a Pathé-China recording. According to Cheng Mien, Répertoire du théâtre chinois moderne, Paris 1929, p.148, this play was created in Peking in 1921. However, I saw Mei Lan-fang act in it in 1920, and a summary can be found (pp.79-80) as well as a fragment of it (pp.137-8) in the small work on Mei Lan-fang published in 1918 by the Chung-hua shu-chó in Shanghai, in which it is expressly confirmed that this play was an original creation by the distinguished actor.

ONCE UPON A PRESENT TIME:
AN AVADÂNIST FROM GANDHÂRA†
TIM LENZ

When Captain James Cook set sail from Plymouth on 12 July 1776, he was charged with the secret mission of circumnavigating the globe at the highest possible latitude in the southern hemisphere to search for Terra Australis Incognita, establish British dominion over newly discovered islands or continents, look for new sources of plants, animals, and minerals suitable to quench the British thirst for lucrative items of trade, and make friends with the indigenous inhabitants of the new world. Cook left port armed with astronomers, naturalists, artists, a landscape painter, as well as four chronometers, and ultimately he left the world a detailed account of the land, the people, the plants, and the animals encountered during the course of his journey. Unlike Cook, when the earliest followers of the Buddha set out from the eastern Indian heartland of Buddhism armed with the religious paraphernalia—texts, Buddhist legends, and relics—that would serve to

† The title of this communication alludes to Jan Nattier's Once Upon a Future Time: Studies in a Buddhist Prophecy of Decline, a work that inspired me to discover certain attributes of the Gandhāran avadānists that I might otherwise have missed. Thanks go to Professor Nattier for her comments on an early draft. Thanks also go to Dorothy Lenz and Darcy Dye for their help in ensuring that my observations were rendered into a form that would be intelligible to more readers than a dozen specialists in Gandhāran philology.

1 W. Goetzmann, New Lands, New Men: America and the Second Great Age of Discovery, New York 1987, p.44.
propagate the Buddha’s teachings in distant lands, they apparently traveled without an entourage. The early Indian Buddhist monks left no maps, no journals, and no pictures portraying what they did or what they encountered on their travels. There is, therefore, practically nothing with which a scholar of early Buddhism can draw upon to bring to life the lives of the countless monks and nuns who helped to make Buddhism one of the world’s great religious traditions. But with clues gleaned from sources such as early manuscripts, archaeological excavations, and artistic remains, a researcher sometimes can painstakingly reconstruct some aspect of the life of a member of the early Buddhist community.

The possibilities of making such a reconstruction have been increased in recent years with the discovery of hitherto unknown collections of early Buddhist manuscript fragments. Such collections afford researchers the opportunity to search for clues with which to reconstruct early Buddhist history by means of analytic methods that would otherwise yield little new information. With early Buddhist manuscripts in hand, we can analyze the physical condition of the documents and ponder the significance of their origin in order to discover clues with which to uncover some of Buddhism’s lost past. Specifically, we can study the handwriting of their scribes, catalogue the kinds of writing errors made in their texts (e.g., crossed out letters), discover the genres represented among their texts, assess how their texts are arranged, consider the relevance of their geographic association, and of course, examine the content of their texts. From such analyses, as will become clear, we can deduce information that is unattainable from the usual sources consulted by scholars of early Buddhist history and culture, such as published editions of Buddhist texts, reports of archaeological excavations, and analyses of artistic remains.

The kind of information that can be gleaned from manuscript fragments can be demonstrated by an examination of some of the texts from a collection of Kharoṣṭhī manuscripts recently acquired by the British Library. These documents were acquired by the British Library’s Oriental and India Office Collections in September 1994. The collection consists of twenty-nine fragments of birch bark scrolls written on both the recto and verso in the Kharoṣṭhī script and the Gāndhārī language. The scrolls contain texts from a variety of Buddhist genres, including didactic poetry, scholastic commentary, doctrinal analysis (abhidharma), and previous-birth stories (jātaka/avādāna). They are written in a language that is generally similar to that of the famous ‘Gāndhārī Dhammapada’, critically edited by John Brough, which was until recently the only Gandhārī manuscript available for scholarly study. The recent discovery of these scrolls confirms the existence of a Gāndhārī Buddhist canon, which was postulated more than a century ago though only proved with the recent manuscript find

The new manuscript fragments can probably be dated to the first half of the first century CE

2 Jātakas are commonly distinguished from avādānas as follows: Jātakas concern the past lives of the Buddha whereas avādānas may be about past lives of the Buddha or other figures, including kings, ministers, brahmans, monks, disciples, and commoners. Such a distinction generally holds true in well-known texts such as the Pali Jātakatthavaginā and the Sanskrit Divyāvadāna, but the complexities of the historical development of this type of literature probably are belied by this rather simple distinction. See T. Lenz, A New Version of the Gāndhārī Dhammapada and a Collection of Previous-Birth Stories: British Library Kharoṣṭhī Fragments 16 + 25, Seattle 2003, pp.92 and 108 for an edition of Fragments 16 + 25 and for comments relating to this matter.


manuscripts discovered to date. The British Library collection is particularly important for our purposes, for it contains a sizable collection of texts written by a single author. When analyzed, these texts provide unique clues with which we can deduce something of the otherwise undocumented life of their author.

From the circumstances of the British Library collection’s discovery, we can determine the location of the home of the monk with whom we are concerned. According to hearsay reports, the British Library manuscripts were found in Haḍḍa, a small village near present day Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan. This village is located in the heart of Gandhāra, the region between the Suleiman Mountains in Afghanistan and the Indus River in Pakistan (see fig. 1), where the Kharoṣṭhī script and Gāndhārī language flourished from approximately the third century BCE through the third century CE. Although the origin of the manuscripts is unknown with any degree of certainty, the large number of Gāndhārī manuscripts that have been found at Haḍḍa and other sites in the Jalalabad Plain, lends some credibility to the hearsay reports. Thus, we can tentatively assume that our author was a Gāndhāran Buddhist monk who lived in Haḍḍa.

This Gāndhāran monk from Haḍḍa is known only through portions of six texts that are preserved on British Library Kharoṣṭhī Fragments 1, 2, 3, 4, 12 + 14 and 16 + 25. To date, only the text on Fragments 1 + 10, lines 174-84 of Frag. 11, lines 1-7 (recto) of Fragment 212, lines 1-11 (verso) of Frag. 3, and the first five lines of the text on Frag. 12 + 1414 have been critically edited. In addition, preliminary transcriptions of all of the texts written by this monk, as well as translations and lexicons for the texts on Fragments 2, 3, and 12 + 14 have been produced15.

Like many other Buddhist manuscript texts, the aforementioned ones bear no name or biography of their authors. But unlike other manuscript texts, which are largely scribal copies of well-established texts, our Gāndhārī texts are apparently written in their author’s own hand. In other words, our Gāndhārī works are Buddhist texts that were learned and memorized by our scribe and subsequently set down by him in written form. All the texts in question, save one, are written in a single hand consisting of large, flowing letters, which are the source of the very non-monastic nickname we have conferred upon their author, ‘Big Hand’. The sole text of Big Hand that was not written completely in his own hand (Frag. 4) is one that was begun by a monk with a distinctive thin, slanting, vertically elongated hand and apparently completed by Big Hand.

That Big Hand is both author (though not necessarily the

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5 See Salomon, Ancient Buddhist Scrolls for a comprehensive introduction to the British Library Kharoṣṭhī fragments.
6 The map in figure 1 is reprinted from ibid., p.2 with permission from the University of Washington Press.
8 Salomon, Ancient Buddhist Scrolls, p.68.
9 See ibid., § 2.3 for general descriptions of these fragments.
10 Lenz, op. cit., Part II.
11 Ibid., appendix 3; see also Salomon, Ancient Buddhist Scrolls, pp.145-9 for comments on another portion of this text.
12 Salomon, ibid., pp.141-5.
13 Lenz, op. cit., appendix 2.
15 All translations and transcriptions used in preparation of this article are my own.
16 See Lenz, op. cit., Ch. 8 for an examination of Big Hand’s handwriting.
17 Salomon, Ancient Buddhist Scrolls, pp. 45 and 54.)
original composer) and scribe of these texts is evident from the copious number of textual corrections that stand in his texts, errors that probably would have been expunged by a professional copyist who was merely reproducing a previously written text. For example, in his text on British Library Fragments 12 + 14, a portion of a line of writing (l. 82) has been crossed out (see fig. 2). In another line (l. 98), Big Hand apparently had difficulty writing the verb hokṣaḍi (Satā, 'will be', vṛddhā, 3rd pers. sing. fut.), for he apparently wrote hokṣavidence (Satā) and then, for some unknown reason, crossed out vi and di, the final two letters of the word (see fig. 3). Furthermore, in the text on Fragments 16 + 25, Big Hand wrote a large punctuation mark, apparently consisting of six circles arranged in two columns of three circles each, to indicate the end of a section of text. Such punctuation marks are not unusual in Big Hand's writings, but this one is written over the top of a previously written letter (see fig. 4). The syllable ga (A) or perhaps ge (E) is obscured but visible beneath the well-preserved lower column of circles.

Besides indicating that he is an author as well as a scribe, the corrections in Big Hand's texts suggest that he does not have complete mastery over the material that he is writing. The crossed out letters (Frgs. 12 + 14) and punctuation marks written over the top of other letters (Frgs. 16 + 25) are reminiscent of student life before the advent of the word processor, when early drafts of handwritten papers were filled with crossed out words, sentences, and sections. In this light, we might regard Big Hand as a student, perhaps a very young monk struggling to become fluent with one

genre of Buddhist literature. Such a characterisation is hypothetical, but there is some internal evidence suggesting that Big Hand was a student.

A comparison of Fragments 12 + 14 with Fragments 16 + 25 shows fairly clearly that much like an 'ideal student' today, Big Hand has the ability to learn from his mistakes. In addition to the obvious difficulties of writing suggested by the crossed out letters, his text on Fragments 12 + 14 shows stylistic inconsistencies that are absent in the one on Fragments 16 + 25. The texts on both of these scroll fragments are avadāna-type texts, consisting of a numbered series of brief story summaries, or skeleton texts, that presumably were known to their author in much more fully developed forms. Typically the summaries include a one- or two-sentence introduction, a description of a few important scenes, a concluding abbreviation formula telling the reader that he should be able to expand the story for himself with reference to the supplied summary, and a story number. For example, one of Big Hand's stories (Frgs. 16 + 25, l. 18-23) concerns a previous life of the Buddha as a shipwrecked merchant who sacrifices his life to save his shipmates from drowning:

[18] A previous birth of the Buddha. Thus it was heard. [19] The Buddha was a merchant, a merchant of the great ocean. Supplies were [20] collected by him. He set out on the great ocean. The ship was destroyed. [21] The merchant met his death on the surface (*of the ocean). It was a favour... The merchant himself [22] was set down here on the shore. He killed himself. Thus the previous birth (*purvya). Expansion should be according to the model. [23] It should be told. (*Story number) 1.

