Faith, modesty and giving are the things most praised by worthy people. 'In truth, that is a divine way', they say; because by means of it the world of the gods is reached.

2. The avaricious do not go to the world of the gods. Foolish are they who do not praise giving; but a person of faith rejoices in giving, and hence he finds happiness in the other world.

3. Faith is the greatest richness of mankind. The Doctrine, when well observed, brings happiness. Truth is indeed the sweetest of drinks. A life of wisdom is said to be the best of lives.

4. Faith in the Doctrine of the Noble Ones leads to Nirvāṇa. Whoever wishes to learn (the Doctrine) acquires wisdom everywhere.

5. By means of faith, the river is crossed, by means of heedfulness, so is the sea; by means of vigour, suffering is dispelled; by means of wisdom, purification is acquired.

6. Faith is a person’s counterpart and praised by wisdom. The bhikṣu who delights in Nirvāṇa shatters the bond of existence.

7. Whoever possesses faith, morality, harmlessness, abstinence and moderation, of that intelligent and unblemished person it is said: 'He is a model of wisdom.'

8. Whoever possesses faith and morality, which is generosity, free of greed, is honoured wherever he goes.

9. The wise man who acquires faith and wisdom in the world of the living possesses the greatest treasure; his other treasures are not so valuable.

10. Whoever has the wish to see the Noble Ones, who delights in hearing the Good Doctrine, and who has dispelled the stains
of avarice, is called a man of faith.

11. As provisions the man of faith carries merit (with him), which it is very difficult for thieves to steal. A thief caught stealing is punished; āramanas who acquire (merit) are well-liked; (on seeing a āramaṇa processsing), the wise rejoice.

12. There are men who give according to their faith, or according to their wealth. Hence, whoever is irked by food and drink being given to others attains concentration neither by day nor by night.

13. He whose faults have been completely destroyed and cut down like the top of a palm-tree, will attain concentration by day and by night.

14. A man without faith should not be frequented; he is like a waterless lake: if it is dug, nothing but water smelling of mud is found.

15. The man who is wise and has faith should be frequented; a person who seeks water goes to the lake whose water is clear, calm, fresh and undisturbed.

16. One should not please while saying: (I am pleased; thus are men destroyed时尚) perturbed persons should be avoided and those who are calm frequented.

(End of Śraddhāvarga, 10)

17. Impermanence, Desire, Craving, Heedfulness, Affection, Morality, Good Conduct, Words, Karma (Action) and Faith: these are ten.

(Translated by Sara Hoin-Webb from the French of N.P. Chakravarti)

A NOTE AND RESPONSE TO 'THE BUDDHIST PERSPECTIVE ON RESPECT FOR PERSONS' (BSR 4, 1)

David Evans writes:

I read the above article with considerable admiration, feeling that the author had derived the Buddhist ethic from the general framework of ancient doctrine in a remarkably consistent and lucid way. However, two questions occurred to me after reading it.

The first point concerns his remarks on suicide which seem the least satisfactory part of the paper. Dr Harvey writes: '... suicide is an incredible waste (as well as being impossible, since one is reborn somewhere else, probably in a worse condition and has to carry on facing the problems of life)'. There seems to be some kind of contradiction here in that if it is 'impossible' it is not clear how it can be a 'waste', certainly not in the sense that it might be so considered if one believed in only one life and then deliberately cut it short. Perhaps the thought is that rebirth might not be as a human, but then if one regarded the present state as intolerably painful it would be natural to think that nothing could be 'worse' and take an optimistic view of whatever might ensue from the destruction of one's body.

The most illuminating text dealing with this important issue is 'The Discourse on Chāṇṇa'. In it an old monk who is sick and in pain states that he will take the knife to himself. Sāriputta fails to dissuade him and subsequently approaches Gotama for a judgement on what has happened. The answer is at M III 266 and runs (Horner's translation) '... whoever, Sāriputta, lays down this body and grasps another body, of him I say he is to be blamed. The monk Chāṇṇa did not do this; the monk Chāṇṇa took the knife to himself without incurring blame'. There are two inferences to be drawn here. The fact that suicide with a view to a better rebirth is specifically condemned may indicate that the monks did not equate such an act with any other form of killing and that it was a special problem for Gotama. This possibility is further supported in the very next discourse when
the monk Puñna speaks of '... disciples of the Lord who, dis-liked by the body... look about for a knife' (M III 269). I am inclined to conclude that belief in rebirth was quite likely to be an incentive to suicide. The other point, of course, is that Gotama's clear exoneration of Channa indicates that, on a broader level, he himself regarded the taking of one's own life as not comparable to any other act, and certainly not covered by the first precept. Moreover, the kinds of argument generally advanced in support of not harming others tend to start from an assumption clearly inapplicable in this sort of situation, namely that one values one's own life.

My second question arises from the various ways in which one might interpret the author's stance in relation to his own article. The title and introduction suggest that the view taken of personality by any system necessarily colours its approach to ethics, a view with which I am in complete agreement. However, in the case of Buddhism it is also clearly coloured by acceptance of the rebirth dogma, one outcome of which I have just examined. So consideration of the truth or otherwise of this doctrine would seem crucial, on the face of it, in relation to whether the ensuing ethic is viewed as 'very persuasive' or not.

I don't wish to go into the pros and cons of rebirth as such, but simply to suggest the various attitudes to this which might be maintained. Firstly, one might simply affirm the traditional orthodox position - rebirth is recognised as true on grounds of faith and moral questions are addressed accordingly, though differences of opinion about the relation between rebirth consciousness and kamma would still make a variety of positions possible. Secondly, one might be disinclined to give credence to rebirth in its own right, but promote it as an imaginative scenario precisely because of the way in which it provides support for a moral order. Like some approaches to Christianity this really reverses the traditional view of the relationship between morality and religious dogma, justifying the latter by reference to the former rather than the reverse. Thirdly, one might insist on treating the rebirth question quite independently and take the view that Buddhist 'ethics would necessarily require intellectual re-structuring in the light, either of the abandonment of the idea, or of deepened knowledge of what truth lay behind it. In the meantime some of the moral insights derived from the rebirth notion, e.g., the links between human and other life forms might be sustained from modern sources of knowledge such as evolutionary biology. My own position is certainly some kind of variant of this third approach.

Peter Harvey replies:

On this matter of suicide, I said that this was 'impossible' in the sense that it is not possible to cut off the life-continuum; it can only be transcended by the attainment of Nibbāna. The view that it is automatically cut off at death is an annihilationist view, frequently condemned by the Buddha as factually wrong (e.g. M I 402). Suicide is a 'waste' as it destroys a rare and precious opportunity: human life, with all its potential for spiritual development. Someone faced with some weighty suffering might indeed be 'optimistic' and kill himself in the hope of something less intolerable after death. The question is, though, whether a human life is to be thrown away on the grounds of a maybe. Because we want or hope something to be true does not make it so. Certainly, from the Buddhist perspective, the next rebirth might be less than human; and being an animal preyed on and eaten by others, or a 'hell-being', i.e. a being of tormented consciousness, might well be even more 'intolerably painful'. Even in the case of a human rebirth, there are many possible forms of severe suffering. In Buddhist practice, the teaching that suffering is inherent in life means that specific sufferings (of one's own) can be seen as not so very out of the ordinary. While trying patiently to live with any suffering that continues in spite of efforts to alleviate it, one may perhaps learn something of the nature of suffering. From a Buddhist perspective, killing oneself is only likely to lead to a continuation of the ripening of the kamma which led to the suffering of the previous life, along with the fruition of the kamma of killing oneself (if thus there be). Suicide, moreover, must be an act motivated by vibbāva-tanha, craving for annihilation. This form of craving manifests itself any time one wants to get rid of something unpleasant. In the case of suicide, it is where
one's whole situation is perceived to be so unbearable that one says 'no!' to it. The only type of self-killing which might not be motivated by such craving is that involved in the altruistic giving of one's life for the sake of others, as seen in certain aspects of the Bodhisattva tradition, most recently manifested in the Vietnam war, when a number of monks burnt themselves to death so as to bring the plight of the South Vietnamese people to the attention of the world (see Thich Nhat Hanh, The Lotus in the Sea of Fire, London 1967; also 'Self-Decreation in Mahāyāna Buddhism' in Walpolā Rabula's anthology Zen and the Taming of the Bull, London 1978).

One Buddhist idea which might lead in the direction of sanctioning some form of euthanasia is the idea of having a 'good death'. That is, dying in a reasonably calm and conscious state. If someone knew for certain that they would die soon, and that they would be in increasing pain, only maskable by drugs that rendered them semi-conscious, then they might choose to go sooner in a good state of mind, rather than later in a bad one. And yet such a path would cut short any opportunity perhaps to learn by going through a painful experience: certainly, the death of a nun at Amaravati Buddhist Centre (near Hemel Hempstead, Herts) not so long ago was felt by those who cared for her to be a very ennobling and uplifting experience. Furthermore, euthanasia would also be likely to leave a very bad taste, and self-recrimination, among the surviving family. Apart from such considerations, if one was not in fact bound for death in the near future, euthanasia would be throwing away the potential of human life.

M III 266 (cf. similar passages at S I 120, S III 119 and Thag 350-4), does indeed tell of a monk, Čanna, who kills himself. The reason that the Buddha said that he was blameless, however, was not that he didn't think suicide wrong, but because Čanna had the presence of mind, while dying, to attain arahantship. Once at this level, 'blame' is beside the point. The inference to be drawn from the fact that the Buddha said, 'whoever, Sāriputta, lays down this body and grasps after another body, of him I say he is to be blamed' is surely that anyone who kills himself and is reborn (one can't be re-born without grasping) is worthy of blame. Note that if Čanna had attained arahantship prior to his death, he would have had no motive for suicide (no craving for annihilation), as arahants are described as neither wanting nor not wanting death; they await it as a workman patiently waits for his wages. They did not, for example, go in for death by starvation, as certain Jain saints did. That some monks thought suicide an 'incentive to suicide' may well have been true (see S V 320ff. and Vin III 68ff.); but then the Vinaya describes errant monks and nuns doing all sorts of things.

The only thing implied by certain passages about the Buddha exonerating suicides who become arahants at the moment of death, is that if someone thinks they will have such presence of mind, the great risk of suicide might be worth taking. But then, if they have not got the presence of mind to attain enlightenment now, how likely is it that they will have it while they are dying? A discussion of cases similar to Čanna's can be found in Martin Wiltshire's 'The "Suicide" Problem in the Pali Canon', in the Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1983.

The fact that suicide does seem to come within the ambit of the first precept is the fact that the Buddha classified 'speaking in praise of suicide' as a breach of the third pārājīka rule, dealing with murder of a human being (Vin III 73). The four pārājīka rules are those whose breach involves 'defeat' in the monastic life, i.e. permanent expulsion. The four rules parallel the first four precepts and relate to: any form of sexual intercourse; stealing; bad breach of the first precept, by killing a human being, including procuring an abortion; and a bad breach of the precept on false speech, by claiming, to the laity, spiritual powers that one does not possess. The only reason suicide itself is not a pārājīka offence is that a dead monk can't be expelled from the Sangha.

As regards whether the kind of argument advanced for not harming others - that one values one's own life - is applicable in the case of suicide, I would say the following. The general rationale for the precepts is: don't do to others what you would not like them to do to you (S V 353-5). This does not allow, for example, the masochist to go round hurting others. He clearly has to learn to like himself more, by mettā practice. Similarly,
if someone does not value his own life, this does not allow him to go round killing others. The precepts' rationale, then, has to be taken in the context of a) what people generally don't like, and b) learning to have loving-kindness for oneself, overcoming ill-will (rooted in craving for annihilation) to aspects of one's existence.

On the matter of my 'stance' in the article, I wrote it both as an attempt to resolve the apparent paradox of ethics in a system which doesn't accept a substantial self, and to see what insights into this matter Buddhism might be able to share with other world-views. I would agree that the second of the three attitudes to rebirth outlined by David Evans is not very satisfactory as such. I also agree that, as one does not know that rebirth is true (or false), one has to keep something of an open mind on the matter. Nevertheless, I would hold that there are enough grounds for a practising Buddhist to work with the concept. As the Buddha's teaching is found to be true in many matters, it seems rational to trust his testimony on the matter of rebirth: that is, belief on the grounds of faith (saddha) tempered by wisdom (pañña). The Buddha clearly did not just accept the rebirth teaching from the Brahmanism of his day; at the time that the Buddha taught rebirth, materialists were denying it, agnostics were sceptical on it and the Ājivikas taught rebirth but not karma. The Buddha clearly felt that he had good empirical evidence for belief in rebirth: that derived from the 'threefold knowledge' gained on the night of his enlightenment. The importance he attached to teachings on rebirth is shown by the fact that he included these teachings in 'mundane' right view, which must be developed before the wisdom of Ariyan right view can be developed (M III 72). It can certainly be said that the rebirth perspective can help 'make sense' of many aspects of life, such as the suffering of the innocent, and there seems to be a fair body of current empirical evidence building up in favour of central features of the rebirth concept The most significant is the results of the research of Dr Ian Stevenson on 'spontaneous recall' in young children (e.g. his 20 Cases a Spontaneous Recall). While more open to some alternative explanations, the evidence of re-living past lives under hypnosis also seems significant (see, for example, J. Ivenson, 8re Lives Than One?.

London 1976). Such research, if taken as truly relating to rebirth, may bring new facets of rebirth to light, and perhaps modify a modern Buddhist's understanding of it: one anomaly, for me, is that it appears that consciousness does not always enter the womb at the moment of conception, but may do so much later. There also seems to be some evidence, as reported by Francis Story in his Rebirth as Doctrine and Experience (Kandy 1975), for a between-lives state. Such a state is denied in traditional Theravādin orthodoxy, though there seems to be considerable evidence for early belief in it in the Pali Canon (see my The Between-lives State in the Pali Suttas' in Perspectives on Indian Religions: Papers in Honour of Karol Werner, ed. Peter Connolly, Delhi 1986). Martin Wilson's Rebirth and the Western Buddhist (Wisdom, London, repr.1987) contains some interesting reflections on rebirth in the light of modern knowledge.

Finally, as regards whether Buddhist-type insights can be sustained by such modern sources of knowledge as evolutionary biology, I'm not so sure. The theory of evolution specifies evolution as taking place by survival of the fittest. The Social Darwinists saw this as lending support for laissez-faire capitalism and letting the poor sink or swim. Moreover, Sociobiologists emphasise that evolution concerns the survival of the fittest set of individual genes - not a species as a whole. So 'evolution' would seem to support an ethic of personal survival, helping others only when it has some perceivable pay-off for oneself, or at least aids the passing-on of genes similar to one's own (i.e. those of a close relative). As regards animals, an evolutionary ethic can sustain looking after other life forms on the grounds of possible advantage to humans, perhaps including aesthetic ones. It seems that it can only, though, express concern for species of other animals, and not so much for individual living beings. Nevertheless, such organisations as Greenpeace can certainly teach the Japanese, who have a Buddhist heritage, something about caring for 'the whole'! But then traditional Buddhist ethics, with its rebirth perspective, got considerably diluted in Japan.

* Ed. Readers may be interested by the inclusion in this issue of two studies on suicide in Buddhism which, despite some unavoidable overlapping, put the subject in proper perspective.
Whether of religious inspiration or not, suicide is hardly the usual theme of an academic lecture. To the Western mind it is a troublesome subject. We are none too sure whether it is a matter of morality, psychiatry or both, and should a thought of suicidal tendency chance to arise in our mind, we hurriedly swerve away from it by means of a simple auto-defensive reflex. And who would blame us?

Easterners in general and Buddhists in particular consider the problem more calmly, and with that sense of the relative which is characteristic of them.

Let us leaf through their voluminous treatises on morality and stop at the following passage:

If a monk, with deliberate intent, takes with his own hands the life of a human being or anything resembling a human being, if he himself gives him a weapon and tells him to kill himself; if he praises death to him; if for example he says to him, 'Fie on you! What good does this miserable life do you? Far better to die than live', in such a way that the other conceives in his heart a delight in dying; if in these various fashions he tells him to die or praises death to him, and later that man, because of this, dies, that monk is blame-worthy of a very grave offence and should be excluded from the Community.

The text is conclusive, you would say: Buddhists, in the name of their morality, condemn suicide. No! They prohibit an instigation to suicide, but leave each person free to end his own days. For them morality only rules our behaviour in relation to others, but does not impose on us any duty with regard to ourselves. When Buddhist morality prohibits murder, theft, sensual misconduct, ill-will and false views, this is because these bodily, vocal and mental misdeeds are harmful to others.
As to the rest, each acts according to his understanding.

The sage Nāgārjuna explains²:

According to the Treatise on Discipline, suicide is not murder. Fault and merit result respectively from a wrong done to others or the good done to others. It is not by caring for one's own body or killing one's own body that one acquires merit or commits a misdeed.

However, if suicide is not a moral fault properly speaking, it is nonetheless a conscious and voluntary action, subject as such to the law of Karma, that is, the fruition of actions. Good or bad, every human action is vitiated by desire and by the triple poison of greed, hatred and delusion. Every action brings in its wake a fruit of fruition to be gathered in the present existence or in future existences: pleasant fruit if the action is good, unpleasant if the action is bad. Good or bad, our actions draw us into the round of rebirth, into the world of rebecoming, an unpleasant world since it is unstable and subject to perpetual change.

The desire which vitiates action should be understood in its widest meaning: 1. the thirst for pleasure - a desire which awakens and takes root when faced with agreeable objects and pleasant ideas; 2. the thirst for existence - a desire associated with the belief in the continued enduring of existence; 3. the thirst for annihilation - a desire associated with the belief that everythings ends with death.

The desperate person who takes his own life obviously aspires to annihilation: his suicide, instigated by desire, will not omit him from fruition, and he will have to partake of the fruit of his action. In the case of the ordinary man, suicide is a folly and does not achieve the intended aim.

In contrast, suicide is justified in the persons of the Noble Ones who have already cut off desire and by so doing neutralised their actions by making them incapable of producing further fruit of fruition.

From the point of view of Early Buddhism, suicide is a normal matter in the case of the Noble Ones who, having completed their work, sever their last link with the world and voluntarily pass into Nirvāṇa, thus definitively escaping from the world of rebirths. This is the first form of suicide, which I would call suicide through disgust for the world.

I

The Noble Ones who normally practise this are the Buddhas, Pratyekabuddhas and Arhats.

The Buddhas are those fully and perfectly enlightened beings who, having acquired omniscience, expound the Buddhist Doctrine to mankind. The Pratyekabuddhas also understand perfectly the mechanism of cause and effect but, through fear of exhausting themselves uselessly, they do not teach. As for the Arhats, in the main these are disciples of the Buddha who, basing themselves on the Master's teaching, understand the general characteristics of phenomena: impermanence, suffering and impermanence, and who, owing to this wisdom, have eliminated the delusions and passions which attached them to the world.

Very often these Noble Ones, to whichever category they belong, take their own lives when they consider they have done what had to be done. Fully lucid, they pass into Nirvāṇa like a flame which is extinguished through lack of fuel. They will not be seen again by gods or men.

The last Buddha to appear in the world was Śākyamuni. He was born in India about 566 B.C. At the age of twenty-nine, he left home to take up the life of a religious mendicant. Six years later he reached enlightenment and thus became a Buddha. He taught the Buddhist Truths for forty-five years. Finally, in 486 B.C., when he was eighty years old, he entered Nirvāṇa.

This death or, if you prefer, this disappearance was voluntary. One day in Vaiśālī he declared³:

"Today my disciples are instructed, formed and intelligent; they will be able to refute all their adversaries, and the pure conduct I have taught is wide-spread throughout the whole world. Three months from today I shall enter Nirvāṇa". Having said this, he threw off his vital forces (āyusakhrāṃ oṣaṣṭi).

