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Buddhist Studies Review is the bi-annual journal of the Institut de recherche bouddhique Linh-So'n and the Pali Buddhist Union

ISSN 0265-2897

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Annual Subscription: Individual: £6.00
Joint or Institutional: £8.00
- payable by cheque, Giro transfer (to A/C No. 57 611 4003) or international money order to 'Buddhist Studies Review'
Frontispiece: the calligraphy in Sino-Vietnamese characters (Hôm) by Ven. Thich Huyên-Vi reads:

"They [the dharmas] neither arise nor cease, they are neither pure nor impure, they neither increase nor decrease. Thus, in emptiness there is no form."

The seals engraved by Ven. Bhikkhu Dhammavīro, Thailand, convey the same meaning as the calligraphy.

EDITORIAL

We very much regret that you have had to wait so long for this issue. This has been due partly to circumstances beyond our control and partly to sheer lack of time to devote to it due to other commitments. However, we hope this special double issue for the year will help mitigate the delay.

We have decided to discontinue the serialised English translation of the Udānavarga from the French version, as the latter is now outdated and was never completed anyway - at least, no trace of the second of the two proposed volumes has ever been found.

Owing to ever-mounting costs of both production and postage, we have reluctantly had to raise the subscription charges as from 1991. The individual subscription will be £7.50, and the institutional rate £12.50.

As long as our plans go according to schedule, Buddhist Studies Review will henceforth be prepared by computer which, we hope, will lead to better quality. We also hope to catch up with ourselves and not let so much time elapse before the next issue appears.
THE PĀÑCAΓATI VAGGA, SUTTA NO. 10 RESTORED
(SAMYUTTA LVI, VAGGA XI)

John D. Ireland

Thus have I heard... at Śāvatthī...

Then the Lord, taking up a little dust on the tip of his nail, said to the bhikkhus: 'What do you think, bhikkhus, which is greater? This little dust on the tip of my nail or the great earth?'

'This great earth is surely greater, venerable sir. Compared with it the little dust on the tip of the Lord's nail is insignificant, it does not amount to the merest fraction of it, set beside the great earth.'

'Even so, bhikkhus, few are those beings who deceasing as devas are reborn among men; many more are those beings who deceasing as devas are reborn in hell (niraya). What is the reason? It is not seeing the four ariyan Truths, bhikkhus. What four? The ariyan Truth of suffering; the ariyan Truth of the origin of suffering; the ariyan Truth of the cessation of suffering; the ariyan Truth of the course leading to the cessation of suffering. Therefore, bhikkhus, to realise, "This is suffering", an effort must be made; to realise, "This is the origin of suffering", an effort must be made; to realise, "This is the cessation of suffering", an effort must be made; to realise, "This is the course leading to the cessation of suffering", an effort must be made.'

This was said by the Lord and those bhikkhus were pleased and delighted with the Lord's talk.

1 The other sutras of this Vagga are various permutations showing how few beings deceasing from any of the five places of existence (the pañcaγati: devas, humans, animals, ghosts and hell-beings) are born again among devas or men, the majority are born again in hell. Each sutta employs the same simile and the same conclusion, and all are entitled 'Pañcaγati Sutta'.

In 1916 the Pali Text Society published Manual of a Mystic - 'A translation from the Pali and Sinhalese work entitled The Yogā-vachara's Manual'. According to the Sinhalese authorities quoted by C.A.F. Rhys Davids in the Preface and Appendix, 'at that time Buddhism in Ceylon was so decadent that there could not have been much samādhi and jhāna practice among the monks. The life they led was apparently so loose that King Vimala Dharma Sūriya (1684-1706) and his successors had to get thetas from abroad (Siam etc.) to hold ordination ceremonies, and thus impart new life to the Buddhist Sāmaṇa'. Such was the situation in Sri Lanka when there arose 'the moving spirit in the reform of the eighteenth century'... 'We see, then, that the old Theravāda tradition had either survived in Ceylon, or was flourishing in Siam, or both, when this Manual was written. And this venerable skeleton, with its incarnations of later thought and fancy, lends a quite special interest to the little work which is from a literary point of view so unsatisfactory'. The existence of this 'Dhyāna book was ascertained by the Anagārika G. Dharmapāla in... 1892'. At that time 'the bhikkhu Doraṭiya-vēya, Thera, was incumbent of the Hangurangketa Wihāra in the Western Province of Ceylon, and was living so recently as 1800. He came by the knowledge of the system... instructed his guru, 'then an aged monk' who instructed him as 'his chosen disciple in the system, and not long after passed away. The disciple, it is said, did not practise the process himself...'.

About the same time, at the beginning of this century, the old method of Buddhist meditation was also rediscovered in Burma in a fragmentary form, apparently even more incomplete, but it found a much better acceptance in the revised practice and later became, from the time of Buddha Jayanti (1936), internationally...

populargised. This 'Burmesene method' is called sukhavipassanā or 'bare insight', because it entails 'dispensing with the prior development of full concentrative absorption (jhāna)'. By virtue of skipping over the meditation-development of 'tranquility' (samātha-bhāvanā) as the first condition for 'right concentration' (samāsa-samādhī) - which is the highest and 'the last link of the 8-fold Path...defined as the 4 meditative Absorptions (jhāna)' in the 'one-pointedness of mind' (citta-sukkha-vipassanā) - this Burmesene method is criticised as a 'shortcut to Nibbāna' benefit of its fundamental psychological condition.

About twenty years prior to the Buddha Jayanti, Evola's Doctrine had the fortune and advantage of being written before the popularisation of the artificial reduction by a psychologically impossible vivisection and transposition into 'dry' words of sukhavipassanā, or 'objectified' insight, from samatha-bhāvanā, or inner stillness of a mind appealed by introverted cultivation in jhānap. The dead remainder of this hair-splitting cleavage on the side of samathā is thus 'appeased' and explained away in relegating it eventually to Indo-European mythology, although Buddhism, as in its historically preceding archetypal model of Jainism, was of a different, much deeper extraction, and also belonged to a logically rationalised mythology.

If a bhikkhu should frame a wish, as follows: ... Let me through the extinction of intoxicants (sāvānaṃ khāyati) in the present existence attain by myself the freedom of mind from intoxicants, the freedom of wisdom by proper understanding - then he must attain perfection in virtues (gītānaṃ), bring his mind to a state of quiescence, practise diligently the jhānas, stabilise insight (vipassanā), and tend to frequent lonely places.' (Akkābhāya Sutta, M 6)

'With his mind so collected, made pure, clean, stainless, without defilement, supple, ready to act, firm, imperturbable - he applies and inclines his mind to the knowledgeable insight.... Just as if in a mountain current there were a pool of water, clear, transparent, undisturbed; and a man of clear sight, standing on the bank should perceive the oysters and the shells, the gravel and the pebbles, and the shoals of fish as they move about or lie within it. He would know: 'This pool is clear, transparent, un-

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disturbed, and there within it are the oysters and the shells.... and the shoals of fish are moving about or lying still.... This is: 'mahārāja, an immediate fruit of the life of a recluse, visible in this world....'

(Samāhāphala Sutta, D 2)

'Just as a woman or a man, or a clever boy or girl, looking at the image of his own face in a clean and brilliant mirror or in a basin of clear water, and if it had a mole on it, would know that it had, and if not, would know that it had not.... so the bhikkhu in his mind - concentrated, purified, translucent, blameless, free of moral defilements, supple, ready to act, firm and imperturbable directs and inclines his mind to that knowledge which penetrates the heart....' (D 2, 92)

In Zen and other Mahāyāna schools, to which Evola turns for 'technically' preferable alternatives at the end of his Doctrine, the mirror represents (also in rituals and ceremonies) the best visible symbol of archetypal purity described in these and several other Pāli texts on the 'invariable sequence' of the threefold training (tīvrdha sikkhā). Progress is made by following safely, slowly and with an aesthetically cultivated enjoyment the way of purification (visuddhimagga) consisting of the aggregate of virtue, the aggregate of concentration and the aggregate of wisdom, without any danger of shortcuts, so pernicious for 'modern', and still more for 'post-modern blue riders' on the 'tiger's back', or hair-splitting pundits entangled in psychologically impossible and physiologically dangerous attempts at dislodging the kudalini vital force of their spines by vivisection, anaesthetised with psychedelic dope.

The same texts bear testimony also to the criterion for the selection of prerequisite virtues in the ethos of knowledge of 'those sons of noble families who having trust in me have gone forth from home into the homeless life' and 'found contentment in their ascetic life' (M 68).

Buddhaghosa's manual of meditation per excellence, Visuddhimagga ('The Path of Purification' 37, 5th c. A.C.), which is the best-known text in classical Pāli literature, is increasingly cited by followers of the Burmesene 'dry insight' (vipassanā) method and by their opponents as the basic authority for introducing 'a
distinction between two types of yoga, differentiated by their paths of contemplative development, the samatha-vānikā and the vipassanā-vānikā. Pointing out the superficiality of this kind of word-splitting, Kheṇinda Thera quotes the commentary to the Visuddhimagga, the Paramatthamañjūsa by Dhammapāla: 'By mere knowledge alone one is not established in Purification of Mind', and concludes that 'since the vipassanā-vānikā has completed Purification of Mind he must therefore have previously gained jhāna, too.\textsuperscript{38}

When Evola was writing his Doctrine in the pre-Jayanti era, the danger of this dilemma was not yet formulated in the exegeses of the dogmatic dialecticians of our days. Otherwise he might have been attracted by this apparent analogy with the absolutism of neo-Regelian dialectics by whose fascist trend he was educated and ultimately ruined in the way in which political revolutions 'devour their children'. Saved at least from this premature fall, however, he could continue writing in the following undisturbed way at the outbreak of another world war:

\textsuperscript{1}In A IV 170 it is said that the bonds give way and the path opens when samatha is combined with vipassanā.

\textsuperscript{2}It to this “knowledge” [of vipassanā] is added the calm and the control of samatha, then its development is assured and transfigured, and the result is the acesa which leads to awakening. In any case, these two factors are such that they reciprocally integrate each other (cf. A V 92-94).

'And if this mastery is not to be of an entirely psychological character, and therefore ephemeral, the ascetic must, in his earthly existence, have developed to a high degree both the contemplations that produce a superior calm (samatha) and the “wisdom” that is closely connected with the will for the unconditioned, which leads to change of heart and detachment, and which brings realisation of the non-substantiality of all that is samāric... (cf. A IV 124).'

This doctrinal discussion refers to Chapter XVIII of Part III of the Visuddhimagga, on 'Purification of View'. Concerning the same discussion, the orientation of the author of the present survey was predetermined - at the same time and in the same direction as Evola's - by another, preceding and more fundamental passage in the Visuddhimagga. Its purely descriptive import to direct experience of individual essences of the first and second jhāna in their logical sequence (savītakka-saviññāna) bracketed by the avitakka-saviññāna state of one-pointed concentration) and specific distinction - suggested, still unawares, a preliminary definition on the unprejudiced background of the primordial event and the hub of meditative cultivation (bhāvanā). Its analogy became for me the most suggestive guideline to understanding the entire Visuddhimagga as the basic manual of Buddhist meditation and its application in ascetic practice during the last thirty years - since Buddha Jayanti when I first read it in Nyānamahāloka's German translation (Konstanz 1952):

'So it should be understood that seclusion-by-suspension of lust is indicated by the phrase quite secluded from sense desire, and seclusion-by-suspension of all five hindrances by the phrase secluded from unprofitable things... So far the factors abandoned by the jhāna have been shown. And now, in order to show the factors associated with it, which is accompanied by applied and sustained thought it is said: Herein, applied thinking (vitak-kaṇa) ..., hitting upon, is what is meant. It has the characteristic of directing the mind on to an object... Its function is to strike at and thresh - for the meditator is said, in virtue of it, to have the object struck at by applied thought... It is manifested as leading the mind on to an object. Sustained thinking (vicāraṇa)... is continued sustainment. It has the characteristic of continued pressure on the object... It is manifested as keeping consciousness anchored on that object. And though sometimes not separate, applied thought is the first impact of the mind in the sense that it is both gross and inceptive, like the striking of a bell. Sustained thought is the act of keeping the mind anchored, in the sense that it is subtle with the individual essence of continued pressure, like the ringing of the bell. Applied thought intervenes, being the interference of consciousness at the time of first arousing thought, like a bird spreading out its wings when about to soar into the air, and like a bee diving towards a locus when it is minded to follow up the scent of it. The sustained thought is quiet, being the non-interference of consciousness, like the bird flying with outspread wings after soaring into the air, and like the bee buzzing above the lotus
after it has dived towards it... This difference becomes evident in the first and second jhānas (in the fivefold reckoning).... Thus it is said in the text "The mind arrived at unity enters into purification of the way, is intensified in equanimity, and is satisfied by knowledge" (Paṭisambhidamagga I, 167).... There let him find joy with a mind that is glad in exclusion....

To the question 'Why is only the second jhāna said to have confidence and singleness of mind? , it may be replied as follows: It is because the first jhāna is not fully confident owing to the disturbance created by applied and sustained thought, like the water ruffled by ripples and wavelets... Also, it is said in the Vibhaṅga: "So this applied thought and this sustained thought are quieted, quietened, still, set at rest.... done away with,... dried up,... made an end of; hence it is said: without applied thought, without sustained thought" (Vibh 258).... In the same way this (second) jhāna is without applied thought and without sustained thought, not as in the third and fourth jhānas... with just absence, but with the actual act of stilling the applied and sustained thought... so that it does not indicate the bare absence of applied and sustained thought.... So only this jhāna is called "born of concentration". 40

The pivotal point for the whole structure and procedure of jhāna is contained in the Kolita Sutta (S XXI 1): the noble silence (ariyo cūhi-bhāvo) - 'And what is the noble silence? My experience of it, friend, was as follows: In this state the bhikkhu, with the stilling of conceptual and discursive thinking (vitakka-vivacca), attains the second jhāna: the internal clearness, the one-pointedness of mind without conceptual and discursive thinking, the alertness and ease (pāti-sukha), and abides therein. This is called the noble silence.'

In another text of the same collection (S XXII 80), the Buddha exhorts a group of new disciples: 'Bhikkhus, it is advisable to cultivate markless concentration (animittā saṃādhi). Markless concentration, when cultivated and continuously practised, brings abundant fruits and great advantage.'

According to some other texts, the noble silence should be understood as the fourth jhāna, and the bhikkhu who has attained that jhāna, as well as he who has taken it for the basic subject

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of meditation (mūla-kammathāna), should be considered as dwelling in noble silence.

Consequently it is stated in Dhammapada i34: 'If you make yourself as still as a broken gong you have attained Nibbāna (extinction), for agitation is not known to you.'

Evola showed a sensitive understanding of this 'noble silence' and its importance for alertness in the cultivation of meditative attentiveness upon which the integral proceeding of jhāna-bhāvanā is based. Under the heading 'Sidereal Awareness - The Wounds Close', in the chapter preceding the main part of Doctrine on 'The Four Jhāna' (designated as the 'Irradiant Contemplations' - Ch. VI-VI et seq.), 'the initiation into the doctrine of the Ariya', described as 'the discipline of the watch over the senses or binding the wounds,... is shown by the simile of the man who has at a cross-roads a thoroughbred team and can guide them wherever he pleases' (S XXXV 198). 'The man who does not know or who forgets this practice is dominated by forms, sounds, smells, tastes, contacts and thoughts, instead of being their master.' The continuation of this essential connotation of jhāna is adequately compared with its closest analogy in Greek religious philosophy: 'In another way this discipline can also be summed up by the word silentium ... in the sense of the Eleusinian σιλοπα Impressions are arrested at the periphery, at the limit of the senses. Between them and the 'I' there is now a distance, a zone of silence which consists of not pronouncing either the exterior word or the interior word, and this in turn implies not hearing, not seeing, not imagining'.

(a) The first part of Patasajjali's Yoga-sūtrāni, samādhī-pāda, deals with the same problem of the relation and sequence of the first two dhyānas. Even the basic structure of this section shows the development of dhyāna - bhāvanā on this level not only on an analogical way but also in a homologous sequence of synonymous constituents corresponding with the Buddhist model in whose scholastic sequel it seems to have been formulated. The cardinal constituents in this common essential structure on both sides are:

Pāli Sanskrit
niruddho nirodha

vitakka-vicāra
vitarka-vicāraḥ
appamāṇā
aparimāṇa
brahma-viḥārā

According to sūtra 2 'yogāś is inhibition (nirodhāḥ, cessation, or bracketing in terms of modern phenomenological philosophy to a wide extent) of the mental processes.'

Nirodha, the third 'noble truth' - arīya-sacca of the Buddha, referring to dukkha-vikkhaya - extinction of suffering, is defined, according to sūtra 2.15 of Patanjali, as follows: 'Because of the sufferings caused by changes and anxieties and the saṃskā-

rā̃h (aggregates of existential factors), to the one who sees clearly, everything is pain.'

The definition corresponding to the first jhāna is given in sūtra 1.17 of Patanjali: 'It is cognitive (saṃprajñātāḥ) because accompanied with reasoning and reflection (vitarka-vicāra), with joy and the consciousness that I am (asmitā).'

Sūtras 1.42-44 describe the relation between saṃvittakā and nirvītakā samādhi, corresponding to the first and the second dhyāna:

1.42 - 'Sa-vitarka(dhyāna) is disturbed by uncertainty concerning understanding of the proper meaning of words.'

1.43 - 'When pure awareness (smṛti, Pāli saci) is attained, nir-vitarka(dhyāna) with the object alone (cf. noema in the phenomenological philosophy of Husserl) shines forth apparently devoid (cf.Husserl's epoché) of the own nature of knowing (subject; Husserl's noesis).'

1.44 - 'In the same way are explained the subtler objects (on the subjective side, i.e.of noesia) of discursive thinking - sa-vicāra and nir-vicāra - and their abstracting in bracketing (avyrpa-sūnyeva in sūtra 1.43 quoted above).

The last attainment mentioned in the sequences of our homology appamāna (Skt aparimaṇa) is explained both in Pāli and Sanskrit context as brahma-viṁśa - the four 'boundless states' or 'divine abodes' described as modes of sublime virtues, appeased in pervasive emotional attainments on the subjective side of mindfulness, corresponding to rational purification (inhibition by epoché ) as results in the 'pilgrim's progress' on the way to the four jhānas: friendliness (empathy, mettā, Skt maśtri), compassion (ka-

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ruṇḍa), gladness (sympathetic joy, mudda), equanimity (upekkhā).

It is only on this same track of encompassing attainments that I can understand the parallel reflective (paśṭimbhā) program of 'objective' (noematic) contents in harmony of arūpa- with rūpa-jhānas (- see chart on next page).

(b) In the Pāli Buddhism of the late Sinhalese Theravāda tradition the practice of meditation has been reduced to schematised rudiments of a primitive 'technicalisation', as described in the Manual of a mystic. Its 'mystical' method of presenting the system of the classical meditation subjects (kammaṭṭhāna) consists in 'the way of making wax-taper offerings for the fivefold rapture'...

The early schematisation of the Abhidharma scholasticism was decaying between its accomplishment at the time of Aśoka (3rd c.B.C.) and the Sinhalese compilation of the Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha (in the late Middle Ages), the 'historically latest layer of dry bones survived archaeologically...'

Already at the time of the early, but still Indian, formation of Mahāyānist philosophy, Nāgārjuna's dialectic ignored the mechanically vivisected atomisation of Abhidharma 'elements' (dhetu), fixed as 'the ultimate constituents' of the world as a whole, in keeping with 'the simile of the butcher' (M 10). The analysis of structural elements of the phenomenal world, from a revived biological viewpoint at the time of transition from the Theravāda statically deadened conception of abhidharma vibhaṅga-vāda to the Mahāyāna thesis of the viññāna-mārāra-sīdhiḥ, occurred in Va-subandhu's Abhidharmakośa. This determined the specific difference of the viññānavaḍa trend from the Madhyamaka dialectical logic. Whilst in modern European philosophy, Kant's transcendental criticism preceded Hegel's reprise into metaphysical speculation, in Buddhist philosophy the historical ripening followed in a slower and more extensive natural course of time from the speculative idealism (analogous to Hegel) to the critical idealism in transcendental logic (analogous to Kant).

(c) This is the situation in its broadest historical complexity, as seen from the alienated standpoints of 'modern' and 'post-

modern', 'contra- and infra-cultural' groping for 'alternative solutions', applicable by mass media and emergency 'techniques',
primarily with 'psychedelic' effects, on existential problems wherefrom the last traces of ethical conscience have been excluded, 'scientifically' reduced to pure verbal meanings, and banished by 'hermeneutical analysis'. The fast traces whatsoever of any 'ancient path of purification' have been erased to make room for new 'post-structural shortcut'.

To recapitulate the actual position of all such gropings indicative of the crisis in our Kali Yuga and symptomatic of the rapid decadence from the beginning of this century:

On the one hand the primitive 'technique' of 'mystical' sterilisation inherited from the preceding centuries (as the last remnants of the Sinhalese yogavacara have been dubbed by C.A.F. Rhys Davids) were dismissed in the concluding section of Evola's Doctrine in his advice to 'the reader who is attracted by true spirituality' who should turn to more authentic traditional doctrines 'to understand what a 'spiritual science' really is: these doctrines will teach him the clarity of pure knowledge, divorced from all forms of visionary “clairvoyance”, joined to a spiritual sovereignty, and to the will to break not only the human bond, but the bond formed by any other "world". Modern man has not only to fight against materialism, but must also defend himself from the snares and allure of false supernaturalism.

On the other hand the Burmese 'dry insight' method of trouble-shooting results in the strictest cutting short the practice for fear of unpractical and therefore unnecessary erratic penetrations in the states of jhāna. The slow way to these states is called the way of tranquillity (samatha-yana) and requires ('technically') two 'relays'47, leading from 'access concentration' to 'full concentration'. But a sūdha-vipassanā-yānikā, i.e. 'one who has pure insight as his vehicle', proceeds 'without developing either of these concentrations'....""
scheme of virtues synoptically presented in our table on the preceding page, results as a consequence of the still worse dread of 'asceticism' (comparable, for me, to Kant's most meaningful 'radical evil').

Ultimately, in the most precarious situation at the fin de siècle of our Kali Yuga, when all ethical requisites of such 'practical' references have been precluded, all that remains for our serious consideration appears to be reduced to exclusively 'scientific' experimental psychiatric investigations. An unsurveyable jungle of treatises on such, mostly pseudo-scientific, investigations has mushroomed in this field of 'Meditation as Metathereapy', 'Psychotherapy and Liberation', 'Mysticism and Schizophrenia', 'Drugs and Mystical Experience'...49 since Evola's prophetic warning nearly fifty years ago: 'A thing then occurs, with reference to which the doctrine in question is singularly in agreement with what "psychoanalysis" - even with its deformations and exaggerations - has presented to our modern eyes in the guise of theories of the libido and of the "Dedipus" or "Electra complex".50

William James, among the founders of experimental psychology, in his Gifford Lectures (1901-2) spoke of the strong impressions and influence that Swami Vivekananda (the first outstanding Indian missionary in America) made on him. At that time the Swami was still under the strong influence of Buddhism. James met him in New York in 1895 and read his book on Rāja Yoga51. Unfortunately, James also became the first who started experimenting for scientific purposes with hallucinogen drugs. His younger contemporary, Henri Bergson, tried to explain in defence of his friend James by the historical analogy of the irruption of Oriental mysteries in Greek religion with the cult of Dionysos:

'If mysticism is really what we have just said it is, it must furnish us with the means of approaching it, as it were experimentally.... Indeed, we fail to see how philosophy could approach the problem in any other way.

'As a foreign god from Thrace, Dionysos was by his violence a sharp contrast to the serenity of the gods upon Olympus. He was not originally the god of wine, but he easily became so, because the intoxication of the soul he produced was not unlike that of wine. We know how William James was treated for having described as mystical, or at least having regarded as such for the purposes of study, the condition induced by inhaling protoxide of nitrogen. People took this to be a profanation....'52

Carl Gustav Jung, in his extensive comparative studies of archetypal mythology, remained ambiguous and often inconsequential in his assessment of the comparative value and applicability of Eastern (Indian and Chinese) criteria for Western psychotherapeutic purposes, notwithstanding his early pre-War diagnosis Asia ante portas53.

Erich Fromm remained always more of a positive, consequential and assiduous student and direct collocutor with such Asian experts as D.T.Suzuki54, always ready to extend the scope of his universal culturological interest beyond the limits of a psychiatrist technician's object considered more or less exclusively as a geographically conditioned givenness.

Prof.J.H.Schultz (Berlin) in his 'clinically-practical' presentation of 'the autogenous training' 55 also describes references to Indian and Japanese motives appearing in his clinical praxis with symptoms of Asia ante portas. The fundamental denotation of his method as 'autogenous training' has the exceptional advantage of non-passivity of samā vajāna, or the proper effort as an essential quality for the 'high level' of psychotherapy in its 'closest relations to the rational wakefulness', underscoring the importance of mindfulness for the ethical aim of 'psychokatharsis'.

Chapter XI, under the heading 'The Yoga' is the central chapter of the last part (C) on the 'Procedure related' to the method of Schultz. This comparative part begins in Ch.IX with detailed references to 'Analories in ethnology and psychology of religion'. Special attention is paid to books on religion by W.James. In the whole context of the psychology of religion, the most valuable, in my estimate, are the pages (213-4) on 'Nirvana-therapy' for psychosomatologically incurable patients, 'leading to religiously coloured experiences of diving into states of meditation' (- Verensekung, the term for dhyāna adopted in German Buddhist literature).
(d) Reverting at the end to the contemporaneous aspect of the philosophy of religion, it may suffice to mention A.N. Whitehead's book, *Religion in the Making* (1926), where religion is defined as the 'force of belief cleansing the inward parts' of the human character. 'For this reason the primary religious virtue is sincerity, a penetrating sincerity' - the opposite of all Dionysian ecstasies and trances, invariably misleading the modern and post-modern revamping of thirst for religious short-cuts since W. James' experiments with *Varieties of Religious Experience*. According to Whitehead's definition, 'religion is solitariness, and if you are never solitary, you are never religious'. It is the direct negation of the theory that religion is primarily a social fact. 'Religion is the art and the theory of the internal life of men', and, consequently, meditation is 'what the individual does with his own solitariness'.

Let the reader judge for himself how far Evola in his fascist attempt 'to ride the tiger' has fallen short of understanding the Buddhist philosophy of conscience, and not merely of formal consciousness with its logical and 'technical alternatives', in order to avoid renouncing, giving up (pahāya) the way of purification (visuddhimagga) through jhāna, and to escape the 'extinction with remainder' (anavasesa nibbāna).

NOTES

33. Nyanaponika Thera in his Translator's Foreword to *The Progress of Insight* by Mahasi Sayadaw, Kandy 1965.
34. Cf. Nyanatiloka's *Buddhist Dictionary*, under *sammaati*.
41. *Doctrine*, p.175.
45. Schopenhauer's interpretation of 'these moments, when, delivered from the fierce pressure of the will, we emerge, as it were, from the heavy atmosphere of the earth' which 'are the most blissful that we experience. From this we can infer how blessed must be the life of a man whose will is silenced not for a few moments, as in the enjoyment of the beautiful, but for ever, indeed completely extinguished, except for the last glimmering spark that maintains the body and is extinguished with it...'. *The world as Will and Representation* I, 390, § 68. (See my *Studies in Comparative Philosophy* I, Colombo 1983, p.66.)
47. Cf. Kheminda Thera *The Way of Buddhist Meditation* (pp.20-1) on M 24, Rathaviniita Sutta.
THE TRANSMISSION OF TRUTH IN THE BUDDHA'S FIRST SERMON

Peter Harvey

Discussion of the Buddha's first sermon often centres on the four Ariyan (Holy) Truths, the essential message of the discourse. If we look at the context of that message, however, we gain a greater insight into it and its importance. The fullest version of the text is given at Vin I 4ff.

After his Enlightenment, the Buddha reflected: 'This Dhamma, won by me, is deep, difficult to see, difficult to understand, peaceful, excellent, beyond dialectic, subtle, intelligible to the learned. But this is a creation delighting in sensual pleasures... So that... this were a matter difficult to see, that is to say, dependent co-origination. This too were a matter difficult to see, that is to say, the calming of all karmic activities, the renunciation of attachment, the destruction of craving, dispassion, stopping, Nibbāna.'

Because of the profundity of this Dhamma (Truth, Reality) which the Buddha had discovered, he hesitated to teach it to others, for it might prove too subtle for them to understand. At this, Brahmā Sahampati, a great compassionate god, became alarmed: what if this Enlightened One were not to pass on his rare and precious knowledge - a great opportunity would be lost to the world. He therefore approached the Buddha and respectfully asked him to teach, pointing out that there are some who will understand, who are spiritually mature. When asked three times, the Buddha surveyed the world with his 'divine eye' and saw that this was so. He then made the momentous decision to teach. Having previously attained full wisdom, his compassion now unfolded and he proclaimed 'Open for those to hear are the doors of Deathlessness'.

Having decided that his five former companions in asceticism are the audience most receptive for his message, the Buddha then made his way, by foot, to the deer park at Sārnāth, some 150 miles away. The five ascetics saw their old companion in the distance, but resolved to snub him. They were continuing in their arduous asceticism, while Gotama 'lives in abundance' and 'wavers in striving'; he had gone soft and given up their shared quest
to find the end of suffering. Nevertheless, they perceived that
a great change had come over Gotama and, in spite of themselves,
respectfully greeted him and washed his feet.

At first the ascetics addressed the Buddha as an equal, as
'your reverence', but in response the Buddha insisted: do not
address a Tathagata - a Thus-gone, Truth-attained One - like
this, for he is fully Awakened, a Buddha; listen! - the Deathless
has been found (I've attained it!); I teach! The five
hesitated to accept Gotama as their teacher, but when he
repeated his affirmation three times they acknowledged that he
spoke with a new-found assurance and authority: they accepted
that he had never spoken to them like this before. This is because
a Buddha has 'become Dhamma' (D III 84) and so is supremely well
equipped to teach Dhamma.

In many later sermons, the Buddha often prepared the minds
of his listeners with a 'graduated discourse': on the goodness
of giving, of a virtuous life, how these led to a heavenly rebirth,
and on the emptiness of sense-pleasures. With the listeners'
minds in a state which was calm, clear, uplifted and open to
change, he then taught the four Holy Truths. In the first sermon,
the Buddha prepared the way for these Truths by establishing
his right to teach and by pointing out the fruitlessness of the
two extremes of harsh asceticism (as practised by his listeners)
and the mere pursuit of sense-pleasures. The Path he had dis-
covered is a Middle Way.

The Truths state that suffering is inherent in life, that
its cause is craving, that it can be transcended by rooting out
craving, and that the Holy Eightfold Path is the way to transcend
suffering. Elsewhere, the Buddha put his teaching in an even
briefer form: 'Suffering and the cessation of suffering only
do I teach'. In the first sermon, suffering (dukkha) is explained
as both physical and mental suffering, as frustration, and as
the very composite nature of one's personality. In addition,
suffering is explained as being of three kinds: suffering as
(mental or physical) pain, suffering which arises due to the
changing nature of things we grasp at, and suffering in the sense
of the limitation and imperfection of our conditional nature.

The transcending of suffering, Nibbāna, is talked of in many
ways in the Buddha's sermons. In a powerful passage at S I 62,
the Buddha says that our lived-world (vitiated by ignorance and
craving) - this is equivalent to suffering - exists in one's
'fathom length body', as does its cause; its cessation, Nibbāna,
and the Path to its cessation can also exist in it. The state
of one who has attained Nibbāna is also said to be that of com-
plete (mental) health.

The Holy Eightfold Path beyond suffering essentially consists
of virtue, meditation and wisdom: it involves restraining and
purifying one's actions, developing the heart/mind (citta), and
growing the insight which brings letting go and going beyond.
The role of samatha (calm) meditation in this process is to focus,
calm, clarify, purify, strengthen and integrate the citta. It
is likened to the process of purifying gold (S V 92-3): it weakens
the spiritual hindrances and allows the natural purity of the
citta to emerge from its depths to its surface. In a citta which
is clear and bright, the conditions for developing liberating
insight are ideal.

The first sermon does not end once the four Holy Truths are
given. The climax comes immediately after this when one of the
audience, Kondañña, 'gets it' and gains insight into the Truths:
'the Dhamma-eye, dustless, stainless, arose in the venerable
Kondañña...having seen Dhamma, attained Dhamma, known Dhamma,
plunged into Dhamma, having crossed over doubt...'.
This marks the 'Stream-entry' of Kondañña, his entry into the
'stream' of the Holy Path which will certainly bring him to full
Nibbāna. This transforming experience is one in which he gains
the 'Dhamma-eye', with which he sees that: 'whatever is of the
nature to uprise, all that is of a nature to cease'. This is
much more than an insight into impermanence. It indicates the
first living glimpse of the Dhamma 'won' by the Buddha at his
Enlightenment: dependent co-origination and Nibbāna. Insight
into the continuous conditioned arising of phenomena (all of
which are suffering) is insight into dependent co-origination.
Insight into their liability to stop brings a vision of Nibbāna
which is a blissful 'stopping': its transcends the incessant
process of rising and falling which is inherent in the process
of the world, and so transcends dukkha. In seeing the goal of
the Path, Kōṇḍañña knows it exists, and he can see the Path which leads to it: this is what brings his entry to the Holy Eightfold Path, which moves beyond the ordinary Eightfold Path.

Kōṇḍañña's using the Dhamma-eye to 'see' Dhamma reminds us of the Buddha saying: 'He who see the Dhamma sees me, he who sees me sees the Dhamma' (S III 120). The 'me' here is not the individual Gotama, but his nature as a Tathāgata: one who is Thus-gone, Truth-attained (note that it is as such a Tathāgata that Gotama teaches the first sermon). At the end of the first sermon, Kōṇḍañña (and later his four companions) 'see' the Dhamma with their Dhamma-eye, and so 'see' the Tathāgata. That is, they 'see' his real nature, Nibbāna, for it is the experience of Nibbāna that makes a person a Tathāgata and makes him 'Dhamma-become'2. At Stream-entry, one 'sees' and 'plunges into' the 'hard to see' Dhamma which the Buddha awakened to and fully won. In doing so, one 'fathoms' the Tathāgata, who is 'hard to fathom as is the great ocean' (M I 48). A person who has done this is on the Path which assuredly leads to Nibbāna, becoming a Tathāgata, an Arahat, attaining 'unshakable freedom of citta'.

The first sermon refers to Kōṇḍañña, at his Stream-entry, as 'having crossed over doubt, having put away uncertainty, having attained without another's help to full confidence in the teacher's instructions'. As a Stream-enterer, he attains un-wavering faith in the Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha. This is because Stream-entry involves a profound going-for-refuge: one which is supramundane, focused on that which transcends the conditioned world. Not only is Kōṇḍañña taught by the living Buddha, but he 'sees' and 'plunges into' his nature as an enlightened being. Not only does he hear the taught Dhamma, but he 'sees' Dhamma as Nibbāna, and is established in Dhamma as the Path going to that goal. His refuge-taking in the Sangha is outwardly expressed by his wish to be ordained as (the first) member of the Community of Monks, but his profound inner refuge-taking in the Sangha is his becoming a member of the Ariyan Sangha; the community of those who have had an insight into Nibbāna. In sum, he has deep, experientially-based faith in that which is Thus-gone, for, as described in the well-known Ratana Sutta, the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha refuges are each described as being Tathāgata.

As pointed out previously, the climax of the first sermon is when Kōṇḍañña attains Stream-entry. At this momentous event, a joyful cry spreads throughout the heavens from one set of gods to another: 'The supreme Dhamma-wheel rolled thus by the Lord at Benares in the deer-park at Sārnāth cannot be rolled back by any recluse or brahmin or god or by Māra or by Brahmā or by anyone in the world'. This message is given out not when the Buddha finished speaking but when Kōṇḍañña gets the Dhamma-eye: the crucial point in the first sermon, then, concerns the transmission of an experience, prepared for by teaching. When this occurs, one can say that 'Buddhism' begins: the transmission of something of the Buddha's enlightenment-experience. In symbolic terms, it is the setting in motion of the Dhamma-wheel, the inauguration of the spiritual reign of the Buddha and Dhamma, and of their power for spiritually transforming those who revere and live by them. This inauguration is portrayed, in the first sermon, as an event of cosmic, universal significance: the gods spread the good news far and wide, the earth shakes, and light spreads throughout the world.

Of course, when the Buddha sent out the first sixty enlightened arahants to teach Dhamma compassionately, he said that they should teach both gods and men. Many of those who benefited from this teaching became members of the Holy Sangha: those who glimpsed or fully realised Nibbāna. These included monks, nuns, lay-people and gods, even Sakka, or Indra, ruler of the pre-Buddhist Vedic gods. This community of enlightened beings has continued down to the present day, as the Sangha-refuge, represented by the Sangha of monks and nuns. The biography of the great Thai meditation-teacher Acharn Mun shows that there can still be arahants in the twentieth century: the long life-span of gods ensures that even those gods who became Stream-enterers in the Buddha's day are still alive today, so the world is not empty of Holy beings to inspire one. The goal we should aspire to is to become like them: to enter the Holy Eightfold Path by attaining Stream-entry. This was very common in the Buddha's day and is still possible today. By Stream-entry, we greatly reduce the dukkha in our lives, escape rebirths as animals, frustrated
The word 'Theravāda' has a long history and in that time it has gathered a number of intertwined meanings. Theravāda Buddhism is not easily defined and to do this the various layers of meanings must be examined. Along with this question goes another: where are the boundaries of Theravāda to be drawn? By examination of this latter question the complex meanings to the term will come into focus.

1. Definitions of Theravāda's Limits

There are quite a number of possibilities for defining these boundaries or limits which will be explored from the most limited 'fundamentalist' approach, through the broadest scholastic one, to considerations of practice, ordination and geography.

(a) Scholastic Definitions

In the most ancient texts, the Vinaya and the Sutta collections, we find repeated references to the Buddha's Teachings as Dhamma-Vinaya, while in the accounts of the first two Councils appended to the Vinaya collection only the Vinaya and Sutta are mentioned as having been chanted. There is no mention of Abhidhamma. It is possible to use this as a definition for the basis of Theravāda: that the Vinaya and Sutta are original teachings of the Buddha but that the Abhidhamma has been added and is therefore not his teachings. The old Commentaries (attha NORMAL kathā) do not adopt this approach as by the time they came to be written the Abhidhamma was already established. It should be noted that the Pāli Vinaya and Sutta collections are virtually the same (with some omissions and elaborations) as the comparable Vinaya-Sutta teachings of Buddhist sects now extinct but whose writings are preserved in Chinese and Tibetan. This does provide one standard, a rather 'fundamentalist' position, for Theravāda's boundaries.

A second scholastic definition would be to accept the traditional (not actually the Buddha's term) and inclusive group: Tipitaka, the Three Baskets of the Buddhist teachings mentioned above as Theravāda's delimitation. In this group the Abhidhamma is
included though there is no account of how it came into existence until the time of the Commentaries. It is important to realise that the seven books of the Pāli Abhidhamma are unique to Theravāda and while other Buddhist Schools had an Abhidharma (only that of the Sarvāstivādins survives in translations into Chinese and Tibetan), their works though similar were not the same. It could be said that, together with a few earlier books (Pепako-padesa, Nettipakaranā), the Pāli Abhidhamma is the first distinctively Theravāda production. However, a definition of Theravāda that was limited to the Tipiṭaka would seem very deficient to most Theravāda scholars who are accustomed to use Commentaries to interpret the basic texts.