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18 Jason Neelis (University of Florida) is currently preparing a critical edition of Fragments 12 + 14.
19 Figure 4 is reprinted from Lenz, op. cit., p.124, with permission from the University of Washington Press.
20 Ibid., p. 102; for further discussion, see § 7.8.
For purposes of this discussion, the above story's abbreviation formula and its story number are of particular interest. The sentence 'Expansion should be according to the model' (vistare ya iyupamano siyadi) apparently became a standard abbreviation formula in this genre. It occurs in most of the avadāna-type texts in the British Library Kharoshṭhī collection, probably occurring four times in Fragments 16 + 25 alone. The stories included in the avadāna-type texts are also numbered with a story number that is almost always placed at the end of a story following one or more circular punctuation marks (see fig. 5).

In Big Hand's text on fragments 12 + 14, however, the aforementioned abbreviation formula and numbering pattern show unusual variations. For example, at the end of story number 7 (l. 107), Big Hand concludes with a truncated form of the standard formula 'Expansion should be according to the model' (vistare ya iyupamano siyadi): 'Expansion according to the model' (vistare ya iyupama). Although the words making up the shortened formula are familiar components of the longer one, the second term lacks its final syllable: ya iyupama rather than ya iyupamano.

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25 The reproduction here is very difficult to read. The reading is clearer on the original colour digital image supplied by the British Library.
26 Thanks go to Jason Neelis for sharing his notes on the abbreviation formulae used in Fragment 4. It should be noted that at least two of the stories in Big Hand's text on this fragment end with something other than formulae commonly seen in Big Hand's texts. Since the text is badly damaged, I am unable to determine whether this is because the stories lack final abbreviation formula or whether they include formulae that are somewhat different from the ones used elsewhere in Big Hand's writings. This may or may not be clarified after Fragment 4 is critically edited.

The consistency of the text on Fragments 16 + 25 seems to indicate that Big Hand has a greater command of writing avadāna-type stories than he had when he wrote the text on Fragments 12 + 14. In other words, he seems to have learned from past mistakes and has, therefore, written a cleaner text.

Since it appears that Big Hand improves his writing with practice, we can hypothesize that he is a student of his craft rather than a master. Given the kind of errors and inconsistencies that occur in some of his texts (crossed out letters and passages, unusual numbering patterns and abbreviation formulas), it is tempting to describe him as a young novice, perhaps the equivalent of a modern-day high school student. But such a characterization would be premature without access to biographical accounts or diary entries, which Big Hand unfortunately did not see fit to produce.

In any case, another feature of Big Hand’s work that appears to mark him as a student is that in nearly all of his texts there are one or more interlinear notations stating that the text has been ‘written’ (likhidago). Seven such notations are written on five different scrolls (for one example, see fig. 7), apparently added after Big Hand had completed his texts:

1. It is written (*lh)kh(*i)dago, Frag. 1, l. 130a
2. Now, all is written, (likhidago aco sarv[vo], Frag. 1, l. 172a)
3. Now, all these avadānas are written (sarva ime avacāna [aca] (*likhidaga), Frag. 2, r, between ll. 8 and 9; see fig. 8; see also Salomon 1999: pl. 15)
4. All is written (likhidaga sarve, Frag. 3, above l. 1 (verso); see Lenz 2003: Fig. 18)
5. Written (likhidaga, Frags. 12 + 14, between ll. 75 and 76; Allon 2001: pls. 4 & 7)
6. All is written (likhidaga sarvo, (Frags. 12 + 14, l. 77;

These notations are subject to various interpretations, but the fact that they are found exclusively in avadāna-type texts and that two of the notations, numbers 3 (see fig. 8) and 7, specifically refer to avadānas strongly suggest that all the notations refer to the avadāna texts rather than generally to their respective manuscripts. If this is the case and if Big Hand was a student rather than a master, the notations might best be interpreted as proofing marks of a teacher or inspector, indicating that the stories were satisfactorily written by one of his students. Accordingly, Big Hand’s text can be viewed as a student’s writing assignments and the inspector’s notation as something akin to the grading mark that modern-day professors place at the top of completed student papers.

If we accept the ideas that Big Hand was a student and that his texts are completed writing assignments, we can determine the focus of his studies by assessing the range of literary genres represented in his texts. Since Big Hand’s extant works are exclusively avadāna-type texts, we can surmise that he probably was studying to become a specialist in this type of literature. Such avadāna specialists are mentioned elsewhere in Buddhist literature. In two verses in the Kalpadrumavādānāmālā, an anthology of avadāna-type stories, they are called ‘avadānists’, avadānika or avadānārthakovida in Sanskrit:

27 Salomon (Ancient Buddhist Scrolls, p.76) and Allon (op. cit., p.303) transcribe likhidago sarvo, but sarvo is clearly visible on Allon’s plates 4 and 7.
28 This list was compiled by Salomon (loc. cit.). No. 7 corrected from likhitage.
29 Lenz, op. cit., §§ 7.8 and 7.10; for an alternative analysis, see Salomon, Ancient Buddhist Scrolls, § 4.2.
From dharmic actions, beings obtain bliss. From evil action, they are allotted suffering. From mixed action, they come to enjoy mixed fruits. Thus speak the avadānists.30

By the measure of qualities and dharma, there are no standards of caste at all. Thus proclaim the Buddhist avadāna-experts.31

If our interpretation of Big Hand’s work is correct, his texts would represent a unique collection of avadāna-type stories written by a student who is studying to become an avadāna specialist, that is to say, an avadānist like the ones mentioned in the Kalpadrumāvadānamālā.

Even though Big Hand’s avadāna texts are unique and exciting finds for a modern-day Buddhist studies scholar, the texts that we have probably were little prized by members of the Buddhist community other than by the avadānists themselves. Although there is no direct evidence in this regard, physical evidence suggests that our avadāna-type texts were considered as secondary to other types of Buddhist literature, which is not too surprising for works that may have been student writing assignments. All of the


31 Loc. cit. I have changed Strong’s translation of gunadharmapramāṇena from ‘By measure of dharmic qualities’ to ‘By the measure of qualities and dharma.’

gunadharmapramāṇena jātā naiva pramāṇata

tathā ca procīyate bauddhāya avadānārthāthakoviḍitaḥ. (v. 162, p.275)

avādana-type texts appear as the second text on scrolls made up of two texts, suggesting that they were not primary. The first text on a scroll that contains two texts is always a formal Buddhist text, such as a didactic or popular poetry text (e.g., Dharmapada)32 or a canonical sūtra text (e.g., Ekottarikāgama-type sūtra). Typically, the avādana texts commence immediately after the first text on a scroll, fill up any remaining space on the recto, and then continue onto and presumably fill the verso, though this remains hypothetical because only the beginning portions of our texts have been preserved. One possible explanation for this state of affairs is that avadānists were ‘scavengers’ who had to search for and appropriate unused space on scrolls containing previously written texts. In any case, because the avadāna collections are invariably the second text on scrolls containing two texts, they do not appear to have been held in as high esteem as the more formal texts that preceded them. This also might indicate something of the status of Big Hand and his fellow avadānists in the Buddhist community, but there is no indication in the manuscripts that such a hypothesis is warranted.

But even though our Gāndhārī specialist’s written work may not have been accorded high status in the Gāndhāran literary hierarchy and his personal status might not have been extremely high in the monastic hierarchy, we can, nevertheless, deduce that his work did fill an important niche in the monastic community. A still widely held view concerning avadāna-type literature is that it is not serious Buddhist literature and was not really studied by monks: it was a literature for laymen and for the winning of

32 See Lenz, op. cit.33 for an edition of the Dharmapada.

33 See Allon, op. cit. for an edition of the Ekottarikāgama Sūtra.

34 Credit for the outlines of this interpretation (also mentioned in Allon, ibid., p.3 and Lenz, op. cit., p.108) goes to Richard Salomon (see Ancient Buddhist Scrolls, p.35).
converts. No doubt, this is true up to a point. Some of our Gândhári stories seem to be especially aimed at laymen. The most obvious example of this comes from Fragments 12 + 14:

Thus it was heard. The Kardamaga King’s father was named Kardamaga. He was born in the womb of a pig. An exceedingly stingy mind. All should be according to the model.

The message of this story seems obvious, even though the literary style is extremely terse: ‘Be stingy with regard to the Buddhist monastic community at your peril.’ Presumably, such a story would have been ‘expanded’ in front of a non-monastic audience in order to obtain monetary support or other political favor.

On the other hand, Big Hand wrote one story that apparently is intended for much loftier purposes. The story in question is about a magic contest between a white (indra mayagara) and black (sábári mayagara) magician, wherein the black magician brings about darkness and the white magician overcomes the darkness with light. Such a story could conceivably be used for any number of purposes, but after its conclusion in the written text, there is a notation telling exactly what the story is to be used for: ‘Understanding of impermanence. With regard to the characteristic of impermanence, all should be told.’ Though the significance of this notation is debatable, it seems to me that it implies a ‘serious Buddhist’ discussion that most likely would have taken place within the monastic community. Thus, from the aforementioned two stories we can deduce that Gândhári avádáñists oratorical skills were probably put to use instructing both monks and laymen (in Big Hand’s case, training to instruct monks and laymen). Avádáñists must have been instructors who always had a story at the ready to ram home an abstruse doctrinal point or to coax an Indo-Scythian king into donating a bag of drachmas to the Buddhist cause.

Thus, even in the absence of paintings, sketches, scientific treatises, and diaries, such as those produced by Captain Cook and his entourage, we are able to reconstruct something of the life of one Gandháran storyteller, the avádáñist Big Hand. The reconstruction is admittedly incomplete, but we still have three other avádána-type texts in the British Library collection that wait critical editing and other manuscripts from places such as Merv, Afghanistan (e.g. the so-called Bairam-Ali manuscript) which should provide useful comparative material and further information with which to fill out our initial attempts at drawing a character sketch of one ancient Gandháran monk. With further examinations of Buddhist manuscripts – comparing manuscripts, cataloguing story themes, assessing the percentages of local and “traditional” stories contained in our collection, identifying the historical data (e.g., royal names) preserved in our stories, and accounting for the physical circumstances and condition of our manuscripts – solutions to many unsolved riddles surrounding the monastic life and career of Big Hand and his fellow avádáñists may yet be discovered: To what end does Big Hand specialise in avádána-type literature? What kind of audience would be interested in listening to Big Hand’s stories? Which Buddhist doctrines are illustrated by Big Hand’s stories? What is Big Hand’s status within his monastic community? How was Big Hand chosen to be an avádáñist, a specialist in avádána-type literature? Our manuscripts hold the key to answering such questions, though, of course, information gleaned from these sources must necessarily be supported by archaeology, art history, epigraphy, literary criticism, and numismatics. In any case, further creative explorations into
uncharted Buddhist-manuscript territory will undoubtedly bring to light solutions to many intriguing mysteries associated with the study of early Indian Buddhism that previously the mists of antiquity have caused to remain unsolved.

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Transcription Key

[] An unclear or partially preserved akṣara (graphic syllable) whose reading is uncertain.

(*) A lost or illegible akṣara that has been conjecturally restored on the basis of context, parallel citation or other means.

A missing portion (consonantal or diacritic vowel sign) of a partially legible akṣara. For example, \( .e \) represents an akṣara in which the vowel diacritic \( e \) is visible, but the consonant to which it was attached is lost or illegible; \( g \) signifies the consonant \( g \) is legible, but incomplete so that it cannot be determined whether or not a vowel diacritic was attached to the syllable.