Three months later, at the hour he had fixed, he reached
the town of Kuśinagara and had his death-bed prepared in the Śāla Grove. There he lay down on his right side, with his head turned to the north. He entered the first absorption, and from one absorption to the next, went up to the ninth. The monks gathered around him thought him to be dead, as this absorption is a cataleptic state devoid of consciousness and feeling. However, he came down to the fourth, a state of consciousness and perfect lucidity. From there he passed into Nirvāṇa.

The Pratyekabuddhas are inferior to the Buddhas, but their deaths are often more spectacular. When Sākyamuni entered his mother's womb, five hundred Pratyekabuddhas were assembled in the Deer Park, present-day Sārnāth, a few kilometres from Vaiśālega. The appearance of a Buddha meant their stay here in this world was superfluous. They rose into the air to the height of seven palm trees and, having attained the fire-element, burned themselves up. Then, like extinguished torches, they entered complete Nirvāṇa. Whatever they had in the way of bile and phlegm, fibres and nerves, bones, flesh and blood, all completely disappeared, consumed by the fire. Their pure relics alone fell to earth.

On the decease of the Buddha, a great number of Arhats passed into Nirvāṇa with him. This was not through grief or despair but because they had understood that everything that is born must perish. The majority of them abandoned their bodies in mountains and forests, in gorges and ravines, near water courses and streams. Some, like the royal swans, took flight and disappeared into space.

These are out of the ordinary deaths, making use of supernormal powers. The latter are not within the reach of everyone. We know from the canonical texts that certain disciples of the Buddha, who were already Arhats or on the point of becoming so, took their lives by quite ordinary means: the rope or the knife.

The suicide of Vālkali is so characteristic it deserves to be told in full.

Vālkali was a young brahmin from Śrāvasti who assiduously devoted himself to the study of the Vedas, the sacred books of Brahminism. One day he met the Buddha Śākyamuni and was so struck by his splendour and majesty that he could not take his eyes off him. Giving up the privileges of his caste, he entered the Buddhist Order so as to be always at the Master's side. Apart from meal and bath time he never stopped gazing at him. This assiduity ended by making the Buddha tired: one day, at the end of the rainy season, he dismissed Vālkali and suggested he go elsewhere. Deeply upset, Vālkali went to the Vulture Peak mountain while the Buddha remained at the Bamboo Grove in Rājagaha.

One day, however, the Buddha recalled his disciple. Overjoyed, the latter was hurrying at the invitation when, on the way, he was taken ill and had to stop at the Potter's House in Rājagaha. He said to his companions: 'Please go, Venerable Sirs, to the Blessed One and, in my name, prostrate yourselves at his feet. Tell him that Vālkali is sick, suffering and greatly weakened. It would be good if the Blessed One, through pity for him, were to come here.'

Vālkali's colleagues therefore went to the Buddha and transmitted the message. As was his wont, the Buddha consented by remaining silent. The next day, he dressed, took his begging bowl and his cloak and went to the sick man. The latter, seeing the Master from afar, became restless on his couch. The Master approached and said to him: 'Do not move, Vālkali, there are seats quite near and I shall sit there.' Having sat down, he went on: 'Friend, is it tolerable? Is it viable? Are the painful feelings you are experiencing on the decrease and not on the increase?'

'No, Master,' replied Vālkali, 'it is neither tolerable nor viable. The painful feelings are on the increase and not on the decrease.'

'Then have you some regret and some remorse?'

'Yes, Master,' confessed Vālkali, 'I have much regret and much remorse.'

'Does your conscience reproach you for something from the moral point of view?'

'No, my conscience does not reproach me for anything from the moral point of view.'

'And yet,' stated the Buddha, 'you have regret and remorse.'

'This is because for a long time I have wanted to go and look at the Master, but I do not find the strength in my body
Māra the Malign One who is seeking the whereabouts of Vālkali's consciousness. But Vālkali's consciousness is nowhere: Vālkali is in complete Nirvāṇa.'

Hence the Noble Ones who have triumphed over delusion and eliminated passion can, once their task is done, speed the hour of deliverance by voluntarily taking their own lives. Whatever the means used, act of will, recourse to the supernormal, or quite simply the rope or knife, their suicide is apāpika 'blameless'.

II

Another form of voluntary death is the giving of life, commonly undertaken by the Bodhisattvas or future Buddhas. Correctly speaking, a Bodhisattva is not a Noble One since he has not entirely eliminated delusion and passion. He has, however, made an aspiration one day to reach supreme and perfect enlightenment which leads to Buddhahood in order to devote himself to the welfare and happiness of all beings.

To reach Buddhahood, the Bodhisattva has to go through a long career. For countless existences over three, seven or thirty-three incalculable periods, he has to practise the perfect virtues and thus acquire the mass of merits needed to become a Buddha. These perfect virtues, or perfections, are giving, morality, patience, vigour, concentration and wisdom.

The first of these virtues is giving: the Bodhisattva is above all else an altruist, and his generosity knows no limits. He gives unstintingly his goods, riches, wife, children, blood, flesh, eyes, head and whole body.

In the course of his previous lives, he who was one day to become the Buddha Śākyamuni boundlessly multiplied his deeds of generosity. A great deal of literature is devoted to them: this is the literature known as the Jātakas or 'Stories of Previous Lives'.

Giving of the body. - In the person of Mahāsattva, a prince of the Pañcañas, the Bodhisattva, seeing a starving tigress on the point of devouring her young ones, made her a gift of his
Giving of flesh. - When he was the king Śibi, the Bodhisattva, seeing a pigeon being pursued by a falcon, undertook to redeem the bird. He cut from his thigh a piece of flesh equal in weight to the pigeon's. When it was weighed the pigeon always turned out to be heavier than the weight of the severed flesh and, to account for this, the compassionate king ended by cutting up the whole of his body into pieces.

Giving of eyes. - The same king Śibi tore out his eyes in order to give sight to a blind brahmin.

Giving of the head. - King Candragarha is famous for his generosity. The brahmin Raudrākṣa came and asked for his head. The ministers implored him to accept a head made of precious substances instead, but the brahmin refused to accept. The king attached his hair to a tree and cut off his head himself in order to offer it to the brahmin.

These charitable deeds performed by the future Buddha were commemorated, on the very spots where they occurred, by sumptuous funerary monuments: the four great stupas of Northern India. Chinese pilgrims who went to India did not fail to visit them: Pa-hainen about the year 400, Sung Yun in approximately 520 and Hsüan-tsang about 630. Their exact location have been precisely determined by archaeologists. The giving of the head would explain the name of Takṣaśāla, 'cut rock', for Takṣaśāra, 'cut head', given to the great town in North-West India, well-known to the Greek historians and geographers by the name of Taxila.

Altruism, the spirit of solidarity, is one of the elements that caused, around the beginning of the Christian era, the blossoming of a Buddhist revival which, in opposition to the early Buddhism known as the Small Vehicle (Hinayāna), assumed the grandiose title of Great Vehicle (Mahāyāna). A new ideal inspired its adherents. It was less a matter of winning holiness and ascending to Nirvāṇa, as the earlier disciples of the Buddha required, than reproducing in one's everyday life the charitable deeds of a Bodhisattva, solely concerned with the welfare of others. Henceforth charity took precedence over everything else. Any bodily, vocal or mental action became permissible as long as it was favourable to beings. Giving is; if it transcends he-

al, when whoever gives, inspired by supreme wisdom, no longer distinguishes between donor, beneficiary and the thing given.

III

Alongside the Noble Ones who hastened their death when they had done what they had to do, alongside the Bodhisattvas who gave their life for beings, there were also Buddhists who attempted suicide in order to pay homage to the Buddha and his Doctrine. This third form of suicide was generally carried out by auto-cremation.

The Saddharmapundarikasūtra or 'Lotus of the Good Doctrine', which was translated into Chinese towards the end of the third century, relates the following legend:

In bygone days, innumerable cosmic periods ago, the Buddha Candrasūrya appeared in the world. He expounded the 'Lotus of the Good Doctrine' at length to a great assembly of Disciples and Bodhisattvas, beginning with the Bodhisattva Priyadarśana. Under the teaching of the Buddha, Priyadarśana applied himself to the practice of difficult tasks. He spent twelve thousand years wandering, exclusively engaged in meditation on the 'Lotus' through the development of intense application. He thus acquired the supernatural power of being voluntarily able to manifest all forms. Gladdened, delighted, overjoyed and filled with joy, satisfaction and pleasure, he had the following thought: 'Supposing I were to pay homage (pujā) to the Blessed Lord Buddha and the 'Lotus of the Good Doctrine' which he has taught me? I immediately put into action the power which he possessed to manifest all forms and, from on high, caused a shower of blossoms and perfumes to fall. The nature of those essences was such that a single gramme of those perfumes was worth the whole universe.

However, on further reflection, this homage seemed inadequate to him. 'The spectacle of my supernatural power,' he said to himself, 'is not likely to honour the Blessed Lord Buddha as much as would the abandoning of my own body. Thereupon Priyadarśana began to eat Agaru (aloe), incense and olibanum, and to drink Campaka (castor-oil). He thus spent twelve years in ceaselessly and constantly partaking of inflammable substances. At the end of those twelve years, Priyadarśana, having clothed his body.
in heavenly garments and sprinkled it with scented oils, made his benedictory aspiration and then burnt his body, in order to honour the Buddha Candrasūrya and the discourse of the 'Lotus of the Good Doctrine'.

Universes as numerous as the sands of the eighty Ganges were illuminated by the splendour of the flames thrown off by the blazing body of the Bodhisattva Priyadarśana. The Buddhas who were in those universes all expressed their approval: 'Excellent, excellent, O son of good family! This is the true homage due to the Buddha; this is the homage due to the Doctrine. This is the most distinguished, the foremost, the best, the most eminent, the most perfect of homages paid to the Doctrine, this homage which is paid to it by abandoning one's own body.'

Twelve hundred years went by, while the body of Priyadarśana continued to burn. Finally, at the end of those twelve hundred years, the fire stopped.

This sacrifice was repeated by the Bodhisattva Priyadarśana through the ages in various forms. He is, at present, the Bodhisattva Bhaisajyagurāja, 'King of Medicinal Plants', in our universe.

Priyadarśana's feat would doubtless seem to us more admirable than imitable; anyway, the methods used for burning for twelve hundred years are not within our reach. We do not know to what degree his example was followed in India. We only know through a seventh century witness that religious suicides were common at that time:14;

[in India] an action such as burning the body is regarded usually as the mode of showing inward sincerity... In the River Ganges many men drown themselves everyday. On the hill of Buddhagayā there are not un freq uently cases of suicide. Some starve themselves to death and eat nothing. Others climb up trees and throw themselves down. Some intentionally destroy their manhood and become eunuchs.

Little can be gathered from such vague information. In contrast in China, where the 'Lotus of the Good Doctrine' (Hua yén ching) was highly successful, Priyadarśana's example was taken literally, and self-creation as he had practised it constituted a ritual act which was regulated by a tradition and bound by a collection of beliefs. From the fifth to the tenth centuries religious suicides were very common, and it is believed that they continued long after that date since, clearly, recent events in Vietnam have re-established them (since June 1963).

With regard to the great period of religious fervour, details are supplied by three successive biographies devoted to the 'Lives of Eminent Monks' (Hao sēng chuan) respectively published in 544, 667, and 988. From the point of view that concerns us here, these biographies have been studied by Jacques Gernet in his remarkable article 'Les suicides par le feu chez les bouddhistes chinois du Ve au Xe siècle' (Mélanges publiés par l'Institut des Hautes Études Chinoises, II, Paris 1960). Eleven cases of suicide by fire are shown noted between 451 and 501, two in the sixth century, three in the seventh, four in the ninth and four in the tenth.

They all took place according to the formalised ritual: it was not a question of a 'minor incident' but a definite religious ceremony. This is the oldest case:

Fa-yū came from the prefecture of Chi (near present-day Yung-chi, the extreme south of Shansi). He took the robe when aged fifteen and was the disciple of Hui-shih who had founded a method of asceticism and cultivation of the dhotas (purification procedures). Fa-yū, who was full of energy and courage, penetrated (the secrets of) his method in depth. He constantly aspired to follow in the steps of the King of Medicinal Plants (Bhaisajyagurāja) and burn himself in homage (to the Buddha). At that time, Yao Hsū, the fake prince of the Chin (Later Chin), had set up his garrison in Pu-fan (to the north of Yungchi). Fa-yū informed the prince of his intention: 'There are,' said Yao Hsū, 'many ways of entering the Path (ju t'ao). Why do you necessarily have to burn yourself? I do not dare oppose your plan categorically. However, I would be pleased if you would consider carefully.' Since Fa-yū's determination was unyielding, he instantly began to eat small pieces of incense and wrapped his body in oil-soaked cloths. He recited the chapter on the Abandoning of the Body (ohē shān p'in) and, finally, he set fire to
himself. The monks and laymen who were present at this spectacle were all filled with compassion. Fa-yü was then forty-five years old (tr. after J. Cerny).\(^{16}\)

This short account condenses in a few lines all the phases of the ceremony: the prior initiation into a method of asceticism; the formation of the intention to burn oneself in homage to the Buddha, on the example of the Bodhisattva Priyadarśana; the authorization sought from public powers and given, though not without reluctance; the recitation of a text, usually that of the 'Lotus', Ch.XXII; the cremation itself and, finally, the wonder of those present.

The influence of the 'Lotus of the Good Doctrine' on Buddhist customs appears even more clearly in the Brahmājālasūtra 'The Sūtra of Brahma's Net', an extremely widespread work in the whole of the Far East which constitutes the Code of the Mahāyāna in China. It would seem to have been translated by Kumārajīva in 406, but this has not been authenticated. In it it is said that if one does not burn one's body, arm or finger as an offering to the Buddhas, one is not a Bodhisattva. In order to obey this rule, Chinese monks, on the eve of their ordination, have fairly deep burns made on the top of their heads so as to destroy the hair roots. Small cylinders of carbonised aromatic wood are burnt on their skulls. That is why this ceremony is called jūn hsiang or chu hsiang 'burning by incense'. On those who perform it, it confers a merit equal to that of a complete burning of the body since, in matters of ritual, the part equals the whole.\(^{17}\)

In brief, if suicide was practised widely in Buddhist circles, this was due to three reasons. In the Hinayāna the Noble Ones - whether Buddhas, Pratyekabuddhas or Arahats - once their work was done, met death voluntarily in order to enter Nirvāṇa as soon as possible. In the Mahāyāna, the Bodhisattvas offered up their bodies and lives for the welfare of beings or in order to pay homage to the Buddhas.

As was only to be expected, there was some resistance. It is said that the Buddha taught us to control ourselves; he could not suicide contribute to the destruction of passions? It is unworthy of a monk to cut off a piece of his flesh in exchange for a pinion. It is not in our power to destroy a Bodhisattva,
EMILE DURKHEIM ON SUICIDE IN BUDDHISM

Arvind Sharma

Although on occasion Emile Durkheim confessed that 'the author knows too little of' Buddhism and Jainism to make certain judgements on certain aspects of suicide in these religions, in his classic work on suicide he did on other occasions pass comment on the role of suicide not only in Buddhism and Jainism but also in Hinduism.

In this paper we shall examine the remarks he makes on suicide in the context of Theravāda Buddhism, though one cannot be sure that he was fully aware of the distinction between the two types of Buddhism.

Durkheim makes the following statements, it would appear, in relation to suicide in Theravāda Buddhism:

1. Though Buddhism is often accused of having carried this principle [of suicide] to its most extreme consequence and elevated suicide into a religious practice, it actually condemned it. It is true that it taught that the highest bliss was self-destruction in Nirvana; but this suspension of existence may and should be achieved even during this life without need of violent measure for its realization.

2. The metaphysical and religious systems which form logical settings for these moral practices give final proof that this is their origin and meaning. It has long been observed that they co-exist generally with pantheistic beliefs. To be sure, Jainism, as well as Buddhism, is atheistic; but pantheism is not necessarily theistic. Its essential quality is the idea that what reality there is in the individual is foreign to his nature, that the soul which animates him is not his own, and that consequently he has no personal existence. Now this dogma is fundamental to the doctrines of the Hindus; it already existed in Brahminism.

Cf. Traité I, p.89, with many sources in n.2.
Cf. Samyutta II 119-74; Tse a han, T 99, No.1265, ch.47, pp.345b-347b; Tseng I a han, T 125, ch.19, pp.642b-643a; Pāli Apādana II 465.
Cf. Vinaya III 68 ff; Majjhima III 266; Samyutta IV 59.
Suvarnaprabhāsa, Ch.18: Vāghīparivarta; Jātakaśi, Ch.1: Avadānakapalāta, Ch.51, vv.28-50.
Jātaka No.499: Jātakamālā No.2.
Dīvīyāvadāna, Ch.22, pp.314-28; Avadānakapalāta, Ch.5 (I, pp.154-75).
Gernet, op.cit., p.531.
Theragāthā v.1003.
These remarks may now be examined.

According to Durkheim, Buddhism, contrary to the popular supposition in his time, condemned suicide. This statement seems to be substantially correct. There are at least two ways in which the philosophy of Buddhism could be seen as involving suicide: 1) by insisting on Nirvāṇa which puts an end to future births, thus the effect of Nirvāṇa could be regarded as suicidal, and 2) by insisting that Nirvāṇa involves the 'destruction' of the false notion of a 'permanent self' - and that this amounted to self-destruction or suicide.

The first of these arguments was used by the Greek king Menander to argue that Buddhism implied suicide. The second of these is used by Durkheim, but he corrects his own criticism by pointing out that Nirvāṇa could be achieved in this life and therefore need not be considered suicidal. He is also right in pointing out that Buddhism forbade suicide for the Buddha declared that 'A brother is not, O Bhikkhu, to commit suicide. Whosoever does no shall be dealt with according to the law.'

Indeed the Buddha seems to have been opposed to suicide both concretically and philosophically. One of the four offences which warranted immediate expulsion from the Order was the following:

3. Whatever Bhikkhu shall knowingly deprive of life a human being, or shall seek to an assassin against a human being, or shall utter the praises of death, or incite another to self-destruction, saying, 'Oh, my friend! what good do you get from this sinful, wretched life? death is better to thee than life!' - if, so thinking, and with such an aim, he, by various arguments, utter the praises of death or incites another to self-destruction - he, too, is fallen into defect, he is no longer in communion.

Philosophically, the second Noble Truth of Buddhism (A-nibbāya) deals with the arising of suffering, which is traced to rūpa. This rūpa is of three kinds: kāma, bhava, and vībhāva. One should note that suffering is said to be to this: rūpa (trans.nā) for worldly objects, thirst for re-existence as desired by the eternalists (sāsata-vādins) and desire for self-annihilation as sought by the annihilationalists (ucchedavādins). Either of such thirst or desire is associated with a wrong view, which causes rebirth.

Thus, generally speaking, Durkheim is right in maintaining that Buddhism condemned suicide. The justification for this position which he offers, moreover, is correct inasmuch as it relates it to the achievement of Nirvāṇa in terms of 'self-destruction'. The linkage is correct but the notion of Nirvāṇa to which it is linked - that of self-destruction, seems to be misconceived. It was, however, a very common misconception and only recently have Buddhist studies in the West succeeded in freeing themselves from it.

The second statement of Durkheim about Buddhism does not show an adequate recognition of the fact that in contradistinction to Hinduism and Jainism, Buddhism does not believe in a soul - one of the hallmarks of Buddhism being the doctrine of anatta. He is right in regarding Buddhism in some sense atheistic, but wrong in regarding it as pantheistic (especially in relation to Theravāda Buddhism).

If Durkheim's analysis of suicide in Buddhism may be described as correct in tone but not in detail or, rather, as superficial, then the criticism made in the earlier sections of his position is itself liable to the same charge. For the attitude towards suicide in Buddhism is much more complex than appears at first sight.

