UDĀNAVARGA

Chapter IX

KARMAVARGA - Karma

1. A man who has transgressed against even a single rule, whose words are false and who scorns the other world - there is no crime he does not commit.

2. It is better to swallow an iron ball as burning hot as flaming fire than to live immoral and unrestrained, dependent upon [public] charity.

3. If you fear suffering, if suffering is hateful to you, do not commit any bad actions, either in public or in private.

4. If you are to commit or if you do commit bad actions you cannot escape from suffering, even if you take flight in the air.

5. Neither in the air, nor in mid-ocean, nor in the depths of mountains, nowhere on earth is there a place where one can dwell without being pursued by bad actions [karma].

6. If, in this world, having seen another's bad action, you censure him, you must not commit such yourself; (since men) are bound by their actions.

7. By giving a wrong measure or committing an action contrary to the law, one does harm to men. By using dishonest means, one falls into the precipice oneself. Indeed, all men are bound by their actions.

8. Of all his actions, good or bad, man is the inheritor; for an action does not vanish.

9. A man steals as long as it profits him; then others steal from him; and so it is he who is stolen from.

10. While committing (a misdeed), the fool thinks, 'That will not catch up with me.' However, in the other world, he learns the destiny of wrong-doers.
11. While committing (a misdeed), the fool thinks, 'That will not catch up with me.' However, subsequently, he tastes bitterness when he experiences the consequence.

12. If, when committing bad actions, the fool does not become aware of what he does, the stupid man is burned by his own actions as if by fire.

13. The foolish, whose wisdom is false, behave towards each other as towards enemies, committing bad action which is a fruit filled with bitterness.

14. Action is done without wisdom when, having done it, one is tormented and it is with weeping, one's face bathed in tears, that one reaps its fruit.

15. However, action is done with wisdom when, having done it, one is not tormented and it is with delight, one's heart full of joy, that one reaps its fruit.

16. It is with laughter that they commit a bad action, those who seek happiness; it is with tears, overcome by suffering, that they acquire its fruit.

17. A bad action, once committed, is like fresh milk: it does not curdle immediately; it is with a (gentle) flame that it pursues the fool, like a fire under ashes.

18. A bad action, once committed, does not cut immediately, as does a new sword. On the contrary, it is in the other world that one learns of the destiny of wrong-doers; it is later that one tastes the bitterness, when reaping the fruit.

19. Rust is created by iron and ceaselessly, once created, consumes it; it is in this way that the man of impure conduct is led by his own actions to the 'fateful way' (hell).

(Translated by Sara Boin-Webb from the French of R.P. Chakravarti)

The Samskrātāsamskrātavibhāga-viniścaya of Daśabalaśrimitra

Peter Skilling

The Samskrātāsamskrātavibhāga-viniścaya-nāma (henceforth referred to as Sav) of Daśabalaśrimitra is a work contained in the Nga mtshar bstan bcos (*Adhuta-dāstra) section of the Mdo 'grel (*Śūtra-tāka) division of the Peking edition of the Tibetan Bstan 'gyur (P 5865 vol.146) under the Tibetan title 'Dus byas dang 'dus ma byas rnam pa nges pa shes bya ba. In English, the title may be rendered as 'An Analysis of the Conditioned and the Unconditioned'. As the original Sanskrit text is lost and there is no known Chinese translation, the text is available only in Tibetan. The Sav is a wide-ranging treatment of the universe – cosmogony and cosmology, the nature of being, psychology and philosophy, and of the nature of spirituality, methods and attainments, according to a number of Buddhist schools and teachers, both of the Śrāvakayāna and the Mahāyāna. The following study proposes to demonstrate that the Sav possesses several unique features that render it worthy of detailed attention.

Structure of the text

The Sav takes up 106 pages of the reprint edition of the Tibetan Tripitaka, or 526 blockprint pages. It opens with two introductory verses of four lines each. In the first verse, the author states that he bows down to the Omniscient One, the Glorious One (the Buddha), who, having understood by and for himself all phenomena in all their diversity, teaches them to sentient beings in accordance with his realization. In the second verse he states that the Sage (muni, the Buddha) summarized phenomena as consisting of the conditioned (samskṛta) and the unconditioned (unconditioned (unconditioned), and that he, the author, will explain them as an aid to memory.

The body of the text is divided into thirty-five chapters; these, with tentative reconstructions of the Sanskrit titles and English translation are as follows (the headings are my own):

A. The Conditioned and the Unconditioned

1. Samskrātāsamskrātavibhāga-viniścaya: An analysis of the dif-
ferences between the conditioned and the unconditioned (4.3.4. - 4.5.6)

B. The Conditioned

B. 1. According to the general Vaibhāṣīka tradition

2. Neta-viniścaya: An analysis of causes (4.5.6 - 5.3.1)
3. śhājana-loka-viniścaya: An analysis of the environment, the 'receptacle universe' (5.3.1. - 7.2.4)
4. Sattva-loka-viniścaya: An analysis of the world of sentient beings (7.2.4. - 9.2.2)
5. Rūpa-kāla-viniścaya: An analysis of matter and time (9.2.3 - 9.3.8)
6. Kāya-āyuḥ-viniścaya: An analysis of physical dimensions and life-spans (9.3.8 - 10.2.7)
7. Anavabhāṣagata-sattva-viniścaya: An analysis of microscopic beings (10.2.7 - 10.5.3)
8. Kalpa-viniścaya: An analysis of the aeon (10.5.3 - 19.3.6)
9. Skandha-āyatana-dhātu-viniścaya: An analysis of aggregates, bases and elements (19.3.6 - 24.2.6)
10. Pratītyasamutpāda-viniścaya: An analysis of dependent arising (24.2.6 - 32.1.7)
11. Ārya-loka-viniścaya: An analysis of the realm of the noble (32.1.7 - 33.3.4)
12. Catur-ārya-satya-viniścaya: An analysis of the Four Noble Truths (33.3.4 - 38.3.3)

B. 2. According to the Sthavira school

13. Sthavira-nikāya-nāyaga-skandha-āyatana-dhātu-viniścaya: An analysis of the aggregates, bases and elements according to the Sthavira school (38.3.3 - 41.4.7)
14. Sthavira-nikāya-nāyaga-pratītyasamutpāda-viniścaya: An analysis of dependent arising according to the Sthavira school (41.4.7 - 44.4.4)
15. Ārya-sthavira-nikāya-nāyaga-ārya-satya-kausāya-viniścaya: An analysis of skilful understanding of the Noble Truths according to the Ārya-Sthavira school (44.4.4 - 53.1.3)

B. 3. According to the Sāmaññiya school

16. Ārya-sāmaññiya-nikāya-āgama-nāyaga-anuśaya-viniścaya: An analysis of non-latent mental states according to the tradition of the Ārya-Sāmaññiya school (53.1.3 - 57.1.3)
17. Ārya-sāmaññiya-nikāya-āgama-nāyaga-anuśaya-viniścaya: An analysis of latent tendencies according to the tradition of the Ārya-Sāmaññiya school (57.1.3 - 58.3.8)
18. Sāmaññiya-nikāya-āgama-nāyaga-apuṇga-viniścaya: An analysis of the unwholesome according to the tradition of the Sāmaññiya school (58.3.8 - 61.3.6)
19. Puṇya-viniścaya: An analysis of the wholesome according to the Sāmaññiya school (61.3.6 - 63.3.3)
20. Ānihya-viniścaya: An analysis of undeflectable action according to the Sāmaññiya school (63.3.3 - 64.1.8)
21. Ārya-sāmaññiya-nikāya-āgama-nāyaga-ārya-satyā-viniścaya: An analysis of the Noble Truths according to the tradition of the Ārya-Sāmaññiya school (64.1.8 - 72.1.8)

B. 4. The Mahāyāna

22. Pāramitā-viniścaya: An analysis of the perfections (72.1.8 - 76.3.8)
23. Bodhisattva-mārga-viniścaya: An analysis of the Bodhisattva Path (76.3.8 - 79.5.2)
24. Bodhisattva-nāyag-pudgala-viniścaya: An analysis of individuals according to the Bodhisattva Vehicle (79.5.2 - 84.3.1)
25. Bodhisattva-nāyag-mārga-viniścaya: An analysis of the path according to the Bodhisattva Vehicle (84.3.1 - 88.1.8)
26. Bodhisattva-nāyag-bodhicittotpāda-viniścaya: An analysis of the generation of the aspiration to enlightenment according to the Bodhisattva Vehicle (88.1.8 - 90.1.2)
27. Bodhisattva-nāyag-prajñāpāramitā-artha-bhāvanā-viniścaya: An analysis of the cultivation of the meaning of the perfection of wisdom according to the Bodhisattva Vehicle (90.1.2 - 99.2.4)
28. Bodhisattva-nāyag-anāsārava-dharma-viniścaya: An analysis of pure states according to the Bodhisattva Vehicle (99.2.5 - 102.3.6)
29. Nānā-sūtra-bhāṣita-tathāgata-guṇa-viniścaya: An analysis of the qualities of the Tathāgata as taught in various discourses (102.3.6 - 103.1.5)
30. Buddha-kāya-laksana-anuvyāpajjana-vinīścaya: An analysis of the major and minor physical characteristics of a Buddha (103.1.5 - 104.4.5)
31. Tathāgata-pravacana-vinīścaya: An analysis of the teaching of the Tathāgata (104.4.5 - 105.3.8)
32. Upāya-kauśalya-vinīścaya: An analysis of skilful means (105.3.8 - 107.3.7)
33. Pravacana-vinīścaya: An analysis of the sacred teaching (107.3.7 - 108.5.8)
34. Netu-phala-paropakāra-vinīścaya: An analysis (of a Tathāgata's endowments) of cause, fruition and benefiting others (108.5.8 - 109.5.1)

C. The Unconditioned
35. Asamkrta-vinīścaya: An analysis of the unconditioned (109.5.1 - 110.1.6)

Conclusion: Verses on the nature of the work and the reasons for composing it (110.1.6 - 110.3.3)

Thus the first chapter deals with both the conditioned and the unconditioned (in fact in the form of a mārkā, similar to those of the Dhammasāgāṇi and other early Abhidharm texts), while the last chapter deals with the unconditioned alone. The bulk of the work deals with various aspects of the conditioned as related to the spiritual path, Chapters 2 to 21 largely according to the Śrāvakayāna, and Chapters 22 to 34 largely according to the Bodhisattvayāna.

In structure the Sav may be compared with the lam rim or 'graded teaching' literature that became popular in Tibet. Starting with the basis of existence - an analysis of world, body and mind - it goes on to describe the spiritual paths and their fruits, first according to the Vehicle of the Disciples (śrāvakā), then according to the Bodhisattva Vehicle; after devoting several chapters to various aspects of Buddhahood, the goal of the latter vehicle, it concludes with a chapter on the unconditioned, the goal of both vehicles.

Sources of the Sav
Dasabalaśrīmitra displays a vast knowledge of the texts and traditions of a variety of schools:

1. Abhidharmakośa: In Chapters 2 to 12, Dasabalaśrīmitra relies mainly on the Abhidharmakośa of Ācārya Vasubandhu; for example, the third chapter, 'An analysis of the environment', summarizes the Kosa and cites a number of its verses. Numerous other quotations from or paraphrases of the Kośa, which is cited by name at 38.2.7 ( = Kośa 2:44b) and 107.5.7 ( = Kośa 1:25a, b), occur throughout the work. Some teachings, however, are drawn from sources other than the Kośa: Chapter 7, 'An analysis of microscopic beings', opens with the statement that 'microscopic beings are not discussed in the Abhidharmakośa...'.

2. The Sthaviras and the Vimuktimarga: Chapters 13 to 15 constitute an abbreviated but extensive citation of the Vimuktimarga, generally held to be a manual of the Abhayagiri sub-school of the Sthaviraśāna; the source, however, is not named but simply described as 'the Āgama of the Ārya-Sthavira-nikāya'. The Vimuktimarga of Upatiṣya, lost in the original Pali or Sanskrit, is preserved in full in Chinese translation. Two other passages from the same work are also found in the Sav: the concordance between these citations and the Chinese Vimuktimarga is as follows (references are to the English translation):
- Sav ch.13 = Vimuktimarga ch.11, section 1, pp.237-59
- Sav ch.14 = Vimuktimarga ch.11, section 1, pp.259-68
- Sav ch.15 = Vimuktimarga ch.11, section 2, pp.269-82 (ch.12, section 1 omitted); ch. 12, section 2, pp.301-26
- Sav 73.2.2 - 73.4.4 = Vimuktimarga p.6, cf. also p.10
- Sav 73.5.4 - 75.3.1 = Vimuktimarga ch.10, pp.229-36, complete citation.

The Sav presents ten other views or interpretations of the Ārya-Sthaviras:
- 9.3.3 - 9.3.4: the length of the dhanu, krośa, gagāyuti and yojana (in verse);
- 11.5.1 - 11.5.5: the sixty-four destructions (samvartanī) of the universe by fire, water and wind;
- 12.3.6 - 12.3.7: the maximum life-span is unlimited;
- 17.1.7 - 17.2.1: definition of the 'lesser' and 'greater' incalculable aeons (asamkhya-kalpa);
- 17.3.4 - 18.3.6: the Buddhas revered by Śākyamuni as a bodhisattva during twenty great incalculable aeons plus 100,000 (lesser)
aeons: the future Buddha Ajita-Maitreya (18.2.8); the three types of individual (pudga): dominant in faith, in energy and in wisdom (Pali saddhādhi, viriṇḍhi and paññādhi, 18.3.2).

18.5.5 - 19.1.5: the seven jewels (saṃkrāta) of a universal emperor (akravartin); the ten species of elephant (basti-kula); the four species of horse (āvī-kula); the six types of universal emperor who go to the heavens (deva-loka-gāmin);

19.2.5: five Buddhas arise in an 'Auspicious Aeon' (bhada-kalpa);

19.3.2 - 19.3.5: the five types of aeon in which Buddhas appear (sūra, manda, vara, sāramanda, bhada);

77.4.8 - 77.5.3: the five levels of meditation (dhyāṇa);

108.4.8 - 108.5.7: where Śākyamuni spent the eighty years and vargas of his life.

Although most of these theories are found, at least in part, in the Atthakathā and still later works of the Mahāvihāravāsins. I have not been able to find their exact counterparts, except in the case of a verse summary of the sixty-four destructions (Sav 11.5.4), which corresponds perfectly to a verse of the Abhidhammatthavibhāvīṇī.

3. The Śāntaniyās: Chapters 16 to 21 are citations of an undefined and unnamed work or works of the Śāntaniyā school, again described as Agama, but again in abbreviated but extensive form. That they are direct citations from the works of that school is proved by the fact that they are replete with verse summaries (uddāna) of the topics discussed and with quotations from a number of discourses. Several other tenets of the Śāntaniyās are given elsewhere in the Sav:

12.4.3: cosmogony and cosmology;

17.2.1: the number of Buddhas revered by Śākyamuni during the three incalculable aeons of his bodhisattva career;

19.2.5: 500 Buddhas arise in an 'Auspicious Aeon';

106.4.7: the sixteen past negative deeds ('phar ba = karmaploti?) of Śākyamuni which produced their fruits in his last existence.

4. The Mahāyāna: Chapter 22 opens the presentation of the philosophy of the Mahāyāna, to which the bulk of the remainder of the text is devoted. These chapters draw frequently and extensively on the Abhidharmaśāntamuccaya of Ārya Asaṅga. For example, Chapters 24 and 25, on types of individuals and the spiritual paths, follow

the Prāptiviniścaya of that text closely; in some places it is summarized, while in others it is supplemented by commentarial material drawn largely from the Abhidharmaśāntamuccaya-bhāṣya. Both these works are cited or summarized throughout the text; the Abhidharmaśāntamuccaya is referred to by name in connection with the following topics:

23.3.4 the cittāvīryāyukta-samkāra;

86.3.6 the fivefold analysis of the thirty-seven bodhipāca-dharma;

93.4.5 antagrāha-dratī;

107.3.2 the twelve aṅga, the Tripiṭaka and the 84,000 dharmakāndhas.

A number of passages demonstrate that in his exegesis of the Prajñāpāramitā Daśabalaśrīmitra followed the classifications of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, such as the twenty-two aspects of the bodhicitta (88.5.6f. = Abhisamayālaṃkāra 1:20-21), the twenty-seven karmas of a Buddha (97.3.1f. = ib. 8:34-40), and the twenty-one types of anāśrama-dharma that constitute the dharma-kāya (99.2.5f. = ib. 8:2-6). Daśabalaśrīmitra gives two sets of definitions of the twenty-seven karmas, the first from a source I have not been able to trace, the second, attributed to others (gshen dag, 98.5.5f.) very close to Haribhadra’s Abhisamayālaṃkāroloka. From this it appears that Daśabalaśrīmitra belonged to a different school of interpretation than that of Haribhadra, active c. 800 A.C. The references to Ārya Vimalakīrti (see below), the earliest commentator on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra (c. sixth century) show that Daśabalaśrīmitra had studied this literature widely.

Several categories given in the Sav resemble those of Asaṅga’s Bodhisattvabhūmi, for example the four dhāraṇī (79.4.2 - Bodhisattvabhūmi, ed. N. Dutt, Patna 1978, p.185) and the four pārśajika of a Bodhisattva (29.4.1 = ib. p.108) and of the Sūtrakārika - for example the three reasons for the order of the pārśajika (79.4.2 = Sūtrakārika 16:14), but may also be found in other texts. There are numerous other citations or explanations that I have not yet traced; hopefully further research will throw light on the sources employed by Daśabalaśrīmitra and the school or tradition that he followed.

5. Vinaya: In his outline of the eight classes of monastic offen-
ces (āpatti, 28.4.5f.), Daśabalaśrīmitra mentions ninety-two pāyantika-dharma and 'over fifty' āṣika-dharma; unfortunately he does not list them. Of the Prātimokṣa known to us, those of the Thera-vādins and the Mahāsāṃghikas (the latter in both Sanskrit and Chinese versions) list ninety-two pāyantika-dharma - the Sarvāstivāda and Mūlasarvāstivāda have ninety only 4 - while the Mahāsāṃghikas alone refer to 'over fifty' āṣika-dharma 5, giving sixty-seven in the Sanskrit text and sixty-six in the Chinese translation. Other schools list from seventy-five to an hundred and thirteen 6. From this it seems likely that Daśabalaśrīmitra is referring to the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya, and may have been ordained in that tradition 7.