? An illegible, but visible or partially visible akṣara.

+ A missing akṣara that would have appeared on a lost or obscured portion of the scroll. A series of these symbols indicates the approximate number of lost syllables, one + sign being equivalent to one akṣara.

/// Beginning or end of an incomplete line.

o A small dot or circle used in the original text to indicate word, sentence, verse, half verse or other minor unit divisions.

O A large circle, a design of circles or other large circular or square design used in the original text to mark sectional divisions.

\([-\) A word break within an akṣara: used in phrases such as \( karyam\,\,\ido \), in which the final consonant of the preceding word and the initial vowel of the following are written as a single syllable (\( \text{mi} \)).
Fig. 3. Frags. 12 + 14, line 97: *hokṣavati.

Fig. 4. Six-circled punctuation mark from Fragments 16 + 25.

Fig. 5. Story numbering in Fragments 16 + 25: number 1 (?) in 1. 23 and number 2 (?) in 1. 27.

Fig. 6. Truncated abbreviation formula: *vistare yaśayupāma[ja] 7 O.

Fig. 7. Story numbering and abbreviation formula, avadāna 3, Fragments 12 + 14.

Fig. 8. Likhidago notation written in small letters between lines of text (Frag. 2): *sarva ime avadana [aca] (Likhidaga).
EKOTTARĀGAMA (XXXIV)

Translated from the Chinese Version by Thích Huyễn-Vi and Bhikkhu Pāsādīka in collaboration with Sara Boin-Webb

Twelfth Fascicle
Part 21
(The Triple Gem)

9. "... What is the enjoyment of forms? [Let us] suppose [someone] sees a girl either of noble descent (kṣatriyajāti), of brahminic descent or of a householder’s (grhapati) family, fourteen, fifteen or sixteen years old, neither tall nor short, neither plump nor thin, neither [too] fair nor [too] dark, being respectable and of incomparable [beauty] seldom to be found in the world. Hardly has one seen her complexion when one experiences pleasure and joy (sukhasaumanasya) — this is called enjoyment of forms.

How do forms create sheer distress? If one sees that "girl" again after [a time], being eighty, ninety or even a hundred years of age, her complexion has totally changed; with the passage of time her vigour is gone, her teeth are broken and her hair is as white as snow; her body is blotchy, the skin is flaccid, the face all wrinkles, the spine deformed, the body [resembling] a creaking and groaning old cart; with shaking frame she stumbles along, leaning on a stick. What do you think, bhikṣus? [The girl] endowed with such a pleasing (ramya) appearance before and afterwards having totally changed, is that not sheer distress? — It is, Exalted One, replied the bhikṣus. — That is how forms create sheer distress, the Exalted One [went on] saying to the bhikṣus.

Moreover, if one sees that woman with her body exposed to great affliction, being confined to bed, incontinent and unable to rise and stand, what do you think, bhikṣus? [The girl] originally [being endowed with] such a pleasing appearance and now exposed to this

affliction, is that not sheer distress? — It is, Exalted One, replied the bhikṣus. — That is how forms create sheer distress, the Exalted One [went on] saying to the bhikṣus.

Furthermore, bhikṣus, if one sees that woman’s body, broken up, lifeless and on its way to the cemetery — how is that, bhikṣus? Formerly beholding that pleasing form and now — what a transformation! When in this [situation one’s] mind experiences pleasure and pain5 welling up, is that not sheer distress? — It is, Exalted One, replied the bhikṣus...

And again, if one sees that woman in one place being dead for one day, two, three, four, five, up to seven days, her body being bloated, putrid, nauseating and decomposing — how is that, bhikṣus? That originally pleasing form which has now undergone this transformation — is that not sheer distress? — It is, Exalted One, replied the bhikṣus...

In addition, if one sees [how] crows and magpies, kites and vultures come [near], squabbling with [each other] over that woman [as their] prey, or [if] one sees [her] either being devoured by foxes, dogs, wolves [or] tigers or being [infested and] fed on by mosquito larvae, rapidly worming [their way into the flesh, and by other] extremely small wriggling worms — how is that, bhikṣus? Originally she was endowed with such a pleasing appearance, and now she has undergone this transformation! When in this [situation one’s] mind experiences pleasure and pain welling up, is that not sheer distress? — It is, Exalted One, replied the bhikṣus...

Additionally, if one sees that woman’s body half eaten away by birds [of prey] and worms, [with its] bowels, stomach, bloody flesh [and various kinds of] impure substances [exposed]... That is how forms create sheer distress, the Exalted One [went on] saying to the bhikṣus.

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1 See T2, 605b18 ff.; Hayashi, p. 201 ff.
2 Lit.: ‘bounded by stains’; cf. M 1, p. 88; tilakādhatagattim (Burmes and Nālandā readings to be preferred: gattim): ‘with her body affected with spots’.
3 Lit.: ‘bed-mattress’.

4 Lit.: ‘grave - intermediate space’. For the Chinese 塚間 is, of course, an area of land for burying the dead whilst the ancient Indian śmaśāna / susāna was 'a place where the corpses were left to rot' (after PTSD).

5 I.e. the ambivalence of feelings due to one’s remembering that ‘girl of incomparable beauty’ and one’s being shocked to witness the said transformation.
Furthermore, if one sees that woman’s body without flesh and blood, the bare skeleton with its bones [still] joined together... That is how forms create sheer distress... If one sees that woman’s body without flesh and blood and only [with dry bones] held together by tendons [like] a bundle of firewood⁶... That is how forms create sheer distress... If one sees [the remains] of that woman’s body, [viz.] disconnected bones scattered in different places – here a bone of the foot, there a humerus, here a...⁷ bone, there (T2, 606a) a hip bone, ribs, a shoulder blade, vertebrae of the neck and the skull⁸. That is how forms create sheer distress... If one sees the shining white or dove-grey bones of that woman’s body... That is how forms create sheer distress... If one sees the dry bones of that woman, after countless years putrid, rotten and [finally] indistinguishable from earth... That is how forms create sheer distress.

Moreover, these forms are impermanent (anitā), [subject to] change (parināma) and ephemeral (acirā); there is nothing that remains young. That is how forms create sheer distress.

How should one escape from forms? When someone succeeds in giving up and getting rid of all stupefaction (mārčhā) with regard to forms, this is called giving up with regard to forms. As for forms, the so-called śramaṇas and brahmī [ascetics] cling to them; they do not know of [their entangling] sheer distress, and they do not overcome [clinging] because they do not know [forms] in accordance with fact (yathābhūtām). They are not [real] śramaṇas and brahmī [ascetics and] do not [really] know of the deportment pertaining to them, being unable themselves to realise [the ultimate goal] and perfect mastery over themselves. The śramaṇas and brahmī [ascetics] who, as for forms, do not cling to them, profoundly knowing of [their entailing] sheer distress, certainly know [how] to overcome [all attachment]. That is what is called with śramaṇas and brahmī [ascetics their] knowing of the deportment pertaining to them; by themselves they realise⁹ [the ultimate goal] and perfect mastery over themselves. This is what is meant by giving up [stupefaction] with regard to forms.

What is that which [has been] referred to as enjoyment of feelings? When there is a bhikṣu experiencing a pleasant feeling, he knows, “I am experiencing a pleasant feeling.” When experiencing a painful feeling, he knows, “I am experiencing a painful feeling.” When experiencing a neither painful nor pleasant feeling, he knows, “I am experiencing a neither painful nor pleasant feeling.” When experiencing a pleasant sensual (sāmīṣa) feeling, he knows, “I am experiencing a pleasant sensual feeling.” When experiencing a painful sensual feeling, he knows, “I am experiencing a painful sensual feeling.” When experiencing a neither painful nor pleasant sensual feeling, he knows, “I am experiencing a neither painful nor pleasant feeling.”

Moreover, when the bhikṣu is experiencing a pleasant feeling, he does not experience a painful feeling; and he does not experience a neither painful nor pleasant feeling either; at that time he [knows], “I am just experiencing a pleasant feeling.” When he is experiencing a painful feeling, he does not experience a pleasant feeling; and he does not experience a neutral feeling either; at that time he knows, “I am just experiencing a painful feeling.” When the bhikṣu is experiencing a neither painful nor pleasant feeling, he does not experience

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6 For a parallel to the present context also containing this simile (not found in Pali), see Bh. Pāśādika, “The Śrīvyūpanāstāsītra of the Ekottarāgama Translated from the Chinese Version”, in: C.P. Sinha, K. Prasad et al., Facets of Indian Culture, Gustav Roth Felicitation Vol., Patna 1998, p. 498.

7 According to CBETA, the character consisting of the radical 肉 + 齿 is a doubtful reading which Hayashi (p. 203) replaces by the character consisting of the radical 肉 + 辰 (T2, 606, n. 40) (‘spleen (bone)’ (sic)).

8 CBETA emends 触 to 触.

9 I.e. 已身作證 (ātmana sākyat-āśr); at T2, 605b17 for 已身 read 已身 (unnoticed both in Hayashi and CBETA). Consequently, at BSR 21, 1 (2004), p. 63, 1. 16, for ‘They have given [rise] to their realising...’ read ‘By themselves they realise...’ Cf. in this context: M. Hara on J.W. de Jong who ‘kept insisting on the need for a critical edition of the Taishō Tripitaka; see H.W. Bodewitz, Minoru Hara (eds.), Gedenkschrift J.W. de Jong, Tokyo 2004, p. XIX.

10 Whereas at the beginning of the sentence ‘neutral’ and ‘sensual’ were not considered incompatible with each other, here ‘sensual’ is omitted because, perhaps, a neutral feeling was thought to exclude a sensual one.
either a pleasant or a painful feeling; [at that time he knows, “I am] just experiencing a neutral feeling.”" Again, feelings are indeed impermanent and subject to change. So considering the impermanence of the feelings certainly being subject to change – that is how feelings create sheer distress.

How should one escape from feelings? When someone succeeds in giving up and getting rid of all stupefaction with regard to feelings, this is called giving up with regard to feelings. As for feelings, those śramaṇas and brahmin [ascetics] who cling to them, do not know of [their entailing] sheer distress, and they do not overcome [clinging] because they do not know [feelings] in accordance with fact. They are not [real] śramaṇas and brahmin [ascetics and] do not [really] know of the deportment pertaining to them, being unable personally to realise [the ultimate goal] and perfect mastery over themselves. The śramaṇas and brahmin [ascetics] who, as for feelings, do not cling to them, profoundly knowing of [their entailing] sheer distress, certainly know [how] to overcome [all attachment]. That is what is called with śramaṇas and brahmin [ascetics their] knowing of the deportment pertaining to them; personally they realise [the ultimate goal] and perfect mastery over themselves. This is what is meant by giving up [stupefaction] with regard to feelings.

In addition, bhikkus, if a śramaṇa or brahmin [ascetic] does not discern (vi-viññā) painful, pleasant or neutral feelings and does not know [them] in accordance with fact, but if they teach [other] persons, such action is improper. If a śramaṇa or brahmin [ascetic] succeeds in giving up [clinging to] feelings [by dint of] knowing [them] in accordance with fact and if he inspires [other] persons through his teachings to become detached from them [too], this is correct and proper. This is what is meant by giving up [stupefaction] with regard to feelings.