In general, it is true, Buddhism condemns suicide or provoking people to it. However, the situation becomes more flexible when the attainment of Nirvāṇa becomes directly involved. For in this context one discovers that:

1) some Buddhist monks bent on Nirvāṇa were reproved for trying to commit suicide by the Buddha;
2) the suicide of some monks was approved by the Buddha; and
3) some Buddhist monks and nuns achieved Nirvāṇa while attempting suicide out of frustration at their failure in achieving it.
The first point is illustrated by the case of Vakkali. He had become so attached to the Buddha that the Buddha saw that as a hindrance to the achievement of Nirvāṇa.

The Master, waiting for the maturity of his insight, for a long while made no comment: then one day he said: 'What is to thee, Vakkali, this foolish body that thou seest? He who seeth the Hare, he is that seeth me. For seeing the Hare he seeth me, and seeing me he seeth the Hare.' At the Master's words, Vakkali ceased to look, but he was unable to go away. Hence the Master thinking: 'This bhikkhu, if he get not deeply moved, will not awake', said on the last day of the rains: 'Depart, Vakkali!' Thus heded, he could not stay; but thinking: 'What is life to me if I cannot see him?' climbed the Vulture's Peak to a place of precipices. The Master, knowing what Vakkali was about, thought: 'This bhikkhu, finding no comfort away from me, will destroy the conditions for winning the topmost fruits'; and revealing himself in a glory, spake thus:

Now let the bhikkhu with exceeding joy Delighting in the Buddha's Way and Lore, Go up on to the holy, happy path. where things component ne'er excite him more.

And stretching forth his hand, he said: 'Come bhik-

Thus the Buddha prevented a suicide here as premature. The interesting thing is that later on the same Vakkali, after he had achieved maturity of insight, was allowed to commit suicide. According to the Sāgīyat Nikāya Vakkali was suffering from a painful illness and this time the Buddha told him that his death will be a blameless one, whereupon he 'took his life.

The crucial consideration is whether suicide is karmically mature or premature. 'The monk Channa (, Sutta i44) did not grasp after another body, and his suicide was blameless. The monk Vakkali (S III 120) did not doubt the impermanence, anguish and changeable nature of the five khandhā and had no desire for them. The monk Godhika (S I 121) turned out clinging by its root, and was without longing for a new life. All had reached the end of their karmic time when they committed suicide.'

Cases where attempted suicide leads to enlightenment are found in the Theragāthā and Therigāthā. The monk Sappadāsa thus describes how he achieved Nirvāṇa in such circumstances:

Full five and twenty years have passed since I Had left the world and in the Order lived. And yet not for one fingersnap of time Have I found peace [and sanity] of mind. Intent and single vision ne'er I own, Distraught and harassed by desires of sense; In tears, wringing my hands, I left the lodge. Nay now I'll take a knife or else - For what Is life to me? And how can such as I, Who by my life the training have denied, Do better than set torn to it and die? So then I came and with a razor sat me down Upon my couch. And now the blade was drawn Across my throat to cut the artery... When lo! in me arose the deeper thought: Attention to the fact and to the cause. The misery of it all was manifest; Distaste, indifference the mind possessed, And so my heart was set at liberty! O see the seamy order of the Hare! The Threefold Wisdom have I made my own, And all the Buddha bids us do is done.'

Similarly, in the Therigāthā the sublime despair of Sīhā leads to the attainment of Nirvāṇa.

Distracted, harassed by desires of sense, Unmindful of the 'what' and 'why' of things, Stung and inflated by the memories Of former days, o'er which I lack control -
Corrupting canker spreading o'er my heart—
I followed heedless dreams of happiness,
And got no even tenour to my mind.
All given o'er to dalliance with sense,
So did I fare for seven weary years,
In lean and hollow mis'ry of unrest.
I, wretched, found no ease by day or night.
So took the rope and plunged it into the wood:
'全域 for me a friendly gallows tree!
I'll live again the lou life of the world.'
Strong was the moose I made: and on a bough
I hound the rope and flung it round my neck.
When see!... my heart was set at liberty!  

To conclude: Emile Durkheim's use of Buddhism in his discussion of suicide does not penetrate to the heart of the issue. The central fact that suicide cannot be covered over with a blanket condemnation by Buddhism or in Buddhism raises serious questions of analysis. Do we need a new category of 'salutific suicide'? How will it differ from 'altruistic suicide'? Or does the negation of the 'ego' put the Buddhist case in the category of 'egoistic suicide'? Indeed, an even more basic issue is raised: is this not a task in which the sociologist and the psychologist must join hands? Suicide may start with sociology but what does one do when it involves one ultimately in a soteriology?

Notes


3. Spaulding and Simpson, op. cit., pp. 223-4, 226, etc.

4. We shall not, for instance, be concerned with such cases of suicide which obviously belong to Mahāyāna Buddhism: as the one cited by him on the authority of Charlevoix: 'Nothing is commoner than to see ships along the seashore filled with these fanatics who throw themselves into the water weighted with stones, or sink their ships and let themselves be gradually submerged while singing their idol's praises. Many of the spectators follow them with their eyes, lauding their valor to the skies and asking their blessing before they disappear. The sectarians of Amida have themselves immured in caverns where there is barely space to be seated and where they can breathe only through an air shaft. There they quietly allow themselves to die of hunger. Others climb to the top of very high cliffs, upon which there are sulphur mines from which flames jet from time to time. They continuously call upon their gods, pray to them to accept the sacrifice of their lives and ask that some of these flames rise. As soon as one appears they regard it as a sign of the gods' consent and cast themselves head foremost to the bottom of the abyss... The memory of these so-called martyrs is held in great reverence' (ibid., pp. 224-5).

5. They do not seem to be distinctly mentioned.


7. Ibid., p. 226. A third statement, to which Emile Durkheim does not commit himself, may be noted but not commented upon. While discussing the role of 'collective sadness' in relation to suicide he remarks: 'The anarchist, the aesthete, the mystic, the social revolutionary, even if they do not despair of the future, have in common with the pessimist a single sentiment of hatred and disgust for the existing order, a single craving to destroy or to escape from reality. Collective melancholy would not have penetrated consciousness so far, if it had not undergone a morbid development; and so the development of suicide resulting from it is of the same nature' (ibid., p. 370).

He then adds the following footnote: This argument is open to an objection. Buddhism and Jainism are systematically pessimistic doctrines of life; should the indication of a morbid state of the peoples who have practiced them be assumed? The author knows too little of them to decide the question. But let our reasoning be considered only with reference to the European peoples, and even to the societies of a metropolitan type. Within these limits we think it open to little dispute. It is still possible that the spirit of renunciation characteristic of certain other societies may be formulated into a system without anomaly (ibid., p. 370, n. 8).


9. Ibid., p. 273. According to Rhys Davids the nearest approach to this statement in the Pali Canon is in a 'passage in Sutta Vibhaṅga on the 3rd Pārājika

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\\(11.5.13)\) (Ibid., p.273, n.1).
16 J. III 120.
19 Ibid., I, p.54.

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EKOTTARAGAMA (VI)
Traduit de la version chinoise par
Thich Nhuyn-Vi
Fascicule troisième
Partie 8
Le Roi des Asuras

1. 'Ainsi ai-je entendu. Lorsque le Bouddha, le Bienheureux, résidait dans le parc d'Anāthapindaka à Śrāvasti, il disait à ses bhikṣu: O bhikṣu! Personne ne peut avoir une plus grande taille que le roi des Asuras. Il mesure 84.000 yojana. Sa bouche a 1.000 yojana de largeur. A une certaine époque, le roi des Asuras a voulu attaquer le Soleil. Il a étière sa taille jusqu'à 168.000 yojana pour arriver jusqu'aux pays du Soleil et de la Lune. Les rois du Soleil et de la Lune étaient très inquiets pour le pain de leur royaume. Pourquoi? Parce que la stature [du roi] des Asuras était très impressionnante. Et parce qu'ils étaient inquiets, les rois du Soleil et de la Lune n'émettaient plus de lumière. Cependant le roi des Asuras n'osait pas capturer les rois du Soleil et de la Lune parce que ces derniers avaient beaucoup de prestige, de volonté, de force, de longévité, de grande prudence et jouissaient d'un bonheur sans fin. Pour connaître la durée d'une vie, nous n'avons qu'à regarder notre position actuelle dans la vie. C'est pourquoi les rois du Soleil et de la Lune n'ont pas été agressés par le roi des Asuras. Ce dernier ressentait l'amertume de cet échec jusqu'à la fin de sa vie.

'De la même façon, Ó bhikṣu, les démons (Mara) sont derrière vous, ils cherchent par tous les moyens de détruire vos racines de bien (kusala-mūla). Ils emploieront des moyens magiques pour ensorceler votre vue, votre ouïe, votre odorat, votre goût, votre toucher et pour perturber votre esprit. Ils raisonnneront ainsi: nous devons leur en capturer les yeux, les oreilles, le nez, la langue, le corps et les pensées pour les troubler. A ces moment
là, vous devez être fermes pour ne pas succomber à ces six tentations malgré leurs aspects merveilleux. Vous ferez ainsi reculer les démons. Vous emporterez cette victoire grâce à la force du Tathāgata, l’Arhat.

Les bhikṣu qui étudient studieusement le Dharma mais qui digèrent difficilement les offrandes des fidèles risqueront de se perdre dans les cinq vœux et n’atteindront jamais l’éveil. Bhikṣu, vous devez vous y appliquer. Celui qui n’y est pas encore persuadé doit faire un effort. Celui qui n’a pas encore compris doit chercher à comprendre. Celui qui n’a pas encore été secouru, doit être secouru. Celui qui n’a pas encore atteint l’éveil doit être aidé pour qu’il l’atteigne. C’est pourquoi, bhikṣu, celui qui n’a pas encore reçu d’offrandes, ne doit pas en rêver; celui qui en a reçu ne doit pas y preter trop d’attention par crainte d’engendrer des souillures mentales (kīrdu). C’est ainsi, ô bhikṣu, que vous devez vous instruire. Ayant entendu ces paroles du Bouddha, les bhikṣu étaient heureux et les mettaient respectueusement en pratique.

2. Ainsi ai-je entendu... Le Bienheureux disait à ses bhikṣu: Comment appelez-vous celui qui vient en ce bas-monde pour rendre service, pour apporter la paix à tous les êtres? Celui qui, devant leur aveuglement originel, cherche à leur en sortir, qui désire faire réaliser aux dieux et aux humains leur propre bonheur et leur propre protection. C’est le Tathāgata, l’Arhat, le Samyaksambuddha. Ô bhikṣu, vous devez le vénérer et suivre son merveilleux exemple. Ayant entendu ces paroles du Bienheureux les bhikṣu étaient heureux et les mettaient respectueusement en pratique.


5. Ainsi ai-je entendu... le Bienheureux disait à ses bhikṣu: Dès la venue du Tathāgata dans ce bas-monde, les vues erronées dues à des préjugés, à l’ignorance du profane qui est lui-même prisonnier dans le cycle de la renaissance incessante, ont été rectifiées. L’obscurité a laissé la place à la lumière. Ô bhikṣu, soyez vigilants dans votre perfectionnement. Ayant entendu ces paroles du Bouddha, les bhikṣu étaient heureux et les mettaient respectueusement en pratique.

6. Ainsi ai-je entendu... le Bienheureux disait à ses bhikṣu: Les trente-sept auxiliaires de l’illumination sont enseignés grâce à l’arrivée du Tathāgata, l’Arhat, le Samyaksambuddha, en ce monde. En quoi consistent ces trente-sept auxiliaires (saptatrimad bodhisattvikā dharmān)? Ce sont: les quatre fixations de l’attention (samtyupasthāna), les quatre efforts corrects (samayakarāyā / samyakprahāga), les quatre fondements de pouvoir magique (rddhipās) 21, les cinq facultés spirituelles (indrīya) 11, les cinq forces (bala) 11, les sept membres de l’illumination (sambodhyāga) 13, le noble chemin à huit branches (mārgāga) 14. C’est pourquoi, ô bhikṣu, vous devez vénérer le Bouddha et étudier son Dharma. Ayant entendu ces paroles du Bouddha, les bhikṣu étaient heureux et les mettaient respectueusement en pratique.

7. Ainsi ai-je entendu... le Bienheureux disait à ses bhikṣu: Celui dont la disparition en ce bas-monde va laisser des regrets,
A 1. 'Ainsi ai-je entendu... Le Bienheureux disait à ses bhikṣu: L'apparition du Tathāgata apporte la lumière dont le ciel et la terre bénéficient la clarté, une clarté très pure comparable à celle de la pleine lune de la mi-automne qui éclaire le moindre royaume. Grâce à cette lumière, la foi naît dans l'observation des règles, dans l'écoute du Dharma, dans la générosité et dans la sagesse, tout comme la lumière qui éclaire partout. Ō bhikṣu, veuillez le Tathāgata et étudiez avec application le Dharma. Ayant entendu ces paroles du Bouddha, les bhikṣu étaient heureux et les mettaient respectueusement en pratique.

9. 'Ainsi ai-je entendu... Le Bienheureux disait à ses bhikṣu: Dans un pays où le roi est un saint homme, où le peuple est prospère, les pays voisins seront peu puissants. De même, la présence du Tathāgata en ce monde donne de la prospérité aux humains et aux résidents célestes, par contre le nombre de prāta, des animaux et des condamnés à l'enfer diminue. Ō bhikṣu, mettez toute votre foi en le Bouddha et tous vos efforts dans l'étude du Dharma. Ayant entendu ces paroles du Bouddha, le bhikṣu était heureux et les mettaient respectueusement en pratique.

10. 'Ainsi ai-je entendu... Le Bienheureux disait à ses bhikṣu: Celui qui n'a pas d'égal, dont personne ne peut lui servir de modèle, celui qui s'avance dans la solitude sans compagnon ni famille, celui qui n'a pas d'égal en assurance, en discipline, en connaissance, en générosité, en sagesse, c'est le Tathāgata, l'Arhat, le Samyaksambuddha. En effet, personne en ce monde ni aux cieux ne peut l'égaler. C'est un être parfait à tout point de vue. C'est pourquoi, Ō bhikṣu, vous devez vénérer le Bouddha et étudier assidument le Dharma.

Après avoir écouté les conseils du Bouddha, les bhikṣu étaient heureux et les mettaient respectueusement en pratique.'

NOTES

1 Voir T2, 560r6 et suiv. Cf. Āguttara II 17 (Paññattisutta), le discours sur les quatre êtres dits 'prééminents'. Le premier cité est Rāhu Asurinda, Rāhu, roi des Titans, surpassant tous en ce qui concerne le taille du corps. Sur Rāhu et ses activités, l'ancienne explication mythique indienne, voir Nanalasekera, Dictionary of Pali Proper Names, II, 735-7.

2 Ancienne mesure de distance indienne: selon la PTD, un yojana égale environ sept milles, et selon les dictionnaires sanskrit environ huit où neuf milles; cf. Soothill et Hodous, A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms, p.197b: un yojana est 'about 9 English miles, or nearly 30 Chinese li'.

3 C.-a.-d. six sortes de tentations: de par la forme, les sons, les odeurs, les saveurs, les tangibles ou les objet de la pensée.

4 Les cinq gati, voies ou destinées, sont: la renaissance dans les enfers, parmi les prāta, les animaux, les êtres humains ou célestes: cf. BSR I, 2, p.133, n.9; ibid., II, 1-2, p.46, n.25, 'les trois mauvais être destinés'. Quant aux difficultés relatives à la 'digestion des offrandes', on associe d'abord les offrandes avec le don de la nourriture; cf. l'idée répandue dans toutes les traditions monastiques bouddhiques que le bénéficiaire des aliments contracte des dettes naus s'il fait de son mieux pour pratiquer les enseignements du Dharma. Complètement libre de dette, il est lui seul qui a éliminé toute influence mauvaise (ānāgārasaṃparītho naṃ jáparītho nāma): cf. Āguttara I 10 (Acharañāgāra:vasa): Si te parais prétendre être un moine. Cependant, 'la digestion' des offrandes ne se réfère seulement au don de la nourriture, mais veut dire aussi être digéré d'offrandes dans un sens général.


6 Lit. 'Celui qui prend pitié de tous ceux envelopés et ignorants'.


8 Voir RSR III, 2, p.142, n.14; ibid., IV, 1, p.57, n.8.

9 Voir ibid., III, 2, p.141, n.2.

10 Les cinq facultés (pālinteviṣyādhisattva), aussi appelées les cinq forces (pālīkhotuļ), nomm : la foi (śraddhā), l'énergie (vīyu), l'attention (prajñā), la concentration (samādhi), la sagesse (prajñā). Voir Traité III, 1127; cf. Mahāvyutpatti, ed. Sakaki, Kyoto 1926, p. 976-87.

11 'Les six croyances perverses'? Quatre croyances perverses sont citées dans l’Agottattagī 52 (Vipassātanama) : i. pramāna pour prautastu ce qui est impénétrant ; ii. pramāna pour bonheur ce qui est souhaitable ; iii. pramāna pour un soi qui n’est pas un soi ; iv. pramāna pour agréable ce qui est désagréable. Dans Soothill, Chinese Buddhist Terms, p.126b, cinq croyances perverses sont citées : i. la croyance erronée dans un vier soi ; ii. les croyances extrêmes dans l’éternité ou dans l’immatérialisme ; iii. la vue fausse qui nie la cause et l’effet ; iv. la vue fausse qui pr conclan de toutes les supérieures, les plus pires pour les meilleures ; v. les croyances intrinsèques dans les pratiques d’ascétisme rigides.

12 Les membres de l’illumination sont : i. le membre de l’illumination nommé attention (sattavasa); ii. le membre de l’illumination nommé concentration des dharmas (dharma-prācīnāsamābodhi), etc. ; iii. le membre de l’illumination nommé cognition (prajñāsamābodhi); iv. le membre de l’illumination nommé joie (prajñāsamābodhi); v. le membre de l’illumination nommé relaxation (prajñāsamābodhi); vi. le membre de l’illumination nommé égalité d’esprit (prajñāsamābodhi). Voir Traité III, 1126 et suiv.; cf. Mahāvyutpatti, p. 988-95.

13 Le noble chemin à huit branches consiste en : i. la vue correcte (samyaksamādhi); ii. la conception correcte (samyaksamādhi); iii. la parole correcte (samyagvāka); iv. l’action correcte (samyakkarmantaka); v. la manière de vivre correcte (samyagājīva); vi. l’effort correct (samyagavājīva); vii. l’attention correcte (samyaksamādhi); viii. la concentration correcte (samyaksamādhi). Voir Traité III, 1129; cf. Mahāvyutpatti n° 998-1004.

14 Voir Dīgha III 263 (Sāgītissasutta, nava satāvāsasutta); ibid., III 286 (Dasutarasutta); des sections du texte correspondant sanskrit sont citées dans l’Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, éd. Waghara, Tokyo 1932-6, pp.267,268-6-12. Cf. aussi Soothill, Chinese Buddhist Terms, 182-b. La première région de résidence des êtres vivants appartient aux êtres 'who are diverse in both body and mind, such as mankind, certain gods and some who have gone to an evil doom'. Les autres régions de résidence des êtres vivants appartiennent aux êtres qui résident dans les diverses extrémes de dhīna à et certains dieux.