This brings us to the third definition: Theravāda is the teaching and practice of the Tipiṭaka plus their ancient Commentaries or Atthakathā. All Indian texts have commentaries, at first oral and given by teachers to pupils, later written down as the accepted tradition for interpreting the root texts— which were often brief and in need of explanation. The Atthakathā represent a further ordering of the Vinaya and Sutta material, which had begun with the Abhidhamma. The Suttas especially are rather chaotic with regard to their material: in them the Buddha is concerned to lead living beings out of dukkha, not to present a scholastic system which could be studied easily. The Abhidhamma is much easier to study than the Suttas as it has been compiled systematically, but 'the heart' that one feels in the Suttas has gone and 'the head' with its analyses and syntheses has replaced it. The Atthakathā go further and often try to analyse the Suttas in terms of the Abhidhamma. (It would be an interesting study for someone of analytical bent to see how much of the Abhidhamma and its Commentaries can be justified on the basis of the Suttas.) Thus the Commentaries present a distinctively Theravāda interpretation of them (occasionally even twisting their obvious meaning) and make them fit into a Theravāda system, as it now became. If all the interpretations of the Commentaries are accepted as a definition of Theravāda's limits, then it should be quite easy to add the remarks of the Tipiṭaka sub-commentaries as further buttresses to the system. And there are even Anuṭiṭaka which comment upon the Tipiṭaka. It may be a measure of Theravāda's limitations (rather than limits) that the past thousand years, since the time of the Tipiṭaka's writing, nothing much has been written in Pāli, certainly nothing interesting or inspiring. The system had been rounded off and it appears monk-authors went to sleep. Even the last century has seen nothing impressive in Pāli writings. To return to the Tipiṭaka—difficult words and passages do need elucidation and in the course of explaining these matters definite philosophical positions are usually adopted. Eventually a complete system is constructed which is hoped to be, though such a thing is an impossibility, logically and philosophically impregnable to the attacks of non-believers. Buddhists in India had to contend with such attacks, both from non-Buddhist opponents and from other varieties of Buddhists. It would have been better had more of them listened to the Buddha's wise words on the fruitlessness of arguments (Sutta-Nipāta 878–914) and the necessity of practice. It seems that a lot of Indian Buddhists viewed matters the other way round! This was the cause for decline in Indian Buddhism. All such argument comes from adopting a philosophical position, having constructed a Buddhist system, and then having to defend it. The Buddha was not at all concerned with such matters. One of the merits of Māgārjuna's much later critique of scholastic Buddhism was that he presented no system needing defence and tried to return to the Buddha's non-dogmatic teaching. Perhaps, though, this could only be done by one who had accomplished the Dhamma within.

(ii) Practical Definition

There is also an effort to return to non-dogmatic Buddhism in what could be called 'practical', as opposed to scholastic, Theravāda. Though there are some traditions of Theravāda practice which do not employ scholastic terminology such as the concepts of the Abhidhamma and the Atthakathā, an example being the Mahāsa Sarīpaṭṭhāna technique from Burma, most practical teachers eschew these complications. Examples of this can be found in the large numbers of Ācariyas (teachers, achārīn in Thai) who continue the forest monastery tradition in north and northeast Thailand. Most of them have some connection with the teachings of the Enlightened Masters, Tun Ācārīn Sāo and Tun Ācārīn Mun, and teach a strictly practical approach to Dhamma and Vinaya.
Many of these Acharns, as well as their pupils, have not formally studied the Tipiṭaka and know only a little Pāli. The Vinaya, as it applies in Thailand, is practised well and a few Suttas will be known by heart. When they speak Dhamma it is on the basis of their own realisation of it, a contrast with town-dwelling scholastic monks who often quote the Suttas, the Abhidhamma and the Commentaries. This direct approach combined with some local custom and tradition constitutes 'Theravāda' for those who train with such Acharns. The majority of Westerners now entering the Theravāda Sangha go into the forest tradition of practice and therefore tend to have this view of Theravāda.

(iii) Sangha Definition
The narrowest of all definitions of the Theravāda when viewed in terms of persons rather than texts, would be by ordination lineage. Thus a bhikkhu is a Theravāda bhikkhu because his teachers and ordination ceremony are of Theravāda tradition, conforming to the Vinaya in Pāli. In Buddhist countries of South and South-East Asia such a bhikkhu would follow not only the Vinaya as preserved in Māgadhi (or Pāli) but also the teachings of the Suttas and Abhidhamma in the same language. He would hardly be able to follow any other tradition as other Buddhist sects (e.g. Chinese Buddhism in Thailand) are insignificant and use other languages for their scriptures and teaching. It should be noted that this position of Theravāda ordination automatically guaranteeing study of only the Pāli Tipiṭaka was not always the case in the past. Theravāda bhikkhus in India in Hsiian-tsang's time studied (and presumably practised according to) Mahāyāna sūtras. We know that some of them did this in Sri Lanka, perhaps up to the end of the Polonnaruwa period. In India, it seems, followers of so-called Hinayāna and Mahāyāna - having the same ordination lineage, lived side by side in the same monastery, a real exercise in tolerance, patience and loving-kindness. This possibility presents a very different situation to that mentioned at the end of the last section (I,ii).

(iv) Geographic Definition
In this case Theravāda is defined in terms of countries where it predominates or by groups of people who follow it. The majority of Burmese, Cambodians, Laotians, Sinhalese and Thai in their own countries are followers of Theravāda Buddhism, as also are Bengali and hill-tribe Buddhists in Bangladesh and large numbers of Cambodians in Vietnam. The Thai in China (and the younger generation of Chinese in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia - Ed.) are also Theravādins. Where Theravāda has been the religion of the majority in a state and therefore the ruler's religion too, it has acquired a strong and distinctively different flavour, as is evident to anyone familiar with Thai, Sinhalese or Burmese forms of Buddhism. This does reflect adaptability and flexibility to particular peoples and cultures within the framework of Theravāda boundaries. It means also that followers of Theravāda acquire in those countries a strong nationalistic attitude.

II. Some Modern Considerations of Theravāda Limits
The points discussed above should now be reviewed in a more critical way, taking into consideration modern knowledge and conditions.

(1) Critical Analysis of the Tipiṭaka
Traditionally the words of the Vinaya, Sutta and Abhidhamma are regarded as all spoken by the Buddha. This is a view which only some Asian scholars now hold, quite untenable in the light of modern critical analysis. The latter attitude agrees with the words of the Buddha himself (mā picaka-sampadāya, Kālāma Sutta, A III 63), while the former traditional attitude is close to fundamentalist ideas in theistic religions.

The traditional attitude is based on strong faith which makes acceptance of the whole Tipiṭaka as the Buddha-word easy. However, it is weak on wisdom and cannot bear much examination of its position. When all the Tipiṭaka is believed to be Buddha-vacana - The Buddha's Words, Theravāda seems to have a very strong base, but when careful examination of the Pāli is undertaken in comparison with the Vinaya and Sutta translations in Chinese and Tibetan, the former dogmatic assumptions have to be relinquished. Lines which formerly could be clearly drawn, 'This is Theravāda, that is not Theravāda', can no longer be made.
(11) Traditional Sangha Organisation

From ancient times the Commentaries have made much of the difference between the work of books (gāthādāhura) of the town-dwelling (gāmavāsī) monks, and the insight-work (vipassādāhura) of the anubhūtis or forest-dwelling monks. At present in Thailand, this leads to a rather sad situation where town-dwelling monks do no meditation and forest-dwellers have no scholarship. Two quite distinct forms of Theravāda are then found in the Sangha with not very much common ground. This is surely an unhealthy sign, especially for Westerners who often want only to meditate and no study at all. There is as much danger in ignorant monks who only meditate as in limited monks who only study.

(11) Theravāda and other Buddhist Traditions

Since Theravāda is no longer sheltered in Theravāda-only countries such as Sri Lanka, Burma and Thailand, it is inevitable that its practitioners will come into contact with Buddhists of other traditions. Wherever Theravāda has been established in the West it has had to meet with other Buddhists and to some extent exchange ideas with them. In Western countries the devotees of other Buddhist traditions cannot be ignored, as is still the case in Theravāda countries, and must be seen as fellow-practitioners whose ways are somewhat different but not inferior.

All Buddhist traditions tend to have some kind of ‘one-upmanship’ over others, a reflection of the conceit of those who formulate such positions. While the one-upmanship of Mahāyānists is obvious in the claim of being followers of the Great Vehicle, and that of Vajrayānists has been the claim to the fastest and ultimate vehicle, Theravādins have relished their own supposed purity of tradition (as against the corrupted traditions of others). All these kinds of attitudes are out of place in our present shrunken world.

(11) Theravāda and Nationalism

In all Buddhist countries there is a strong nationalist identification with Buddhism. This causes strange distortions in thought and speech, as when a Thai sees a Westerner ordained and remarks that he has ‘ordained as a Thai’. The nationalist mixture in Asian Buddhism is unattractive to Westerners, much of it being merely exotic while some features of it are repellent and actually anti-Buddhist. It is unlikely that Theravāda as it becomes acculturated in the West will ever develop nationalism, attitudes, that is, not until all the great cathedrals become Buddhist temples and the rulers of Western countries become Buddhists!

(v) Theravāda and other Religions

The countries that have become known as Theravāda Buddhist states had, prior to the introduction of Buddhism, no very strong religious tradition. This applied to Sri Lanka where some sort of Deva worship existed, to Burma with its Nat, and to Thailand and Laos with their Phi. It is interesting that Theravāda did not persist in India where there has always been religious tradition, or rather, a great variety of them. It may be noted here that other so-called Hinayāna Buddhists were very successful in India and right up to the end of Buddhism there remained as the majority of temples, monks and practitioners. The fact that Theravāda did not flourish in India could mean that it has usually retreated from such contact and exchange in order to preserve itself ‘unchanged’. (We shall review this idea of an unchanging pure tradition below.) In Western lands, Theravāda has to face a culture with some kind of Christian background. What sort of exchange of ideas will come out of this encounter? It is difficult to see what ideas Theravāda Buddhists could borrow from Christianity, though the latter, especially in the realm of meditation has much to learn from Buddhist teachers. Religious exchanges in the past have occurred slowly over the centuries and even in our days of instant communications will still take a long time to mature. All religions tend to be conservative and change comparatively slowly.

(vi) Theravāda and the Psychotherapies

While the latter have learnt some techniques of mindfulness and meditation from Buddhist and other sources, it is doubtful whether such therapies could lead to much change in Theravāda. In general, modern therapies aim to restore people to their ‘normal’ (greed-hate-delusive) selves so that they can cope with ordinary life, whereas Theravāda Buddhism on its highest level urges people to live rather extraordinary lives and dissolve themselves away! However, many people at present who wish to practise meditation intensively need first to straighten out the major kinks in their
personalities with some kind of therapeutic treatment.

(vii) Theravāda and Feminism

Here there is a very great need for Theravāda to change, that is, if it is to make much impact on just over half the world's population - women. In Theravāda Buddhist countries women have mostly been content to play a secondary role in Buddhist learning and practice. This has come about largely due to the disappearance of the Bhikkhuni Sangha in Sri Lanka during the 10th century A.D. A woman's place has been either that of female devotee, a married or unmarried laywoman who supports the monks at the local temple and who, if more pious, undertakes Eight Special Precepts on Moon Days, or that of a 'nun' whose position is somewhat ill-defined. As she has no Sangha, a nun can live at home in a special room, or with other nuns altogether observing Eight or at most Ten Precepts. They would be welcome in some temples, mostly there to lead a life of 'holy domesticity' - cleaning the shrines and arranging the offerings as well as cooking for the bhikkhus, but quite unwelcome in others. Generally they had to arrange their own support as none would be given them in the same way as the bhikkhus. Sometimes they had their own senior and experienced nun teachers but usually they had to rely for teaching on the monks. On the whole they were not encouraged to study and only where meditation was emphasised would they get a chance to practise. While older women who had retired to the nun's life after raising a family were more acceptable, younger women were usually regarded with suspicion as the possible seducers of bhikkhus.

As it is now, Theravāda has almost no facilities for training Western women. That this is true is confirmed by a comparison of the numbers of Western bhikkhus in Buddhist countries with those of Western nuns. There are hardly any of the latter because conditions are too difficult, particularly with regard to sexual discrimination. Nuns are looked down on (as having only Eight or Ten Precepts and probably little or no learning and no opportunity to practice much), viewed very much as only modified laywomen with no Sangha structure of their own, and generally expected to make a resolve to be men in their next life when they will be able 'to do it properly' as bhikkhus. Hardly an incentive for Western women to be nuns! Though this position is slowly beginning to change in traditionally Theravāda countries, no prospect is yet to be seen there in favour of re-establishing a Bhikkhuni Sangha. The only Theravāda Western nuns in any numbers are associated with the Chithurst and Amarāvati Ārāmas in Britain. However, because the tradition exemplified there has to tread a precarious tightrope between orthodox Thai Theravāda on the one side and Western needs to change on the other, to fit in with a world very different from either the one that Gotama the Buddha taught in or from a contemporary Buddhist country, nuns are still lacking both a Sangha tradition and ordination lineage as bhikkhus.

In a summary of this section we should consider the justice of the label often attached to Theravāda - that it is conservative (and even rigid according to some authors), and therefore whether change is possible in the various areas indicated here. Anyone who knows Theravāda in an Asian setting will be aware that, in contrast with the picture that might be gleaned from books, it has quite a 'liquid' frontier. Some extraordinary modifications are made for the benefit of uneducated followers, so that local deities, festivals and even superstitions are accommodated; things seemingly opposed to the principles of Theravāda as found in the sutras. There is a limit to such adaptability, however, for once the standard of conduct of the Sangha appears to be declining reform movements arise which not only purify the Sangha but discard many of the concessions to popular taste. Theravāda is, then, not so inflexible as some have supposed, or it could not have flourished in so many countries for so long. It can be shown, too, that in the past it has changed, that the label Sthaviravāda in India of Huân-tsang's time did not mean what Theravāda does now in Sri Lanka. The change is not only temporal but also geographic for Theravāda does not look or sound quite the same in Sri Lanka, Burma (Myanmar), Thailand, Laos or Cambodia. Each of these 'Theravādas' has a rather different taste. If then Theravāda is as adaptable as these examples show, there seems no reason why it should not grow and adapt, with its liquid frontier in the West. Indeed, whatever body cannot change in changed circumstances is doomed to extinction, its 'purity' the whiteness of its skeleton, the dusty records of its past life.
III. Directions of Probable Change in Theravāda

What is written here combines observations of present trends with some personal preferences. Others may well have different views on Theravāda's future. If it is to have a future outside Asia, which is particularly troubled just now, it has to change.

(1) Balanced Study and Meditation

This is a necessary prescription for monks and nuns but also one for lay people. The study should be directed to encourage practice, not to encourage the development of views. This means that most scholastic ballast will have to be dumped because in the main it is not practical. There are examples of such 'ballast' even from early Theravādin days: such books as the Pācekakadesa (Piṭaka-disclosure, PTS 1964) and the Nettipakarana (The Guide, PTS 1962) will find few indeed to open them now. This means that study should be centred on the Vinaya and the Sutta and a non-dogmatic approach be used in teaching them. As was mentioned above, study must not be divorced from practice, especially mindfulness-meditation practice. The results of years of study and no meditation can be seen in many Asian monks - it does not lead to a deep or balanced appreciation of the Dhamma. On the other hand, we find Western Buddhist monks and nuns who only want to meditate, never to study. This is understandable in that few Buddhist institutions offer any course of study of Vinaya-Sutta which stimulates enquiry into and analysis of this material. Without such study and with only application to mindfulness and meditation, people cannot present the Buddha's teaching lucidly when they are asked about it. The Suttas especially offer so many frameworks upon which to hang experience so that it may be clearly seen by others. Views can as easily, perhaps more easily, arise among the meditation-only group, as among the study-only group, for those of the former are likely to be deeper and more divisive than those of the latter.

(II) An analytic and cautious Approach to Vinaya/Sutta

This kind of approach is needed so that the study of the Buddha's teachings is stimulating and interesting, leading to, as it certainly will, the abandonment of many dogmatic positions. Nā Piṭaka-saṃpadāya (not believing in the authority of the record-ed canon) is the right spirit to adopt in studying both Vinaya and Sutta. There is no need to force meanings onto texts so that they fit into a rigid system - a pastime of the Commentators, rather than let outstanding and even opposing ideas stimulate the mind. At the same time, analysis of the content of the Suttas and Vinaya should be encouraged, a cautious analysis based on wisdom rather than speculation. These two Piṭakas should not be treated as though their ideas cannot be explored for signs of change in Buddhist ideas, for ways in which change can come about according to Dhamma.

(iii) Leaving aside the Abhidhamma and Commentaries

These are precisely the texts that receive the most attention in Buddhist countries. They are studied by monks and require years of diligent study to master the whole system. They are therefore not very interesting or attractive for most lay people to study. One who has mastered the seven formidable books of the Abhidhamma with their Commentaries will indeed be a great scholar, but it is likely to be scholarship without much application to the real life of people in this century. The Commentaries are sometimes helpful in understanding difficult words and phrases in the Sutta and Vinaya, but in general their pronouncements should be accepted with a grain of salt. If the Sutta and Vinaya material itself is to be examined in the light of the Khālāma Sutta, how much more should this principle apply to the Commentaries?

(iv) The Use of Traditions from various Countries

Theravāda countries, as we observed before, preserve or have developed differing emphases in study and practice. Asian Buddhist monks tend to follow the traditions of only their own country so that their institutions preserve as far back as possible the appearance of Buddhism 'back home'. Asian Buddhist devotees generally require this and would be unhappy with any significant changes. There seems to be no reason for Westerners ordained into Theravāda to follow rigidly only the traditions of one country when others might be more appropriate. It is worth remarking, though, that there are very few Westerners who have this sort of experience, while many of them (nearly all men) know only one tradition from one Buddhist country. This may
be good for faith—faithfully following the way of one’s teacher, but is scarcely good for breadth of experience.

(v) Incorporation of ‘Mahāyāna’ Elements

When the records of the past are consulted, Theravāda Buddhism can be seen to have flourished best when it had a little adversarial stimulation: there are examples of this in Pagan, Burma and Anuradhapura, Sri Lanka. Without such stimulation and supported by Buddhist governments, as in Thailand at the present day, there is a tendency for the hierarchy of senior monks to become complacent and arch-conservative policies to preclude necessary changes. A little Mahāyāna influence in Theravāda countries could be seen as a good thing, probably beneficial to both sides: Theravāda needs stimulation from Mahāyāna so that it does not ossify, while the latter needs some Theravāda principles of Vinaya so that the proper direction of its practitioners is maintained. A close study of the Suttas reveals that much that is thought of as Mahāyāna is already present there, at least in embryonic form. What sort of practices are adopted will depend on individual teachers, but a more lively devotional and ritual attitude, incorporating some varied chanting and perhaps prostrations would seem to be needed. Some of the possible practices that could be incorporated, while quite foreign to Theravāda in the present Buddhist countries, would not have been so to Theravāda as it existed a thousand years ago in India. It may not be beside the point to remark that the various Buddhist traditions spread throughout Asia now are rather like various limbs without a body, or perhaps a body lacking a heart: the native Buddhism of India no longer lives and shows little sign of coming back to earth [except amongst the so-called ‘Untouchables’, thanks to the FWBO – Ed.].

(vi) A Better Deal for Women

There is a great deal of opposition in traditional Theravāda, mostly from senior monks, to the ordination of nuns as bhikkhunis. All kinds of objections are raised: historical, moral and political, all of them perhaps underlain by fear. Theravāda monks now have had no experience of working with a Bhikkhu-sangha for over a thousand years. Certainly such a Sangha of dedicated women would precipitate many changes in the Theravāda Buddhist world which would mean that the monks would have to relinquish some of their power as well as changing their attitudes towards women. As the rules for a Bhikkhu-sangha stand now (as they were collected and formulated by the Bhikkhu-sangha after the Buddha’s Parinibbāna), the bhikkhūs are dependent in many ways on the bhikkhus. This situation is hardly appropriate at the present day and can rightly be highlighted by feminist critics as just another example of patriarchal religion. What is needed now is a well-trained group of Western nuns who are willing to set up their own Bhikkhu-sangha.* This would serve as a real focus for the faith of lay women and give them an ideal for which to strive.

Some of the richness and complexity of Theravāda has been explored in this article, along with some notes on its limitations. Our times are exciting ones for the Buddhist religion which now has the first chance since its destruction in India to begin an exchange of ideas and practices between its various traditions. Theravāda has a very important part to play in this exchange and of course, as must be the case, its limits and limitations will change in the process.

* Ed. This has now been accomplished in all but name. In December 1988, at the Hsi Lai Temple, Hacienda Heights, near Los Angeles, over 200 women received ordination in the main Chinese Vinaya lineage, the (Mahāyānist) Dharmaguptaka. Representatives from the major western European countries and, significantly, from Sri Lanka, Burma and Thailand, participated. For a full report, and discussion of the Bhikkhu-sangha, see NISWA (Newsletter on International Buddhist Women’s Activities) No.18, Bangkok, Jan.-March 1989.
Rationality is one feature of early Buddhist doctrine which some Western scholars and many European followers of Buddhism, or at least sympathetic readers of Buddhist scriptures, have rated highly. They have very often seen in it what they regard as the most important quality, or perhaps even the core of, Buddhism as a religion or philosophy of life. This was the case particularly in the early years of the Western world’s encounter with Buddhism — in the last century, in the early years of this one, even up to the 1930s. Academics like H. Oldenberg or von Glasenapp belonged to this category and so did some Buddhist monks of European origin such as Nyanatiloka, and lay followers writing on Buddhism like Paul Dahlke.

As a result, the public at large was presented with a doctrinal picture of Buddhism which was stripped of most of those specifically religious features which it shares with other religions around it. And so the result of an encounter of an educated European traveller, or a newly-ordained Buddhist monk from Europe, with popular Buddhism in Asia was often one of disappointment if not shock, and frequently led to judgments in which the notion of 'superstition' played a part.

Some of those European intellectuals who were inclined to accept certain tenets from Buddhist thought on the grounds of their rational soundness and even some members of Buddhist movements in the West adopted a selective attitude to Buddhist doctrines, eliminating those elements which seemed to them non-rational or even irrational. One such casualty has been the teaching on rebirth in successive lives. This appears for some reason unacceptable to some Western minds, although it is essential to the central doctrine of Buddhism which is the final attainment of Nirvāṇa/Parinibbāna, hardly conceivable as to be accomplished in a single life. Yet this objection can still occasionally be met with, even in Buddhist circles. Another casualty has been the belief in or acceptance of beings from invisible worlds participating in events at the same time as humans, like the Buddha’s birth and death, listening to and taking part in many of his...
discourses or even becoming members of the *ariya sāvaka* sangha or the community of saints.

Although, as has already been partly indicated, the excessively rationalistic tendency in interpreting Buddhism has not entirely disappeared, the knowledge and appreciation of Buddhism as a global and all-embracing system of religious and philosophical tenets as well as meditational, devotional and even ritual practices has gained wide currency in all the circles concerned. It has come about by a widening of academic research to cover the many schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the spread of Buddhist meditational practices in the West, the popularity of Zen Buddhism and the influence of the Tibetan Buddhist presence in the wake of the Chinese seizure of Tibet.

Nevertheless, rationality has to be acknowledged as an important component of Buddhism, particularly of its early doctrinal message, even if it is clear that it does not reach or encompass the higher layers and the highest point of the edifice of the Buddhist system. But it would probably be agreed among sympathetic students and followers of Buddhism, if not among all academic scholars, that whatever is, in the Buddhadhama, outside the range of rationality has to be regarded as suprarational, never as anti-rational. Rationality should be able to accompany one as far as the threshold of the transcendent stages of experience as presented by the teaching. From there on the plunge can only be individual. However, even that can be rationally motivated: to see for oneself that, or whether, the promise of a supermundane achievement can indeed be verified by personal experience even if not in the sense of the modern philosophical or scientific requirement of objective verification.

An academic enquiry into the aspect of rationality in early Buddhism can be seen as an important undertaking which could correct much that lingers in the minds of Westerners and westernised Asian Buddhists from older studies referred to above, since some of them are still read and influential.

The book under discussion is a slim volume adapted for publication from the Ph.D. dissertation written by the author whilst a postgraduate student in the Department of the History and Philosophy of Religion in King's College, University of Lon-

don. The Head of Department, Prof. S. Sutherland (now the Principal of the College), commends the book warmly in a short Foreword for its achievement as a sensitive contribution in depth to the dialogue between East and West. The author now lectures in the Philosophy of Religion at the University of Montevallo in Alabama.

As can be expected in a work derived from a doctoral thesis, its theme is narrowed down to specific well-defined issues. The rationality it is concerned with does not cover the whole of the Buddhist doctrine as a philosophy of life and a 'world view' but focuses on those of its aspects which are relevant to contemporary Western philosophical enquiry and the handling of which in the Pāli Nikāyas, when measured by Western academic standards, would secure or deny Buddhism the status of a rational doctrine by those standards. The acceptance or denial of that status depends, in the first place, on the willingness of Western philosophical minds to look at issues in the Pāli sources and on their ability to understand and interpret adequately the originally intended meaning of the textual formulations. Buddhism has all too often been dismissed as containing logical contradictions, being unintelligible in some of its statements and favouring undue pessimism in its view of life. Buddhist followers and some of its sympathetic interpreters have always maintained that such judgments are based on inadequate understanding of the texts. This would stem from the fact that Western philosophers could not read the original texts whilst textual experts lacked the philosophical sophistication to grasp the subtle issues of logic and meaning and present them adequately so that they could be identified on the appropriate conceptual level and subjected to analysis by Western philosophical techniques.

The author of this book has been trained in these techniques and has also acquired proficiency in reading the original Pāli texts, and this greatly enhances the relevance and importance of his contribution. In the first Chapter, 'Understanding Early Buddhism', he outlines his methodology. He regards the Nikāyas as the earliest source for the study of Buddhism which need not be supplemented by the study of the Commentaries, and indeed should not be if one wants to see what early Buddhism says about topics which concern rationality and mind. Even other canonical
texts, such as the Abhidhamma, have to be excluded, because they treat the matter on a different level. Limiting oneself to the Nikāyas is, for the purposes of the author's enquiry as he has conceived it, a methodological necessity.

In Chapter Two, 'Rationality and Logic', the author concentrates on the question whether there is a contradiction in the so-called fourfold logic of Buddhism. Its best known instance is, of course, the question whether the liberated one, the Tathāgata after death, (1) is, (2) is not, (3) both is and is not or (4) neither is nor is not. However, this fourfold logic is applied also to other utterances and it has been the source of accusations that Buddhist logic violates the law of contradiction. The author's solution is to show that while Buddhist texts did not develop, at that stage, propositional logic so that the attempt to translate their sentences into propositions expressed in formal symbolism does not work, the principle of contradiction was fairly observed and used as a binding rule and an heuristic principle for debate—an important methodological device without which nothing could be found out, discovered or established. But the fourfold pattern was not always applied in debates, presumably because it was not always relevant to the issue discussed. And it is not unique to 'Asian logic', either: the author quotes an interesting example of it from David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. The third and fourth statements in the fourfold formula can be understood on the basis of being elliptical which makes the third one realistic whilst the fourth one, although sometimes conceivable, appears to be almost always rejected by the Buddha. Example: (1) dukkha is self-caused; (2) dukkha is not self-caused (but other-caused); (3) dukkha is (partly) self-caused and (partly) other-caused; and (4) dukkha is neither self-caused nor other-caused (but arises by chance). This solution would have to be tested by its application to less obvious examples. We shall have to wait and see what Chapter Six has to say about the problem of the Tathāgata's existence after death.

Chapter Three tackles the accusation of irrational pessimism on account of the universality of dukkha. But what is dukkha? We all know that many Buddhists reject its translation as 'suffering' and prefer 'unsatisfactoriness' or other substitutes, although these do not cover all instances where dukkha appears in the texts. The author points out that it has at least two meanings. One is derived from statements which indicate that whatever is impermanent is dukkha, and in these instances unsatisfactoriness fits in (at a certain point the author uses in this case the term 'unease'). The second is derived from the description of the first Noble Truth which lists birth, ageing, death, grief, etc. These are clear examples of suffering as such and are not described by the substitute translations such as 'unsatisfactoriness'. I.B. Horner translates it often in this context as 'anguish'. What is clear is that dukkha has a wide meaning covering a range of experience which is minimally that of deprivation and which may also be that of mental and/or physical pain. Its root is craving (taṇhā) and since everybody craves happiness and would recoil from pain, dukkha is not only a descriptive, but also an evaluative term. It represents the inclusive recognition that what is impermanent is always dukkha which enables one to see the profane character of Sāṃsāra in contrast to the 'sacred' nature of Nibbāna which is beyond impermanence. But since Nibbāna may be achieved, in the long run, by anybody even whilst still living in Sāṃsāra and dukkha itself is, therefore, impermanent, Buddhism cannot be logically regarded as pessimistic. Even within the sāṃskāric context itself temporary consolations from dukkha in the narrow sense can be worked for, and attained, for long periods of time, for example being reborn in the worlds of bliss.

Chapter Four is called 'Mind and Rebirth' and attempts to tackle the logical problem of rebirth without anything being reborn or the accusation that 'rebirth ( punabbhava ) and no-soul ( anattā ) are logically inconsistent'. The author regards this objection as a misconception. There is nothing illogical in a continuum such as vinnāna, which is not an unchangeable substance and therefore not a soul or atta in the Hindu sense, to be reborn, even if between lives it is sometimes called sādhana. Early Buddhist terminology for the rebirth link is not settled. Other candidates in the texts are sākhāras and cittā (but never mano). This is enough to indicate that continuity and moral responsibility across lives are affirmed. However, what is it that ensures continuity between lives in the absence of the Upaniṣadic ātman as controller? Or what are the criteria...
for reidentifying a person across lives? In a protracted and formally complicated argument, the author finds explanations of various Buddhist writers inadequate, rules out memory of past lives as incomplete and unreliable and does not find other 'reasonable grounds' for believing that continuity across lives can be verified. And so he suggests that rebirth may be viewed as part of the 'background' for other tenets, for example the first Noble Truth which presupposes rebirth, but it can never be accepted as an empirical proposition since it is not a verifiable theory as understood in the West today.

The argument continues in Chapter Five, 'Mind and Verification'. Much is accepted by Buddhists 'on faith' (saddhā) even prior to investigation despite the admonition of 'come and see'. And that goes also for rebirth as a doctrine. Even enlightenment is a subject of belief which in turn is a condition of the enlightenment experience, namely the sixth abhināna or knowledge of the destruction of the āsavas, and this experience functions to confirm the faith. Even then some liberated ones would have to accept rebirth on faith, since few adepts attain the threefold knowledge which includes retrocognition of past lives (pubbenivāsanussati-sāna) and clairvoyance (ñībbacakkhu) which enables one to see the rebirth of others. Besides, even if, for the sake of argument, it is granted that there have been those who acquired the three knowledge, this does not make the doctrine of rebirth and destruction of the āsavas verifiable in the usual sense for everybody. In fact, Buddhism is not an empiricism and is not even a doctrine in the sense of a set of verifiable propositions. No religion can make that claim. Religions do not provide knowledge as science does, although they may provide 'religious wisdom' which, however, cannot be defined in a set of propositions but may be embodied in practice, in the lives of religious people.

With the conclusions arrived at so far the author approaches the problem of 'The Deathless (amāra)' in the last chapter. Basically, it is a short enquiry into the nature of Nibbāna coupled with the problem of the difference between Nibbāna before and after death, the latter often being termed Parinibbāna. The author rejects attempts to prove from the texts that there is no difference between the two, a view which would allow the status of the Tathāgata after death to be understood as transcendental (possibly indicated by the fourth statement of the fourfold formula, namely that he 'neither is nor isn't'). So what does amāra mean in relation to Nibbāna? Certainly not 'endless life'. It simply means the destruction of the āsavas: the two expressions mean precisely the same, at least during the lifetime of the arahant. But what, then, is Parinibbāna? An immortal existence in a transcendental state has already been ruled out. Moreover, nowhere in the early Buddhist sources does the Buddha say anything about the afterlife of a Tathāgata. The word 'exists' does not apply here in any of the forms of the fourfold formula. One simply 'does not philosophize about the matter, because philosophizing is just another source of attachment'. That is, of course, the Buddhist stance, but the author himself feels, naturally, free to proceed further with the matter and maintains that there are textual considerations which point to the conclusion that implicitly, even if it is never explicitly stated, the early Buddhist position on Parinibbāna suggests the Tathāgata's extinction rather than continued existence after death. This is because a person is a composite of five aggregates (khandhas) and cannot continue in Nibbāna which is not a composite of any kind; and because consciousness (viññāna) depends on conditions, it does not continue in the absence of conditions: nothing whatever remains of a Tathāgata when Parinibbāna occurs. Why did not the early texts explicitly state that Parinibbāna is extinction? (1) To avoid putting forth views for argument and counterargument and (2) to avoid confusion with Gārvāka, the materialist, who believed in the extinction of everybody, whereas early Buddhism suggests that 'extinction must be earned by adherence to a religious path'. This sounds a strange interpretation and a gloomy prospect to work for over a period of many lives. Yet the author does allow what, to my mind, amounts to a rather extraordinary loophole. Because Parinibbāna, although being truly the extinction of the person - which rules out the belief in immortality as 'endless life' - is nevertheless amāra, the deathless, it allows, in fact, room for belief in 'eternal life' which is independent of death and, by way of the absence of composite personality and conditions, also presumably free of personal consciousness.

However, what kind of eternal life is it? The author does not elaborate and refers to Sutherland's theory of it which takes
Buddhist experiential hint, but Western affinity is primarily transfigured if not downright Divine consciousness. Are we not here depending on Advaita Vedanta? The term for ‘eternal life’ which is not ‘endless life’ and is beyond the limitations of time, space and any kind of conditions is there — brahman, the only true, unchanging reality. But brahman is identical with ātman (Pāli: atta), the inmost essence of man which is universal as the early Upaniṣads already proclaim, whilst the individual soul or jīvātman, the atta of the Buddhist anatta statements, is discarded in Advaita just as the empirical personality of the khandhas is discarded in Buddhism.

It may not be without irony that a highly skillful attempt to translate the important tenets of the Buddhist philosophy of life and salvation into the academic language of post-Wittgensteinian logical analysis finishes with a hint which to most Buddhists would be pointing in the direction of the most dreaded ‘heresy’, namely a variety of Atavāda. It only stresses what the author himself fully understands as the early Buddhist stance: the renunciation of philosophizing, at least about the ‘unanswered questions’. But even among Buddhists there are examples of the Atavāda: D.T. Suzuki is one, George Grimm another. However, it is possible to philosophize in Buddhism even about the unanswered questions of the early discourses without falling into the trap of Vedāntism. The great Mahāyāna schools of Mahāyāna and Vijñānabhaṣa and some other minor ones are a proof of that. It might even be profitable for the purpose of an academic analysis of the early teachings to consult the Mahāyāna philosophical developments if one wishes to bring out the implicit meaning of the early sources before resorting to the employment of modern European (in this case neo-Christian) philosophical concepts, although the latter method is in itself perfectly legitimate as well, despite exposing itself to criticism of the kind I have just indulged in.

So what is the merit of this book? It certainly succeeds in competently articulating the issues involved in the basic tenets of Buddhism, using the current Western idiom of logical analysis: the nature of the Buddhist view of life, the problem of consciousness and mind, the question of the feasibility of verification of rebirth and personal continuity across lives and the possible alternative interpretations of the final outcome of the Buddhist endeavours, Nibbāna. It thereby demonstrates that rational discussion of issues of Buddhist philosophy of the earliest period is possible in the context of modern academic research and that early Buddhism does not represent only a pre-logical stage in doctrinal system building in India. It also throws light on the claim of many Buddhist writers that Buddhism is an empirical doctrine, perhaps even on a par with science. There is, it is true, an affinity between Buddhist methodical approaches to the final result which is experiential and ultimately not based on faith (and here I disagree with the author) and between scientific procedures of verification: on this point Buddhism differs from other religions, particularly those which expect salvation through faith which usually cannot be experienced in this life, whereas Nibbāna can. But the author does have a point: the Buddhist ‘come and see’ is not of the same order as the scientific demonstrability of results for anybody to see which is what the Western notion of empiricism requires. The case histories on recognition collected by Ian Stevenson do not have that power of empirical proof and an arahant can only be recognised reliably by another arahant.

What it amounts to is that Buddhism, besides being a religion in the conventional sense on one level and a rationally graspable teaching on another, is above all a spiritual discipline with an outlook which points to transcendence. Science could come in only if scientists — individually, but in significant numbers — adopted methods leading to heightened perception, in the way advocated by Pītā Scāla for research into mysticism or by myself into Yoga. This might eventually push the frontiers of shared knowledge into the realm of transcendence. In the meantime the plunge is a matter of individual choice based on initial faith but motivated by the promise of individual verification by experience.
The author covers in his book only a small section of rationality in Buddhism and does not concern himself with the vast areas of the Buddhist system which are not open to direct rational scrutiny but do require elucidation from the angle of rationality. Every religion has such areas and it is philosophy of religion whose province it is to undertake their investigation. We cannot, of course, expect too much from a Ph.D dissertation, but we learn from the dust cover that the author's current research involves a synthesis of philosophy of religion and Pali Buddhist studies with a view to producing a philosophy of Buddhist religion. We can only wait and see.


THE BUDDHA'S REDEFINITION OF TAPAS (ASCETIC PRACTICE)

Ria Kloppenberg

The earliest religious literature of India refers to certain persons who abandoned life in society and their own family circle in order to search for release from the endless chain of birth and rebirth. Escape from the misery of Samsāra, it was thought, could be effected by following a special way of life in separation from the community, and by practising specific observances termed ascetic.

When speaking of 'ascetic', 'asceticism' etc. in this context we mean those individuals and groups which follow a special way of life; i.e. apart from what can be considered as the normal and accepted way of life in a community and which is characterised by adherence to strict rules regarding food, clothing, dwelling and communication with others, and by practising - usually temporarily - some prescribed observances which are designed to free the body and mind of the practitioner from physical, emotional and mental bonds, so as to prepare him or her for release and freedom. Mokṣa, muktir, nirvāṇa and other terms are used to denote this state.

The Vedas only incidentally mention ascetics, i.e. munis, 'silent ones' who were supposed to have mastered supernatural powers, like flying through the air and reading other people's thoughts. The rṣis, the inspired sages who inhabited the remoteness of the Himalayan ranges are, however, mentioned only briefly in these writings. The reason for their comparatively rare occurrence in Vedic literature seems to be connected with the fact that they formed a group which was clearly distinct from the dominant orthodox brahmins, the authors and commentators of these texts. It might be suggested, moreover, that most of those who deliberately placed themselves outside the Vedic social and religious system, thereby opposing the supremacy of the brahmins, belonged to the warrior (Kṣatriya) class with very few coming from the priestly elite.

During the era of the earlier Upaniṣads (7th-5th c.B.C.) these groups of ascetics gradually became more accepted, and the way towards salvation followed by them became better known
and practised, and by greater numbers. For them, the principal means to attain insight into the highest reality, which is called the release from mundane suffering and worldly bonds and the inner realisation of the ultimate unity of the microcosm and macrocosm, was by practising ṭapasya or sannyāsa, i.e. renunciation. It involved relinquishing the established social and religious structures, popularised by the Vedic cult and its social consequences, by the maintenance of the sacrificial fire in the home, by wearing the sacred thread (upavīta) and the tuft of hair (śikha). Those who intended to practise this kind of renunciation did so either individually or in groups. Among these a new style of religious life evolved, together with stricter rules for the ascetic life. Living in isolation outside a community was considered essential for breaking all bonds with Samsāra. Therefore, ascetics chose to live in a forest, in a deserted area or on the outskirts of towns or villages. Clothes were made of cast-off rags, leaves or of bark. The hair and beard were shaven or matted. Food was obtained from plants and roots or by begging.