Now, bhikkus, I have availed myself of [the occasion] to speak about sense-pleasures, one’s clinging to and enjoying them, about their creating sheer distress and about those who succeed in giving them up. I have spoken likewise about forms, one’s clinging to and enjoying them, about their creating sheer distress and about [those who] succeed in getting rid of [all stupefaction] with regard to forms; [I have] availed myself of [the occasion] to speak about feelings, one’s clinging to... them... succeed in giving up [clinging to] them. As to what behaves all Tāthāgatas to do, viz. to teach (caus. - pra-viññā), I have discharged [my duty] now. [You should] always practise mindfulness; meditate under trees; wisely reflect (manasi-viññā) in empty places, do not be negligent. That is what I would like to bring home [to you] (sam-anu-viññā). 13 – Having listened to the Exalted One’s words, the bhikkus were pleased and respectfully applied themselves to practice.'

10. ‘Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was staying in Śrāvastī, at Jetū’s Grove, in Anāthapindāda’s Park. Then the Exalted One said to the bhikkus: There are three [things] that are inevitably insecure. Which three? Inevitably insecure are a) one’s body, b) one’s life and c) one’s property. These, bhikkus, are the three [things] that are inevitably insecure. Now, bhikkus, in regard to the three [things] being inevitably insecure, one should search for [three kinds of] skilful means so as to realise three [kinds of] complete security. Which are the three? [There are the skilful means of someone] in quest of complete security a) [in regard to] one’s body, b) life and c) property that are inevitably insecure. And what is [the skilful means of someone] in quest of complete security a) [in regard to] one’s body that is inevitably insecure? It is reverence (gaurava).

11 Whilst in the Pāli discourse the feelings experienced in the jhānas are referred to, this part of EA, being a close parallel to the EA version of the Śrīyupasthānasūtra (see above n. 6, op. cit., p. 499) on the contemplation of feelings, is inconsistent. The two EA paras. on feeling surely represent a textual corruption; for ‘contemplation of feelings’ does by no means correspond to ‘enjoyment of feelings’.

12 Cf. n. 9 above; here instead of अति बहुवान्द, maybe for the sake of stylistic variation, अति बहुवान्द (ātambahāvana) is found. As for stylistic variation, against Pāli usage, cf. also BSR 21, 1, p. 60, ‘wretchedness’ (after Hirakawa, p. 66: 達 atayaya..., atibhava), and ibid., p. 61 ff., n. 11, ‘distress’ (अति बहुवान्द).
worship (vandana) and, in due time (yathākālam), enquiring into [the Dharma] (pariprechā),\textsuperscript{14} This is [the skilful means of someone] in quest of complete security [in regard to] one’s body...

What is [the skilful means of someone] in quest of complete security b) [in regard to] one’s life that is inevitably insecure? As for [this kind of skilful means, it is spoken of] when a son or daughter of good family, as long as life lasts\textsuperscript{15}, does not kill any living being, does not brandish (pra-ṵ kṣip) either a sword or a cudgel, being always guided by modesty (lajjā) and with a heart [full of] friendliness (maitri) and compassion (karunā) encompassing all living beings; when [he or she], as long as life lasts, does not steal [anything], always intent upon generosity (dāna) and with a heart unstained by stinginess;\textsuperscript{16} when [he or she], as long as life lasts, neither is licentious nor [induces] others to be so; ... as long as life lasts, does not tell lies, being always intent upon absolute honesty and without cheating anybody in the world;\textsuperscript{17} and does not drink alcohol, [thereby] avoiding getting befuddled and [thus being able] to maintain the observance of the Buddha’s moral training. This is [the

14 This first skilful means is reminiscent of v. 8 of the Mañgalasutta: gāravo ca nivāto ca... kālena dharmassavanam | As for the ‘act of hearing / learning’ being connected to ‘enquiring’, see Khuddaka-Pāṭha together with its commentary Paramathajotikā I (PTS 1915), p. 148: kalyānamīte... te kālena upasam-kavāta paripucchati paripaṭhātīti |  
15 直形舊 rendering yāvajīvam, seems peculiar to EÁ.  
16 Cf. D.I, pp. 4, 63: pāṇātīpātām pahiya pāṇātīpātā paṭivirato... nihitadāno nihita-sattho lajji dayāpanno saba-pāṇa-bhūta-hitānukkampi viharattī |... adinnadānam pahiya adinnadānam paṭivirato... dinnadāyi dinna-pāṭikankhi athena-suci-bhūtenā atāna viharattī. See M. Walshe, Thus Have I Heard, The Long Discourses of the Buddha. London 1987, pp. 68, 99f.: ‘Abandoning the taking of life, he dwells refraining from taking life, without stick or sword, scrupulous, compassionate, trembling for the welfare of all living beings... Abandoning the taking of what is not given, without stealing.’ – It is noteworthy that in this place, with reference to the second dīla, EÁ includes the concept of generosity, being a useful hint relevant to the question of the EA school affiliation. \[citation needed]  
17 Ibid.: musā-vādam pahiya musā-vādā paṭivirato... sacca-vādī sacca-san-dho... avisamvādako lokassāti | Walshe 1987, ibid.: ‘Abandoning false speech,... dwells refraining from false speech, a truth-speaker, one to be relied on,... not a deceiver of the world.’ – At Hayashi, p. 205, the second kind of skilful means is omitted.

What is [the skilful means of someone] in quest of complete security c) [in regard to] one’s property that is inevitably insecure? As for [this kind of skilful means, it is spoken of] when a son or daughter of good family, as long as life lasts, is always intent upon generosity towards śramaṇas, brahmin [ascetics] and all those living in poverty, giving food to those who require it, providing broth\textsuperscript{18} to those who need it, [providing] robes\textsuperscript{19}, food, lodging, medicine for treating the sick\textsuperscript{20}, accommodation and a place to live [either in a city [or in a] suburb; [when he or she, as long as life lasts,] supplies indeed everything that is needed. Suchlike is [the skilful means of someone] in quest of complete security [in regard to] one’s property that is inevitably insecure. It is, bhikṣu, by dint of these [three kinds of skilful means] that one aspires to the three [kinds of] complete security [in regard to] the three [kinds of] inevitable insecurity just mentioned. – Then the Exalted One uttered the following verses: Knowing that one’s body is inevitably insecure and that, Of course, the same holds true of one’s life, and that One’s property is subject to wastage, one should aspire To complete security. It is extremely difficult to obtain a Human body; before long one’s life comes to an End and the fate of one’s property will be destruction. [So] one [should] happily be intent upon generosity. – After listening to the Buddha’s words, the bhikṣu were pleased and respectfully applied themselves to practice.’\textsuperscript{21}

18 For 槳 Hayashi reads 槳 (encouragement).  
20 Ibid., n. 6.  
21 Two places in the Vimalakīrtinirdesāstra suggest that the present EÁ sātra might have been their source: a) Vimalakīrtinirdesā (BSR)\textsuperscript{22}, Sanskrit MS of the Vimalakīrtinirdesā preserved at the Potala Palace, transliterated by the Taisho University ‘Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature’, Tokyo 2004, p. 172: asārāt sārdāndbhāvhitṛha kāya-jīvita-tabhagopratilibham... b) Ibid., p. 176: yasya dāyakasya dānapater yādī śrī tathāgatē daksīṇāya nīlai tādī śrī garadarādire nirnānati eva samā māhakarunācātīta vipākārakamkṣanatati parītyāgaḥ... See The Teaching of Vimalakīrti, from the French translation by Étienne Lamotte, rendered into English by Sara Boin, PTS 1976, repr. 1994, pp. 108, 112: ‘(the offering of the giving of the Law consists of)... the gains of body, life.
The butter tea was ready. It was specially prepared for this occasion by my room teacher (shag rgyan). A senior Geshe (dge bshes) accompanied me to the abbot’s residence. As we entered, I made three full prostrations (brkyangs phyag), offered a silk scarf (kha dar) and knelted as instructed while the Geshe presented me to the abbot with the flask of tea. Momentarily, the abbot’s attendant served the tea to all three of us in small china cups. I was not supposed to sip it but gulp it down at once. It almost burnt my tongue and throat. The abbot asked me few questions, to which the Geshe replied on my behalf. The abbot was particularly pleased to have a postulant from Bhutan, a country poorly represented in Geluk (dge lugs) monasteries. With no physical or mental unfitness to bar me from the holy community, he gave his blessings for my admission to the Jay College of Sera Monastery.

George Dreyfus’s *The Sound of Two Hands Clapping* gives a vivid and extensive account and analysis of the education that follows the initiation I have undergone like many tens of thousands

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**Addendum to EÁ XXVI, XXVII**


and riches (kāyajīvitabhogalābha) resulting from the action of taking for the substantial that which is not substantial (asāre sāropidīdam)... The giver (dāyaka) who bestows his gifts on the poor of the town (nagaradaridra) while thinking that they are as worthy of offerings (dakṣiniya) as the Tathāgata, the giver who gives to all without making distinctions (asamabhinnam), impartially (samacittena), with great goodwill (māhāmaitrī), great compassion (māhākaruṇā), and without expecting any reward (vipākanihṛṣṇa), this giver, say I, fully performs the offering of the giving of the Law (dhammayājan paripūrayati).

See also R.A.F. Thurman, *The Holy Teaching of Vimalakirti*, University Park & London 1976, p. 40 f.: a) ‘(The Dharma-sacrifice consists) of the gain of body, health, and wealth, consummated by the extraction of essence from the essenceless... b) The giver who makes gifts to the lowest poor of the city, considering them as worthy of offering as the Tathāgata himself, the giver who gives without any discrimination, impartially, with no expectation of reward, and with great love – this giver, I say, totally fulfills the Dharma-sacrifice.’ – See also Thurman’s n. 34 on p. 122: ‘... The three indestructibles are infinite body, endless life, and boundless wealth... the body, health, and wealth here referred to are not mundane in nature, but refer to the true body, etc., of the Buddha.’

The above second passage of the Vimalakirtinirdesaśūtra might have been inspired by the third kind of skilful means of the EA sūtra, consisting of generosity equally practised towards ascetics and ‘all those living in poverty’.
of Gelukpa monks. Interweaving his rich personal experience with the penetrative analysis of an established academic in his field, the author presents a thoroughgoing study of Tibetan monastic education, particularly in the Geluk tradition, mixed with a saga of his own spiritual and educational journey in that tradition. An impressive work, Dreyfus's *The Sound of Two Hands Clapping* reveals the formalities, modalities, strengths, weaknesses, challenges and prospects of the scholastic training prevalent in the major seats of the Geluk school. It captures the aspirations, occupations, lifestyle and achievements of monks in Geluk scholastic centres and his personal quest for Buddhist scholarship in such a milieu.

Dreyfus's odyssey culminated in the highest degree of academic honour the Geluk tradition offers, making Dreyfus, also known as Geshe Sangay Samdrup, the first Western person to obtain a traditional Geshe title. This book, as he rightfully claims (p.5), treats the subject both from within and without, integrating rich personal experience with the academic skill of analytical and comparative thinking. It combines the criticality and inquisitiveness of an enquirer outside the tradition with the in-depth understanding and familiarity of a member within the tradition.