6. Other sources cited by name

6.a. Texts, Śrāvakayāna

Āgulysaṃgrahastūra 83.1.4
Abhidharma 21.3.4
Parinirvāṇasūtra 109.4.1 (cf. Dīghanikāya ii 156)
Vinayagrantha 29.1.3
Vibhāgastūra 83.2.1
Vibhāga 38.2.7
Sūtra 109.5.8

6.b. Texts, Mahāyāna

Acintyabhāvavijñānaniśatā 92.3.2
Avalokiteśvarasūtra 94.4.1
(Arya-)Gandavyūhasūtra 88.5.1
Catudharmakosastūra 30.3.2
Tathāgataguhyaśāstra 104.5.3
(Arya-)Dharmajāvarajānasūtra 101.1.1, 101.3.4
Pārvavājītatāvahārikārāgrantha 34.2.3, 90.4.5
(Arya-)Buddhabhūmisūtra 97.3.4
Bhagavatī 91.4.7
Bhadraśālikasūtra 19.2.6
Mahābhagavatī 96.4.2, 99.2.5
Mūlamadhyamaka 92.3.8 (= Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 25:19-20)
*Rājāvādaraśtrāvalīvivaraṇa 96.5.1
(Arya-)Rājāvādaraśtrākasūtra 88.4.2
(Arya-)Laṅkāvatārasūtra 96.2.7

From the above it is evident that the Sau is a compendium of summaries, paraphrases and direct citations of a large number of works of the Vaibhāṣikas, the Sautrāntikas, the Sāṃmatiyas and the Mahāyāna, and thus contains little if any original material: Daśabalaśrīmitra's task was that of presentation, selection and arrangement. As far as can be ascertained his presentation is extremely if not totally reliable. This is easily confirmed in the case of well-known and available works such as the Kośa and the Abhidharmasamuccaya, as well as in the case of the Vinuktiśāstra, since the Sau quotations agree very closely with the Chinese version. The views of the Sāṃmatiyas are difficult to confirm owing to the non-availability of their major works; however, a number of the passages cited in the Sau agree with and clarify Sāṃmatiya tenets presented in the various compendia of tenets such as the Kathavatthu of the Mahāvihāravāsin Therāvādins, the Sāmaññaphalaparacananakrama of Vasumitra, the Nikāyabheda-vaibhāṣikābhyaśaṇa of Bhavya and the Sāmaññaphalaparacananakramaṇa-kāśyaphaladaparāsananāmāsangaha of Vinitadeva. Furthermore, the general accuracy of the Sau and the fact that Daśabalaśrīmitra cites the texts of that school directly lead to the conclusion that here too he should be reliable.
Authorship and date

The author of the Sav is given as Daśabalaśrimitra (Tibetan Stobs bcu dpal bshes gnyen); in the colophons to the chapters he is invariably described as the 'great authority' (manāpandita) and occasionally as the 'senior monk' (sthavira-bhikṣu), the 'great senior monk' and the 'Śākyan monk'. No other works are attributed to him in the Peking edition of the Bstan 'gyur, and to the best of my knowledge he is not mentioned in any Sanskrit sources. A common method of obtaining an upper date for a text is from the date of its translation into another language; here, however, we are unfortunately left in the dark: the name of the translator or translators, commonly provided in the colophons of Tibetan works, is not given. The Sav is not listed in the catalogue of works translated into Tibetan during the reign of King Khri srong lde bstan (second half of the eighth century), nor in the similar catalogue compiled by Bu ston in the first half of the fourteenth century. At the end of the first chapter, Daśabalaśrimitra cites a verse of four lines that corresponds to the first verse of Jitārī's Sugatamavitahāṇāgakārikā (P 5867 vol.146). This may be the latest source utilized by Daśabalaśrimitra: however, as many of the verses of the Sugatamavitahāṇa are identical to those of the (later) Aryadeva's Jñānasārasamuccaya, and as there may have been two Jitāris, one living about 800 and the other about 1000 A.C., the citation is inconclusive. Thus it is difficult to establish where and when Daśabalaśrimitra lived; however, the evidence listed below suggests North-eastern India of the Sena period (twelfth-thirteenth centuries A.C.), more or less the final phase of Buddhism in that area.

1. The Blue Annals, compiled by 'Gos lo tsā ba gzhon nu dpal between 1476 and 1478, refers twice to a Daśabalaśri. a) The first reference is found in the account of the life and works of Stengs pa lo tsā ba tsul khrims 'byung gnas (Śilākara, born in Tibet in 1107), 'whose benefit was great for the Lineage of the Recitation of the Sūtras in Tibet'. Śilākara made three visits to India; during the first he spent over ten years in Magadhā, including some time at Vajrāsana (Rohā Gaya); during the second he 'studied extensively the Tantras and Sūtras under thirteen scholars', including a Daśabalaśri, before returning to Tibet with 'many man-loads of Indian books', where he made numerous translations and revised existing translations, including commentaries on the Vinaya and the Prajñāpāramitā/Abhisamayālaṃkāra, plus the Jātakamālā of Āryāvīra and a Kālacakra. On his third visit to India he studied the Mahāvībhāṣa for three years; returning to Tibet with the Sanskrit text, he began a translation, 'but after finishing two thirds of the text, the pāṇḍita passed away' in 1190 A.C.

2. Tāranātha, the sixteenth century Tibetan scholar and historian, refers to a Daśabalaśri in two of his works: a) In his Egya dar chos 'byung, or History of Buddhism in India, he states that during the Sena period the Dharma was nourished by many scholars and saddhas like Subhākaragupta, Raviśrījāna, Nāyakaśīla, Daśabalaśri, Vīkhyātadeva, Śībhadra, Lalitavajra, Dharmakarṣa, Ratnakara, Padmavajra, Ratnakṛṣṭa, Buddhaghoṣa, Vanaratna. The last named was a great pāṇḍita from Eastern India who was active in the fifteenth century; he bestowed many initiations in Tibet, including some on 'Gos lo tsā bā himself'.

b) In his Bka' babs bdun ldan, or Seven Instruction Lineages, he refers to a lineage of the upattikrama consisting of Ratnakaragupta, Abhayakara, Subhākaragupta, Daśabalaśri, Vajraśri, Dharmanāthaśri, Buddhaśri, Ratnakṛṣṭa and Ratigupta, and to a lineage of the 'word tradition', Abhayakaragupta, Subhākaragupta, Daśabalaśri and Vīkhyātideva. At the end of the first lineage he states that 'a more lengthy account of this period between the Śākyas is not dealt with elsewhere.'
It is clear from the lineages that Daśabala and Daśabalaśrī refer to the same individual.

3. A Sanskrit verse inscription recovered from the latest stratum of monastery No.vii at Nalanda mentions an ascetic (yati) named Karuṇāśrīmitra who dwelt at Somapura (Somapuramahāvihāra, the ruins of which have been located at Paharpur in Bangladesh) and then lists a line of succession consisting of Mañjriśrīmitra, Aśokāśrīmitra and Vipulāśrīmitra. The last named is said to have performed a number of meritorious works such as repairing and rebuilding monasteries and temples: at Somapura he built a temple of Tārā and at an unspecified place he built a monastery and dedicated it to the mitras. N.G. Majumdar, the original editor of the inscription, feels that the mitras were the line of ascetics to which Vipulāśrīmitra belonged and that the monastery in question was monastery No.vii at Nalanda. The inscription has been dated on paleographic grounds to the first half of the twelfth century A.C.16

4. A stone inscription from Bodh Gaya of Gāhāvāla Jayacandra of Kanauj (ruled from 1170), assigned to the late twelfth century, opens with an invocation to the Buddha, the Bodhisattvas and the royal guru, a monk named Śrīmitra. It records the construction of a cave at Jayapura with images of Tārā, Ugratārā and Dattatāra.17

The evidence given above falls naturally into two groups: items 1 and 2, and items 3 and 4. Firstly, it seems clear that the Daśabalaśrī of 'Gos lo tsā ba's two references is the same as the one in Tārānātha's lineages and is likely to be none other than Daśabalaśrīmitra. Secondly, item 3 establishes the existence of a mitra lineage active in Eastern India - at least at Nalanda and the Somapuramahāvihāra - in the first half of the twelfth century. Item 4 mentions a royal guru named Śrīmitra resident at Bodh Gaya, not far from Nalanda, in the late twelfth century; because of the similarity of names this royal guru could well have belonged to the mitra lineage. It is probable that Daśabalaśrīmitra was also connected with this lineage and at least possible that he was the Śrīmitra of Jayacandra's inscription: the date accords with that provided by items 1, 2 and 3 and, from the epigraph displayed in his only known work, he was certainly worthy of the position of royal guru.18

(It should be noted that although the Sav makes no mention whatsoever of Tantra or the Vajrayāna, this by no means precludes Daśabalaśrīmitra from being a Tantric master. From the Pāla period onwards, many of the great teachers of the Madhyama-Yoga were also Tantrics: the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra provide the philosophical basis, the Vajrayāna the praxis. When composing works dealing with the Madhyamaka or Yogācāra, however, they would restrict themselves to the subject at hand, and make no mention of Tantra.)

In summary, it seems probable that Daśabalaśrīmitra, possibly ordained in the Mahāyāna tradition, was a master of uṣṇīṣa and śāstra, of Pāramitayāna and Vajrayāna, who lived in Northeastern India about the second half of the twelfth century; that he belonged to the mitra lineage, may have been appointed royal guru by Jayacandra of Kanauj and may have resided or spent some time at Bodh Gaya. Furthermore, it is at least possible that the Sanskrit text of the Sav was brought from India to Tibet by Śīlākara, who studied under Daśabala and may even have translated the text: the quality of the translation of the Sav reveals the hand of an experienced translator familiar with a broad range of material, as was Śīlākara.19

From Tārānātha's remarks on the absence of materials on the scholars and siddhas of the period and lineages that include Daśabalaśrī(-mitra), there does not appear to be much hope of discovering an extensive Žman Thar of him among Tibetan sources.

A late dating for the text under discussion is likely because of the fact that the later period of Buddhism in India was characterized by syncretism: while little that was original was produced, the teachings of the different schools were refined, studied together and interpreted harmoniously. As may be seen from the sources of the Sav, it is a highly syncretistic work characteristic of the period. Furthermore, there is ample evidence that during this period Daśabalaśrīmitra could have had direct access to the teachings of the Sthavira school, particularly at Bodh Gaya or Vajrāśana where, according to the testimony of Husan-tsang20, of Tārānātha21, of the Tibetan pilgrim Dharmavāmin22, and of inscriptions23, the Sinhalese and other Śrāvakas were important and at times dominant up to the thirteenth century.
According to Tāranātha, the Śrāvakas also wielded considerable influence at Odantapurī during the late Pāla period. The Vīmuktimārga, Daśabalaśīrimitra's main source for the Stāhvīra teachings, was in all probability a manual of the Abhayagiri school of Sri Lanka; according to Sinhalese tradition this school was united with the Mahāvihāra school by King Parākramabāhu I of Polonnaruva in the second half of the twelfth century. Even if Daśabalaśīrimitra lived after this reconciliation of the Sinhalese schools, it is unlikely that Parākramabāhu's reforms had much influence on the sub-continent; indeed the Gīlavamsa (78:13) itself states that many monks left Lanka for foreign lands as a direct result of Parākramabāhu's interference in monastic affairs, and it is possible that there was an influx of Abhayagiri and other heterodox monks about the time of Daśabalaśīrimitra. At any rate, the Vīmuktimārga, a profound and practical work, was well-known in the Buddhist world is established by the fact that it was translated into Chinese by Samghapāla, a monk from Funan (a kingdom in the southern region of mainland South-East Asia) in 505 A.C., and that the third chapter was translated independently into Tibetan by Vidyākaraprabha and Dpal brtsegs in the late eighth century under the title of Vīmuktimārgadhutasunānideśa. That the Abhayagiri school had relations with India is proved by the Sinhalese chronicles; its influence outside India is reflected in the Batu Baka inscription from Central Java, dated 792 A.C., which refers to the Abhayagirtvihāra of the Sinhalese.

We have very little hard evidence of the existence of the Sāmātīyas during the Sena period; in fact, considering the importance of the school (see below), it left very few traces of any kind in India itself. Tāranātha refers several times to large numbers of 'Sendha-pa' Śrāvakas residing at Vajrāśana and Odantapurī, from the time of King Dharmapāla (c.800 A.C.) up to the Sena period, when as many as 10,000 assembled for the rains-retreat (varṣaśāsa) at Vajrāśana. Although the significance of 'Sendha-pa' is not clear, the most probable derivation is from the Sanskrit saṁdhava, 'residents of Sindh'; since both Hsūn-tsang and I-Ching state that the Sāmātīyas were predominant in that area, the Sāndhava-śrāvakas could possibly have been Sāmātīyas. Tāranātha also states that two branches of the Sāma-
The Sâmatiyas based their views on essentially the same Sūtra Pitaka as that of other schools. The Sav citations themselves reveal that they had their own highly developed Abhidharma, cosmology and Buddhismology, as did the other known Buddhist schools. Some of their theories betray a decided Sarvāstivāda-Valbhāṣāka influence, while others appear to be unique. Curiously, their fundamental tenet (according to their opponents), the 'heresy' of the existence of the person (pudgala) is not discussed. However, the Sav citations confirm their adherence to a considerable number of the doctrines attributed to them (or to kindred schools like the Viśāputtiyas) by the other schools. Important material on the history of the school is also given. Hence the Sav, as a treasury of lost teachings of the Sâmatiyas, increases our knowledge of that school immensely and hence sheds further light on the philosophical development of Buddhism in general.

The Sav is also important for the study of the Sarvāstivāda school. Although most of the material given by Daśabalaśrīmitra is drawn from the orthodox Valbhāṣāka tradition as presented in the Abhidharmakosa and other works, some of the theories are different. For example, the Sav gives only three varieties of scent: su-, dur- and sama-gandha (19.5.6), as against the usual four, and the lists of forty cittasamprajyukta- (20.1.8f.) and nineteen cittavipragukta-samskāra- (23.3.1f.) are different from those of the Valbhāṣāka, and agree with those given by Candrakīrti in his Pañcaskandhapakaraṇa. The same may be said of the importance of the Sav for the study of the Mahāyāna: although most of the sūtras and śāstras cited by Daśabalaśrīmitra are well-known, it is possible that among the untraced sources there are passages from texts or teachings that are otherwise lost.

In the case of all the traditions mentioned above, the Sav is a significant testament to the state of Buddhist scholasticism during the Sēna period. Although long discredited by scholars, the unfortunate opinion that Buddhism died out in India because it degenerated into a corrupt form of Tantrism still persists. The Sav, both in the quality and variety of its contents, is a clear refutation of this theory: it demonstrates that not only were the Mahāyāna traditions still followed, but that also the teachings of the Sarvāstivāda-Valbhāṣākas, the Sthaviras and the Sâmatiyas were still studied during the twi-

light of Buddhism in India. It may well be that Daśabalaśrīmitra, seeing the destruction of the great monasteries of Northern India and the depletion of the ranks of the Āryasaṅgha, composed the Sav in order to preserve the teachings of a number of schools for posterity; although he does not express such an intention in the colophon to his work, this is in fact what he has done. For this we must be deeply grateful to the great pandita, the great senior monk, the Śākyan monk', Daśabalaśrīmitra.

Notes

Details in square brackets edited by Ed.


2 B. Nanjio A Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripitaka [Oxford 1883], repr. San Francisco 1975, p.129, and Appendix ii p.102. Engl. tr. The Path of Freedom (Vinumitāgga) by Rev. N.R.M. Khara, Soma Thera and Kheminda Thera. Colombo 1961 repr. Kandy 1977. Nanjio reconstructs the translator's name as Sanghabala or Sanghabarman; A. Bureau Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule, Paris 1955, p.242, as Sanghabharā. The other eight translations attributed to him are of Mahāyāna texts, including a Pajñāpārami text and a Dhāraṇī. The original of the Vinumitāgga that he translated has not come down to us. His teacher, the Indian monk Gnanabhāra had visited Śīlalāla and other southern countries, and brought with him copies of various works, but we do not know whether the Vinumitāgga was among them, or whether Sanghabhāra brought it to China from Pusen (his homeland) or from India. Cf. C.P. Malalasekera The Palli Literature of Ceylon, Colombo 1928, p.86 [repr. 1958].


5 The Tibetan of the Sav, lings bca 'byang dang bcas pa, is exactly equivalent to the sūtra saṃskāra of the Mahāsāṅghika text.

6 Olivelle, loc. cit: Prebish, op. cit, p.15.
As will be seen further on, I have come to the conclusion that Daśabalaśrīmitra lived in Northern India during the Sena period. Since Dipamkaraśrījñāna (Atīśa, c.1000 A.C.) took the Mahāsaṃghika ordination at Odantapurī (A. Caitopadhyaya Atīśa and Tibet, Calcutta 1967, pp.372, 378), and since Taranātha notes that during the Sena period Buddhaśrī of Nepal acted as Chakravira of the Mahāsaṃghikas at Vikramaśīla and that Ratnakāśita (also associated with Vikramaśīla) belonged to the Mahāsaṃghika school, it is quite possible that Daśabalaśrīmitra was ordained according to the practice of the school (cf. Taranātha, Tibetan text ed. A. Schiefner, Taranātha's Doctrines Buddhistae in India propagandae narratio [St. Petersburg 1868] repr. Tokyo 1965, p.192; Eng. tr. ed. D. Caitopadhyaya Taranātha's History of Buddhism in India, Calcutta 1980, p.317. Further references to Taranātha will be given by the pages of the Tibetan text/translation).

Taranātha's History... p.93, n.17, quotes S.C. Vidyabhūsana's History of Indian Logic, Calcutta 1921, p.217ff. [repr. Delhi 1971]; see also his History of the Medieval School of Indian Logic, Calcutta 1909, repr. New Delhi 1977, p.79: 'Pandita was a degree which was conferred by the Vikramaśīla university on its successful candidates. It is not known what the university of Nālandā conferred on its distinguished students. Perhaps, in that university too, the title pandita was recognised...'. Since I do not have access to Vidyabhūsana's work, I do not know whether this statement is well-grounded. It does, however, seem likely that pandita was more than a mere epithet during the age of the great universities; perhaps mahāpandita was an even more advanced degree.


Buston's History of Buddhism, Tibetan text ed. Lokesh Chandra, New Delhi 1971, folio 917.5 ff.


ib. pp.800-1. It is interesting that the only reference to the Sav in the Tibetan works available for this study is in the passage in the Blue Annals where 'Gos lo tsa ba names it when citing a passage on the life of the Buddha Blue Annals, p.21 - Sav 108.5.13. This may not be accidental, since 'Gos lo tsa ba was linked to Daśabalaśrī through Varanātha.

Taranātha, pp.191/316 and 191/318-19 where he gives 'Daśabala' only.

The Seven Instruction Lineages (Taranātha's Dka' babs dten Idam), tr. and ed. by D. Templeman, Dharmasāla 1983, pp.xvi, xvi, 65, 73. Although I have been unable to consult the original Tibetan of this text, I have made slight corrections to several of the names, especially from Daśabala and Daśabala to Daśabala. Vikrītideva is probably the same as Śrī Vikhyātideva of the Blue Annals and Taranātha's History... cf. the latter, p.316, n.6.

Epigraphia Indica XXI, No.16, pp.97-101 and plate: H. Saert Nālandā and its Epigraphical Material (Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India No.66), pp.103-5. I have not come across any references to the four mitras of the inscription in the Sanskrit and Tibetan works available to me.


Names ending in 'mitra', for example Vasumitra, were common from at least the start of the Christian era. Names ending in 'śrī', such as Śākya-śrī, Buddha-śrī, Ratna-śrī, Guna-śrī, Dharma-śrī, etc., and names having 'śrī' as the second-last element, such as Virya-śrī-datta, Śākya-śrī-bhadra, Kumāra-śrī-bhadra, Buddha-śrī-śāna, Dipamkara-śrī-śāna, etc., became quite common from the Pāla period onwards; names ending in 'śrīmitra', such as Śāna-śrīmitra, Buddha-śrīmitra, Vinaya-śrīmitra, Tāra-śrīmitra, Upāya-śrīmitra, Sugata-śrīmitra and Kanaka-śrīmitra, also appear from the late Pāla period. In some cases names with similar endings denote a particular lineage of teaching, ordination or esoteric initiation, as in the case of the mitra lineage dealt with here. I have come across a number of possible cases of 'mitra' being dropped from the end of a name in A. Caitopadhyaya Catalogue of Kanjur and Tanjur I, Calcutta 1972: Vinayāśrīmitra (p.69) and Vinayaśrī (p.70): Dharmaśrī
'alias' Dharmasīmitra' (p.437): Jñānaśīmitra with variant Jñānaśīrī in the colophon (p.16). There is also a Kanakāskī of Nepal (p.479), also Khe Hsüan-tsu, (p.382, 384), a Kanakāskīntra of India (p.502) and a Kanakāskī, skinnled in logic (tarka), who composed the Kālandā inscription (cf. n.15). One may note that Atśa is variously referred to as Dpankaśa, Dpankarasāśi, Dpankarāśi, Dpankarajśāna, Dpankarajśāna, Śrīdipankarajśāna, etc. (cf. Aṭṭa and Tibet, op. cit. ch.4).