One of the motives underlying the practice of such asceticism was based on their opposition to the rigid social structures and the strong discipline of the Vedic religion. A feeling of freedom from worldly cares and religious obligations is expressed many times in the literature of this period: as a reward for the hardships they took upon themselves. Another motive seems to have been the wish to attain supernatural powers. From the earliest times onwards, such an acquisition of supernatural powers was connected with the practice of acquiring ṭapas (‘heat’). It provided the ascetics with an opportunity to rise above the Brahminical, sacrificial priest; not only on the level of spiritual development, but also in their social status and in the eyes of the people. The ascetics who achieved their goals were considered more powerful than any other person in the universe; even the gods could be challenged and made subordinate to them.

The Dharmasastras tried to incorporate this kind of renunciation within the system of the stages of life (śārīra); i.e. as the last stage, that of the sannyāsīn: 'he abandons his house and family and does not take the sacrificial fire with him' (Apastamba Dharmasūtra) 1. Often he keeps a vow of silence. He is allowed to beg for food in the villages and to clothe himself with rags or walk naked (Manu VI, 41-58).

Apart from the practice of asceticism during the last stage of one's life, as is allowed by the Dharmasastras, it remained possible to cut one's ties with society and start one's search for insight at any time. Those who did so were called parivra-jakas, i.e. 'the wandering ones'. Some lived in a community whilst others wandered alone. Although they did not share identical ideas concerning the nature of the way towards insight and the state of release, they had many common characteristics. They all rejected the social system by leaving their places in society; i.e. by performing the pravrajyā - ceremony, thereby denouncing the symbols of brahminist supremacy, the upavīta, the śikha, the sacrificial fire and the Vedas. For a long time they were regarded as outlaws and were sharply opposed by householders and brahmans.

At the beginning of the 5th century B.C. they became the forerunners of the various heterodox groups which would emerge later in order to give an answer to the changed and changing, turbulent social, economic, political and cultural circumstances in Northeast India. During the lifetime of the Buddha, this ancient tradition of asceticism and the need to find new ways to shape and value the changed ways of life seemed to have reached its culmination. At the same time, we can see the emergence of ideas which would become closely related to this search for insight through a life of asceticism, namely, those emphasizing the importance of the individual and his personal way towards salvation.

Upon examination of the pre-Buddhist ascetic tradition, a development in the meaning given to the notion of ṭapast (ascetic practice') and in its practical elaboration can be clearly observed. Ṭapast originally was used to denote the, in principle, amoral, austere practice of ascetic observances by which the practitioner was considered capable of acquiring 'heat' (ṭapast). This would give him or her power; indeed, so much power that it enabled the practitioner to challenge the divine and thereby reach immortality and become deified. During the Upanisadic period, attempts were made to redefine the Vedic heritage in the light of the emerging individualistic interest: the Vedic sacrifices had to become 'internalised', the deeds, words and sacrifices being
performed in the meditator's mind and heart. A similar redefinition can be seen in the case of *tapas*: there was a tendency to 'internalise' the ascetic practices as well. This actually led to an intimate connection between asceticism and morality in the whole process of salvation; and also to a reinterpretation of the term, so that *tapas* became more closely related to meditation and the spiritual life.

In contrast to this development during the same period were the orthodox brahminical efforts to harmonise the aspect of social protest in 'leaving the established society in order to attain personal salvation' with the ideals of the Dharmasastras (which were being drafted in the later part of this period) and to bring it under orthodox control. In this process, the main emphasis is not placed on the individual and spiritual aspects of asceticism, but on its technical and social dimensions, on rules of conduct, behaviour, regulations for the contacts between ascetics and brahmins, special observances, food, clothing and other outward features. This should be understood against the background of the task the writers of the Dharmasastras had taken upon themselves, namely, to organise society according to orthodox religious beliefs and attitudes. They considered this organisation as an important condition for the individual to live in accordance with his or her dharma, which would eventually offer him or her a chance to attain perfection and immortality.

At the beginning of the Buddhist era, numerous groups of orthodox, but mostly heterodox, ascetics and wandering monks were found either living alone or following a leader, dwelling in the forests or wandering freely as mendicant monks. Buddhism, as well as Jainism, was inspired by their ideals of the religious life; ideals which emphasized the importance of withdrawal and introspection for the attainment of liberation. Both Buddhists and Jains considered that renunciation of life in the world was essential for the attainment of release. Thus, they continued the tradition which stressed the individual, solitary way towards enlightenment.

From the traditional accounts of the Buddha's life, it is clear that he himself had intimate personal experience with all the ascetic practices which were known and practised at that time. Therefore, he considered renunciation as an important first step on the way towards insight. Nevertheless, he rejected the ideals of austere asceticism and self-torture as well as the practice of ritual. In fact he proposed an alternative, namely, the so-called Middle Path, which was to lie between extreme asceticism on the one hand and worldly involvement on the other.

At this point, it is instructive to consider in detail the development and reinterpretation of the concept of *tapas* in the Pāli canonical writings.

In this process of reinterpretation several layers or levels can be distinguished which cannot always be clearly separated and sometimes overlap, but which do indeed indicate how an ancient concept and practice has been redefined to adapt to the new needs. This redefinition was not only possible because of the Buddha's personality and his efforts to present a religious way of life with primary emphasis on its individual and spiritual aspects, but was also a result of increasing popular criticism of the austere practices of brahminical and sectarian ascetics and, presumably, because the concept and the practice itself seem to have become more and more meaningless and reduced to the level of mere conformity. It can also be shown that this process of redefinition does not necessarily imply that the classical connotation of the concept actually disappeared. Also at a later stage, we can find both connotations and both interpretations of the same concept. It is interesting to see that the word *tapas* might then occur in the same text in its traditional meaning, which is disapproved of, as well as in its redefined meaning. It is because of this sometimes confusing use of the term that we might find the basis for the future developments of the concept and practice of asceticism in the history of Theravāda Buddhism. Therefore, we are repeatedly confronted with the results of the co-existence of these two interpretations: both the ancient one - more or less revised and adapted as the case may be - and the Buddha's reinterpretation, which in turn also becomes subject to later Buddhist criticism. This means that in the history of Buddhist monastic institutions we can still recognise the consequences of these earlier discussions. The possibility of choosing a particular ascetic observance has remained for individual monks. And in the history of the Theravāda we are regularly com-
fronted with the emergence of ascetic movements which, with their criticism of the traditional life of the Order (Sangha) and purification of the older interpretations of the ascetic life, created a tension, a dichotomy even, within these institutions.

The terms tapas ('asceticism, ascetic practice'), tapassīn ('ascetic'), samāna ('wandering ascetic') and similar, i.e. cognate terms have been redefined by the Buddha. This redefinition coincides with the redefinition of such terms as brahmāna ('brahmin') and brahmācāriya ('religious life', originally the celibate life of a Vedic student).

The Buddha himself is repeatedly called a samāna (e.g. D I 4,87; Sn 91,99; Vin I 8,350), as explained for example in DA I 246: 'In this connection samāna should be understood as: because of the fact that evil has been appeased (by him)' (tattha samitapāpattā samano ti veditabbo). And the commentator continues: 'For this has been said: Appeased are his evil, unwholesome, elements', etc. 'The Lord is one who has appeased evil by means of the highest noble (eighthfold) Path'.

Here we find not only the well-known and popular etymological connection of samāna (< V sram-), 'wanderer', with samita (< V sam-) 'appeased', but also one of the main emphases in the Buddha's redefinition in which he connects the ascetic life with the Noble Eightfold Path, the way towards insight and freedom which he has developed on the basis of his own personal experience with the ascetic life.

A similar definition of tapas can be found at Khp.A 151 where it is said that 'tapas means: he burns (tapati) the evil elements'. (Cp. also DA II 359, where tapas is explained as: 'he burns (tapati)'. This is the name of the energy which burns the defilements (kīlosa-santīpa-viriyassa 'etam nāmam'), which is a prerequisite for entering the way towards enlightenment).

There are several places in the Pāli canonical texts where a redefinition is made clear by placing side by side the two connotations: i.e. the traditional one (as criticised by the Buddha) and his own interpretation. In Vin I 233 (= Vin III 3; A IV 175 and 184 - note the regular recurrence of the passage), in a discussion with Śīha, a follower of the heretical sect of the Niganthas, the Buddha states: 'There is, Śīha, a way of speaking, by which one might, speaking truly, say of me: the samāna Gotama is who detests (jegucchi; namely evil); he teaches a doctrine of detestation by which he guides his followers.... There is, Śīha, a way of speaking, by which one might, speaking truly, say of me: the samāna Gotama is an ascetic (tapassānī); he teaches a doctrine of asceticism by which he guides his followers'.

Elaborating on this he also states (Vin I 234): 'And, Śīha, which is the way of speaking, by which one might, speaking truly, say of me: the samāna Gotama is an ascetic (tapassānī)? I, Śīha, say that the evil, unwholesome, elements are to be burned (tapānīya), bad conduct of the body, in speech and mind. For, Śīha, he whose evil, unwholesome, elements, which are to be burned, are eliminated, with roots cut off, uprooted like a palm tree, made unable to sprout again, having no elements left to come up again in the future, him I call an ascetic (tapassīn). And, Śīha, of the Tathāgata (the Buddha) the evil, unwholesome, elements...have been eliminated.... Therefore, Śīha, this is the way of speaking, by which one might, speaking truly, say of me: the samāna Gotama is an ascetic....'

A complete rejection of tapas can be found, e.g., in D III 232, where the practice of tapas is divided into four categories: (1) persons who practise asceticism on themselves; (2) those who (advise) it for others; (3) those who both practise it themselves and (advise) it for others; (4) those who neither practise it nor (advise) it for others. The first three categories are rejected whilst the fourth is considered as the one leading to Nibbāna in this very life.

Another passage where the criticism is clear is in S I 29. Here it is said that: 'Ascetics and brahmins practise a hundred years according to the five (?) Vedas, but their minds are not rightly released. They are of the nature of lowness and not going beyond (the suffering of Saṃsāra). Seized by desire, bound to observances and ethical rules, they practise a hundred years severe asceticism, but their minds.... There is no self-control for the one who loves pride, there is no ascetic quality for the one who is not concentrated, even when one lives in the forest alone, when one is careless, one may not reach beyond the realm of death.'
And again at S IV 117-8: 'They were fond of Dhamma and meditation, those brahmins who ancient tradition remembered, but (now) they, having deviated, say: “Let us recite”, and intoxicated by their family of birth they go forward on the wrong way. Overcome by anger, exceedingly violent, they fail among the weak and the strong: useless are they for the one who does not control himself, as the wealth a man has received in a dream. Fasting, sleeping on the ground, bathing early in the morning and (reciting) the three Vedas, (wearing) rough hides, with matted hair and dirt, (uttering) sacred syllables, following ethical rules and observances, using ascetic practices, hypocrisy, deceit, sticks, the various ritual uses of water, these are the characteristics of the brahmins, practised for some insignificant gain.'

And yet again at A II 200: 'Those ascetics and brahmins, Śīha, who profess that ascetic practice and disgust are a reason (for release), who see ascetic practice and disgust as essential, who adhere to ascetic practice and disgust, remain incapable of traversing the flood. For, Śīha, those ascetics and brahmins are endowed with an impure behaviour of body, speech and mind and with impure ways of living and therefore they are incapable of knowledge and insight, of the highest complete enlightenment.' 

Those monks who possess the traditional views of the ascetic life and use tapas thus, are also rebutted: 'The monk who practises the religious life, praying to some group of deities, thinking “I myself wish to become a god or some deity or other by using this observance, or by using ascetic practices, or by using the religious life”, his mind is not bent on zeal, on practice, on perseverance, on exertion' (A III 250).

In the Thera- and Therīgāthā we can also find the personal confessions of those monks and nuns who have attained the goal of liberation. Some speak of their former wrong practice of asceticism, e.g. Thag 219: 'Seeking purity by the wrong method, I tended the (sacrificial) fire in the wood. Not knowing the path of purity, I practised asceticism to gain immortality.' And again at Thag 283-5: 'For fifty-five years I wore dust and dirt; eating a meal once a month, I tore out my beard and hair. I stood on one leg, I avoided a seat. I ate dry dung and did not accept special food. Having done many such actions leading to a bad rebirth, being swept along by the great flood, I went to the Buddha as a refuge.' And Sn 901: 'Some trust in asceticism, some in detestation. And some in things they see or hear or feel: tall speakers are they, who continually talk about purifying and who thirst for becoming this or that.'

In other passages tapas is allowed in the sphere of personal choice; but it is limited to the norms of the Buddhist Order. And finally Thag 228-30: 'If one wishes to live happily, full of longing for the ascetic’s state, one should not despise the Order’s robe, nor its food and drink.

- one should make use of (the Order’s) lodging, as a snake a mousehole.
- one should be satisfied with whatever comes one’s way and develop the sole Doctrine.'

By rejecting the austere pre-Buddhist interpretation of tapas the Buddha became engaged in a discussion with other groups of samanas, who continued to emphasize the overall importance of the ascetic practices for the purification and destruction of the burden of former kamma, as the Jātins did (see, e.g., M II 214 and A I 220). Several times he is asked by other, concerned, ascetics why he rejects the traditional practice and interpretation. In D I 161-2 (= S IV 330) the naked ascetic Kasappa asks him: 'I have heard this, dear Gotama: "The samana Gotama disapproves of asceticism (tapas), he reproves and blames absolutely every ascetic (tapassin) who leads the hard life." Those, dear Gotama, who speak thus...were they repeating what has been said by Gotama and did they not accuse the Lord Gotama falsely? In reply the Buddha states that he indeed was quoted wrongly for: "I see, Kasappa, in this world, some ascetic or other who follows the hard way, and with my divine eye, which is pure and transcends the human (eye), I see that after the dissolution of the body, after death, he attains an unhappy, bad form of existence, a place of suffering and hell." Whereas one who follow-
ed the same hard way attains a good rebirth. In the same way, some who follow an ascetic life of less hardship can be seen attaining a bad rebirth as well as a good one. Therefore, 'How could I disapprove of all asceticism, and reprove and blame every ascetic who follows the hard way absolutely?'

A little later in their discussion Kassapa tells the Buddha (D I 165-6) that: 'There are, venerable Gotama, these kinds of ascetic practices (tapas) which are by some samanas and brahmins considered as (really) belonging to the state of a samana and to the state of a brahmin'. And he begins to give an interesting list of ascetic practices which can be quoted here to provide some idea of the kind of practices which they discussed (D I 165-7, cp. D III 40-2; M I 77ff; cf. Bollee 1971 and Dutoit 1903): 'The one who goes naked, who is of loose (impolite) habits, who licks his hands (after a meal), who does not accept food when on his almsround he is requested to come nearer or to wait, who does not accept food that is specially prepared for him, nor an invitation for a meal. Who does not accept food straight from the rim of the pot or pan, nor food that is placed within the threshold, nor among the faggots or the rice-pounders, nor when two people are eating, nor from a pregnant woman, or one who is feeding a baby, nor from a woman who has had intercourse with (another) man...'.

After this enumeration of restrictions for accepting food, Kassapa lists several prohibitions regarding the nature of the food (166): 'Who feeds (only) on herbs, on millet, on wild rice, on the skin of rice, on water-plants, on the powder of rice husks, on the flour of oil-seeds, on grass, on cowdung, on roots and fruits from the forest, or on fallen fruits only'.

Then the ways in which various ascetics clothe themselves are enumerated (166-7): 'who wear clothes of hemp, of different materials together, of rags taken from corpses, made of refuse-rags, made of bark, of antelope-hide, of strips of hide, of kusa grass, of bark, of strips of wood, of human hair, of animal hair, of owl's feathers...'.

And regarding bodily conduct (167): 'who plucks out his hair and beard, who stands upright, refusing to sit, who squats, who sleeps on a bed consisting of iron or natural pins covered with a skin, ... on a plank, ... on the bare ground, ... always on one side, who "wears" dust and dirt, who lives in the open air, who accepts any seat offered to him, who lives on dirty food (dung, clay, urine, ashes), who refuses to drink cold water, who goes down to the water to wash away this evil three times a night'.

The Buddha's answer to Kassapa's question of whether one can truly speak of ascetics in these cases is clear (167): 'If he practises this nakedness etc. and has not his attainment of morality (sila), of the cultivation of the mind by meditation and of wisdom cultivated and realised, then he is far away from either the state of an ascetic or the state of a brahmin.' And again he redefines the concept: 'But, Kassapa, from the moment that a monk (bhikkhu) [note that now he does not speak of a samana or brahmana but of a bhikkhu, a member of the Buddhist order] cultivates a loving mind, without enmity or ill-will, and having himself realised and experienced, by the destruction of the evil influences (of sensual desires, of the wish to live forever, of ignorance), the freedom of mind which is without evil influences and the freedom of wisdom in this very life, and remains in this state, this monk, Kassapa, is called a samana, a brahmin!'

In the course of this discussion, Kassapa emphasizes the difficult life of the ascetic, whereupon the Buddha replies (168): 'It is a common saying, Kassapa, in the world - "Difficult to practise is asceticism"... But it would not be right to call it difficult if only the application of ascetic practices is meant'. In fact, anyone, even a slave-girl, can decide to practise one of those observances. 'But as, apart from these ascetic practices, the life of an ascetic or brahmin is hard, very hard to live, then one is justified in saying that the life of an ascetic or brahmin is hard to live'. He also speaks of the bhikkhu who cultivates a loving mind and destroys the evil influences by following the Middle Path as an example of the true ascetic way of life.

Here the Buddha mentions the development of a loving mind (metacitta) which is free from enmity and ill-will, as a first phase of the true ascetic way of life. There are other proofs that he deliberately emphasized this loving mind in his new
interpretation of tapas. It seems to be a first attempt to incorporate social emotions in the - formerly and by nature - rather anti-social practice of asceticism. See, e.g., D II 49 and Dhp 184 (cp. A III 371) where we find this verse:

'Forbearance (khantí) is the highest tapas, endurance, Nibbāna is the highest of all, say the Buddhas. For he who has entered the religious life is not one who injures others, a samana is not one who hurts another person.'

The commentator (DA II 478) connects the injunction not to injure by a samana with the popular etymology of the word (pápanam samitattā samano ti: 'he is a samana because he has quietened (sama) the evil elements'): 'He is not one who hurts another person. Why? Because he is not quieting (his evil elements) by hurting (others)'. So tapas is presented here as a means to quieten down, also in combination with loving-kindness (metta) and forbearance (khanti), the mental disturbances which make the practice of meditation impossible.

Another passage in which the Buddha speaks of his new interpretation is described in D III 40–52. Here, the question posed by the wandering ascetic Nigrodha is (40): 'We, venerable one, remain professing asceticism and detestation (jignuca; namely, of evil influences and those mental states that oppose the endeavour to attain enlightenment), for us asceticism and detestation are essential, we adhere to asceticism and detestation. When, venerable one, are asceticism and detestation complete, when incomplete?'

Then the Buddha enumerates all the types and practices of asceticism which he knew and asks Nigrodha (42): 'What do you think, Nigrodha? When they are like this are asceticism and detestation complete or incomplete?' 'If they are like this they certainly are complete and not incomplete'. 'I, Nigrodha, declare that there are various defects (upakkilesa) in the asceticism and detestation which you call complete'. He then enumerates sixteen 'defects' which he has noticed in ascetics (D III 42–5):

1. An ascetic is content with this achievement and considers his purpose fulfilled.

2. On the basis of that feeling he exalts himself and despises others (cp. also M III 37–45 where it is stated that the pride of the ascetic who exalts himself and disparages others because of his ascetic achievement is the first reason for rejecting tapas, whereas the true ascetic will always remember that others who do not practise his type of asceticism, or follow no ascetic way of life, can also be considered as persons capable of living according to the Doctrine).

3. He is so enthralled by his ascetic practices that he becomes careless.

4. By his practice of asceticism he receives possessions, honour and fame and, content with these, considers his purpose to be fulfilled.

5. On the basis of that he exalts himself and despises others.

6. He is enthralled by his possessions, honour and fame.

7. He becomes faddy with his food: 'This seems nice to me, that does not', and gives up wanting what does not seem nice and becomes greedy for what seems nice.

8. He practises asceticism out of a desire for profit, honour and fame.

9. He accuses his fellow samanas or brahmins of living in abundance and eating all.

10. When he sees another samana or brahmin being honoured in families, he vents his anger towards those families and adopts a selfish attitude towards them.

11. He lies down visibly (for the laypeople to see).

12. Or he does not show himself, whilst pretending to practise.

13. He resorts to some hidden fault. When being asked: 'Is this approved of?', he replies, knowing it is not approved of, 'It is', and vice versa, thus deliberately telling lies.

14. He does not acknowledge the Dhamma of the Tathāgata or of a disciple of the Tathāgata who preaches it as it is, as well as the instruction that is to be appreciated.

15. He is angry and grudging.

16. He is hypocritical, spiteful, envious, selfish, treacherous, deceitful, hardened or proud, wishing for the evil of evils, overwhelmed by his desires, of false views, allied with wrong views, infected with worldliness, holding his own position and he is one who finds renunciation difficult.
Then follow the sixteen opposite characteristics of the true ascetic (D III 45-8), which are called pure but do not lead to the highest or the essence (insight). The attainment of this level of ascetic practices and detestation, even if they are pure or complete, is compared to the attainment of the outside of the bark of a tree. On the question whether it is possible to attain the highest and the essence by means of asceticism, the Buddha offers his eightfold Middle Path as the only method of achieving that aim (D III 48ff.), which he explains here as consisting of:

(i) Morality, the basic ethical rules.
(ii) Resorting to a solitary place, a forest, the root of a tree, a mountain cave, and sitting there practising mindfulness (sati). (By the practice of mindfulness the Five Hindrances (nivarana) for further spiritual development will be overcome, namely, covetousness, malevolence, sloth and torpor, excitement, worry and doubt.)
(iii) When the hindrances have been destroyed, lovingkindness should be practised, as well as compassion, sympathy and equanimity, the four so-called Immeasurable States, which Conze (1962: 80ff.; Kloppenborg 1983) calls the social emotions of Buddhist practice. On this level, the highest and essence has not yet been attained. The practice is pure, but the attainment is compared with the attainment of the inside of the bark of a tree.
(iv) Next comes the attainment of the so-called Higher Knowledge: the remembrance of one's former existences. The practice is pure but the essential has not yet been attained. The attainment is compared to that of the wood surrounding the pith of the tree, inside the bark.
(v) The following level provides the ascetic with another Higher Knowledge, the 'divine eye', by which he sees the mechanism of the cycle of rebirth of other people. This can finally be considered as pure as well as leading to the essential (the pith).

The Buddha himself experienced many varieties of asceticism in the period preceding his final enlightenment. He speaks about these experiences in several passages, e.g. M I 77 where he declares: 'I, Sāriputta, being a practitioner, fully understand the religious life with its four aspects: (i) I became an ascetic (tapassin), the foremost ascetic, (ii) I became one who chose the hard life (whereby the body is not taken care of at all), the foremost of those..., (iii) I became one who was disgusted (with evil), the foremost of those..., (iv) I became one who chose a solitary life, the foremost of those...'. Speaking of his own practice of tapas, he gives a similar list of practices as the one quoted above: severe restrictions in eating, living, clothing etc. And he concludes (M I 81): 'Even by this behaviour, Sāriputta, by this method, by this hard practice, I did not reach the transcendentual conditions, the distinction of the truly noble knowledge and insight. And why? By this (method) there is no attainment of the noble wisdom which, when attained, is noble, leading to salvation and leads, for the doer thereof, to right destruction of suffering.'

S I 103 gives a discussion of the Buddha shortly after his enlightenment when he expressed his joy on finally attaining freedom and insight. Mara (Death), who adopts the stance of the defender of traditional asceticism, remarks: 'Having abandoned the ascetic practices, whereby young men are purified, the impure thinks he is pure, whereas (in reality) he had left the way towards purity.' And the Buddha replies: 'Having come to know that it belongs to the useless, whatever ascetic practice there is, it brings no good at all, like oar and rudder in a ship on land; (but) morality, meditation and wisdom produce the way towards insight.
I have attained the highest purity. You are slain, Death!'

In M I 27ff., he offers his new interpretation of the career of samanas and brāhmaṇas, which can be equated with the Eightfold Path: 'As samanas, samanas, monks, do the people know you, and you, when you have been asked "Who are you?", should acknowledge, "We are samanas... And what, monks, are the things that are tasks of samanas and brāhmaṇas?" Yet again he incorporates the practice of tapas, i.e. the life of a samana, within the Eightfold Path, which is condition for meditation and insight which follows. Cf. also D II 151: 'In which doctrine and practice, Subhadda, the Noble Eightfold Path is not found, therein also a samana
is not found.'

So *samana*-ship means:

1. Being endowed with modesty and shame.
2. The conduct of the body should be pure and controlled.
3. The ways of speech should be pure and controlled.
4. The ways of the mind should be pure and controlled.
5. The way of living should be pure and controlled.
6. The guarding of the doors of the senses.
7. Moderation in eating.
8. Intent on watchfulness.

When these conditions of the ascetic life have been fulfilled, the actual search for insight can commence: i.e. by choosing a solitary place and practising mindfulness, thereby destroying the Five Hindrances. This prepares the way for the final meditations (*jhānas*) which will lead to the attainment of the Higher Knowledge and arahantship; or the knowledge of final release: *'Birth is destroyed, the religious life is practised, done is what was to be done, I know no other existence beyond this one'* (M I 280).

In another discourse on the same subject (M I 281-5), the Buddha tackles the same problem from another point of view: (281) *'How, monks, does a monk (bhikkhu) become one who does not follow the practice that is proper for a samana?'* He then gives a list of negative moral characteristics which a monk was hitherto unable to overcome. The main point of asceticism is, then, to overcome them. *'Monks, I do not say that the ascetic way of life of one who wears a robe depends solely on his wearing of the robe. Monks, I do not say that the ascetic way of life of one who goes naked depends solely on his going naked. Monks, I do not say that the ascetic way of life of one who lives in dust and dirt depends solely on his living in dust and dirt. Monks, I do not say that the ascetic way of life of one who lives at the foot of a tree... in the open...of one who stands erect...of one who feeds only at regular intervals...of one who meditates on sacred syllables... of one who wears matted hair depends solely on his wearing of matted hair....'*

'So, monks, I see someone who wears a robe etc., who is covetous, with a malevolent mind, angry, grudging, hypocritical, spiteful, jealous, greedy, fraudulent, deceitful, with evil desire, with wrong views, therefore I do not say that the ascetic way of life of one who wears a robe, etc., depends solely on his wearing of the robe.' (cp. Carrithers 1983: 62-66).

Passages can also be found where the words *tapas* and *sama- na* are used in an approved sense, without the usual discussion and explanation. They often occur in parts of the Canon which contain descriptions of the lifestyle of monks and nuns, and seem to have accepted the new interpretation to a certain degree. Sn 267 - Khp 3 says: *'Ascetic practices and the religious life, insight into the Noble Truths, and the realisation of Nibbāna, this is the highest good.'*

Here too the right sequence, also according to the Commentary (Khp I 151-2) is: *tapas → destruction of hindrances → meditation → insight.*

Some verses in the Suttanipāta, as well as in the Theragāthā, are of the same kind; e.g. Sn 655 - Thag 631: *'By ascetic practice, by the religious life, by self-control and self-restraint, by this one becomes a brahmin. This is the highest state of being a brahmin.'* (Note the occurrence here of three new interpretations: of *tapas*, of *brahmācārya* and of *brāhmaṇa*.)

The Suttanipāta verses (the Khaggavisāṇa Sutta first) and the Theragāthā especially exalt the solitude of the ascetic, his life in the forest, his self-restraint, his disgust for the impermanent and the worldly, and his struggle for emancipation.

Here are some relevant examples:

*Thāg 329 - 'May that intention of yours, which you seek, prosper, Sundari. Leftover scraps and gleanings (as food) and a rag from a dustheap as a robe, these are sufficient. (You will be) without evil influences in the next world.'*

*Thāg 312-3* (cp. Thāg 223) - *'Let this body be broken willingly, let the lumps of flesh be dissolved, let both my legs fall down on the knee-joints. I shall not eat, I shall not drink, nor shall I go forth from my cell. I shall not even lie down on my side so long as the dart of craving is not removed.'* (asamana-s according to the new norms) *Thāg 285 - 'Lady, you fell asleep saying "Ascetics": you woke up saying "Ascetics", you...
praise only ascetics; assuredly you will be an ascetic. You bestow much food and drink upon ascetics, Rāhunī. Now I ask you: why are ascetics dear to you?

(The popular rejection) 'They are not dutiful, lazy, living on what is given by others, full of expectation, desirous of sweet things; why...?'

(The new views) 'Truly for a long time you have been questioning me about ascetics, father. I shall praise to you their wisdom, virtuous conduct and effort. They are dutiful, not lazy, doers of the best of action. They abandon desire and hatred; therefore ascetics are dear to me. They shake off the three roots of evil doing pure actions; all their evil is eliminated. Therefore... They are spotless like mother-of-pearl, purified inside and out, full of good mental states. Therefore...

Having great learning, expert in the doctrine, noble, living in accordance with the doctrine; they teach the goal and the doctrine. Therefore....

Having ... doctrine; with intent minds, they are possessed of mindfulness. Therefore....

Travelling far, possessed of mindfulness, speaking in moderation, not conceited, they comprehend the end of pain. Therefore.... If they go from any village they do not look back (longingly) at anything; they go without longing indeed. Therefore.... They do not deposit their property in a storeroom, nor in a pot, nor in a basket, (rather) seeking that which is cooked. Therefore....

They do not take gold, coined or uncoined, or silver: they live by means of whatever turns up. Therefore....

Those who have gone forth are of various families and from various countries; (nevertheless) they are friendly to one another. Therefore ascetics are dear to me.'

Although discussions about the redefinition of asceticism seem to have been intense and well-known, the ideal of the solitary recluse, not only during the preparatory phase preceding the practice of meditation, but as a special way of life, remained present in the minds of many who entered the religious life under the Buddha's guidance.

His unwillingness to make several ascetic rules obligatory for all monks, as had been asked e.g. by Devadatta, illustrates

The Buddha's Redefinition of 'Tapas'

one of the main problems in the early community. Devadatta wanted the monks to live in the forest, to feed upon begged food, to wear cast-off rags, to sit and rest at the foot of a tree, and to abstain from eating fish and meat. However, the Buddha refused to make these rules compulsory for all and allowed only individual monks, who expressed the wish, to practise them. Those who anticipated a life of asceticism by joining the Sākyaputta Samanās, were opposed to the flexible and moderate way of life of the monks. It appears that the Buddha at first did not wish the Order to be subject to too many rules; rather, he regarded it as more of a community in which individuals could work out their own salvation.

For those who preferred the life of a solitary recluse, he sanctioned a loophole: they could follow their particular choice of ascetic practice after ordination or at least after having received some instruction; but then with the obligation to remain in contact with the rest of the Order by attending the uposatha ceremony. The therī Mahākaśyapa, who had a great reputation for wisdom and was held in high esteem, was the first of those who chose to make retreat into this kind of solitary asceticism. Not seldom did he complain about the decay of the ascetic tradition: 'Formerly the monks lived in the forest... on begged food... with rags as clothes; they possessed only three garments... were not desirous... were satisfied... living solitarily without social contacts.... But now the more no longer practise these virtues' (S II 208-9).

In contrast to earlier criticism of the ancient ascetics, which concentrated on the futility of their outward activities, the criticism now focussed on the worldly involvement of the monks. This created such an unease as to have unbalanced some of the monks. In fact, it is a criticism of the relative freedom which the Buddha's alternative ascetic way of life allowed and of the encouragement of the social interests of the monks. The following quotation is clearly a criticism of the 'easy' way of life of most of the monks when compared with the earlier, stricter observance of asceticism, which has also been accepted as belonging to the Eightfold Path, e.g. Thag 920-45:

'The behaviour of the bhikkhus now seems different from when
Buddhist the protector of the world, the best of men, was alive. (There was) protection from the wind, a loin-cloth as covering for their modesty; they ate moderately, satisfied with whatever came their way. If it were rich food or dry, little or much, they ate it to keep alive, not being greedy, not clinging to it. They were not very eager for the necessities of life, for medicines and requisites, as they were for the annihilation of the evil influences ( \textit{asava}). In the forest, at the foot of trees, in caves and grottoes, devoting themselves to seclusion, they dwelt making that their aim, devoted to lowly things \textit{\textsuperscript{6}}, of frugal ways, gentle, with unstubborn minds, uncontaminated, not garrulous, intent upon thinking about their goal. Therefore their gait, eating, and practices were pious; their deportment was smooth, like a stream of oil. Now these elders with all evil influences completely annihilated, great meditators, great benefactors, have attained \textit{Nibb\~ana}. Now there are few such men...'.

From this and similar passages in the Canon, it can be concluded that the earlier way of life of the Buddhist \textit{samana}s, which were in accordance with the ancient ascetic practices, was, by virtue of the reinterpretation of \textit{tapas} and \textit{samana}, already changing in the time of the Buddha. The development was increasingly towards a communal life, which was more open to the outside world. This was considered by some as both the result of and, simultaneously, the cause of a weakening of spiritual values. Mah\~akassapa's complaint, for instance, recurs frequently in the history of the Therav\~ada.

Traces of the earlier ascetic tendencies have been left in the Buddhist texts. One important trace is found in the descriptions of the figure of the Paccekabuddha. As I have dealt with this subject elsewhere (Kloppenburg 1974 and 1983), I would like to confine myself here to those observations that are relevant to this particular subject. In the figure of the Paccekabuddha ('who is enlightened by and for himself'), who was supposed to have attained insight during a period in which the Dhamma had not been preached, the earlier ascetic tradition has found its continuity in another form. His individual way of life, his solitariness, going (the way) which had to be gone alone, his silence regarding those revelations which cannot be transmitted, his superior, condescending attitude in his contact with the people who feared his curses and supernatural powers, his subtle, indirect way of inspiring others to start on the way to liberation, all these are characteristics of pre-Buddhist Indian ascetics as well. What makes him 'Buddhist' is that we do not find a reference to his use of any of the austere 'external' ascetic practices which the Buddha rejected.

The conviction that the Way can only be followed individually and that the truth can only be recognised by the one who strives for it by adhering to a special and necessarily ascetic way of life, belong to the Indian ascetic tradition. They recur in the Buddhist texts in connection with the Paccekabuddha. By thus giving the ascetic tradition and the pre-Buddhist ascetics a place within the scriptures in the form of the Paccekabuddha, the validity of their attainment, which means the validity of the attainment of pre-Buddhist ascetics, was affirmed. And part of this asceticism and individualism was included in Buddhism. This has, for instance, been expressed in the canonical descriptions of the \textit{dhutanga}, 'the expedients to shake off (the defilements)', as advocated by Mah\~akassapa and others after him.

Buddhaghosa deals with them extensively in his \textit{Vism}, ch. II, pp.71-3. They are enumerated as follows: to clothe oneself in cast-off rags, to wear only three robes, to beg for food, to go from house to house during the round of alms-begging, to eat only once a day, to eat only what is collected in one begging-bowl, to take no second meal, to live in the forest, to rest at the foot of a tree, to live under the sky, to live in a cemetery, to pass the night at the place where one happens to be, to sleep in a sitting position. According to Buddhaghosa, a monk can, after having consulted his teacher, choose from this list of ascetic observances one or two which attract him or agree with his character. Since many of the rules, however, no longer fitted into the pattern of living as it had developed in the monasteries in Buddhaghosa's time (5th c. A.C.), those who wished to practise, e.g., \textit{aran\~naka}, living in the forest, or \textit{pamsukulika}, to clothe oneself in cast-off rags, usually left the monastery to live the ascetic life in individual huts.
in the forest or in remoter areas. Some just wandered around.

The scope of this article does not allow for the elaboration of later developments in Theravāda practice, which are based on this choice in favour of the renovation and reinterpretation of asceticism and ascetic practice by the Buddha, the discussions and the reactions thus evoked and on the process of interaction between this proposal for reinterpretation and the earlier practice (cp. Kloppenborg 1981; see also Silber 1981, Ṛṣaṭṭhivako 1980, Carrithers 1979, Yalman 1962).

The Buddha's reinterpretation of asceticism has proved to have given Buddhist practice and Buddhist monastic life the necessary new outlook on living the religious life in a community: withdrawn but also interacting with others, inside as well as outside the religious community, with monks and nuns as well as with the laity, with Buddhists as well as with non-Buddhists. This might very well have contributed to the vitality of the Buddhist tradition. It included a new interpretation of spiritual life by emphasizing the necessity of knowing and controlling one's mental and emotional states in the struggle against the suffering which results from wrong desires and ignorance.

This was a strengthening and a redirecting of the individual's concern for release and salvation which had begun to emerge in the early Upaniṣadic period. By doing so, the Buddha offered his contemporaries, who were confronted by the psychological problems of the transition from a closed agricultural society to a more open and pluralist society, characterized by the advent of cities, crafts, a monetary economy, trade and increasing political involvement, a newly adapted world-view together with a means of escape from worldly turmoil in order to attain personal rest and release. In the history of Buddhism it has, up to the present day, retained its attraction to many who felt the need to escape from the burden of life in society, from pain, and to realise their own inner stillness and freedom. The reinterpretation of the Buddha was a result of his evaluation of his own experiences with ascetic practices and meditations. That personal experience is his main argument for them and has been accepted by his followers as a sound argument. Did he not present himself as a therapist, rather than as a teacher of theoretician; did not his followers expect his guidance as they sought to find their personal way towards salvation?

The space which he created for the individual choice of the religious life made it possible for traditional ascetic practice to continue amongst monks and nuns. We can still find it in the list of dhutanga. The historical continuity of two "ways" within the Buddhist Order, i.e. the monastic and the socially involved way, which developed out of the earlier community, as well as the ascetic way, which emphasizes the individual, solitary path, have also been noted. The asceticism found among these last groups or individuals never really conflicted with the Buddha's new interpretation: though it is not congruent with the way of life of the established monastic Order as it developed in the Theravāda, despite its basis in the reinterpretation of the Buddha.

**NOTES**


3. The ethical and social norm, laid down in the Vedas and worked out in the Dharmaśūtras and Dharmaśāstras, stating a person's duties in society and religion.

4. The translations of the Theragāthā and Therigāthā are by Norman 1969 and 1971.

5. Greed (lobha), delusion (moha) and hatred (dosa).

6. The Commentary explains: 'devoted to humble things', i.e. cast-off rags, begged food etc.

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A CONVERSATION WITH KING PASENADI

John D. Ireland

Pasenadi, the king of Kosala, is often represented as meeting the Buddha and having various conversations with him. The gradual development of the king’s faith in the Buddha can be traced in the Pali suttas. However, there is one sutta in particular that contains some unusual features which emerge upon a careful study of it. This is the Kannakatthala Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya (M 90). Superficially, this sutta is not all that interesting doctrinally since no complex or profound teaching is expounded. It merely contains the answers to some questions about caste and the existence of devas posed by King Pasenadi.