He starts by giving a comprehensive history of the Tibetan monastic and scholastic tradition and the organisation and maintenance of monastic institutions, and the moving account of how his own membership began. He leads the reader on an intellectual journey into the long and arduous system of Tibetan education, for which the Geluk school in particular is well known. Discussing the religious, pedagogical, social and political strands of the educational process culminating in the degree of Geshe and, finally, the dynamics of change with which it is confronted in a globalised world and scattered diaspora, Dreyfus's work is aimed at portraying a complete and clear picture of the Tibetan monastic education. No-one so far has undertaken such a project and only a few such as this author have the knowledge and means to do it successfully.

Dreyfus's account, as he duly reminds us, is focused on the three seats of the Geluk tradition, which are debating institutions (*rtsod grwa*) run in the style of corporates. Apart from minor reforms, the seats in India have retained the traditional form of administrative, social and pedagogical practices. The Nyingma (*rnying ma*) monastic college at Namdroling, which Dreyfus chose to represent the commentarial institutions (*bshad grwa*), is however a modern establishment styled on the Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies in Sarnath. It is truly the best centre for an all round Tibetan Buddhist education focusing on the Nyingma tradition but, except for its pedagogical practice, it is run like a boarding school and thus does not reflect the settings of a traditional commentarial institution. Like the thriving centres at Serta and Yachen in Tibet today, most institutions belonging to the commentarial tradition consisted of unstructured shanties built by independent disciples and devotees encamped around a charismatic lama and lacked a proper administrative and curricular organisation. Thus, the monastic centres discussed here do not represent the set up of and the lifestyle and education in most Tibetan monasteries, much less all.

In the course of his explanation of the Tibetan monastic politics and the religious education imparted therein, Dreyfus exposes for us a number of underlying assumptions about Tibetan Buddhist monasteries. In particular, he targets the 'virtual' image people of the West have of Tibetan monasteries as sanctuaries of peace and tranquillity filled with compassionate and enlightened souls. Far from being islands of peace and spirituality that most outsiders imagine, he tells us that they are 'oceans housing all kinds of fishes' (p.38). He shows us their human side with its shortcomings (gun culture, p.55, punk monks, p.58, corporal punishment, p.58, materialism, pp.58, 256, etc.) despite the rigorous religious training, which involves much hardship and austere living. Dreyfus even compares the severe discipline of the monasteries to an army boot camp training. This naturally leaves the reader wondering why the means and the end do not meet. Why do Tibetan monasteries, notwithstanding the intensive training in one of the world's most pacifist and non-materialistic civilisations, have a significant

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3 The college officially known as Ngayur Nyingma Institute is part of Namdroling, the largest Nyingma monastery in exile.
number of bellicose and materialist monks? My teacher told me that the monks of Darge monastery in Kham were almost all armed with guns, as were the gangster monks (idab ldob) in the three seats in Central Tibet. It is not at all rare to come across rows and fights in the big monasteries. I have myself witnessed dozens of bloody confrontations between monks during my eleven years at Sera and Namdrolling, in strong contrast to merely two instances of shoving in rowdy bops during six years at Oxford. Tibetan history also contains numerous episodes of large-scale monastic violence.

Dreyfus, like Goldstein, explains such ills as unfortunate elements concomitant with 'mass monasticism'. They are by-products of being 'the big ocean'; to give the common Tibetan religious idiom, the dge 'dun 'dus pa rgya mtsho. However, one may also add to this the inefficiency in the methods of education to civilise the students. The educational curricula and pedagogic techniques, particularly in the first few years of training in the main Geluk centres, are very professional and technical in nature rather than practical and liberal. Although the topics studied mostly consist of serious Buddhist metaphysics and soteriology, they are taught in a highly theoretical and pedantic style and are largely an extrovert art of academic learning rather than a religious training internalised to tame the mind and improve one's personality, or an education to broaden the perspectives of the pupil.

Geluk monks, as Dreyfus points out, spend years in the monasteries without even knowing what precepts they are supposed to observe (p.114). It is not rare to find a monk running into his fourth year in a Geluk monastery still not knowing what the ten virtuous and ten non-virtuous actions are. Similarly, in many non-Geluk monasteries such as the Dratshang (grwa tshang) of Namdrolling and Central Monk Body of Bhutan, monks have to devote almost all their time to liturgical training and duties so that they seldom have the opportunity and means to learn and practise the Buddhism of principles and values. Many do not even know the most fundamental of Buddhist concepts and values. Thus, most monasteries hardly succeed in imparting to their monks a value education and a philosophical and moral training such as the one classically exemplified in the sequential cultivation of three kinds of discriminative knowledge (shes rab nram gsum).

In Part II, Dreyfus studies the early educational practices and curricula in the monastic centres assessing the roles of literacy and memorisation. He looks into what constitutes literacy and how it is obtained and utilised in Tibet. He also gives vivid picture of the memorisation exercises, underlying their importance in traditional education and the benefits he has personally reaped from adopting them (pp.96-7). Highlighting the vocality of Tibetan monastic education, here again, Dreyfus's account destroys the Western imagination of Tibetan monasteries as oases of quiet and peace. He shows how they are full of cacophony of sounds from memorisation drills, ritual chanting, monastic music and the clapping of hands, thudding of feet and the roars and screams coming from the debate courtyards.

Dreyfus then discusses the monastic curriculum and the roles of commentary, interpretation, authority, oral transmission, meditation and their interrelationship in Tibetan Buddhist scholarship. He provides a clear survey of the scholastic curriculum in the major seats of the Geluk tradition, presenting both its strengths and weaknesses. His clarification on the excesses of yigcha manuals in the Gelukpa curriculum is particularly interesting given the qualms about it among non-Geluk Tibetan scholars and Western academics. However, the curriculum at Namdrolling, contrary to Dreyfus's claim, is not centred on the collection of thirteen texts of mkhan po gZhan dga', who has also confused with gZhan phan mTha' yas, the founder of Srisintha College at Dzogs chen (p.148). Of the thirteen texts associated with mkhan po gZhan dga', the Abhidharmasamuccaya is not in the curriculum, nor is Dharmakirti's Pramāṇapārvatīkā included in the list. Thus, texts within gZhan dga's collection do not constitute even one third of the volume of the curriculum of Namdrolling's college. Curricula

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4 Personal communication with Khempo Pema Sherab, 1995.
at rDzong gsar and rDzogs chen monastic colleges, however, are said to have been centred on the thirteen texts.

Another comparison that can be made between the two traditions, which Dreyfus does not undertake in detail but which is very interesting and educationally significant, concerns moral guidance, which does not form part of the monastic curriculum per se. It is often given before, after or outside the structured curricular lessons. In the Geluk monasteries, such guidance focuses on how to cherish one’s own tradition, to show commitment to one’s system and to serve one’s monastery. Membership in the monastery is taught to be seen as a privileged status and service to the monastery as a noble deed. This inculcates a strong sense of attachment and belonging to the monastery.

Like the answer Dreyfus received to his queries about meditation (p.169), my teachers, who were leading Geshes in Sera, warned me that undertaking meditation with the hope of gaining enlightenment in our degenerate age is too ambitious. Were one to go and stay like Milarepa in the snows, one might only freeze to death. The prudent thing to do now is to study in the monastery, contribute to its communal success and pray to reach enlightenment when Maitreya comes to save the world. Such advice deeply influences the students, making them both attached to the monastery and cordial and committed members. I remember one new monk in Sera gazing at the three-thousand strong assembly from the corner of the hall and remarking, ‘What a great fortune to be sitting with this holy congregation!’ It is primarily such admiration of their monastic community that has helped Gelukpa monasteries to thrive socially and economically. Some monks work as vendors for many years to throw a good party for the whole monastery, while others sacrifice their whole life for the monastery engaging in some drudgery. The Geluk monks are particularly well-known for conducting their public relations with much civility.

In contrast, non-Gelukpas are less occupied with the success of their monastic communities. At every session in commentarial colleges such as the one at Namdroling, moral guidance is given routinely before the curricular lessons in the form of preliminaries known as kun slong kun spyod kyi rims pa, the procedure of intention and behaviour. Students are reminded of what intentions and behaviours they should avoid and what they should cultivate in pursuit of the Dharma in general and for the lesson in particular. The length and style vary from teacher to teacher but the students are always reminded to generate bodhicitta and frequently to reflect on the four points of mind turning (blo ldog rnam pa bzhis): the rarity and preciousness of humanhood, the impermanence of life, the flaws of Samsara and the infallibility of karma.

Monks are also frequently told how important it is to internalise the Buddhist doctrine through practice and to meditate on it after learning it theoretically. In stark contrast to the Geluk attitude mentioned above, the Nyingmapas believe that drastic spiritual developments are possible even today and claim that rDzogs chen teachings have become more effective in the degenerate age so that Buddhahood is obtainable even in one lifetime. Thus, all worldly pursuits are discouraged and meditation taught to be the most important undertaking after scholastic training. Such exhortations instil in the students a strong inclination for unworldly spiritual goals, giving rise to a great number of practitioners. However, as a consequence Nyingma monks tend to be socially inept and their monasteries are run very poorly with much less solidarity and cohesion than the Gelukpas.

Thus, the advice and admonitions received as an adjunct to the actual curricular teachings and the values and achievements idealised in their communities play a major role in shaping their personalities and outlooks. Although the contents of the curricula in Gelukpa and Nyingma generally are not very different, there is certainly an ideological gap between the two, resulting from the differences in these kinds of approaches and priorities.

Chapters 10, 11 and 12 form the crux of The Sound of Two Hands Clapping. Dreyfus gives an elaborate account of the nature of Tibetan debate and its formulation in the greater context of Indian and Western forms of logic and dialectics. Discussing the procedures and rules of debate, he depicts the ritual that Tibetan debate is, with its theatrical physical conduct and verbal exchanges, which often escalate into a spectacle involving much ag-
gression and abuse, and occasionally blows. He explores the study and teaching of debate through the Collected Topics and its subsequent role in and relationship with the study of subjects such as epistemology and Madhyamaka. An account of the long Geluk educational process is unfolded, interwoven with the art of debate which is its main thread.

Dreyfus's exposition is thorough and captivating, except perhaps for a rather simplistic remark that Geshe is the highest degree awarded by Tibetan Buddhist monastic universities/institutions (pp. 2, 254). Although there is some truth in it, it simplifies the reality of Tibetan educational systems, which his book seeks to unravel and does so successfully. There is no one common standard for degrees in Tibet and Geshe, as an abbreviation of dge ba'i bshes gnyun (Sanskrit: kalyāṇamitra) as he notes (p. 254), does not always refer to a degree. It is often used as a title, such as the titles of Lopen (slob dpon) and Khenpo (mkhan po). Moreover, the Geshe title in Geluk monasteries is sometimes conferred on people with no proper academic credentials, as suggested by the pejorative epithet Tongo Geshe (gtong sgo dge bshes) or Party Geshe. Dreyfus passes over this in silence but there is a significant number of Geshe titles given to candidates who go through a symbolic exam and throw a party for the monastery.