19 Of the Śrīśātras given in n.18, Vinayā-, Tārā-, Upāya-, Sugas- and Kanakāśītra were all Indian translators who worked in collaboration with Tibetan lo tsā ba; assuming that they belonged to the mitra lineage, it is also possible that one of them translated the Sav.


23 ib., pp.63-4: Epigraphia Indica XII, No.6, p.276.

24 Tāranātha, pp.175/289, 189/315.


26 One may note that Parākramabahu's reconciliation of the Sangha does not appear to have been very successful, since not long after his death King Kārtti Miśākṣa Nālu also claimed in an inscription to have united the three Nikayas' (cf. Epigraphia Zeylanica I. p.134: The Polonnaruwa Period, op. cit., pp.138-9). However, the former's attempte reforms could have made life difficult enough for dissident monks to flee to India, as reported in the Gālavamsa.

27 See above, n.2.

28 Vimbuktimārga Bhutagunanirdeśa, ed. and tr. P.V. Bapat, Bombay 1964. The Tibetan version gives the Sanskrit title in Tibetan transcription, followed by the Tibetan translation Bnem par grol ba'i lam las byangs pa'i yon tan ba pat zhen bya ba: that the compound Sanskrit title, which shows no case endings, was rendered into Tibetan as 'The Exposition of the Qualities of Purification from (lam) the Vimbuktimārga' can only mean that the translators knew that they were dealing with an excerpt of a work named Vimbuktimārga and not an independent text. Otherwise they would have rendered it as 'Qualities of Purification of (lam gyi)' or perhaps 'in' or 'in relation to (lam la) the Path of Liberation', taking the last as common nouns.

29 Cf. R. Gunawardana. 'Buddhist Nikayas in Mediaeval Ceylon', The Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies 9, No.1, p.55f. Encyclopaedia of Buddhism I, Fasc. 1, Colombo 1961, p.21f. Inscriptions, plates inscribed with Mahāyāna texts and dhāranī, icons and archaeological remains clearly demonstrate that Sinhalese Buddhism was strongly influenced by Northern Indian Buddhism during the late Anurādhapura period, roughly equivalent to the Pāla period.

30 H. R. Sarkar, Corpus of the Inscriptions of Java I, Calcutta 1971, No.6(a).

31 Cf. notes 21 and 24.


34 Barea, loc. cit.


38 P 5267 vol.99. [Tr. by Stefan Anacker in Seven Works of Vasubandhu, Delhi 1984.]

Peter Skilling
WHAT DID THE BUDDHA EAT?

John Stevens

"Hunger is the greatest ill, Health the highest gift, Contentment the supreme wealth." — Dhammapada, vv.203-4.

While there have been numerous studies of the Buddha's controversial last meal, little research has been done on his nourishment during his six year period of ascetic quest, the food he took immediately prior to and following his enlightenment, and his regular daily fare. Since the need for nutriment (āhāra), in both its gross and subtle forms, is the basic fact of existence, the Buddha's attitude towards food has profound philosophical and religious implications.

As an Indian prince, the young Gotama enjoyed dishes favoured by the wealthy inhabitants of his time: pluck, a high quality long-grained rice; barley cakes, dairy produce such as ghee, butter and curds; meat, especially beef, goat, fowl and venison; freshwater fish; eggs; a variety of fruits and vegetables; and cereal based beers and liquors. Following his renunciation of the world, however, Gotama assumed the diet of mountain ascetics, i.e. roots, fruit and dry grains.

In his intense desire to attain liberation, Gotama eventually undertook the most rigorous diet of the strictest seekers. In the Buddhacarita (XI, 96), this ultimate fast is described as ekake...kala-tila-randulaih, i.e. one jujube fruit, one sesame seed and one grain of rice a day. Obviously, this miniscule amount of food cannot sustain life indefinitely, and likely was not intended to do so, being a slow form of starvation to purify the body and transform one's being into pure spirit.

After a week of such meagre fare, Gotama was in fact near death but no closer to enlightenment. Thus, he decided to abandon his fruitless reliance on ascetic practices, mental gymnastics and fasting. He would, he declared, take nourishing food to fortify himself and either attain awakening or die in the process.

Although a few texts state that Gotama ate various kinds of food and drink prior to his enlightenment, most accounts iden-
ify the food that restored his health as pāyāsa, rice cooked with milk and mixed with crystal sugar and fragrant spices. The most detailed version of the preparation of this delicious, nutritious dish—a favourite treat of the upper classes as well as the preferred oblation to the gods—occurs in the Nīdānakathā Jātaka.

The wealthy Sujātā wanted to make a special offering to a sacred tree for granting her wish of a good husband and a son as her first-born. She pastured a thousand cows in a nearby grove and collected their milk. She fed the milk to five hundred selected cows and then to two hundred and fifty and so on in halves until the final product was collected from the eight best cows. This process of working the increasingly rich froth in and out greatly enhanced the thickness, sweetness and strength giving properties of the milk. This "cream of the cream" was then mixed with the highest grade rice and boiled. The tale goes on to say that when Sujātā discovered Gotama seated near the site of the sacred tree she offered him the pāyāsa instead. Gotama accepted the milk rice; the life-giving dish sustained him for the next seven weeks—"he drank no water, nor did he relieve himself" over the entire period.

In the palace, Gotama partook of the choicest delicacies: as a mendicant, he had to suppress his disgust and eat whatever scraps were put in his bowl. Later, he nearly fasted to death on an ascetic’s tiny ration but then ate a rich food to restore his physical and mental vigour. That is, Gotama experienced every type of sensation regarding food—ranging from gustatory delight to revulsion and from satiety to starvation—prior to his enlightenment.

Also, Gotama accepted the pāyāsa from a lovely woman, dressed in her finest clothes and accessories, without shying away from her beauty and sexual presence. Furthermore, he did not condemn her use of the best, most costly materials in both the food and the offered bowl. Finally, he ate the food not for himself but for the sake of all beings. All this symbolizes the fact that Gotama's enlightenment was all-embracing, centred in the Middle Way.

The first food that the Buddha received after his great awakening was madhu, honey, and maṇtha, a cake made from parched barley mixed with honey or curds. These high-energy foods were offered to him by two travelling merchants who discovered the Buddha sitting blissfully under the tree.

The main source of information on the daily fare of the Buddha and his monastic disciples is the Vīnaya Piṭaka. There are hundreds of references to food and drink in the Canon; the main points to be noted are as follows.

The Buddha praised the ten advantages of yagū, gruel taken daily as the morning meal. Yagū, he stated, "gives one life, beauty, comfort, strength and intelligence, as well as checking hunger, satisfying thirst, regulating the wind, cleansing the bladder and aiding digestion". Regular yagū was prepared with a large quantity of water and a handful of rice and salt. It was also made with sour milk, curds, fruit, leaves and occasionally meat or fish. (Even today, a type of yagū called kagū forms the basis of a monk’s diet in the Far East.)

The "Five Foodstuffs" (bhajanīya or bhajana) recommended by the Buddha were: (1) odana, boiled rice prepared with ghee, meat, fruit, etc.; (2) saccu, baked grain—e.g., barley, wheat, millet, or gram-flour—taken in the form of small balls or licked as a paste; (3) kuṃāsā, a boiled mixture of barley (or rice) and pulses; (4) maccho, fish; and (5) maṃsa, meat.

It is well known that the Buddha permitted monks and nuns to eat most types of fish and meat provided the food was pure in the "three ways"—i.e., the person had not seen, nor heard, nor had the apprehension that the animal was killed especially for him or her—and that he refused to make vegetarianism compulsory. Raw meat was wisely prohibited because of the health hazards involved as well as the flesh of unhygienic animals such as dogs, snakes, lions, tigers, leopards, bears, and hyenas. Horse and elephant meat was proscribed, presumably because they were royal animals, and human flesh was never to be eaten under any circumstance. (Human flesh was part of the Indian materia medica, and a laywoman once used part of her thigh to make a broth for an ill monk. The Buddha denounced the practice strictly forbidding it thereafter.)

This topic has been extensively covered by many others, and my only comment here will be to relate the following story taken

from the Telovada Jataka. Once the Buddha was served food with meat in it. A (Jain?) ascetic severely criticized the Buddha for eating the meal. The Buddha replied, "Ages ago in a different age, when I was living as a mendicant, a rich man deliberately served me fish. After the meal, the rich man gloated, 'Wicked people kill, cook and eat meat: one who does so is greatly defiled.' To this I countered, 'A wicked man may slaughter his wife and son and offer them as food. But if a pure man eats it, it is no sin.'" The Buddha went on to explain to the ascetic, "The one who takes life is at fault but not the one who eats the flesh: my followers have permission to eat whatever food it is customary to eat in any place or country as long as it is done without gluttony and without evil desire."

All leafy vegetables were permitted as well as lotus root, gourds, cucumbers and aubergines, but garlic and leeks were avoided presumably because of their offensive odour and because they were alleged aphrodisiacs. However, those two vegetables could be taken in case of illness.

Edible fruit mentioned in the Canon includes jackfruit (panasa), breadfruit, palmyra fruit (tala), coconut, mango, rose-apple (jambu) and banana; apparently no fruit was prohibited. Sadavana, a fruit pudding, was singled out as an excellent dish.

Sweet drinks (pana) were recommended by the Buddha for their capacity to refresh and he allowed them to be drunk in the late afternoon as a kind of pick-me-up. Those drinks were made from extracts of the following: mango, rose-apple, banana, honeyfruit tree, waterlily root, grapes and sugar cane.

Food was seasoned with salt - sea, black, kitchen and red - and spices such as pepper, cumin, myrobolan, ginger and turmeric. Mustard and cloves were used as flavourings. Molasses (guda) was an important sweetener and sweet. Sesame cakes were evidently a great favourite of the monks. One bhikkhu was so enamoured of the snack that he has to confess his excessive partiality for it in front of the entire assembly.

Food was primarily cooked in vegetable oil and, in the case of illness, with animal fat such as bear, fish, alligator, pig, porpoise or ass.

The "Five Medicine Foods" (bhesajja) - to be taken only in case of illness - were: (1) sappi, ghee; (2) navanita, fresh butter; (3) telu, oil made from sesame, mustard or castor seed; (4) madhu, honey; and (5) phanita, molasses made from sugar cane.

It appears that in the Buddha's time the regular daily fare consisted of: yagyu gruel, taken with a ball of molasses, in the morning; a substantial midday meal of rice, meat or fish curry, fruit and vegetables; and an evening repast of fruit juice, sugar water or molasses. No solid food should be taken after noon; this rule was not instituted as an ascetic discipline but to promote health - "Not eating food at night, O monks, I enjoy good health, vigour and comfort".

The exact nature of sukara-maddava, the Buddha's final meal, has long been the subject of controversy. The main interpretations of sukara-maddava are: (1) a dish of (young?) pork; (2) truffles or some other type of mushrooms; (3) bamboo shoots; (4) a rice broth made from the five products of the cow (i.e., milk, curd, butter, urine and dung); and (5) an "elixir". Recent research supports the theory that sukara-maddava was in fact a dish of (possibly psychedelic) mushrooms. At any rate, the significance of the Buddha's last supper is not in the contents but in his attitude towards the food. He clearly recognized that something was wrong with the food, prepared by a well-meaning but poorly trained lay follower, ordering it to be buried in a hole. Realizing that his time on earth was drawing to a close, the Buddha honoured the layman by partaking of the food and also protected his monastic followers from trying to digest something with which they could not cope.

In keeping with the Middle Way, the Buddha's attitude towards food was moderate and realistic. While encouraging his followers to eat as simply as possible, only taking the minimum amount of gross and subtle nourishment, the Buddha prohibited very few foods and those for reasons of health. It was the intention, not the food itself, that was the key to enlightened eating. As long as his followers obtained their food through mendicancy among a population that ate meat they should accept whatever was put in their bowls. One must eat regularly. Once the Buddha went to Alavi to preach the Dhamma to a certain poor man. The same day, the farmer's single ox escaped and he spent hours searching for it. When he returned, the Buddha saw to it that the
starving, exhausted man was well served with food before he began his teaching. A starving person will simply not benefit from a sermon, no matter how exalted the teacher.

The Buddha bequeathed to us many commonsense pointers regarding food, pointers that are still valid today regardless where Buddhists happen to be.

Notes

Author’s Note: The author wishes to thank Russell Webb for his kind assistance in researching this article.

1 Sāsbe sattā āhāraṇāvikā, Dīgha Nikāya III, 211. See also Nyanaponika, The Four Nutriments of Life (BPS, Kandy 1967) and H.G.A. van Zeyst, ‘Abhāra’ in Encyclopaedia of Buddhism 1, 2 (Colombo 1963).

2 See On Prakash, Food and Drinks in Ancient India (Delhi 1961).

3 Mahāvagga IV.


5 Mahāvagga IV.


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THE BUDDHIST PERSPECTIVE ON RESPECT FOR PERSONS

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This paper grew out of certain issues raised in an article by Ninian Smart, 'Creation, Persons and the Meaning of Life', dealing with 'respect for persons' in the context of world-views which consider the human person to have no internal principle of selfhood or identity.

'Respect for persons' may be seen as the basis and foundation of any ethical system, as it is a presupposition required by them. One may elaborate its meaning which comprises four main elements:

1. the right to 'individualisation' - to be treated not just as a human being, but as a particular one, with all one's personal differences;

2. the right to 'acceptance' - to be taken as one is, good or bad;

3. the right to 'self-direction' - to autonomy and the making of one's own choices;

4. the right to impartial treatment.

In traditional Western culture, which had a predominantly Christian ethos, these 'rights' were underpinned by the Christian emphasis on men as persons, each one being unique, and with this uniqueness rooted in the divine order - all men are the 'children of God', 'made in the image of God' or have an 'eternal soul'. Such basic ideas supported the conception that all men were of worth and were to be respected accordingly.

In present society, we are in many respects living in a post-Christian culture. Many Christian values have been inherited but the religious or philosophical underpinning has been dropped. On the one hand, modern secular society tends to stress individuality, its expression and assertion (in ways which lack some of the safeguards of the Christian doctrine), and on the other, disciplines which study human behaviour tend to undercut any solid basis for belief in man's uniqueness, or in any internal principle of selfhood or identity. Psychology sees man as a conditioned process, sociology sees personality as arising from
'social precipitation', and modern philosophies like Existentialism deny that there is any fixity about human nature - we make ourselves up as we go along, our 'existence' precedes our 'essence'. All of these ways of looking at the world would deny that man has any 'self' or 'soul', in the sense of some fixed identical nature, internally determined. Now in such a context, with the 'eternal substance' dissolved away from persons, on what basis can respect for persons, and thus ethics, stand?

This brings us to the reason for examining Buddhism and its ethic as, in common with modern views of personality, it seems man as radically conditioned and without a solid 'core', and yet constructs a very persuasive ethic on this basis.

Pre-Buddhist ideas on the person in India

During the Buddha's lifetime there were people holding a number of different conceptions on the nature of the person:

1. materialists who denied any non-material 'self' and who asserted that a person is completely destroyed at death;
2. those who held that each person has an individual, inner self which sees, hears etc. and which is eternal, surviving death and remaining ever the same in its nature;
3. those who held that the inner self, the ātman, is universal, the same for every being, and not, in the last resort, individual.

The Buddhist attitude to these three, from the ethical point of view, would be as follows:

1. this gives no support to ethics;
2. though this conception, with its allied ideas of karma and rebirth, gives some support to ethics, ultimately it encourages selfishness;
3. as such an ātman is seen as being universal, it can encourage impartiality to all. It is, however, seen as beyond both mind and body, though controlling these, and so does not encourage respect for the individuality of different persons (i.e. of different mind-and-body combinations).

Buddhist views relating to the person

1. Buddhism sees the world and the beings in it as being completely impermanent in their nature. The mind and the body are composed of a patterned flux of ever-changing mental and physical processes.

2. Related to this is the view that these evanescent processes are mutually dependent and conditioned. These processes, mental and physical 'events', take place only when all the requisite conditions are present, and they in turn act as conditions for further events. (This situation is not one of mechanical determinism, as mental factors like knowledge provide many of these conditions, thus giving the flow of events a certain openness and fluidity.)

These first two views imply that individuality, which pertains to the impermanent and conditioned mind and body, is not of any great value in itself. Western views of man generally see individuality as a positive quality, and aim to guard, satisfy or even increase the preferences and desires which spring from it. Buddhism, in common with many other Indian philosophies, sees individuality as a form of imperfection, and the desires which come from it, which of course indicate feelings of lack, as of negative value and as forms of limitation.

3. Following on from the view that what composes a 'person' is ever-changing and conditioned, is the view that there is, therefore, no evidence for an unchanging, identical 'self', which might act as the 'essence' or permanent principle of unity in a person. The term 'self' can only legitimately be used as a short-hand way of referring to the collection of impermanent mental and physical processes, which the Buddha analysed into five khandhas or 'groups':

(i) material shape - the body,
(ii) feeling - pleasant, unpleasant or neutral hedonic tone,
(iii) perception or cognition - that which classifies and labels experience,
(iv) 'mental formations' - volition and various impulses and habits which mould and give shape to one's character and actions, and
(v) discriminative consciousness - the basic awareness of a sensory or mental objective field, and its division into parts, to be classified by perception.
Thus the 'person' is analysed into a collection of five sorts of impersonal, ever-changing and conditioned events or processes. The challenge which this presents for respect for persons seems striking. We will first outline further Buddhist teachings, however, before dealing with this.

4. Though a 'self' in an ultimate sense is not admitted, the empirical reality of self (i.e. the mind and body) and the functional unity of personality are admitted. One does have individuality and personality, but one should understand the sense in which this is so. Though there is no permanent identity to it, there is continuity in the process of change which gives 'identity' in a relative sense and some structure to the process. This allows for such things as responsibility.

5. Related to this is the Buddhist acceptance of the ideas of karma and rebirth. Death is not seen as final, but it is followed by another life, which is followed by another, etc. A 'self' or 'soul' is not required for this process, as it is conceived of as simply a series of relatively discrete sections of a continuous process of change in mind and body. No 'entity' carries over from one life to the next, but only the flux of consciousness and the force of one's karma, or action, which conditions the quality and events of the next life. Crudely put, this means that 'good' or wholesome actions lead to pleasant future rebirths, which may be at the human level or in one of various (long-lasting but impermanent) heavens; and 'bad' or unwholesome actions lead to unfortunate rebirths, such as a poor human being, an animal, or perhaps in one of the hells (which are also impermanent). Thus one passes through a series of lives according to the quality of one's actions. The whole process, called Samsāra or 'wandering on', is considered to have no discernable beginning in time, and this thus implies that we have all been humans, animals, gods, hell-beings, etc., countless times.

6. The final relevant Buddhist doctrine is that relating to the goal of Buddhism, or Nirvāṇa. This is a state of perfection, achievable during life, by meditation, and by the overcoming of attachment, craving, hatred, pride and deluded belief in a real self or 'I'. Having attained it, 'one' is no longer reborn, and at death there is a non-individual, indefinable state of bliss.