15 Voir RSR III, 1, p.37, n.7.

16 'Les onze bienveillances'? Pour les trois sortes de bienveillances, voir Traité III, 1250 et suiv. Une explication succincte des onze sortes serait : un médiateur qui, selon les autres traitants des quatre immuables (apramāna), rayonne la bienveillance d’une manière méditative le fait dans les quatre directions successivement (1-4) (ekānām adhimaṇa sphārit-vā... tathā dvītiyam... ), vers le nadir et le zénith respectivement (5-6) (ūrdhvatā, abhasa), dans les quatre directions intermédiaires (7-10) (tirayak) et finalement, partout irradiant de bienveillance le monde entier (11) (sarva-saṁ sarvāvanta imam lokam). Cf. Mahāvyutpatti n° 1508-9. Interpréter tirayak comme voulant dire vidikṣa, dans les aires intermédiaires du vent, est naturellement de la conjoncture : néanmoins un sens de tirayak, selon les dictionnaires sanskrit, est 'au milieu ou entre'.


18 C. w. a. d. la fixation de l’attention en ce qui concerne : i. le corps; ii. les sensations; iii. la pensée; iv. les dharmas (objets de la pensée). Cf. Traité III, 1121 et suiv.

19 C. w. a. d. faisant de grands efforts pour que : i. les méchants mauvais dharmas non encore nés ne naissent pas; ii. les méchants mauvais dharmas déjà nés soient détruits; iii. les bons dharmas non encore nés prennent naissance; iv. les
bonds dharma déjà nés soient maintenus... cultivés et complétés. Cf. Traité III, 1123 et suiv.

21 Voir BSR III, 1, p.37, n.6; ibid., IV, 1, p.57. n.2. Cf. aussi Traité III, 1124 et suiv. 'Ici le moine cultive le fondement de pouvoir magique qui est muni de la concentration: i. du zèle... ii. de l'énergie... iii. de pensée... iv. de l'examen.'

NEWS & NOTES

Pali Text Society

1. The registered office has moved to 73 Lime Walk, Oxford OX3 7AD: tel. 0865 742125.

2. Following the closure of Knightsbridge Books, the main stockists and distributors in the UK are John Randall (Books of Asia), 47 Moreton Street, London SW1V 2NY; tel. 01 630 5331.

3. The second J.B. Horner Memorial Lecture was held at the School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London) on 7 September 1987. A Council member, Dr Steven Collins - Visiting Professor of Indian Religions at Indiana University - spoke on 'The Very Idea of a Pāli Canon' and discussed the nature of 'apocryphal' works within the Theravāda Buddhist context.

The Buddhist Forum

'A series of seminars on various aspects of Buddhism: history, philosophy, religion, culture, art, architecture, philology...' is being held at the School of Oriental and African Studies under the auspices of the Centre of Religion and Philosophy. The papers presented are as follows:

14 October 1987 - Dr T. Skorupski (Convenor), 'The multifarious aspects of the proliferation of Buddhist culture in Asia.'

11 November 1987 - Dr A. Piatigorsky, 'Buddhism: the features of early terminology.'

9 December 1987 - Prof. R. Gombrich, 'Recovering the Buddha's message.'

13 January 1988 - Mr A. Huxley, 'How Buddhist is Theravāda Buddhist Law?'

10 February 1988 - Mr K.R. Norman, 'Pāli philology and the study of Buddhism.'

9 March 1988 - Dr I. Astley-Kristensen, 'Aspects of esoteric Buddhism as reflected in the Prajñāpāramitā in 150 ślokas.'

11 May 1988 - Prof.-T.H. Barrett, 'Kill the patriarches.'
University Course on Buddhism

Under the supervision of the tutor, Ven. Pandit M. Vajiragnāna, a University of London Extra-Mural Course on 'Buddhism - The Theravāda School' was held at the London Buddhist Vihāra. Beginning in September, the twenty-week course presented the fundamental principles of Buddhism and was divided into four equal parts: One dealing with the life of the Buddha, the Four Noble Truths and meditation; Two - 'Buddhist Ethical Conduct'; Three - 'Rebirth and因果'; Four - 'Buddhist Psychology'. Depending on its reception, it is hoped to repeat this course in the following academic year.

Adopt a Book

Out of a collection of 15 million books in the British Library, 75% of the pre 1850 and 16% of the post-1850 books need conservation treatment. Age and constant use are resulting in progressive deterioration with the likelihood of priceless books ceasing to exist unless remedial work is urgently undertaken. To ensure the continuance of research at the library, the academic world and private scholars have a moral responsibility to contribute funds to pay for the necessary materials, staff and equipment.

Since it is estimated to cost between £50 and £200 to save a single precious book, the British Library has devised an Adopt a Book scheme whereby individuals or groups are encouraged to donate funds for this purpose. Full acknowledgement will be made although, as at September 1987, only two nineteenth century marginally Buddhist publications are requiring conservation.

For further details contact the National Preservation Office, 5 Great Russell Street, London WC1B 3DG.

Nigel Hulstcin Memorial Conference

To commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the death (in Peking) of the Buddhist Sanskrit scholar, Alexander v. Stachiwolowich, a conference was held between 10 - 14 June 1987 on his former estate at Tytšama, Estonia.

A notable Buddhist scholar at Tartu University, Linnart Mäll (who has translated the Dhammapada, Vajracchedikāpāramitāsūtra and Bodhicaryāvatāra into Estonian) or citing this event.

A Report - with Special Reference to Buddhist Studies - on the viith World Sanskrit Conference on 23-29 August 1987 at Leiden

The well-attended viith World Sanskrit Conference - nearly 250 participants and well organized by the Kern Institute - took place at the prestigious University of Leiden, the oldest in the Netherlands.

'Sanskrit' in this context must be regarded - for the sake of convenience if not preciseness - as a blanket term standing, in fact, for the various branches of Indology as well as Jaina and Buddhist studies. This is borne out when scanning the topics dealt with in the workshops and sections of this conference. A wide range of Indological disciplines included, for instance, Vedic studies: Pāñini and the Veda, sense and syntax in Vedic, syntax and semantics of ritual, etc; Jaina studies: the concept of identity and difference in Jainism, etc; Hinduism: text and myth analysis, soma, Yoga, epic and purānic studies, religious issues in the context of dharmaśāstra, the Sanskrit tradition and Tantrism; linguistic studies: India as a linguistic area, Middle Indo-Aryan studies, modern Sanskrit, Sanskrit and the computer; Sanskrit literature and literary criticism: poetics and aesthetics, modern Sanskrit literature, Sanskrit outside India; Śāstra and pravara in the performing arts, music and dance, forms of expression in ancient Indian art; the history of Indology, the history of sacred places as reflected in traditional literature; sciences, Sanskrit medical literature, etc.

From among twenty workshops and thirty sections only two workshops - treating of 'Earliest Buddhism' and 'Mahāyāna and Madhyamaka Buddhism' respectively - as well as the sections Buddhism I and II were allotted to Buddhist studies. Nevertheless, thanks to the circumstance that occasionally different topics discussed in the workshops and sections overlapped, it was possible for those particularly interested in Buddhist studies also to take considerable interest in and benefit from other workshops set aside for philosophical problems, Middle Indo-Aryan or Jaina studies. Thus, for example, S. Ichinoura offered a paper entitled 'Did the Madhyamika and the Vedāntin find a Common Ground for Fair Games of Refutation or Dialogue?'. K. Bruhn surveyed in his paper on 'Sectional Studies in Jainology' inter alia Jaina
asceticism and monastic training which lend themselves to interesting comparisons with Buddhist practice. In addition, the workshop covering Middle Indo-Aryan studies proved very profitable: C. Caillac dilated upon the expression dhamma vusīmā and also referred to passages in the Pāli canon. In her paper on sāṅgha-sāmāya, A. Mette convincingly proposed an additional meaning to the term sāmāya ("time, junction"). I.e. "obligatory convention" applicable in some places in Pāli and also Prakrit scriptures. K.R. Norman contributed 'Nyāyāntis in Middle Indo-Aryan', a paper of great importance for all those interested in textual criticism and translation of Pāli texts. Another paper on Pāli philology, 'Some Original Features of the Saddaniti' was read by N. Halbir.

Due to the fact that a number of scholars announced in the programme could not participate in the conference, there was a slight mix-up about the schedule. So, chronologically and topically speaking, the papers of Buddhist interest referred to in what follows were not, in point of fact, presented in the same order as mentioned here. In the workshop relating to Earliest Buddhism, R. Gombrich spoke on 'Recovering the Buddha's Message', setting out from the dichotomy of the traditional Buddhist claim that the canon is what monks remembered the Buddha as having said on the one hand, and of the verdict that 'one cannot actually prove anything about the past' on the other. In the same workshop K.R. Norman presented a second paper of his canvassing 'Aspects of Early Buddhism' and, in 'Some Remarks on Older Parts of the Suttanipāta', T.E. Vetter did not agree with some scholars who hold that Madhyamaka thought be traceable in parts of the Suttanipāta. N. Aramaki's paper was a disquisition on 'Some Precursors of the Subconscious Desire in the Atta-
datānīlūta'.

J.W. de Jong's paper on 'Buddhism and the Equality of the Four Castes' was the first contribution to the workshop focussing on Mahāyāna and Madhyamaka Buddhism. While the early Buddhists' attitude towards the caste system was well-known, in a Buddhist text of the seventh or eighth century (i.e. Bhāvaviveka's Prajñā-prādīpa) apparently the caste system is approved of. In the paper the problem is pointed out as to whether this is an isolated case or reflects a change in attitude amongst Buddhist scholars in later times' (cf. VIIth World Sanskrit Conference, Abstracts, Leiden 1987, p. 40). K. Lang's paper focussed 'On the Expression advītyam divadvāram in Catuḥṣatakā XII: 13', followed by G.M. Pongard-Levin's discoursing upon Buddhist MSS and fragments (of mainly Mahāyāna texts) from Central Asia and the history of their discovery and exploration by Russian scholars. A very welcome piece of information was that a re-edition of A. von Steidl-Holstein's editio princeps of the Kāyavaparivarta is being prepared by Pongard-Levin and V. Vorobyeva-Desyatovskaya. E. Steinkellner probed the question of whether Dharmakīrti's 'ultimate philosophical character was that of a Madhyamika' (Abstracts, p. 182) as later Indian tradition has it, and D. Seyfort Ruegg examined 'The Literary-historical Problem of Bhāvaviveka/ Bhavya'.

The sections Buddhism I, II opened with a lecture by A. Wayman on 'The Three Pratyekabuddha Paths per Asanga'. H. Prets put forward his learned 'Remarks on the Structure of saddhana in the Abhidharmasamuccaya', and P. Ebbatson discoursed upon the meaning of prajñāpti, basing his talk on the oft-cited Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 24.18. In his paper C. Goeke, too, concentrated upon Nāgārjuna: 'On some Non-formal Aspects of the Proofs of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikās'. R. Kloppenborg contributed 'The Composition of the Bodhicaryavatāra' by analysing parts of the text in the light of Buddhist meditative practice. With the help of many quotations from both the Triyāna literature and Pāṇini, K.N. Mishra inquired into 'Advaya (Non-dualism) in Buddhist Sanskrit'. H. Katsumura read 'Lexical Notes on the Vinaya', comparing various Sanskrit recensions and MS fragments with each other and with their parallels in Chinese and Tibetan. J. Pereira could not participate in the conference, so the chairperson read his exposition of the Four Noble Truths in Vasubandhu. The problem of two Vasubandhus was reconsidered in the next paper by M. Mejor. With great competence R. Basu handled the cāṇḍu (ornate prose-and-verse texts) structure of Āryādīra's Jātakamālā. Perhaps the most unsatisfactory paper (strictly speaking the final part of it) presented at the conference was K.T.S. Sarso's 'Who and what Originated Buddhism?'. Viewing the history of Buddhism from sociological angles is quite reasonable and can be insightful unless one indulges in generalizations. The speaker's reducing Buddhist principles to platitudes (p. 6f. of his
handout) or his virulent remarks levelled against the ancient Sangha, pleasure-loving and wallowing in urban luxury, by citing the Jatakas as his main authority were strongly criticized as being altogether unscholarly.

Apart from the academic programme, social events such as receptions, with subsequent get-togethers, by the Municipal Council of the City of Leiden or by the famous National Museum of Ethnology and excursions were made good use of by the participants for making or renewing the acquaintance of fellow Indologists, Buddhologists and lovers of sanskrita-vidya from four continents.

(Bhikku Pasadika)

American Conferences
1. The Third Biennial Conference of the International Association of Shin Buddhist Studies was held on the Berkeley campus of the University of California between 6-8 August 1987. (The first two conferences were held in Kyoto 1983 and Hawaii 1985.) Following the opening address by the President of the Association, Dr Masatoshi Nagatomi, twenty-one papers were delivered by American and Japanese scholars on several aspects of Shin Buddhist art, doctrine, history and social ethics. Two of the co-chairmen were Dr Alfred Bloom (Dean of the Institute of Buddhist Studies, Berkeley) who gave the Keynote Speech and Rev. Philipp Eidemann (a veteran Shin Buddhist minister and translator).

2. Following Buddhist-Christian meetings in Honolulu in 1980 and 1984, a third international conference was held in Berkeley between 10-15 August 1987 and was similarly co-sponsored by the Graduate Theological Union and the Institute of Buddhist Studies. '... designed to broaden the interface between the scholarly community and the general public in the area of Buddhist-Christian dialogue', themes of mutual concern and the subjects of discussion included Death and Dying, Ethics, 'Liberation Theology', Meditation and Prayer, Monasticism, Peace, Relics and Images, and Women. Guest speakers included Tai Situ Rinpoche, Doboom Tulku, Master Huu Lan, Ven. Ajahn Sumedho, Ayya Khemā and Joanna Macy, whilst American/Asian academics comprised Masao Abe, David Kalupahana, Anne Klein, Whalen Lai, Lewis Lancaster and Sung Bae Park.

Dharmacakra Vidyapita

The Dharmacakra Vidyapita, situated at the Rajopavanaramaya, Getambe, Peradeniya (Sri Lanka), is a Centre of Higher Learning in Buddhism. The institution provides:

1. the study and research into Buddhism in its totality of theory, practice and insight (pariyatti, patipatti, pativedha).
2. the development, encouragement and extension of the study and practice of Buddhism.
3. the advancement and propagation of knowledge and practice of Buddhism to all parts of the world.

The Dharmacakra Vidyapita has organized courses in:

* Training of Buddhist monks at post-graduate level in the English medium to work as emissaries locally and abroad;
* Short-term courses in Buddhism to groups of foreign visitors and Universities;
* Recognition and conferment of certificates of excellence to international researchers on Buddhism by examination by dissertation;
* Courses of Early Buddhism to Mahayana Buddhists;
* Seminars and conferences on Buddhism;
* Regular meditation courses;
* Teaching program for novice monks with a view to training them in the Dharma and the Vinaya until they reach the level of following the post-graduate training course as mentioned.

All courses are conducted by qualified University teachers and other scholars, all of whom volunteer their services with dedication. The construction of a large building complex to facilitate teaching, research, meditation, conference and residence is underway.

Branches of Indian Publishers

Motilal Banarsidass, Head Office: Bungalow Road, Delhi 110 007 branches: Chowk, Varanasi 221 001; Ashok Rajpath, Patna 800 006; 6 Appar Swamy Koil Street, Mylapore, Madras 600 004; 24 Race Course Road, Bangalore, India.

Representatives: M/S Motilal Books (U.K.) Ltd., 52 Crown Road, Wheatley, Oxford OX9 1UL; South Asia Books, P.O. Box 502, Colum-

Library of Tibetan Works and Archives

With the exception of The Tibet Journal (which is now distributed by Biblia Impex Pvt Ltd., 2/18 Anart Road, New Delhi 110002, although the editorial address will remain at Gangchen Kyishung, Dharamsala 176215, H.P., India), the sole distributor and selling agent for all LTWA publications is Charitrust Tibetan Handicraft Exports, 16 Jor Bagh, New Delhi 110003.

New publications include a New English-Tibetan Dictionary by Norbu Chophel comprising over 10,000 entries (RS 6.25 or airmail: $ 8.95 including postage and packing - direct to author at Dharamsala address) and Tibetan-English Dictionary of Buddhist Terminology (comprising 10,000 entries with Sanskrit equivalents, based on the Mahāvyuttpattī) by Taepak Rigzin ($ 21 or Rs 225 incl. p. and p., and available from Charittrust).

Göttingen Conference

The latest in the series of symposia sponsored by the Kommission für die buddhistische Studien der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen will be held between 11-13 April 1988. No less than thirty-eight scholars from all over the world will present papers on 'The Date of the Historical Buddha and the Importance of its Determination for Historiography and World History'. A full report will appear in a future issue.

33rd International Conference of Orientalists in Japan

This annual event will be held in Tokyo and Kyoto on 1st, 2nd and 7th May 1988 under the auspices of The Tōhō Gakkai and the International Congress for Asian and North African Studies - Japan Liaison Committee. It would appear that only Japanese scholars will participate. The Transactions of the congress will be published in December 1988 by the Tōhō Gakkai, 4-1 Nishi-Kanda 2 Chome, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 101, Japan.

OBITUARIES

Hermann Kopp (1902-87)

With the death of Dr Kopp in the early part of this year, the field of Pāli studies has lost the services of a distinguished representative.

Hermann Kopp was born in Neckarhausen bei Mannheim and studied Sanskrit and Pāli at Heidelberg under Heinrich Zimmer and Max Walleser respectively, pursuing these subjects at Leipzig between 1922-8. He later returned to Heidelberg where he received his doctorate in 1935 for a critical edition of 'Buddhaghosās Kommentar zum siebenten Buch des Aṅguttara-nikāya'. From 1936 to 1939 and after the Second World War until 1953 he worked closely with the Pāli Text Society for which he edited the following texts: the Commentary to the Aṅguttara Nikāya (Manorathapuranī II-V, 1930-57, together with the second ed.of Vol.I, 1973) and the indexes to the Therāgāthā Commentary (in Vol.III, 1959), Samantapāsādikā (forming Vol.VIII, 1977), Itivuttaka and Cariyāpiṭaka Commentaries (Paramatthapāṇi I and VII, 1979). During the years 1954-8 he gave courses in Sanskrit and Pāli at the University's Seminar für Indologie and, after a break of six years at Mainz University, resumed teaching Pāli grammar in relation to the texts. Until about 1960 he directed the declining fortunes of the Institut für Buddhismuskunde following the sale of Walleser's library by his executors. Between 1958-68 he also served as assistant editor of the Critical Pāli Dictionary in Copenhagen, contributing to Vol.II, fascicles 1-10 (1960-79), and at the time of his death was compiling an index of proper nouns, titles and gathās in Jātaka VI and the Papanḍadari.

Eugène Denis (1921-1986)

Né dans une bourgade des environs de Rennes (France), au sein d'une famille profondément catholique, Eugène Denis avait hérité les solides qualités des paysans bretons. Touche dès l'adolescence par la vocation religieuse, il avait fait de sérieuses études au séminaire, puis était entré dans la Compagnie de Jésus. Celle-ci l'envoya, tout jeune, rejoindre la mission de Chine, ce que lui permit d'acquérir, entre autres choses, une excellente
connaissance de la langue chinoise. Peu après la victoire du maquis en 1949, Eugène Denis quitta la Chine pour le Thaïlande, où il devait résider définitivement, plus précisément au Xavier Hall de Bangkok. Il y apprit la langue thaï, qu'il parla bientôt couramment, et s'intéressa vivement à la culture de ce pays et à la religion de la très grande majorité des habitants, le bouddhisme theravādin, ce qui le conduit à apprendre le pāli. Ses connaissances en la matière devinrent vite d'une telle valeur qu'il fut admis dans le cadre des chercheurs du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique français en 1961 et y demeura jusqu'à la fin, accomplissant des travaux de recherche qui lui valurent une promotion au grade de chargé de recherche dès 1968.