In the final chapter of Part II, Dreyfus investigates whether Tibetan debate is merely a pedagogical exercise or constitutes critical enquiry. Maintaining the two cases to be a matter of personal opinion and pedagogical style, he argues that some Geluk scholars consider debate merely as a mnemonic tool and intellectual exercise to internalise pre-given truths. Geshe Rabten is portrayed as a teacher of this category who believed in debate and, for that matter, any educational enterprise as instruments to internalise rather than enquire, and to reiterate rather than reveal. On the other hand, Geshe Nyima, the scholar who had to hold his right eyelid with his finger, is seen as an epitome of the latter type who advocated a degree of Socratic enquiry. Gen Nyima, Dreyfus tells us, excelled in the art of questioning and accepted no answer as final. He rejected absolute views and kept 'the pragmatic dimension of the inquiry in sight' (p. 288).

Dreyfus continues the discussion of the role of critical thinking and the room for rationality in Geluk monasteries in Part III of his book. He first assesses the role of rational enquiry in Tibetan monasteries, placing it in the greater context of Tibetan world view and juxtaposing reason and rationality with popular cultures. From the many popular beliefs, the author elaborates on spirit worship, a practice that is deeply engrained in Tibetan society. Both here and elsewhere, Dreyfus poignantly narrates the controversy surrounding the cult of Shuk-den (shugs ldan), which has divided the Gelukpa community and resulted in the ruthless murder of one of his teachers. Describing this dispute, in which Tibetan virtuosi of the highest order such as the Dalai Lama and his teacher were involved, Dreyfus remarks that Tibetan scholars saw no conflict between rationality and belief in spirits and many things scientifically unproven. He concludes that Tibetan reason and rationality are thus deeply embedded in their order of the world and culture. He could perhaps have said a little more on how in fact the Tibetans use their reason and rationality to support such beliefs and world order, as they do to prove previous and next lives.

Next, the author explores the limit of rationality in Tibetan monasteries and the constraints imposed internally by the rigidity of scholasticism and externally by orthodoxy influenced by socio-political concerns. He shows how Tibetan scholasticism is progressive in that it evolves through re-interpretation and re-appropriation, but only within the limits set by orthodoxy. Debate and enquiry are constrained by social and political factors. He cites the case of Gedun Choephel (pp. 284, 314), the maverick Geluk scholar, and Gen Nyima and Palden Drakpa to illustrate this grip of orthodoxy. Dreyfus concludes by giving a brief overview of his study of Tibetan scholasticism and goes into an account of changes taking place in the scholastic centres driven by both globalising trends and socio-economic factors. He also recounts his departure from the monasteries and his experience at university where he missed debate but broadened his knowledge

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of Tibetan Buddhism through exposure to other traditions. The book ends with sixty pages of very informative endnotes, bibliography and an index but has numerous typographical errors in the Tibetan transliteration (pp. 57, 59, 65, 83, 84, etc.).

The Sound of Two Hands Clapping is certainly a great achievement and a compelling read and Dreyfus, as always, treats his subject with much passion and rigour. A personal story intertwined with an intellectual journey into one of the world’s most exotic educational traditions, the book is both a unique and a significant contribution to the field of Tibetan studies. Dreyfus may have failed to be a Geluk protégé of his teachers (p. 331), but he has certainly succeeded in revealing their life and wisdom and explaining the intricacies and complexities of their culture with a remarkable zest. This book is indispensable for those wishing to understand Tibetan scholasticism in general and the art of learning by clapping two hands in particular.

While George Dreyfus is the first Western Geshe, Jinpa is the first traditional Geshe Lharampa (dge bshes lha rams pa) to obtain a doctorate from a famous Western academic establishment. Jinpa was a star scholar of Gaden monastery even before he became the personal interpreter for the Dalai Lama, a role that earned him a high reputation. At the end of Jinpa’s final exam, a prominent Geshe of Gaden is said to have taken off his hat and made a wish publicly that Gaden be filled by personalities like Jinpa (to which one may also add that later, when Jinpa renounced his monkhood and married his wife, some witty monks of Gaden, with playful irony, remarked that the wish of the old Geshe never come true, lest Gaden would have no monks left).

Jinpa’s illustrious career continued with his study at Cambridge University, which culminated in his doctoral degree. Self, Reality and Reason in Tibetan Philosophy is a revised version of his doctoral dissertation entitled ‘Self, Persons and Madhyamaka

7 See also his other major work, Recognizing Reality, Dharmakirti’s Philosophy and its Tibetan Interpretations, Albany 1997.

Dialectics: A Study of Tsongkhapa’s Middle Way Philosophy. Combining his profound understanding of Tsongkhapa’s thought, which he obtained through his monastic training in Tsongkhapa’s writings as ‘a living tradition’, and his extensive comprehension of philosophical literature, which he gained later, Jinpa presents a lucid and penetrating exposition of some selected topics of Tsongkhapa’s Madhyamaka thought. Thus, he integrates the two approaches of what he calls his ‘native’s point of view’ and ‘contemporary philosopher’s point of view’ (pp 2-3) in reconstructing and reformulating Tsongkhapa’s Madhyamaka theories in a contemporary philosophical language.

The Introduction and Chapter I discuss the historical backdrop and context for development of Tsongkhapa’s Madhyamaka theories, as well as the textual context and the methodology for Jinpa’s re-appropriation and articulation of them. He emphasises that much of the time, he ‘listens to Tsongkhapa’ (pp 2, 15) and lets Tsongkhapa speak through ‘his own voice’ (p.5) uncluttered by later scholastic literature, which has dominated the Geluk study of Madhyamaka both in the traditional monasteries and the West, or with too much digression into what Tsongkhapa’s critics have to say. He chooses to undertake a holistic reading of Tsongkhapa by seeking the intended meaning and overall cohesion and consistency in Tsongkhapa’s philosophical enterprise.

A very intriguing observation Jinpa makes in this regard is his distinction of Tsongkhapa’s Madhyamaka vis-à-vis Geluk Madhyamaka (p.5). It is particularly interesting in that it comes from someone of Jinpa’s background and authority. The traditional Geluk scholars would reject such a distinction for it implies divergences between them and the founder, quite against their claim and belief. It is all the more significant because non-Gelukpa authors such as Mipham have also made a similar division between Tsongkhapa and a few other Gelukpas such as I Cang sijia on the one hand and the mainstream Gelukpas on the other with regard to their ultimate understanding of Emptiness. One Nyingma mKhan po, brTson ’grus Phun tshogs, who also received training at Sera, went so far as to brand the mainstream Gelukpas as Neo-Gelukpas who have discarded Tsongkhapa’s
thoughts and who deceive the naïve with self-invented false reasoning.

Another assertion that Jinpa makes, which begs further explanation, pertains to the portrayal of Tsongkhapa as a great/foremost ‘reformer’ (pp.1, 12), although not a revolutionary (p. 12). Many authors on the Geluk tradition seem to indulge in using this epithet for Tsongkhapa while others tend to be cautious. Still others disapprove of its use and have argued against it. The problem is partly due to the linguistic gap. There is no Tibetan equivalent for the English terms ‘reform’ or ‘reformer’. Applications of such terms thus undoubtedly risk arbitrary imposition of an *emic* term across cultures as though it were *etic*. Tsongkhapa, truly an eminent luminary of Tibet, can rightly be attributed with regeneration and revitalisation (which Jinpa emphatically does) for the contributions he made and the changes he brought to Buddhism in Tibet. But on what grounds can we call Tsongkhapa a reformer while many other masters such as Milarepa, Klong che pa, Dol po pa, etc., are not? Shing *rta’i srol ’byed che’ mo, the concept which Jinpa refers to, is itself of very loose application varying from context to context and people to people.

The rest of Chapter I spans the qualms Tsongkhapa had about the Madhyamaka theories prevalent during his day, and how he arrived at his own understanding and interpretation of ‘the perfect middle way’. Tsongkhapa, Jinpa says, was first and foremost concerned with a lack of analytical and philosophical rigour in Tibetan thinking. Jinpa depicts a picture of pre-Tsongkhapa Madhyamaka scholarship in Tibet as being marred by a philosophical

naivety derived from a literal reading of Madhyamaka literature and by an anti-rationalism inspired by an epistemological scepticism and tantric mysticism. Jinpa contrasts Tsongkhapa’s highly philosophical and rational approach to this existing trend of his precursors, whom he criticises.

There is certainly no denying that Tsongkhapa excelled in the art of rational and critical enquiry and undertook his Madhyamaka analysis with much philosophical rigour. It is also true that he rightly accused some opponents, particularly practiciting ners and meditators, of insufficient rationalisation and of their inclination towards non-analytical quietist meditation. However, would it be justified to tax the Mādhyamikas who preceded Tsongkhapa in general, including a great number of Sakya (*sa skya*), Kayu (*bka’ rgyud*) and Nyingma scholars, with a literal reading of Madhyamaka literature, philosophical naivety and anti-rationalism? Would Tsongkhapa have described his opponents with such words?

What Tsongkhapa considers literal reading was to the early Tibetan Mādhyamikas direct reading of the texts without any paraphrastic qualifications such as ‘intrinsically existent’ or ‘conventionally non-existent’, which the Gelukpas profusely added. They did not see the need for such paraphrases in the context of Mādhyamika analysis. However, this does not turn them into scholars who stubbornly adhered to the literal meaning of the words without allowing any implied, contextual or figurative use of language. Furthermore, most of the early Mādhyamikas were also staunch rationalists, often conflating Candrakirti’s ontology and Dharmakirti’s epistemology and distancing themselves from Hwa shang’s Quietist/Simultaneist tradition. The problem of the over-broad negation that Tsongkhapa accused them of implies their excessive use of deconstructive analysis rather than the lack of it. The denial of the validity of everyday experience and of any thesis in Mādhyamaka analytical discourse, which these scholars underscored, is a conclusion reached through a rigorous philosophical

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8 mKhan po brTson ’grus Phun tshogs, *Sher phyin ’chad pa’i sngron ’gro*, Byllakuppe 1996, p.2: Blo bzang grags pa’i dgongs pa rtsa lta’i dor / rang bzos lta’i snang ngs pa’i ’phur / ’khor gyis / byis pa’i ’drid pa dge ldan gsar / ma’i gzhung ’gpar gnas blo ldan su’ yis yid rtsin’ os //

9 See for instance A. Wavman (tr.) *Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real: Buddhist Meditation and the Middle View*, New York 1978, p.8.


and rational enquiry. Thus, to accuse them of being philosophically naïve and anti-rational is, to say the least, a little amiss.

Jinpa gives a succinct discussion of Tsongkhapa’s deep concern about the no-thesis viewpoint and quietist trends and the consequent development of Tsongkhapa’s own Madhyamaka thought, discussing its originality and the process through which Tsongkhapa arrived at it. The most crucial point of this process is of course Tsongkhapa’s vision and consultation of Mahāyāna, which Jinpa suggests could be seen as a methodological procedure. This mystical experience, for a tradition which claims the centrality of rationality and analytical acumen and disdains others for the lack of such, is ironically the milestone with which to define Tsongkhapa’s novel understanding of Emptiness and bring about profound changes in his philosophical thought.