The importance of this idea for ethics, in Buddhism, is that every single living being is seen as having the potential for attaining Nirvāṇa. This is perceived in the idea that, 'This mind is brightly shining, but it is defiled by adventitious defilements'\(^2\). That is, the latent state of mind-flux, as experienced in dreamless sleep, has purity and power. Within all are the seeds of perfection, which will mature given the right conditions. This potential for Nirvāṇa might be functionally compared to the Christian idea that all men are 'children of God', or the Hindu concept that all have a divine Ātman or self. This is because all three doctrines relate man to a transcendent source of value, which is absent in any materialistically world-view. The ultimate worth of the transcendent thus reflects on all men, or all beings (in the Buddhist and Hindu cases), and thus encourages impartiality to all (at the very least).

Buddhist ethics - An introduction

Historically, Buddhism can be seen to have had a great humanising effect on the whole of Asia, encouraging non-violence and the adherence to basic moral values. The Buddhist ideal of non-violence can be illustrated by a passage from the Majjhima Nikāya, vol.1, p.129: 'Monks, low down thieves might carve one limb from limb with a double-handed saw, yet even then, whoever sets his mind at enmity, he, for this reason, is not a doer of my [the Buddha's] teaching.'

The reaction which someone who can live up to this recommendation should have is that of loving-kindness towards his assailant who is so foolishly bringing suffering onto himself (due to the working of karma). Such a reaction is only possible for someone who has seen through the delusion of 'I am', of ego or self.

As a background to this passage and to what will follow, it is necessary to look at the Buddhist view of what brings greatest harm to a person. States of mind such as greed, hatred or delusion are seen as those things most to be avoided. They lead to suffering, both of oneself and others, as an immediate result; they also hinder one's progress towards Nirvāṇa and lead to bad rebirths through the operation of the law of karma. Thus, if
someone wishes to harm you, and attacks you or abuses you, he can only succeed in bringing you lasting harm if you react, with anger etc. This reaction of anger is an act on your part and by it you co-operate with your assailant's wish to bring harm to you. As it says in the Visuddhimagga, p.300:

'Suppose an enemy has hurt you in what is his domain, why try yourself to hurt your mind? - that is not his domain... Suppose another, to annoy, provokes you with some odious act. Why suffer anger to spring up, and do as he would have you do? If you get angry, then may be you make him suffer, may be not; but with the hurt that anger brings, you certainly are punished now.'

Anger is conditioned by the attack of an assailant, but it is not determined by it. Another necessary condition for anger to occur is the assertion of ego, the 'I am' conviction. If that is absent, there can be no anger.

This position might be taken to imply, however, that one cannot really harm another person (they are the only one that can do that), and that one can therefore treat them as one likes. This conclusion is false, nonetheless. Firstly, most people do have an ego-attachment, so mistreating them will lead to anger etc. - not only physical harm but 'mental' harm as well. Secondly, if one acts out of the intention to harm another, this brings unpleasant karmic consequences upon oneself.

The philosophical basis for respect for persons in Buddhism:

1. Respect and change

Because man has no fixed self and is of a changing nature, this guarantees the possibility of development and growth. Man is a dynamic reality, not static. Though the impermanence of persons is, in the long run, an imperfection, and their individuality is not of worth in itself, the potentiality for change towards Nirvāṇa floods it with value. People are as they are, with all their differences, and if they are ever to move towards or attain Nirvāṇa, this must be fully accepted and taken into account. This is the 'acceptance' aspect of respect for persons. Indivi-

dual differences mean that each person needs individual treatment if he or she is to be helped, or help him- or herself, towards Nirvāṇa (or perfection). This is the 'individualisation' aspect of respect for persons. The only person who can, in the event, divest one of one's deluded belief in a real self or 'I', is oneself. Dependence on others just leads to a dependent-ego, where one still believes in self, but feels it must rely on others. This is the 'self-direction' aspect of respect for persons.

Fixed types and labelling
(a) with regard to others:

Not respecting a person nearly always involves dismissing him or her as an 'x' e.g. 'Oh, he's a thief'. A fixed label of 'bad' or 'mad' is put on a person, thus denying the potentiality for change, and dismissing a person as unworthy. This is to take the past actions of a person and regard them as defining his or her nature. As the past is closed and fixed, so the person is taken to be too. The future, however, is always open, thus providing opportunity for the potential in a person for moral, spiritual or intellectual growth (or decline) to come to fruition. The Buddhist texts refer to the time when the Buddha went to the bandit Aṅgulimāla (the name is an allusion to his habit of wearing a garland made of the fingers of his victims) because he saw he only needed a little exhortation for him to change his ways, become a monk and soon attain Nirvāṇa. This represents the 'acceptance' aspect of respect for persons.

Thus one is not 'good' or 'bad' by nature - good and bad qualities are not inalienable possessions, but are conditioned factors occurring in the personality, and one may gain or lose them. Acceptance and respect, indeed, may themselves elicit a response, thus leading to a change for the good. Disrespect and labelling may do the opposite, and confirm a person in their ways. This brings us to the parallel problem of putting fixed labels on oneself.

(b) with regard to oneself:

Firstly, one might see an undesirable part of oneself and passively accept it as a fixed part of oneself, duly regarding it as
'me' - 'Oh, I've always been like that, what can I do about it?' This is to take oneself as being from a fixed mould - it is what Sartre called 'bad faith'. The Buddhist simile for this state of mind is someone leaving a bronze bowl, which is already dirty, in the dust to continue tarnishing. All beneficial progress is barred. Faults must be fully acknowledged and accepted (this is part of self-acceptance and self-respect) but they should not be seen as permanent or unchangeable.

Secondly, one's own good points, virtues and attainments are also impermanent - they are not inalienable possessions of a 'self'. Thus they should not be taken as a basis for superiority, assertiveness, complacency etc. - they must be constantly tended and cultivated. If one does not do this, those good qualities will wane, just as a new bronze bowl will tarnish if left in the dirt and not cleaned.

Thirdly, to disrespect others by anger, hostility etc. is the very process by which one loses one's own good qualities, and clouds one's mind. If the disrespect issues from 'superiority' based on fame, wealth etc. one still loses what is of real value to oneself as well as probably weakening one's success in these fields.

Respect for someone not seeking Nirvāṇa or perfection

Though potential for change towards Nirvāṇa may provide a basis for respect, what of those who
(a) by their evil action seem clearly to be heading away from Nirvāṇa, or
(b) simply are not interested in seeking Nirvāṇa or in changing their ways in accordance with moral criteria?

This sort of problem does not present itself in Buddhism alone:

'Individualistic existentialism and... the doctrine of the social precipitation of personhood in individuals... do not strongly express the worth of uncreative or inauthentic people. More generally, they do not strongly bring out the indelible worth of persons' 6.

We will first discuss the question of respect towards one not interested in self-change. To disrespect such a person will in no way encourage their changing themselves for the better, or their wanting to do so. The potential for change towards Nirvāṇa is always there even when neglected. What is more, to disrespect another because they are not trying to realise this potential is to hinder one's own movement towards that goal. Certainly there is every reason for not trying to force a change in someone else. Beings, according to Buddhist ideas, are at different levels of maturity, and this must be fully realised and accepted. If a person is ever to change, this must come from their own wish to do so, because the sort of change which tends towards Nirvāṇa is based on understanding. It cannot be forced on someone, but must develop from within them, and does not come from just holding 'correct' opinions. Thus a Buddhist has reason to respect the integrity of others and their right to self-direction.

Now we come to consider the question of respect for someone who acts in a morally reprehensible way. We have already seen the example of the Buddha and Anāgāriki, but now wish to spell out certain other considerations.

No matter how 'bad' a person may be, he or she may once have been, in this life or a previous one, very 'good'. Moreover, due to the beginninglessness of one's cycling in rebirth after rebirth, the law of averages (at least!) means that we have crossed paths with all beings before, and as the Sāgyutta-Nikāya vol. II, pp.189-90, says,

'It is not easy, monks, to find a being who has not in the past been one's mother or one's father, brother, sister, son or daughter.'

Thus all beings have at some time in the past given one great love and should be regarded accordingly.

So much with respect to the past. The future brings other considerations. Because of the law of karma, a wrong-doer will certainly bring much suffering on himself, in this or a later life. Such a person thus deserves one's compassion for his sorry plight. Consideration of such a person is in fact recommended as one of the easiest ways of developing the quality of compas-
sion in oneself. Normally one would send loving-kindness to a person by considering some good quality that they have, but if they have none compassion is recommended instead.

Moreover, there is still the future potential for change for the better, the roots of which may be planted now. (This also provides a good reason against capital punishment - a person must be given every opportunity to perform good karma and change for the better before they die and perhaps find themselves in one of the lower worlds where it is difficult to do this.) The context of rebirth, past and future, thus provides a way of considering persons aside from their present roles, actions and character.

II Respect and suffering

This is the second basis of respect in Buddhism, although it is linked to the first; a person's situation may change for the worse and thus bring suffering.

Buddhism emphasises that suffering is common to all beings, human or otherwise, and it thus provides an important basis for respect for all beings. Each being desires happiness for him- or herself but inevitably experiences all sorts of frustration and privation etc. that bring suffering. Given the Buddhist non-acceptance of any ultimate basis for separate selfhood, that both oneself and others consist of a flux of changing psychophysical elements, then there can be seen no important difference between one's own desire for happiness, and experience of suffering, and that of others. The barrier which normally keeps us within our own 'self-interest' should thus be dissolved or widened in its scope to include all beings. Thus suffering in others must evoke compassion. Moreover, as a Buddhist learns to look at him/herself and see how suffering arises from craving, delusion etc., and realises that there is a state, namely Nirvāṇa, free from such causes and the consequent suffering of any kind, then compassion is heightened. This is because the suffering in oneself and others is seen as rooted in one's 'own' actions, delusions etc., and is unnecessary. This awareness means, negatively, that one avoids inflicting suffering (which you yourself do not like) on others; and positively, that one tries to help others towards the state free from suffering.

An example of this type of reasoning is given at Dīgha Nikāya vol. III, p.73, where there is described the moral decay of society which culminates in people living for a very short time and indulging in 'sword-periods' of mutual slaughter. Those who hide away in the mountains to avoid this eventually emerge and, contemplating life as having become like Hobbes's state of nature ('nasty, brutish and short'), embrace anyone they find at the sheer joy of finding them alive. On the basis of this awareness of shared suffering, people then resolve to avoid killing and to reinstate other neglected aspects of morality.

Solidarity

Various aspects of suffering can also be seen to promote solidarity in beings:

(i) As stated above, all beings can be seen as having once been one's mother etc. This means that one has, in the past, shared suffering, hopes and fears with all beings. The past relates all beings to each other as they have all crossed paths at some time or other. This encourages 'acceptance' of beings and also impartiality - although there is a relative individuality to beings, the enormity of the samsāric past and all it contains overshadows the differences between them.

(ii) Death, in particular, is a form of suffering which 'levels' all, whoever they are, rich or poor, friend or enemy. As we see at Samyutta Nikāya, vol.1, p.102:

'As though huge mountains made of rock,
So vast they reach up to the sky,
Were to advance from every side,
Grinding beneath them all that lives,
So age and death roll over all.'

Thus all beings whatsoever are in the same boat (i.e. Samsāra) and from this basic quality comes reactions of friendship, sympathy, compassion and solidarity.

(iii) The faults and imperfections that we all have may, paradoxically, be another basis for solidarity and respect. Buddhism sees all people who have not yet had some insight into Nirvāṇa
as, in one way or another, lacking full mental health ('all worldlings are deranged'). As one learns to acknowledge a variety of faults in oneself, so one can tolerate them in others and respect them accordingly. This also means, incidentally, that there is no overriding reason for choosing to describe certain people as 'insane' (and thus to treat them with drugs, electric shock etc.) on the assumption that everyone else is perfectly sane.

III Respect for animals and humans

Many of the above reasons provide equal grounds for respecting animals and humans. Certainly, from a Buddhist point of view, all life is to be respected, but we may ask whether there is any 'higher' respect owing to human beings? In Hinduism, which shares the idea of rebirth with Buddhism, one finds that a sacred cow may be afforded greater respect than a human who is an 'out-caste' - what safeguards are there against this in Buddhism?

(1) Firstly, it is said to be worse to kill a more highly developed being than one less so, e.g. it is worse to kill a horse than to kill a rat, or to kill a saintly person than an ordinary person. The main reason for this is to do with intention - the intention behind the act is more perverted when one kills or injures a more highly developed being, especially a saintly person to whom respect is due. (This is a question of psychology but it also affects the nature of karma (the act) and thus of the result.) Again, although all beings have a potential for Nirvāna, one already highly developed has greater ability to materialize that potential (and thus help others too) during his lifetime, than others.

(2) Secondly, human life is seen as a great opportunity which is comparatively rare - there is said to be a greater chance that a one-eyed turtle, surfacing once every century, should put his head through a ring on the surface of the ocean than a being in hell should become human again. Added to this is the view that the human plane is the most auspicious as far as attaining Nirvāna is concerned - those in the hell worlds, or animals, are affected by too much suffering and ignorance to be able to do the 'work' necessary for the development of wisdom which brings the attainment of Nirvāna; those in the heaven worlds live lives which are so long and comparatively pleasant that they think they are immortal and are too complacent to work for Nirvāna; the human plane is a 'middle world' with enough suffering to encourage the seeking of Nirvāna but not so much that this is made impossible. Human life is, therefore, the best context for the quest for Nirvāna as well as being the realm where most effective good and bad karma is performed (- humans are less creatures of instinct and have greater 'freedom').

Such a great and rare opportunity should thus be used wisely and treasured in others. It also means that suicide is an incredible waste (as well as being impossible, since one is reborn somewhere else, probably in a worse condition and has to carry on facing the problems of life). As we read at Dīgha Nikāya, vol.II, p.331:

"... The virtuous have need of their life. In proportion to the length of time that such a men abides here, is the abundant merit (result of good karma) that they produce and accomplish for the good and welfare of many...".

(31) Whereas the Brahmin contemporaries of the Buddha saw mankind as divided into four classes of types, and the male sex as vastly superior, the Buddha taught that mankind was one species. He taught that the biological differences between humans was only nominal, that the classes arise out of occupational differences and that such differences, as well as sex, are irrelevant to spiritual progress. (He did feel, however, that women faced certain obstacles which men did not.) Thus we read in Fielding Hall's description of Burmese society that:

"There was, and is, absolutely no aristocracy of any kind at all. The Burmese are a community of equals, in a sense that has probably never been known elsewhere."

Thus, human beings should be afforded greater respect than animals, but this is only a difference of degree, not of kind. All beings suffer and should, therefore, not be mistreated or killed. All beings have the potential to change for the better but the human state provides the greatest opportunity to actual-
lise this.

Summary

One can, perhaps, summarise the different grounds for 'respect for persons' as follows:

1. Christianity supports it by establishing the positive worth of persons, producing a sort of spiritual 'balance of powers'.

2. In secular society others tend to be protected from abuse by assigning them certain rights, by law, and there is less emphasis on the positive worth of each person.

3. Buddhism, in the main, aims to support respect by removing the basis for lack of respect, i.e. egoism and attachment to self.

The view that no permanent 'self' can be found in persons does not mean that one can therefore manipulate them, as there is no basis for 'self' in oneself, either. Lack of respect for others springs from the basic delusion of 'self' - that 'I' am a positive, self-identical entity that should be gratified and that should be able to brush others aside if they get in 'my' way. Moreover, because of the law of karma, one cannot, in the long run, say, 'I'm all right Jack, blow you' - as by doing so one inevitably brings suffering on oneself. To harm others always harms oneself. One may thus say that helping others helps oneself (in terms of karmic result and good qualities of mind which are developed) and helping oneself (by purifying one's mind and behaviour) enables one to help others better.

We may also summarise the various bases of respect for persons, firstly those of relevance to a secular society without belief in karma, rebirth or Nirvāṇa (but not without some idea of human perfection) (A); and secondly, other bases in the full Buddhist context, which accepts these presuppositions (B):

A. 1. Other people are not fixed or unchangeable and so one should not 'label' and 'dismiss' them.

2. One's own attainments, moral, intellectual or material, are impermanent, and are thus no sound basis for despising others.

3. Disrespecting others is the very process by which one loses one's good qualities (in the moral sense).

B. 1. All beings have the potential to change towards Nirvāṇa or change for the better. Respect assists and may elicit this.

2. All beings have once been one's mother etc. - we have been through many things with, and have been loved by, all beings.

3. An evil-acting person will certainly suffer, due to his/her karma, and thus deserves compassion and help.

Buddhism and the four elements in respect for persons

1. The right to individualisation:

   Individuality is, in the long run, to be transcended, in Nirvāṇa. Any change towards Nirvāṇa must start where people are at, however, and thus the way in which they gradually change towards Nirvāṇa will be different. Former rebirths and karma ensure that even Siamese twins will be of differing character and make-up. Man is not just the sum of heredity and social, psychological etc. conditions, but he has a long past in a line of rebirths which also condition his present life, and often this provides a 'hidden source' of ability etc.

2. The right to acceptance:

   Good and bad etc. are not fixed parts of any unchanging 'self'. One can thus never tie a person down to what he has done or 'was' in the past, but must always address him or her in the present, which opens to the future and a host of possible changes. The faults that others have are often shared by ourselves also.

4. One is oneself not fixed and thus one should not indulge in 'bad' faith by labelling oneself.

5. Change, in others, must come from within if it is to be genuine and cannot be forced from without.

6. All share in the common lot of suffering and thus deserve compassion and to be viewed in the same way that one views oneself.

7. Death and ageing affect all and bring quality to all, in this respect.

8. We all have a share of the faults and neuroses we see in others.
3. The right to self-direction:

Any worthwhile change in a person must come from within, by understanding and growth. Although a person has no completely free 'will' or self, the fact that he or she is a complex flux of interdependent psycho-physical elements means that he or she must be approached as a dynamic 'whole' (in a functional, not ontological sense) and not 'treated' by drugs etc. which might be used to interfere with and alter part of the personality (this, with respect to the treatment of the 'mentally ill').

4. The right to impartial treatment:

All have the potential for Nirvana and all bring themselves into situations, good or bad, by their own karma.

References

1 In Ralph Ruddock (ed.) *Six Approaches to the Person*, London 1972.
4 Ninian Smart, in Ralph Ruddock, *op. cit.*, pp.34-5.
6 *The Soul of a People*, London 1902.

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**Groupe 2**

"Parmi mes disciples, les nonnes suivantes sont les plus éminentes:
- La bhikṣuṇī Pa t'o kia p'i li (帕打斯拉翻) connaît son karma et les faits des époques de ses vies antérieures.
- La bhikṣuṇī Hi mo chō (喜摩頂) est d'une beauté et d'une distinction extraordinaires qui inspirent du respect à son entourage.
- La bhikṣuṇī Surā possède le don de convaincre les non-croyants et les convertir au Dharma.
- La bhikṣuṇī Dharmadinnā sait expliquer les différences entre les pratiques pour permettre un choix judicieux aux adeptes.
- La bhikṣuṇī Uttarā n'a pas honte de ses vêtements peu élégants.
- La bhikṣuṇī Prabhā a acquis la sérénité en ce qui concerne les organes de sens et la concentration.
- La bhikṣuṇī Tch'an t'ëou 蕃頂 enseigne le Dharma comme elle porte ses robes: d'une façon strictement selon les règles.
- La bhikṣuṇī Dattā est capable de discuter sur des thèmes variés et est sans doutes ni obstacles.
- La bhikṣuṇī T'ien yu 天優 est capable d'écrire des gāthā honorant les qualités du Bouddha.
- La bhikṣuṇī K'iu pei 菩卑 is érudite et a beaucoup de délicatesse dans ses relations avec autrui."