Here is a synopsis of it:

The Discourse at Kannakatthala

The Lord is staying in the deer-park at Kannakatthala and King Pasenadi has arrived nearby upon some business. The king sends a message to the Lord proposing to visit him after he (the king) has finished his meal. The sisters Somā and Sakulā, who are said to be wives of the king but are not mentioned elsewhere, ask the king to convey their respectful greetings to the Lord. When the king passes on the message of Somā and Sakulā to the Lord, the Lord queries why they could not have sent someone else. The king then asks if what has been reported as a statement by the Lord denying human omniscience is true. The Lord says it is not true and he has been misrepresented. The king then turns to Vidudabha, his son and commander-in-chief of the army, asking who brought this topic of conversation into the palace. Vidudabha says it was the brahmin Sañjaya of the Akasa clan and the king immediately sends someone off to summon Sañjaya into the king’s presence.

Meanwhile, having for the present dealt with this subject of omniscience, the king asks a question about the four castes: Is there any distinction and difference between them? The Lord replies that there is a distinction in the mode of address and respect for the two higher castes, but the king says this is
not what he meant. He is not asking about the 'here and now', but about the 'future'. The Lord then discourses on the five qualities for attaining: having faith, good health, not being deceitful and possessing energy and wisdom. Having these qualities one may attain freedom from suffering to whatever caste one belongs. Thus there is no difference between the four castes in this respect. The similes are given of the trained and untrained elephant, etc., and that fire can be produced from dry sticks of different kinds of wood.

The king next asks, 'Are there superior devas (adhideva),'# instead of replying the Lord repeats the question adding, 'Why do you ask?' The king then says, 'Are these superior devas returners to this state or are they not returners?' The Lord replies, 'Whatever devas are malevolent (savābha) will be returners, whatever devas are non-malevolent will not be returners.'

At this point the commander-in-chief, Viñgūdabha, enters the conversation asking if those superior devas who are malevolent and returners could drive out or banish those who are non-malevolent and non-returners. The venerable Ananda then interposes to answer Viñgūdabha, claiming that he stands in the same relationship to the Buddha as Viñgūdabha does to the king. Ananda says this cannot be as those superior devas who are malevolent cannot even see those other devas, they are outside their sphere of influence, just as the devas of the heaven of the Thirty-three are beyond the jurisdiction of King Pasenadī. The king is delighted with Ananda's answer, asks who he may be and praises him. He then asks another question, this time about the existence of superior brahmans (adhibrahma). Again the Lord repeats the question and again the king continues by asking whether they are returners or not. The Lord replies in the same way: it depends upon whether they are malevolent or not. The brahmin Sañjaya then arrives and the king asks who brought that topic of conversation into the palace. Sañjaya says it was Viñgūdabha, but before this question can be resolved an attendant tells the king his carriage is ready. The king then breaks off the conversation, thanks the Lord for fully answering all his questions and departs.

One of the peculiarities of this sutta has been dealt with by K.R. Norman who draws attention to the somewhat rare words adsideva and adhibrahma: a superior deva, a superior brahma. However, his suggestion that the Buddha does not immediately reply to the king's question on the existence of adidevas because he was uncertain what Pasenadī was getting at seems unlikely. The Buddha is represented as always understanding his questioner. Although he does sometimes refuse to answer or put a counter-question when the question has been wrongly framed, the Buddha can never be caught out as ignorant or confused by a question. That the king framed the question wrongly is more likely, but in this context I think not. Nor do I believe the king is referring to those on the third stage of the Noble Path, anāgāmins, non-returners, when he asks about those devas returning or not. Nowhere else are ānāgāmins divided into two types as devas and brahmans. I think the king formulated his questions with a different aim in view, suggested by his use of the term adideva (and later adhibrahma), the precise meaning of which must remain in doubt. However, the Buddha, perhaps deliberately ignoring any distinction there may be between the terms deva and adideva, keeps to his own terms of reference. That is, the difference between a returner and a non-returner is a spiritual distinction, shown by the introduction of the idea of having malevolence or not. Malevolence is the fifth of the five lower fetters (nāmapajāna) and the absence of this implies the absence of the others too and hence the attainment of the path of non-return for the āriya-puggalā.

On the face of it, Pasenadī's question, 'Are there adidevas?' is absurd for, as Norman points out, as a king (rajā), Pasenadī is himself a deva and an adideva, being a mahārāja, a superior or 'great king' with lesser kings submitting to his rule. The Buddha too is an adideva and adhibrahma in his spiritual role. And then there are devas and brahmans by birth in the heavenly realms. That the king is already aware of the existence of the latter is affirmed by Viñgūdabha when questioned by Ananda. It is unlikely that he is referring to the Buddha and his further reference to adidevas as returners or not may possibly be assumed to refer to heavenly devas. But perhaps after all he is referring to human devas, to himself and his like, although
ostensibly talking about the heavenly kind, or so it has been assumed. If heavenly devas are returners to this world they become men, losing their deva-status. The loss of the deva-status of a king means he has been deposed, his throne has been usurped. That the king is asking the Buddha how best he may maintain and preserve his position is made possible by the further question of Viḍūḍabha in which he directly refers to driving out and banishment. The contention is that this is one of the purposes of the king's questioning the Buddha: the eliciting of a response from Viḍūḍabha. Is the commander-in-chief honest and reliable? Is he malevolent or not? Is he a threat to the king? Pasenadi gets an answer to his problem upon the arrival of the brahmin Sañjaya and his reply to the question. The king immediately makes a diplomatic exit with the carriage conveniently ready on cue to carry him away.

From commentarial sources we learn that Viḍūḍabha did in fact later depose Pasenadi and become king and had considerable antipathy towards the Sakyas. Pasenadi was tricked by the Sakyas into taking as a wife the daughter of a slave-woman (instead of the pure-born woman as he was led to believe), and this wife became the mother of Viḍūḍabha. This was only discovered many years later when Viḍūḍabha went to visit his Sakaian relations. The main event of Viḍūḍabha's reign was his revenge for the insult by slaughtering the Sakyas. In view of this, Pasenadi's questioning the Buddha about the distinction of the four castes would have been a sensitive issue both for himself and Viḍūḍabha. Assuming the Buddha understood what was afoot, he would have shown his reluctance to be drawn into the debate by the delaying tactic of the counter-question, but then replies on a purely ethical level. Ānanda's reply to Viḍūḍabha suggests he may have misunderstood the question, or else he is deliberately diverting it on to another plane. Pasenadi's praise of Ānanda is effusive and genuine so perhaps Ānanda's intervention diverts a possible dangerous situation from developing into open confrontation. Another possibility is that Ānanda is giving a rebuke to Viḍūḍabha, saying in effect that the Buddha is so superior to him (Ānanda), i.e., beyond his sphere, that he would not even consider taking his place. And that Viḍūḍabha's relationship to Pasenadi should be considered in the same way. No wonder the king is delighted and signals his approval.

The appearance of the brahmin Sañjaya, which leaves apparently unresolved the question of who brought that topic of the Buddha's omniscience into the palace, both Viḍūḍabha and Sañjaya blaming each other, is curious. Why should it be left unresolved? But perhaps it does, after all, answer an unasked or implied question of the king as suggested above.

This sutta was not fully understood from the earliest times. There was textual confusion concerning the word 'adhidēva' as Norman has pointed out. And there is missing information, such as that regarding Somā and Sakulā, who are only called wives of the king by the commentary. There are similar situations in the Pāli Canon where background information is lacking, but is supplied by the Commentaries. However, we have no way of knowing how accurate the commentarial explanations are and often they are circumstantially suspect. It is probable that this background knowledge was widely available at the time when these suttas were composed. As, by the time the commentaries were compiled in distant Ceylon, this knowledge was even then lacking, there is no way we can ever hope to recover it today. So, all that has been said and suggested here is pure surmise.

NOTES

1 To visit immediately after a meal is unusual (an 'improper time') and suggests a certain urgency about the visit. Or else it implies the king is so busy with state affairs this is the only time available.
4 See M.M.J. Harasinghe Gods in Early Buddhism, Vidyalankara 1974, and his treatment of this sutta.
5 All devas and brahmans, even the highest - except anāgāmis who are a special case - will eventually fall or return from their heavenly position because of the universal law of impermanence.
EKOTTARAGAMA (XI)

traduit de la version chinoise par
Thich Huyn-Vi
Pancicule sixième
Partie 13
Recevoir des offrandes

1. 'Ainsi ai-je entendu. Une fois, quand le Bouddha résidait à Sāvatthi, dans le bois de Jeta, au parc d'Anāthapindada, le Bienheureux disait aux bhiksū: Recevoir des offrandes n'est pas facile parce qu'il peut vous empêcher de parvenir à l'état du Non-agir (anāgārtha). Pourquoi? Supposons le cas du bhikṣu Surata qui n'a pas la convoitise des offrandes, qui, étant imprégné de la doctrine, ne quitte jamais les trois vêtements reliques pour s'installer chez un laïc. Le bhikṣu Surata a pratiqué comme l'āranyaka; il observe l'horaire pour aller manger sa nourriture, pour rester assis et méditer, il ne mange qu'à midi, il s'assoit souvent au pied d'un arbre ou dans un endroit calme, il porte l'habit à cinq pièces et les autres trois vêtements religieux, il aime rester seul dans un cimetière pour méditer. Pendant qu'il pratique ainsi l'ascétisme, il reçoit un jour de riches plats savoureux offerts par le roi. Le bhikṣu apprécie beaucoup ces aliments délicieux, les aime bien, et commence à relâcher les pratiques religieuses comme celle-là de l'āranyaka. Il abandonne au fur et à mesure les bonnes habitudes, et enfin les trois vêtements religieux pour reprendre la vie mondaine. Il tue d'innumérables animaux pour sa nourriture et sa gourmandise. Après sa mort il se retrouve en enfer.

Ô bhikṣu, rappelez-vous toujours de cette histoire. Il faut savoir que recevoir des offrandes est très précaire, puisqu'il peut empêcher les religieux de parvenir à la perfection. Si la convoitise des offrandes n'est pas encore née, il faut l'empêcher de naître. Si la convoitise est déjà née, il faut l'anéantir par tous les moyens. Ô bhikṣu, il faut vous y exercer ainsi.

Après avoir entendu ces paroles précieuses du Bouddha, les bhiksū étaient très heureux et les mettaient respectueusement en pratique.

2. 'Ainsi ai-je entendu. Une fois quand le Bouddha résidait à Sāvatthi, dans le bois de Jeta, au parc d'Anāthapindada, le Bhagavat disait aux bhiksū: Il faut supprimer une chose et je vous assure que vous obtiendrez des pouvoirs surnaturels, toutes vos passions seront éliminées. Quelle est cette chose? C'est le désir gustatif. C'est pourquoi les bhiksū doivent maîtriser ce désir gustatif; je vous affirme que vous obtiendrez des pouvoirs surnaturels et toutes vos passions seront éteintes. Alors le Bienheureux récita cette gāthā:

Les êtres vivants qui s'emivrent de saveurs.
Seront amenés aux pires mondes après leur mort.
Ceux qui maîtrisent maintenant leur désir gustatif,
Parviendront à la sainteté des arhat.
Donc, ô bhiksū, on doit abandonner la passion des saveurs. Ô bhikṣu, il faut vous y exercer ainsi.

Après avoir entendu ces paroles précieuses du Bouddha, les bhiksū étaient très heureux et les mettaient respectueusement en pratique.

3. 'Ainsi ai-je entendu. Une fois, quand le Bouddha résidait à Sāvatthi, dans le bois de Jeta, au parc d'Anāthapindada, il y avait un maître de maison (grhapati) qui voulait perdre son fils. Affligé par la mort de son enfant bien-aimé qui ne s'est pas endormi de sa mémoire, le pauvre père perdait son bon sens habituel et devenait très agité. Il demandait à toute personne qu'il rencontrait: 'Avez-vous vu mon fils?' Peu après, il arriva au couvent du Jetaana, approcha du Bhagavat, se tint debout à ses côtés et lui demanda respectueusement: 'Ô śramaṇa Gautama! avez-vous vu mon fils?' Le Bienheureux lui dit:

- Pourquoi avez-vous une si mauvaise mine? Pourquoi vos sens ont-ils l'air si perturbé?

- C'est vrai, car je viens de perdre mon fils. Il m'a abandonné. Mon affliction n'est pas encore soulagée, elle m'a perturbé l'esprit. Je voulais respectueusement vous demander si vous avez vu mon fils?

- Ô maître de maison! la naissance, la vieillesse, la maladie, la mort sont des choses courantes en ce monde. Etre séparé de celui qu'on aime est souffrance. Etre ensemble avec celui qu'on hait est souffrance. La mort de votre fils vient de l'im-
permanence de la vie. Ce sont des choses naturelles et inévitables. Pourquoi êtes-vous si malheureux, si déprimé?

Avant entendu ces paroles du Bienheureux, le malheureux père n'était pas satisfait, il quitta le lieu. Rencontrant une autre personne sur son chemin, il demanda:

- Le sramana Gautama disait: Être séparé de celui qu'on aime est aussi un plaisir. Est-ce vrai?
- Être séparé de celui qu'on aime, répondit l'autre, est loin d'être une joie.

En ce moment, non loin de la ville de Sravasti, il y avait un groupe de joueurs qui se rassemblaient pour s'amuser. Le maître de maison se dit: Ce sont des gens habiles et intelligents, ils doivent tout savoir, je vais leur présenter mon douce. Il se rendit alors au lieu où les joueurs s'amusaient et leur demanda:

- Le sramana Gautama m'a dit: La souffrance venant de la séparation avec celui qu'on aime, ou de la rencontre avec celui qu'on hait est aussi un plaisir. Qu'en pensez-vous?
- Être séparé de celui qu'on aime n'a rien de gai. Dire que c'est un plaisir n'est pas juste.

Cependant ces gens pensaient que le Tathāgata ne pouvait pas mentir. Pourquoi être séparé de celui qu'on aime est-il aussi un plaisir? Il faut réexaminer cette question. Notre maître de maison se retournait vers Sravasti, puis devant la porte de la citadelle proclama: Le sramana Gautama a enseigné que "Être séparé de celui qu'on aime ou être ensemble avec celui qu'on hait sont aussi du plaisir". Ces paroles se propagent partout dans la ville comme dans le palais royal. En ce moment le grand roi Prasenajit et la reine Mallikā étaient en train de se coberl de joie en haut du palais. Le roi Prasenajit dit à la reine Mallikā:

- Peut-être le sramana Gautama a dit cela.
- Je ne pense pas, dit la reine. Mais si le Tathāgata l'a dit, cela doit être vrai.
- Quand le Maître dit à ses disciples de faire ceci, de ne pas faire cela, continua le roi, les disciples ne font qu'obéir. Toi, Mallikā, tu dois te conduire de la même façon. Quoi que le sramana Gautama ait dit cela, tu dois dire que c'est vrai et qu'il n'y a aucune erreur. Maintenant circule, ne restes pas devant moi.

Alors la reine ordonna au brahmane Nādijaṅgha: "Va au couvent du Jetavana, auprès du Tathāgata, mets-toi à genoux à ses pieds, et, en mon nom, lui présente ce qui a été raconté sur son enseignement en ville et dans le palais, et lui demande s'il a bien dit que "Être séparé de celui qu'on aime ou être ensemble avec celui qu'on hait sont du plaisir". Si le Bienheureux confirme qu'il a dit cela, écoute attentivement et raconte-moi fidèlement ses paroles.'

Le brahmane Nādijaṅgha arriva au couvent du Jetavana, présenta ses hommages au Tathāgata et lui adressa ces paroles: 'Ô Bienheureux! la reine m'a dit de venir vous présenter ses respects, de m'enquéir de votre santé, et de porter à votre connaissance un événement important qui se passe dans la ville de Sravasti. En effet il se propage une phrase prétendue venant de l'enseignement du sramana Gautama. La voici: "Être séparé de celui qu'on aime ou être ensemble avec celui qu'on hait sont tous du plaisir". Le Bhagavat, dit-il cela?'

Le Bienheureux dit à Nādijaṅgha: 'Dans la ville de Sravasti il y a un maître de maison qui a perdu son fils. Il aime beaucoup cet enfant. La mort de celui-ci l'a tellement bouleversé qu'il erre dans la rue et demande à tout le monde si l'on a vu son fils. Ainsi, Ô brahmane, être séparé de celui qu'on aime ou être ensemble avec celui qu'on hait sont des souffrances et ne sont pas du plaisir. Autrefois, dans la ville de Sravasti, il y avait une personne qui perdait sa mère par l'impermanence, il aussi perdait l'esprit et ne pouvait plus reconnaître ni l'est ni l'ouest. Il y avait aussi un vieil homme mort: ses frères et ses sœurs, bouleversés par l'événement, perdent l'esprit et le bon sens, devenaient incapables de reconnaître ni l'est ni l'ouest. Ô brahmane, jadis dans cette ville de Sravasti, il y avait un jeune homme qui venait de se marier avec une jeune fille très belle et vertueuse. Peu après il fit faillite et devenait très pauvre. Ses beaux parents voulaient récupérer leur fille pour la marier à une autre personne. Avertis, il cachait un couteau sous sa chemise, allait voir ses beaux parents
et leur demande:
- Où est ma femme?
- Ta femme travaille à l'ombre d'un arbre dans la cour, répondit la belle-mère.

Le jeune homme alla voir sa femme là où elle travaillait, et lui demanda:
- Pourquoi tes parents t'ont-ils arrachée à moi pour ce marier à une autre personne?
- Ce que tu dis n'est pas vrai, répliqua la jeune femme. Je ne veux plus t'écouter.

Emporté par la colère, le pauvre homme retira son couteau, tua sa femme sur le coup, puis frappa le couteau dans sa propre ventre tout en criant: 'Il vaut mieux que nous mourrions ensemble!'

Ô brahmane, la séparation de celui qu'on aime est souffrance, la rencontre de celui qu'on hait est souffrance. Ce sont des scènes de tristesse indescriptibles.

Alors le brahmane Nādiyaṅgaḥa dit:
- C'est vrai, ô Bienheureux, ces souffrances existent, et ce n'est pas du plaisir. Il y a quelques années j'ai eu un enfant emporté par l'impermanence. Jour et nuit je ne pouvais oublier son image adorable. Mon affliction était si grande que je perdais la tête; je cherchais mon enfant partout et demandais à tout le monde où était mon enfant. Aujourd'hui le brahmane Gautama m'a bien expliqué; tout ce qu'il a dit est vrai mais pas du tout évident [à ceux qui sont accablés de douleur et donc ignorants du fait que tout est impermanent].
- Maintenant c'est le moment d'y réfléchir, dit le Bhagavat.

Le brahmane Nādiyaṅgaḥa se leva, fit trois tours autour du Bouddha pour le saluer, puis s'en retourna au palais royal, et rapporta à la reine Mallikā ce qui s'était passé.

La reine se rendit auprès du roi Prasenajit et lui dit:
- O Majesté! j'ai quelques questions à vous demander, veuillez avoir l'obligeance de répondre à toutes mes questions. Sa Majesté aime-t-elle le prince Liéou-li?
- Je t'aime bien, répondit le roi.
- Si le prince était nourris à l'impermanence, Sa Majesté serait-elle affligée?
- Mon affliction serait grande.
- Ainsi Sa Majesté a reconnu que la séparation de la personne qu'on aime est souffrance. Sa Majesté pense-t-elle toujours au prince Yi-lo?
- Oui, parce que je l'adore.
- Si le prince n'était plus, Sa Majesté serait-elle triste?
- Je serais très triste.
- D'après ce qui a été dit, nous savons bien que la séparation de l'être aimé n'apporte jamais de la joissance. Sa Majesté pense-t-elle à la Kṣatriyā Sa-lo-t'o?
- Je l'aime bien, je pense souvent à elle.
- Si la reine Sa-lo-t'o trépassait, Sa Majesté serait-elle triste?
- Je serais très triste.
- Ainsi Sa Majesté a confirmé que la séparation de celui qu'on aime est souffrance, Sa Majesté éprouve-t-elle de l'amour pour moi?
- Naturellement, je t'aime bien, chérie.
- Supposons que mon corps subisse l'impermanence, Sa Majesté serait-elle triste?
- Si il t'arrive quelque chose, je serais très déprimé.
- O Majesté, vous avez confirmé encore une fois que la séparation de celui qu'on aime et la réunion avec celui qu'on hait ne sont pas de la joie. Pourquoi Sa Majesté pense-t-elle souvent au peuple du Kāśī-kośala?
- Je t'aime bien le peuple du Kāśī-kośala.
- Supposons que ce peuple soit frappé par l'impermanence, Sa Majesté serait-elle triste?
- Si le peuple du Kāśī-kośala n'était plus, ma vie ne serait plus en sécurité, ne parions pas de tristesse. Car ce peuple a beaucoup contribué à mon existence; quand la vie est en danger, la tristesse est peu de chose.
- Ainsi il faut savoir que la séparation de celui qu'on aime est souffrance et non pas joissance.

Alors le roi Prasenajit se tourna dans la direction du Bienheureux, s'agenouilla, les mains jointes et prononça ces paroles: 'C'est merveilleux! c'est merveilleux! L'enseignement du Bienheureu-
eux est miraculeux. Le sramaga Gautama a des idées très subtiles. Il explique conformément à la vérité. ‹ chérie, le roi s'adressa à la reine, dorénavant j'aurais encore plus de considérations pour toi, je ferais attention à tes parures et à ton habillement de telle façon qu'il n'y ait plus de différence entre toi et moi.'

Quand le Bhagavat avait entendu la discussion entre la reine Mallikâ et le roi Prasenajit, il dit aux bhiksu: 'La reine est très intelligente. Si le roi Prasenajit m'avait eu posé ces questions, j'aurais répondu de la même façon en lui adressant les mêmes questions que la reine. D'ailleurs, ô bhiksu, la reine Mallikâ est parmi les meilleurs de mes ârâvaka (disciples du premier niveau) laiques qui ont la foi la plus solide et les résultats les plus brillants.'

'Après avoir entendu ces paroles précieuses du Bouddha, les bhiksu étaient très heureux et les mettaient respectueusement en pratique.'

Ainsi, je t'entends. Une fois, quand le Bouddha résidait au pays des Bhâgya, au mont Śīramāra, dans le parc des gazelles nommé Bhīsanikāvana, il y avait un maître de maison nommé Nakula-pitr qui vint se prosterner aux pieds du Bienheureux, se tint debout à ses côtés, puis, après un moment, lui adressa ces paroles:

- Je suis vieil, ravagé par des maladies et des soucis. Je vennais respectueusement prier le Bienheureux de bien vouloir divulguer un enseignement approprié qui permet à la multitude d'être vivants de pouvoir passer une longue durée dans la tranquillité. Comme vous avez dit, répondit le Bienheureux, le corps humain est très vulnérable, il n'est protégé que par une mince couche de la peau. Il nous cause beaucoup de peur et de soucis, comment pouvons-nous y prendre refuge? Ô maître de maison, il est vrai que l'esprit prend refuge dans le corps, mais seulement pour quelques minutes de joie. C'est donc l'esprit stupide et non pas l'esprit de sagesse. C'est pourquoi, ô maître de maison, quoique le corps soit malade, il faut faire de telle sorte que l'esprit ne l'est pas. Pour cela vous devez faire des efforts pour apprendre. Ayant entendu ces paroles [du Bouddha], le maître de maison se leva, se prosterna aux pieds du Bienheureux et se retira. Il dit: Maintenant je dois aller voir le vénérable Sāriputra pour m'enquérir du sens des paroles [du Bouddha].

Mon loin de là, le vénérable Sāriputra était assis au pied d'un arbre. Nakula-pitr arriva, se prosterna à ses pieds et s'assit à ses côtés. Le vénérable Sāriputra lui demanda:

- Ô maître de maison, vous avez l'esprit paisible et joyeux. Quelle en est la cause? Est-ce parce que vous avez écouté l'enseignement auprès du Bouddha?

- C'est vrai, vénérable Sāriputra, je suis paisible et joyeux parce que le Bienheureux a versé l'ambroisie de son enseignement dans mon cœur.

- Comment avez-vous reçu le versement de l'ambroisie de son enseignement dans votre cœur?

- Voici ce qui s'était passé: J'ai dit au Bienheureux que je suis vieux, souvent malade et très malheureux. J'ai prié le Bienheureux de bien vouloir analyser ce corps pour que les êtres vivants et moi-même puissions vivre tranquillement. Alors le Bienheureux m'a dit: "C'est vrai, ô maître de maison, le corps humain est très fragile et vulnérable, il n'est protégé que par une mince couche de la peau. Grâce à ce corps l'esprit a un certain moment de joie, mais il n'est pas conscient de la longue durée de la souffrance sans limite. C'est pourquoi, ô maître de maison, quoique le corps soit malade, il faut que l'esprit soit en paix. Pour cela vous devez faire des efforts pour apprendre." Le Bienheureux a versé dans mon cœur cette ambroisie de son enseignement.

- Pourquoi n'avez-vous pas demandé des explications plus détaillées du Tathāgata: Comment le corps est en danger mais l'esprit est sans soucis? Comment le corps est malade mais l'esprit ne l'est pas?

- Je n'ai pas le niveau suffisant pour poser ces questions au Bienheureux. Je vous prie de bien vouloir m'expliquer.

Alors Sāriputra dit:

- Ecoutez bien et refléchissez bien, je vais essayer de vous expliquer tout cela.
- Oui, vénérable. Je suis prêt à recevoir votre enseignement.

Śāriputra adressa ainsi le maître de maison:

- Ô maître de maison, les gens vulgaires ne voient pas les hommes saints, ne reçoivent pas l'enseignement des saints, n'acceptent pas des conseils; ils voient rarement les gens vertueux et ne s'associent avec eux. Ils ont l'idée préconçue que la matière (rūpa) c'est le moi, que la matière appartient au moi, que le moi appartient à la matière, que dans la matière il y a le moi, que dans le moi il y a la matière, que d'autre matière et la matière à moi se réunissent en un seul endroit. Une fois qu'elles se sont réunies, la nouvelle matière de détériorée, se transforme sans cesse, dans laquelle apparaissent des souffrances. Ils ont l'idée préconçue que les sensations (vedanā)... les notions (saṃjñā)... les volitions (saṃskāra)... les connaissances (vedañā) - appartiennent au moi, que dans les connaissances il y a le moi, que dans le moi il y a des connaissances, que d'autres connaissances et la mienne se réunissent en un seul endroit. Une fois qu'elles se sont réunies, les connaissances ainsi formées se détériorent, se transforment sans cesse, dans lesquelles apparaissent des souffrances. Ô maître de maison, comme cela le corps a ses souffrances, l'esprit a aussi les siens.

- Quand le corps souffre, le maître de maison demanda à Śāriputra, que faut-il faire pour que l'esprit ne souffre pas?

Śāriputra dit:

- Ô maître de maison, les disciples des saints vénèrent et écoutent les saints, observent les abstentions, s'associent avec eux ensemble avec des amis vertueux, chéritent à la fréquenter. Ils ne prétendent pas que le moi est matériel, que dans la matière il y a le moi, que dans le moi il y a la matière, que la matière est le moi ou qu'il appartient au moi, ou que le moi appartient à la matière. C'est pourquoi ils n'ont pas ni soucis, ni souffrances quand la matière change, se transforme sous l'effet des maladies. Ils ne voient non plus que les sensations, les notions, les volitions, les connaissances appartiennent au moi, ils ne voient pas que dans les connaissances il y a le moi, que dans le moi il y a les connaissances, que les connaissances appartiennent au moi, que le moi appartient aux connaissances. C'est pourquoi ils n'ont ni soucis, ni souffrances quand les connaissances se détériorent par la réunion des différentes connaissances. C'est ainsi, Ô maître de maison, que le corps peut être souffrant sans que l'esprit le soit. Ceci dit, pour arriver à ce niveau il faut faire des efforts dans les études et la pratique, il faut vous exercer à maîtriser le corps et l'esprit, et à ne pas s'attacher à eux.

Ayant entendu ces paroles de vénérable Śāriputra, le maître de maison Nakula[pitṛ] se rejoignait et les mettait respectueusement en pratique."

NOTES

1. Voir T2, 571a 23 et suiv.
2. Pour les trois vêtements ou kāśāga, voir BSR 2, 1-2, p.46.
3. Pour l'aranyaka, voir BSR 6, 2, p.128, n.5.
4. Littéralement: 'Iour'.
6. Le chinois est une tentative sans succès de traduire nāli/Nādi- (tige creuse, tuya) jāñgha (jā) (bas de ou devant de la jambe) 'bambou - partie supérieure du bras, épaul') 竹根.
7. 竹觔, ce qui suggère peut-être 'Vajjīrī' (Majjhimanikāya II, p.110)
8. 甘藷, avec l'évocation de 'Vidūdabha' (ibid.).
9. 竹觔, suggérant 'Vasabha' (ibid.).
10. Comme il convient dans ce discours le texte pāli ne contient pas cette dernière phrase banale comme fait le chinois.
NEWS & NOTES

'The Dhammapada - East and West' (BSR 6,2 - 1989) additions to bibliography

**Bengali** - for further details of Devanāgarī texts and translations, contact the PTS Representative for India, Prof. D.K.Barua, Block L/1, Flat 1, Govt Housing Estate, 40/1 R.N.Chowdhury Rd, Calcutta 700013, India.

N.B. L.M.Joshi and S.Gandhi ed. correctly a *Punjabi* trans.

**Marathi** - P.M.Lad (tr., with Devanāgarī text ed.P.V.Bapat) Maharashtra Rajya Sahitya Mandal, 1975


N.Y.Banerjee (ed.& tr.) New Delhi 1989
Buddhaakkhit, repr. as A Practical Guide to Right Living, 1986

David Evans (tr.) The Dhamma Way, Leeds 1988
S.Wannapok, repr. 1988 (continued on p.186)

BJK Institute of Buddhist and Asian Studies

The enterprising Indian scholar, A.K.Narain, who was instrumental in founding the International Association of Buddhist Studies (of which he is Chairman) and, also whilst at Wisconsin University, edited its Journal, established the above centre in honour of his late uncle, the renowned Pali scholar, Bhikku Jagdish Kashyap (BJK) four years ago. 'This Institute ... proposes to have three roles: first, that of a learned society with membership, second, that of providing a suitable place and environment for study and research, thirdly, that of a communication centre for exchange of ideas.' Dr N.H.Santani is Deputy Director in charge of the Buddhist Studies department.

The following projects will (hopefully) be implemented:
1. Critical editions of lesser-known texts and their translation;
2. Compilation of source books, bibliographies, dictionaries and indexes;
3. Archaeological exploration of Buddhist sites not so far excavated scientifically;
4. Identification, location and archaeological exploration of towns and villages visited by the Buddha;
5. Preparation of corpus of Buddhist inscriptions in South and Southeast Asia;
6. Photo-archiving and indexing of Gandharan sculptures and other Buddhist antiquities in South Asia;
7. Survey studies of revitalisation movements of Buddhism in the Himalayan regions and Maharashtra and their social and political implications. Annual conferences and occasional seminars are also envisaged.

Apart from a periodic newsletter, *Appamāda*, the Institute publishes two annuals, the *Indian Journal of Buddhist Studies* and The *Indian Journal of Asian Studies*.

For further details, contact the Institute at Ashok Marg, Sarnath, Varanasi 221007, India.

Exhibitions in London

1. British Museum (ended 30.7.89): 'Living Buddhism' - a travelling exhibition of photographs by Graham Harrison'. (The coffee table book bearing the former title was authored by Andrew Powell.)
2. British Museum (2 parts, 7.4. - 12.12.90) - 'Caves of the Thousand Buddhas. Chinese art from the Silk Route' - based on the Stein Collection. Illustrated talks were given to provide the background to the exhibits whilst one of the lecturers, Prof. Roderick Whitfield, produced a full-length brochure-catalogue.
4. Crypt Gallery, St. George's Church, Bloomsbury (Nov.1989) - 'Arts of Tibet', accompanied by lectures in the church on *thangka* painting, etc. by Jamyang Dakpa, Robert Beer and Thubten Jinpa.

Conferences, Seminars and Lectures

1. International Dhammakṛti Conferences. (The First was held in Kyoto 1982.) Under the presidency of Prof. Dr Ernst Stein-kellner, the Second Conference was held in Vienna (11 - 15.6.89) where scholars from Europe, North America, India and Japan discussed those aspects of philology, epistemology, logic, 'language and concept' and philosophy related to the 7th century logician.
2. The PIS-sponsored I.B.Horner Memorial Lecture was held at SOAS, London, on 22.9.89. (Temporary) Bhikkhu Mahānāmo (Maurice Walshe) spoke on 'Pāli and the Western Buddhist' which dealt with some linguistic errors that have occurred in the texts. John Ireland remarks: 'One of these was Avalokiteśvara's ascription as "tearful-faced" (aṭṭumukha) converted to "horse-faced" (aṣṭamukha) due to a misreading of the word. But this may not, after all, have been a mere linguistic mistake made out of ignorance. It may have been initially a deliberate mistake, possibly a joke or pun, employed as a teaching device. For in the Buddhist Tantra the wrathful (bhairava) or Heruka form of the "Compassionate Lord" is Hayagriva, the "Horse-necked One". Thus one could say of his two aspects he is both aṭṭumukha and aṣṭamukha - a neat way of remembering it! A somewhat similar linguistic punning derived the name Vajravārahī, vārāhī or "sow" coming from abbreviating her actual full name of Vajra-vatirocanā-hārīṇī and is evident when her mantra, containing this, is repeated rapidly and continuously. In Buddhist art Vajravārahī is depicted as identical to Vajrayogini, except for a sow's head appearing behind her ear. Similarly, Hayagriva has the usual Heruka form, but for a small horse's head protruding from the top of his head, which identified him.'

3. 'The Buddhist Forum' at the Centre of Religion and Philosophy (SDAS) resumed its annual series of monthly lectures on all aspects of Buddhism in October 1989. A selection from the first series has now been published by SOAS and comprises the following papers: R.F.Gombrich 'Recovering the Buddha's Message' and 'How the Mahāyāna began', K.R.Norman 'Pāli Philology and the Study of Buddhism', A.Ruxley 'How Buddhist is Theravāda Buddhist Law?', T.H.Barrett "Kill the Patriarchs!" and 'Exploratory Observations on some Weeping Pilgrims', I.Astley-Kristensen 'Images and Permutations of Vajrasattva in the Vajradhātu-āṇḍala'.

4. The Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion - Buddhist Section (Anaheim, 18 - 20.11.89) witnessed seminars on 'Pure Land Buddhism', 'Re-evaluating "Kamakura" Buddhism', 'The Objective Scholar and Buddhist Practice', 'Buddhist Encounters with Other Traditions' and 'Interpreting Buddhist Ritual'.

5. 'The Esoteric Buddhist Tradition' was the theme of a conference organised by the Seminar for Buddhist Studies, Copenhagen and Aarhus (21 - 24.8.89). This was possibly the first occasion at which mainly European specialists debated Indo-Tibetan and Far Eastern manifestations of Tantric Buddhism.

6. An 'International Seminar on Buddha's Law of Dependent Origination: Its History, Ethics and Philosophy' was held in Calcutta (26 - 28.11.89) to commemorate the birth centenary of the pioneer of Pāli studies in modern India, Benimadhab Barua. It was inaugurated by the President of The Maha Bodhi Society of India, (the Sinhalese bhikkhu) P.Chandananda Mahanāyaka Thera, and conducted under the chairmanship of Prof.B. Raychoudhuri, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Calcutta. Nearly fifty scholars from the Sub-continent, Sri Lanka and Japan actively participated in the proceedings which have been transcribed and are obtainable from the Centenary Celebration Committee, 4 Raja S.C.Mullick Rd, Calcutta 700032. An abridged brochure, highlighting the life and career of B.M.Barua in English and Bengali, is also available.

Of all the (mainly long-term) proposals put forward by the above Committee, one that has been immediately realised is the Dr. B.M. Barua Birth Centenary Commemoration Volume which comprises reprints of some of Barua's papers in English and Bengali together with articles by Indian writers, Ananda W.P.Guruge (UNESCO, Paris), Dennis Cordell (Columbia University, New York) and Helmut Eimer (Bonn University).

7. 'Buddhism into the Year 2000' was the theme of an international conference sponsored by the Dhammakaya Foundation and held at Sukhothai Thammamet Open University, Bangkok (7 - 9.2.90). The speakers included Prof.Dr H.Beichert (represented in absentia - Göttingen University), L.S.Cousins (Manchester University), Prof.Sanyo Dhammasakti (President, World Fellowship of Buddhists), Dr Ananda Guruge, Prof.Jacques Martin (Strasbourg University; President, Union Bouddhiste de France), Bhikkhu Pasādika, A.Sanderson (Lecturer in Sanskrit, Oxford University), Prof. Dr L.Schmithausen (Hamburg University) and a number of scholars from Thailand and Japan (including Dr Akira Yuyama). They delivered papers on both classical and contemporary Buddhist doctrine and practice whilst opportunities were provided to discuss the principles of the Dhamma in modern sociological perspective. The programme
and abstracts in one volume are available from the Dhammakaya Foundation, Khlong 3, Khlong Luang, Pathumthani 12120, Thailand.

8. An international seminar on 'Buddhist Translations: Problems and Perspectives' (the first of its kind) was held at Tibet House, New Delhi (20 - 24.2.90). Funded by the Ford Foundation and actively supported by the Indian Council for Cultural Relations, over fifty scholars from a dozen countries heard twenty-four papers read on ten different themes. The Keynote Address, 'On Translating Tibetan Philosophical Texts', was given by Prof. D. Seyfort Ruegg (now based in London after completing his lectureship at Hamburg University) and published in the Tibet House bulletin 5,1 (1990) where the conference's recommendations and resolutions are also featured. Address: 1 Institutional Area, Lodhi Road, New Delhi 110003, India.

9. The Central Asian Studies Association (based in the Centre and Department of Near and Middle Eastern Studies, SOAS, London University) sponsored two two-day conferences in April 1990: 'Languages and Scripts of Central Asia' and '40 Years On: Tibetan 1950-1990'. Convened by Dr Shirin Akiner and Dr Nicholas Sims-Williams ( - Tsering Shakya for the second conference), the former attracted participants from the U.K., Germany, Israel, China and the U.S.S.R. Twelve papers were delivered and included discussions on Tibetan, Tocharian and Iranian, and Turkic languages in Aramaic and Brāhmī scripts. A wider international assembly subsequently participated in 'the first major international conference on modern Tibetan studies'.

10. The 35th International Conference of Orientalists in Japan was held under the auspices of The Tōhō Gakkai and the International Congress for Asian and North African Studies in Tokyo and Kyoto in May 1990. Under the presidency and chairmanship of Emeritus Prof. Tatsuro Yamamoto and Masao Mori, mainly Japanese scholars participated in discussions on Far Eastern culture, philosophy and sociology.

11. The VIIIth World Sanskrit Conference was held between 27.8 - 2.9.90 at the University of Vienna, under the auspices of the Department of Indology. Three volumes of Panels of the VIIIth World Sanskrit Conference (which was held at the Kern Institute, Leiden 1987) have now been published by E.J. Brill (Leiden) under the general editorship of Dr Johannes Bronkhorst. (A further seven volumes are scheduled.) Vol. 2, Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka, has been edited by two of the participants, D. Seyfort Ruegg and L. Schmithausen.

12. The XVIIth Congress of the International Association for the History of Religions was held in Rome (3 - 9.9.90) on the theme, 'The notion of "religion" in comparative research'. Details may be obtained from Prof. Dr Ugo Bianchi, Dipartimento di studi storico-religiosi, Università di Roma - 'La Sapienza', Piazzale Aldo Moro 5, I-00185 Rome, Italy.