In Chapter II, Jinpa surveys Tsongkhapa’s Madhyamaka hermeneutics, giving a list of strategies he used in delineating the parameters of negation at the beginning of the chapter (p.38). The most original hermeneutic strategy Tsongkhapa and his followers formulated with much urgency and repetition is perhaps the identification of the Madhyamaka object of negation or negandum. Tsongkhapa accused his predecessors of over-broad delimitation of Madhyamaka negandum and underscored its exact identification. The negandum of Madhyamaka reasoning, according to him, is limited to ultimately, hypostatically or intrinsically an existent entity (see Jinpa’s Table 1). As a corollary, Tsongkhapa and his followers also stressed the application of qualifications such as ‘ultimately’ and ‘hypostatically existent’ to the negandum. These endeavours at narrowing the object of negation down to a refined construct and leaving the empirical phenomena unsashed by Madhyamaka analysis then tie up with his famous assertion of the validity of conventional reality. It is these points which the later Gelukpa critics, such as Go rams pa bSod nams Senge, Zilung pa Sákya mChog Idan, ‘Ju Mi pham rGya mtsho and A rdo ba dGe ’dun Chos ’phel, attacked, accusing the Gelukpas of restraining the thoroughgoing Madhyamaka dialectic and its spiritually therapeutic impact by diverting its deconstructive analysis to a hypo-statized target isolated from our day-to-day empirical world.

Chapter III contains a discussion of the pan-Buddhist concept of No-self and Tsongkhapa’s hermeneutic manoeuvres for integrating his rather heterodox assertion of the conventional self, which is the object of our instinctive thought ‘I am’. Jinpa says (p.72) that Tsongkhapa, in contrast to the standard Buddhist view, adopts what might be called in modern Western philosophical terms a non-reductionist view. In the course of identifying the person and self that is rejected and maintained in Tsongkhapa’s thought, Jinpa explains the nuances of the latter’s distinction of person and selfhood into an eternal, unitary and autonomous self (rtag gcig rang dbang can gyi bdag), a self-sufficient existential self (rang rkya thub pa’i rdzash yod kyi bdag), an intrinsically existential self (ngo bo nyid kyus grub pa’i bdag) and a conventional self (tha snyad kyi bdag). He only maintains the last category.

This is followed by a concise exposition of the five- and seven-fold deconstructive reasoning used by Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti to refute the concept of self and an analysis of Tsongkhapa’s concept of intrinsic nature. Jinpa’s clarification is outstanding on Tsongkhapa’s understanding of rang mtshan as unique particulars, unique properties and intrinsic nature (p.95), the last of which a Madhyamika rejects according to Tsongkhapa, and the distinction of ‘being intrinsic nature’ and ‘being existent by means of intrinsic nature’. Tsongkhapa uses the latter scheme particularly to harmonise rationally the general Madhyamaka denial of intrinsic nature and the paradoxical presentation of Emptiness as intrinsic nature in Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā XV/2.

Chapters IV and V deal with Tsongkhapa’s radical assertion of conventional person or self, the mere ‘I’, and his criteria for conventional existence. Jinpa critically explores how Tsongkhapa, in the absence of an intrinsic person, which is annulled by Madhyamaka scrutiny, theorises a conventional self qua person that is the agent for all our moral actions and spiritual endeavours. No Buddhist, save perhaps the Vātsīputriya personalists, would have argued so emphatically for the existence of self qua the object of I-consciousness. This position, which Jinpa calls conventional realism (pp.116, 168, 176), seems at least prima facie to go right to the heart of the nominalism which Buddhists generally adopted apropos of self and personhood. Moreover, by theorising
the conventional status of self and person and by probing into the status of conventional reality, isn't Tsongkhapa himself succumbing to an implicit reification and the essentialist tendency which he accused other Buddhists of espousing? Can his acclaimed nominalism and conventionalism (p.117) be sustained in the midst of his verification and objectification of the self that almost all Buddhists reject? In defining the self as a nominal construct, which is an atemporal generality separate from the aggregates, how accurate is Tsongkhapa's presentation of the worldly conventional view of self? An astute metaphysician might also argue about the compatibility of such a self with the empirical role a person plays as a moral agent. Jinpa's articulation of Tsongkhapa's thought is both stimulating and thought-provoking, arousing many questions such as these.

Questions can also be raised on Tsongkhapa's concept of convention and its degree of objectivity, but such would escape the purpose of this review. The crux of Tsongkhapa's conventional theory is of course his three criteria for what is conventionally existent (p.157). However, his definition is circular in that one must first establish what it is to be familiar with conventional cognition and agree on a valid conventional knowledge in order to understand what is conventional. Critics such as dGe 'dun Chos 'phel have also argued that this presupposes some form of homogenous and absolute conventional standard and authority among sentient beings, which is impossible. The mention of the ultimate analysis, which probes into the real nature of things, among the criteria for conventional existence also risks conflating the two perspectives of the ultimate and the conventional, a fault which Tsongkhapa accuses others of committing.

Jinpa further explains Tsongkhapa's nominalism through the metaphor of illusion and what may be called his scholastic interpretation of the metaphor in two ways. This is followed by a discussion of Tsongkhapa's procedures of avoiding the extremes of absolutism, nihilism and relativism and the soteriological dimension of No-self and reasons pertaining to it. While proceeding with the rejection of relativism, Jinpa mentions that 'Tsongkhapa does not reject the reality out there' (p.175). This in a way succinctly summarises Tsongkhapa's Madhyamaka ontology and his theory of self and personal identity. This also leaves readers, like his critics, with much disquiet and dissatisfaction. In singling out a hypostatic intrinsic nature as the only philosophical villain to be annihilated and in leaving the empirical world unscathed and indeed validated, and our ordinary sense of self and the world veritably confirmed, Tsongkhapa's description of things as nominal and fiction-like still eludes us and sounds like mere rhetoric.

Nonetheless, Jinpa succeeds in revealing Tsongkhapa's complex and abstruse standpoints with great clarity and acumen. This is a pioneering work on the topic of personal identity in Tibetan philosophy and, for all those interested in Tsongkhapa, it unravels the most intricate of the thoughts of that lofty figure of Tibet. It will be a long time before another Tibetan will explain his philosophical heritage with comparable insight and articulacy. My only disappointment is the book's price which puts it beyond the reach of many people, particularly in Asia. Yet, all in all, it is a remarkable work.
BOOK REVIEWS


Only a few months after the publication of their Index to the Jātaka, Professors Ousaka and Yamazaki have produced an index to the Visuddhimagga.

As Dr Cone makes clear in the preface, this is an index of the PTS edition as it stands, including its wrong readings and misprints, although a few unambiguous misprints have been rectified. For the most part, however, even obvious errors have not been rectified. The result of this is that a printing error such as adikusalānam (4, 28) is listed as such, instead of being listed as the two words adi' and kusalānam.

As in the compilers' previous work, line numbers are shown by a superscript numeral after the page number, instead of following the Critical Pāli Dictionary's pattern of having a lower case numeral in a smaller font size. Occurrences of words in verses are not distinguished from their use in prose, so there are no examples of the strange addition of an asterisk to a page number, which was found in their earlier work.

Dr Cone hopes that this index will prove a valuable tool for anyone preparing a new edition of the Visuddhimagga. At the very least, the existence of the index and the electronic version of the Visuddhimagga upon which it is based will enable the PTS to offer a corrected reprint in due course with (dare we hope?) the paragraph numbers of the Harvard Oriental Series edition inserted. This would make cross-referencing between the editions and Bhikkhu Nāgamoli's translation immeasurably clearer.

Anyone wishing to make a corrected version, as opposed to a revised version, of Visuddhimagga will find that this index immediately draws their attention to anomalies. For example, the juxtaposition of pavattitanāmarupam and pavattitanāmarūpam, occurring in close proximity (at 43, 2, 22, 30 and 413, 8 respectively), will show the need to check, and correct, the text.

Usage of this index will very soon enable readers to appreciate more fully the compilers' achievement in producing this invaluable aid to the study of Buddhaghosa's masterpiece. K.R. Norman

Book Reviews


Findly draws together diverse material in this book to offer an in-depth study of a practice central to Theravāda Buddhism: the giving of food and other requisites to the monastic Sangha by lay people. This specific focus is underscored by her initial definition of the term dāna as 'donation' (p.xiii), which draws on the Latin parallel to the Pāli term rather than the more popular concepts of generosity and giving.

The book is divided into nine chapters. There is a good deal of overlap between them and some repetition. Broadly speaking, the first two focus on the socio-economic and religious context in which the Buddhist practice of dāna developed. The next four explore the dynamics of the donation itself, for example the relationship of interdependence between ordained and lay fostered by dāna on both material and soteriological levels. The main focus of the remaining chapters is the monastic Sangha: its attitude to property; its strategies for encouraging dāna; and, lastly, 'The Renunciant as Facilitator: The Case of Ānanda'.

Three important strands of exploration are woven together throughout the book: the Vedāntic antecedents to and parallels with dāna that were consciously exploited by the new Buddhist movement; the socio-economic context in which the practice of dāna developed; the place of dāna in the Dhamma, within the path towards liberation. I will take an example of each strand as illustration of the book's content.

The word pīṇḍa (lit. lump of food, in early Buddhism, alms given as food), Findly suggests, entered Buddhism laden with 'Vedic baggage' (p.131), particularly its presence in the funeral and ancestral rites enacted prior to and after the death of a father to 'preserve lineage and augment family property' (p.132). Draw-
ing on research by David Knipe into the Vedic practice, she parallels this use – an offering to the dead for the benefit of the dead person as well as the donor – with its subtly transformed Buddhist use, 'the transmutation of food into a new rebirth, not for himself (the bhikkhu) but for the donor' (pp.135-6). Her implication is that the antecedent uses of the term played positively into the message the monastic Sangha wanted to convey: that food given to it benefited the giver soteriologically by creating the conditions for a better rebirth.

Findly maps a socio-economic context for the development of dāna that was characterised by the rise of the wealthy, middle class gahapati (householder), and a market-orientated culture in which the choice of both religion and objects of patronage were beginning to operate at the level of the individual rather than the family or community. She then looks at the guidelines of behaviour that eventually became the rule of discipline (Vinaya) for the Buddhist renunciant community through the lenses of this data. Her point is that Vinaya studies should not be done without taking into account the demands of this competitive environment, in which the support, and by extension the surplus wealth, of the laity had to be won and retained through good marketing techniques, if the survival of the movement was to be assured. It is not only rulings about clothing and external behaviour that she is thinking of, but also the early emphases on moderation (the Middle Way) and egalitarianism. Both, she argues, served to shape 'a public etiquette conducive to donor expectations' (p.34), the whole emerging as a way of 'drawing donor attention to the worthiness of the recipient' (p.35).

To pass to the last strand, the author identifies non-attachment as the point where the practice of dāna feeds into the soteriology inherent in the Dhamma. In what she terms a 'brilliant move' by the shapers of early Buddhism (p.194), wealth is not condemned – that would have alienated the very people the movement wanted to attract as donors – but attachment to wealth. And by offering itself as the 'field' through which non-attachment could be practised and the fruits anticipated, the monastic Sangha again secured its own survival. Findly uses the term 'contract' to define this relationship the donor ensures the viability of the ongoing monastic Sangha through material support; the Sangha offers itself in an act of compassion as the means through which lay people could work towards the uprooting of causes of suffering. Both sides 'purchase' something from each other.