En résumé:

Pa t'o kia p'i li, Hi mo chō, Surā, Dharmadinnā, Uttarā, Prabhā, Tch'an t'ëou, Dattā, T'ien yu, K'iu pei.

**Groupe 3**

"Parmi mes disciples, les nonnes suivantes sont les plus éminentes:
- La bhikṣuṇī Abhayā aime vivre dans les lieux paisibles et évite les villes.
- La bhikṣuṇī Viśākha s'en va mendier sa nourriture quotidienne de porte à porte sans distinguer les riches des pauvres.
- La bhikṣuṇī Bhadrapālā choisit un endroit précis pour faire sa méditation et ne change plus de lieu.
- La bhikṣuṇī Mo nou ho li (摩那和利) s'en va par monts et par vaux pour enseigner le Dharma.
- La bhikṣuṇī Dama est parvenue très vite à l'éveil sans rencontrer de graves difficultés.
- La bhikṣuṇī Sudamā porte toujours les trois vêtements réglementaires ou kṣaṭya 6.
- La bhikṣuṇī Li hiu na (離頭那) médite au pied d'un arbre avec une concentration imperturbable.
- La bhikṣuṇī Chö t'o (照苑) vit à la belle étoile sans jamais songer à un abri quelconque.
- La bhikṣuṇī Yeou kia lo (獨迦陀) préfère vivre dans les endroits paisibles qu'aux villes bruyantes.
- La bhikṣuṇī Li na (離那) s'assied toujours sur un tapis d'herbes séchées et n'est pas attachée aux vêtements ni aux ornements.
- La bhikṣuṇī Anupamā porte les cinq vêtements rapécés 7 selon l'ordre."

En résumé:

Abhayā, Viśākha, Bhadrapālā, Mo nou ho li, Dama, Sudamā, Li hiu na, Chö t'o, Yeou kia lo, Li na et Anupamā.

**Groupe 4**

"Parmi mes disciples, les nonnes suivantes sont les plus éminentes:
- La bhikṣuṇī Yeou kia mo (獨迦摩) a choisi le cimetière comme lieu de méditation.
- La bhikṣuṇī K'ing ming (清名) réserve la majorité de son temps en voyage pour enseigner le Dharma.
- La bhikṣunī Somā montre beaucoup de compassion pour les personnages qui n'ont pas voulu choisir la voie indiquée par le Dharma.
- La bhikṣunī Mo t'ī la (มุขอ) accueille avec joie ceux qui acceptent l'enseignement du Dharma.
- La bhikṣunī Kālākā protège toute bonne conduite et sa pensée n'est jamais distraite.
- La bhikṣunī Devasū [tā] s'oriente vers l'étude de la Vacuité^8 en cherchant à l'analyser, à la comprendre.
- La bhikṣunī Sūryaprabha se rejouit dans le Sans-marque^9 et élimine tout attachement.
- La bhikṣunī Manāpā cultive la Non-prise en considération^8 et est assidue à faire largement du bien.
- La bhikṣunī Vimādā n'a plus de doute au sujet du Dharma et son devouement pour autrui est sans limite.
- La bhikṣunī Samantaprabhāsā aime à expliquer de façon approfondie le Dharma et ses subtilités."

En résumé:

Yeou kia mo, K'ing ming,
Somā, Mo t'ī li,
Kālākā, Devasū [tā],
Sūryaprabha, Manāpā,
Vimādā, Samantaprabhāsā.

Groupe 5

"Parmi mes disciples, les moniales suivantes sont les plus éminentes:
- La bhikṣunī Dhamadhī pratique la patience tout comme la terre qui contient et qui reçoit toute chose.
- La bhikṣunī Suyamā enseigne le Dharma et ses disciples construisent beaucoup de lieux de culte. Elle leur procure aussi tout le nécessaire pour leur pratique.
- La bhikṣunī Indrajā a pu se débarrasser de toutes pensées illusoires. Aussi son esprit est serein.
- La bhikṣunī Nāgī médite sans se décourager [sur le manque de substance] de toutes choses.
- La bhikṣunī Kiu na lo (郭耶) a acquis une volonté très ferme que rien en ce bas monde ne peut troubler.
- La bhikṣunī Vasu entre dans la concentration sur l'eau^10 [dont la fraîcheur imprègne [son esprit] ainsi que toutes choses.
- La bhikṣunī Candī pratique la concentration sur la lumière^10 qui éclaire jusqu'aux moindres recoins.
- La bhikṣunī Tchō po lo (達達) dénichent les mauvaises actions, expose les choses malsaines et explique leurs origines, leurs causes.
- La bhikṣunī Cheou kia (遙錧) aide toutes personnes qui se trouvent dans le besoin.

- Enfin, la dernière des mes moniales les plus éminentes est la bhikṣunī Bhadrā Kum달akeṣā."

En résumé:

Dhamadhī, Suyamā,
Indrajā, Nāgī,
Kiu na lo, Vasu,
Candī, Tchō po lo,
Cheou kia, Bhadrā Kum달akeṣā.

Voilà mes cinquante bhikṣunī ainsi énumérées^11.

Fascicule troisième

Partie 6

Les Caractéristiques des véritables Upāsaka^12

Groupe 1

- Le maître de maison Citra est le premier en ce qui concerne la sagesse^14.
- Kien tī a lam (鍾錡) est le premier, faisant beaucoup de bien et ayant acquis des pouvoirs surnaturels.
- Le maître de maison Kiu to (遙佐) sait convertir les autres au Dharma.
- Le maître de maison Upagupta enseigne et explique de façon
approfondie le Dharma.
- Hastaka-Alavaka pratique assidûment la méditation.
- Le maître de maison Yong kien (勇健) a l'habitude de dompter les démons.
- Le maître de maison Chô li (劉利) vit dans le bonheur grâce à son bon karma.
- Le maître de maison Sudatta est un grand donateur (mahâ-dânâpata) [venant en aide aux Trois Joyaux et aussi au peuple].
- Le maître de maison Min t'ou (敏光) a réussi en ce qui concerne sa famille."

En résumé:

Tri-phala, Citra,
Kien t'u a Ian, Kiuo to,
Upagupta, Hastaka-Alavaka,
Yong kien, Chô li,
Sudatta, Min t'ou.

Groupe 2

"Parmi mes disciples étant upâsaka, les plus éminents sont:
- Le brâhmana Cheng man (生還) aimant se faire expliquer le sens profond du Dharma.
- Brahmayus est très intelligent.
- Yu man mo na (御馬磨納) est un fidèle messager pour les affaires du Sangha.
- Le brâhmana Hi wen k'in (喜聞琴) reconnaît son corps pour le non-moi (anâtman).
- Le brâhmana P'i k'ieou (皮貴) est toujours vainqueur dans les discussions sur le Dharma
- Le maître de maison Upâlin écrit des gâthâ et les récite ensuite. Ses paroles sont rapides et sincères.
- Le maître de maison Jyotis aime venir en aide aux pauvres en distribuant ses richesses sans jamais avoir le moindre regret.
- Ugra Vaisâlika aime semer les germes de bon karma en faisant de bonnes actions.

L'upâsaka Anuttara Abhaya est capable de prêcher en profondeur le Dharma.
- T'euo mo ta kiang ho de Vaisâli (巍摩大師頭) n'a pas peur d'enseigner le Dharma pour semer de bons germes chez autrui."

En résumé:

Cheng man, Brahmayus,
Yu man mo na, Hi wen k'in,
P'i k'ieou, Upâlin,
Jyotis, Ugra Vaisâlika,
Anuttara Abhaya, T'euo mo ta kiang ho de Vaisâli.

Groupe 3

"Parmi mes disciples étant upâsaka, les plus éminents sont:
- Le roi Bimbisâra aimant venir en aide à son peuple.
- Le roi Rasâmiprabhâsa est moins généreux mais très sincère dans son geste.
- Le roi Prasenajit a jeté la base pour bâtir des bienfaits.
- Le roi Ajâtastru, en dépit de son manque de racines de bien, a commencé à faire confiance [au Dharma].
- Le roi Udayana oriente avec persévérance et respect sa foi envers le Boudha.
- Le prince Candraprabha vénère le Dharma et fait beaucoup de progrès dans sa pratique.
- Le prince Jeta fait des offrandes au Sangha en toute égalité.
- Le prince Simha vient souvent en aide aux autres sans tenir compte de son rang.
- Le prince Abhaya vient en aide avec délicatesse aux autres sans distinction de classe sociale.
- Le prince Kukkutas est très honoré à cause de [sa conduite révé- lante] la modestie et la honnêteté."

En résumé:

Bimbisâra, Rasâmiprabhâsa,
Prasenajit, Ajâtastru,
Udayana, Candraprabha,
Les Caractéristiques des véritables upāsikās

Groupe 1

"Parmi mes disciples étant upāsikā, les plus éminents sont:
- Le maître de maison Pou ni (步尼) pratiquant la compassion.
- Mahānāma Śākyya a de la compassion pour tous les êtres.
- Bhadra Śākyya pratique avec joie (muditā) le sacrifice.
- L'upāsaka P'ī chō hien (惠護惠) veille sur ses biens mais sait faire du bien autour de lui.
- Le général Simha supporte tous les ennuis et pratique la patience.
- L'upāsaka P'ī chō yu (惠護惠) est très intelligent et aime analyser toutes les doctrines.
- L'upāsaka Nandibala reste silencieux en ce qui concerne de saints hommes.
- L'upāsaka Uttara cherche inlassablement à faire de bonnes actions.
- L'upāsaka T'ien mo (天摩) a acquis la sérénité d'esprit et de ses sens.
- Kiu yi na mo lo (秋意那摩羅) est le dernier de mes disciples (étant upāsaka)."

En résumé:

Fou ni, Mahānāma Śākyya,
Bhadra Śākyya, P'ī chō hien,
Simha, P'ī chō yu,
Nandibala, Uttara,
T'ien mo, Kiu yi na mo lo.

Voici énumérés mes quarante upāsaka (les plus éminents).

Partie 7

Les Caractéristiques des véritables upāsikās

Groupe 2

"Parmi mes disciples étant upāsikā, les plus éminents sont:
- Mallikā Devī qui aime faire des offrandes au Tathāgata.
- Devī Hui lai p'o (婦賴婆) reçoit et pratique correctement le Dharma.
- Devī Chō hui (遮毘) prend soin et fait des offrandes au Samgha.
- Candraprabhā admire et respecte les sages du passé et dans l'avenir.
- Devī Lei tien (雷電) est une généreuse bienfaitrice [pour honorer les Trois Joyaux].
- L'upāsikā Mahā-Prabhā pratique la méditation en rayonnant de la bienveillance (maṣṭī)17.
- L'upāsikā Vidhi pratique la compassion (karunā)18.

Nandabala16 a atteint l'éveil, à peine [devenue upāsikā].
- L'upāsikā Khujuttarā est la plus sage.
- L'upāsikā Supriyā pratique la méditation avec plaisir.
- L'upāsikā Vibhū est intelligente parce qu'elle possède un haut degré de lucidité.
- L'upāsikā Yang kie chō (養親惠) peut accepter les enseignements du Dharma au niveau élémentaire.
- L'upāsikā Bhadrāpālā Suyamā peut expliquer finement les significations des sûtra.
- L'upāsikā Vasudā a réussi souvent à convaincre les gens de la vérité propagée par le Dharma.
- L'upāsikā Asokā possède une voix limpide.
- L'upāsikā Phalādā a l'habitude d'analyser toute chose.
- L'upāsikā Hiu t'eou (留遊) est très courageuse et persévérante."

En résumé:

Nandabalā, Khujuttarā,
Supriyā, Vibhū,
Yang kie chō, Bhadrāpālā Suyamā,
Vasudā, Asokā,
Phalādā, Hiu t'eou.
- L'upāsikā Pa t'i ( cultivateur) [cultive] sans interruption la joie (muditā).
- L'upāsikā Nandamātī fait sans cesse de bonnes actions.
- L'upāsikā Tchao yao ( 觀音) a acquis la foi dans [la voie de] la délivrance [ultime].

En résumé:
Mallikā, Hiu lai p'o,
Chô mi, Candraprabhā,
Lei tien, Mahā-Prabhā,
Vidhi, Pa t'i,
Nandamātī, Tchao yao.

Groupe 3
"Parmi mes disciples [étant upāsikā], les plus éminentes sont:
- L'upāsikā Nihāokā qui choisit la patience comme conduite de perfectionnement.
- L'upāsikā P'i tch'eu hien ( 觀音) pratique la méditation [en éprouvant] la vacuité.
- L'upāsikā Unnata pratique la méditation [en éprouvant] la sans-marque.
- L'upāsikā Amalā pratique la méditation [en éprouvant] la non-prise en considération.
- Śrī Devī aime enseigner le Dharma à ses semblables.
- L'upāsikā Yang kie mo ( 杨集) observe strictement les règles de conduite morale.
- L'upāsikā Lei yen ( 羅尼) a beaucoup de distinction et de prudence.
- L'upāsikā Vijayā a acquis la sérénité des sens.
- L'upāsikā Nīlā suit régulièrement les enseignements et son esprit devient réceptif.
- L'upāsikā Hieou mo kia t'i hiu to niu ( 妙喜) se vêtu de kārikā et des gāthā avec assurance.
- La dernière fidèle upāsikā [parmi les plus éminentes] est l'upāsikā Kālā.

NOTES
2 Pour les rādhācala, voir BSR 3, 1, pp.32, 37, n.6.
4 Divya-sakṣus, 'l'Oeil divin': acuité visuelle spéciale faisant partie des 6 pouvoirs surnaturels acquis par la méditation; cf. BHS 50.
5 Pour les quatre pratīṣamādī, voir BSR 3, 2, p.141, n.5.
6 Pour les trois vêtements ou kāgāga, voir BSR 2, 1-2, p.46.
8 Voir É. Lamotte, Traité (I, p.32 et suiv.; III, p.121 et suiv.) pour ce qu'il appelle 'les trois concentrations', 'de la Vacuité (śūnyatā), de la Non-prise en considération (upāsikā) et de Sans-caractère (ānimittā)' (cf. ci-dessous, n.9).
9 Pour (559b15, 560b23), lire 妙.

11 Bien que le chinois en compte cinquante, cinquante-et-une bhikṣuni sont citées par nom.

12 Le chinois a littéralement (559-c8) 'upāsaka purs/hommes laïques bouddhiques' et (560a28) 'upāsikā pures/femmes laïques bouddhiques' respectivement.


16 Alias Sujātā qui a donné de la nourriture au futur Bouddha après son jeune; cf. BHSD 289.

17 Voir BSR 3, 2, p.142, n.15.

18 Voir ibid., n.16.

19 Bien que le chinois a 'trente upāsikā', il en est question de trente-et-une dans le texte.
the Institute is easily accessible from Florence or Pisa.

The inaugural seminars will be held this summer: 'Man and His Universe' (20-30.6.87) which will discuss 'The Great Religions of the World' and 'The convergence and divergence of important currents of eastern and western thought in the fields of psychology, social philosophy and science', with tutorials offered on, i.e., Eastern Influences in Modern Western Literature, East Asian Literature in Translation and South Asian Literature in Translation; and 'The Buddhist Way to Freedom' (10-20.7.87) which will be divided into two sections - 'The Buddhist Tradition of Self Development' and 'Buddhist Meditation', with tutorials in Buddhist Psychology (Abhidharma), Esoteric Buddhism (Vajrayana), Sanskrit Language and Literature, Pali Language and Literature, and Tibetan Language and Literature.

Director: Peter Della Santina - B.A., M.A. and Ph.D. in Religion, Philosophy and Buddhist Studies. Associate of the Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, Fort Lee, New Jersey, U.S.A. Ex-Coordinator, Buddhist Studies Programme, Curriculum Development Institute of Singapore, Ministry of Education, Singapore. Author of Nāgārjuna's Letter to King Gautamiputra (with Lozang Jampa and Nangaw Sangten Chophel - Delhi 1978), three series of transcripted lectures given in Singapore - Fundamentals of Buddhism (Sri Lankaramaya Buddhist Temple, 1984), An Introduction to buddhist Higher Teachings (= the Abhidharma - The Buddhist Union, 1985) and An Introduction to the Vajrayana (privately produced, 1985), his doctoral dissertation - Madhyamaka Schools in India (Deli 1986) and articles and translations to various journals.


For further information contact the Institute at 71 Via di Tofoiri, San Gennaro, I-55010 Tofori, Italy (tel. 0583-978100)

Indo-tibetansk Seminar

A conference on this theme was held at the 'Institute of Oriental Philology', Copenhagen University, between 10th and 14th November 1986. The Convener and Chairman was Prof. Chr. Lindtner who is in charge of Buddhist Studies at the Institute and is the new

Editor of the Critical Pāli Dictionary.

The following participants presented papers: Jiang Zhong-xin (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Peking) reported on 'Sanskrit and Buddhist Studies in China' and on 'Sanskrit MSS Preserved in China and Tibet'. The theme of the paper offered by David M. Eckel (Harvard University) was 'Tarkajñāla, Chapter III, the Structure of Bhāvaviveka's Madhyamaka System'. Per K. Sørensen ('East Asian Institute', Copenhagen) spoke on 'Some Observations on the Transmission and Translation of Sanskrit Texts into Tibetan'. Lambert Schmithausen (Hamburg University) discussed the 'Initial Passage, Yogācārabhūmi: MS fol. 78b5'. Chr. Lindtner presented 'Some Remarks on Mind-only' in Early Indian Madhyamaka' whilst his colleague with the Critical Pāli Dictionary, Ole Pind, treated 'Dignāga's Theory of Apoha and Bhāva's Critique'. Hu Hai-yan (Seminar für Indologie und Buddhismuskunde, Göttingen) dealt with 'The Exploration of the Gilgit MSS', and Bhikkhu Pāsādika (associated with the Göttingen Academy of Sciences, Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der Turfan-Funde) contributed 'Further Notes on the Śūtrasamuccayas'.

In this context, literary activities devoted to Buddhist studies at Copenhagen University are well worth mentioning. Prof. Lindtner has made a name for himself as a specialist on Nāgārjuna. Apart from his numerous contributions to learned journals and, for example, his Danish translation of the Dhammapada (Buddhas lærebør, 1981), it is largely due to him that the Indiske Studier series has become a great success. He has to his credit important contributions to the Danish language and literature, e.g., translations of the Ratnavālī in Nāgārjuna: Juvelkøden og andre skrifter (1980), Suśilāka and Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra (Indiske Studier 1, 1981) and Nāgārjuna's Bodhicitattavatāra, Lokākāśitāva, Acintyātāva, Muśamahyamakākārikā, Śūnyatāsaptatīvṛtti, Vighravyāsvartani, Bodhisattvabhadra (Indiske Studier 2, 1982). His best-known work is Nāgārjuniana. Studies in the writings and Philosophy of Nāgārjuna(Indiske Studier 4, 1982; repr. Delhi 1987) in which he discusses Nāgārjuna's 'authentic writings' and the 'unity of Nāgārjuna's thought'.

Lindtner's critical editions and/or English translations include, i.a., the following: Candrakīrti's Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa...

(Tibetan text - Acta Orientalia 40, 1979), MĀlamadhyamakārīka (Sanskrit text - Ind.Stud.2), Śunyatāsaptati (Tib. - ib.), Śunyatāsaptati (Tib.text with English tr. - Ind.Stud.4). Vigrāhavāyuvarati (Skt and Tib. - ib.), 6 verses of the Vyabhārasiddhi (Tib. text with English tr.- ib.). Yuktisāṅkta (Tib.version, Skt fragments and English tr.- ib.), Lokāntatava (Skt, Tib. and English tr.- ib.). Acintyaśatva (Skt, Tib. and English tr.- ib.), Bodhicittavivarana (Tib.,Skt frag. and English tr.- ib.) and an analysis and English tr. of the Chinese version of the Bodhisambhara [ka] (ib.).