Il fut ainsi amené à étudier de près le Lokapaññatti, traité tardif en pāli décrivant le monde et les êtres qui le peuplent selon les conceptions du Theravāda. Ce ne fut pas chose aisée, car il ne put retrouver, non sans beaucoup de mal, que deux manuscrits de cet ouvrage, en outre fort mauvais l'un et l'autre. Pour restituer le texte pāli aussi correctement que possible, il dut donc utiliser les traductions chinoises anciennes, heureusement excellentes, de plusieurs ouvrages parallèles appartenant à d'autres écoles du bouddhisme antique, accomplissant ainsi un admirable travail de philologie bouddhique. Il put ainsi résoudre un grand nombre des problèmes posés par l'établissement et l'interprétation du traité pāli, et aussi faire beaucoup d'intéressantes comparaisons, qui lui permirent de retracer les grandes lignes de l'histoire de l'ouvrage. Après de nombreuses années de travail acharné, il souffit enfin, en 1976, très brillamment devant l'Université de Paris IV, une excellente thèse intitulée 'La Lokapaññatti et les idées cosmologiques du bouddhisme ancien', qui contenait, outre le texte pāli et sa traduction française, fort abondamment annotés et commentés, une longue introduction d'un haut intérêt sur l'origine de l'ouvrage pāli et ses relations avec les textes parallèles.

Bien qu'un tel effort eût altéré sa santé au point qu'il dut subir une intervention chirurgicale à coeur ouvert, Eugène Denis reprit bientôt ses travaux avec le même ardeur. Il entreprit d'abord de rechercher en Thaïlande et même ailleurs tous les manuscrits pālis traitant de cosmologie bouddhique. Sa réna-

cité fut si bien récompensée qu'il retrouva, non seulement quelques autres manuscrits de la Lokapaññatti, mais aussi et surtout ceux de plusieurs autres ouvrages que l'on croyait perdus depuis longtemps ou dont l'existence était même ignorée. Laissant alors provisoirement de côté une amélioration de son travail sur la Lokapaññatti, il se mit à éditer et traduire en français ces nouveaux traités. À commencer par le Lokapadiptakasāra, l'Aruṇavaṭī et la Cakkavalaṭipani.

Malgré sa santé devenue fragile, Eugène Denis poursuivait en plus d'autres activités importantes sans ménager sa peine, en particulier un enseignement régulier à l'Université Chulalongkorn, la grande Université de Bangkok, où il préparait à la recherche les étudiants de maîtrise de la Faculté des Lettres. Les hautes autorités de l'enseignement supérieur thaï l'avaient en très grande estime et n'hésitaient pas à faire appel à sa science. C'est ainsi qu'il fut chargé, seul étranger avec quelques savants thaïs, d'établir une édition revisée du texte de la fameuse stèle de Rakamhaeng, dite de Sukhotai, et d'en donner la traduction française.

C'est en revenant de l'Université Chulalongkorn à Xavier Hall qu'il fut terrassé par une crise cardiaque le 11 décembre 1986. Sa disparition brutale fut cruellement ressentie par les nombreux amis, français, thaïs et autres, que le Père Eugène Denis s'était attachés par sa bonté toujours souriante et chaleureuse, sa vaste érudition et son infatigable dévouement.
**BOOK REVIEWS**


As she received the typescript of her edition of Paññāsa-Hātaka (PJ) from Professor P.S. Jaini, Miss I.B. Horner, at that time President of the Pali Text Society, began to translate it into English. A bad fall, which subsequently led to her death in April 1981, interrupted her work. She was halfway through the twenty-third Hātaka of the collection, and her task was never completed. After her death, the Council of the PTS decided to publish her translation as a tribute to her memory. They persuaded Professor Jaini to complete the translation of the twenty-third Hātaka, and with his translations of the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth Hātkas, the result is now published as Vol.I of Apocryphal Birth Stories. His own translation of Hātakas 26-50 makes up Vol.II.

The Council asked one of their number, Dr Steven Collins, to edit Miss Horner's work and see it through the press. The task was not easy. The unfinished half story was still in manuscript. The earlier Hātkas had been typed out, but queries abounded. Many of the footnotes which Miss Horner had already appended included references, culled from Miss Horner's vast knowledge of Pāli literature, to parallel passages which gave a hint as to the proper way of interpreting the text, but they also revealed a number of places where she was still doubtful about the way in which to interpret the difficult Pāli of the original. The supplementary portion by Jaini differed in style and choice of translation for individual words, and his footnotes were far fewer and were restricted almost entirely to suggestions for emending the text. Rather than try to assimilate the whole together, Dr Collins decided to leave Miss Horner's portion as unchanged as possible.

In addition to his editorial duties, without which the translation would have never seen the light of day, Dr Collins contributes a short Preface, in which he outlines the history of the translation, and adds a few remarks on the uses of the word 'apocryphal' in connection with Buddhist texts. The usage of the word is modelled upon the Christian use, in connection with the Apocrypha books of the New Testament, which are regarded as lacking the divine inspiration which is required to make them canonical. Such a definition cannot, of course, apply to Buddhism, where, in the absence of a God there can be no divine inspiration. The various Buddhist schools did, however, regard their Canons as having a specific authority, and it is this authority which the 50 apocryphal Hātkas from Chiang Mai lacked, although they were closely modelled upon, and in places reproduced verbatim, portions of the canonical Hātkas.

In addition to Collins' Preface, Vol.I contains a short list of abbreviations. There is no index of names, or any comment about the provenance, date or authorship of the text from which the translation is made. To give these would merely have duplicated the Introduction to Vol.II of Jaini's edition of the PJ (PTS, 1981), to which readers are referred. They will also find there a summary of each story, which contains information about the canonical Hātkas and other sources from which any borrowings have been made.

There can be no doubt that if Miss Horner had lived she would have made numerous corrections and improvements to her translation. To see it in this unrevised form, however, enables us to gain an impression of the way in which Miss Horner worked. We have, as Dr Collins states, a sense of looking over the shoulder of the great scholar to whom the Pali Text Society in particular, and Pāli studies in general, owe so much.

K.R. Norman


The Lokaneyyappakaranam (LNP) belongs to the type of literature which is normally called niti, i.e., it abounds in moral aphorisms. It is not, however, a mere collection of such aphorisms, as are the texts from Burma which were edited by Bechert and Braun, and published by the Pali Text Society in 1981 under the title of Pāli Niti Texts of Burma. LNP is told in the form of a Hātaka
story, with a nīdāna at the beginning and a samodhāna (in which more than 30 characters are identified) at the end. The work is alleged to have been preached by the Buddha to the king of Kosala, after Ānanda had once expressed surprise that the Buddha had been able to convert a group of heretics so quickly. The Buddha explained that in a previous birth, as the Bodhisatta Dhanañjaya, he had converted a cruel yakkha. The story of Dhanañjaya, who at the age of seven answered the king’s riddles and subdued a yakkha, is then told. The theme is doubtless borrowed from the Mahāummaggañjātaka, where the subduing of thieves and yakkhas is similarly related. In that Jātaka, the word pañha ‘question’ or ‘riddle’ is used as a synonym for ‘chapter’, since the Bodhisatta Mahosadha is compelled to answer a number of testing questions, which constitute episodes in the story. It seems that the LNF’s author has borrowed the same designation, for the various sections of the story are called pañhas, even though in several sections there is no question to answer.

In the introduction to this edition of the LNF, Jaini gives a summary of the whole text. It consists of an introduction (uppattikākha), 37 aabhantara (interior) pañhas and a further 4 bāhiddhā (external) pañhas which occur at the end, after the main body of the story has been finished. Nīti verses are interspersed in the course of the prose narrative, rather as comparable verses occur in the Hitopadeśa or the Pañcatantra. Jaini explains the context in which the verses are uttered and the purpose they serve in each pañha. Including repetitions, there are nearly 600 verses of which, however, only about 140 may be regarded as true nīti verses. Many of these can be traced either to Pāli nīti texts included in the PPT, or to Sanskrit nīti texts from which one verse (v.165) is taken over entire and all, although in saying that this is the only example in Pāli of the sārūdavi-kṛidita metre Jaini has overlooked the occurrence of the metre at Mahāvamsa XXX 100. The source of about 30 verses remains untraced. Of the other, non-nīti, verses, about 50 can be traced to the Jātaka collection, and another dozen to the Paññāhan-jātaka (PJ). An index of first pādas of all the pāṭhas is given at the end of the work.

Jaini also considers the question of the date and provenance of this text which appears to be a unique example of the genre in Pāli literature. The theme of one pañha is found elsewhere in Pāli literature only in the PJ, which is probably to be dated to the fourteenth century. There are also references to a city called Bhāṣgarattha, with the variant Abhāṣgarattha. Both these names are perhaps identical to Bāṣgarattha, which is to be identified as modern Chiang Mai in Northern Thailand. On the basis of this and other evidence, Jaini comes to the conclusion that LNF was probably compiled between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries in Thailand, in the Chiang Mai area, although it is for the most part based upon much earlier material. A number of the narrative stories told in the pañhas are taken from the Jātaka collection. Besides the frequent borrowings from the Mahāummaggañjātaka, the Abhājàtaka is taken over almost verbatim, while another pañha is based closely upon the Kurudhammājātaka, even to the extent of its name (Kurudhammākandapāñha).

The LNF also includes a reference to the Majjima-atthakathā, which is not found in existing versions of the Papanācaūdani, raising the possibility that we have here a reference to the pre-Buddhaghosa Sthira atthakathā. It also includes a few lines of commentary upon the list of ten kilesas (v.41) which look as though they come from some lost āṅgikas, perhaps an exegetical work on Abhidhamma. The total of almost eighty verses in the Kurudhammākandapāñha, in which the Bodhisatta provides what is virtually a textbook on polity, must also have been taken from some text on the subject, now lost.

The edition is made from a single MS, which Jaini found in Bangkok in 1960. As in the case of other texts from South-East Asia, the orthography of the LNF differs considerably from the Pāli of the Canon and the early commentaries. In particular, doubled consonants are written as single, and vice versa. Jaini has regularised such readings in his text, but since orthographic variations are found in many published Pāli works from S-E Asia, it is possible that they represent genuine features of the Pāli language as used in that part of the world. If that is so, then Jaini was probably wrong to ‘correct’ the language as he has done. He has, however, retained the MS readings in brackets, so that the reader can see what they were, and he has moreover collected them in appendices at the end of the book, so that anyone wishing to study this phenomenon will find the relevant
material together.

Jaini describes the efforts he has made to find other MSS of the same text, and the frustration of examining MSS of texts with similar sounding names. The LMF has clearly fallen out of favour with readers - Jaini states that he was unable to find even one learned monk acquainted with it. A recently published list (Journal Asiatique, 1983, pp.187-90) of uncatalogued MSS in the Bibliothèque Nationale includes one entitled Lokaneya and another Lokaneyapakarana-vanana. Mme Jacqueline Fillozat has announced (Bulletin d'Etudes Indiennes I (1983), p.63) her intention of editing the former on the basis of eight MSS which are available to her. It will be interesting to compare her edition in due course with Jaini's work, to see if it is indeed the same text and, if it is, to see if the orthographies of the two editions are identical.

Despite the number and importance of the Pali texts produced in S-E Asia, very few works from that part of the world have been published in the West until now. This addition to that small number is, therefore, particularly welcome.

K.R. Norman


One of the best known authors in medieval Ceylon was the theri Vedeha, who composed in Pali the collection of Buddhist edifying tales known as Samavatini. Like others who wrote in Pali at that time, his writings were subjected to two particularly strong influences. One was the vernacular language, Sinhalese; the other was the Hindu culture or, more particularly, Sanskrit, the learned literary language of that culture.

A member of a group of forest-dwelling monks called Arahana-vinas, Vedeha was asked by a fellow member to write a poem and chose as his subject the mountain peak which the monks could probably see from their hermitage. His poem tells the story of the life of the Buddha right up to the point when, as tradition has it, he came to Ceylon and planted his footstep on that very peak. The last part of the poem tells of the beauties of the

mountain and the planting of the footprint. The influence of Sinhalese upon his grammar and syntax is obvious, while the Sanskrit influence is particularly noticeable in his vocabulary. A number of words he uses are borrowed from the Sanskrit lexicon, although the fact that Vedeha uses them surely renders them part of the medieval Pali vocabulary, and makes their exclusion from the Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary inexplicable.

The translation of his SamantakutaVAvanan (= SKV) reviewed here is a revised version of a B.A. dissertation submitted to the Australian National University at Canberra by Mrs A.A. Hazlewood. To the translation is added a glossary and index of proper names, with an asterisk against those who do not appear in the Pali-English Dictionary or the Critical Pali Dictionary. There is also a glossary of translated epithets and words, which will be helpful for readers who know little about Indian culture when they are faced with the problems of identification presented by passages such as v.196 with its references to 'the Four-faced One', 'the Thousand-eyed One', 'the Hooded One', and 'the Ten-necked One'. The basis of the translation is C.E. Codakumbara's edition of the text, published by the Pali Text Society in 1958 and unfortunately marred by the misprinting of the author's name as Veheda on both cover and title page. There is a list of corrections to, or departures from, that edition.

Although the SKV is composed mainly in the sloka metre, it does contain over 300 verses in other metres, and Vedeha was clearly proud of his ability to handle such ornate metres as the Vasantatilaka. Mrs Hazlewood has not tried to emulate Vedeha's erudition, but has chosen to translate into prose, 'as literal [and, it may be added, as accurate] as idiomatic English will permit'. This reviewer is firmly of the opinion that only those who are poets in their own right should try to translate poetry into poetry, and he can therefore only applaud this decision. He must, however, point out to readers that this inevitably means that they have thereby been deprived of any indication of all the poetic embellishments which befit an Indian kavya composition and which brought Vedeha fame as a poet.

K.R. Norman
Another curious passage from the Tannishō is quoted in the Introduction: 'If Amida's Primal Vow is true and real, Shākyamuni's teachings cannot be lies. If the Buddha's teaching is true and real, Shan-tao's commentaries cannot be lies. If Shan-tao's commentaries are true and real, can what Hönen said be a lie? If what Hönen said is true and real, then surely my words cannot be empty.' This is to argue from the unproven to the proven. It is a curious argument to say that because Amidism is true Dharma therefore the historical Shākyamuni's teaching is true. No Buddhist school disputes the reality of the historical Buddha, but there are Buddhists who question the validity of some Mahāyāna developments.

The question is asked, but not answered, 'Is not to alter the scriptures to do violence to them?' Coupled with the sometimes strained quotations, we also have the narrowing down of authorities from the whole Mahāyāna Canon to the Three Pure Land Sūtras, and then by a further selective process to the Larger Sukhavati Sūtra. The Meditation Sūtra and the Smaller Sūtra are assessed as 'provisional'. Sākyamuni appeared in the world, we gather, solely to teach this Larger Sūtra. 'All other teachings were delivered as temporary provisional means, accommodated to the capacity and character of particular listeners.' And this brings us to the forty-eight vows of the Mahāvairocana Dharmākara. Only three of these are stressed, the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth, and of these three only the eighteenth seems totally acceptable, but with the provision that its exclusion clause be overlooked. The other two Pure Land Sūtras, and the nineteenth and twentieth vows are all guilty of 'affirming reliance of self power'. So we reach the tiny base of one Vow out of forty-eight, in one Sūtra out of the whole vast Canon.

It seems clear that this minimal approach was intended to put forward Shinran's particular viewpoint at the time of the Japanese Middle Ages, to the exclusion of any other viewpoint. It is a slender base for such a far-reaching doctrine and seems not to take into account the personal experience. The vitality of Zen stems largely from reliance on personal experience of the Dharma, and Shin needs it as much as any other school if its core of Shinjīn is to be maintained. For Shinjīn is the heart of the matter, and it is the entrusting of ourselves to


This is a translation of the first part of Shinran Shōnin's monumental 'Apologia pro vita sua'. It contains the first two chapters on True Teaching and True Practice, the remaining chapters on True Faith and True Enlightenment being reserved for another volume.

There is a previous translation by a committee at Ryōkoku University, published in 1966, which gives the Chinese, Romaji and English texts on each page, with copious footnotes numbered against passages in all three renderings. It remains a most valuable source material for scholars and students. The present publication has less stilted English, but does not offer the Chinese or Romaji, nor the detailed footnotes. However, it makes up for this with its candour.

The Introduction says (p. 31): 'Chief among his [Shinran's] methods is his controversial use of the Japanese practice of punctuating and annotating Chinese texts in order to recast them into Japanese sentence structure and grammatical form and to interpret the Chinese characters. He added such reading notes to all the passages in his collection, but at a number of points he chose to depart from the accepted readings and to impose new interpretations, some clearly at variance with the literal meanings of the texts.' Also: 'If scripture is cited as proof, it is necessary to quote with sufficient care so as not to distort the meaning of the original. To alter a passage in order to make it accord with one's own perspective is to destroy its value as scriptural testimony.'

As justification for distorting texts we have: 'He did not alter the texts ignoring the original meaning as some have charged; quite the contrary, he read the source meanings of the scriptures more deeply and clearly than the original authors, and in order to bring it out, he changed the traditional meanings where he felt that they were inadequate.' This plainly claims that Shinran knew better than the Buddha and the original compilers of the texts than they did themselves.
Amida, to the exclusion of our own calculations. It is the acceptance of the heart of Amida Buddha, making us one with the Buddha: the attainment of Buddhahood in spite of our limitations, by the power of the Buddha. Many of Shinran's other writings testify to this experience.

Explanations are no more than fingers pointing the way. 'Letters of Shinran' (Mattoshō) is a good example of guidance for the believer and can more likely help the Western enquirer than this controversial and difficult text.

Jack Austin


This fourth volume in the Berkeley Buddhist Series of the University of California is an admirable production adding to the prestige of that enterprising new series. Much has, of course, already been written about Buddhist cosmology by indologists whose works are based on Sanskrit, Pāli or Tibetan sources. Nevertheless, this 'Sermon on the Three Worlds' (Traibhubikathā) or, as it became known later on, the Three Worlds According to King Ruang (Trai Phum Phra Ruang), is by no means just a repetition at length and in a slightly new garb of what others published on the subject before. The translators are certain right when they state that 'not only from a buddhological point of view, but also from a more historical or anthropological perspective, it is no exaggeration to say that the Trai Phum is the most important and fascinating text that has been composed in the Thai language' (p.7).

The bulk of the book consists of the translation of the Three Worlds (viz. the 'world of desires', of 'form' and of 'formlessness'). Besides traditional descriptions of the various realms of saṃsāric beings, passages on ancient Indian cosmography, on the geography of Jambudvīpa, on cosmic destruction and renewal make interesting reading. The climax of the Traibhubikathā is Chapter 11 on 'Nibbāna and the Path'. The translation is preceded by 'Words of Praise' and a prologue, and followed by an epilogue, all containing important historical information about the royal author, Phya Lithai, who wrote the Trai Phum in 1345, about the personalities in the early history of the Thai Sangha, and about the Pāli texts, commentaries and sub-commentaries used by them.

In the translators' introduction it is mentioned that the Trai Phum is 'an expression of the orthodox Theravāda tradition' (p.5). There is no denying the fact that this is so. Nonetheless, in the introduction to his work, Phya Lithai refers to 'those who know basic principles, have wisdom... the Bodhisatta (pp.54-5). In a footnote to this passage the translators rightly refer to a Bodhisattva's vow of postponing his entry into Nirvāṇa in order to help all other sentient beings realize the final goal of Buddhahood and ultimate release - a distinct Mahāyāna ideal. After perusing the translators' most informative introduction, one can easily explain for oneself this fundamental Mahāyāna feature in what otherwise is 'clearly the high point of Theravāda cosmological expression' (p.19). Early Sukhothai history is highlighted by the Thai people's struggle for independence which was finally won from the Khmer empire. Establishing close cultural links with Sri Lanka, the Sukhothai kings became staunch supporters of Theravāda Buddhism, certainly not out of sheer piety but with a view also to stressing in respect of cultural and religious affairs the newly-won independence from Cambodian suzerainty and Khmer Sanskrit culture. As a 'very dynamic leader' Phya Lithai made use - so as to further consolidate Sukhothai power - of what Khmer rulers had most effectively employed for themselves and their empire: of taking the title of Mahādhammarāja and of 'associating himself very directly with the Bodhisatta ideal... and even with the figure of the fully realized Buddha. In a famous inscription he proclaims his own Bodhisatta vow to work for the salvation of all beings' (p.9).