13. 'Themes of Early Indian Mahāyāna' and '... the Main Mahāyāna Schools', comprising nine and six lectures respectively, are being delivered every fortnight (from 5.10.90) at The Buddhist Society, London, by Dr Eric Auerbach. Following the publication by the Society of his masterly survey of Fundamentals of Mainstream Buddhism (4 parts, 1985-8), which includes almost the only easily accessible material in English on Indian Hinayāna and early Mahāyāna, he has just had published the first part of a sequel to the foregoing, The Pre-Mahāyāna Landscape.

Publications

1. Buddica Britannica was launched at the end of 1989 as a series to promote 'new academic material on any aspect of Buddhist religion, philosophy, history, philology, customs, art, architecture and other related subjects'. Under the general editorship of Dr T. Skorupski, the joint publishers-The Institute of Buddhist Studies (36 King St, Tring, Herts HP23 6BJ) and SOAS (Thornhaugh St, Russell Sq., London WC1H 0XG) - have already produced two volumes: The Buddhist Heritage. Papers from the Symposium at SOAS 1985 (1989) and Indo-Tibetan Studies (1990).

2. Studies in Central and East Asian Religions is the annual journal of The (Danish) Seminar for Buddhist Studies. It first appeared in 1988 and may be obtained from Aarhus University Press, DK-8000 Aarhus C, Denmark. The specialist editors are Per K. Sørensen (Tibet and Mongolia - Copenhagen), Henrik H. Sørensen (China and Korea - Copenhagen) and Jan Astley-Kristensen (Japan - Aarhus).
3. Tocharian and Indo-European Studies is another annual, dating from 1987. Edited by Dr Jörundur Hilmarsson (P.O.Box 1268, 121 Reykjavik, Iceland), it is mainly a vehicle for Central Asian philological studies but occasionally includes Tocharian Buddhist texts or relevant exegeses.

4. The International Research Institute for Zen Buddhism has issued its first (illustrated) Newsletter (June 1990), in English and Japanese and in magazine format produced on an Apple Macintosh computer system. Under its German (?!) editor, Urs App, this organ is hoped to appear twice a year and will, unexpectedly for material emanating from a 'sectarian' source, be anything but a 'house' journal. The contents of the inaugural issue include details of 'Buddhist database projects', 'Soviet Publications on Zen/Ch'an', 'Recent Publications about Zen in German' and 'A List of Chinese Zen Masters' in Pinyin, Wade-Giles, Kanji, Romanised Japanese and Kana transcriptions.

The Institute itself was founded in 1988 under the directorship of Seizan Yanagida but only inaugurated in the following year. 'It is dedicated to research in Ch'an/Zen/Ch'an Buddhism and related fields, publication of research results, promotion of research, and international information exchange. Its library consists of more than 15,000 volumes, among them various rare ancient woodblock editions of Zen texts. The Institute forms part of Hanazono College (founded in 1872), one of the Buddhist academic institutions of Japan. Its affiliation is with the Rinzai branch of Zen Buddhism.'

Further information may be obtained direct from the Institute, Hanazono College, 8-1 Tsubonouchi-cho, Nishinokyo, Nakakyo-ku, Kyoto 604, Japan.

Dhamma Study and Propagation Foundation

Based in Bangkok, this association of lay Buddhists was founded five years ago by Khun Sujin Borirharnwanakhet who produces radio programmes twice daily (broadcast on twenty stations throughout Thailand), lectures extensively and writes articles and books - all on Dhamma. Her association's prime aim is the study and dissemination of Dhamma according to the Pali Canon. Contrary to the 'forest tradition', emphasis is given to a correct understanding of the Teaching, without which the practice will be faulty. 'The first step of the development of insight should be the clear intellectual understanding of realities and their functions without the idea of self.' Thus the important role that practical Abhidhamma can play in daily life.

Although the principal teacher is Khun Sujin, the most prolific writer connected to the Foundation is the Dutch-born Buddhist, Nina van Gorkom, whose essays constitute the overwhelming bulk of English-language material freely available to enquirers. For further details contact the main centre at 590 Taksin 39, Charoennakorn Bukkhalo, Bangkok 10600, or its U.K. representative, Alan Weller, tel. 081-767 4544.'

This great mystical writer who was deeply influenced by the Buddhism of Japan was born in Munich with the full name of Karl Friedrich Alfred Heinrich Ferdinand Maria, Graf von Dürckheim. He read Philosophy and Psychology at Munich and Kiel, graduating in 1923, and was 'habilitated' seven years later at Leipzig where he was an assistant in the Institute of Psychology between 1925-32. Appointed Professor at the Pedagogical Academy, Breslau, in 1931, he transferred to a similar centre in Kiel (lecturing also in Philosophy) in the following year. From 1937 until the end of the Second World War he resided in Japan but returned to Germany where, in 1948, he established a practice in psychotherapy at Todtmoos in the Black Forest.

His vast output of literature has been largely kept in print by O.W. Barth Verlag of Munich and many pieces have appeared in other European languages. Those relevant to Buddhism include Japan und die Kultur der Stille (1949, 1984; trans. as The Japanese Cult of Tranquillity, London 1960, 1974), Hara - die Ermität des Menschen (1956, 1970; tr. as Hara - the Vital Centre of Man, London 1962, 1988), Zen und Wir (1961, 1988; tr. as Zen and Us, New York 1967), Die Wunderbare Kette und andere Zen-Texte (1964) and Der Weg, die Wahrheit und das Leben (1981); also, a collection of thirty-three talks given in Frankfurt between 1967-83 - Weg der Ubnung, Geschenk der Grade (Aachen 1990). He also contributed 'Die Erfahrungswesheit des Zen-Buddhisms als abendländische Erfahrung' (Christencum und Buddhismus, ed. Alfonse Rosenberg, Munich 1959) and 'Die Ganzheit des Menschen' (Weg zur Ganzheit, Festschrift for Lama Govinda, Almora 1973). On the occasion of his 70th birthday a Festschrift was presented to him under the title Transzendence als Erfahrung (Munich 1966).


Traveller, musician and committed Buddhist, he was born in Liverpool of Greek parents - his father, a poet and scholar, who had spent many years in India instilled into him a love for the culture of the Sub-continent which was to lead him to Buddhism. He became a professional musician (helping to found The English Consort of Viols) but took a keen interest in mountaineering. The latter activity drew him (in 1933) to the Himalayas where he witnessed living Buddhism (in the person of 'the saintly and knowledgeable Lama of Lachen', in northern Sikkim) and studied Tibetan and Buddhism in Ladakh under Konchog Gyaltse of Phiyang. In 1937 he invited the Mongolian monk, Geshé Wangyal, to England for purposes of private tuition. Exactly ten years later, in 1947, Pallis was enabled to pursue his religious studies in Shigatse (Tibet), an experience which 'confirmed and broadened my impression of a Buddhist society as lived at all levels, and of the Buddhist tradition in its home country'. Back in London, in the late 1970s, he became a member of the Shin Buddhist Association, another spiritual experience which was described by him as 'reinforcing the Tibetan influences - again without the least trace of sectarian competition'. Peaks and Lamas (London 1939 - New York 1940; rev. ed., London and Portland, Oregon 1974) narrates his discovery of Buddhism whilst The Way and the Mountain (London 1960) describes his exploits in the Himalayas. The majority of his articles were reprinted in the anthology, A Buddhist Spectrum (London 1980 - New York 1981).

Pieter Hendrik Pott (3.10.1885 - 29.7.1989)

Until his retirement in 1985, Prof. Dr Pott was Director of the Museum voor Volkerkunde, Leiden. From 1973 he also occupied the Chair of Museology at the University. To facilitate research he compiled an Introduction to the Tibetan Collection of the National Museum of Ethnology (1951), an appropriate catalogue for the Rijksmuseum - Coden en demonen van Tibet (Leiden 1948) and 'The Tibetan and Nepalese collections of the Baroda Museum' (Bulletin of the Baroda Museum and Picture Gallery, 1952-3). His dissertation on the bodhisattvas and the meditations associated with them was published under the title Yoga on Tantra in hunne betekenis voor de Indische Archeologie (Leiden 1946; English ed., The Hague 1966). He contributed papers on 'A remarkable piece of Tibetan ritual painting and its meaning' (International Archiv für Ethnographie XLIII, Leiden 1943), 'A Tibetan Painting of Térā from Tum Huang' (Orientalia Neerlandica, Leiden 1948), the introduction to the 2nd edition of W.J.G. van Heurs' Tibetan Temple Paintings (Leiden 1952), 'Le bouddhisme de Java et l'ancienne civilisa-

Obituaries

Buddha, was enhanced by means of worldwide travel and familiarity with other peoples and cultures, and his sincere interest and participation in interreligious dialogue stemmed from this recognition of the validity of others' views and feelings.

Head of the Vihāra from 1957 to 1985, he was elected President of the Sangha Sahā of Great Britain in 1966 and Sanghasīkāya Thera in 1981. On the academic side, he enrolled at SOAS (London) as a Research Scholar and gained his doctorate from Edinburgh for 'A Critical Edition and Study of the Upāsakajana-lākāra' (the only Pali book devoted to the laity and published by the PTS in 1965). He was Professor of Pali and Buddhism at Toronto University (1966-9) and occupied numerous other posts in the same field; also, Council Member (later Vice-President) of the Pali Text Society on whose behalf he laboured for many years, editing and translating the Dasabadhisattapattikatha (1975) and contributing to the Pāli Tipiṭaka Concordance.

Apart from his teaching abilities, he also proved a prolific writer in English and Sinhalese. He touched on most aspects of Buddhist thought and practice and the majority of his articles to various journals have been reprinted in 'a representative collection of Venerable Saddhatissa's life work' entitled Faces of Buddhism (published by his own creation, the World Buddhist Foundation, c/o The Vihāra, 1 Old Church Lane, London NW9 8TG, at the end of 1990). He contributed a pioneer series of essays on Pali literature in Cambodia, Laos and Thailand (which will also be reprinted in one volume by the same publisher) together with a translation of the Sutta-Nipāta (1984) in contemporary language. His full-length works aimed at the general reader comprise Buddhist Ethics (1970), The Buddha's Way (1971) and The Life of the Buddha (1976) which also appeared in other European languages. These became prescribed college textbooks, whilst the second book was described as 'the best, simplest, most readable and comprehensible short introduction to what the Buddha taught that has yet been written in English'.

Ven.Saddhatissa had been in failing health for some years, but his benign serenity and detachment from worldly considerations enabled him to transcend his physical weakness.

(Based on the Editor's obituary to The Daily Telegraph, 20.3.90)
A Tribute to Ven. Saddhatissa from Phra Khantipalo

Though it is thirty years and more since I first met Venerable Saddhatissa Mahathera and though the memory does not work that well and smudges the past, yet I recall some incidents worthy of being recorded. The first of them, my initial meeting with him, was made on a rainy night when presumably it was not too cold. In those days, keen on cycling, I went all the way from my home in Enfield up to Knightsbridge (where the London Buddhist Vihara was then situated) on my bike. The journey was not uneventful for I remember slipping off on the tramlines and coming off near the entrance of the trolley bus. Either past good kamma or the local devisa, aware of my intention to visit my future teacher, saved me on this occasion and I arrived safely. I do not recollect now what kind of teaching went on that night, nor did I actually speak to Ven. Saddhatissa, but I gained confidence in the Sangha, an important prerequisite for my next step.

This was to become a novice-monk. In those days (1960), it was impossible to be ordained as a bhikkhu as the five requisite monks for this act were not found in Britain, not even in Europe. Therefore I became a samanera to be ordained by Ven. Saddhatissa but living with an English monk, Ven. Pahavaddho (now 1990, still a bhikkhu in N.E. Thailand), two German monks, Vimalo and Dharmiko who were brothers, and a nun of Latvian Jewish extraction, Rev. Jhānāmāndā, who has long passed from this life. While I was learning the novice ordination procedure I followed the Thai version used before me by Ven. Pahavaddho. Then one early spring evening I knelt at the feet of Ven. Saddhatissa and the other monks and shivering with cold and stage fright started to recite the request for ordination. Ven. Saddhatissa stopped me in the first line evidently having quite a different version of the procedure. However, when he saw that I felt deeply embarrassed, out of his kindness he allowed me to continue in the way I had learnt. I was very grateful for this concession.

Years later, when I was in Thailand, he came to visit me in Wat Bovoravives, Bangkok. Its size impressed him though it is by no means one of the biggest temples. One evening as we walked round we came to an open lighted window beyond which, in a large room, many senior members of the Sangha were gathered for some meeting. The scene was peaceful and orderly with each abbot presenting his views quietly in a spirit of lovingkindness. Ven. Saddhatissa gazed long and silently at this scene, remarking when we eventually turned away, 'That is how the Sangha should be run'.

During my last visit to Britain, now more than twenty years ago, I stayed with my teacher at the Chiswick address of the London Buddhist Vihara. He was most kind at the time and helped me in many ways to cope with a scene very different from the war of Bangkok and the forest of N.E. Thailand. He appreciated the difficulties I had in adjusting to a life (in Australia) where the minutaie of the Vinaya could not be maintained.

He took me with him to visit a Buddhist woman dying of cancer in hospital. I remember his chanting for her, his compassionate concern for her welfare and his gentle assurances expressed to her that she had nothing to fear in her journey ahead.

He remains in my mind as a great but humble scholar, one who did not display his virtues but kept them well-hidden. His calm face and quiet dignity gave confidence to many people who are sure to miss his presence. Among them I have lost a good friend in the Dhamma with whom I corresponded several times a year. It would be an impertinence to wish that all his good karmas become the basis for his quick attainment of Nibbāna: this will surely happen as a result of his dedication to Dhamma. Perhaps if we are so fortunate, we may again encounter him during our future lives of pilgrimage together for his and our 'benefit and happiness for many a long day'.
BOOK REVIEWS


The Bukkyo Dendo Kyokai, to give its English name, the Buddhist Promoting Foundation, was founded in 1965 with the personal funds of Mr Yehin Numata, manufacturer of precision tools and devout Buddhist, for the purpose of disseminating the Buddhist teachings throughout the world. Although the Foundation has published several books, it remains best known for The Teaching of Buddha, a popular anthology of texts in translation which has to date appeared in over twenty languages besides English. Encouraged, presumably, by the success of this book, the Foundation decided some time ago upon a new and altogether phenomenal undertaking; this was to be nothing less than a complete English translation of the Taishō Tripiṭaka, the Sino-Japanese Buddhist Canon. All 2,920 texts of that enormous compilation were to be made available to the ‘general reader’ in translations which, remaining true to the popular approach of the Foundation, would be provided with only the briefest of introductions and would also be entirely without notes. Culture, as Confucius made clear a long time ago, must be assimilable, and given the aim of the Foundation, which is that of placing the Buddhist teachings before as many people as possible, one can understand why it should have opted for a non-academic approach. However, many of the Mahāyāna texts are extremely difficult, and one wonders whether, in its desire to avoid a fussy sort of scholarship which would get between the reader and his appreciation of the text, the Foundation may not have gone to an opposite and equally unhelpful extreme. Be that as it may, an Editorial Committee was formed in 1983, and the project got under way in earnest. Since it would clearly be impossible for any organisation to translate and publish the whole of the Taishō at one go, 139 texts were selected to make up the First Series of 100 volumes, and the Foundation hopes to have them all in print by 2000 A.D. The first three volumes, planned for publication in 1988 (but yet to appear – Ed.) will offer translations of the following six texts:

1. No.16 Śrīmālādevīsīhmānā-sūtra (Taishō No.353)
influence in later times.'

Each entry, as may be seen, gives the series number of the work, its Japanese, Chinese and Sanskrit titles (the latter two where applicable), the number of fascicules it takes up, the name of its composer or compiler or translator (in both its original and Japanese forms, and not merely Japanised as the Hōbōgirin Répertoire so irritatingly does for the names of Chinese throughout), its Taishō number, and a brief description of the contents. The whole of this information is then handsomely repeated in Japanese translation on the facing page, and so one is never in any doubt about kanji. The book is rounded out with three title indexes, in Japanese, Sanskrit-Pali and Chinese, and concludes with a short and wholly inadequate account of the Buddhist Canon.

As for the brief descriptions, although most of them are reasonably informative, a fair number do seem to end up by telling us very little about the work in question (e.g. No. 7 on the Aṣṭa-māhāstikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra) whilst others appear somewhat uncritical. We are not told, for example, that the Wu-liang-i-ching (No.13) is almost certainly apocryphal, nor are we told that the Hsin-hsin-ming (No.87) is probably not by Seng-ts'ian. But perhaps one's greatest dissatisfaction with the descriptions stems from the fact that, although a new page is devoted to each item, so brief are the descriptions that much of the book consists of empty space. A case in point is that of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (No.57), which reads in full as follows: 'This "Compendium of the Mahāyāna" is so called because it presents an attempt to systematize Buddhist thought into a united whole from the standpoint of the Mind-Only School (Vijñānavāda). The essentials of Mahāyāna Buddhism are arranged under ten headings, to each of which is devoted a single chapter. This work became the basic text of the Shē-lun (abbreviated title of this work) School in China.' That's all, a mere sixty-five words or so, but since we could have been given, and ought to have been given, much more, particularly in the case of such an important text as this, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that we have in this book an example of Japanese scholarship at its most laid back.

To turn to the English, although it is a considerable improvement over that of The Teaching of Buddha, it remains at times de-cidedly peculiar: 'This sutra is a collection of in all (sic) 121 stories' (No.5): 'it is marked by an unadulterated (sic) presentation of the concept of "emptiness"' (No.7): ' Asserting that the whole universe be (sic) an emanation of the Buddha Vāsudeva' (No.15).

From the foregoing it may be seen that the Bukkyo Dendo Kyokai appears to be labouring under two serious misapprehensions. First, that the 'general reader' is less intelligent than he really is. Second, that since English is an outlandish language anyway it doesn't really matter whether one gets it right or not. If the Foundation could be persuaded to set its sights a little higher, if it could both overcome its aversion to scholarship (— it's not all bad!) and start taking more care over its English, written, or at least revised, by native speakers of English instead of foreigners, its books would be likely to do much more good in the world and Mr Numata would be getting much better value for his money. Still, whether 'scholarly' in the fullest sense or not, and despite the occasional lapses in English, the Bukkyo Dendo Kyokai project is undoubtedly impressive and is one that we must all be thankful for. Many of the texts it intends to publish have never been translated before into any Western language and one looks forward with interest to their appearance.

A. Saroop


It is good to be able to welcome a new English translation of the Dīgha Nikāya as the old one by the Rhys Davids, a pioneering work, is long out of date. That translation, Dialogues of the Buddha (3 vols., PTS) is still in print but after all it was the first complete Dīgha version in English. The author of this new rendering acknowledges in many places his debt to the old translators who surely would rejoice if they could see the splendid volume of this second entire translation.

Mr Walshe, the translator, has been a Buddhist who has practised meditation for many years as well as heading the English Sangha Trust, a body which supports the Sangha in Britain led
by Ven.Sumedho Thera. He has produced a translation in a good readable style of English, dispensing with as much of the repetitions as possible. Hence it is a pleasure to read the Buddha's words in this condensed form without having to plough through the involved permutations of repetitions which are so common in these originally oral teachings. The translator's pruning is judicious and nothing has been lost in his work. Another advantage is the slimmness of the volume which surprised the reviewer who had been used to the three-volume set of the Pali Text Society. Wisdom Publications have helped to keep the thickness of the present volume manageable by using high quality thin paper. They have also reproduced a number of paintings and drawings, some by a contemporary Thai artist, Pang Chinasa, being particularly attractive.

There are very few criticisms to be made of the actual translation and these are all quite minor matters. Sāra, for instance, is not best translated by 'pith' (p.390ff) - which is soft and found in elder bushes and the like, but by 'heartwood' which is hard and the core of a tree. A strange feature of the extensive and helpful notes is to cite previous examples in the text as 'verses' rather than quoting paragraphs by number. This would not be confusing if the text cited actually was in verse but almost every case, it seems, refers to prose. Vitakka-vicāra (n.80, p.543) in the context of jhāna is certainly not 'thinking and pondering' since such mental activity ceases long before jhāna is attained. Perhaps this is the most misleading translation in the whole book. Some idea of its meaning is conveyed by the term 'initial and sustained application' (of the mind). Perhaps a few other points could be found of this sort but these are very small blemishes in such a large and well-translated work.

As to the contents of the thirty-four suttas here, readers should explore them since there is something for everyone. The devotee will enjoy Sutta 16, the Buddha's Last Days, whilst the sceptic will find humorous if somewhat grisly delight in Debate with a Sceptic, Sutta 23. For lay people there is the Sīkālā Sutta, 31, monks and nuns being well-instructed with Sutta 7. The Fruits of the Homeless Life. Those who prefer analysis will find States of Consciousness, Sutta 9, interesting, but others who like to chant protective words will be encouraged by Suttas 20 and 32, The Mighty Gathering, and the Āṭānuṭṭa Protective Verses. Perhaps you want to learn groups of dhāmas by heart - then there are the last two Suttas, The Chanting Together and Expanding Decades, or perhaps you enjoy Sutta 28, on the faith Venerable Sāriputta had in the Buddha. For deep Dhamma there is The Great Discourse on Origination, Sutta 15, whilst for the application of Dhamma to the world there is Sutta 26, The Lion's Roar on the Turning of the Wheel. From just the titles of the suttas one may see how varied they are.

Besides being well-produced, the book is rounded off with Technical Notes, an Introduction and a Summary of the Thirty-four Suttas. Following the translation (pp.67-521), is an adequate Bibliography, a List of Abbreviations, Notes (pp.533-624), and an Index of both English subjects and Pāli words. Altogether an excellent job, a translation which will not be superseded for many a long year.

Phra Khantipalo

The Long Discourses of the Buddha (Dīgha Nikāya), Fr P. Anatiello, Anchor Publications, Bognor Regis 1986. viii, 128pp. £6.95

Fr Anatiello's 'attempt to a deeper understanding of the Long Discourses of the Buddha 1 is a pleasure to read. It is a slight work but, despite some shortcomings (probably inevitable in the circumstances, as we shall see later on), a remarkably perceptive one. Above all, it is refreshing to be free from preconceived notions and interpretative bias. No mean achievement on the part of someone who, as an ordained minister of the Roman Catholic Church, may be presumed to hold a strong personal commitment to a faith so far removed from what the Buddha taught on a number of fundamental issues. A faith, moreover, which - for all its manifestations of readiness to interreligious dialogue in recent decades - seems to be by its very tenets to be precluded from wholeheartedly accepting other beliefs (and most especially a non-theistic teaching) on an equal footing.

In most cases, at any rate, that is the effect it seems to have, judging by the writings of other Catholic priests engaged in Buddhist studies, such as Fr Pérez-Ramón 2 and Fr Ismael
Quiles, S.J. 3. They are far more deeply involved in Buddhist studies than Fr Anatriello but, either through unconscious bias or through deliberate intent, what they produce are 'reinterpretations' of the Dhamma in terms rather more palatable to the Christian world view than fairly representative of the non-Christian teachings that are supposedly being elucidated.

Not so Fr Anatriello. Without in any way renouncing his own beliefs 4, he approaches the sutras of the Digha Nikāya with a sympathetic, truly open mind. He originally undertook this task, as he explains, out of love and respect 5, and these two qualities are indeed very much in evidence throughout the book. This is an honest attempt to understand the basic points of the Buddha's teaching, carried out by an outsider with rare intellectual humility. The result is a study which, although of limited interest to Buddhist readers on account of its rather elementary level, has quite a lot to offer to interested non-Buddhists, both by way of firsthand information and as an excellent example of a truly interreligious attitude.

This being said, it must be admitted that the picture of the Buddha's teaching that emerges from Fr Anatriello's study of the Digha Nikāya, while correct in some important particulars, tends to be somewhat confused and confusing in others. Of course, the author suffers from a double handicap. Firstly, he is writing in a language not his own. Secondly, and more importantly, he is attempting a close study of texts which he cannot read in the original. He relies, he tells us, on the PTS English translations by the Rhys Davids. Now these were remarkable as pioneering efforts at the time, but they are not always sufficiently exact in terminology nor informed about the technicalities of jhānic and insight practice. So Fr Anatriello's difficulties have at times been compounded by his dependence on them.

A few examples will show what is clear and what is doubtful in this book:

The Dhamma is understood both cosmologically, as 'the Law, the Norm that 'is the motor and ruler of the Universe' (pp.12 and 41), and soteriologically as the Buddhahammas which teaches the pursuit of 'wisdom and righteousness' as the 'supreme perfection among gods and men' (p.13) and leads to 'the wonder of wonders [that] is the attainment of arahatship' (p.16). On the negative side, we have here the assimilation of this Law or Norm to a 'supreme force ruling the universe', which is moreover stated to be 'quite distinct from the universe itself' (p.31) and comes thus perilously close to being identified as a theological entity. Fr Anatriello, however, clearly sees that this 'force' is 'not a person like the Supreme God of the Jews, of the Christians, of the Muslims', and that 'it is not a Buddha' (31) either. So, since he cannot, in the end, get away from the idea of a Prime Mover, and thus cannot grasp that what keeps the wheel of existence going are simply the three root-conditions of jāho, dosa and moha, he is led to conclude, somewhat lamely, that '[the Law] is a Supreme, which though continually giving existence and continually moving the universe, cannot be apprehended and completely understood, but only vaguely defined' (31). One regrets the misunderstanding but respects the honesty which stops the author from trying to define this supposed Supreme in unsuitable theological terms.

As regards the Buddha himself, one is grateful to Fr Anatriello for firmly resisting any temptation to attribute divine qualities to the Teacher's figure: 'Gotama was a lucky way-farer, who reached the light of the Law, who succeeded in catching it, to understand it for saving himself and for leading others to salvation' (43). And in discussing the relationship of the gods to the Buddha: 'Though the Buddha is supreme over all the gods or Devatās, he is not their creator; in his innumerable existences he was one of them, only by his enlightenment he became their teacher, but not their king or master' (57-8).

On other basic issues, such as pāṭicca-samuppāda and the operation of kamma, Fr Anatriello recognises that 'for the Buddhist cognition [the term used by the Rhys Davids for vinnaṇṇa in the account of pāṭicca-samuppāda] is not a spiritual being with an immortal existence like soul. Cognition is not created by an external as [sic] God. Cognition, name and form, are inseparable. They both form one cause in the chain of causes of a living being. This chain of causes continues to turn by itself indefinitely till it will be broken by the [sic] meditation, in which the insight is perceived' (73). And with regard to kamma Fr Anatriello rightly sees 'everybody, either god or man or sufferer
of a punishment works out his destiny by his own thoughts, words and deeds; no other than himself can influence his future. Therefore, there is no place for a Supreme God who prays to mitigate or nullify (cancel) the effect of one misdeed' (73). Furthermore, he stresses that, in Buddhism, there is 'no place for any doctrine of original sin', and that 'the belief that a Redeemer, who makes up for the sins of others is to be excluded' (83). Consequently, 'a Buddha or an Arahat, advanced in meditation, may teach, help by showing the way how to fight craving, but the real effort to eradicate craving is a personal affair only' (83).

The practice of meditation, discussed mainly with reference to the Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta (D 22) and the Mahānidāna Sutta (D 15), is one issue where there is a lot of confusion. The author (as quoted above from p.73) has clearly understood that deliverance is to be achieved through the practice of meditation, or mental development (bhāvanā). But, notwithstanding all his goodwill and intelligence, he lacks the necessary background for a proper understanding of the texts he is dealing with (i.e. knowledge of the whole relevant range of original texts and commentaries, familiarity with the tradition and, last but not least, practical experience of meditation under expert guidance). Consequently, the distinction between tranquillity and insight is blurred, the eight emancipations or deliverances (vimoksha) at the end of D 15 are confused with the eight jhānas and, above all, the nature of insight as a liberating experience is totally misunderstood: '...the aim is perfect and complete deliverance from anything, from anybody: as long as we are dependent on anything, on anybody, we are subject to ill, to suffering. When by intense consciousness we are set completely free from anything, from anybody, then we become indifferent and in peace; such a state is Nirvana' (104).

The truth of anatta is not apprehended, either here or elsewhere in the book. Neither is the radical character of anicca, nor the fact that the whole point of meditation is to achieve a correct perception of these characteristics of existence and o. their concomitant dukkha. But this is hardly surprising. The whole issue of the nature, practice and effects of meditation is one which has more than once baffled supposedly qualified Western scholars, and on which even Buddhists themselves are not always as clear as they should be. So we can hardly blame Fr Anatriello for not doing better. Having his roots in such an entirely different tradition, the imaginative leap he has performed in understanding as much of the Buddha's message as he has done in many parts of this book is already a remarkable feat.

The author is much more at ease when dealing with ethical and social aspects which are common to all religions, as in the exposition of the layman's code of conduct from the Sīḷavatiputta (D 31), and in explaining the Buddha's condemnation of animal sacrifices in the Kūṭadanta Sutta (D 5).

Fr Anatriello's book closes with a brief consideration of the Dīgha Nikāya's relevance to the modern world, stressing that, in the Buddha's teaching, 'regardless of age, sex, social class, race, all men are equally entitled to the same human rights' (124) and highlighting the principle of respect for all forms of life.

Finally, two factual points concerning the list of translations of the Dīgha Nikāya included in the Introduction:


2. If and when the book is reprinted, the section on German translations should be proof read by someone with a knowledge of German, as most of the titles have been massacred by the printers.

NOTES

1 'Synopsis', first of six unnumbered pages preceding p.1.
4 'This book is the fruit of a great effort to understand with a Christian mind an important part of the Pali Canon' (flap of dust jacket, my emphasis).
5 'I lived many years in Burma, a Buddhist country... The love of that people and the great respect of his [sic] religion urged me to undergo a long and
patient reading of the Pali Canon (flap of dust jacket).

Anadeo Seld-Leris

Ed. Regrettably, the publisher would seem to have gone out of business, whilst the author died in the year of publication.


It is hard to see the purpose of bringing out this new selection from Neumann's dated translation of the Majjhima Nikāya, except that the publishers presumably hope it still retains something of the reputation it enjoyed in the early years of this century as a 'beautiful' translation. Its artistry, we are told, was admired by no fewer than six Nobel prizewinners, including not only the Belgian Maeterlinck and the Dane Gjellerup, both of whom probably did know German, but Bernard Shaw, who not only admitted his ignorance of that language but proved it in his Translations and Tomfooleries! However, in a translation of the Buddhist (or any other) scriptures, style is less important than accuracy and clarity, and here Neumann leaves much to be desired, as was pointed out by Kurt Schmidt, whose own selection (which has some different faults) appeared in a Rowohl (Reinbeck) paperback in 1961 (Ed. and has been reissued under the title Die Sammlung der mittleren Texte des buddhistischen Pali-Kanons, Leiden 1989). It is impossible to list all the errors here: indeed, Schmidt published a small dictionary largely concerned with correcting them. Suffice it to quote from the editor's own Foreword and Introduction, where (p.10) he tries vainly and probably against his own better knowledge to defend Neumann's Hörerschaft (heatership) for sotāpatti (misspelt sota-patti), which is a simple mistake for 'stream-entry'. On p.11 Hecker further quotes from a well-known passage 'das Leiden, die Entwicklung, die Auflösung, den Weg' (suffering, development, dissolution, the path), which is to say the least misleading ('- it should have at least been dessen Entwicklung...i.e. development...'). And what of the (unannotated) reference (p.256) to 'der Freie Bruder Nathaputto', meaning the Nigantha (Jain) of that name? On the whole, Hecker's notes are more relevant and useful than those by Neumann they replace, even if they produce fewer striking parallels from world literature (- Neumann was very well read). Finally, the selection itself is odd: no Satipatthāna Sutta, yet room is found for No.150 with its lurid (and certainly late) description of hells. The German-reading public still awaits a standard translation of the Pali Canon.

Maurice Walsh


This is a welcome addition to the corpus of printed Pali literature from Thailand. Although the name of the author and the date and place of composition are unknown, the Foreword (p.1) suggests that the work (henceforth Jmn) was composed by a Thai during the Ayudhya period (mid-14th to mid-18th centuries). This seems a reasonable assumption since copies were made during the First Reign of the Bangkok period (1782-1809), especially since the work does not seem to be known in Sri Lanka or Burma. A list of the nine palm-leaf MSS preserved in the National Library shows that the Jmn was quite popular. All are in the Khaer or Knom script: Nos 1 and 3 were copies in the First Reign, Nos 4,7,8 and 9 in the Third Reign (1824-51), whilst Nos 2,5 and 6 are undated.

The Jmn is a life of the Buddha and thus belongs to the class of literature known in Thai as Buddha-prahvati. It is essentially an anthology: the unknown but erudite author has culled material relating to the career of the Bodhisatta/Buddha from a wide range of sources - canonical and post-canonical, prose and verse - and arranged it into a well-ordered chronological account. While most of the verses are from other sources, at least several are the work of the author. These are introduced by the phrase tava vaddhi (113.5, 120.6, 126.7) into the account of the early 'conversions', the prose of which is from the Vinaya Mahāvagga. Another three verses follow the Mahāvagga statements 'at that time there were 6,...7,...11,...or 61 arahants in the world': these are introduced by ke panete? (111.16, 121.13, 122.15) or sotthidam (115.8), and list the arahants in question. These verses are also probably by the unknown author. Some of the prose
may be original; whether this is so can only be determined by a thorough analysis of the text. In traditional manner, the author-editor rarely names his sources and is content to introduce them with such phrases as "yathā, tena vuttam, itam gātham-āha, etc. The few works that he does name include the Buddhavamsa (p.1.14, 100.18, 109.9, 148.20, 154.23, 170.5, 171.2) and its Vaṃśā (p.68.12), the Cariyapitaka (p.30.25), the Mahāpadāṇa-suttavānaṇā (p.65.3) and the Dhammapadagāthā (p.96.15). A number of verses from the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta are introduced by the phrase tenāh sāyātikākā (p.228.5, 233.6 and 22, 290.10), as are the verses on the thirty-two omens (pubbanimittā) that appeared to the Bodhisattva at the moment of his enlightenment (p.87.6).

The text opens with two verses of homage (panama-gāchā):

Having bowed my head in homage to the Buddha, to the Dhamma, well-taught by him, and to the unblemished Saṅgha, a field of merit unsurpassed, I will relate in brief the excellent Career of the Jina: listen without distraction for this account is rare indeed.

The author then explains the title and states the scope of the work: jinānīdanaṁ nāmetaṁ buddhanīnaṁ buddhakuramanuṣṭhānam buddhagocaranti veditabbam, amhāram hi bhagavato abhiniharato paṭchāya yāva par innibbaṇā niđānakāthā jinānīdanaṁ ti veditabbā... ('The Conqueror being the Buddha, the title "Genesis of the Conqueror" means the "sprint" of the Buddha, the vow of the Buddha, the career of the Buddha, the range of the Buddha. The story of our Lord from the [initial] vow [to become Buddha] up to his passing away is the "Genesis of the Conqueror".')

The first section, entitled Dīpankaraśa Jinaṇidānakāthā, takes us back four incalculable aeons plus one hundred thousand aeons to the city of Amarāvatī, and relates how the Bodhisattva, as the brahman youth Sumedha, met the Buddha Dīpankara. Relevant verses from the Buddhavamsa are cited at length. Then follow accounts of the bodhisattva's career under the remaining twenty-three past Buddhas; for Nos 2 to 23, the accounts are in prose and are quite brief, generally taking up less than half a page. The section on Kassapa, which is somewhat longer, includes verses from the Buddhavamsa.

The succeeding sections deal with the Bodhisatta's descent from Tuṣita, his birth and youth, the Great Renunciation, the victory over Mara, the first seven weeks after the Enlightenment, the early teachings, the series of miracles performed at Uruvela, the early conversions, and so on, up to the Parinibbāna and the division of the relics.

From this it may be seen that the Jān is a complete account of the career of the Bodhisatta/Buddha. Although it contains little material that is original, this by no means detracts from its value or interest. It has the merit of bringing a wide range of sources together under a single cover, and as such seems to be unique since it is the only Pali life of the Buddha that I know of that treats the subject in this manner. Thus the author's statement that 'this account is rare indeed' (dullabhā hi ayan kathā) appears justified.

The Pali text is complemented by a number of useful footnotes. References to the sources of the citations in Thai printed editions are frequently, but not consistently, given. The editors also supply alternate readings, without specifying the divergent manuscript(s), and frequently remark on variants between the Jān citations and the Thai printed editions, as well as on differences in the order of verses cited (Buddhavamsa, p.155, n.1). There are a number of interesting references to unprinted texts preserved in manuscript in the National Library: the Buddhacarita (pp.75, 87, 88, 99, 11) and the Pathamaṇamabhikāthā (pp.77, 79, 114). On p.69 the editors note that they have retained the form paṭhāriya (for paṭhāria, etc.), hicherto unattested, because it is given in all MSS. A particularly interesting feature of the Jān is that it gives in full the sixty-four verses spoken by Kāludāyi in order to persuade the Buddha to return to Kapilavatthu (bhaggavato kulānagaram ganiṭṭheṭṭhāya ganiṭṭhavānaṇām vappento catasatamacca gāthāyo, pp.156-67) and the eight Narasīha verses (aticchānaṁ bhagāchāya, pp.160-1).

Whilst the Pali text is unindexed, the Thai translation has an index of twenty-two pages. The Pali text does, however,
have a table of contents that supplies an unnumbered list of the sections or kathā; this enables the reader to locate the main events quite easily. The text is attractively printed and at the front of both volumes there are colour reproductions of a set of lacquer paintings, presumably from old cabinets, illustrating eleven scenes from the life of the Buddha. On this subject I would like to refer briefly to the Nidānakathā (Brah buddharaṭṭhavatī) of Than Chambp (Brah buddhaghosātharā) published by the Fine Arts Dept in 2528 (1985). This is a Thai translation of the Nidānakathā of the Jātaka-āthakathā by Dhanit Yupo, a former Director of the Dept. In his Introduction, the translator refers to a National Library Ms of the Jātaka (No.9 of the list given in the Introduction to the latter) and relates the following: 'I wrote to Miss I.B.Horner, President of the Pali Text Society, in London, England, to ask whether she had ever heard of a Pali biography of the Buddha entitled Jātaka, and whether she could send me any information about it. She replied that she was not aware of a text of this name, and recommended that I make enquiries in Burma. But I did not do so.'

Dhanit Yupo gives the verses of Kāludāyittthera and the Narāśthagathā from the Jātaka (Ms 9) in Pali and Thai as appendices to his work.

Peter Skilling


This compendium was composed by Srīmahāgala Mahāthera at Navapura (Chiangmai) in B.E.2503 (1520) and thus belongs to Lanna Thai or Northern Thai Pali literature. The text is divided into six kāṇḍa, which are subdivided into various kathā, as follows:

Introductory verses of homage: Panama-gathā;

Pathama-kāṇḍa: Cakkavāla-saripādi-niddesa;

Dutiyaka-kāṇḍa: Pabbatā-niddesa (Sinera-, Yussandharādi-, Himavatādi-pabbata-, Cakkavāla-pabbata-kathā);

Tatiya-kāṇḍa: Jālāsaya-niddesa (Samudda-, Sara-, Savantī-, Pokkhanayanādi-kathā);

Caturthaka-kāṇḍa: Dipa-niddesa (Mahādīpa-catukka, Paritta-dīpa);

Paddama-kāṇḍa: Bhūmi-niddesa (Apēyabhūmi-, Devabhūmi-kathā);

Chattha-kāṇḍa: Pokinnaka-vinīcchaya (Āyu-, Āhāra-, Bhūmi-ganāna-,

Rukkha-, Loka-, Lokadhātu-, Ananta-kathā).