Finally, mention should be made of two more recent publications in the Indiske Studier series: (a) Miscellanea Buddhica, ed. Chr. Lindtner (Ind.Stud.5, 1985) which contains four important contributions: (1) J.W.de Jong 'Le Gandavyūha et la loi de la naissance et de la mort' - substantially a comprehensive review of Yoshiro Imaeda's tr.of a Tibetan text from Dunhuang, 'qui s'est largement inspiré de la traduction tibétaine du Gandavyūha' (op. cit...7). (2) H.D.Eckel 'Bhāvaviveka's Critique of Yogācāra Philosophy in Chapter 25 of the Prajñāpradīpa'. (3) V.V.Gokhale and S.S.Bhulkar 'Madhyamakahrdyakārīkā Tarkāvāla, Chapter 1'. (4) Chr.Lindtner 'A Treatise on Buddhist Idealism: Kambala's Alokamāla'. For the history of religion this last named work is of great interest insofar as it can be classified as a didactic poem on cittamātrata, in a sense a precursor of and Yogācāra (Madhyamaka) pendant to the celebrated 'popular' - by Buddhist standards - Madhyamaka poem bodhisattvaśārgavatāra (ib., III).

The second contribution includes an English tr.of the chapter in hand, in the third the relevant Skt text is also given and in the fourth a complete English tr.of the text is offered together with a critical ed.of the Skt and Tib.texts.

(b) Aryadeva's Caubhāṣṭaka, on the Bodhisattva's Cultivation of Merit and Knowledge by Karen Lang (Ind.Stud.7, 1986) is a much-anticipated work presenting a complete translation of the entire treatise together with a critical edition of the Tibetan text and the Sanskrit as far as extant.

(Bhikkhu Pāṇādika)

'From India to Tibet'

This year's Louis H.Jordan Lectures in Comparative Religion were given at the School of Oriental and African Studies (London University) by Prof.D.Seyfort Ruegg who is currently Professor of Indo-Tibetan and Tibetan Studies at the University of Hamburg. Based on the above theme, he delivered a public lecture on 4th March on 'the transmission and reception of Buddhism in a comparative religious and cultural perspective'. During the next two days the following related seminars were held: 'The Mundane (lau-kika) and the Supramundane (lokottara) and the problem of the pan-Indian substratum in Buddhism', 'Brahmanical "Self" (atman) and Buddhist "Trans-self" (paramātman): a problem in hermeneutics', 'Models of Buddhism in contact and opposition in Tibet: the Great Debate of dSa-m-ya', and 'Mahāyāna and Śrāvakayāna in Tibet' or 'Two models of Emapliness (śunyata) in Tibetan thought'.

As in the case of previous Jordan Bequest Lectures, it is hoped to publish the Proceedings. Further details can be obtained from Miss N.C.Shane, Centre of Religion and Philosophy, SOAS, Malet St, London WC1R 7HP.

(The foregoing event has coincided with the simultaneous publication by Serindia - London and Shambhala - Boston of the latest work by the Emeritus Professor of Tibetan at London University, David Snellgrove. Entitled Indo-Tibetan Buddhism. Indian Buddhists and Their Tibetan Successors, this study provides a comprehensive survey of Indian Buddhism and its subsequent establishment in Tibet. It concentrates on the tantric period of Buddhist theory and practice, from the eighth to the thirteenth century, when the Tibetans were actively engaged in absorbing all they could find of Buddhist culture and religion into their own country'. The second half of the U.K.edition (Vol.Two of the U.S.edition) describes 'Buddhist Communities in India and Abroad' and 'The Conversion of Tibet' and includes 123 plates.)

VIth World Sanskrit Conference

The International Association of Sanskrit Studies will hold this convention at the Kern Institute, Leiden University, between 23rd and 29th August 1987, and a detailed report will undoubtedly appear in the official organ of the Association, Indologicalia Tour...
nonsia. Further details may be obtained c/o P.O. Box 16065, 2301
GB Leiden, The Netherlands, but only two workshops relating to
Buddhism have been provisionally arranged: 'Earliest Buddhism' and 'Mahāyāna and Madhyamaka Buddhism'.

Eighth Conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies

This will be held on the Berkeley campus of the University of California between 8th and 10th August. Members of the Association will also have the opportunity to attend the conference of the International Association of Shin Buddhist Studies (6 - 8 Aug.) and the Buddhist Christian Dialogue Conference (10 - 15 Aug.).

For further information write to Professor Lewis Lancaster, Department of Oriental Languages, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720, U.S.A.

Conference on World Buddhism in North America

Under the auspices of the Zen Lotus Society, this ecumenical congress will meet at the Society's Temple in Ann Arbor, Michigan, between 10th and 17th July.

Prof. Luis O. Gomez from the University of Michigan will coordinate the presentations from leading members of the Sangha and from Buddhist laypersons and scholars. Known participants include Vens. Maha Ghosananda, Vivekananda, H. Katamasara, Geshe Sopa, Bishop Tamaoka, Ven. U Silananda, Bishop Nakamura, Ven. Samu Sunim (President, Zen Lotus Society and publisher of Spring Wind), as well as Robert Aitken, Robert Thurman, Joanna Macy, Alan Sponberg, Mary Farkas, Carl Bielefeldt, Kina Sircar, George D. Bond and Ronald Nakasone.

A complete report will appear in Spring Wind, obtainable from The Zen Buddhist Temple, 46 Gwynne Avenue, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M6K 2C3.

OBITUARY

Mircea Eliade (9.3.1907 - 22.4.1986)

Mircea Eliade, one of the great historians of religion in this
century, died in Chicago at the age of 79. He was world famous
for his studies of myth and symbolism in archaic religions,
the results of which appeared in such works as The Sacred and the Pro-
fane, Myth of the Eternal Return and Patterns in Comparative Reli-
gion. Indeed, for many people, Eliade's writings are practically
synonymous with the field of the History of Religions itself.

Eliade was born in Bucharest. Intellectually precocious,
he left Romania when he was 20 to take up the study of Sanskrit
and Indian philosophy in Calcutta with Surendranath Dasgupta.
It was during this time that Eliade began his researches into
yoga and its place in Indian religion, studies he continued through-
out the thirties while teaching at the University of Bucharest.
Eliade left Romania again in 1940, an exile caused by the Second
World War, but this time he was not to return to his homeland.
He settled in Paris after the War and began a very productive
period of writing and teaching, especially on the significance
of primitive religions. In 1956 he joined the faculty of the
University of Chicago Divinity School where he taught up to his
death. A brief biography of Eliade has been written by his col-
league at the University of Chicago, Joseph M. Kitagawa, and
is found in The Encyclopedia of Religion, edited by Eliade (New
life may be found in his autobiography, Journey East, Journey West
(which is only the first volume of his memoirs) and in the selec-
tions published from his journals.

Eliade was a talented and creative writer, and many of his
scholarly works reached a broad audience. He often explored
imaginatively in fiction themes that were prominent in his scholar-
ship, especially the character of sacred and profane existence.
He was an original cultural critic, whose observations appear in
occasional pieces on modern art and literature (some of which
are now collected in Diane Apostolos-Cappadona, Symbolism, the Sac-
red and the Arts) and in many interviews in periodicals (see
especially the long interview which has been published as a boo'
under the title Ordeal by Labyrinth). Eliade was an indefatigable author; he published his first article at the age of 13 and was active up to his death. A useful and relatively complete bibliography to his many works is available in Douglas Allen and Dennis Doeing, Mircea Eliade, An Annotated Bibliography.

Eliade's contribution to Buddhist studies is significant, if not direct. He did of course include Buddhist material in many of his studies, most notably in his classic Yoga: Immortality and Freedom, although students of Buddhism have sometimes found his presentations and conclusions of Buddhist material distorted or wrong. If Eliade did not contribute to our immediate understanding of Buddhism, he did help to shape the larger intellectual context in which the study of Buddhism is now practised. Eliade was optimistic about the role of the History of Religions in modern culture. He wrote in Images and Symbols that 'through study of the religious traditions, modern man would not only rediscover a kind of archaic behaviour, he would also become conscious of the spiritual riches implied in such behaviour' (1961, p.35). By recognizing the humanistic value of the study of religion, Eliade was able to help release research on religions such as Buddhism from the shackles of Christian apologetics or superficial exoticism. The respect that the work of Eliade (and of course many others) won as serious enquiry made it possible for Buddhism to be studied in universities as a religion and philosophy rather than as a specialist branch of philology and orientalism.

Eliade's lifework was the construction of a grand theory of religion in which he emphasized the importance of a number of symbolic complexes. Some scholars have found these patterns helpful for understanding Buddhism, but even for those who considered Eliade's theory unconvincing, he raised the possibility that the elements of the tradition are arranged by systematic requirements and not simply by historical accidents. His broad vision has also challenged all of us to see particular religious traditions as part of a global history of religion.

In writing for a broad audience, Eliade helped to make the work of Buddhologists such as Paul Mus and Giuseppe Tucci known outside specialist circles. His critical bibliographies appended to the first three volumes of A History of Religious Ideas (which remained unfinished at his death) continue this practice of disseminating the best fruits of scholarship and they can be read with benefit by any student of Buddhism. Eliade's interest in interpretation made him alert to the difficulties of intercultural hermeneutics. He made a contribution to Buddhist studies by making others aware of these difficulties: he inspired, for example, Guy Welbon's valuable The Buddhist Nirvāṇa and Its Western Interpreters.

Eliade's contribution to Buddhist studies thus was on many different levels. While we may mourn his death, we can also be content in knowing that his intellectual legacy will be influential and admired for many years to come.

Charles Hallisey
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BOOK REVIEWS


Although the 'Indian inspiration' of the Sūraṅgama Sūtra (Chinese: Lēng yēn ching) has been questioned (even Dōgen Zenji raises the issue in his Hokkyo-ki), this Sūtra has always been held in high regard in Chinese and Japanese monasteries, serving as Buddhavacana alongside other major Mahāyāna works and esteemed no less than the Lankavatāra, Vajracchedikā, Hṛdaya, et al. The Sūraṅgama Sūtra has been particularly influential in the Ch'ān tradition and Lu's translation has been made that much more interesting for being based, in part, upon the fascinating commentarial material written by the eminent Ming dynasty Ch'an Master, Han-shan (1546-1623), set down after his own experience of samādhi as indicated in the text.

The Chinese text from which Lu's work derived has been traditionally attributed to Master Paramiti of Central North India, said to have rendered the Sūtra into Chinese at the Chih-chih monastery, Canton, in 705 A.C. Various copies are known to exist with a slightly different text and alternative accounts of authorship (cf. T 19, No.943, pp.105-55, and T 55, No.2154, p.571c), but regardless of these questions the Sūraṅgama Sūtra is an important text which had exerted considerable influence in Chinese Buddhist circles.

Unlike the Sūtra of Forty-Two Sections (Seū shih êrh chang ching) which manifests so many peculiarly Chinese characteristics as to leave little room for doubt about it being 'home-grown' (which by no means invalidates it in its own context), the Lēng yēn ching invokes a highly 'Indian' atmosphere, fairly bristling with terms and components so reminiscent of the Yogācāryabhūmiśāstra and Vijnaptimatrattratāsiddhi that it would be philological madness to ignore the distinctly 'Indian' feel of its ideas. Indeed, the Sūraṅgama Sūtra is a practical approach to the net of ideas wrapped in the Ch'ēng wei shih lun which owes its inspiration to the form of Indian Buddhism developed by Vasubandhu and Dharmapāla between the fourth and sixth century (T 1545, Vol.31, pp.1-60). Therefore, if this Sūtra is to be appraised according to its content rather than its form, it is much more 'Indian' than Chinese.

The original Chinese text is a forest of vertical columns, apparently unsystematic at first glance, but it is much more ordered than the Lankavatāra, and Han-shan's commentary restores this sense of order, bringing various topics under respective headings and sub-headings in a way most complementary to the nature of the text and its ideas.

The major theme of the Sūraṅgama Sūtra is the Buddhist account of how the entire phenomenal world springs from the One Mind, revealing the law of causality relating to both delusion and enlightenment. Its practice aims at breaking up the Śaya-vijñāna or 'eighth consciousness', otherwise called the 'store-consciousness', which is transmitted into the Great Mirror Wisdom. In answer to Ananda's request for instruction on the three meditative studies (pamāsa, samāpatti and dhāna), the Buddha reveals the light of the Sūraṅgama-Samādhi for his benefit.

The Sūtra teaches that instead of cognising the True Mind, we cling to the illusory body and mind made up of the five aggregates (tattavādha) as an ego, with sense data in the surrounding world as its objective field of perception. The Sūtra deals with the elimination of the coarse attachment to ego and dharmas arising from discrimination pertaining to the sixth and seventh consciousnesses, and with the subtle attachment to ego and dharmas as inborn, arising from the seventh consciousness clinging to the Śaya-vijñāna's perception as an inner ego or 'knower' and its realisation of samādhi. According to the Sūtra, it is only after wiping out both the acquired, discriminative attachments and the inborn attachments that we reach the One Mind and attain Enlightenment. A careful digestion of the Sūtra refutes the unfounded idea that the Vijnānavāda system, of which our text is a variety, teaches an equivalent of Western 'subjective idealism'. If it teaches that we must break up the seventh consciousness's clinging to the eighth consciousness's perception as an 'inner ego' or 'knower', we are left with nothing to which to cling either by way of the 'subject' or the 'object'.
The whole theme of the Sūtra deals with basic ignorance caused by limited self-awareness as subject with its counterpart in the objective realm and its six coarse conditions: knowledge, responsiveness, attachment, assigning names to objects, karmic activity and suffering, which alone create the law of continuity in conditioned existence.

Thus, in response to Ānanda's request, the Buddha orders the twenty-five enlightened ones in the assembly to disclose the various means by which they have attained enlightenment. After their statements of realisation by means of (the introspection of) the six sense data, the six sense organs, six consciousnesses and the seven elements, the World Honoured One asks Mañjuśrī for his opinion of these methods. Mañjuśrī then praises Avalokiteśvara's method by means of looking into the organ of hearing, which is recommended as the best practice. This part of the Sūtra has always been of particular interest to Ch'an (Zen) adherents, the famous 'Long Gāthā' appearing at this point.

Lu's translation is most thorough and makes the most of Han-shan's able commentarial notes. It is a complex text, but well worth the price of sustained examination, for it begins to throw into focus the otherwise arid details dryly set out in the Ch'êng wei shih lun, placing them in a dynamic, practical context as erlebnis (the lived experience of the Buddhist quest). Because of the highly detailed nature of the text, it is impossible to convey its sense of structure in a review, but an outline of the main headings will give an indication of the atmosphere: (1) The Noumenon of the Tathāgata Store; (2) The Phenomenon in the Tathāgata Store; (3) The Tathāgata Store Containing Both Phenomenon and Noumenon; (4) Self-Enlightenment; (5) The Enlightenment of Others, etc., there being eight in all, with sub-divisions of a precise and exact nature. A brief indication of the material found in the sub-headings of the first chapter illustrate the wealth of detail:

(a) Ānanda's weakness - the reason for this sermon; (b) The Meditative study of all as void (śamatha); (c) Wiping out the five aggregates and eight consciousnesses to expose the unreality of ego; (d) Revealing the bright samādhi; (e) Origin of inversion; (f) Actual inversion, etc. The text closes with a section contain-

ing a 'Warning to Practisers', listing the 'Fifty False States Caused by the Five Aggregates', and along with the glossary and index, the whole translation makes a most useful handbook on the Mahāyāna.

The Śrāvaṇagama Sūtra is never going to be popular reading; only practising Buddhists and Buddhist scholars will appreciate the vast amount of work which has gone into its translation, which is a masterpiece. Lu's work has been criticised in the past because of the missing chapters on the Śrāvaṇagama Mantra (not found in his work) and a word must be said on this here. The Mantra has approximately 2,620 characters in 544 lines of Chinese text. Quite rightly, it is recited and used in conjunction with the Sūtra in Asia, but the Sūtra proper is quite able to yield up its meaning in its own right and has been used by meditators in the Far East to check their understanding of the Dharma - the case of Han-shan's skillful use of it being a sterling example of this. When Lu Kuan Yü embarked upon his translation, few Westerners were that enthusiastic about mantras and even the most fervent would have had doubts about learning this long one by heart in order to recite it. A different climate prevails today, favourable to the reception of the mantra. Despite this, however, the Śrāvaṇagama Sūtra can be considered in its proper context without appeal to the Mantra, and Lu's version based upon Han-shan's able commentary is a most readable and reliable translation.

Thus, whether the dhyanā is cultivated by means of one-pointed concentration, with or without the Mantra, it amounts to the same thing in the end. Lu's text makes a most useful and relevant handbook on the Mahāyāna and deserves a permanent place in every Buddhist library.

Upāsaka Wen Shu (Richard Bunn)
but based upon authentic texts giving the teachings of various schools in undiluted form.

The text opens with a vital chapter from the Śrāngama Sūtra (Lêng yên chíng) outlining the meditational methods utilised by twenty-five great Bodhisattvas and Arhats, culminating in Naḥuśī'ī's recommendation of the method of Avalokiteśvara's 'Meditation on the Organ of Hearing'. This is undertaken by disengaging the organ of hearing from its object, sound, and then directing that organ into the stream of concentration. This section is complemented by the 'Long Gāthā' in praise of the method chosen.

The second chapter comprises selections from various Ch'an (Zen) sources, many untranslated elsewhere. Luk's preamble to this section of the text is very informative and concise and leads up to an extract from Hsü-yun's 'Dharma-Discourses', in which the eminent Master (then in his 113th year) gives hints as to the correct practice of the hua-t'ou technique used in Ch'an monasteries. It is followed by a fascinating extract from 'Journey into Dreamland' by Master Han-shan (1546-1623), again providing excellent instruction in the Ch'an method. Further accounts follow from eminent monks Kao-feng (1238-1295), Chung-feng (1263-1323), Ta-kuan (1543-1604), San-feng (1573-1635) and Yin-yuan. Luk also provides an informative summary of the Ch'an schools or 'Five Houses' as they were known in China. This is topped up by outlines of the 'enlightenment experiences' of Masters Hsü-yun and Han-shan, all of which is very inspiring.

The following chapter provides us with a fascinating outline of Pure Land Buddhism, as yet little understood in the West, and Luk's work goes a long way to fill this gap. This part of the text supplies a list of the main sūtras known to the school, a list of its Patriarchs and then proceeds to outline the method of visualisation used in connection with the 'Sūtra of the Contemplation of Amitāyus', enhanced by its fabulous symbolism. All of this is supplemented by informative footnotes and detailed analyses of the various stages involved. As Luk points out, the 'single-mindedness' achieved by the Pure land method is just as effective as the Ch'an method, many devotees of the school knowing the time of their death beforehand.

The fourth chapter brings us to an outline of self-cultivation according to the T'ien-t'ai school, of which we still know too little in the West. What we do hear is often jaundiced by the fact that in its later history, the T'ien-t'ai became ridden with philosophical casuistries and metaphysical speculations. However, there is nothing more practical and useful than Master Chih-ya's T'ung-meng Chih-kuan or 'Śamatha-Vipaśyāna for Beginners'. Just taken by itself, this part of the text - if applied effectively - is enough to set someone well on the path. It is a virtual manual in itself. Being so detailed, it is impossible to outline its contents in full, but the text hinges upon the twofold aspects of chihs - or stilling the mind, and kue - developing insight on the basis of that stillness. In reality, these two aspects are 'one' in the end. Chih-ya's guide also deals with meditation for the healing of ailments, the idea being that when the mind is upset the 'four elements' of the body will be out of harmony, and that when the mind is in harmony the 'four elements' will be in harmony.