A merit of F.K. and M.B. Reynolds' work is that they have made accessible a document presenting at epic length the cosmological visions of Thai Theravāda and that they have portrayed a colourful personality whose writing has played a decisive role in the 'development of a more exalted style of Thai kingship' (p.11). The Trai Phum may also serve as a key to explain the extraordinary fact that even nowadays, in spite of twentieth
century power politics and military régimes, in the last constitutionnal monarchy of South-East Asia the 'father figure' of the piya-mahādhamma-rāja is the only really stabilizing factor uniting all Thai-speaking people who have managed to preserve their independence since the Ayutthaya or even Sukhothai period.

Unfortunately, there is a considerable number of misprints, especially in the glossary of selected terms. On p.304, e.g. for the Thai term sattha nibbāna should be read sattha nibbāna. At some places Pali words are not correctly transcribed, i.e. the Thai pronunciation is partly retained in the spelling. Such relatively minor shortcomings, however, are more than compensated by meticulous charts and diagrams and by a useful appendix and index. On p.20, the translators mention a well-known contemporary monk from south Thailand, Ācariya Buddhadasā. They seem to have overlooked a work (with a very interesting introduction by Elizabeth Lyons) by that monk dealing with a manuscript from Chaliya which, though much shorter, younger and less refined than the Trai Phum, is very similar to the latter as far as subject matter and religious import are concerned: Teaching Dhamma by Pictures, Social Science Association Press of Thailand, Bangkok 1988. There also exists a German translation of this work (Tübingen 1970).

The Three Worlds According to King Rüang can with good reason be recommended to scholars specializing in Religious Studies and to the interested general reader alike.

Bhikkhu Pāṇādika


In the last hundred years or so the libraries of Nepal and Tibet, and the caves and ruins of Afghanistan, Kashmir and Chinese Turkestan have given up a mass of Buddhist manuscripts in Sanskrit and other languages. To distinguish between Mahāyāna and Hinayāna affiliations causes few problems, but it is not always easy to decide to which school of the Hinayāna a particular text belongs, if it does not actually include an attribution. Sometimes the mention of a specific doctrinal point is a clear indication. More commonly a newly-found Sanskrit text can be identified as the version from which a particular Chinese or Tibetan translation has been made. If the affiliation of the translation is named in the later traditions, then the problem is solved. Often, however, except for Vinaya texts, no school is named in Chinese translations.

The third in the series of symposia on Buddhist research was held in Göttingen in July 1982 to tackle this very difficult subject of the identification of the school-tradition of Hinayāna texts. The first part of the proceedings of that conference has now been published. To the proceedings is prefixed a long introduction by Heinz Bechert, the convenor of the conference, in which he gives an excellent account of the early history of Buddhism and the rise of the various sects of Hinayāna, only slightly marred by a tendency to follow the 'Bellman' principle. It must be emphasised that tentative suggestions about the affiliation of texts to schools, e.g. of the Upālīpariprचāsātra to the Abhaya-giri-vihāra, do not become proven fact by mere repetition.

The papers presented in this book fall into various categories: (a) Several deal with stylistic and linguistic criteria: Oskar von Hinüber examines the form which various technical terms, e.g. pācittiya, take in the texts of various schools, and Lore Sander considers the distinction between parigad and paragd as used by various sects. It is obvious that such linguistic idiosyncrasies are used consistently by schools, then they can be used to identify the affiliation of the texts in which they occur. Georg von Simson makes a similar investigation of stylistic considerations.

(b) Several papers discuss the evidence afforded by Sanskrit and Tibetan texts about the names of the languages used by the schools. It is clear that if a particular language can be proved to be used exclusively by one school, then anything in that language belongs to that school. Of very great importance for this problem is the information given by the Tibetan historians. Claus Vogel gives a translation into English of the relevant
portions of Bu-ston's history and other Tibetan sources, and David Seyfort Ruegg analyses this information. For many years the Mahāvastu was the only text belonging to the Lokottara Mahāsāṃghikas of the middle country (Madhyadesa) known to us, although opinions differed about the precise meaning to be given to 'middle country', since no other sect seemed to describe themselves by a geographical location of this sort. In recent years, however, a number of other texts of this school have been edited from MSS discovered in Tibet, and in those also in new MSS of the Mahāvastu which have been collected by the German-Nepal Manuscript Project, the school is spoken of as belonging to the madhyadesa. Gustav Roth considers this phrase, decides it is the correct form and translates it as 'in the intermediate language'. An article on the same subject by J.W. de Jong which first appeared in Orientalia Josephi Tucci memoriam dicata (IsMEO, Rome 1985) is reprinted here. These two articles make it clear that we are indeed dealing, not with a geographical location, but with a description of the Sanskrit-cum-Prakrit language which is characteristic of the Lokottara Mahāsāṃghika school.

(c) Several papers deal with individual canonical texts. Some of the folios of the Gilgit Manuscripts now preserved at Ujjain were identified by Professor J. Takasaki many years ago as belonging to the Sarvāstivādī version of the Dharmakanda, a section of the sixth book of the Abhidharmapitaka of that school. Takasaki himself pointed out that the Sanskrit version so identified seems to differ greatly from the version from which the Chinese translation by Hsuan-tsang was made, and it has been pointed out that if this identification is certain, this was the first Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma text found at Gilgit. It is interesting, therefore, to see that Dr Dietz has now decided that the Dharmakanda and also the portions of the Lokaprajñapī and Ekottarāgama found in the Ujjain MSS are all Mālasarvāstivādin texts. Chandrabāl Triśāṭṭhi compares a portion of the Sanskrit Ekottarāgama MS from Gilgit with various fragments of the Saṅgītiśūtra and Saṅgītiparāśaya, and concludes that the Paris fragment of the Saṅgītiśūtra and the Turfan fragment of the Saṅgītiparāśaya 'derive most probably from the Mālasarvāstivādin school'. Bhikku Pasāndika treats the question of the canonical quotations in the Abhidharma-kośa-bhāgaya.

(d) A number of papers deal with non-canonical texts. Dieter Schlingloff discusses the affiliation of the versions of the Sūmājātaka which underlie paintings of episodes of this Jātaka. Jens-Uwe Hartmann discusses the affiliation of the Avadānājātaka, and Adelheid Mette edits and discusses a fragment of the Padmāvatī-avādāna from Gilgit. Michael Hahn deals with the affiliation of various authors, including Gopadatta, Haribhattra, Āryasūra and Kumāralāla.

Tripāṭṭhī's caution in coming to a conclusion about the affiliations of his texts seems well justified in the light of a paper from Egaku Mayeda, reviewing Japanese studies on the schools of the Chinese Āgamas. Readers who are perplexed by the way in which scholars change their minds from time to time about the affiliation of a particular text will read Mayeda's review with respect. It is clear that there is little certainty about the subject, and some of the identifications of MSS from Turfan or Gilgit which have been made may perhaps not be as well founded as their proposers might imply.

Professor Ernst Waldschmidt's 85th birthday (15 July 1982) fell during the time of the Symposium. The volume was therefore offered to him as a birthday present and is prefaced by a laudation by Herbert Harter. As readers of this journal will know, Professor Waldschmidt died on 25 February 1985 and most regrettably did not see his birthday present in print.

X.R. Norman


The principle aim of books like this is to bridge the gulf of incomprehension between different philosophical traditions and reveal their common foundations under different developments. We are, after all, members of the same race living in the same
world, and therefore faced with the same sort of difficulties and endowed with the same faculties to overcome them. However, that is not how it works out. The three monotheistic religions, the two parallel religions from India and the two main ones from China, start from different assumptions and aim at different solutions; their adherents look on the others as irrelevant, nonsensical, superstitious and barren. How marvellous to extract from them all that is of lasting value and produce a synthesis to guide the population of the world into the friendly unity we all say we crave! The purpose of this book is, however, much less ambitious than that, aiming only at using the method of one particular school of Western philosophy to make the doctrines of two Japanese Buddhists easier to understand.

Phenomenology is a method developed by Husserl (1859-1938) of stripping one’s consciousness of all the accretions of one’s particular culture and getting down to the basic awareness all men share. This would seem to have something in common with Buddhist meditation, especially Kūkai’s (774-835) doctrine that meditation is designed to rediscover our inborn but lost Buddha nature and Dōgen’s (1200-53) teaching that even the struggle to achieve enlightenment can become an obstacle to its attainment. Husserl, however, was no religious sage, but the heir to two hundred years of Western philosophy, and if that constitutes philosophy are we wise to bracket it with Buddhist thought and practice? Dōgen has a famous description of how to perform zazen, the very performance of which, if properly carried out, can entail instant enlightenment. Whoever heard of a Western philosopher laying down rules of posture and mind control as a prerequisite of understanding his doctrines? Religions all do this, Christians kneel and close their eyes, Muslims on their knees bend their foreheads to the ground as they face Mecca; the right words have to be said in the right order. These are tokens of utter commitment to this or that religious basis and go with bells, gongs and other musical instruments; but Western philosophy claims to be a science, developing pari passu with Western physical sciences to produce cold truths experimentally testable. It fails to do this and spends more words on unravelling the doctrines of the recognised classic philosophers than on building new structures on agreed and solid foundations. David Shaner perfectly realises all this and a perusal of his last chapter could be usefully tried as a warning of the limits of his possible accomplishment.

The previous six chapters are tidily arranged in an outline of the basic doctrines of Husserl, Kūkai and Dōgen, each followed by relating them to what is called third, second and first Order of Bodysminded Awareness, phenomenological categories of states of mind taken from Husserl and used to compare Kūkai and Dōgen and to show that all three were basically talking to some extent about the same thing. But whether or not Shaner reveals a common basis of these two Japanese Buddhists and one at least of Western philosophical threads, it is a useful introduction to the thought of all three and inevitably shows up the differences of language, aim and method between Buddhist and Western philosophical writings.

The language difference itself is very striking. The rich poetic imagery of Buddhist writing contrasts sharply with the technical terms, often peculiar to one school of thought or even to one author. Here you have bodysminded awareness in three stages, sedimentation, noetic focus, poetic vector, presenting, neutralizing, horizon, for instance. All, of course explained as they occur. On the other hand, one common feature indubitably does exist in all three and that is the unity of body and mind, not quite the obvious junction of mind as a function of the body, like digestion or breathing, but at least the denial of a duality of substance. It is this that demands one word for both together. We don’t say that the body thinks, nor do we say that mind moves. So bodysminded was the best to be found.

Alban Cooke


This is the first, and given the author’s thoroughness - I must confess that upon finishing the book I thought to myself, 'This is really more than I care to know about the subject' - likely the last English language study of the life and writings of Muju Ichien (1226-1312), 'a voice for pluralism in Kamakura Buddhism'.
Compared to the fatalism of Shinran, the arrogance of Dōgen and the fanaticism of Nichiren, Mūjū's gentle eclecticism is indeed refreshing. Morrell quotes Mūjū (pp.19-20):

'There is not just one method for entering the Way, the causes and conditions for enlightenment being many. Once a person understands their general significance, he will see that the purport of various teachings does not vary. And when he puts them into practice, he will find that the goal of the myriad religious exercises is the same... When a man who practices one version of the Way vilifies another because it differs from his own sect, he cannot avoid the sin of slandering the Law. It has been said that a man who slanders the methods of another out of attachment to his own beliefs will surely suffer the pains of hell even though he observes the commandments.'

Mūjū was originally a Tendai monk but then studied a variety of other exoteric and esoteric systems as a kind of free-lance priest, eventually becoming a disciple of the Rinzai Zen master Enni Ben'en (Shōichi Kokushi, 1202-80), abbot of Kyoto's Tōfukuji. Mūjū established Chōbōji, in what is now Nagoya, as a branch of that school. Mūjū's main claim to fame is as a sessūwa, 'teller of tales'. His chief work is the Shasekishū, an enormous compendium of morality tales, fables, street sermons, didactic poems and the like composed over the years 1279-83. Even though the translator has mercifully summarized many of the sections, the English version, Sand and Pebbles, runs to nearly 200 well annotated pages. The following sample tale gives an idea of the book's frequently disconcerting entries and the pedestrian style of the translator/editor:

'6:8 'The Preacher Who Praised a Breaking of Wind'.

When the Hexagonal Hall was destroyed by fire, a series of daily sermons was given to raise funds for its reconstruction. In a large audience which had assembled on the day that Shōgaku spoke, a young lady-in-waiting by the worship platform dozed off and broke wind so loudly that it was heard throughout the hall. Moreover, the odour was so overpowering that people lost interest in the proceedings.

The celebrant was undaunted by the noise. 'The sounding flutes, of many reeds or of one only, and lyres, mounted on stands or not, and lutes and cymbals all produce a wondrous sound, but they have no scent. The incense of precious woods and resins, on the other hand, have a fragrant aroma but they make no sound. But today's worthy exhalation has both sound and fragrance; hear it and note its aroma!'

On being so excessively praised, the woman removed one of her garments. 'Along with this,' she said, 'make it an offering to the Buddha from Lady Orange Blossom.'

Even the unpraiseworthy has [sic] praised! This is true eloquence. The lady was pleased with what happened and began to call herself 'Lady Orange Blossom', as was only fitting.

But what a god-forsaken offering!'

The rest of the section goes on in a similar vein (yes, there is more!).

Packed full of such useful information, the present study may interest specialists in Japanese religion and literature, but the book has little appeal for general Buddhist readers due to its narrow focus, verbosity and uneven contents.

John Stevens


Professor Bareau is already well-known and admired for his books on early Indian Buddhism. In particular, one recalls his Les Sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule and Les Premiers Conciles Bouddhiques in which he marshalled diverse and multilingual sources to produce studies of immense and lasting value to students of Buddhism. Both of these works incorporated source material translated from the Chinese versions of texts originating in the mainland Indian schools of the Hinayāna as well as from the more familiar texts in Pāli. In this, his latest book, he once more draws upon the Buddhist canonical literature in Chinese to present a biography of Śākyamuni Buddha together with the principal elements of his teaching. Although biographies of the Buddha are already quite numerous, some by eminent European scholars, this one represents a fresh approach to the subject inasmuch as the story is carried by the texts themselves, not,
as is usually the case, an author's narrative supported by textual quotation and reference. The freshness of the approach is all the more marked by the fact that upwards of three-quarters of the texts translated for this purpose belong to an early stratum of Indian Buddhism and are appearing in a European language and are thus accessible to the general public for this first time.

For readers of French this book must be a most welcome addition to the literature on Buddhism. This is because, unlike the material available to readers of English who have for a long time had this story from the Pāli versions, the texts previously translated into French on Śākyamuni's life have not covered the ground to anything like the same degree. However, it should not be thought that Bareau's book simply fills a gap in the Buddhist literature in French. It does much more than that. By placing before the general public his translations of texts of Indian origin dealing with Śākyamuni's life, Bareau offers a view of the matter which complements that of the Theravāda which has hitherto been the primary representative of this early period. We are thus reminded of the fact that the textual Canon of the Theravāda is only one of several such Canons of Buddhist scriptures. All of the original recited collections were compiled within the wider Buddhist community during the first centuries after the Buddha's decease c.480 B.C. Such new translations of texts from other Canons provide us with the opportunity to discover how the biography was recounted by Buddhists of the Indian Sangha, by the 'home team', as one might say, as distinct from the traditions recorded in distant Sri Lanka.

This is not to say that the texts of Indian origin contain anything startlingly new. On the contrary, the broad outline is much the same, though there are differences of detail. Texts of Indian origin such as these, however, when set beside the Pāli record, show us that because all the early Canons were compiled and stabilized some centuries after the events they describe, they all draw upon the same body of original oral transmissions which preceded them. In this way, the Theravādin records of Sri Lanka take their place beside those of their mainland counterparts and have a validity equal but not superior to them.

Like the majority of his European predecessors in this field, Bareau believes that most of the existing ancient records represent a developed stage of the story of the Buddha's life. In his valuable Introduction he tells us how the compilers of these texts began to elaborate the story so as to present their Master as superior to the gods and possessing superhuman characteristics. None of this was meant to falsify but was simply a matter of unconstrained devotion to what was felt to be a very special life and personality. It follows, in all likelihood, that somewhere within and behind the canonical stories there may lie concealed the 'real' Buddha Gautama. Also, if this assumption is correct, the actual historical figure was not quite as we have him depicted in the traditional narratives. Bareau tantalizes us by offering here and there his own perceptions of this inferred historical figure. In one remarkable passage he refers to 'La silhouette du personnage indubitablement historique...' (p.15) and elsewhere he writes '...un homme au corps mince et nerveux, mais solide et résistant, au visage maigre, sinon émacié...' (p.20).

This researching for the historical Śākyamuni behind the textual records is of great interest, especially when conducted by one with the experience and skill of Prof. Bareau. This reviewer, however, feels bound to express another opinion, albeit with some temerity. It is that if all the accounts derive from the same oral source and if they all present a similar 'elaborated' picture, then it is just possible that there was not as much elaboration as we think. Also, given the fact that Śākyamuni founded the religious movement which became the faith of much of Asia, it was the image of him and his works perceived from just such texts as these which survive to this day. In effect, it is not only what these early texts conceal, but what they reveal which lays claim to our attention. However, opinions aside, it is one of the many merits of this book that we can read the accounts of the events and the teaching in the connected series of texts themselves. By doing so we are, in a sense, listening to the ancient Indian devotees recounting their stories and, as the translations are given in complete sections with minimal commentary, our 'listening' is relatively undistracted.

The main body of the book is preceded by a 25-page Introduction setting out concisely, but informatively, the contemporary
Indian scene of Śākyamuni's time, the outline of his eventful life and a useful account of the basic literature as it exists today. In addition there are eight full-page illustrations in black and white, a map of Buddhist India and a four-page glossary of Sanskrit terms. The work concludes with a three-page bibliography of other studies of the subject in French, English and German. Also included in the bibliography is a section on other translations of canonical texts in French, English, German and Italian.

The heart of the book is, of course, the translated texts. This is organized into three groups, the first being devoted to Śākyamuni's youth, Enlightenment, first conversions and the initial response. Most of the source material for this first group is drawn from the Vinaya of the Dharmaguptakas. Those familiar with the main elements of the Life will find that here the story begins rather abruptly with the young Bodhisattva leaving his palace on the chariot drive which begins the sequence of the Four Signs leading to the Renunciation. There are no textual descriptions of his birth, Asita's prediction, his early sheltered life or his marriage. Such a hiatus, even while making full allowance for the author's convictions about legendary material, reduces the impact and import of the Great Renunciation and foreshortens the story rather drastically.

The second group of texts presents the elements of the early teaching. Here, the various doctrines and practices are collected according to relevance under each of the Four Noble Truths. Textual sources for this middle part are more varied and are taken from the Pāli as well as the Chinese Tripitaka. In the third and final group we are taken through the last period of Śākyamuni's life and teaching, his Parinirvāṇa, the funerary rites and the relics. For this last section the translation is confined to a single canonical text, the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra belonging to the Canon of the Dharmaguptakas. Here again, we have a hitherto inaccessible text providing us with the opportunity to compare its contents with its better known counterpart in Pāli, the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta.

Each of these three main divisions is preceded by an explanatory preface and likewise each of the translations is introduced by a brief paragraph on the subject of the text. The footnotes at the relevant pages are informative but not intrusive. The print is large and well spaced, and the whole is handsomely presented. No index is provided, however, and this may well be a handicap in a book which will surely become a work of reference.