Since the text consists almost entirely of quotations, there is very little that is original. However, Srīmahāgala displays a vast erudition and brings together material relevant to each topic from a wide variety of sources and periods: sūtra, aṭṭhakathā, tiṭṭha and late 'treatise' literature. Thus his work is an extremely handy source for the study of the development of Buddhist cosmology in Pali literature.

There is a preface that deals briefly with the author and his works, and an introduction that lists the palm-leaf manuscripts of the National Library utilised and discusses the editing and translation work. The sources of the citations are traced in the footnotes which also point out variants between the text and the printed Thai editions. There is a table of contents and a bibliography but no index. The Thai translation, which follows the text, is illustrated with nine colour plates from the Thonburi edition of the Traibhūmi-lokasaṅkhāna.

Peter Skilling

Lokapaṇṇatti. (Same publishers). B.E.2528 (1985)

This text, of uncertain authorship and date (12th-13th century), was published as a thesis by the late Eugène Denis under the title La Lokapaṇṇatti et les idées cosmologiques du bouddhisme ancien (Lille-Paris 1977), in the form of a critical romanised edition, a French translation, a lengthy introduction, copious notes and several appendices. The present edition has a brief introduction which deals with the question of authorship and the nature and structure of the text, but makes no mention whatsoever of the manuscript(s) employed. Furthermore, no critical notes, variants, or sources of citations are supplied. Only the Thai translation, which precedes the text, has an index. Because this is not a critical edition and we are not even told the provenance, script or date of the Ms(s) used, this edition cannot be of much use in unravelling the problems and history of the text. A random comparison with the Denis edition, primarily of the verses distinguished as such in print (- something that is not always done), shows that it is closest to the LP-1 of Denis: a Ms in the National Library, Bangkok. Sometimes, however, the text agrees with Denis' LP-2, a Ms belonging to l'Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient (Paris) and sometimes it agrees with neither.
Since we know nothing of the method or degree of editing, it is impossible to know whether the same text, LP-1, was read differently or 'corrected' by the editors, or is a new Ms belonging to a tradition similar to that of LP-1.

The text is accompanied by eight colour plates which, although the source is not mentioned, are from the Thonburi Traibhumi. Its main virtue is that it makes the Lokapāṭṭhattī accessible in Thai and Pali to the Thai public for the first time.

**Peter Skilling**

Lokadīpākasāra. (Same publishers). B.E.2529 (1986)

Also known as Lokappadīpākasāra, this is a treatise composed primarily in verse by Medhāṅkara Thera in the 14th century. The present edition has a foreword dealing with the nature of the text and the question of authorship, plus a list of Ms utilised, the oldest of those which are dated being a Khom script text of B.E.2314, in the Thonburi period. The Thai translation, which comes first, is followed by an index; the Pali text has no critical apparatus. The work is divided into eight pariccheda: Pañhama-pariccheda; Paṭhamama-pariccheda: Sakkārāloka-nīdāsas; Dutiya-pariccheda: Nirayagati-nīdāsas; Tatiya-pariccheda: Pette-ātī-nīdāsas; Cattutha-pariccheda: Tīracchānagati-nīdāsas; Paṭhanama-pariccheda: Mahāsagatī-nīdāsas; Chaṭṭha-pariccheda: Saggalika-nīdāsas; Sattama-pariccheda: Okalika-nīdāsas; Aṭṭhamā-pariccheda: Pañhakānayakaśa-nīdāsas.

As with the later Cakkavāḷadīpanī, the pariccheda are subdivided into kāthā.

This is an important and comprehensive treatise, dealing with many topics not found in the older Lokapāṭṭhattī, for the study of cosmology as had developed in Southeast Asia by the 14th century. The lengthy text, running to 300 pages for the Pali alone, is illustrated with eight colour plates from the Thonburi Traibhumi, again not named.

**Peter Skilling**


A genre of works called Traibhumi, dealing with the three worlds or levels of existence - the kāma-, rūpa-, and arūpa-bhūmi - became popular with the Thai from at least the reign of King Lidai or Mahādhāmarāja I of Sukhodaya in the mid-14th century. Lidai gives two lists of his sources, which include canonical texts, aṭṭhakathā, tiKā and a number of late cosmological treatises including the Lokapāṭṭhattī. According to the colophon of the Lokadīpākasāra, Medhāṅkara himself was sometime Lidaya-rājasa ṣaṇu, 'teacher of King Lidai'. The present work is a new edition of the king's work, the oldest extant composition, apart from inscriptions, in the Thai language. It is accompanied by critical notes and references to sources, and a glossary from old Sukhodaya Thai to modern Central Thai. The Introduction gives several cosmological charts and eight colour plates from the Thonburi Traibhumi.

**Peter Skilling**

Ed. For bibliographical notes, see BSR I,1 (1983-4), p.76.


Having studied these cryptic verses of Nāgārjuna for several years at Indiana University, Komito candidly reflected at last that 'What I didn't know was perhaps even more vast as a result of having learned a little'. Certainly, Nāgārjuna can have that effect on one! The teachings of this great philosopher have been an essential item on the curricula of Mahāyāna monasteries in India and Tibet for over one and a half thousand years and no-one has ever thought the subject easy. Perhaps, however, this very carefully thought-out volume will go some way towards clarifying the issues for the modern reader.

Chapter One is a fifty-page essay by the author in which he succinctly outlines the mental operations of living beings in order to show how each of us creates and sustains for himself a network of delusion that leads to endless suffering. The causes and conditions of Samsāra are shown to be based on our fundamental ignorance concerning the way things are in reality
and Nāgārjuna's task has always been to demolish that ignorance by means of his commentaries on the Perfection of Wisdom.

Chapter Two contains the bulk and main theme of the book: a presentation of the Śūnyatā-saptati-kārikā ('Seventy verses on Emptiness') by the 2nd century Indian sage, Nāgārjuna. The original verses of the text having been lost long ago, Komito has based his study on Tibetan translations - the texts of which he has thoughtfully included in the present publication. (How I wish that more authors and publishers would see fit to do this!) To begin with, a straightforward English translation of the seventy (actually seventy-three) verses is presented so that the original text can be read right through as a whole. This is followed by a careful breakdown of the work with each point being analysed and put into context. Thus, hopefully, the original author's intentions are made clear and the reader is guided to a state of insight into the Madhyamika philosophy which claims to have no philosophical position at all. Various views concerning the nature of reality are put forward and then demolished. If this kind of study is of interest to you then this particular book must be one of the best available. The two Tibetans who worked with Komito in its production are experts in their fields of philosophical commentary and translation so that the book really should be an accurate and authentic work that is at the same time lucid and readable. To have achieved this is no mean feat considering the difficult nature of its subject matter but, even so, the reader may find that he has to go through it more than once. Traditionally, of course, one may well have studied the works of Nāgārjuna in a monastic university for twenty years before being granted a 'Master's Degree' in the subject.

The third chapter delves into historical considerations concerning the treatises of Nāgārjuna, their importance in India and their translation into foreign languages as their teachings were transmitted abroad.

Finally, I am glad to note that only a little of what the author needed to say has been relegated to the footnotes in this book -- for they are not easy to consult. The Bibliography and Index, on the other hand, are both valuable contributions to its overall usefulness.

Martin Board


This book is a photomechanic reprint, slightly reduced in size, of the editio princeps which appeared in Gaekwad's Oriental Series in 1930, was reprint ed in the same series in 1968 but is now out of print.

It contains the Sanskrit text of the Nyāyapravēṣa ('Nyāyapravēṣakasūtrām' in the colophon) by the Buddhist author Śāṅkaraśāmin and the Sanskrit texts of the commentaries by the Jain authors, Haribhadrasūri and Parbadeva. The Sanskrit texts are followed by 104 pages of notes by Anandshankar B.Dhruva, which comment on all three texts. Although the commentaries are called 'Nyāyapravēṣavṛtti' and 'Nyāyapravēṣavṛttipāñjikā' in the title, the colophons read 'Nyāyapravēṣaśāṅkālīka' and 'Nyāyapravēṣāvṛttipāñjikā' respectively. These are the only commentaries on the Nyāyapravēṣa (NP from now on) extant and therefore, of course, important for its study. The NP is also available in Chinese and Tibetan translations. A Sanskrit fragment discovered by Walter Slage in the National Library (Vienna) supplied new material to this recension (see 'Miscellanea zu den Wiener Sanskrit-handschriften', WZKS 29, 1985, pp.151-4).

As an introduction to certain aspects of the Buddhist epistemological tradition, the NP is certainly good reading. However, before we arrive at a more profound understanding of Dīnāgā's contribution, we should not be too self-confident in interpreting this seemingly simple text.

Welcome as this reprint may be, especially as a reprint of the commentaries, one has to note the following blunder regarding the authorship of the NP: the Chinese tradition (the older one) attributes it to Śāṅkaraśāmin, the Tibetan one to Dīnāgā. However, there is nothing to add to the arguments of Giuseppe Tucci ('Is the Nyāyapravēṣa by Dīnāgā?', JRAS 1926, pp.7-15), which are in favour of the Chinese. (For a bibliography of the discussion see Musashi Tachikawa 'A Sixth-Century Manual of Indian Logic. A Translation of the Nyāyapravēṣa', Journal of Indian Philosophy 1, 1971, pp.111-45, p.119, n.3.) The attribution

Among the works brought back by the German, French and British expeditions to Chinese Turkestan in the first years of this century were many texts belonging to the Sarvāstivāda school. In 1913 Pinot published an edition of the Prātimokṣa of that school, based upon the Pelliot manuscripts. The work could be identified because what remained of it corresponded exactly with the Chinese recension included in the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya. His edition was accompanied by a translation into French of Kumārajīva's Chinese rendering.

The German texts from Turfan and elsewhere also contain fragments of the same text, as do the collections in London. Basing his work upon the identifications of the German material already made by Else Lüders and Herbert Härtel, Prof. von Simson (Oslo University) has now produced a very meticulous treatment of all the unpublished portions of this work as a preparatory step towards establishing a critical edition of the Sarvāstivāda version of the Prātimokṣa.

It is to be hoped that Part II of this work, which will comprise a critical study of the text, will not long be delayed.

K. R. Norman


As is well known, the Patimokkha does not have an independent existence in the Pāli Canon, but is incorporated in the Vinaya Piṭaka. At the end of the Bhikkhu Patimokkha (Vin I PTS ed. IV 207, 11-19) there is a short prose epilogue in the form of a brief summary of its contents, stating the numbers of rules in each category, except for the sekhiyā dhammā. All the extant Prātimokṣa of the other Hinayāna sects also have a similar summary. The other versions, however, differ from the Pāli in that, after the prose summary, they have sets of verses, varying in number and ascribed to the last seven Buddhas, from Vipaśyin down to Śākyamuni, either individually or to the seven as a group. Most of these verses are also found in Pāli, not in the Vinaya but elsewhere in the Canon, mainly in the Dhammapada and Udāna, where they are attributed to Gotama Buddha.

The starting point of the book under review is the presence among the German Turfan material of many fragments of the Sanskrit version of the Prātimokṣa of the Sarvāstivāda, and also of two folios of a translation of the summary and verses into the 'A' dialect of Tocharian. After a brief introduction, Dr Schmidt describes the German material together with the Pelliot Prātimokṣa material from Paris which he has used for his study. The major part of the book consists of a synopsis of this material and a comparison with parallel versions from other sects. The Sarvāstivāda recension of the summary and fifteen verses, as reconstituted from the fragments, is given at the head of the page. Under it are set out all these fragments so that it is possible to comprehend the basis for each portion of the Sanskrit text. Below that are reproduced the following versions: Tocharian; Mūlasarvāstivāda as found in Gilgit; Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravāda, photographed in Tibet by Rāhula Sakṛtyāyana; Pāli; and, for the verses alone, what has been identified as the Dhammaputta version written in Prakrit in the Kharoṣṭhī script on a tablet discovered by Aurel Stein in Chinese Turkestan. Other parallels to individual verses are quoted from various Pāli texts, the Gāndhārī Dhammapada, the Udāna, where as many as eleven of the fifteen verses occur, the Divyāvadāna, and some fragments
The reconstituted Sanskrit text is then given separately in full. The text of the Tocharian version is also set out separately, followed by a German translation and a short commentary. A set of appendices gives the readings of three each of the German Sanskrit fragments and Pelliot Prātimokṣa manuscripts, of which two seem not to belong to the Sarvāstivādin school. Improved readings are given for the folio used by Finot for his edition of the Prātimokṣa. The readings of the editions of the Mūlasarvāstivādin recension by A.C.Banerjee are so unsatisfactory that Dr Schmidt has made a revised version of the relevant portion from the facsimile edition of the Gilgit Ms published by Raghu Vira and Lokesh Chandra. The final appendix provides a concordance of the names of the Buddhas cited in the verses, compared with the list found in the Mahāvādanā. There is an index of Sanskrit words found in these two concluding portions of the Prātimokṣa, with Tocharian equivalents where they occur. This is followed by a Tocharian index, with Sanskrit equivalents in brackets. The work ends with reproductions of one of the Pelliot folios (recto and verso) and the two Tocharian folios (recto and verso).

Dr Schmidt's monograph is of importance for two reasons. In the first place it shows, in an exemplary way, just what can be done in the way of reconstructing a text from fragments. In the second place the text it reconstructs gives information about the early history of the Prātimokṣa. The fact that the vākipāya dhammā have no number doubtless explains how it came about that each school of Buddhism was able to have a different number of rules in this category. From the fact that all versions have the prose epilogue but the Pāli recension lacks the verses we can deduce that the prose predates the split between the Theravādins and the other schools, whereas the verses represent a post-schism addition. The variations in the order and number of verses and in their attribution doubtless represent differences in the traditions of the non-Theravādin lineages of Buddhism.

K.R. Norman

Zur Schuizugehörigkeit von Werken der Hinayāna-Literatur II. (Symposion zur Buddhismusforschung,III,2) Ed.by Heinz Bechert. (Abhandlung der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Philo-
to be unsuccessful, because the relationship between the various schools and the recensions of texts belonging to those schools is by no means a clear-cut matter. In these discussions we must be aware of the fact that the relationship between the two schools varied from country to country. We might assume that in India they were still closely connected, whereas in Central Asia the effect of interrelationship was perhaps not so strongly felt, and there the Sarvāstivādins remained more independent and evolved a standardised version of their texts which did not owe as much to the Mūlasarvāstivādins as in India proper.

The conclusion which I draw from Schmithausen's examination of these very complicated relationships (to which are appended indexes of names, quotations from other languages, words, and various tables of parallel passages) is that we must reconsider many of the statements which have been made about the affiliation of literary texts to schools. Many proposed affiliations have been based upon the evidence of an individual verse or passage being identified as a quotation from a literary text belonging to a particular school, which is taken as proving that the work containing that verse or passage must therefore also belong to that school. It now seems that it would be quite possible for a Sarvāstivādin text (say) to include a quotation of a verse found in a Mūlasarvāstivādin version of another text. Such evidence is clearly of no value for defining the affiliation of these texts.

Such is the confusing nature of the situation that it is likely that some of Schmithausen's statements have been vitiated by his own findings, e.g. he states that the affiliation of the Yogācārabhūmi and other Yogācāra works with the Mūlasarvāstivādins is confirmed by a quotation from the Prātimokṣasūtra which only fits the wording of their version of that text. It would, however, be possible to suggest, in view of his other findings, that such a wording was introduced into a Sarvāstivādin text by a Sarvāstivādin who was acquainted with Mūlasarvāstivādin works.

Despite this sense of uncertainty which he has inserted into the problem, two of Schmithausen's conclusions seem certain, and are especially important: (1) there must have been a close contact between the Sarvāstivādins and the Mūlasarvāstivādins as is shown by the many common traits in their canonical texts, which distinguish them from other schools; and (2) the Mūlasarvāstivādins had a Vinaya-, Sūtra- and Kṣudraka-Ṭīkā peculiar to themselves and different not only from the Central Asian Sarvāstivādins but also from the Indian Vaibhāṣikas.

K.R. Norman


This book might almost equally well have been entitled Principles of Buddhist Philosophy if the author had not already written a book with a similar title *. It is, therefore, no surprise to find a (very short) first chapter headed 'History of Buddhist Philosophy - An Interpretation', perhaps the most important sentence of which (p.3) is: 'For nearly thirty years, [Murti's] interpretation of Nāgārjuna's philosophy has dominated modern scholarship, providing justification for an age-old sectarian conflict between Theravāda and Mahāyāna. Indeed, the final victim is the Buddha himself, who is presented not only as a metaphysician whose ideas had to be improved on by his later disciples, but also as one who did not have the capacity to instruct his immediate disciples in the truth he had discovered.' This needed saying.

This is an extremely valuable book and remains so even if certain points of its argument can be called into question. A main contention is the denial that the goal of Buddhism is to 'facilitate the development of a transcendentally state of consciousness beyond the reach of linguistic expression' (p.xi). Even if one may query this conclusion, it is possible to go along with a great deal of the argument. The main issues are neatly summarised on p.108 with reference to the controversies discussed in the Kathāyathu: (i) The nature of the self (topic 1.), (ii) The nature of the objective world (topic 6) and (iii) The nature of freedom (topics 11-53, 176-84 etc.). To anticipate, I feel that Prof. Kalupahana has proved his case in regard to points (i) and (ii). Any reservations I may have regarding (iii), which essentially concerns Nibbāna and the question of ultimate reality, are purely due to my own ignorance. As Nyāṇaṭṭiloka wrote in his Buddhist Dictionary, 'it is an essential preliminary condition to grasp fully the truth of Anattā, the egolessness or insub-
Buddhists, Buddhist, paccattāna, any, but Part, point, in, be, person, me, 'a', rather, the, 'substantialism', say, them, me, am, observe, well, Moggaliputta-tissa (to whom the Kathāvatthu is ascribed).

The book falls into two parts: I. The Buddha's Psychological Reflections and II. Revisions and Resurrections. The analyses of the first part owe much to William James, who in these post-Freudian and post-Jungian days seems to be experiencing something of a comeback. Certainly there are things in James's psychology which have yet to achieve general recognition, such as the statement (not mentioned in this book) that we are angry because we have a feeling of anger, and not the reverse. This, though denied by a recent writer, is obvious to any practitioner of insight meditation. Most of what Kalupahana has to say in this part, though admirable, calls for little comment, but there is an error on p. 33 that ought not to pass unheeded: 'The Buddha's claim that even a person who has attained freedom (nibbāna) continues to experience pleasant (manāpa) as well as unpleasant (amanāpa) sensations so long as his sensory faculties remain, is a clear indication that he is not a person without emotions'. The whole point, surely, is that the enlightened feel sensations, nice or nasty, like the rest of us do, but do not react to them with what, in English, is termed 'emotion'. Such reactions of the worldling are not 'feeling' in the sense of vedanā, but belong to the saikhārakkhanda. It is in fact an important part of the meditative process just to observe the sensations and to learn to avoid, increasingly, giving way automatically to such emotional reactions. What the enlightened person does perfectly, the meditator succeeds in achieving partially to a varying extent.

In Part II, the point concerning Nāgārjuna is developed, and here it is made clear that the main target of his attack was the 'substantialism' of the Sarvāstivādins and Sautrāntikas, which modern scholars had wrongly ascribed to 'primitive Buddhism'. That this kind of 'substantialism' cannot rightly be imputed to Theravāda can be easily seen (sabbe dhammā anattāl). By what looks rather like a sleight of hand, however, the author then proceeds to use 'substantialism' in a rather different sense which is more debatable. Surely the idea, whether right or wrong, that Nibbāna is, or is perceived by means of, 'a transcendental state of consciousness beyond the reach of linguistic expression', is not sufficiently similar to Sarvāstivādin ideas about the nature of dharmas to be fittingly referred to by the same term.

Kalupahana gives a brilliant account of Nāgārjuna and also what to me is a new and convincing interpretation of the Yogācāra school, along with much else (although his criticism of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra will not be popular in Zen circles). If I am a shade less carried away by his enthusiastic championship of the neglected Moggaliputta-tissa, that is probably due to my ignorance. The appendices with text, translation, and commentary, from Maitreyanātha and Vasubandhu, are valuable in their own right. And as to the ultimate question of whether or not Nibbāna or liberation supposes 'a transcendental state of consciousness beyond the range of linguistic expression', I can only humbly fall back on the statement that the Dhamma is paccattāma vedītabbo vinādhī, which seems to me to imply something of the sort. But then, I am not sufficiently vinādhī to know for myself (paccattām). Is Professor Kalupahana? I wouldn't know.

Maurice Walshe

*Buddhist Philosophy. A Historical Analysis. Honolulu 1976


In these days of global awareness and instant worldwide communication, everyone agrees on the necessity for better mutual understanding between the world's major religions. Interreligious dialogue has become a familiar concept, especially in the area of Christian-Buddhist relations, where it is being vigorously pursued through conferences, seminars, workshops, East-West monastic exchanges and so on, and where numbers of Christian writers...
have attempted, with varying degrees of genuine open-mindedness, to come to terms with the Buddhahammad.

There have been a few serious attempts at a real understanding and synthesis, such as the immensely perceptive and well-informed writings of Fr R. Panikkar, S.J., in particular his outstanding *Il silenzio di Dio - La risposta del Buddha*. There has been the touchingly humble, loving approach of Fr Anatriello in *The Long Discourses of the Buddha* (reviewed above). However, old ethnocentric habits die hard. All too often one comes across books which are merely new jars for the old wine of Christian spiritual pride. Bristling with textual references, arguing with casuistic subtlety and issuing in radically contrary interpretations of basic Buddhist tenets. Thus, Fr J. Pérez-Romón in *Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism*, reviewed in this same journal.

And thus, alas, also the subject of the present review. Fr Pérez-Romón set out to prove that *anatta* was an ontologically real, eternal, transcendent entity, i.e., not to put too fine a point on it, God. And now Dr Masefield, as the deliberately provocative title of his book indicates, purports to demonstrate the divinely revealed nature of the Buddha's message. Thus is errant Buddha brought into the fold of monotheistic revealed religion. We may now perhaps look forward to some further latter-day scholastic proving (to his satisfaction if not to ours) that the Tiratana of Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha is just another formulation of the Holy Trinity!

However, let us turn to Masefield's book. This is identical to his Ph.D. dissertation entitled 'Thus They Once Heard: Oral Initiation in the Pali Nikāyas', submitted to the University of Lancaster in 1979. There is a parallelism there with Pérez-Romón's book which is also based on a doctoral thesis. One may wonder to what extent the controversial stance of both works may not have been stimulated by young men's urge to shock the academic establishment. Masefield is certainly fully aware of flying in the face of scholarly tradition. Right at the beginning he claims that 'the labours of a band of international scholars have provided us with thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of books on Buddhism...yet when we seek for a book going beyond a general introduction to the religion we tend often to seek in vain', and that 'not only are the majority of such generalisa-

rions not substantiated by the texts but also that they are often contradicted by the wealth of suttas lying between those usually cited' (p.xv). There is, of course, a lot of truth in his contention that 'much of the basic terminology and symbolism of the Nikāyas is still in need of detailed investigation' (p.xv), although more has been done than he seems willing to admit. And one cannot but approve of the expression of scholarly caution with which the Preface ends: 'My next reading of the Nikāyas will probably cause me to rethink some of the claims made in the present work but if, in the meantime, enough has been said to stir others into realisation of the need for a re-examination of the Buddhism portrayed in the Nikāyas, my efforts will have been rewarded' (p.xx).

An unexceptionably moderate sentiment, but hardly borne out by the curt manner in which the wealth of scholarship to the contrary [of his own views] (p.136) is dismissed in the body of the book, where some of the most respected scholars of our time come in for rather rough treatment. The 'German monk Nyāgati-loka (- is the stress on 'German' somehow meant to imply a disqualification?), author of the fundamental *Buddhist Dictionary* is accused of repeated 'misrepresentation' (p.38) and dismissed as having 'got himself into [a] muddle' (p.42). The conception (universally shared by Buddhists of all schools) of the Eightfold Path as a gradual development, starting with a preliminary intellectual understanding (*pariyatti*) and progressing through practice (*paṭipatti*) to experiential realisation (*paṭivedha*), as faultlessly formulated by Ven. Sangharakshita (founder of the Friends of the Western Buddhist Order) is held up to ridicule as 'a travesty of the teachings of the Nikāyas' (p.43). (Inevitably so, since the essence of Masefield's argument hinges, as will be seen, on the rejection of this proposition.) Lama Anagarika Govinda is taken to task for saying that 'faith in a divine revelation...cannot be found in the Buddha's teaching' (p.60), and Ven. Walpola Rahula is accused of ignoring the texts and producing question-begging definitions on account of having stated the evident fact that, since the idea of a Creator God is utterly alien to Buddhism, it is inconceivable and absurd to talk about the operation of divine grace (p.138).

Yet Masefield himself having, by his own account, perused
the Nikāyas with dedicated attention, is unable to produce one single incontrovertible text in support of his own view. His whole case rests on learned inference and interpretation. Based on abundant textual discussion, to be sure, and on closely argued presentation, but not any more convincing for all that to anyone who does not share his basic assumption which, very simply, relies on the definition of 'initiation' as an act of supernatural grace.

The author's point is that salvation in early Buddhism depended upon the saving intervention of the Buddha's grace, that Buddhism, as portrayed in the Pali Canon, was a typical revealed religion (— see especially pp.xviii—xix, 93-4, 136) and that the Buddha, far from teaching a discipline of pragmatic self—endeavour available to all, 'was every bit the Indian guru' and propounded a salvation scheme characterised by 'lack of universality' (p.15). In working towards these conclusions, Masefield raises historical, technical and linguistic issues which are, in themselves, of considerable interest (such as the spiritual division of the Buddhist world, the precise distinctions between different varieties of enlightened persons, or the relationship between Buddhism and Brahmanism). Given the limitations of a review format, however, they must regretfully be left aside to concentrate on the main thrust of his argument, which may briefly be summarised as follows:

1. The eightfold path begins necessarily with right view (xviii) and progress on it takes place in strict sequential order, i.e. the attainment of each successive factor is dependent upon successful accomplishment of its predecessor (94).

2. The right view which constitutes access to the path cannot be acquired by any effort of one's own: 'since the path would seem to incorporate all aspects of Buddhist practice this entails that there can be no practice by means of which such right view might be acquired' (xviii, my emphasis).

3. Consequently, the only way to obtain right view and thus be able to start practising the path is through a specially tailored oral initiation imparted by the Buddha (xvii).

4. However, that is not all. Even when one has been initiated into the path by the grace of the Buddha, and thus become an arīyāsāvaka, a noble disciple, a second initiation is required to attain the fruit of the path. As the author recapitulates it: 'I have hoped to demonstrate that, in spite of the wealth of scholarship to the contrary, both of these stages were occasioned by way of an oral teaching from the Buddha: first, we have found that in theory there would seem to be no practice by means of which right view might by acquired and that in practice this was always acquired through hearing Dhamma; secondly, though in theory the eightfold path would seem to be the means to attaining the (various) goal(s), these too were in practice always brought about by a further oral teaching' (136).

5. The whole being regarded as an exercise of grace on the part of the Buddha (p.xix and section on 'The necessity of grace and the disappearance of the sāvaka', pp.136-44), whose action in this respect is compared to that of the Hindu goddess Sri Lakshmi (139).

Now obviously you cannot start practising Dhamma (or anything else, for that matter) unless you have been told about it and have understood the instructions. However, what is not clear, in spite of all Masefield's efforts, is why you should only be able to start doing so after having received a divine grace from on high, rather like having no access to Christian salvation unless you have received the sacrament of baptism.

The issue of the pre- eminent importance of divine grace (as contrasted with man's own works) as the means of salvation is of course a very old one within Christianity and is, in fact, inherent in the very structure of monotheistic theologies based on alleged divine revelation. To find it now imported into a discussion of the Buddha's teaching is, to say the least, a novel experience. But is the approach relevant? Dr Masefield deploys all his considerable powers of persuasion to demonstrate that it is. To this end he quotes many instances from the Pali suttas where the Buddha's preaching results in the conversion of listeners, and maintains that all of these show the characteristics of an initiation through grace giving instantaneous access to the supermundane path by granting to the favoured person a right view which involves at least the degree of insight of a sotāpanna. This is the crucial point in his argument, and it is my contention that he fails to prove it satisfactorily.
Certainly, the Buddha's preaching in the Nikāyas results time and again in the conversion of listeners. But conversion, i.e., the shedding of previously held convictions and adoption of a new belief which is found to be more congenial or more convincing is far from being necessarily bound up with the operation of supernatural grace. The experiences of conversion can occur, and are shown in the Pali texts to occur, at different levels. What they all have in common is the feeling of wonder at hearing at last someone explain things in a way that makes complete sense, the feeling expressed in the standard formula: 'Wonderful, venerable sir, wonderful! It is as if one were to set upright what was upside down, or reveal what was hidden, or show the way to one who was lost, or carry a lamp into the darkness so that those with eyes might see the things that are to be seen.'

However, this initial sense of discovery is in itself no more than the intellectual perception of the correctness of the teaching. What follows thereafter depends on the person's circumstances and karmic disposition; some simply take refuge in the Three Jewels and carry on as householders, others decide to leave the household life, go forth and seek ordination. For many of them, the degree of initial understanding, or Right View, is just enough to provide the motivation to start on the long purposeful journey to deliverance. For some 'with very little dust in their eyes', a first hearing suffices to bring about an experience of liberation (one of the four fruits of the Path), as in the case of Kondañña, the ascetic, on hearing the Buddha's first discourse at Isipatana.

Only in these latter instances could one conceivably try to make a case for the operation of supernatural grace, were it not that it is always made clear that such occasions concern persons who, like Kondañña, have already made considerable progress (in this and in previous lives) through their own efforts, and have thus reached a point where intellectual apprehension can trigger off, either immediately or shortly after, the actual change of consciousness. 'You yourselves must make the effort, the Tathāgatas are only teachers', to bring up yet again one of those passages that Masefield complains are too often quoted. Hence the Buddha's own emphatic disclaimer, as found in another well-known text, the Gānakamoggalāna Sutta. There the Buddha is asked why don't all his disciples attain final deliverance, 'since there is Nibbāna, and the way leading to it, and Master Gotama as guide', and he answers with the smile of the road to Rājagaha. Suppose, says the Buddha, someone asks you the way to Rājagaha, and you tell him in detail yet he still takes a wrong turning and gets lost, while someone else, having been given identical instructions, follows them correctly and reaches Rājagaha. 'Why is that?' asks the Buddha of the questioner who, naturally enough, replies that he cannot be responsible for how others follow the instructions; he merely told them the way. 'Similarly', says the Buddha, 'when my disciples are advised and instructed by me, some attain Nibbāna and some do not. What have I do with that, brahman? A Tathāgata is simply one who shows the way'. The point could not be made more tellingly. The Buddha shows you the way. Whether, and how, you follow it is your own business. No supernatural agency or power of grace is involved or implied.

The author's constant claim is that he is getting back to the texts, 'to make a fresh and independent attempt to understand' (xvi-xvii). He declares that the texts 'should be seen in their own terms' and stresses that 'one must be very careful to avoid passing judgements of one's own' (xvi). A very sensible principle which, however, is not always seen to inform his actual dealing with the texts.'If the Buddhism of ancient India', states Masefield, 'is to be understood it will have to be remythologised in the sense that there will have to be restored to its technical and metaphorical language all the nuances and associations its terms once had for those who heard them' (xvi). And there, of course, lies the rub, since such a restoration cannot ultimately be anything but a matter of more or less informed personal judgment.

To perceive a discourse as its original hearers or readers did is of course every scholar's dream. But every scholar also knows that it is an impossible dream. Even when dealing with our own contemporaries it is difficult enough (except for very simple messages) for a reader or hearer from a different group, language or culture to achieve the exhaustive understanding implied in the phrase 'all the nuances and associations'. How much more so when the message is complex and two and a half millenia

old. As Dr George Steiner admirably put it in his perspicacious study of language: 'The meaning [to the modern student] of a word or sentence uttered in the past is no single event or sharply defined network of events. It is a recreative selection made according to hunches or principles which are more or less informed, more or less astute and comprehensive' 9. With all respect due to Dr Masefield's powers of argument and painstaking industry, one may be forgiven for not sharing his hunches and thus not being able to accept his recreative selection.

Amadeo Solé-Leris

3 Asterisks are used by Masefield to identify technical terms applicable only to a noble disciple as defined by him, i.e., someone who is at least a sotāpanna, a stream-enterer, as a consequence of having received the grace of an oral initiation from the Buddha.
5 I.A. stream-enterer, once-returner, non-returner or arahant.
7 Dhammapada XX.4.


Despite the grandiose title, this slim book gets nowhere near to the essentials of the subject. A perusal through the 158 large-print pages of the main text reveals that it is composed of tedium of canonical paraphrases and summaries of the ideas of other scholars. On reading the text more closely, the slipshod editing, with numerous misprints and take-it-or-leave-it diacriticals, reinforces a first impression of a book knocked together in haste after very limited and superficial research and almost no original analysis.

The project from the outset is hopelessly unrealistic. The book is described in the author's Foreword as 'an attempt to treat Buddhist ethics taking into account the whole spectrum of Buddhism from Thersavada through Mahayana to Buddhist Tantra, thus avoiding the lamentable parochialism exhibited by many Buddhist scholars' (p.vii). The desire to avoid parochialism must be endorsed, but it is not achieved simply by including long quotations from translations of a haphazard selection of Mahayana sources such as Entering the Path of Enlightenment, Perfection of Wisdom Texts and extracts from Hua Yen. As for Tantra, it is the author's idiosyncratic belief that 'the central philosophical thesis of Tantraism can be seen best formulated in the Vimalakirtinirdesa Sutra', from which he proceeds to extract several pages of quotes. With earlier brief references to the Tibetan Book of the Dead and some muddled remarks on non-duality, this concludes the coverage of Tantra.

Another bold claim made in the Foreword is that 'Buddhist ethics cannot be satisfactorily analysed through western categories of ethical analysis (...) because the basic Buddhist ethical [sic] principles are not amenable at all to narrow western thought categories'. There are assertions throughout of this kind with no attempt at justification nor apparently even an awareness of the complexity of the issues raised. Nevertheless, having dismissed Western thought categories the author proceeds to employ them in Chapter 3 and gets himself into an appalling mess. On a superficial acquaintance with the terminology of philosophical ethics he makes sweeping and ill-considered statements such as: 'In Buddhist morality, the end can and does justify the means' (p.32); and 'Buddhism does not regard “goodness” as a moral absolute' (p.33). As to typology, he concludes that Buddhist ethics is a form of act-utilitarianism.

While many of these claims may be arguable or even true (I personally believe they are not), there is at no point a serious examination of the evidence or consideration of alternative viewpoints. To raise only a few obvious problems: if the end justifies the means, why are there apparently absolute prohibitions on certain actions, such as taking life? What is meant by describing ‘goodness’ as a moral absolute? Are there any moral absolutes in Buddhism? If Buddhism is a form of act-utilitarianism, why are there so many moral rules? If it is utilitarian in any
form at all, how can the author also maintain that 'Path action is disinterested action. One is only interested in the act never in the fruit' (p.36), a view normally associated with a deontological system. The statement that 'the Buddha (...) advocates treating all beings as ends in themselves' (p.26) again seems to contradict this conclusion. The author may well have answers to all these points, but there is not even an acknowledgement of the problems to be found in these pages.

There are hosts of other problematic assertions, such as 'The Buddha maintains that life is the only ultimate, intrinsic and sacred value in this universe' (p.26). No references are supplied which specifically back this up, but if it is so, one wonders why the main thrust of Buddhism is directed towards escaping as quickly as possible from existence of any kind and why life is constantly characterised as dukkha? Why is life an 'ultimate' value, and what structural model of Buddhist values has been used to allow this claim to be made? What about wisdom and compassion as important values? The reverse could easily be argued, namely, that life in itself receives a very low priority, and that only certain forms of life (those involving the practice of Buddhist virtues) have any real value. It is hard to see an eternity of lifetimes in Samsāra as an ultimate value for Buddhism.

The two chapters in which the above issues are explored (2 and 3) are hopelessly confused. The author is clearly out of his depth and has made no effort to think the problems through: his entire research seems to boil down to a short article by Jayatilleke in 1972. Nor is it acceptable to dodge the difficult questions by taking refuge in obscurantist talk about the 'transcendence' of available analytical categories and gesticulating vaguely towards the Mahāyāna doctrine of Emptiness.

There is very little evidence of original thought in this book. The writer's research seems to have amounted to plundering the Canon and the works of other authors. Thus Chapter 5 on the sublime virtues is borrowed almost entirely from Harvey Aronson's Love and Sympathy in Theravāda Buddhism, a debt the author acknowledges. Chapter 6 is a summary of the Aggaṅña Sutta while Chapters 7 and 8 quote extensively from the Sigāloṇḍa and Cakkavattisāhanā Suttas. Chapter 9 acknowledges a large debt to Gokulas

De's Democracy in Early Buddhist Sangha, with 13 of the 17 references in the Chapter drawn from this source alone. Chapter 10 on the bodhisattva owes a good deal to Marion Matics' Entering the Path of Enlightenment, while Chapter 11 on Mara is heavily indebted to Trevor Ling's Buddhism and the Mythology of Evil.

Leaving aside the debt to Jayatilleke in the earlier chapters, what is left? - only an Appendix entitled 'Buddhism and the Modern World' which seems at odds with ideals expressed in the main body of the book. Even more extraordinary claims are made here, such as that 'All good and bad and the whole of morality is meant only to serve the function of preserving the species'; 'Ordinary morality is always a group morality'; 'Human societies behave exactly like societies of rats...'.

There is a great need for serious studies of Buddhist ethics which take the subject beyond the 'Bible stories' level of extracts from the Canon. There are already perfectly sound books, such as Saddhātissa's classic work [reviewed below], which summarise the ethical prescriptions of the Pali texts, and there are translations of the texts of other schools for those who wish to read them. This raises the question of why Dr Dharmasiri wrote this book at all: ethics is a field in which he plainly has no expertise and nothing original to contribute. It is a book which has the mark of being compiled in haste, which cannot pursue an argument for more than a couple of sentences, which contains eccentric ideas and which can only breed confusion in the mind of any reader unfortunate enough to come into contact with it.

Damien Keown


This excellent work has long been out of print and it is, therefore, good news to see its appearance, especially since it has not been superseded from any other quarter. The republication is timely indeed - as the author points out with great conviction in his preface - for the world is witnessing a rapid degeneration of human behaviour which can only be reversed by adherence to ethics.

The author's lucid style is most praiseworthy. His theme
is of vital importance, because in all schools of Buddhism the practical realisation is based upon it. 'An immoral man/woman cannot reach Nirvāṇa' - this is the basic premise, without which we are not entitled to speak of Buddhism at all. Dr Saddhātissa explains ethics not only in Western terms - his main effort is placed within the context of the totality of Buddhist moral principles and, whilst doing so, the Buddha's Teaching becomes crystal clear in outline. Moreover, by reading the book one will become familiar with many of the scriptures of the various schools of Vedic and Upaniṣadic thought.

It is advisable to ponder and bear in mind what the scholarly author writes in the Preface and throughout the book. 'Buddhismus ist Wirklichkeitslehre' (Buddhism is the Teaching of Reality') was a definition of the Dharma/Dharma of the Buddha made by Paul Dahlke, a German Buddhist in the 1920s. And truly, if the Teaching of the Buddha is not based on Reality, cannot become one with it, what is the purpose of it for us? Fortunately, the Tathāgata taught Reality and the same can be said of the present book also.