The two final chapters are devoted to Taoist Yoga and healing arts, about which we could learn much more. It is very supportive to the Buddhist ideas imparted elsewhere and Yin Shih-tsu's 'Method of Meditation' (Yin-shih Ts'ou-ch'ing Tso-ja) is a very modest title for a quite remarkable work, outlining the full impact of regular meditation practice upon body and mind. It details the extent to which accumulated chi (prāna) will invigorate and rejuvenate the entire body-mind system. Yin's accounts are given in diary form and provide a very real picture of the powers of meditation. Of particular note is the correspondence between the 'vibrations' experienced in effective meditation and the circulation of energy brought about by the stimulation of acupuncture points.

The book closes with an outline of Chinese medicine, followed by an excellent glossary of Buddhist terms. It is hard to imagine how more practical and useful information could be packed into 240 pages, and this text is a treasure trove of spiritual teachings. It should be in the library of every Buddhist and given recognition as the classic work it truly is.

This volume of selected translations and its ancillary volume form a pilot scheme for a larger plan to translate the entire Pāli Canon, with Commentaries and Sub-Commentaries, into English. The texts chosen are key ones: Suttas 1, 2, 9, 15, 16, 22, 26, 28, 29 and 31 - a list which could be recommended for introductory reading to anyone interested in this Nikāya, though not necessarily in that order (No.22, on the Foundations of Mindfulness is the most vital for practice, while No.31, with its advice to layfolk, and No.16, on the Buddha’s last days, are in different ways perhaps the most appealing). The Burma Pāli Association, founded by former Premier U Nu, aims to provide an authoritative version under the guidance of experts. The introduction explains how this is to be achieved, with final decisions on doubtful points being made by the Sangha Advisory Board of the Association. Thus a high degree of accuracy (or at least orthodoxy of interpretation) would seem to be assured. However, despite this, there are some distinctly curious renderings. I mention one or two (quoted here by Sutta and paragraph as in the PTS edition).

Normally, great care is taken with technical terms which are often left in the original Pāli with parenthetical explanations or footnotes. It is all the more surprising that this procedure is departed from in a well-known passage. In the Bhāmajjā Sutta (1.2.27) we find the famous tetrallemma about whether the Tathāgata exists after death, or does not exist, or both, or neither. Some very learned articles have been written about this problem, both from the Theravāda and Mahāyāna viewpoints. One is therefore a little surprised to find the rendering here: ‘whether there is life after death... whether there is no life after death...’ (which is surely not, just like that, the issue!). The only elucidation offered is a laconic footnote: ‘Literally, whether a sentient being exists after death...’, although the text in fact has ‘Tathāgata’. The reason, as the ‘general reader’ cannot guess, is that the Commentary glosses Tathāgato (the Buddha’s normal way of referring to himself) as satta ‘being’. The fourfold question recurs at 20.30 (p.422f.) and here the rendering (without footnote or cross-reference) is: ‘A being exists after death...’ etc. Without going further into the intricacies of the case, it may be suggested that the translators here have played less fair with the reader. Rather similarly, in the well-known Buddha-formula given at 2.8, Sugata (lit. ‘well-gone’), which is usually rendered ‘Well-farer’ or the like, is translated somewhat cumbersomely ‘that he speaks only what is beneficial and true’ - with no explanation of this obviously non-literal rendering.

Another unexplained oddity occurs at 16.2.8, where the Buddha is made to refer to the ‘Mirror of Wisdom’, glossed (after the Sub-Commentary) as ‘Mirror of Magga [i.e. Path] Insight’. This is fair enough, but the Pāli is dharmadāsa ‘mirror of Dharma’, and not pāññādāsa as the translation presupposes. If there is a Burmese variant to this effect, the PTS edition does not record it. More such matters could be raised if space permitted, but I must content to mention one or two more small points. The jhāna-factor, pīti, always difficult to render, is here called ‘delightful satisfaction’, which is clumsy but better than the frequent ‘apture’, and much better than Ṛṣanomoli’s ‘happiness’, a term more suited to sukha, from which pīti has to be clearly distinguished. But why not simply ‘delight’? More comical than this is the rendering ‘ruling class’ for Ṱhattriya at 16.6.24. I hastily looked to see if sutta was translated as ‘working class’, but it does not appear to occur in the present selection. One is reminded of Ṛṣanomoli’s too bright idea of rendering brāhmaṇa as ‘divine’ (noun) in his Majjhima translation. Finally, a quibble over the spelling Sāṅgha for the more usual Sangha. The m, over- or underdotted, is confusing to the uninitiated, and when, as often, the dot is omitted, positively misleading. Since Sangha (which will probably soon make the English dictionaries)* gives a good guide to the pronunciation, Buddhists should agree to use it in English, and as there is no difference here between Sanskrit and Pāli, this should be acceptable to all schools. The PTS Dictionary lends authority to its use even in Pāli.

The style of the translation is reasonably happy if one overlooks the intrusive parenthetic explanations and the continuos use of original Pāli terms. Needless archaisms in the Rhys Davi
mode are avoided, but it should be noted that this is a provisional version subject to revision. Suggestions for improvement are invited (and some offered here). There are several appendices giving useful details of much (for many readers) obscure matters as the eight abhisibbhañāna jhānas, and there is a helpful index. The text is followed by 200 pages of names of subscribers of 1300 kysts or over. If this list were omitted, the second part of the work could easily be included in the same volume. This second part contains an essay on the three fundamental concepts, i.e., sīla, saṁādhi, paññas, the saṁādhi section including a lucid account of the meditation method taught by the late Mahasi Sayadaw. The author of all this part, and of much of the rest, is ex-Premier U Nu. Although much valuable information is given, the whole is less than a sufficient running commentary for most Western readers and an air of dogmatism sometimes obtrudes, even down to the bald statement (p.112) that the Buddha's Parinibbāna occurred in 544 B.C. - a traditional but not particularly probable date.

But despite whatever few captious criticisms one may make, this venture is of course to be warmly welcomed. It is an enormous task that has been undertaken, but Burma contains many devoted and learned scholars both in and out of the robe. Let us hope that they will succeed in bringing the project to fruition in the foreseeable future - i.e. before the end of this century.

Maurice Walsh

[Ed.: In fact 'Sangha' is included not only in the third supplement to the OED (1982), but even in the Concise Oxford Dictionary (1982)].


This new version of what is probably the oldest sutta on paticcasamuppāda follows the now tried and tested pattern of Bhikkhu Bodhi's previous translations: an introductory essay, the text of the Sutta in English and a translated selection of all doctrinally relevant passages from the Commentary and Sub-Commentary. These are followed by an appendix and two tables, glossary and index. If it is true, as is claimed, that this doctrine is one of inexhaustible profundity, at least this little book goes far towards elucidating it in its more accessible aspects. Concerning which, a small story and a personal comment. I still recall, at a Buddhist Society summer school some years ago, hearing somebody declare that 'dependent origination' was easy to understand, and my own rather naughty pleasure in telling the gentleman concerned of the Buddha's rebuke to Ananda on this very subject.

To be fair, however, it must be added that that speaker may have been at least dimly aware of the contemptuous dismissal of the whole formula by some Western scholars as some kind of illogical humbug. It is in fact not very hard to see, in an elementary way, the logic of the formulation. Indeed, its pedagogical value would have been very slight if this had not been the case. And it is just this elementary logic which can tempt us into thinking we have understood it more thoroughly than we really have!

As is known, the presentation of the paticcasamuppāda formula in the Dīgha Nikāya has its own peculiarities. Of its three 'appearances', that at the end of Sutta 1 is very partial, with a mere mention of the steps from phassa onwards. Sutta 14 gives all but the first two, while the present Sutta 15, though entirely devoted to this subject, has the same progression as in 14 but omits sajāyādana, thus giving only nine links instead of the usual twelve (and thus the twelve do not appear in this Nikāya at all). In compensation, there is an excursus dealing with some additional 'consequences' after tanhā, and for good measure the Sutta ends with a discussion of the problem of self, and with the 'Seven Stations of Consciousness' and the 'Eight Emancipations'. This Sutta as such has been comparatively little treated in the literature. The PTS translation, it should be noted, is not by T.W. Rhys Davids but by his wife, who also wrote the introduction and, probably, most of the notes which, though learned and valuable, bear the marks of her more temperamental style (though not yet, fortunately, the signs of her later aberrations of interpretation). Content apart, Bhikkhu Bodhi's coolly analytic style certainly makes a greater appeal to this reviewer.
at least. Apart from two Wheel publications, this Sutta seems to have come in for little special treatment: perhaps the best discussion of it previous to the work under review is by A.K. Warder in Chapter V of his Indian Buddhism (rev. ed., Delhi 1980). This draws, unlike Bhikkhu Bodhi's work, on the Chinese versions as well as the Pali, although it is somewhat vitiated by the author's extraordinary translations of technical terms ('emotion' for vedanā is the worst).

The Introduction (pp.1-51) begins by placing the theme of the Sutta in the context of the Pali Canon as a whole (though not, as with Warder, in relation to Mahāyāna versions). Patice-saṇuppāda of course, for which Bhikkhu Bodhi's preferred rendering is 'dependent arising', occurs in various places, but especially in a series of suttas in the Sāyutta Nikāya. Its importance (p.1) is for two reasons: it provides the teaching with its primary ontological principle, and also with the framework that guides its programme for deliverance, a causal account of the origin and cessation of suffering. These describe 'the fundamental pattern of experience as such', but 'it takes a Buddha to point to the startling truth that the basic pattern of our experience in itself the source of our bondage.' Systematically we are taken through the salient points of exegesis. Dependent arising is called 'deep' for four reasons: depth of meaning, of phenomena, of teaching, of penetration. Thus the first looks back from the effect to its condition and the second from condition to effect, the third refers to the diversity of methods used by the Buddha to expound dependent arising, while the fourth, 'depth of penetration' (pativedha) is especially important, involving as it does the definition of dhamma 'phenomena'. These have both 'particular characteristics' determining them as things of a particular sort, and 'general characteristics', especially those of anicca, dukkha and anattā; through these each dhamma's nature is penetrated by insight. While the Commentary enumerates the principal characteristics of each factor, the Sub-Commentary provides further elucidation.

The Buddha explains the consequences of not understanding dependent origination, which are further entanglement in defilements and wrong views and consequent inability to escape the weary round of rebirths. 'The penetration of dependent arising therefore becomes a matter of the utmost urgency. It is the gateway to liberation through which all must pass who seek deliverance from the round' (p.9). In the first main division of the Sutta, §§ 2-22, we have the detailed account of dependent arising, while the second, §§ 23-32, investigates different views of self. A final part, §§ 33-36, goes on to other matters we shall mention shortly. (I am glad to note that, in contradistinction to his ārahamāyāna version, Bhikkhu Bodhi here retains the paragraph numbers of the PTS edition and translation. He also sensibly quotes other canonical references by a dual method, e.g. A II.76/1.223.) In the first part we are taken through the series, first in reverse order from aging and death back to consciousness being dependent on mentality-materiality, and then in forward order up to aging and death. This approximates to the treatment in Sutta 14 except that here not only ignorance and the volitional formations (saṅkhārā) but also the six sense-bases are absent. Here, dependent arising is explained in terms of indispensability which (p.11) 'cautions us against interpreting it as a principle of causal necessitation'. It is, incidentally, for precisely this reason that the present reviewer objects, and has objected in the case of other books, to the use of the word 'causation', which is profoundly misleading in a matter where there is already confusion enough. The point is (and it is surely not an 'abstruse' as Bhikkhu Bodhi makes out), that in some cases the condition can occur without arousing the dependent state - and this makes deliverance possible. The most important such case is at the link between feeling and craving: by cutting (with the sword of wisdom, as one might say) at this point, craving can be prevented from arising (p.12) 'a movement is made in the direction of cessation'. (Incidentally, the absurdity of Warder's use of 'emotion' for vedanā is made manifest here, since it is precisely by the inhibition of an 'emotional' response (tanha) that that vital step in the direction of deliverance is made.) An excursion at tanha is a unique feature of this Sutta, dealing with the social consequences of craving (pp.16f.).

With, as noted, the omission of the six sense-bases, the Sutta proceeds backwards to what Bhikkhu Bodhi calls (p.22) 'the
hidden vortex', i.e. the reciprocal conditionality of viññāna and nāma-rūpa (as found also in Sutta 14). We are warned that the description here of consciousness 'descending' into the womb is metaphorical, with an appropriate reference to the Buddha's criticism of Śādi's wrong view in M 38. The disclosure of this interdependence of consciousness and mentality-materiality has, we are told, momentous consequences: it provides the middle way between the opposing concepts of eternalism and annihiliationism. All this is brilliantly explained on pp.27-32. In the following section, headed 'The Pathway for Designation', Bhikkhu Bodhi devotes considerable ingenuity to explaining the relevance of the words '(it is) to this extent that there is a pathway to designation...'. Referring back to the Buddha's words in D 9 ('These, Citta, are merely names, expressions, turns of speech, designations in common use in the world. And of these a Tathāgata makes use, indeed, but he does not misapprehend them'), we are led to the distinction between conventional and ultimate truth. Discussion then proceeds to another important topic, that of 'self', all the worldling's different views on which are due to the entanglement in a 'tangled skein' as mentioned in the beginning of the Sutta. This subject is further developed, following §§ 27-32 of the Sutta, under the heading 'Considerations of Self'. The final section (pp.47-51, covering §§ 33-36) deals with 'The Liberated One'. Here, Bhikkhu Bodhi concentrates on the distinction between the two main types of Arahant, the paññāvimutta and the ubhāro bhāgavimutta. He states (p.50) that the twofold liberation of the latter should not be confused with the two liberations (ceto visutti and paññāvimutti) so often mentioned. He devotes little space to a discussion of the Seven Stations of Consciousness and Two Bases, and the Eight Emancipations actually mentioned in the text at this point. Could this be because, without perhaps wishing to say so, he shares my suspicion that this whole passage is a scholastic addition of late date?

It only remains to add that the translation is clear and readable, and the selection of commentarial material judicious. The appendix relating the links of paññācasamuppāda to the twenty-four 'conditional relations' of the Abhidhamma is most helpful, as are the two tables showing respectively the standard twelve-link series and the Mahānidāna version, and the tabulation of the Seven Stations and Two Bases. All in all, an extremely valuable contribution to the study of a difficult but fundamental aspect of Dhamma.

Maurice Walshe


Here is a compact book which gives an excellent overview of the Buddha's Teachings in one of the earliest accounts of his own words as preserved in the Khuddaka Nikāya of the Pali Canon. Before the arrangement of the Canon as we have it now possibly its contents were found as independent pieces, such as the 'Eights' and 'The Way to the Beyond'. Originally in Pali verse, the translator has made a clear prose rendering in English which brings out the meaning well. The writer is amply qualified to translate this difficult text as he is a scholar of repute and one of the most senior Buddhist monks in Britain.

Every aspect of the Buddha's teaching is covered in this work, from conversations with farmers and brahmans round to profound instructions to monks and other seekers of the Way. As an example of the first there is Kasi the brahmin farmer (1, 4) who reproaches the Buddha for not ploughing and sowing which leads to the Buddha's rejoinder on interior cultivation. As an example of brahminical superior attitudes there is the protagonist in The Outcast (1, 7) and the Buddha's pungent reply on what kind of human being is truly and outcast. Another brahmin (Kassapa) accuses the Buddha of eating meat ('that has a rotten stench', literally) and then has to listen while the latter speaks of the real rotten stench's of this world: 'taking life, beating.
wounding, binding, stealing, lying, deceiving, worthless knowledge, adultery: this is stench, not the eating of meat...' (II, 2).

Apart from dialogues, brahmans are told how to behave (II, 7) by a code of conduct which would be very suitable for anyone leading the household life today. More on the same subject is found in II, 4 where a synopsis is given of both lay life and the monks' way of living. There are also several discourses on how a monk behaves, such as at II, 6, 13, etc.

However, while many monks lived together there were a number of others who preferred eremitic existence, the muni, or sages, so often mentioned in this text. There is the Muni Discourse for instance (I, 12), which speaks of this ideal, while earlier in the work The Unicorn's Horn (actually a Rhino's! [Ed.: lit. 'a single-horned' animal as in the Indian rhinoceros!]) praises this way of life in forty-one verses: 'Having abandoned the harming of living beings, not tormenting even one of them, let one not wish for a son, not to speak of a friend! Let one live alone like a unicorn's horn...'. The qualities of a muni are also listed in a sutta in the book's fourth part (IV, 10).

This type of solitary existence is really only successful if one is mature spiritually. Many would like to 'live alone like a unicorn's horn' for the wrong reason: that they cannot stand other people! Their hermit life would be embittered, full of hatred and frustration at not enjoying the pleasures that are dear to most people. For this reason, hermit life is only permitted in the Sangha (Buddhist Order) after having lived with a teacher and other pupils for a minimum of five years. 'The Boat' (II, 8) gives the standards for choosing a good and learned teacher. Having found one, he will give one the training so that one has a wholesome attitude (II, 9) and, when one is lazy, exhort one to make more effort (II, 10).

There are, in this collection, two or three discourses of an autobiographical nature where the Buddha speaks about events in his own life. For instance in III, 11 he gives an account of his own birth, while in III, 1 and 2 are found some details of his leaving the palace and his later, extreme ways of striving.

Another famous trio of Buddhist discourses is also found here: the discourses on Loving-kindness (I, 8), on Jewels (II, 1) and on Auspicious Performances (II, 4), though these words are a rather clumsy translation of the word mañgala which means blessings, what is auspicious (usually in a superstitious way). These three suttas are frequently chanted in Buddhist countries and many people know them by heart.

However, besides the more popular material, this book also contains very thought-provoking subject-matter, such as the long and profound discourse on the Twofold Insight (III, 12). Here, the Buddha expounds two sides of many factors beginning with suffering and ending with the Teachings of the Way Things Are. It is said that many monks reached Enlightenment on hearing this discourse.

The Chapter of the Eight (IV) also contains many profound instructions in very brief compact form. It has as well a number of discourses about religious debates and their general futility (8, 9, 11, 12, 13). Debates were a popular part of Indian religious life and the contestants had to employ the strict standards of logic or else be judged to have lost the dispute. Anger, or at least animosity, was often aroused in the course of debate and the Buddha warns people against fruitless arguments.

Perfect freedom in which there is no craving, either for existence or non-existence, is the subject of two suttas, V, 14 and 15. It is generally assumed that the monk or nun will have more time and opportunity to approach this freedom so we find quite a number of discourses about or addressed to members of the Sangha. These are scattered throughout the book and make good reading for the laity too. When one reads them then one shakes off complacency and sloth, and thinks 'I must not become lazy with my Dhamma practice'.

The last section of the work (V) was probably an independent piece at one time as, with its prologue and epilogue, it gives the story of sixteen brahmans and how they approach the Buddha to ask questions, each one having different spiritual problems to put to him. Here is part of the dialogue of the Buddha with Upasāva:

6. It is like a flame struck by a sudden gust of wind'.

said the Buddha. In a flash it has gone out and nothing more can be known about it. It is the same with a wise man freed from mental existence: in a flash he has gone out and nothing more can be known about him.'