For this reviewer at least, *En Suivant Bouddha* is a major addition to the translated documents on the Buddha's life and teaching. Moreover, Professor Bureu is to be congratulated for bringing these Chinese-language texts to the attention of the general reader and, more importantly, for allowing them to tell their own story. His book opens another window on the life and times of the Great Teacher and is a valuable source-work for the historian of religions as well as for students of Buddhism. The book is relatively inexpensive and therefore within the reach of a wide, non-specialist range of readers. It deserves a numerous public and warrants an English translation to ensure its appeal will be that much greater.

*Eric Cheetham*


The chief value in reprinting this early translation may be to allow comparison with similar hagiographies of the Buddha, notably the better known Lalitavistara and Mahāvastu. Janakutta (Jñānagupta), a bhikṣu from Gāndhāra, translated the so-called Abhinīṣkramanasūtra into Chinese (T 190), from which version the pioneer Sinologist Rev. Beal - almost the only worker in the Buddhist Chinese field in the nineteenth century - made the present rendering. Another factor worth remembering is that this text is one of the very few identifiable with the Dharmaguptaka school (which became so widespread in China) that is accessible in a Western language.

A charming narrative presented in an attractive and well-produced format.
Spirála Buddhova učení (The Spiral of the Buddha's Teaching).

Anonymous; no place or date of publication in Czechoslovakia given. Disseminated in typescript copies since 1965. 312 pp.

The attitude to religion in the Soviet bloc countries has always been ambiguous, at least once it was discovered, in fact quite soon after the October revolution of 1917, that it would neither go away as a result of education and propaganda by a concentrated effort of the state authorities to replace it with the official philosophy of 'scientific materialism' nor be eliminated through persecution and suppression. Accommodation under state supervision and control was recognized as the next best solution, hopelessly temporary until the final truth of Communist enlightenment would take hold of the minds of people and make them give up the obnoxious 'opium of the masses'.

This does not mean that the religious organizations which have accepted a modus vivendi with the 'godless' authorities and have from time to time served them as tools of propaganda, have escaped persecution altogether. But on the whole, the established churches have managed not only to survive reasonably well, but also sometimes to thrive on their hardships when on occasion they made a stand against the authorities on some matter of principle so that their followers rallied round them with renewed commitment.

The situation has been entirely different with minority religions such as Seventh Day Adventists or, for that matter, Buddhists. The latter have not fared very well in the Soviet Union, not even in the territories, like Mongolia, where Buddhism was an established majority religion of the people before the introduction of Soviet rule.

However, things have been even worse with respect to religions without a previous organizational basis. Despite the theoretical freedom to belong to any religion guaranteed by the constitutions of practically all Communist states, founding an organizational basis for a religion which had not had one at the time of the Communist take-over of the respective country has proved virtually impossible. The frustrated attempts of this reviewer to found a Buddhist organization in Czechoslovakia in the 1960s were reported on in the articles 'Buddhism in Czechoslovakia' and 'Problems of Buddhism in Czechoslovakia' in World Buddhism, Vol. XII (1964), No. 1, pp. 5-6, and No. 6, pp. 7-8. These were preceded by the author's activity of translating Buddhist books and booklets, sent to him by Buddhist organizations and well-wishers from abroad, which could be circulated only in typescript form. This activity then continued, apparently carried out on a widening scale by others even after the reviewer's departure for England in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.

The book under review differs from the others referred to above in that it is not a translation, but a work of reflection written by someone who has apparently the advantage of knowing a foreign language and was lucky enough to get hold of the whole collection of the Buddha's Middle Length Discourses, probably in the German translation by K.E. Neumann. Having read the collection three times while taking copious notes, the author came to the conclusion that the teaching and practice of the Dhamma can be best understood and followed if envisaged as a spiral - hence the title of the book. He then set out to rewrite his notes in the form of a book for the benefit of his friends and others who might be interested.

The book has fourteen chapters, the first of which, on the 'Buddha and his doctrine', presents a sober and, we can say, demythologized picture of the Buddha as a man who, having reached enlightenment, offers his help to others out of compassion. The next chapter stresses that the Dhamma is not a picture of truth, truth itself or liberation, but an instrument of liberation as expressed in the Parable of the Raft. It should not be used for argumentation or speculation, but for realization through direct insight which is wisdom rendering the tool of the Dhamma unnecessary from then on. The third chapter argues that the heart of the Doctrine is 'interiorization' of experience which is the state of mind called samādhi, to be achieved by systematic and progressive preparation. The basis of this is the turning of one's mind to the good through purification of the heart (citta) and the development of love through the four brahma viharas with total commitment to the moral precepts as a necessary condition. Discipline and the overcoming of obstacles and of craving, the
subjects of the subsequent three chapters, make it all possible.

Chapter 7 explains the process of the formation of the empirical personality through clinging to the five aggregates, while the next one tackles the problem of consciousness. The author understands its ambiguous nature as an aggregate of clinging on the one hand and as the seat of understanding as well as the basis for the development of liberating insight on the other. In the next chapter he explains the problem of the duration of personality through the chain of deaths and births perpetuated by craving which generates karmic entanglements determined by ignorance. The last five chapters are geared towards the final achievement. Meditation is tackled first: its main objective is to learn the truth about the 'I'. The understanding of 'I' as a conditioned process enables the achievement of progressive meditational absorptions culminating in the inner sense of freedom. Two chapters are dedicated to the process of the acquisition of wisdom. Preparation for it is observation (usually termed 'mindfulness' or 'awareness' in English books), both as a meditative device and a perpetual frame of mind which eventually makes it possible to arrive at the state of 'the fullness of letting go' exempting one from the chain of causes and effects. Letting go is, in fact, the only truly free decision whose immediate fruits are: liberation, knowledge of liberation and a sense of happiness and peace. Knowledge is, for the author, the key word. One has to know what one knows and what one does not know and only then one truly struggles for final knowledge. In that lies the 'wisdom of knowing' which eventually and inevitably culminates in liberation.

Interestingly, the author discusses the topic 'suffering and reality' in his penultimate chapter, unlike most books on Buddhism which usually start with it, presumably because the first Noble Truth is the truth of suffering. And yet, is it not one of the most difficult features of the Dharma to grasp that all life is, basically, suffering? The author clearly understands the two meanings of 'suffering'. In everyday usage it is only the opposite of joy or pleasure, but in the context of the Dharma it is the underlying quality of all experience associated with things impermanent. Since the whole of reality is impermanent and substanceless, the very nature of reality is suffering. To realize this, not conceptually but inwardly, is to have reached the threshold of Nibbāna, a realm without opposites, a state free from craving, hatred and delusion. Liberation, the subject of the last chapter of the book, is then nearly won.

This book represents a remarkable achievement in conditions of isolation and of lack of contacts. It has a peculiar style of its own, with frequent repetitions of related themes in subsequent chapters influenced, no doubt, by the author's concept of the course of practice of the Dhamma as a spiral which works its way through the same topics again and again, each time on a higher level. Repetition, however, is a feature of the Buddhist texts themselves. It is a sign of a text which does not aim at mere conceptual clarification and systematic presentation, but which seeks to implant insights into progressively deeper layers of the recipient's mind. In the context of the conceptual acquisition of knowledge we often find repetitions tiresome and dispensable, hence the frequent shortening - sometimes in rather a clumsy way - of modern editions and translations of Buddhist texts, including those of the Pali Text Society.

There is no doubt that the author has rendered invaluable service to his fellow countrymen who have no access to foreign language books, while - as I hope is well known - no original Czech or translated materials on Buddhism have been allowed to be published in Czechoslovakia since the Communist patriarch in 1948. This holds true even now under the still very hard-line Communist authorities there. As the reader will have gathered, the author is steeped in the early Buddhist doctrine of the Pali discourses and many of his interpretations and explanations have a clear Theravāda ring to them, derived from quotations from Buddhaghosa which presumably the author's copy of the Middle Length Discourses contained in notes or which the author may know from other sources. He has, further, written another book on 'Symbols in Buddhism' and may now have finished a third one dedicated entirely to the practice of meditation. This is certainly an example of a tireless activity in the service of the Dhamma under difficult conditions.

Karel Werner

Sera rje btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1469-1546) was one of the foremost dGe lugs scholars of the century following Tsong kha pa, a time in which the dGe lugs extended its monastic framework and intellectual influence, codifying and systematizing with scholastic precision the already complex and refined doctrinal heritage left by Tsong kha pa and his principal immediate disciples. A feature of the formidable dGe lugs intellectual enterprise at this time was the composition of monastic textbooks (yig cha) written in a stylised debate format, clarifying and explaining the dGe lugs position, or the position of a particular monastic college, and at the same time refuting with razor-sharp precision rival interpretations of other colleges, or the often withering attacks on the dGe lugs intellectual project by non-dGe lugs scholars such as the Sa skya lamas Shakyapa choq Idan (1428-1507) and Go ram pa bSo dams seng ge (1429-89), or the Eighth Karmapa, Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507-54).

The title of Guy Newland's book is perhaps somewhat misleading. It contains little by way of an analysis, Tibetan or otherwise, of compassion as such (recognisable philosophical issues concerning what it is to be compassionate, its nature, psychological classification, generation, how it differs from love or affection, pity and so on, or how to be more compassionate, a nicer person). Rather, Newland's book is a translation of a section from Sera rje btsun's Madhyamaka yig cha treating the opening few verses of Candracikirti's Madhyamakavatara. Sera rje btsun's yig cha are used to the present day in the monastic curriculum of Sera monastery's Byen college. dGe lugs Madhyamaka yig cha, the monastic textbooks for the study of Madhyamaka, are manuals for debate on topics arising out of the Madhyamakavatara and its svabhāṣya, as interpreted by Tsong kha pa in his great commentary, the dbu ma dgon pa rab gsal. The section translated, therefore, is from a pedagogically detailed sub-sub-commentary. A Tibetan studying this text would have access to the root texts by Candracikirti, Tsong kha pa's sub-commentary, as well as the great Indian ārya by Jayānanda, which is often criticised by Tsong kha pa and Sera rje btsun. He might have access also to other yig cha, and an understanding of Sera rje btsun would presuppose some familiarity with the ideas of non-dGe lugs scholars. Certainly Sera rje btsun himself was writing in an environment where the views of rival scholars were well known. Crucially, also, a Tibetan would have spent many years studying and engaging in debate. The present text, therefore, is deeply embedded within the history and practices of Tibetan Buddhism and is extremely difficult to understand or appreciate without some considerable background knowledge. While it is possible to read the relevant sections of Tsong kha pa's commentary in English translation (Jeffrey Hopkins' Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism, Rider, London 1980), there is at the time of writing no English translation of Candracikirti's text easily available. (Relevant sections are accessible in the French of de La Vallée Poussin and in an English 'working version' which accompanies a tape commentary produced by the lUtutu Lama Tsong Khapa, Pomaia, Italy.) A translation is forthcoming, I believe, from Wisdom Publications.

Guy Newland offers what appears to be a reasonable translation, prefaced with a long introduction in which he clarifies and explains Sera rje btsun's text. Newland was a pupil of Hopkins, which might help to explain the style of his translation and writing. He follows his text totally and uncritically, even to the extent of reproducing the traditional etymology for Sanskrit words (p.17). It is no longer possible to hold, however, with the classical Sanskrit grammarians, that every word and particle can be derived from a verbal root. The fact that this was held by Bhāvaviveka, for example, and followed by Tibetan scholars, does not warrant us repeating it as though it were true. Obscure expressions in Newland's text receive scarcely any clarification (e.g. 'Hinayāna knower of bases', p.20), whilst the English style is not always very felicitous (e.g. 'the main of the deeds', p.122). Our author offers no background material, not even a short note on Sera rje btsun himself. There is no index. Newland appears not to have read any of the scholars criticized by Sera rje btsun. Indeed, he simply translates Sera rje btsun's text as received ('Some scholars say...') without making any attempt to identify or trace those who are being attacked. This is scarcely satisfactory from the point of view of the Western scholar (one can assume that in the traditional Tib-
etan context it is usually known who is being criticized, or there is at least some oral tradition on the subject). It is well known that Sera rje btsun fiercely attacked his rivals, polemically at times, and directed particular critiques at Go ram pa bSod nam seng ge, Shākya mchog Idan and Mi bkhyod rdo rje. Commentaries on the Madhyamakāvatāra by all three lamas are available, although it is highly unlikely that Sera rje btsun in his Madhyamaka yig cha was attacking Mi bkhyod rdo rje. The young Kema pa challenged the elderly Sera rje btsun to debate in the former’s Abhisamayālaṅkāra commentary. I rather doubt whether Sera rje btsun would have known of Mi bkhyod rdo rje’s later Madhyamakāvatāra text, however. Nevertheless, I strongly suspect that an examination of Go ram pa and Shākya mchog Idan’s work would reveal the origins of a number of Sera rje btsun’s rivals’ views. To take just one example: a strongly-worded attack by Sera rje btsun in the present text is directed against a non-dualistic opponent who criticizes a rather technical point of Tsong kha pa’s analysis:

'Through your continual repetition of slander about the eastern Kṣaṇaka-Sha, the second Conqueror, without even understanding this coarse fact, you engage in activities that ruin yourself and others; all of your reasonings appear to be just like this' (p.116).

Now, this opponent is, in fact, almost certainly Go ram pa bSod nam seng ge, and his criticisms of Tsong kha pa attacked by Sera rje btsun can be found in his Madhyamakāvatāra commentary, the lTa ba ngan sel, contained in the Sa skyas pa'i bkha'bum, Vol.13 (Tokyo 1969), folios 88b-9b. One might have hoped that Newland, in producing such a book, could have made some slight attempt to trace these rivals, which would have improved the value of his text enormously. This suggests, of course, the serious problem of how far it is possible, with our present state of knowledge, to understand a detailed technical yig cha in complete isolation from its intellectual context. Insufficient academic historical and philosophical study has been done to provide the context necessary for appreciation. Can one really pick up a yig cha and translate it, or study it, without knowing who is being criticized? This is not to mention the additional problem of whether Sera rje btsun correctly represented or under-

stood his rivals. Further study of these controversies throughout Tibetan thought may well indicate an occasional distortion of an opponent’s viewpoint in the polemical context of debate (for a later example, see my paper ‘Ma bya pa’ Byang chub brtson ’grus on Madhyamaka method’, Journal of Indian Philosophy 13, 1985).

The present book is adequate as far as it goes, but I am suggesting that it doesn’t go far enough. It is published in a paperback series, but I suspect that the question of target audience was not fully considered. As an uncritical translation minus an index, the book falls far short of what is demanded by scholars, but is too narrow, too difficult, too specific to a particular Indo-Tibetan intellectual context, for most Dharma practitioners. How many people have read Jayānanda, or been tempted to hold opinions like those of Jayānanda such that Sera rje btsun’s criticisms of them become relevant? Newland himself comments that he wanted to indicate that there was more to Tibetan Madhyamika analyses than emptiness (p.7). In this, and also in indicating the nature of Tibetan scholastic writing and debate, the book is interesting and useful. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that I found it interesting, I am doubtful whether there is sufficient further concern in these issues at this level to warrant paperback publication.

Paul Williams


The enterprise of interreligious comparison is fraught with methodological problems. The most common pitfall is the facile comparison, involving a forced interpretation of a writer or school of thought so as to imply a false agreement between a pair of religious traditions. It is to Rolston’s credit that he gives reliable expositions of the exponents of the various traditions he has selected: Augustine, Ghazali, Saṅkara and Nāgārjuna. After presenting the notion of performative truth - the idea that ‘obedience’ comes along with truth, rather than as a consequence of accepting truth - Rolston examines the parallels in the four traditions with reference to a number of areas: the virtues, the place of words, union with the ultimate and understanding religious truth. A chapter on 'Adherence and Nonadherence' highlights some
important areas of difference amongst the selected scholars, outlining some different ways in which one believer can be caused to reject the faith of another. A final chapter, entitled 'Learning (about) Religion' examines the ways in which one is educated into a religious tradition.

Although inherently competent, I felt somewhat frustrated that the book did not explore some of the methodological issues which underlie this kind of interreligious comparison. Augustine, Ghazali, Saṅkara and Nāgārjuna seem excellent choices of exponents, since all four have commanded a very large degree of assent within their respective traditions. However, it is not clear whether the reader is meant to infer that, where they are agreed, they have independently discovered a common religious truth, or whether it is possible for four great 'saints' to converge upon an error.

Although these writers are fountainheads, they do not command universal assent within their own religious traditions. If Rolston had substituted Aquinas for Augustine, his account would no doubt have been substantially different. Arguably, Rāmacāja typifies popular Hindu devotionalism to a greater extent than Saṅkara. Nor do Nāgārjuna speak univocally for Buddhism, which continues to be significantly influenced, particularly in its Tibetan forms, by the Yogaśāra as well as the Madhyamaka.

Rolston does not avoid noting important differences between his scholar-saints. Usually such discussion is fair, but I think Buddhists may justifiably be somewhat offended at some apparent religious point-scoring in his treatment of Saṃyata. Despite his recognition that the Madhyamaka schools are not nihilistic, Rolston nevertheless states that 'this "emptiness" sounds not so much like the "fullness" promised in the Father of Jesus Christ, or even "the perishing of all save Allah's face", as does it sound like the universal heat death of the distant future predicted by thermodynamics' (p.204).

While noting, correctly, that neither Buddhism nor Hinduism are finally theistic, Rolston also draws attention to the fact that both Nāgārjuna and Saṅkara composed hymns. It would have been useful to have had some discussion as to how devotion can be shown to an ultimate which is not distinct from the world of Saṃsāra. To examine the concept of devotion within the context of Advaita Vedānta may well prove useful in indicating whether in Christianity it would be possible to continue to have worship in a context where God is not viewed as a reality in a supernatural realm. Is it possible, for example, to advocate a 'Christian Buddhism' in the style of Don Culpit?

The reader is given a good analysis of what causes a believer in one tradition to reject the religious claims of another, although I am unconvinced that someone who abandons a tradition comes to 'reunderstand' it. However, Rolston leaves unresolved the issue of whether there is any means whereby one can adjudicate between the competing claims of different faiths. If, as he claims, understanding a religion involves 'undergirding', then how can a representative of one religious tradition understand another, since one cannot 'undergird' these various religions simultaneously? One needs a thesis about how it is possible to decide between competing truth claims without adopting the impossible stance of some independent supra-religious vantage point.

It may seem as if I am demanding a different book altogether from the one Rolston has actually written. Nevertheless, I think my comments reveal a general weakness in Rolston's work, namely that he does not have a real concept of dialogue: we are simply given parallels, and some dis-parallels, but we get no sense of how any one of these writers might enable one religious tradition to be enriched by another.

George D. Chryssides


If philosophy is a mere literary genre, this is a very good example of it; if it is a science, it is a painstaking presentation of the facts on which any theory of the question discussed has to be based. I have seldom been so gripped and so moved by a book and never by a book on philosophy. And that without any feeling that science and mysticism are rival ways of thinking that call for reconciliation and unifying, which is the purpose of the book's enquiry. There are two ways of reacting to the world, one is the scientific way - how does it work? what happens if I do this or that? - and the mystical way, which does not ask questions but accepts whatever comes with equanimity and strives to sublimate all passion in the ecstasy of the sense of unity with the world and the annihilation of the loneliness.

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of the self. It is beyond language except the allusive and evoca-
tive language of poetry. It can find an outlet in all forms
of art, but mostly it is just a feeling, for some a sudden surge
of ecstasy, for the more fortunate a general background to all
living. At no point do these two ways meet. The way of science
leads to the school of life where we learn how to use the world;
the way of the mystic reveals to us how to accept what comes
and not let it interfere with our inner life.