Although the book has been written by a Theravāda monk and radiates the spirit of the Pali Canon, because of its universality it will readily appeal to all Buddhists irrespective of their denominations or traditions. The eight chapters are completed with notes and index, whilst the whole work is beautifully presented, well-researched and edited. It deserves to become a treasure for all Buddhists.

Lajos Györkős

Madhyamaka Schools in India. Peter Della Santina. Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi 1986. xxiii, 242 pp. Rs 100

This book sets out to introduce the two main branches of Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka philosophy to readers unfamiliar with this highly important and interesting school of Buddhist, and Indian, thought.

Briefly stated, the Svātantrika branch starting with Udhāva-viveka (Abhava), rejecting as it did the negative hypothetical propositions used by Buddhālīta as assailable and inconclusive, sought to formulate the principles of Madhyamaka philosophy in the form of standard and self-sufficient inferences and syllogisms containing terms mutually established for both the proponent and his opponent, a logical reason and an example. In this the Svātantrikas were no doubt influenced by the logical and epistemological achievements of the Pramāṇa-schools represented in particular by Dignāga. On the other hand, the Prāsaṅgikas held such commonly established and independent (svatantra) inferences and syllogisms to be unavailable to the true follower of Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka; and, instead, they used basically apagogic (negative hypothetical) reasoning of the prasaṅga type, where the subject did not in fact need to be established in common for both the Madhyamika and his substantialist opponent. Both branches nevertheless agreed in maintaining that, in the case of negative statements, the negation is of the absolute (non-implicative and non-presuppositional) prasaṅga variety, rather than of the relative implicative paryudāsa kind which presupposes an entity that subsists as a sort of remainder after negation of its opposite. For the Madhyamika, the point of these doctrinal differences is that they relate directly to how the Theory or understanding of ultimate reality and Emptiness (Aṇyata) arises in the mental-spiritual continuum of the philosopher-practiser of the Madhyamaka.

After a general sketch of the origins of the Madhyamaka and its main masters in India, the author turns to the place occupied by logic in this division between the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika, and to developments in the controversies between them. Special attention is given to the Madhyamika's rejection of the four alternative positions of conceptual thinking (kotī) as expressed by Nāgārjuna in Madhyamakakārikā 1.1. In his treatment of the fourth position - origination from no cause at all - the author does not raise the question of the excluded middle in the fourth kotī ('neither...nor').

The book covers a wide range of diverse topics and problems. The presentation of arguments and the summaries tend to be discursive and rather general, so that many thorny but essential points are not brought out. The discussion of highly important logical-epistemological problems as well as the documentation and references sometimes leave the reader without the material he needs. Thus, once it is interestingly said that, in addition to the Svātantrikas, the Prāsaṅgikas also 'seem' to accept the division between a conceptualised or 'modal' pāramārttha and a 'non-
modal' paramārtha (p. 206); but no documentation or reference to a source are supplied, and the relevant terms (sa) paryāya and aparītya are not in the index.

This book represents the author's doctoral dissertation written in the 1970s for the University of Delhi, and remains unrevised in the light of publications between c. 1975 and the date of its own publication. In his work in India the author has benefited from the help of scholars of the Sa-skya tradition, in particular Sa-skya khrī-'dzin and mkhan-po A-pad.

Of special interest, then, is the use made in several chapters of this book of the great Madhyamaka commentary (the rGyal ba thams cad 'kyi thugs 'kyi dgon pa zab mo dbyu ma'i de kho na hīd spyl'i dag gis ston pa, Mee don rab gsal) by Go-rams-pa bSod-nams sen-ge (1429-89), one of the principal authorities of the Sa-skya school after Sa-skya Pandita (misspelt Šākya Pandita on p. 101) himself. The page references to this commentary are, however, only to a reprint (Dehra Dun 1975) rather than to the standard facsimile of the sDe-dge edition which is widely available; as a consequence, a reader wishing to follow up finer points in Go-rams-pa's commentary is obliged to engage in laborious searching through a text of 208 folios. Such a need for further following up a matter is felt, for example, when Go-rams-pa's set of valid instruments of knowledge are left unidentified by their Tibetan (or Sanskrit) names on pp. 207-13. An Appendix gives an interesting summary of Koṅ-gston's biography of Go-rams-pa.

This volume contains much that will be of interest to a student of the philosophy and theory of liberation of the Madhyamaka. It will provide a modern enquirer with a readable account of a number of the questions with which the Madhyamikas of India and Tibet were concerned.

D. Seyfort Ruegg

Ed. To illustrate the delay in publication (see Introduction, p.xiv), the Sōnyatāsaprapti and Yukṣaṣapraśaṇa have been edited and translated by Chr. Lindner in his anthology, Nagarjuniana (1982) and the latter text ditto by P. Tola and C. Dragonetti in JIABS 6, 2 (1983).


Today the broad outlines of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism - terra incognita one hundred and fifty years ago - are well-known. There are still numerous unexplored valleys and unscaled peaks - enough to keep many generations of scholars happy - but a comprehensive account of its large-scale features is no longer the impossibility it was a few decades ago. It does, however, take a scholar of Snellgrove's calibre and, yes, tolerance to achieve this. But more of tolerance later.

Although the structure of this book is historical, Prof. Snellgrove writes primarily as if Buddhism mattered. Certain modern writers on religion are particularly prone to the ailment of fake objectivity, the primary symptom of which is an insistence on seeing religions as interesting phenomena, errors of our ancestors to be purged by the dogma of reason. Throughout this book, Snellgrove's historical approach is tempered by an understanding of what a Buddhist might, in his opinion, think, and an awareness that this matters as much, if not more than what the Western academic thinks. For example, during his discussion of the historical Buddha (p. 8), he is aware that a Western prejudice lurks within any attempt to take Śākyamuni as the starting point for any account of Buddhism since, to a Mahāyānist, many have become buddha prior to Śākyamuni. Attempting to get beyond the superficial is not, however, without attendant risks.

Snellgrove sided with the brahmanical opponents of Buddhism in feeling that the Buddhist's insistence on describing Buddhism as anatmanā has led to a lot of unnecessary problems. Concepts such as the Śālayavijnāna are seen as ways of smuggling the soul in through the back door. Uddyotakara, Vacaspatimitra and, it seems, Stcherbatsky, thought so (p. 98-9); Snellgrove himself takes the Śālayavijnāna to be a device to solve 'the perennial Buddhist problem of individual continuity from one birth to another'. In this light the persistence of the Cittamātrin in insisting that the Śālayavijnāna is not a soul of any kind seems perverse. The reason for this stand, not explicitly stated, can be found on p. 105: 'the basic consciousness itself is never stable,

for it consists of a succession of dharmas which manifest themselves momentarily'. All souls necessarily are (or contain) something immutable, an eternal essential core, so by definition the śīlayevijnāna cannot be a 'soul' of any kind.

A similar unconscious (mono)theist prejudice makes itself noticeable during the discussions on karma (p.25). The author sees an 'anomaly' in karma being an 'all-controlling force and the everyday experience of a man's seeming ability to make a free decision to do right or wrong'. Puzzlement is expressed over the Buddhist's placid acceptance of this 'anomaly' given the inordinate amount of time that Christian thinkers have devoted to the problem of predestination versus free will, but there is no such anomaly in the Buddhist case. Karma 'is the field, consciousness the seed and craving the moisture' (A I 223). When the Elder Čakkhupala killed numerous insects whilst walking, the Tathāgata was unconcerned: 'he did not see the insects'. Without consciousness of the act, the 'law of karma' does not operate. The point has been well put by A.Piatigorsky in The Buddhist Philosophy of Thought (Curzon Press, London 1984, p.61): 'one's thinking might be considered, at one and the same time (my emphasis), either subjectively (i.e. from the point of view of freedom of choice), or objectively (i.e. from the point of view of the karmic predetermination). In cases where karmic predetermination is involved, the very category of freedom of choice is totally inapplicable. For in such cases there is neither freedom nor non-freedom, since thought [i.e. the mental continuum as influenced by consciousness of a previous action - BS] is already an undeniable fact'. It is generally advantageous to remember that if we see as a problem is not considered a problem by Buddhists themselves, then there is more often than not a simple Buddhist reason. Buddhists have always been invertebrate scholastics and hence can usually be relied on to find any problems that need finding.

The section on the Vajrayāna is the longest in the book. This is not surprising, considering that this vehicle is the single most 'problematic' development in the long history of Buddhism. To Western, and indeed to Hinayāna eyes, it hardly seems to be a natural development, and past Western explanations of the Vajrayāna have tended to be external, seeking something un-Buddhist as the source. Prof. Snellgrove has in my mind successfully explained the internal Buddhist processes leading to what came to be known as kriyā- and caryā-tantras, and proceeds (p.279) to reposition the dividing line between Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna in such as way as to include kriyā- and caryā-tantras in the former category, and to limit Vajrayāna to the anuttarayoga-tantras. Yoga-tantras straddle the divide uneasily. This novel approach succeeds, and in no way invalidates the established methodological division of the Mahāyāna into Pāramitāyāna and Vajrayāna (the latter in this case consisting of all categories of tantra). The gulf that separates the anuttarayoga-tantras (the Vajrayāna-tantras, to coin a phrase) from the Mahāyāna tantras is indeed huge, but the nature of this gulf remains unspecified in this book. Snellgrove notes (p.152) that the context of the anuttarayoga-tantras is entirely different to that of the other classes and talks of Śaivite associations. Nonetheless, he feels that anuttarayoga-tantras 'offer in effect nothing higher; they merely provide the same teachings in ... more outspoken and deliberately scandalous language' (p.186). They do, however, offer something entirely different - the visualisation (the 'self-generation') of the practitioner's body as the body of the īśadēvacya/yi dam, rather than the visualisation of the deity's form in front of the practitioner as found in the 'lower' tantras. The deities of the anuttarayoga-tantras are hence subject as well as object. Nonetheless, the author feels that 'in short tantric Buddhism seems to offer little new in results, which earlier forms of Mahāyāna Buddhism do not already supply' (p.189). If tantric Buddhism here is synonymous with Vajrayāna then this is most certainly not the case. The body of an enlightened being is different to that of a non-enlightened being (hardly a controversial statement), and the structure of the practitioner's subtle body can be altered to correspond to that of an enlightened being through breathing exercises, sexual intercourse, self-generation and all the various methods given in the texts. The close relationship between mind and subtle body means that the transformation of the structure of the subtle body effects a transformation of mind. When this is accomplished the practitioner has completed the bsegyed rim (ucpattikrama), the generation stage, and can then proceed to the practices of the rdzogs rim (sampannakrama),
the completed stage leading to Nirvāṇa. It is on this basis that tantra claims to be a quick method. Awareness of this process enables us to explain certain statements encountered in tantric material which may otherwise seem problematic. For example (p. 251), Snellgrove feels that there is considerable arbitrariness in the ordering and number of cakras within the body. It helps if we bear in mind that the number and order of the cakras is different depending on whether the body under discussion is that of an enlightened being or not (a threefold descending order in the former case, a fivefold ascending order in the latter).

This book will presumably continue to be the standard work on Indo-Tibetan Buddhism for a long time to come, providing novel and challenging observations on nearly every page based on material taken from hitherto untranslated canonical texts as well as from almost everything written on the topic in Western languages. Thus, the appearance of the most complete overview yet of the origins of Tibetan Buddhism from the pen of Britain’s leading Buddhist scholar would seem to be an occasion for, at the very least, muted appreciation. It is all the more surprising, therefore, to find the reactions of a sizeable proportion of Western practitioners of Tibetan Buddhism ranging from the dismissive to the hostile. This stems in part from the assumption that works on Buddhism not emanating from an acknowledged Oriental master (or from a clearly Buddhist Westerner) are not worth taking seriously, and in part from the fact that these same devotees have not yet forgiven the author for his bowdlerisation of his translation of the Hevajra Tantra (OUP 1959, p.8). As an aside it could be mentioned that, had the dākinīs allowed the Rev. Bowdler to get his hands on this text, the result would have been a book consisting of blank pages. Tibetan lamas themselves have been guilty of similarly disfiguring canonical works (e.g. the rgyal rtse them spangs ma Kanjur omits, without comment, a rite for petrifying or paralyzing women from the Vajrakīlabhāhāra-vatmantra – Toh.466, Pek.105:143v); be that as it may, section III of Snellgrove’s book is full of the most ‘offensive’ tantric rites translated into crystal clear English (see, e.g., p.259, or, even better, the statements on copulation with, amongst others, the deformed on p.182). This may seem a minor point in the book’s favour until we remember that the average dge lugs pa work on the Vajrayāna (say, Tsong kha pa’s sngags rim or Mkhals grub rje’s rgyud sde spyi rim) can be read without ever coming across passages such as those the author provides in section III.

In short, both Buddhists and non-Buddhists have every reason to applaud the amassing, distillation and structuring of such huge amounts of information from so many sources concerning one of the most fascinating, complex and increasingly, it seems, attractive religious systems ever devised.

* See, e.g., the review by S.Hodge in The Middle Way, August 1987, p.122.

**Bu¡csu Sikiöö**

The Tibetan Book of the Dead. Francesca Fremantle and Chogyam Trungpa. Shambhala, Boston 1987. xxii,121pp. $9.95

(Distributed by Random House, New York)

Every fresh reissue of this perennial classic is to be welcomed and the superior quality binding and paper used in the Dragon Editions make this book a lasting joy. What we have lost, unfortunately, are the coloured illustrations that were found in the hardback first edition and on the covers of subsequent paperbacks. We are now left with the mandala of the peaceful deities only, in a detail from a beautiful thangka in the Musée Guimet, Paris, that adorns the book’s front cover. What we have not lost, however, are any of the spelling or typographical mistakes from earlier issues because, within its new covers, the present edition is a straightforward reprint of the one from 1975. Thus, on p.25, Rudra is still described as wearing a tiger-skin shirt instead of a skirt!

Trungpa’s short commentary to the text is beautifully clear and simple. It is not at all scholarly or technical and so, instead of confusing the reader with an overload of tantric cross-references and the minutiae of yogic procedures, he just explains in plain English the overall symbolism of the book and how to use its insights in a way that is beneficial to both the healthy and the dying. It is not a book about being dead but a book about process and change and as such it has a great deal to say about the whole span of life and not just about its final moments.

Dealing with the revolutionary visions of one’s entire being
as it unfolds in the form of a vast mandala of a hundred peaceful and wrathful deities, the text itself is beautifully translated and laid out on the page. I particularly enjoy the use of gTer-ma marks at the close of each paragraph but I don't care much for the random mix of Tibetan and Sanskrit terms within the English. (Perhaps the translators felt that words such as 'bardo' and 'yidam' are now accepted as honorary English words.) I would much rather see all technical terms and proper names in Sanskrit in order to facilitate cross-reference within the total sphere of Buddhist studies. An appendix listing all those terms in Tibetan would then prove a very welcome and useful addition.

However, these are minor shortcomings. This is definitely a book that rewards its reader very generously indeed. Who can afford to be without a copy?  

Martin Boord

(Distributed by Random House, New York)

The basis of the Mahayana is bodhicitta. This has the two aspects of a compassionate concern for the welfare of others (relative bodhicitta) and the wisdom that directly cognises non-duality (absolute bodhicitta). The most profound method leading to the attainment of this precious mind is 'the sacred mystery of exchanging oneself for others' (Śāntideva). This short text outlines the process of awakening to this mystery in accordance with the oral tradition of the 12th century Kadampa master, Chekawa Yeshe Dorje.

The seven headings under which this theme is discussed are: 1. the preliminaries which teach the importance of turning the mind away from Samsāra and of engaging oneself wholeheartedly in the practice of Dharma; 2. training in the two aspects of bodhicitta; 3. the methods of transforming adverse conditions into the path of awakening; 4. practising during life and at the time of one's death; 5. how to measure one's success in mind-training; 6. how to protect one's awareness through conscientious behaviour; 7. general guidelines for training on this path. The text ends with a few concluding remarks - 'additional instructions from the transmission lineage' and is then repeated in summary in an appendix. The entire book closes with a prayer to the mind-training lineage and a very short seven-branch prayer.

This is, then, a brief and unpretentious handbook for those interested in the actual practice of developing bodhicitta. I hope that many people will take it up and find it helpful. It contains nothing in either Sanskrit or Tibetan to entice the scholar and even lacks an index. No discriticals are used for any of the Sanskrit words nor, in general, is any attempt made to transliterate Tibetan names. Since the root text is so short, the omission of the Tibetan original is to be regretted because quite a number of people derive enormous pleasure from reading Tibetan texts and I feel that its inclusion would have enhanced the value of the book.

Martin Boord


This book is from the Gelug tradition of Tibetan Buddhism and sets out the practices of the Lam-rim or Stages on the Path to Enlightenment. These practices have their origins in the teachings of the Buddha and later commentaries, especially the Abhisamayalākāra set down by Asanga which condenses the Prajñāparamitā sutras. The main lineage of the Lam-rim was brought to Tibet by the Indian pandit, Atiśa, who spent many years teaching there. His legacy in Tibet was known as the Kadampa which was succeeded by the Gelugpa founded by Tsongkhapa. The latter composed his momentous work, 'The Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment' (Lam-rim Chenmo), possibly the best-known book of the Gelugpa, on the basis of Atiśa's Bodhipathapradīpā ('The Lamp of the Path to Enlightenment'). All subsequent Lam-rim teachings are based on Tsongkhapa's work and this book is no exception.

As its title suggests, a teaching on the stages of the Path is more than just a map of the spiritual journey as it also describes the practices and meditations necessary for progress on the Path. These begin with the motivation for practice and ceremonial prerequisites followed by generation of respect for one's teacher. Next come a series of meditations that can be
classified as Hinayana practices although it is emphasised that the Mahayana motivation of attaining Buddhahood for all living creatures should be declared from the outset. These practices include meditating on the value and rarity of being a human being capable of taking up a spiritual path; the transience of that human life, it being always under the threat of death; and the importance of seeking refuge now in the Buddha, the Dharma and the Sangha, they being the only real friends at the time of death and the only help in ensuring a happy rebirth. A practitioner who has successfully accomplished these meditations, insofar as the desired results become second nature through constant familiarisation, is said to have achieved the initial level of Lam-rim practice. The practices, still designated Hinayananist, continue with meditations upon the unreliability and deceptive nature of any rebirth no matter how exalted or seemingly happy as long as the deep-seated causes of future sufferings remain in the mind in the form of karmic imprints of previous actions. When the meditator, after long contemplation on the nature of Samsara, turns his mind away from seeking happiness in future rebirths and directs his energy towards Nirvana or liberation from the endless round of death and rebirth, he has attained the intermediary level of Lam-rim practice.

The meditator is then encouraged to broaden his vision and understand that, like him, all living creatures are in the same boat on Samsara's ocean, that all beings have basically the same hopes and fears and that his own plight is no special case. Through many techniques he strives to weaken the inborn attitude of always putting himself first and of considering his own happiness to be of paramount importance. He aims to achieve an exchange of self for others where the happiness of others becomes his prime spiritual goal. Realising that this can only be achieved by becoming a Buddha, he forswears the goal of personal salvation and instead strives for Buddhahood. Such a practitioner is known as a bodhisattva and he possesses bodhicitta, the mind of enlightenment. The title of this book indicates that this achievement is the ultimate purpose of the preliminary meditations. This practice is Mahayana practice and this level is the supreme level of Lam-rim practice.

Buddhahood or even Nirvana is not possible unless the root cause of the uncontrolled wandering throughout the various realms of existence is eradicated. No amount of virtuous practice, such as compassion, morality, patience, giving, concentration etc. will result in Buddhahood unless the meditator destroys his wrong understanding of the nature of phenomena, the root cause of all other negative emotions such as anger, desire etc. which in turn create karma that throws us from birth to birth. To do this he must penetrate, with the aid of single-pointed concentration, to the ultimate truth, first conceptually and then experientially. This is a gradual process and together with the gradual process of developing the mind of enlightenment form the two wings of the bird of Enlightenment. They are sometimes called method and wisdom. This, then, is the last topic in the book.

Any Lam-rim text is a manual of practice and does not dwell on the theoretical and philosophical aspects of Buddhism on which practice is built. This philosophical study which forms the bulk of Gelug monastic education is presented through the medium of logic and its purpose is to clear away doubt and confusion concerning the practices and to analyse the validity of the Buddha and his teachings. Such learning builds a firm foundation for faith. This, then, raises the question for whom is this book intended. Geshe Wangchen's hope is that it will help Westerners overcome any difficulties due to cultural differences and facilitate understanding of traditional Buddhist practice. Clearly, then, it is is for those already possessing some faith in Mahayana Buddhism or for those whose faith could be awakened by the power of attraction and appeal. For those who maintain a critical but open mind on spiritual phenomena, who are reluctant to accept claims not immediately accessible to direct experience, they might profit from supplementing this book with Buddhist philosophy and theory.

Geshe Wangchen is very well-known as a learned monk and his book is peppered with quotes from several Indian and Tibetan sources to support the various points. It is a comprehensive work and includes meditative contemplations as well as techniques. My only complaint is that it could have been better edited for there is a fair amount of superficility and bad sequencing among the sentences. However, the author's English is good
but not perfect whilst the text is written in a style that resem-
bles the way he teaches, suggesting that it was transcribed from
talks or dictation. The editors have obviously endeavoured to
preserve this style, at the same time presenting the text in
readable English, and this must have been no easy task.

Gavin Kilty

Portrait of a Dalai Lama. The Life and Times of the Great Thir-
467pp. £11.95

In 1910 the 13th Dalai Lama of Tibet was forced to flee his coun-
try and take up exile in N.E. India. The Chinese, with their obses-
sive and long-standing desire to gain control over the land,
had made their invasion of Tibet coincide with his return from
exile in Mongolia and China (having fled from the Younghusband
expedition six years earlier). Now, at the age of 34, he was to
settle in Darjeeling for the next two years. It was here that
he came into contact with Sir Charles Bell, the British Govern-
ment’s Political Officer for Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan, whose
duty was to represent his government’s policies towards Tibet
and the crisis there. Consequently the two men held several dis-
cussions over those two years. However, their relationship went
far beyond a political one and there developed between them a
firm friendship based on mutual respect and trust. Fortunately,
Bell spoke Tibetan and by thus removing the barrier of inter-
pretation assisted in forming this meeting of East and West—although
the characters of the two men also played a great part.

Bell was very English: upright, rather reserved, stern look-
ing but honest and politically wise. The Dalai Lama was earthy,
blunt, warm hearted, with a sharp mind and sometimes a sharp
temper to match. In short, they were very dissimilar and yet
together they struck a harmonious chord. The Dalai Lama was ob-
viously impressed by Bell’s sincerity and skill in diplomacy.
Being not at all proud, he was ever ready to learn from Bell
the ways of a world of which he had no experience. At one point
this seeming lack of knowledge confused Bell. He asked a govern-
ment official how a Dalai Lama, who is omniscient, could not
know, for example, where Bengal was. The reply came that the
taking of an earthly body could sometimes dull the omniscience.

Bell was equally impressed by the Dalai Lama’s very Tibetan
character. He particularly admired his sharp mind and his sur-
prising frankness – which in those days could well have been
a political liability – and his ability to change his mood from
seriousness to good-hearted humour. Yet Bell was probably quite
rare among his class. He was fascinated by Tibet and things Tib-
eter. His mastery of the language and study of the culture and
religion went far beyond the call of duty. This is only one of
several books he wrote on Tibet and Tibetans; he even published
a Tibetan-English dictionary. His descriptions of events, rituals
and customs are not only detailed but almost always accompanied
by explanations, showing that he took the trouble to enquire
about them. He even sat down and read the scriptures, whilst
his reports on Tibetan beliefs and Buddhist doctrine are without
a trace of cynicism: one might almost say sympathetic. However,
he gives no hint that he was at any time attracted by Buddhism
or that he was anything but a staunch Christian. There can be
no doubt that he genuinely liked and respected the Tibetans and
that the sympathetic tone of this book was not due to politeness
or diplomacy, although he was acutely aware of his duty to promote
friendship between Britain and Tibet: ‘A duty doubly strong these
days when so many injure our fatherland by ignorant criticism of
those whose forms of government or rules of conduct differ
from our own.’

Above all he admired and respected the person who symbolised
the hopes and aspirations of all Tibetans, the Dalai Lama himself.
Even the latter’s sharp temper is not portrayed as a vice for
Bell was astute enough to perceive that such a trait was not
regarded as a fault in high lamas, many of whom had fiery tempers
but never harboured grudges.

The book divides its subject matter into the political events
of that time and the culture and lifestyles of Tibetans high
and low. On the former, no man was better placed to record the in-
side story than the author. He had access to the thinking of
both the British and Tibetan Governments, and to a certain extent
of the Chinese. Those who search for authoritative statements
with regard to the Sino-Tibetan conflict should at least start
with this book. Bell gives the background to both of the Dalai
Lama’s exiles in 1904 and 1910 and charts his subsequent establish-
ment of supremacy over Tibet in the face of constant Chinese hostility. That the Dalai Lama was an autocrat there can be no doubt; but that he became so in the best interests of Tibet is also certain. Bell had no doubt that Tibet was faced with Chinese aggression and duplicity and has no qualms in saying so. He also stresses that to all intents and purposes Tibet had always been an independent country under no obligation to her large neighbour:

Now Tibet thought the centuries has almost always governed herself, though the Chinese histories will not tell you this' (p.133).

Relations between Tibet and British India fluctuated at this time. They were at a low ebb when Younghusband briskly marched into Tibet which was the cause of the first exile. However, they reached an all-time high a few years later and this was in no small way due to the remarkable bond that had formed between these two men. Although Britain had pledged neutrality in the conflict with China, Bell's obvious sympathy turned the Dalai Lama's affection towards Britain. The days were gone when he stubbornly refused to align with anyone, holding fast to the idea that an isolated Tibet was the best policy. Britain was now a friend and the Dalai Lama even sent some young Tibetans to be educated there.

On a smaller scale but no less fascinating are the political intrigues within Tibet. That some Tibetans in high places were given to the gods of jealousy and envy is well-known. Relationships between monasteries and between monasteries and the government were not always smooth. Bell describes the threatened rebellion by the monks of Drepung monastery, the delicate relations between the households of the Panchen and Dalai Lamas and the rise and fall of high officials. He was able to do this first-hand because in 1920 he visited Lhasa as head of a diplomatic mission after several invitations by the Dalai Lama. He stayed several months, longer than expected and encountered all facets of Tibetan life. His descriptions and explanations of the New Year ceremonies are particularly detailed.

Bell, unfortunately, is no author and there is more than a slight touch of disorder about the book. At times it resembles a series of notes, as if he just wrote events as they came to him and tried to rearrange them afterwards. Frequently, chapters do not live up to their headings - the one entitled 'Rebellion', for example, fizzes out after a few pages. Topics taken up often peter out leaving the reader somewhat stranded. However, may be this is being too harsh. It appears that the book was written twenty years after his experiences and, having been published a year after his death, could have been composed during illness. More than once he mentions ill-health.

Yet one chapter, the first, is especially delightful. In it he describes the characteristics of the Tibetans, warts and all. Bell is obviously writing from sheer pleasure as his memory recalls those special days spent in Tibet. His portrait of the Tibetan personality is perceptive and totally free of prejudice and condensation.

A book, then, for both the politically and spiritually interested, and indeed for anyone who wants to learn about this fascinating culture whose struggle to survive was thwarted by its own resistance to change and by the hostility and indifference of an outside world.

Gavin Kilby


Quite apart from the great esteem in which Dōgen Kigen (1200-53) is held by the Japanese Buddhist world, he is recognised as one of Japan's most seminal 'thinkers' by many contemporary scholars, Eastern and Western, who see Dōgen's characteristic understanding of 'being-time' (uji) as an early anticipation of certain modern ideas chiefly, those of Bergson or Heidegger. As such, Kim's detailed study of Dōgen will be of interest to many people. Modern Dōgen studies began with a series of articles written by Watsuiji Tetsuro for the journals Shin shōsetsu and Shinbō (1919-23). Offprinted under the title Shamon Dōgen - 'The Monk Dōgen' (Tokyo 1929), Watsuiji's essays released Dōgen's ideas from the sectarian vacuum in which they had hitherto been confined, triggering off a whole new phase of interest for this key figure of Japanese Buddhism. Of course, Watsuiji's material has long since been superseded by a whole brace of new Japanese writings on Dōgen; however, with the possible exception of Kode-
ra's study of Dōgen's sojourn in Sung China, comparable material has not been readily available in the West. Thus, Kim's study will undoubtedly foster an enlarged understanding of Dōgen's place in the development of Buddhist thought. His study of Dōgen falls under five main chapter headings:

1. Towards a Total Understanding of Zen
2. Dōgen's Life
3. Activity, Expression & Understanding
4. The Religion & Metaphysics of Buddha Nature

In Chapter 1, Kim explicates what he means by a 'total understanding of Zen', namely, an approach which masters all the resources of modern scholarship to avoid sectarian prejudice - without drowning out the religious sensibility that informs Dōgen's thought. Thus, by and large, Kim's work constitutes a scholarly yet sensitive account of Dōgen's career and characteristic outlook. Chapter 2 outlines some key aspects of Dōgen's life - his early childhood (1200-12); his apprenticeship in Buddhism (1212-27) - initially marked by the spiritual struggle at Hiei and Kenninji (1212-23), followed by Dōgen's pilgrimage to China (1223-27), the last two years being a crucial watershed in which Dōgen met Ju-ching (Nyōjō) at the Ching-te Monastery on Mount T'ien-tung - where he finally resolved the 'great doubt' about enlightenment nurtured since his days at Hiei; finally, Kim devotes the rest of this chapter to reviewing the creative phase of Dōgen's life, spanning the period between his return to Japan and his death in 1253.

In Chapter 3 Kim explores Dōgen's characteristic understanding of dhāna (meditation) and prajñā (wisdom) - and precisely how this Japanese master interpreted the meaning of 'The Rightly Transmitted Buddha-Dharma' (shoden no buppō). For Dōgen, this was primarily embodied in nāman and 'the samādhi of self-fulfilling activity' (jīsyū-samāi), the 'casting-off of body and mind' (shinjīn-datsurahī), and his insistence upon the unity of practice-enlightenment (shushō-itto/shushō-ichingyo). Needless to say, a book review hardly captures the subtle and frequently complex shifts of emphasis which are involved here, interwoven as they are, with Dōgen's characteristic notion of the 'total exertion of a single thing' (jippo-gujin) - the perception that 'things' occupy their 'Dharma-positions' (ju-hō), all of which is inseparably yoked in Dōgen's thought to 'actualising' the power of nāman (zenkū) in life - what Dōgen called 'the kōan realised in life' (genjō-kōan). Kim isolates these terms, examines them, and then links them together again - giving the reader an impression of the richness of Dōgen's teaching. Thus, when it comes to Dōgen qua Dōgen, Kim's account is very succinct and thorough.

However, things are less satisfactory when it comes to Dōgen's position vis-à-vis his Chinese predecessors. It is widely acknowledged that around 1243, when approximately half-way through his Shōbōgenzō, Dōgen's outlook underwent something of a dramatic change. Prior to this date, Dōgen had remained thoroughly impartial, refusing to discriminate between the different (Ch'an) Zen schools, or between the practice of monks, laymen and female devotees (p.42). After 1243, however, Dōgen maintained that monks were superior to laymen: he became critical of female devotees, and also adopted a distinctly polemical attitude towards the Chinese Lin-chi (Rinzai) teachings. Indeed, in certain parts of his Shōbōgenzō, Dōgen's criticism even extended to all five Chinese Ch'an schools (Wu Chia), defining their characteristic idioms as 'mad expressions' (p.49). Clearly, Dōgen was a religious genius, whose depth of insight reached far beyond many of his contemporaries and I have no wish to deprecate the valuable side of his teachings. However, Dōgen's querulous side is another matter, and there are reasons for feeling that many of the misunderstandings that Dōgen sought to 'correct' in the thinking of his Chinese peers and predecessors were in fact his own. For instance, in Chapter 4, Kim touches on Dōgen's harsh judgment of the Lin-chi master, Ta-hui Tsung-Kao, claiming that he advocated a 'negativistic mysticism' (p.115) which 'unwarrantedly regards the essence of mind as exclusively serene and calm' and thus 'distorts the Buddha-Dharma'. Strangely, while Kim hesitated here, confessing that he felt certain reservations about Dōgen's assessment of Ta-hui's position, he goes on to justify Dōgen's claim - viz. that Ta-hui had 'maintained the dissolution of consciousness...a state of unconsciousness' (p.115). Anyone at all familiar with the tensions that were working themselves out in the Sung Ch'an centres will question the veracity of this view-
point, for it is well-known that Ta-hui specifically struck out against such one-sided 'quietism'. Thus, precisely where some 'academic distance' would have stood us in good stead, Kim unfortunately reinforces the very 'sectarian' prejudices that he had promised to avoid. While Kim speaks of Dōgen 'overcoming the difficulties and inconsistencies' of the Chinese and Japanese Zen tradition (p.55) — chiefly, the perceived tension between 'practice based on enlightenment' (ahōjō no shū) and 'practice prior to enlightenment' (ahōzen no shū) — the hermeneutics of the situation are hardly explicated at all and we have to take Kim (and thus — Dōgen) at his word. In truth, of course, the Chinese Ch'an monks saw nothing at all 'inconsistent' about the prospect of practising to 'acquire' insight into what is an essentially 'inherent' endowment — ever present in the mind. Indeed, there is something to be said for the idea that the 'inherent' and 'acquired' aspects of enlightenment must be understood as interdependent facets of one and the same 'thing', perceived differently according to one's point of reference via-à-vis the paramārtha or sāmyutta-satya. Despite its status as a special 'ultra-doctrinal' transmission, the Ch'an tradition nevertheless drew its guidance on such matters from Aśvaghosa's 'Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna' (Mahāyāna Śraddhotpādāṅgā / Ta Cheng Chi Hain Lun), the Sūrangamasūtra (Leng-yan Ching) and cognate Mahāyāna sources. Thus, for practical purposes, the Chinese Ch'an monks have clearly distinguished the difference between the 'in-born' or inherent aspect of enlightenment — as direct 'inner-cause' (yin/hetu), and the 'concurrent-cause' (yuan, prataya) — which enables the practitioner to realise or embody this 'inherent' endowment — as 'effect' or 'fruit' (kua/phala) on the phenomenal/empirical level. Thus, the only 'inconsistency' at work here was Dōgen's failure to distinguish the difference between sāmyutta-satya, as against the higher viewpoint of the paramārtha-satya — in which the notions of 'winning' or 'not-winning' the Buddha-fruit are transcended. Thus, just because Dōgen had felt confused or troubled by this tension between the 'in-born' and 'acquired' aspects of enlightenment since his early days at Hiei, this is not to say that his Chinese predecessors had 'fudged' the issue or failed to reconcile these two aspects of enlightenment in their own training — but this is precisely what Dōgen seems to have inferred, and Kim's account leaves us little the wiser when it comes to the question of how the Chinese masters actually perceived the problem — if, indeed, it was a 'problem' for them at all. Dōgen's religious genius gave a novel slant to his interpretations of Buddhist doctrine, but there are reasons for feeling that he overreached himself at times, leading to a questionable hubris.

In Chapter 5, Kim discusses Dōgen's ideas on 'moral causation', but from beginning to end Kim fails to confront Dōgen's inflated attitude towards his Chinese predecessors. However, in the 'Jinshin Inga' (Deep Belief in Causality) chapter of the Shōbōgenzō, Dōgen finds fault with, in turn, Hung-chih Cheng-chueh (Wanshi Shogaku, 1091-1157), Yuan-wu K'o-chin (Engo Kokugen, 1063-1135) and Ta-hui Taung-kao (Dai Sokō, 1098-1163) — all leading masters of their day, yet Dōgen argues that they and all lacked a proper understanding of 'causality'. However, to suggest with any seriousness that these eminent Chinese masters were all misguided, and that Dōgen alone had understood such things correctly, would be tendentious in the extreme, yet Kim does not address this problem at all. He does raise the question of Dōgen's fidelity to his Chinese teachers, for at several points in the text (fn.on pp.253 & 265) he cites the learned opinion of Japanese scholars like Shokin Furuta and Hajime Nakamura, both of whom have expressed doubts about the degree of correspondence between Dōgen's teaching and that of his Chinese peers. Even so, Kim tends to minimise such issues, showing them somewhat unceremoniously into footnotes at the back of the text as if residual questions are of little interest. Thus, as satisfying as Kim's study of Dōgen may be, all but those with a very specific interest for Dōgen will be disappointed to find that these background details have been skipped over in such a peremptory fashion. As a vital figurehead behind the transmission of Sōtō (Ts'ao Tung) Zen to Japan, points of continuity and discontinuity in Dōgen's teaching are of equal importance when appraising his role as a mediator between the two different cultures and, without making more sense of Dōgen's distinctly ambivalent attitude towards his Chinese peers and predecessors, it could be argued that this work does not even represent 'a total understanding of Dōgen', let alone 'a total understanding of Zen'. I realise
that such comments will savour of ill will after the otherwise generous praise heaped on Kim's work by contemporary admirers of Dōgen. However, a more critical look at Dōgen's prejudices was surely required in a study of this kind, and this is something which Prof. Kim unfortunately fought shy of. Such 'reserve' is understandable in view of the reverence accorded to Dōgen, but what about the reverence we should accord to the Chinese fathers who came before him?

Richard Hunn (Upamaka Wen Shu)


Both research on Central Asia, particularly on the cultures found along the so-called Silk Roads, as well as studies on religious syncretism are currently in vogue. This book comprises the proceedings of an international symposium held under the auspices of the Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft in May 1983 at St. Augustin near Bonn. Since it is quite impossible to deal with all the Central Asian cultures in their entirety in a work of this size, emphasis is laid on forms of religious syncretism in Turkic and Mongolian Central Asia. Whereas Shamanism, Christianity (including Nestorianism), Buddhism (including 'Lamaism') and Manichaism are dealt with in some detail, Islam, nowadays one of the most influential religions in this region, is completely ignored.

The sixteen articles collected in this book are arranged under five headings. The first section, 'Allgemeines', comprises three articles: R.J.Zwi Werblowsky 'Syncretismus in der Religionsgeschichte', Ulla Johansen 'Zur Geschichte des Schamanismus' and Annemarie von Gabain 'Maitreya und Mithra'.

In the first article, Werblowsky summarises his definition of the concept of syncretism in ten theses which he develops on the basis of Kurt Rudolph's essay, 'Syncretismus - von theologischen Scheltern zur religionswissenschaftlichen Begriff' (Humanitas Religiosa. Festschrift für Harald Bioz, Stockholm 1979, pp.194-212) and of Carsten Golpe's studies whose most recent results can be found under the entry 'Syncretism' in The Encyclopedia of Religion (New York 1987, Vol.14, pp.218-27) although this latter piece cannot have been taken into consideration in the present paper. After quoting some examples of religious syncretism, Werblowsky discusses the definition of 'syncretism'. According to him, this concept can be used to describe the relation between diversified 'historisch identifizierbaren Grosse', i.e. complex wholes. Here he distinguishes between a 'vegetative, naive, spontaneous, unreflected, unconscious' syncretism and a 'reflected, conscious' syncretism. Furthermore, the concept 'syncretism' is employed to portray the process of syncretic tendencies and developments. Since syncretism is recognised as a 'universal movens in the dynamics of the history of religions' and the concept is not applied in a universal, univocal way, an exact typology is needed. The precise application and definition of this concept is possible only after an investigation of the specific context in which this term is used or of the specific reasons why it is used.