7. 'Please explain this clearly to me, Sir', said Upasiva. 'You, a wise man, know precisely the way things work: has the man disappeared, does he not exist, or is he in some state of perpetual well-being?'

8. When a person has gone out, then there is nothing by which he can be talked about. That by which he can be talked about is no longer there for him; you cannot say that he does not exist. When all ways of being, when all phenomena are removed, then all ways of description have also been removed.'

In conclusion, the publishers are to be congratulated on bringing out this most useful and inspiring translation. This is a nicely printed book the proof-sheets of which have been carefully read. Now the reviewer invites you to read it in the same way and to put some of it into practice in your life.

Phra Khantipalo


It is a commonplace among students of Indian literature that whereas the Hindus, Jains and Buddhists all made use of literary works for propaganda and educational purposes, the Buddhists made far less use of literature to these ends than members of the other two great Indian religions. Certainly, as a general statement, this is true. There is, for example, no Buddhist version of the Mahābhārata or Rāmāyana to rival the great Hindu epics and their numerous Jain counterparts. Nevertheless, when we come to examine the field of Indian 'Classical' poetry, which

is how Prof. Lienhard renders the word kāyça (otherwise known as 'ornate poetry' or Kunstdichtung), we find that Buddhist writers have an enviable record, and in many cases seem to have been the first to compose in particular fields.

In the general survey of kāyça which Lienhardprefixes to his account of the works of individual poets, he divides such poetry into two classes: minor (laghu-) and major (mahā-) kāyça. The verse component of the latter is canto poetry (sarga-bandha). It is evident that Buddhist poets made outstanding contributions to both verse categories. The minor category includes poems of single verses and also multiple-stanza compositions. In the single stanza class the Buddhists show all the signs of being innovators, since the Pāli Theragāthā and Therīgāthā collections (probably fifth-third centuries B.C.) are several centuries earlier than the great Prakrit Sattasāl anthology by Hāla (probably first century A.C.). This collection of 700 single-stanza poems shows the dhvani theory of implied meaning much further developed than in the Pāli works. Hāla's compilation, however, being an anthology, doubtless contains verses from an earlier period and its pattern, with an emphasis upon secular life, suggests that both it and the Pāli collections, with their intermingling of secular and religious aspects, were based upon an even earlier lyrical tradition going back perhaps as far as 500 B.C. It is noteworthy that Lienhard barely mentions the Pāli Dhanmapada; he does not regard its verses as being kāyça, but dismisses them as being almost entirely didactic or epigrammatic, and hence far removed from the poetic style of kāyça.

Among the multiple-stanza types of laghu-kāyça, the earliest hymns in the stotra class, the religious songs of praise, are also Buddhist. Mārceṣa wrote his hymns in Sanskrit (first-second century A.C.), as did Nāgārjuna (second century) and a number of other Buddhist poets, including King Harṣa (seventh century). In Pāli we find the Pajjamadhu, the Telakaṭhāgāthā, the Paṇḍagatidīpanī (always referred to by Lienhard as -dīpanī, for some unknown reason), and the Anāgatavamsa, all of which were composed between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries. A Buddhist author also tried his hand at carmina figurata (ciltra-kāyça). In the Pāli Jinālaṇkaṇa, not mentioned by Lienhard in his account
of this elaborate type of highly intricate poetry displaying immense linguistic virtuosity, Buddharakkhitā made the same use of literary figures, such as restricting a verse to the use of a single consonant (e.g. verse 105, which consists entirely of the consonant n), as is found in the Sanskrit examples of this genre. Buddharakkhitā wrote in the twelfth century, doubtless under Sanskrit influence.

It is in the single stanza poems of the laghu-kāvyā that Lienhard believes that kāvyā had its beginnings, rather than in the long poems of more than one canto, and he accordingly rejects the claim of Vālmīki's Ramāyana to be the ādi-kāvyā. He maintains that the sarga-bandhas, consisting of two or more cantos, arose as the result of a long period of assimilation which united the lyrical and epic traditions. In this field too the Buddhists can claim authorship of the oldest extant poems known to us. Āvaghoṣa, whose Buddhacarita and Saundarananda are the earliest mahākāvyas we possess, lived in the first or second century A.C. Although writers of mahākāvyas must have existed between his time and the fourth century, their works have not survived. At the beginning of the fifth century came Kālidāsa, acknowledged as the greatest of the Old Indian poets, and it is clear that, although Āvaghoṣa may justly be called the earliest of the mahā-kāvyas poets, he in no way attained the polish, balance and artistic maturity of Kālidāsa, whose Kunārāsambhava and Raghuvamsā dominate the sarga-bandha field, just as his Meghadūta does that of the multiple-stanza laghu-kāvyā style. The following centuries saw the appearance of Bhārtṛ, Bhrāavi, Māgha and finally, in the twelfth century, Sṛṅgha, who constituted a glittering galaxy of poets, responsible for the most famous masterpieces of Indian literature.

In this later period the Buddhists seem to a large extent to have eschewed the arts. Their retirement into their vihāras and their abandonment of literature, even for religious purposes, has seemed to some historians to be responsible, in part, for the total eclipse of Buddhism in the land of its birth at the hands of the Mughal invaders, whereas Jainism, which was far more involved with popular literature, survived, albeit on a restricted scale. The Jains, at this period, were far more devoted to the poetic muse than the Buddhists although, since they used their poems for propaganda purposes, their literary standard was not always very high.

Even so, there are some Buddhist writers of sarga-bandhas at this time. The Kashmirī Śivasvāmin wrote his Kappphīnābhudaya in the latter half of the ninth century, and a writer called Buddhaghoṣa (not to be confused with the great commentator) wrote his Padyacūdāmi, telling the life-story of the Buddha in kāvyā form, at about the same time. Towards the end of the thirteenth century Medhasūra wrote a life of the Buddha in Pāli entitled Ānacarita. The Avadānakalpalatā, a collection of Buddhist birth stories, written in the twelfth century by the Kashmirī Kṣemendra, is identified as narrative literature rather than kāvyā by Lienhard, although he comments upon the fact that many didactic and narrative works stand on the threshold of being classical poetry.

The Buddhist contribution to the field of mahākāvyā outside sarga-bandha was not large. There seems to be no Buddhist example of prose kāvyā, wherein Dandin, Subandhu and Bāṣa excelled in the seventh century, unless the prose portions of the Pāli Kunāśa-jātaka, not mentioned by Lienhard, can perhaps be regarded as falling into this category. In the campū style, consisting of mixed prose and verse, which flourished from the tenth century onwards, the sole Buddhist work mentioned by Lienhard is the Hathavanagallavihāravamsa, a twelfth-century work from Ceylon, which may well be simply an imitation of the Sanskrit works which were known in Ceylon at that time. Lienhard considers the claims of Āryāśūra's Jātakamāla (probably fourth century) to be included in this class, but decides that the prose and verse of this work are not both intended to be kāvyā. The prose is merely intended to be narrative or introductory, on the same pattern as the prose introductions and interludes in various suttas of the Sutta-Nipāta, and he accordingly omits Āryāśūra's compositions from consideration, as being narrative literature.

Lienhard points out that kāvyā poetry was composed all over India in a variety of languages, but he declares his intention of restricting his survey to poetry in Sanskrit, Pāli and Prakrit. The greater number of the works discussed in this book are in Sanskrit, although the Hindus and Jains, particularly the latter,
also wrote in Prakrit. The Buddhists made use of Sanskrit and Pali, with one or two writers composing works in Prakrit. Inevitably the names of the Pali works and authors also occur in the present reviewer’s Pali Literature, published in the same series, but the overlap is surprisingly small. Lienhard’s aim is to assess the literary value of a work, whereas the aim in Pali Literature was rather descriptive and analytical. The two volumes will be found to complement, rather than duplicate, each other.

K.R. Norman


This book contains the edition of a late text from the epistemological tradition of Buddhism together with a short introduction and an index of important words. It does not contain, in contradiction to the title, an apparatus criticus, nor, besides that, a list of the abbreviations used, a bibliography, or an index of the works and authors cited in the text.

The edition is based on a single incomplete Sanskrit manuscript. Although the editor does not say on which manuscript he based his edition, his statement of ‘gratitude to... Rāhul Sākṛtyāyana for his discovery of many valuable Buddhist MSS’ (p.XIII), and the reproduction of two pages of the manuscript (Facing p.1) seems to make it sufficiently clear what material he used. The reproduced pages can be identified as folios 14 recto (= 2A VI) and 15 recto (= 2A VII) of the ‘Vādarahasya’, which was photographed by Sākṛtyāyana in Tibet; the negatives are now kept in the collection of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society, Patna. This manuscript has been described by Gudrun Bühnemann. No other manuscripts have turned up and no Tibetan translation of this text is available.

On the basis of the colophon of the second chapter, which reads: ‘udayananirakaranam vādarahasya...’ (p.43.7), the editor maintains that the title of the work should be ‘Udayanānirākaraṇam’. Bühnemann pointed out in her review of this book that ‘one should, however, take Vādarahasya as the title of the work and translate here: “In the Vādarahasya, the refutation of Udayana”.’ Vādarahasya is also the title under which Sākṛtyāyana lists this text.

Dr Pandey ascribes the Vādarahasya (= VR) to Ratnakīrti. His first argument for this is that in Udayana’s Ātmatattvvaviveka, he identifies a quotation from Ratnakīrti’s Apohasiddhi, which ‘indicates some connection between our work and RATNAKĪRTI’ (p. XI). Apart from being irrelevant, this argument also fails on account of the fact that the quotation is not from Ratnakīrti, but from Jñānaśīrimitra. Pandey’s second argument, that ‘all the works of Ratnakīrti begin invariably with a courteous salutation to the goddess TĀRA... The present work... has the same salutation at the out set’ (p.XI), is nullified insofar as three of Ratnakīrti’s works in the Ratnakīrtinibandhāvali do not carry this salutation. Besides this, such salutations seem to stem from the aribres of the manuscripts, as are also indicated by the different salutations found in Sanskrit texts and their Tibetan translations. Finally, since there seems to be no reference to Udayana in the Ratnakīrtinibandhāvali, and because the VR is nowhere ascribed to Ratnakīrti, one can only say with certainty that the author of the VR is unknown.

The VR was apparently written to defend Jñānaśīrimitra against the attacks of Udayana in his Ātmatattvaviveka. In its fragmentary form, the VR consists of three chapters, of which the third is incomplete. The first is called avayavanukhena kṣanīkatvamānānirākṣasya nirākaranam (p.19.10), and the second vyaśtrekārthha-bhāvadnyāyanirnaya (p.43.7). The third chapter is on apoha, starting with the words ihāpohe pratīcchyādhā vyudasyate (p.44.3).

The editor identifies many quotations, most of them from Udayana’s Ātmatatttvaviveka, Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika, and the works of Jñānaśīrimitra. In the third chapter there are, additionally, many quotations from Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika (svavrtti)7, whilst some extracts from the Hetubindu are especially interesting.

In view of the fact that the photographs of the manuscript of the VR are so difficult to read, one can only congratulate Dr Pandey for having deciphered and edited this text.
I thank Prof. Heinz Bechert for allowing me access to the copies of the Patna collection at Göttingen.


Pramāṇāntarabhāvaprakāraṇa, Vyāpāntināyana and Santānāntarādūṣaṇa.

These quotations are not identified by the editor: VR 36.10-15 = PVSV 145.14-21; VR 36.15-16 = PV I 277; VR 38.7-9 = PVSV 98.14-161; VR 38.17-21 = PVSV 100.20-24; VR 46.11-25 = PVSV 32.15-33.6; VR 46.26-47.20 = PVSV 33.9-34.14; VR 60.23-61.21 = PVSV 25.26-27.2; VR 62.16-21 = PVSV 29.70-28; VR 63 16-24 = PVSV 31.6-17; VR 65.25-66.6 = PVSV 48.24-49.7; VR 66.14-25 = PVSV 49.21-50.10; VR 67.13-14 = PVSV 52.10-22 (PVSV = Pramāṇavārttika(sva)vṛtti: R. Gomli The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmaśāstra, the first chapter with the autocommentary, Rome 1960).


Westerners are often puzzled at the Buddhist denial that there are 'selves'. Those who are hostile to Buddhism dismiss the doctrine of anatta as an obvious falsehood, while other more sympathetic writers, in an attempt to render Buddhism more compa-

tible with Western philosophy, have suggested that the existence of a self was never denied by the Buddha or the early Sangha. The text from the Dhammapada, 'The self in lord of the self', is often taken as substantiation of the latter viewpoint. Collins is justly critical of Christmas Humphreys' insistence that Buddhist affirms the existence of the self, albeit a changing one, and of R.C. Zehner's suggestion that the doctrine of anatta is a moral injunction to eliminate one's selfish ego.

Collins' analysis of the doctrine of anatta is a study in the history of ideas. He demonstrates how the doctrine was rooted in the brahmanical tradition of the Buddha's time, and aims to give a new account which will be both of interest to the specialist and comprehensible to the layperson who has no previous knowledge of Buddhism.

Much of Collins' discussion inevitably draws on the distinction between 'conventional' and 'ultimate' truth. At the level of everyday conversation, he contends, it is perfectly in order to make statements about the existence and identities of selves, but such statements are not 'ultimately true' - that is to say, they cannot count as true statements if one is talking either in the sphere of philosophy or of psychology. Since philosophical and psychological statements are demarcated as those which lay claim to 'ultimate truth', it follows that nirvāna is attained by recognizing the truth of anatta, first on a doctrinal (philosophical) level, and secondly, in psychological appropriation.

Collins emphasises that the Buddha's role as a spiritual healer does not imply that he was indifferent to matters of doctrine. To make such a claim would be to confuse the 'right view' of the Eightfold Path with the doctrine of 'no view' which was held by certain sceptical philosophical contemporaries of the Buddha. The fourteen 'unanswered questions' of the Buddha are not to be avoided purely on the grounds that a spiritual antidote to a poisonous wound is preferable to speculation about the characteristics of the archer who fired the poisoned arrow. Rather, questions such as 'Are self and the world eternal?' or 'Does the Tathāgata exist after death?' are unanswerable because they contain erroneous presuppositions, namely that there exists a self, a Tathāgata, and a 'world-soul', whose continued existence
one can proceed to debate. Interestingly, Collins compares the 'unmaskability' of such questions with recent Western philosophical debate about the analysis of sentences like 'The present King of France is bald': such a statement, although meaningful, can be neither true nor false since there is no present King of France.

Considerable space is given to Buddhist imagery which often occasions confusion amongst Western scholars. The Buddhist comparison between the physical body and a house does not imply that the self is the occupier with the senses as doors (165-76). The chariot has no 'axle of immortality' (232). The reappearance of a fire's flame merely corresponds to the reappearance of mental phenomena (230). River imagery (which receives extensive treatment) is only used in the Theravāda tradition to refer to the forward flow of desire (247-61). Vegetation imagery (218ff) is suggestive of the fact that states of consciousness are either 'seeded' or 'unseeded', and thus what we take to be a self is no more than a stream of bhavaṅga (constituents of consciousness) connected together by karma. The doctrine of the nīdānas demonstrates how the wheel of life turns without any underlying self acting as a causal agent.

I believe that Collins has been eminently successful in his aim of presenting the doctrine of anatta in a form capable of being understood by Westerners, and it is to be hoped that the many Western philosophers who are currently dabbling in the philosophy of comparative religion will pay serious attention to this important volume. Collins has also done Western scholars the service of identifying fundamental points of contact and difference between East and West. Thus, David Hume and the more recent writer Derek Parfit are cited as having affinities to the anatta doctrine. Equally, there are enormous gulfs between the respective traditions, and Collins notes that what are regarded as straightforward logical fallacies in the West - such as an appeal to the teacher's spiritual authority - become the very tools of the trade in the Buddhist tradition. Collins does not attempt to explore these East-West relationships in any depth: to do so would demand a completely different book. But Western scholars would do well to pursue such issues, having been given such a clear and reliable guide to unfamiliar and difficult territory.

George Chryssides


This short book consists of a paper delivered by the author to members of the Western Buddhist Order on the occasion of its sixteenth anniversary in April 1984. Accordingly, the views expressed reflect the particular approach to Buddhism adopted by the Order, although most of the substantive content is unexceptionable and based on traditional sources.

The 'Ten Pillars' of the title are the moral rules known in the Canon as the 'Ten Good Paths of Action' (dāsa-kuśala-karmapātha) and referred to here as the 'Ten Precepts'. It is this particular formulation of moral precepts which the author considers best encapsulates Buddhist ethics; accordingly he describes it as the mūla-prātimokṣa and adopts it as a body of training precepts (tīksāpadā).

The book is divided into two almost equal parts: Part One considers the ten precepts collectively from various angles while Part Two examines them individually in turn. Whereas Part One is informative at an introductory level the more interesting material is found in Part Two, where the author explores some of the ramifications of Buddhist ethical principles in contemporary life. At the outset he rightly draws attention to the tendency among Western aficionados to bypass the 'elementary' teachings of Buddhism, such as its moral precepts, in order to explore 'the secrets of Tantra or the mysteries of Zen' (p.48). Following this, in the discussion of the precepts themselves, an attempt is made to relate them to daily life which results in some interesting conclusions with respect to the lifestyle and political stance a Buddhist should adopt. By virtue of the first precept, it is suggested, a Buddhist should be vegetarian, show concern for the environment and be opposed to the production and deployment of nuclear weapons (indeed all weapons). Similarly, according to the second precept, common ownership of property should be the ideal and legalised force is sanctioned to achieve this end:

'In a democratic country, a more equitable distribution of property or wealth can be achieved through legislation,
which means in effect the forcible expropriation of the minority by the majority...' (p.62).

On this point it is not clear how 'forcible expropriation' can be squared with the prohibition on 'taking what has not been given'. Nevertheless, alongside these somewhat left-wing views there is a counterbalancing 'hard line' on abortion and debt, both of which are condemned without equivocation.

Throughout Part Two the positive side is well brought out: thus as well as prohibiting killing, the first precept requires that we love one another. The positive implications of each of the ten are well explained, the rationale for the third being particularly interesting.

One minor point of criticism concerns the rendering of kusala as 'skilful'. Although this is the practice of most translators it seems inappropriate to use what in English is a non-moral term when a clear moral sense is implied. We speak of almsgiving as a good deed, not a 'skilful' one.

Overall, the book is a handy and easily-readable introduction to Buddhist ethics. Although the more problematic topics are not pursued at any length it will be helpful as the basis of discussion and reflection upon the practical implications of being a Buddhist.

Daaien Keown

STOP PRESS: New congress announced

Preliminary details have just been received of an 'Extraordinary World Congress of Philosophy' to be held in Córdoba, Argentina, from 20 - 26 September. Its theme 'Man, Nature, History' will be developed in five plenary sessions. Seminars and discussions are planned and a special Commission includes Oriental Philosophy. Languages to be used are English, French and Spanish. For details contact: Congreso Internacional Extraordinario de Filosofía, Pabellón Residencial, Estafeta Postal No.32, Ciudad Universitaria, 5000 Córdoba, Argentina.

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Welcome contributions to this journal, particularly in the field of early mainstream Buddhism and especially Buddhism in Central Asia except that, since they are adequately covered in the journals, Tibetan studies per se should be avoided.

Since this journal is produced by offset-litho, which necessitates the retyping of contributions after submission (and editing), it would be appreciated if contributions are typed double-spaced. For the same reason, proofs are not available for checking by contributors, but a copy of the final typescript can be supplied if specifically requested.

Only titles of published books and technical terms need to be italicised (or underlined), with the exception of those words which have become part of the English language, e.g. Dharma, karma, kamma/karma, Nirvāṇa, sūtra/sutta, etc.

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