The question that arose for me in reading this book was: how much of Findly's material is new? Much of her sociological and historical material is taken from secondary sources, from authors such as Uma Chakravarti, Binayendra Chaudhury, George Erdosy, Richard Gombrich, S.C. Misra and Romila Thapar. This secondary material is fused with extensive references to the Pāli Canon and Vedic Sanskrit texts, drawn both from translations and from the Pāli and Sanskrit originals. For instance, Chapter 3 (Resources to Requisites: Gifts to the Gone Forth) has 342 endnotes, the majority of which contain unmediated references to Pāli and Sanskrit terms.

The conclusion I came to was that the strength of this book lies not so much in the groundbreaking nature of its content but in the thoroughness of the author's treatment of her subject and in the way in which she combines, on the one hand, the sociological and the textual and, on the other, knowledge of the Theravāda Canon and Vedic Sanskrit texts. It is this combination that gives rise to the new.

Truly original work lies scattered throughout the book. On the evidence of the bibliography, the author has already re-worked some of this for specialist journals, for example why the term arahant is normally not applied to nuns in the Pāli texts (pp.226-31), and the important role of women as donors in the economic context of Early Buddhism (pp.58-80). Then there is the treatment of Ananda at the end of the book. Drawing on and going beyond a 1978 doctoral thesis by Michael Freedman, Ananda is presented as a facilitator of dāna through his warm interactions with lay people and also the 'canon's earliest critique of the arahant ideal' (p.394) in that his evident anukampā (sympathy for others) and lack of selfishness are not adequate alone, within the Theravāda system, for him to attain Nibbāna.

There were points in this book when I expected the author to take a more discriminating attitude to the Pāli texts. For instance, the Cakkavattī Śīhāṇādā Sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya is wrongly employed to prove that the prospects for society are dismal 'where there are no donors' and no generosity (p.197), in disregard of the
fact that the main focus of the sutta is what happens when the state fails in its duty towards the poor. At other points an over-literalist interpretation of the texts risks simplification. However, these instances are outweighed by a broadly judicious use of the texts and secondary sources.

I welcome this book because of the wealth of material it brings together on an important topic that has often been overlooked.

Elizabeth Harris
(Birmingham University)


Stanley Abe is already known as an established expert on East Asian Buddhist art with a particularly sharp eye for historiographical issues. But this book, an outstanding work of revisionist scholarship, will undoubtedly ensure that he becomes one of those authors who stamp their mark indelibly on their field within Buddhist Studies in such a way that all future researchers will have to be familiar with their writings.

The territory covered is itself a familiar one - the introduction of the Buddhist religion to China - and one might have thought that in the wake of the text-based scholarship of such giants as Erik Zürcher, to say nothing of great art historians such as Alexander Soper, there would be little chance of surprising us with a completely new perspective on the topic. Abe, however, has derived a great deal of benefit from recent archaeology, a science which has now put in our hands a much wider spread of evidence for early Chinese Buddhist material culture than was formerly provided by the relatively few highly regarded pieces of sculpture that were carried off from China to various locations overseas during the early twentieth century. This allows him consistently to challenge the rather narrow perspective of our textual sources which reflect, if not solely the view of the ruling elite, then at best the largely complementary outlook of those members of the Sangha whom the elite found to be congenial companions. At the same time the range of his textual references shows that he is also prepared to incorporate research based on hitherto under-utilised material for the period, such as Taoist sources, rather than base his interpretations on material evidence alone. In fact, one of the main functions of his work is to question existing assumptions and hypotheses, and to stress just how much the new material evidence confronts us with phenomena that we never knew before and indeed have great difficulty in explaining.

To demonstrate how this project is carried out over the full span of almost half a millennium covered by the book would be rather a lengthy business. As an example, however, let us look at Abe's treatment of the very beginnings of some sort of Buddhist presence in Chinese material culture, a topic addressed in his second chapter (the first is effectively a short introduction to the work as a whole), entitled 'Small Beginnings'. Here right from the start the scholar has to deal not simply with a dearth of texts but also with considerable uncertainties as to their reliability. On pp. 13-14, for example, some researchers might prefer not to adduce the Scripture in Forty-two Sections as evidence for Chinese Buddhism in the second century CE, especially when reliable evidence for its existence only emerges two centuries later, and when an apparent second-century quotation from the text can be explained in other ways - as is done on p. 83 of the anonymous article on the dating of this text reprinted in Zhang Mantao, ed., Xiandai Fojiao xueshu congkan II (Taipei 1979), pp.69-84. Similarly, in the annotation (p.320, n.9) to p.13, it may eventually turn out to be inappropriate to assume that in 166 CE it was the Yellow Emperor and Laozi who were being conjointly worshipped with the Buddha - as is done here apparently on the grounds that the two Chinese sages were linked more than three centuries earlier at the start of the dynasty - and perhaps rather better to write, as on p.14 with reference to the earlier joint worship of the Buddha in 65 CE, that the Chinese counterpart of the imported figure was 'Huang-Lao', i.e. literally 'Yellow-Old'. To judge from some of the overtones of the word 'yellow' during this era, one possible interpretation of this compound might be that the now divinised Laozi (an advance in status certainly well attested for the second century CE, as Anna Seidel showed in her 1969 EPEO
monograph) was regarded as a ruler over what had earlier been known as the Yellow Springs, the world of the dead.

This alternative analysis may be of some relevance to Abe’s subsequent discussion of very early images of the Buddha that occur in funerary contexts, especially in what was then the southwest of China, present-day Sichuan. How Sichuan may have been in contact with the Buddhist world is something of a puzzle, though a trade route to India via Yunnan to the south had attracted attention earlier in the dynasty, as is well known from the Shi ji, 129, presented in English e.g. in Jeanette Mirsky, ed., The Great Chinese Travelers (Chicago 1964), pp.19-20. The same source (Mirsky, p.18), however, also points out that the Yuezhi people, who were instrumental in establishing the Kushan empire after migrating west from the borders of China, left behind some of their kin in the neighbourhood of present-day Xining, Gansu. They seem to have retained a somewhat separate identity even in the second century CE, to judge from the materials noted in Miyakawa Hisayuki, Chūgoku shūkyōshi kenkyū (Kyoto 1983), pp.117-18, and Rafe de Cresigny, To Establish Peace I (Canberra 1996), p.9, n.27, and could have been responsible for carrying trade and maybe new beliefs from the Kushan empire on to the south. Alternatively, some would see Buddha images as related to the arrival of coinage – thus for example Huiyi, ‘Fo yu qian de yinyuan’, Fojiao wenhua, 1993.1, pp.28-9. As an argument against this hypothesis it is certainly true to state that none of the Kushan coins bearing a Buddha image has been found in China, as Abe quite understandably points out (p.100). But startlingly enough, Chinese lead ingots bearing clumsy imitations of the Greek script of Bactrian (perhaps early Kushan) coins dating to a period covering the first century BCE to the first century CE equally certainly have been found, and are now published in Annette L. Juliano and Judith A. Lerner, Monks and Merchants (New York 2001), p.37. This discovery illustrates better than most examples the rather random state of our knowledge at this point in the development of Chinese archaeology, which remains as yet quite unsystematic, and the subsequent uncertainties of a situation in which an argumentum ex silentio is often the only one available.

In the light of such disadvantages, Abe’s own preference is, commendably enough, to be cautious and to view the Buddha images of Sichuan on the walls of tombs or on funerary objects known as ‘money trees’ simply as performing a rather generalised function, perhaps of an apotropaic nature, that may reflect little or no firsthand knowledge of the Buddhist religion at all. He is particularly hesitant to accept the recent hypothesis of Wu Hung who, in part as a result of the passages linking the two already noted above, sees the Buddha as substituting for Laozi in an originally aniconic Celestial Master form of proto-Taoism. Wu Hung’s arguments, while subtle, certainly seem to assume a degree of unity in Sichuanese proto-Taoism in the second century CE that is rather undermined by Anna Seidel’s work also alluded to above, in which the Lau bianhua jing, a prime piece of evidence for Laozi’s divinisation, is shown to stem from another and evidently quite distinct Laozi worshipping group active in Sichuan at the same time as the early Celestial Masters. And Abe does stress that the ‘money tree’ objects show a confusing selection of alternative figures, primarily either a bear or the popular contemporary high goddess, the Queen Mother of the West, in slightly different positions. The Buddha image, it seems, equates in its position with the bear a mere guardian figure if ever there was one, since there are no high bear gods in China.

This may, however, be a slightly misleading way to look at the problem, if the aniconic alternative to the Queen Mother of the West was perhaps being represented either by an agent or by a foreign avatar. And Abe’s observation (pp.47-8, 49) that the Buddha seems never to occur together with the Queen of the West has a curious echo in an overlooked textual source making a distinction with regard to their different jurisdictions between the Queen and another figure, namely the well-known compilation by Zhang Hua (ed. Fan Ning) Bowu zhi jiaozhu 9 (Beijing 1980), p.104: ‘Laozi says the ten thousand people all belong to the Queen Mother of the West; only the fates of kings, sages, true men, immortals, and men of the Way belong above to the Lord of the Nine Heavens.’ If we wish to regard the bear as an agent of this more powerful figure, then there is certainly second century CE evidence that has been interpreted to mean that the envoy of the god of the dead, as Anna Seidel noted with regard to the identification made by Hayashi Minao cited on p.698 of her 1987 study of religion in Han tombs, may have an ursine
appearance. As for the Buddha as Lord of the Dead, in 1949, long before any archaeological evidence was uncovered, the Chinese historian Chen Yinke penned a note in his *Jinming gao congkao erbian* (Shanghai 1980), p.82, in which he interpreted a reference in *San Guo zhi* 12 (p.388 in the Beijing edition) as indicating that that was precisely the status of the Buddha for at least some ordinary believers of the third century CE. Though this evidence requires careful reconsideration, it does provisionally suggest that despite Abe's reservations, Wu Hung may at least be on the right track with his hypothesis, and that it might have some merit in a modified form.

Of course, Abe is in all likelihood more than fully justified in his caution at other points, as for example when he goes on in the same chapter to examine the apparently rather trivial Buddhas decorating the so-called hunping funerary jars from further east in China. His treatment in the subsequent chapters of the puzzling steles of fifth century northwest China, and of what has been seen as the 'Buddho-Taoist' art of the Northern Wei, certainly takes us into periods when at least some people, even if only a few monks, knew much more precisely what Buddhism was all about, and which do not entail quite the same degree of puzzlement when it comes to relating religion to material evidence. But by exploring some of the complexities involved in studying the 'Small Beginnings' of Chinese Buddhism, I hope I have indicated both the scale of the problems that Stanley Abe has taken on, and the outstanding value of his consistently careful and astute scholarship. Any future researchers who care to venture into this very challenging academic territory will most assuredly learn a very great deal from this volume, even should they not end up agreeing with its author at every single point.

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(SOAS)