In the second article, Johannes gives a short survey of the history of Shamanism among Central Asian Turks and Mongols. First she analyses the different interpretations of the concept of Shamanism and differentiates between them and her own understanding of it. According to her a shaman is characterised by a vocation, by his ability to go into a trance and to make contact with non-existent beings and by his special ceremonial dress and rituals. As source material for the historical study of Shamanism, the author admits only archaeological evidence and literary tradition as found in early itineraries and reports. She shows how, simultaneously with the decay of centralised empires, the power and functions of the shaman gradually increased.

In the third article, von Gabain investigates syncretic tendencies in the concept of Maitreya, the future Buddha, as well as in that of the Parsic Mithra. In the doctrine of the Śrāvakayāna, Maitreya appears in the list of Buddhas of the past and future who preceded or will follow Sakyamuni (cf. E. Lamotte History of Indian Buddhism, Louvain 1958, pp.699-710). His worship flourished particularly in Central Asia. Von Gabain begins with a study of Maitreya's iconography. He is depicted either standing or seated in Indian or European style. In one sitting posture of the latter type the Bodhisatva's legs are hanging down from the seat and his ankles are crossed, which was the characteristic sitting position of the Kushāna rulers from the 2nd century A.C.
This indicates an Iranian influence on the iconography of the Bodhisattva. Subsequently, the author investigates whether and to what degree the bodhisattva cult adopted Iranian elements, e.g. from the Mazdaist cult of Mithra. The latter was worshipped as the protector of oaths and war and as the Sol Invictus, 'the Unsubdued Sun'. There exist connections with the Vedic Mitra ('Friend') who was also revered as the Sun God. In Manichaean texts of the Uighurs, Mithra is called 'Son of the God' and burxan ('Buddha, Gesandter'). Similarly, Maitreya Ajita ('the Unsubdued') is identified with the sun and, as the protector of Buddhism, his future exploits are described in the different Central Asian versions of the Maitreya-samiti. Iranian influences on the treatment of the Bodhisattva Maitreya and other Buddhist concepts during the Kušāna era are certainly possible, but the author's conclusion that the title 'bodhisattva' itself might be Iranian seems implausible since we possess early textual evidence for the concept (Pāli 'bodhisatta'). (Cf. Lamotte, op. cit., pp. 625-9.)


On the basis of Turkic runic inscriptions from c. 720 to 760, Róna-Tas examines three specific problems: whether the Old Turkic god was a Creator God; whether the Uighur kagan was a sacral king; and the relation between Turkic and Uighuric Tengrism. His conclusions are as follows: Tengrism was the religion of the ruling class of the Central Asian steppe peoples but lost its importance when the Uighur kagans proclaimed Manichaism as the state religion. According to the runic inscriptions, Tengri is an active being, although he does not create ex nihilo but acts in accordance with a universal law, just as a carpenter builds a house guided by a plan. The sacral kingdom is closely connected to Tengrism; thus, in the Tez inscription of 750, the death of the Uighur ruler, Kul Bilge, is described as sacral, i.e. accord-

From the extant texts one may assume that, as a religious minority, Christians were present in Turfan simultaneously with Buddhists and Manichaëans between the ninth and fourth centuries. These Christian documents were written in Sogdian or Old Turkic. In his article 'Das Christentum in der Turfan-Oase' Hage studies possible tendencies of religious syncretism in these texts. He observes that the texts are orthodox according to Nestorian Christianity. Their content is sometimes apologetic and polemical against the surrounding religions, Buddhism and Manichaism, whilst Christian views are emphasised. In the Sogdian translation of the 'St George Passion' the otherwise nameless evil spirit is called Mahākāla after the Buddhist deity. However, Hage stresses that nothing can be said about the popular beliefs at that time since no literary sources are available.

To the literature quoted by Hage the following title may be added: H.-J. Klinke Die Begegnung von Christentum, Gnosis und Buddhismus an der Seidenstrasse (Vorträge/Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften: Geisteswissenschaften; C 283), Opladen 1986.

Klinke discusses 'Buddhistische Übernahmen im iranischen und türkischen Manichaismus' in the context of three areas where adoptions from Buddhism can be traced: terminology, motifs in paintings and subjects in narrative literature. As an example of the progressive borrowing of Buddhist terms, the author quotes such concepts as Buddha, Parinirvāna and Samāra, the use of which gradually increased in Parthian Sogdian and Uighuric texts. The borrowing from Buddhist imagery can be seen in depictions of Mani exactly in the manner of the Buddha. Other motifs include miniatures of Hindu gods and the image of the cintāmani jetel. The Buddhist Jātakas and Avadānas were the main source for the adoption of narrative subjects. The final result was that Central Asian Manichaism lost its identity and was superseded by Buddhism.

In his article 'Das buddhistische Gewand des Manichaismus' Schmidt-Glintzer is also concerned with the adoption of Buddhist concepts in Chinese Manichaean texts. These borrowings were
partly necessary because adequate translations for Manichaean concepts were available only in Buddhist Chinese. The author illustrates Buddhist elements and terminologies in the 'Traité Pelletier' (10th cent.), the 'London Hymn scroll' and in the 'Compendium of Doctrines' (compiled 724, tr. 731). In the last work, Mani is not only an incarnation of the Buddha but also of Lao-tze, with Manichaean displaying both Buddhist and Chinese influence. Furthermore, the author quotes sources which indicate Manichaean influence on China before the T'ang era.


In this section specific aspects of syncretism in Mongolia are described. Hamayon compares the myths of origin of two Buryat tribes, of the Exirit-Bulagat and the Xori, and comes to the conclusion that these two myths represent 'two ideological models of patrilinearity' and that differences between them chiefly concern the trends of clan relationships and the place to be granted to women in them.

Dumas investigates the cult of fire deities in Mongolian popular belief and 'Lamaist' religion on the basis of ritual texts concerning fire. In folk religion the fire cult is closely connected with ancestor worship and the deity of fire is the female goddess of the hearth, whereas in 'Lamaism' the deity of fire is male. In Mongolia these two deities were combined.

Särközi presents in her paper a bilingual (Tibetan and Mongolian) text for a Bon funeral rite, i.e. 'A handbook concerning an after-death exorcising ceremony'. This manual testifies to the adaption of elements of Shamanism and practices of the Tibetan Bon religion when 'Lamaism' was introduced into Mongolia.

Uray-Kohalmi examines syncretic tendencies in the state cult of Cinggis Khan's early successors, as it can be traced in the 'Secret History of the Mongols'.

Heissig enquires into a group of Mongolian prayer texts in which Padmasambhava is mentioned. In these prayers, Padmasambhava is worshipped as initiator of the purificatory incense offerings or, more rarely, even as creator of the Fire God (Miran-ča). As the position of Padmasambhava as an initiator-god gradually developed, he was increasingly appreciated, e.g. the custom of Calling the Soul was attributed to him. In his conclusion Heissig stresses the fact that not everything which hints at foreign influence and syncretic tendencies may be judged as such.

Kaschewsky deals with interpretative transformation in Mongolian renderings of Tibetan and Sanskrit texts. He considers this as 'linguistic syncretism' and quotes parts of the Mongolian translation of the 27th chapter of Candakirti's Prasannapada as an example. Unfortunately, there are several misprints in the Sanskrit. For example: p.173, 1.12 - nižärtha (instead of nižártha); p.175, 1.15 - ātmano (instead of ātmano); p.176, 1.8 - nānāgati' (instead of nānāgati'); p.177, 1.8 - upādāna (instead of upādana).

In his article, 'Shamans, Lamas and Evangelicals in Early Nineteenth Century Transbaikalia', Bawden describes the confrontation between Shamanism and Lamaism on the one hand, and English evangelism, represented by members of the London Missionary Society on the other. The reports, articles and books written by missionaries, e.g. E. Stallybrass, W. Swan and J. C. Brown, are the most important source of information on the religious crisis, the 'relative degree of co-existence' and the antagonism of Shamanism and 'Lamaism' at that time, whereas the influence of their own religious activity remained quite restricted and no trace of it has survived.

In the sixth section, 'Das tibetische Zentralasien', we find only one item, 'Zu den Spuren des Nestorianismus und des Manichäismus im alten Tibet (8.-10.Jahrhundert)', by Géza Uray. This article is a résumé (with addenda) of the paper, 'Tibet's Connections with Nestorianism and Manicheism in the 8th-10th Centuries', which appeared in Contributions on Tibetan Language.

Another book of his, dealing with Der historische Buddha (1982), has been acclaimed in Germany as the best Buddha biography of recent years. As in these books, in Bilderwelt Schumann treats his subject of somewhat daunting complexity with competence, precision and lucidity. Rather than being just a 'manual' of the iconography found in Northern India, Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan and Mongolia, due to its systematic arrangement and analytical index, this work is a comprehensive iconographic reference book. As such it will prove helpful in identifying and understanding, in their religio-iconographic contexts, the seemingly bewildering variety of Buddhas, bodhisattvas, celestial beings, tutelary ideations (yidams) and historical personalities. In his description of the Mahā- and Tantrayāna pantheon the author discusses the vast topic selectively, thus being able to concentrate on the explanation of the most prominent and nonetheless plentiful figures together with their symbolic accessories in Tibetan and Nepalese woodblock prints and drawings reproduced in this book.

In his preface Schumann refers to the problem of dating the historical Buddha Gautama whom he dates following the widely accepted so-called revised Ceylonese chronology, according to which the Buddha lived from 563 to 483 B.C. Schumann also mentions P.H.L.Eggersmont and H.Bechert who have, with sound arguments, thrown doubt upon the historical reliability of this chronology and have proposed, on the strength of Indian sources, to date the Buddha about 115 years later. Since no absolute proof can as yet be given of either the Ceylonese or Indian chronological systems, Schumann leaves it to the reader to opt for one or the other.

On p.7 the author states that since the figures of the Buddhist pantheon, by and large, express philosophical ideas, one has to acquaint oneself with Buddhist doctrine as found in the Hinayāna, Mahā- and Tantrayāna systems and with the history of its spread so as to obtain a deeper understanding of that 'pantheon'. Therefore, after a systematic overview of his book, the author offers an introductory essay on Triyāna Buddhism, on the spread of the Dharma in and outside India, especially in Tibet, and finally on the art of xylography. 'The Canon of Symbols' concluding the introductory part, is a very useful compilation describing postures, gestures and attributes pertaining to the figures
discussed in the body of the book and includes numerous drawings apart from the 420 illustrations proper.

Accompanied by historical and iconographic analyses, each figure in the book is placed in its religious-traditional setting through apt doctrinal remarks and abundant legendary material. It is impossible here to go into details in view of the wealth of iconographic items. Just four of them - admittedly rather arbitrarily - may be singled out.

A special feature of Bilderwelt are the biographical sketches and engravings of the 54 siddhas, the former being based on the Caturaśṭi-siddha-pravṛtti, an 11th-12th century hagiographic work by Abhayadatta, lost in its Indian original, yet preserved in Tibetan. Schumann's bibliography shows that there are a number of publications on the siddhas; all the same, literature on the subject including complete pictorial accounts are comparatively scarce, so this section is particularly welcome.

On p.106 Schumann puts forward an interesting hypothesis when speaking of the Adibuddha. Perhaps inspired by the monotheism of Islam advancing against India, in about the 10th century Buddhist thinkers conceived of the idea that the absolute, so far referred to only symbolically, might also be represented in personified form, namely as the Primordial Buddha (Adibuddha). Associating the idea of an Adibuddha with Muslim monotheism comes full circle when considering Buddhist modernism in present-day Indonesia. Buddhists in this predominantly Muslim country are required, besides their taking refuge in the Three Jewels, to declare somehow their having faith in God. Thus, in 1965, a leading Indonesian bhikṣu stated that Buddhism in Indonesia was by no means atheistic because of its acknowledgment of a supreme being in the form of the Adibuddha! (See H.Bechert 'Buddhismus im heutigen Java und Bali', Internationales Asienforum 19, Cologne 1988, p.27ff.)

The birth of Siddhārtha Gautama under a sal tree in the Lumbini Grove is depicted on p.51. It may be permitted in this connection to refer to three important articles whose authors conclusively show that the traditional Buddhist representation of the would-be Buddha's birth must have influenced Christian art in medieval Europe as far as pictures of Jesus Christ's nativity are concerned: (a) F.Weller 'Buddhistische Einflüsse auf die christliche Kunst des europäischen Mittelalters' in W.Rau (ed.) Friedrich Weller. Kleine Schriften (Stuttgart 1957, pp.1477-1558); (b) Weller 'Beobachtungen eines Indologen im Halberstädtler Dom', ibid. (p.1559ff.); (c) G.Roth 'The Birth of a Saviour in Buddhist, Christian, Islamic and Jain Traditions' in H.Bechert and P.Kieffer-Pulz (ed.) Indian Studies. Selected Papers by Gustav Roth (Delhi 1986, pp.351-65, and plate nos XVI-XXV).

The caption of figure no.19, representing Śākyamuni Buddha with a flower in his right hand (p.69), is 'The Buddha Founding a Tradition without Words'. We are told the well-known Zen story according to which Śākyamuni, whilst teaching on the Vulture's Peak, showed his disciples a flower without saying a word. It was Mahākāśyapa alone who understood this message beyond words and thus became the first patriarch of an esoteric tradition. In 'Some Remarks on the Origins of the Zen School' (The Journal of Religious Studies IV,1, Patiala 1972, p.117), this reviewer gave some thought to the possible origins of the 'flower episode' belonging to the Zen tradition. He came to the conclusion that, apart from vague reminiscences in the Nikāya/Agama literature (see, for instance, the significance of the mandara flower or the position of Mahākāśyapa at the First Council of Rājaγrha), at least in the earlier textual traditions of Indian Buddhism an equivalent of the flower story describing the genesis of the esoteric Dhyāna school could not be traced. It is a remarkable fact that Tibetan iconography knows of a Buddha holding a flower in his hand, and Schumann's mentioning that this Buddha 'is occasionally called in literature Kusumaśri', might point to relatively late Indian origins, traceable only in Tibetan translations, of the story of the Buddha's founding 'a school beyond words'.

The few examples given here are intended to underline the importance of Schumann's fine work as an indispensable study tool for further research, e.g. in the field of intercultural history of art or history of religion. Misprints in Bilderwelt are minimal. Tibetan names are given in their original spelling - e.g. Khri-sron lde-btsan - and in a phonetic transcription: Thrisong Detsen (p.28, passim). On p.336, however, a slight inconsistency occurs with regard to transliteration: 'Thrisong Detsen'. For laṣadovarā (p.209) read laṣadovara, Bhikkhu Pañādiko.

The author was a research student under Alex Wayman at Columbia and acknowledges his gratitude to him for assistance in preparing this book, parts of which are somewhat dependent on Wayman's work. One can, therefore, assume that the book is based on the author's doctoral dissertation, although this is not mentioned. Moreover, the style also suggests it, e.g. some repetitive passages and summaries and the careful stating of facts and bits of information generally well-known to scholars and students. However, this can only prove useful to general readers who will find the book quite readable despite its expertise. They need not even be put off by the numerous Sanskrit quotations in the book, as they are always reasonably well translated. The book meets the usual requirements placed on an academic research work in terms of documentation and cross-references, textual analysis and systematic presentation.

Part I, which forms about two-fifths of the volume, gives the introductory background to the main purpose of the work which is a study of the three main commentaries to Bādarāyaṇa's Brahma-sūtra by Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva in Part II. The study is concerned with just fifteen sūtras (II,7,18-32) and the three commentaries on them which comprise criticism of Buddhist teachings.

After some brief information about the main text (the Brahma-sūtra), the author states the positions of the three Vedāntins. Śaṅkara, as the 'unqualified non-dualist', maintains the identity of the atman and brahman which is always present in everyone; the realisation through knowledge that this is so is, to him, liberation. Rāmānuja, as the 'qualified non-dualist', regards the world with all its beings (that which is conscious and that which is unconscious) to be the body of the Lord or supreme person who is the atman of all; this is a qualified identity parallel to that of the individual life or soul (jīva) with its body. Madhva teaches what we could call a structural dualism; while there is a real difference between creation and the Lord, there are further differences within creation: between individual jīvas who retain their individuality even after liberation, between jīvas and matter, and also between material entities.

Here the author fails to resolve the problem connected with the translation of atman which he sometimes renders 'Self' and sometimes, misleadingly, 'soul'. It is not clear whether he understands Rāmānuja's atman to mean 'universal soul', in which case he should have spelled it 'soul' (as he does with 'Self') to avoid the possible confusion with the jīva which he translates as the 'individual soul'. However, the use of the term 'soul' in any context of Indian religious thought is altogether questionable.

Next we get the discussion of the Buddhist schools, starting with the two 'realistic' ones of Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika which the Vedāntins often failed to distinguish. The former asserted in their Abhidharma texts the existence of all three time periods, viz. past, present and future, and further taught that each dharma has its own nature (svabhāva) to be distinguished from its characteristics (lakṣaṇa). The latter rejected all teachings not contained in the sūtras and accused Sarvāstivādins of contradicting the principle of impermanence. Then the author turns to their teachings on Dependent Origination, the aggregates, momentariness and the 'unconstructed' elements of Nirvāna and space (ākāśa) and points out where one Vedāntin or the other misconstrued, did not grasp or confused the mutually differing Buddhist positions. E.g. Rāmānuja attributes to the Buddhists the tenet of origination from emptiness or passing into emptiness and Śaṅkara also presents a similar misrepresentation; both further interpret nirodha, which virtually stands for Nirvāna, as absolute destruction and fail to grasp the subtlety of the Buddhist notion of space.

The discussion then turns to the Vijñānāvāda school and the Buddhist logicians. The most interesting topic here is about the general tendency, which is reflected also in Śaṅkara's and Rāmānuja's commentary, of ascribing to the Vijñānāvādins the denial of the existence of objects external to the mind. However, the author points out, following an earlier paper by Wayman, that this is incorrect. Different beings (animals, humans etc.) may construe an object differently in their perception, but that does not rule out the external existence of the object itself.
Dignāga spoke of atoms as (presumably external) causes of perception, even though they are not perceived. Not even the notion of śāla-vijñāna, which the author renders 'ideation-store' (others as 'storehouse consciousness'), with its archetypal vāsanās rules out external object-entities, as unjustifiably interpreted by Śaṅkara. It is true that Dignāga explains vāsanās as the inner forms of the knowable, but of course the cause of their perception (or, shall we say, conception by the mind) is the impact of atoms on the sensory process, and they have to be regarded as external.

The crucial concept of the Mahāyānsa school, sāguna-tā (emptiness), was misinterpreted by all three Vedāntins as nihilism. It is, of course, well-known that the Mahāyānsa, particularly in Māgārjuna's works, avoids adopting any definite position and refrutes all positions as mere views and therefore untenable. But this does not prevent Vedāntins from trying by all means to attribute the nihilistic position to this school.

After a chapter on the later logicians (Śaṅarakṣita, Kamalādīya and Raptakirti) the author turns to the theme of Śaṅkara's alleged 'crypto'-Buddhism, a charge made against him and his school initially by some of his Vedāntic opponents, including Rāmānuja. He starts with Gauḍapāda, reputedly the teacher of Śaṅkara's teacher, but possibly the name of a whole school. Much of the work which goes under Gauḍapāda's name seems to be drawn from Buddhist sources and may have been an attempt to syncretise Mahāyāna Buddhism and Vedānta. The question of Śaṅkara's neo-Buddhism is not simple. The strongest parallel to Buddhism in Śaṅkara is the concept of the two truths. Then there is the concept of ignorance (avidyā; the author prefers the translation 'nescience'), and the concept of nāmarūpa, name and form (or name and formation, as the author puts it). All three topics have some Upaninadic, and therefore possibly pre-Buddhist, pedigree. The author's treatment of them is not exhaustive and fully conclusive, but he does provide useful materials and hints for further investigation. It would seem that in employing the notion of the two truths Śaṅkara is to some extent indebted to Buddhism via the influence of the Gauḍapāda school on him, whilst his treatment of avidyā parallels, in particular, the Yogācāra Buddhism of Asaṅga. The problem of nāmarūpa in Śaṅkara and Buddhism was investigated extensively by Prof. Wayman who has found a rudimenary basis for Śaṅkara's dual notion of it in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa. The author suggests that perhaps Śaṅkara's 'crypto'-Buddhism consists in his denial that there is a self in man to be identified with the Lord. However, whether Śaṅkara took it from Buddhism or not, it does follow logically from his unqualified non-dualism. If brahman is the sole reality, then man in the state of avidyā, as a separate nāmarūpa or jīva, does not have true reality and cannot harbour within himself a real self (ātman). Unlike other schools, Advaita Vedānta does not apply the term jīvātman to man, but reserves it for the Lord, Īśvara i.e. the saṃkṣārabrahman. That, of course, means that man (nāma-rūpa or jīva) in Śaṅkara is, in Buddhist parlance, anatta/anātman. Much more will have to be written in future on this highly interesting and philosophically important theme.

The second part carefully documents by a comparative textual study the various doctrinal disagreements among the three Vedāntins in points of Vedāntic philosophy, compares their representations of Buddhism with positions expounded in Buddhist texts and confronts the interpretations of Buddhism given by the three with each other. Despite its typically academic nature, it can be followed with profit by any educated reader interested in the fine points of Buddhist philosophy and in the history of Buddhist thought in its relation to Vedāntic thinking which has remained the prevalent trend in the Hindu tradition till the present day. Some misconceptions about Buddhist teachings current in Hindu circles, in the Hindu-orientated Yoga movements in the West, and even in earlier academic studies on Buddhism can be traced back to the misrepresentation of crucial Buddhist tenets by one or other of the three great Vedāntic teachers. The most notorious of these misconceptions is the interpretation of the Buddhist Nirvāṇa as total annihilation or ceasing to be (cf. G.R. Welbon The Buddhist Nirvāṇa and its Western Interpreters, Chicago 1968). The book under review goes, of course, into further detailed and specialised issues, some of them subtle, others abstruse. On the whole, one can agree with the author's mildly understated conclusion that the Vedāntic critique of Buddhism is for the most part misdirected. The book has a limited index of Sanskrit words and proper names.

Karel Werner

Those contributing to this book include a Benedictine monk, Brother David Steindl-Rast, on one side, and the Dalai Lama on the other. It was inspired by a symposium on the subject at Middlebury College in 1984, and it faces many fundamental differences in the basic doctrines and assumptions from which Christianity and Buddhism arose and in which they have developed.

The whole subject requires much deeper study and discussion that usually characterises the interfaith dialogue to which we are now becoming accustomed. Perhaps this is summed up well in the Epilogue, signed by Steven Rockefeller, when he writes: 'Since Buddhism does not conceive of the problem of liberation as involving the reconciliation of a theistic God with humanity, it finds no need for the kind of Atonement proclaimed by the Christian tradition. Buddhism does not deny the seriousness of the human predicament, but it finds the root problem to be of ignorance'. He goes on to say: 'Nevertheless there are mystics and liberal Christians with a strong humanistic emphasis in their thought who have crossed this line and use a Buddhist-like Christian vocabulary speaking of becoming Christ, each person in his or her own unique way. Once this way of thinking and speaking is accepted, the possibilities of creative dialogue are legion'. These discussions bypass the wearisome generalities and cliches so often trotted out by well-meaning (but superficial) interfaith enthusiasts. There are very great differences between the two faiths and they have to be faced. Perhaps the greatest single difficulty is to find scholars with a wide knowledge of other religions who are also practitioners of the religion which they profess.

Wide investigation is needed but it has to be combined with deep commitment to a chosen path to make the experimental base necessary. It is never easy to find this combination. Adherents of one religion tend to be limited by the refusal to question the ultimate superiority of that particular faith. Many an exposition of Buddhism by a Christian scholar or devotee ends with the conclusion that Buddhism is good 'so far as it goes'. As the Catholic Truth Society pamphlet on Buddhism by de La Vallée Poussin concludes: 'It must nevertheless be admitted, even by the most biased Western theoreticians, that Buddhist thought attained a very high summit of religious speculation'. Generous in its context, one supposes, but hardly an acknowledgment that about a third of the religious world has found that 'speculation' supremely adequate as a guide for religious life, without any reference whatever to Christianity over the centuries.

There are interesting examples of local and cultural ideas being put forward as religious ideals. Following the apocryphal story of the Buddha in a previous life, a Chinese of the Liang Dynasty, one Ta-shin, persuaded his wives and children to be sold as slaves to raise money for famine victims. After this 'self-sacrifice', moreover, he suggested burning himself to death as an offering to the Three Treasures of the Buddha, Dharma and Sangha - to benefit all beings! Such misplaced 'sacrifice' is entirely contrary to the Dharma and yet was accepted widely as being 'pious' amongst Buddhists.

Other misconceptions of the teachings of their faith were to gain currency amongst Christians also. As Brother David points out: 'For a Jew at the time of Jesus, Son of God did not mean physical offspring of God. That would have been utter blasphemy for all early Christians who were Jews. Jesus himself would have been devastated by the very idea of an offspring of God. When he referred to God as Father, he spoke the language of Jewish religion. There was no hint at something like Zeus who goes around and sires offspring left and right... A parallel expression is Son of Peace. That doesn't mean an offspring of peace. It means someone who is perfectly peaceful... Son of Man meant human. Son of God meant perfectly divine. Hold these two together and you have an early Christology'.

When we have a willingness to dig for the real roots and the real meanings of religions, especially those of the theistic Christian and the atheistic Buddhist faiths, and a willingness to question and discard accretions which have been accepted for long periods as integral to the faiths, then, and only then will meaningful dialogue be possible. That there is a more fundamental ground where religions meet is evident to some people now, and if there is to be a future for religion generally that ground
must be sought with determination.

Who finds the common ground sought? In 'The God You Touch', Ann Belford Ulanov makes an important point often overlooked by starry-eyed Buddhist converts: 'Claiming the ego is important. The simple truth is that we cannot go beyond it until we have first arrived there, cannot transcend it if we have not found it, cannot go out of it in an askesis of disidentification and oblation until we have first possessed it'. The facile statement that there is is no ego, often made by Buddhists who ought to know better, needs to be replaced by the acceptance that the ego is real enough, on this plane on which we live, but that there is another dimension in which it can be subsumed. Brother David gets the point better than many. In 'Who is Jesus Christ for Us Today?' he says: 'Truth is ultimately not a truth which we can grasp, but the truth that grasps us; reality that lays hold of us. We give ourselves over to the truth to the extent to which we expose ourselves to reality'. Or, as he says elsewhere: 'If Jesus Christ is to be relevant for us today, he has to be relevant to all religions'.

This is one of the books now appearing which repay close study and much thought. The time for platitudes is past. The time has come for the courage to look fearlessly at all our beliefs and see how they stand up to our present knowledge and our actual experience.

Jack Austin


Within the field of Buddhist Studies a new focus of interest has recently appeared. Known generally as East-West Psychology, contributors to it are attempting to compare, contrast, evaluate and sometimes synthesise with Western psychology, views of the human mind emanating not only from Buddhism but also from Hinduism, Taoism and other Eastern religions. This field is not so far a fully transcultural psychology, however, since it restricts itself to the mainline cultures of India, China, Japan, Tibet and S.E.Asia, omitting the thought systems of more local vernacular philosophies, shamanic ideas for example. Buddhism, moreover, a favoured source for many of the discussions and this is clearly due to the intellectual quality of its psycho-philosophy.

Recent works in this field include studies of the social and historical anchorage of Eastern ideas about the mind and the way they contribute to a psychology interpreted primarily as a Western discipline¹, a volume of essays relating humanistic psychology to Eastern perspectives², another discussing the relations between Western psychotherapies and Buddhism³ and a companion work focussing primarily on the relation between Buddhist thought and Western identity theory and the way in which practical applications of such a perspective may be influential in contemporary social change⁴. It may well be argued, however, that the first work in this genre was that of Alan Watts⁵ in 1961.

The volume reviewed here appeared early in this sequence and takes yet another line, a rigorous comparison between a set of precisely delineated Buddhist themes and their parallel treatments by Western thinkers. This is not an easy book, for there has been no attempt to write at a level appropriate to the intelligent layman whether Buddhistically or psychologically inclined. Rather, we have here a set of essays which, while exhibiting scholarship, acumen and enthusiasm, read like a set of private letters between professors in a language that never attempts a simple clarification or to eschew jargon. The result is that few who pick up this book will either understand it or persist with it. And this is a pity because the work is an important endeavour to examine parallels, contrasts and problems in the hermeneutics of shades of meaning in an East-West dialogue of serious academic integrity.

The editor adopts an unfortunately minimalist role, for he provides no introduction to the major sections into which
the text is divided and no rationale for the organisation of the work as a whole. Each essay simply stands for itself. Prof. Katz does, however, contribute a short and quite sharply worded preface in which he argues that the Western field of study called 'Buddhism' amounts to a 'reflection of a pernicious cultural imperialism' which, like 'Orientalism', holds Asia as inarticulate, monolithic, passive and reactionary - a nostalgia in fact for treating traditional cultures as elements in a bygone political scenario. Such geographically dictated parameters, he argues, lead to an avoidance of any real cultural dialogue. One can see what he means: classes of devout children in Christian public schools being taught 'Buddhism' by fundamentalist schoolmasters - or university students taught by rationalist humanists or survivors from the age of logical positivism.

Buddhist ideas are certainly far more than a cultural curiosity requiring occasional handwaving, but to separate them out and embed them in disciplines like 'Philosophy' or 'Psychology' so dependent on pre-existing Western paradigms leads to a different problem. Katz tells us that this is a book about psychology not Buddhism and thereby tries to assimilate Buddhism to a system of thought already encompassed and managed within a Western tradition.

There are two mistakes here. Firstly, Western psychology is by no means an integrated subject with a clear cut basis in theory (like Biology or Chemistry for example); there are a host of alternative and often conflicting orientations circling about a bio-medical core that some far out practitioners prefer to ignore. Secondly, Buddhist psycho-philosophy is itself a large enough system of thought to take on Western psychology in debate on any of its main tenets. One might even attempt to assimilate Western psychological thought within a Buddhist basis.

Contrary to Katz, I believe this book actually makes the case for a careful, non-comparative, teaching of Buddhism (not of course as a catechism or ideological programme) in order to present Western students with a comprehensive view prior to comparative elucidation in relation to Western ideas. After all, as a psychological perspective, Buddhism, being 2,500 years old, is the elder brother here.

The contributions to this volume are grouped in four successive sections: S. Asian Theravāda, Japanese, Sanskrit and Tibetan Buddhism, an ordering which seems geographically meaningless and historically misleading. The introduction by Chogyam Trungpa Rinpoché then tells us: 'Considered from the viewpoint of Buddhist psychological tradition, there is something missing in the Western approach. This missing element...is the acknowledgement of the primacy of immediate experience.' True to form the book then plunges into unredeemed academism.

The articles range over a wide set of topics. Buddhism is related to a number of Western concerns none of which would, however, be described as 'core' psychology in any British University: psychoanalysis and the Pāli Nikāyas, Jungian analysis and the life of the Buddha, the concept of ātma and the Buddha's enlightenment as selbstverwichtung, Hume, Spinoza and the Buddhist view of emotions, Horsey and Japanese Buddhism, the meaning of death in existential Phenomenology and the Sōtō Zen of Dōgen, Double bind theory and Prasangā, Yogācāra and holography, rdzogs chen and Heidegger's Daseinanalyse, and the 'feminine' in Tantra and Jung.

Each of these papers is a valuable contribution to the hermeneutic project necessarily engaged upon whenever a Western academic attempts an interpretation of Buddhist ideas from within his/her own paradigm. For those equipped to read them these essays are provocative, informative and interesting. There is, however, a prevailing attempt to bring Buddhist ideas within the purileus of a Western equivalent. Often these somewhat biased understandings of Buddhism seem to lead to rather trivial reductions of the sort to which Western thinking is only too prone. Only two pieces, by Masefield and DeMartino, control their comparative drive sufficiently to present a truly in depth account of a Buddhist point of view.

The problems inherent in the comparative approach are well discussed by Steven Heine at the end of his stimulating essay on the concept of death in Heidegger, Freud, Sartre and Dōgen. Heine remarks wisely: 'If some modern methodology or terminology is to be used in analysing Dōgen then it is imperative to clarify presuppositionally which ones are appropriate and for what reasons....The fact that no Western standpoint is adequate in examining Dōgen suggests the need for exploring a variety of inte-
prestive models to uncover his view without obfuscating its com-
plexity, reducing it to or identifying it with any particular
framework, or unacknowledgingly superimposing that stance on
his'.'

Heine goes on to ask whether the fact that Dōgen's account
evades assimilation by the thought of these major Western think-
ers implies a 'fundamentally more comprehensive and univer-
salizable outlook than any of the Western thinkers' or whether
it implies there are ambiguities to be re-examined. Possibly,
he says, Dōgen has a flexibility arising from a deeper founda-
tion which exposes the partialities of Freud, Heidegger and
Sartre.

Such honest self-criticism would not be amiss among those
enthusiastic advocates of Jungian or other Western perspectives
too often taken implicitly and without an argued justification
to have global significance. Certainly, Western psychologists
closer to the core of contemporary psychology would approve such
care.

John H. Crook

1 A.C.Peramjpe, D.Y.P.Ho and R.W.Rieber (ed.) Asian Contributions to Psycholo-
gy.New York 1988
2 J.Welwood (ed.) Awakening the Heart. East/West Approaches to Psychotherapy
3 G.Claxton (ed.) Beyond Therapy. The impact of Eastern religions on psycholo-
gical theory and practice. London 1986
4 J.H.Crook and D.Fontana (ed.) Space in Mind. East-West Psychology and Contem-
porary Buddhism. Shaftesbury 1990
5 A.Watts Psychotherapy East and West. New York 1961

Buddhism and American Thinkers. Ed. by Kenneth K.Inada and Nolan

The fifth of these nine essays, by Inada, studies the concept of
šānyāga and reveals the fundamental difference between Buddhist
and scientific thought. There is a facile distinction drawn in
others of these papers between Western or Anglo-European (Hall's
term) and Eastern or Asiatic 'culture', which ignores the multi-
plicity of philosophical systems on both sides of the divide, wher-

over the line is drawn. Even the mere fact of interest in Buddhism
at all marks off the eight American philosophers writing here
as belonging to a limited section of such people. Nakamura rep-
resents their counterpart in Japan. Inada is quite clearly of Euro-
pean science, now a worldwide phenomenon, and his most suggestive
comparison occurs in the paragraph overlapping pp.61-2. Šūga
is the Sanskrit word for nought and emptiness. In Buddhist thought
it is used for a highly abstract quality of things, leading to a
proper understanding of the world, but by an extraordinary
and lengthy historical journey became the instrument in Europe
of the decimal notation and of scientific calculation. Inada
makes the point that is most inadequately summed up by saying
that just as numbers have meaning only against the background
of no number, so empirical experience has meaning only against
the background of experience empty of sensation. Neither scien-
tific knowledge nor sensation has any life of its own, but is the
background, the sine qua non of life. In both cases it comes
as a great difficulty to think of nothing positively as such.

The European philosopher most referred to in these essays
is A.N.Whitehead. He could write such things as 'everything is
everywhere at all times'. Common English usage just didn't let
him write 'everything is everywhere everywhere'. Such a sentence
strikes most European thinkers as obscure or self-contradictory
but sounds perfectly sensible, even obvious, to a Buddhist thinker.
The mutual misunderstanding arises from the very nature of know-
ledge which distills from the flow of sensation nearly repeating
patterns. Science concentrates on the patterns and think of the
world as a sort of still life painting of these patterns; Buddhism
sees these patterns as empty of meaning until realised
in experience. The underlying common factor is the instinctive
longing for permanence which built up scientific theories in
Europe and drove the Buddha from riches and power to an enlight-
ened view of the unchanging varieties of life. Whitehead, with
his process philosophy and feeling that science missed something
out, approached some way towards a Buddhist position even as
he largely alienated himself from the mainstream of Western philo-
osophy. Incredibly, histories of modern philosophy often only
refer to him as joint author (with Bertrand Russell) of the
Principia Mathematica.
Another thread running through these essays is the current vogue of ecumenism, that the world is one community; that no one tradition has the monopoly of truth and all would benefit by listening to each other. Considering the missionary confidence, the scientific certainties and the European colonialism of the nineteenth century, and bearing in mind the longing for certainty referred to above, this marks a revolution in European thought. Inada sketches the growth of interest in and understanding of Buddhism in Europe and America, reaching a fruitful exchange of scholarly interest at the second East-West Philosophers' Conference in Honolulu 1949. Jacobsen goes so far as to maintain that local cultures imprison and blind their adherents into a narrow understanding, impregnating their very language with false assumptions. Nakamura, from a Japanese point of view, sees in this modern emphasis on intercommunication as basic to the realization of the true self, which is incomplete or non-existent by itself, being largely composed of relations with other selves. It is by sharing each other's concerns, joys and happiness that we achieve our full nature, and by no other way.

McDaniel cites the opinion of Hisamatsu (a Japanese philosopher) that Mahayana Buddhism needs to go beyond individual enlightenment as the aim of student and teacher and consider the social factor. Applying the principle of the empty concept only realised in the momentary experience to the concept of the self, he contrasts the cognitive historical person with the true self which always and only exists in the immediate present. Enlightenment is not something that happens suddenly to a person, but is a constant condition of the here and now selves that add up to such a person. This should lead to some thought of what sort of a world Zen Buddhism would hope to see emerging if it took the lead.

Miller, inspired by Henry Nelson Wieman's Man's Ultimate Commitment (1985), gives an account of the book. Wieman would make an empirical science of religion, whose truth is vouched for by the degree to which it produces joy. This has to include a full realization of 'the dark realities of life' which is his phrase for all the suffering that fills the world. Dogmatic religious, as they exist, are only partly good, being also partly evil. Evil in that they divide people from people and prevent that communication of ideas that can lead to each individual's creation of his highest nature, the condition for the emergence of real joy.

Chi's essay is a successful summary of his book, Buddhist Formal Logic (reviewed by me in BSR 3,1, 1986). Both book and essay point out how Dignaga's Hetucakradamaru from fifth century India goes beyond Aristotle and provides corrections to Principia Mathematica (1910-3), despite the brevity of the former and the extreme length of the latter. This purely academic exercise is a typical modern philosophical one, but he makes it relevant to the purpose of this book by pointing out the loss to human thought when obstructed by poor communications, whether cultural, distance or language. The same problems can be studied in different places at different times, revealing the similarity of human thought processes, which can lack the interfertilization that makes for completeness.

In BSR 1,1 (1983-4) a review was published of Buddhism and Western Philosophy. It contained twice as many essays as in this book, only one of which was written by an author who appears also in this one, namely, Inada; so there is no lack of American philosophers interested in Buddhist thought. I don't think the substitution of 'thinkers' for 'philosophers' helps at all (since we all think!). The purpose of the substitution is to avoid the use of the word philosophy whose field of study has become so blurred and obscure as put people off, but it still gives some indication of the sort of things they write about. Human needs are broadly the same everywhere at all times and the problems that the Buddha sought to solve were the same as those the Greek philosophers tackled. In language like 'What is your philosophy of life?' the key word still refers to a way of thinking about life and acting on it. But what is called modern philosophy has become so intellectual, so academic, almost esoteric, that it has lost touch with the problem of how to face the world for the best. It is the cold and lifeless nature of modern Western philosophy that these contributors seek to transcend under the vibrant appeal of Buddhism to all who feel they have lost touch with the common glories of human life.

Alban Cooke
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