Renee Weber doesn't accept this. She feels that the sage
should be as literate and theoretical as the scientist. She
is baffled by Krishnamurti's rejection of systems and doctrines;
his aim, like a Zen master, to suggest to each aspirant to wisdom
how he can find his own way and work out the principles of conduct
and thought that are his own personal, unique solution to the
challenge of life. She is equally baffled by the rejection of
all mysticism by Stephen Hawking, whose physical limitations
impose no mental limitations on his understanding and frontier
development of Black Holes and the physics and chemistry of astro-
nomical phenomena. (Krishnamurti would applaud his total absorp-
tion in his chosen field.) She sums up her own approach with
an experience in a laboratory. As a philosopher she realized
she had to sample the life and methods of science and took a
course in science. A little piece of paper, punctuated at regular
time intervals by a falling body, demonstrated gravitational
acceleration. The other students studied the paper and threw
it away as having served its purpose, she took it home as a com-
munication from the universe in answer to an enquiry.

The method of the book is brilliantly original, enthralling
interestingly and strangely moving. Having explained her quest,
she uses the device of the press interview - she is herself an
experienced journalist - and records in successive chapters
dialogues with both scientists of Nobel Prize stature and mystics
of world renown. David Bohm, a leading authority on quantum
physics and relativity, became a friend of Krishnamurti, and
spoke with him about some deeper order of existence, implicit
in the finding and searchings of science but ignored by most
scientists. His attitude to such an order is mystical, even
though he feels that that is where the explanation of scientific
paradoxes is to be found. Rupert Sheldrake is a biologist, work-
ing on cell formation and biochemistry, especially with reference
to the improvement of agricultural methods in India. He studied
philosophy and the history of science at Harvard and spends time
at Fr Bede Griffiths' ashram in southern India. He has a difficult
theory of the form of molecules and cells being, as it were, 'in the air',
and bringing about the same forms all over the place. He extends his system into evolution and even into social
forms. His key word is morphogenesis. Ilya Prigogine won the
Nobel Prize for chemistry. His versatility includes a classical
education in Latin, Greek, history, philosophy and music and
he is an accomplished pianist, but studied science at university.
He builds his original theories on the uncertain randomness of
many scientific equations, but not a chance randomness, rather
a possibility of constructive creation. This he applies to non-
living as well as living systems.

Besides Krishnamurti, Weber interviewed the Dalai Lama; Father
Bede Griffiths, a scholar of comparative religion and Christian
theology, who became a Roman Catholic and founded his own ashram
in India as a Christian community with a Hindu complexion; and
Lama Anagarika Govinda, a German-born leading scholar and inter-
preter of Tibetan Buddhism and a respected and influential Bud-
dhist teacher who spent much of his life in India.

Each chapter starts with a biographical sketch of her inter-
vieewes and a reference to his special view of life's basic prob-
lems. The scientists are chosen for their eminence and awareness
of the contrast between their studies and human aspirations.
In one chapter she brings two of them together, in another one
of them with the Dalai Lama. She draws out of them, in language
careful enough not to distort their views and yet devoid of tech-
nical terms which confuse the layman, their contribution to her
quest. One of the most powerful weapons in her onslaught on
her readers' attitude in the quite poetic evocation of the scene
and circumstance of each meeting. She is familiar to them all
and obviously respected and liked by them, sentiments sure to
be shared by anyone reading the book with any interest in the
subject.

Alban Cooke
Buddhism and its relation to other religions: Essays in honour of Dr Shozan Kumoi on his seventieth birthday. Heirakuii Shoten, Kyoto 1985. viii + 299, 431 pp. N.P.

Prof. Shozan Kumoi, emeritus professor of Ochan University and currently professor of Bukkyo University, was seventy years of age on 24 December 1985. To commemorate this happy occasion, a large number of Dr Kumoi’s close acquaintances presented him with this Festschrift Volume. In view of Dr Kumoi’s international stature as a scholar of Buddhism and Indian Studies, contributors were invited to produce papers on the theme of Buddhism and its relation to other religions.

The volume begins with an article in Japanese by Dr Kumoi himself, on the connection between the Yoga school and Buddhism, and there follow seventeen other articles in Japanese by Japanese scholars. The titles suggest that some of these are of considerable interest, dealing as they do with the relationship between Buddhism and Jainism and Buddhism and Hinduism, as well as a number dealing with various concepts of Buddhism as created by the different schools, and these are reviewed at length by Dr Durt below.

There are fourteen papers in English, four by Japanese scholars and the remainder by scholars from outside Japan. Six of these are from Germany or Austria, as is appropriate in view of the fact that Dr Kumoi spent two years at Vienna as a visiting fellow in the early 1960’s. In the English papers Takao Maruyama deals with the Chinese theory of the three ages after the Buddha’s death: B.E. Emmelrick with a Khotanese version of the Sutra of the Lord of Healing; Ernst Sceinkeller with Paralokasiddhi texts; Alex Wayman with the disputed authorship of Tibetan canonical commentaries on the Sarvadurgati-parisodhana-tantra; and Oska von Hinber with what he calls epigraphical varieties of continental Pali. N.A. Jayawardana gives a brief historical sketch of Buddhism in Sri Lanka; Shoryu Katsura writes on the Tairiya formulae, and L. Schmithausen on Mahaayanasangraha 1.8; Yuichi Kajiyama deals with the transference of merit in Pure Land Buddhism: George Champarthy writes about three cardinal theses of the Nyaya-Vaisesikas concerning the validity of the Veda; and Albrecht Wezler provides a note on Mahabhasya II 366.26.

The three papers which have most appeal for this reviewer deal only with Buddhism, and not with the relationship between Buddhism and other religions. They are: a paper by Heinz Bechert dealing with orthodoxy and legitimation in early and Theravada Buddhism; a survey by T.E. Vetter of recent research on the most ancient form of Buddhism; and a paper by Norioshi Arakani on the formation of a short prose pratityasamutpada. All three papers have in common the aim of assessing aspects of the form of early Buddhism. There has been considerable discussion in recent years about the criteria to be adopted when deciding what exactly is early in Buddhism. Some have maintained that anything found in the teachings of all schools of Buddhism must be early, because it predates the separation of the various schools. This conclusion overlooks the fact that we do not know how close the links were between the various schools after their separation.

The converse also raises problems. Something not found in all schools is not necessarily late, since it is possible that some schools might omit teachings for reasons other than ignorance of them. In this connection Vetter quotes Bronkhorst’s statement that the four stages of meditation of the formless state do not appear in the oldest Abhidharma lists, which predate the Abhidharma texts proper. These stages are, however, referred to in various sutras, a fact which might be interpreted as proving that the sutras are later than the Abhidharma lists.

Schmithausen and others have pointed out the numerous inconsistencies which are encountered, if an attempt is made to assess the relative ages of portions of the Theravada canon. The criteria adopted by those investigating these problems are often entirely subjective. Arakani in his investigation into the formation of the pratityasamutpada takes as his guiding principle the belief that the development of the constituent fundamental concepts such as tetra in verse sutras must precede the formative process of the pratityasamutpada formula itself in prose. He quotes verses from the Asathakavagga and the Prayananavagga of the Suttanipata. Since these two vaggas are acknowledged by most scholars to be among the earliest of Buddhist texts, it is not unlikely that these verses are earlier than the prose texts which he quotes. What, however, has not been proved, and
in our present state of knowledge cannot be proved, is that these verse texts are the earliest Buddhist declaration of the dependent statements which were made. There is, I maintain, no evidence to disprove a belief that a prose version of the *pratītyasamutpāda* existed in part or in whole from the very beginning of Buddhism, as the Theraśās and other traditions state, and that quotations of portions of this prose version were made in verse. If this was so, then it is difficult to decide whether the quotations in later prose works were taken from an earlier version in verse or in prose.

Only too often contributors to felicitation volumes are allowed to write on subjects of their own choice, which tends to produce the collection of disjointed and unconnected writings found in most works of this kind. Although, as already noted, not all contributors to this volume followed exactly the organized request to deal with Buddhism and its relation to other religions, must have done so. The result is an offering truly worthy of the honoree, and a triumphant demonstration of the superiority of a Festschrift with a single theme.

K. R. Norman

For a review of the articles written in Japanese, our work will consist mainly in classifying them into their main orientations and in indicating their authors and titles.

The papers are mainly related to the study of Indian Buddhism, the field in which Dr Kunoi has been most active. As he is now teaching in Bukkyo University, a university belonging to the Jodo-shu, it is no surprise to find in this volume studies on Honen, the founder of that Japanese sect, by two colleagues of his at Bukkyo, Kyooshun Toudo and Koji Takahashi.

In the Indian field, Hara Minoru deals with the *Yogasutra* III, 37, Shinkan Murakami with the *Svetasvatara Upanishad* I and Ryusai Mano with the perennial question of the relationship between Early Buddhism and the *Upanishads*. For the later period, we can read Sengaku Maeda's Japanese translation of *Suresvara's Maitakarnyakasiddhi* (I, 1-44). Shigeaki Watanabe's study on the *Sārvāk doctrine* quoted in the *Nyāyabhusanam* belongs to a current of logic researches to which belongs also the paper in English by S. Kasuga (already referred to in the first part of this review) and to which also appertain the majority of the Japanese articles which will be quoted hereunder. In the field of Jaina studies, two papers are devoted to Jaina epistemology by Atsushi Uno and Hōjun Nagasaki (on the concept of *arthakriyā*), although Hajime Nakamura presents a synopsis on the theory of practice found in mediaeval Jaina. Finally, on modern Hinduism, a paper by Kōshirō Tamaki focusing on Krishnamurti and the comparison and interchange between Buddhism and other philosophies fits in with the theme of this Festschrift.

It is probably in the field of studies on Indian Buddhism that the 'anti-theoretical' theme of the present volume has been the most clearly followed. For Pale studies, Keishō Tsukamoto pursues his research on the Andhaka school and deals with its first thesis: the *Satipaṭṭhānakāra*. Shingen Takagi looks at the six heretics of the *Sūmāṇuḥpālasutta*, making use of new material available, especially the long exposition of their doctrines in the *Mūlasarvāstivādin Saṅghabhedavastu* (2nd vol., Rome 1978). Fumimaro Watanabe deals with the terms *vikappa, vitakka* and *vīcāra* while Shinji Kawasaki, pursuing his studies on the concept of omniscience, deals here with the term *abānno* and its relation to the three knowledges (*tvijjā*).

As has already been pointed out, epistemological and logical studies are now enjoying tremendous popularity in contemporary Indian and Tibetan Buddhist studies made in Japan. The following six contributions are related to these topics. Among the logicians, Sāntarakṣita is studied in connection with Dharmaśīla (the problem of the *Śādjadgamaṇa*) by Hiromasa Tosaki, and in relation to Dharmakirti by Matsunori Ichigo. The Samantarakṣita is dealt with by Shōhō Mikogami, and two usages of *upādāna* in *Vijñānapātimātā* treated by Shōko Takeuchi. Musashi Tachikawa writes on the use of the *catuṣkoṭis* argumentation in the *Hua yu* wen *chiao chang* by Fa-teang in the *T'ang* period, and Ichijō Ogawa on the theory of the *Ālayavijñāna* by Tsongkhapa.

There are four studies involving Mahāyāna sūtras. Hajime Nakurabe deals with a translation in modern Japanese of Kumārila's version of the *Pañcavimśati* (Taisho No. 223). Jikidō Taka- naka, pursuing his considerable study on what he is calling the
in both faiths although it is admitted that monasticism is central to Buddhism but peripheral to Christianity. The comparison of the respective rules brings out the fact that those of Christianity are both less detailed and more concerned with behaviour to others, including charity to them, whilst the Buddhist Vinaya rules are very detailed and relate mainly to externals.

Realism is evident in most of these essays, none more so than in that of Dr Gómez. 'There is no such thing as a religion without "problems": discrepancies, contradictions, inconsistencies and complex levels of doctrine and practice.'

The ultimate difference between these two great cultures is in the explanation each offers for the malaise of man. 'Thus the emphasis on sin as an explicit rejection of God, in contrast to emphasis on "ill" as a condition resulting from a fundamental missapprehension (avidya) clearly separates the Christian and the Buddhist.' And, 'In the end we find even the question - familiar to Christians in a slightly different form - of why all beings are not immediately saved if the mysterious saving powers of the Holy are so overwhelmingly irresistible' is of dubious validity. Why indeed? And perhaps there is a sharp point made when Gómez says: 'It is not really true that a religious thinker seeks, but salvation.' That says a great deal about the actual attitude of the religious devotee.

A great deal is to be learnt from this book if it is thoughtfully used. The scholar of either or both faiths, and the practitioners of both, need to reassess their beliefs and practices in the light of a wider ecumenism today. Man no longer lives in sealed compartments of belief. As Dr Corless observes: 'I have found more than once that Christian and Buddhist practitioners, without having a single doctrine in common, seem to understand each other at a deep level.'

Jack Austin

Ed. This book contains the following chapters, apart from the introduction and a concluding index:


Christian scholars have been slow to consider, let alone acknowledge, the possible influence of Buddhism on Christianity. The two traditions seem far apart, both theologically and geographically, yet even the most sceptical reader cannot fail to be impressed by Amore's plausible arguments.

The author's 'Buddhist influence' thesis is not the first to be advanced, and Two Masters, One Message provides a valuable survey of the extant literature in the field. Amore is much more thorough and critical than his predecessors and his case is very closely argued.

Numerous striking parallels between Buddhist and Christian literature are brought to light, particularly relating to the parables and miracles of the two founder-leaders. Specifically, Amore contends that much - although not all - of the Buddhist-dependent material entered Matthew's and Luke's Gospels via the hypothetical Christian manuscript 'Q'. (Q in the material common to Matthew and Luke but not Mark, which many scholars believe existed as a separate collection of sayings attributed to Jesus.) The designation of Q as part-Buddhist, Amore argues, need not entail that Jesus did not himself teach these sayings: Jesus himself could have been influenced by Buddhism and Q could be a reliable record of sayings which were thus influenced.

It is also suggested that later Christian practices are dif-
difficult to explain without reference to a religion such as Buddhism, for example the monastic life (tonsure is specifically mentioned), the use of the rosary and the veneration of relics. It is suggested that there are some parallels in art and that painting provided one possible means of cross-fertilization of ideas and practices.

Buddhist literature, of course, is vast, and it might be argued that if one casts one's net wide enough one is bound to find similar incidents and teachings at some point. Amore's thesis is made more convincing by confining his identification of possible Buddhist sources to a few texts, principally the Dhammapada, the Udānavarga and a small number of Jatakas. It would be useful to know more precisely at what times and places such texts circulated and who would be likely to know them: if Amore could produce such evidence, it could well strengthen his case. Amore recognizes, of course, that his thesis requires the identification of historical and geographical points of contact between the two faiths, and that Palestine was in the middle of the East-West silk route, thus providing the possibility of interchange of ideas.

Given the nature of Amore's thesis, it is inevitable that any reviewer will find some points with which to quarrel. Amore would have done well to acknowledge that not all New Testament scholars share his assumption that Q was a written source or indeed existed in any form at all. It would have sufficed to contend that there is material common to Matthew and Luke (whatever form it originally took) which is sufficiently distinctive to require an explanation outside the religions of the Jews and the Persians.

On the whole, Amore adopts a sane and balanced approach to possible Christian-Buddhist parallels, and refuses to acknowledge influence where he is less than satisfied that the case is proven. However, he tends to overlook the influence of the Graeco-Roman mystery religions on the development of early Christianity. Their notion of a dying and rising god needs a more plausible antecedent of the incarnation, death and resurrection of Christ, rather than (as Amore suggests) the Eastern concept of the avatar (p.98).

There are several occasions where Amore feels the need to explain early Christian ideas by appealing to a Buddhist context, when in fact its Old Testament background would suffice. It is unnecessary to appeal to Eastern influence to account for the Gnostics' personification of wisdom, since we already find this in Proverbs (Pro 8:9); the phrase 'the wheel of birth' in the Epistle of James, although eminently amenable to Buddhistic explanation, has already an antecedent in Ecclesiastes 3, where the author speaks of 'a time to be born and a time to die' as part of a cyclical process of life on earth. Amore's suggestion that the 'paraclete' who succeeds Jesus, according to St John, is to be identified with Jesus' 'beloved disciple', thus paralleling the relationship between Gautama and Ananda is eccentric; John makes it eminently clear that the paracletos is a spirit ('the spirit of truth') rather than a human.

Amore is justifiably puzzled by two New Testament passages which claim to cite an Old Testament scripture but do not in fact do so (John 7.38; 12.34), but I doubt if the problem is solved by looking towards Buddhism. Jesus' apparent quotation, 'Whoever believes in me, streams of living water will flow from within him', is paralleled with the Buddha's 'twin miracle' in which he makes the lower part of his body ignite in flames, while the upper part pours out jets of cold water. The citation by a crowd of an apparently non-existent prophecy that the Messiah will live for ever, Amore believes, possibly parallels a statement in the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta where the Buddha declares that, if he so wished, the Tathāgata could remain on earth until the end of the aeon. Yet the Buddhist references do not match the text any more closely - and arguably less closely - than Old Testament passages suggested by scholars, and still leave unexplained the question of why John misleadingly refers his readers to non-existent scriptural passages.

Despite these criticisms, the strength of Amore's book lies in the cumulative weight of evidence which he has provided and its painstaking rigour. It deserves to be taken seriously both by New Testament scholars and early church historians as well as by Buddhists.

George Chryssides

The fact that Teitaro Suzuki’s lay Buddhist name, Daisetsu, means ‘great simplicity’ tells us a great deal more about the man than any biography, no matter how reverentially it is written. Moreover, it is not generally known that the title, doctor, was awarded him twice: honorary D. Litt and D. Law by Otani University and the University of Hawaii, respectively, in 1933 and 1959. His overriding activity was translating not only Japanese Buddhism into English, but the essence of Zen and Shin into the universal language of the heart. His teaching, in Japan, Europe and the United States, consisted not in high-minded professorial pronouncements on his subject but in so simple and ordinary terms that his listeners often missed the point, expecting something much grander and ‘esoteric’. Suzuki’s lasting contribution to Buddhist studies is his unerring perception of the concrete and practical nature of his subject. His was a mode of thinking perhaps not even yet fully appreciated in the West, despite his repeated chipping away in lectures, articles and books at the shroud with which Buddhism had become invested in the West.

It is a shame that Irwin Switzer’s book is limited to biographical bare bones, and a boon that Snelling’s skilful editing fleshes it out somewhat. The reader might have wished for more detail and analysis of his writings, as the biography in and of itself cannot begin to convey adequately the effect of the numerous conflicts Suzuki faced in his very long lifetime. It can only hint at them; the book does give the impression that the personal difficulties Suzuki encountered only sharpened his senses and spurred him on to greater achievements.

It is refreshing to be reminded that Suzuki introduced Japanese Buddhism to the West in the early days of this century. His efforts, first his books and then, with his able wife, his articles on Mahāyāna in his own Eastern Buddhist, ran counter to the stream of Pāli Buddhist studies then in favour. It has to be said that those engaged in Buddhist activities, academic, archaeological, art historical, chose not to read him if they were, indeed, aware of his contributions. **Outlines of Mahā-​**

*Book Reviews*

*Ed. See also Masao Abe (ed.) A Zen Life: D.T. Suzuki Remembered. Weatherhill, Tokyo 1986. This illustrated volume includes twenty-three essays by, i.a. Robert Aitken, Erich Fromm, Christmas Humphreys, Philip Kapleau, Thomas Merton and Alan Watts, together with the first translation of Suzuki’s autobiography and a bibliography of his writings.*

*Ed. Contrary to the announcement in BSR 4, 1, p.66, Century Hutchinson will not now be reprinting C. Luk The Sūraṅgāma Sūtra before August 1988. The Secrets of Chinese Meditation (reviewed in the same issue, p.71) will be reprinted simultaneously.*
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